No. 241 Strategic Forum June 2009 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss
Diverging Roads: 21st-century U.S.-Thai Defense Relations by Lewis M. Stern
1990s. The close and friendly relationship Key Points America’s involvement in the Vietnam War between leaders has evolved, if only as the deepened the alliance and turned Thailand result of natural selection’s insidious impact into an indispensable ally that hosted a mas- The 175th anniversary of the signing of on both sides. The practical basis for military sive U.S. presence based on U.S.-built airfields, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 2008 was interoperability and the strategic thinking at an important deepwater port at Sattahip, and seized by both Thailand and the United States the core of the relationship have also changed. a military communications infrastructure that as a reason for celebrating a long and mutu- All this has happened without the emergence became a critical support and logistics base for ally beneficial treaty alliance. This alliance of an effective mechanism for restructuring has been defined by the shared though not the practical interactions that constitute the conducting the war in Vietnam. uncomplicated commitment to democracy and military-to-military relationship, and without From the early 1950s to the end of the human rights, and the common interest in free the intellectual investment necessary to infuse Vietnam War, the Royal Thai Armed Forces and fair trade, all of which inform the tradition new strategic meaning into the relationship. received U.S. military training, equipment, of bilateral cooperation. counterinsurgency training, arms, ammuni- For the last 50 years, Thailand supported Defense Cooperation tion, assistance with road building and infra- a continuous U.S. presence in the region, structure development in remote areas, and offered unfettered access to port and airfield Security issues were the core motivat- vehicles that helped build Thailand’s police facilities to the American military, and provided ing force behind Washington’s commitment to force and its military’s special operations unparalleled training opportunities for U.S. preserve Thailand’s sovereignty and dignity at capabilities. The relationship effectively lapsed forces. Since the 1980s, Thailand has hosted and the end of World War II—even as our British in the face of America’s diminished inter- participated in strategically important exercise and French allies sought to treat the kingdom est in overseas commitments at the end of the opportunities, which have given substance to a as a belligerent that should have been occu- Vietnam War and in the aftermath of the Thai continuous Thai commitment to interoperability pied and compelled to pay reparations for its decision to limit U.S. military access to facili- with the U.S. military. wartime alliance with Japan. The rationale ties following the unilateral American decision Thailand’s security equities paralleled for the postwar alliance with the United States to respond to the seizing of the Mayaguez evolving U.S. defense priorities as transnational was the common commitment to opposing without consulting with Bangkok on the use threats in the 1980s and 1990s began to over- and containing the threat of communism. of Utapao airbase. Thailand’s importance as a whelm the resources of all regional players. The Manila Treaty that created the logistical center for America’s extended pres- These threats also began to tax the ability of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), ence in the region diminished. Bangkok’s reli- individual allies and partners outside the region and the reaffirmation of the U.S. security com- ance on Washington’s commitment to defend to respond to burgeoning requirements for new defense and security capabilities, modernized mitment to Thailand in the 1962 Rusk-Thanat the kingdom waivered. Thailand sought to hardware, and new strategic thinking. agreement, provided the legal basis for the fulfill its security requirements by negotiat- The U.S.-Thai defense relationship, alliance and focused U.S. and Thai attention ing a normalized relationship with China; however, has been in a long, awkward on responding to the security threats posed by Beijing’s end to sponsorship of the Communist transitional moment since at least the late external communist threats from China and Party of Thailand, and China’s willingness Vietnam and the internal communist insurgency. to confront Vietnam’s aggressive behavior in
