No. 241 Strategic Forum June 2009 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss Diverging Roads: 21st-century U.S.-Thai Defense Relations by Lewis M. Stern 1990s. The close and friendly relationship Key Points America’s involvement in the Vietnam War between leaders has evolved, if only as the deepened the alliance and turned Thailand result of natural selection’s insidious impact into an indispensable ally that hosted a mas- The 175th anniversary of the signing of on both sides. The practical basis for military sive U.S. presence based on U.S.-built airfields, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 2008 was interoperability and the strategic thinking at an important deepwater port at Sattahip, and seized by both Thailand and the United States the core of the relationship have also changed. a military communications infrastructure that as a reason for celebrating a long and mutu- All this has happened without the emergence became a critical support and logistics base for ally beneficial treaty alliance. This alliance of an effective mechanism for restructuring has been defined by the shared though not the practical interactions that constitute the conducting the war in Vietnam. uncomplicated commitment to democracy and military-to-military relationship, and without From the early 1950s to the end of the human rights, and the common interest in free the intellectual investment necessary to infuse Vietnam War, the Royal Thai Armed Forces and fair trade, all of which inform the tradition new strategic meaning into the relationship. received U.S. military training, equipment, of bilateral cooperation. counterinsurgency training, arms, ammuni- For the last 50 years, Thailand supported Defense Cooperation tion, assistance with road building and infra- a continuous U.S. presence in the region, structure development in remote areas, and offered unfettered access to port and airfield Security issues were the core motivat- vehicles that helped build Thailand’s police facilities to the American military, and provided ing force behind Washington’s commitment to force and its military’s special operations unparalleled training opportunities for U.S. preserve Thailand’s sovereignty and dignity at capabilities. The relationship effectively lapsed forces. Since the 1980s, Thailand has hosted and the end of World War II—even as our British in the face of America’s diminished inter- participated in strategically important exercise and French allies sought to treat the kingdom est in overseas commitments at the end of the opportunities, which have given substance to a as a belligerent that should have been occu- Vietnam War and in the aftermath of the Thai continuous Thai commitment to interoperability pied and compelled to pay reparations for its decision to limit U.S. military access to facili- with the U.S. military. wartime alliance with Japan. The rationale ties following the unilateral American decision Thailand’s security equities paralleled for the postwar alliance with the United States to respond to the seizing of the Mayaguez evolving U.S. defense priorities as transnational was the common commitment to opposing without consulting with Bangkok on the use threats in the 1980s and 1990s began to over- and containing the threat of communism. of Utapao airbase. Thailand’s importance as a whelm the resources of all regional players. The Manila Treaty that created the logistical center for America’s extended pres- These threats also began to tax the ability of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), ence in the region diminished. Bangkok’s reli- individual allies and partners outside the region and the reaffirmation of the U.S. security com- ance on Washington’s commitment to defend to respond to burgeoning requirements for new defense and security capabilities, modernized mitment to Thailand in the 1962 Rusk-Thanat the kingdom waivered. Thailand sought to hardware, and new strategic thinking. agreement, provided the legal basis for the fulfill its security requirements by negotiat- The U.S.-Thai defense relationship, alliance and focused U.S. and Thai attention ing a normalized relationship with China; however, has been in a long, awkward on responding to the security threats posed by Beijing’s end to sponsorship of the Communist transitional moment since at least the late external communist threats from China and Party of Thailand, and China’s willingness Vietnam and the internal communist insurgency. to confront Vietnam’s aggressive behavior in No. 241, June 2009 Strategic Forum 1 addition to Washington’s own evolving rela- Union and the finale to the Cold War, and keeping capabilities, disaster response prepa- tionship with China, changed security realities the regional activism that focused the ener- ration, and counterterrorism training. in the region. gies of the United Nations on resolving the The presumptive alternatives to U.S. Vietnam’s 1978 invasion of Cambodia Cambodian problem eliminated the exter- largess (diminished as it may have been) and installation of a Vietnamese-backed gov- nal security threats that had motivated the offered far less satisfactory packages, mini- ernment led to the reinvigoration of U.S.-Thai Thai-U.S. condominium of defense and secu- mal followup support, inferior training, and defense relations and security cooperation. rity interests, and prodded Thailand to reor- equipment that the Thai military was not at ganize the strategic basis for its key rela- all prepared to embrace as a substitute for tionships. Trade and commerce came to the American-made military hardware. In spite American commitment fore. American commitment to invigorating of this fact, Thailand became less willing to to invigorating democracy democracy in Southeast Asia brought with it a depend exclusively on an identity of secu- in Southeast Asia range of foreign and defense policy standards. rity and defense visions with the United States In 1991, the United States responded to a mil- The tipping point in the relationship came brought with it a range itary coup by suspending economic and mili- in the mid-1990s. At that juncture, Thailand of foreign and defense tary assistance. In 1992, in the face of Thai began to feel that it had as much to give to policy standards military violence against peaceful protes- the relationship as the United States could tors, the United States suspended Cobra Gold bring to the table. Sometime between the exercises. Thereafter, American laws required first Persian Gulf War and the late 1990s, The United States invested in the profession- the cessation of economic and security assis- Thailand’s interests in defense and security alization and modernization of Thailand’s tance in response to extra-constitutional acts terms had grown complex enough so that armed forces through strategic military sales against duly elected governments. the U.S. relationship was but one variable in and the beginning of a generation of joint During the course of the last two Thailand’s calculations of its interests. and combined training exercises that had as decades, the United States has gone from In that context, a string of increasingly their centerpiece the annual Cobra Gold exer- accelerating deliveries of “friendship price” intractable bilateral conflicts over strate- cise that began in 1981. Washington became ammunition to Thailand in the 1980s to gic judgments, bilateral trade and commer- enmeshed in a series of strategic agreements underscore commitment to its security dur- cial relations, regional commitments, and intended to deepen American involvement in ing the conflict in Cambodia, to enforcing global policy issues entered into the calculus the defense of Thailand, including an agree- elaborate policies in the 1990s aimed at pre- of U.S.-Thai relations in a fashion that under- ment to create a War Reserve Stockpile, the venting the introduction of new defense tech- mined Thai confidence in the American first U.S. stockpile outside of the North Atlantic nologies into Southeast Asia in a fashion that security umbrella and spurred recognition Treaty Organization and South Korea. required Washington to explain why the Thai in Washington and Bangkok of the need to However, Thailand’s “frontline state” role could not purchase certain military technol- define a means of responding to new secu- in the effort to resist Vietnam’s continued occu- ogies from the United States, such as verti- rity challenges and transnational threats. The pation of Cambodia, and the prominent part cal launch capabilities or beyond-visual-range U.S.-Thai relationship has been tested by a played by the core members of the Association missile innovations. The United States has number of legislatively mandated reactions to for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in defin- gone from scrambling to respond positively to Thai military coups against elected govern- ing the basis for a peaceful resolution of the mid-1980 requests for replacement F–16s from ments, by decisions taken in Washington that Cambodian conflict, plus China’s willingness to Thailand, to managing failed sales of next- suggested to Thailand a lack of gratitude for actively provide lethal assistance to the Khmer generation fighter jets, the F/A–18, in the mid- Bangkok’s side of the alliance relationship, Rouge (KR) through Thailand, changed the 1990s. And the United States has gone from a failure to appreciate the historical depth of shape of defense realities in the region and pro- special arrangements to provide tailored assis-