No. 241, June 2009 Strategic Forum 1 addition to Washington’s own evolving rela- Union and the finale to the Cold War, and keeping capabilities, disaster response prepa- tionship with China, changed security realities the regional activism that focused the ener- ration, and counterterrorism training. in the region. gies of the United Nations on resolving the The presumptive alternatives to U.S. Vietnam’s 1978 invasion of Cambodia Cambodian problem eliminated the exter- largess (diminished as it may have been) and installation of a Vietnamese-backed gov- nal security threats that had motivated the offered far less satisfactory packages, mini- ernment led to the reinvigoration of U.S.-Thai Thai-U.S. condominium of defense and secu- mal followup support, inferior training, and defense relations and security cooperation. rity interests, and prodded Thailand to reor- equipment that the Thai military was not at ganize the strategic basis for its key rela- all prepared to embrace as a substitute for tionships. Trade and commerce came to the American-made military hardware. In spite American commitment fore. American commitment to invigorating of this fact, Thailand became less willing to to invigorating democracy democracy in Southeast Asia brought with it a depend exclusively on an identity of secu- in Southeast Asia range of foreign and defense policy standards. rity and defense visions with the United States In 1991, the United States responded to a mil- The tipping point in the relationship came brought with it a range itary coup by suspending economic and mili- in the mid-1990s. At that juncture, Thailand of foreign and defense tary assistance. In 1992, in the face of Thai began to feel that it had as much to give to policy standards military violence against peaceful protes- the relationship as the United States could tors, the United States suspended Cobra Gold bring to the table. Sometime between the exercises. Thereafter, American laws required first Persian Gulf War and the late 1990s, The United States invested in the profession- the cessation of economic and security assis- Thailand’s interests in defense and security alization and modernization of Thailand’s tance in response to extra-constitutional acts terms had grown complex enough so that armed forces through strategic military sales against duly elected governments. the U.S. relationship was but one variable in and the beginning of a generation of joint During the course of the last two Thailand’s calculations of its interests. and combined training exercises that had as decades, the United States has gone from In that context, a string of increasingly their centerpiece the annual Cobra Gold exer- accelerating deliveries of “friendship price” intractable bilateral conflicts over strate- cise that began in 1981. Washington became ammunition to Thailand in the 1980s to gic judgments, bilateral trade and commer- enmeshed in a series of strategic agreements underscore commitment to its security dur- cial relations, regional commitments, and intended to deepen American involvement in ing the conflict in Cambodia, to enforcing global policy issues entered into the calculus the defense of Thailand, including an agree- elaborate policies in the 1990s aimed at pre- of U.S.-Thai relations in a fashion that under- ment to create a War Reserve Stockpile, the venting the introduction of new defense tech- mined Thai confidence in the American first U.S. stockpile outside of the North Atlantic nologies into Southeast Asia in a fashion that security umbrella and spurred recognition Treaty Organization and South Korea. required Washington to explain why the Thai in Washington and Bangkok of the need to However, Thailand’s “frontline state” role could not purchase certain military technol- define a means of responding to new secu- in the effort to resist Vietnam’s continued occu- ogies from the United States, such as verti- rity challenges and transnational threats. The pation of Cambodia, and the prominent part cal launch capabilities or beyond-visual-range U.S.-Thai relationship has been tested by a played by the core members of the Association missile innovations. The United States has number of legislatively mandated reactions to for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in defin- gone from scrambling to respond positively to Thai military coups against elected govern- ing the basis for a peaceful resolution of the mid-1980 requests for replacement F–16s from ments, by decisions taken in Washington that Cambodian conflict, plus China’s willingness to Thailand, to managing failed sales of next- suggested to Thailand a lack of gratitude for actively provide lethal assistance to the Khmer generation fighter jets, the F/A–18, in the mid- Bangkok’s side of the alliance relationship, Rouge (KR) through Thailand, changed the 1990s. And the United States has gone from a failure to appreciate the historical depth of shape of defense realities in the region and pro- special arrangements to provide tailored assis- the relationship, and a reluctance to act in vided the basis for a Sino-Thai alliance. In 1986, tance requested by Thai army chiefs (such honor of the friendship instead of in response China began supplying Thailand with a wide as heavy engineering equipment support for to economic calculations and policy inter- range of military equipment including armored General Chawalit Yongchaiyut’s Greening of ests. Serious issues in the relationship have personnel carriers, artillery, and missiles. Isarn program) to efforts in the late 1990s and chipped away at the friendship: Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia early 2000s aimed at shoehorning Thailand in 1989, the end of the war in Cambodia, the into legislatively funded global capability- ■ The 1992–1993 accusations that unceremonious withering away of the Soviet building programs in such areas as peace- Thailand was surreptitiously supporting KR efforts to thwart regional peacekeeping ini- Lewis M. Stern is a Visiting Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense tiatives probably prolonged and extended KR University. The author thanks two colleagues, Mr. George Thomas and Captain David Chase, USN, for reviewing the reach into Cambodia and provoked U.S. legis- paper, offering cogent suggestions, and helping to invigorate the section on policy recommendations. lative initiatives that threatened the cutoff of
2 Strategic Forum No. 241, June 2009 U.S. military assistance if Thailand persisted In September-October, the Thai government certification to Congress that a democrati- in trading with the KR at a rate and volume trimmed the military’s budget and ordered a cally elected government had taken office in that, according to the legislation, provided review of procurement plans. By that time, the Thailand before U.S. assistance under the the money guerrillas needed to buy arms on Thai air force plan for a second-generation Foreign Operations Appropriations Act could the open market and thereby enabled the KR fighter had run into serious financing problems. be resumed. to thwart the United Nations effort to disarm In October 1997, in the face of the baht deval- ■ Presidential intervention was required the competing Cambodian factions. uation, the Royal Thai Armed Forces submit- once the Thai government put the decision ■ The long-dwindling support for sus- ted a revised payment schedule for the LOA and regarding the U.S. proposal to position stocks tained levels of foreign military assistance, asked the Defense Security Assistance Agency of equipment in the Adaman Sea to their including International Military Education and to consider ways to restructure the program prime minister. Training funding levels, eroded Thai military without impacting on the delivery schedule. ■ Presidential authority had to be sought confidence in the alliance with Washington. On December 19, 1997, Prime Minister Chuan in the instance of the 1998 decision to elim- ■ Congressional challenges to Leekpai wrote to President Clinton asking for inate Thai liability for the F/A–18 contract, Thailand’s record regarding trafficking in U.S. Government agreement to a rollover of pay- as well as the Defense Department’s plan people, human rights, and support for democ- ments for the arms procurement program of the to purchase the aircraft for foreign military racy soured Thailand’s enthusiasm for the Thai armed forces until the economy stabilized. sales (FMS) purposes, largely because of the bilateral relationship. Within months, the sale would fail, the United administration’s obligation to ask Congress for ■ The Clinton administration decision States would buy back the eight aircraft, and the the necessary authority for the $250 million to refrain from decisive steps in the aftermath issue of sunk costs invested in the production price tag for the eight aircraft. of the economic crisis of 1997 represented a line would become a major sticking point in the real blow to the Thai government. bilateral relationship. In all three issues, each side walked ■ Legislatively mandated cessations of Third, the legislatively mandated cessation away with less than they hoped to get out economic and security assistance in the wake of security and economic assistance caused fur- of their treaty ally, meaning that the weight of acts against duly elected Thai govern- ther erosion of the relationship. On September of the Presidency and the prime minister’s ments have cut into the vigor with which U.S. 19, 2006, Thailand’s army seized control of the power were not sufficient to move the issues defense and security initiatives are embraced government and declared martial law. Coup to a mutually satisfactory decision. The indi- by Thailand, and diminished the Thai mili- leaders suspended the constitution and most vidual equities of the two countries were, on tary’s willingness to rely on such assistance branches of the government. Section 508 of the these matters, far apart, the differences hard as its unique source of hardware and support. U.S. Foreign Operations Appropriations Act pro- to breech, and the stakes for each country sig- hibited obligating or expending funds for a for- nificant enough that policy positions were not Three Benchmark Issues eign government deposed by decree or mili- easily modified, even with the involvement of tary coup. U.S. Government displeasure with the the highest levels. Three major benchmark issues in U.S.- coup, Washington’s vocal concern over the coup In each of these issues, significant finan- Thai defense relations in the last 15 years group’s willingness to invoke emergency powers cial stakes were involved, and complex legisla- have indicated the limits of cooperation, to quash public demonstrations of support for tion constrained the U.S. Government maneu- defined Thailand’s expectations, and shaped the deposed prime minister, and Washington’s verability, underscoring Washington’s limited Bangkok’s thinking about the parameters of public criticism of the interim government’s ability to tailor responses in a fashion that defense cooperation with Washington. unwillingness or inability to drive forward more would redound to Thailand’s favor. In each First, the 1994 U.S. proposal to preposition rapidly with plans for drafting a new constitu- instance, the Thai military and government military equipment in Thai territorial waters, tion, holding a referendum, and conducting a came to look at the U.S. response as a litmus and Thailand’s rejection of that initiative, new election began a serious downward spiral test of the bilateral defense relationship. In all underscored the shifts in balance of dividends in the relationship as the senior Thai military three instances, massively different depart- that had powered the relationship forward for officials and foreign policy managers wondered mental level equities were at stake within the decades, and provides a perspective on growing why they were coming in for inordinate negative U.S. Government. By the time the government divergence in what had long been an unques- attention from a treaty ally. arrived at a decision point and devised a strat- tioned common strategic starting point.1 In each of these issues, on the U.S. egy for each issue, it was already necessary to Second, the 1997 failure of the F/A–18 side, a Presidential decision was required to deploy serious measures to counter the impact sale impacted on the way the United States approve the Department of Defense proposed of these issues on the relationship. conducted defense sales with Thailand for course of action: In each of these three cases, the Thai many years. A U.S. Government letter of offer side balked at a one-size-fits-all approach to and acceptance (LOA) for eight F/A–18 air- ■ Following the 1996 and the 2006 the relationship and riled at the end of the era craft was offered to Thailand on April 2, 1996. coups, American law required Presidential of friendship prices and special treatment. The
No. 241, June 2009 Strategic Forum 3 Thai policy bureaucracies responded to these a staging area for pretests of defoliants that were begun to shift away from the identity of views on issues in diffuse ways, with no center of deci- ultimately deployed to Vietnam ignited a frenzy regional issues that sustained the coherence of the sionmaking gravity emerging. Various min- of press speculation, National Assembly interven- relationship in the post–Vietnam War decades. isterial level authorities eschewed a voice in tions, and government debate over culpability, U.S.-Thai relations transitioned in the context what many expected would ultimately become liability, and environmental and health impacts of a changing region where ever more sophisti- a National Assembly issue, or a prime minis- that loomed as a problem for the whole relation- cated multilateral interactions fulfilled immediate terial–level decision; Thailand’s governments ship. In early 1999, nothing rankled Bangkok defense and security needs. could not reshape these issues in a way that more than Washington’s support of the Canadian The strains in bilateral economic rela- might have avoided the potential collision candidate for the presidency of the World Trade tions resulting from trade and intellectual prop- course with U.S. interests. Organization (WTO), thus freezing out the Thai erty rights issues were paralleled by growing The U.S.-Thai relationship leveled off in candidate, Suphachai Phanitchaphak, the dep- difficulties in the security relationship. Some 1998 at a low ebb as a result of Thai percep- uty minister for economic affairs and minister of the elements of this evolution included the tions of Washington inaction in the face of of commerce. Beginning in April 1999, Thailand “graduation” of Thailand from status as an serious economic times for Bangkok. Though was increasingly inclined to publicly vent its FMS recipient, the suspension of security and the tone of the relationship remained for- extreme disappointment with how the United economic assistance following coups against mal, proper, and friendly, public opinion and States handled the WTO process of selecting a elected governments, and the U.S. inability to the views expressed by outspoken and influ- candidate for the next presidency. Suphachai’s satisfy Thai requests for military hardware at ential Thai commentators and legislators candidacy was viewed in Bangkok as an oppor- friendship prices. These and other variables, suggested that the reservoir of goodwill had tunity for Thailand to step out onto the world including changing regional alignments and dropped precipitously. Throughout the first stage. Thailand rejected the explanation that the reality of active efforts by a rising China to half of 1999, senior Thai generals, journal- influence Southeast Asia, have driven Bangkok ists, and academics remained perplexed as to to search for alternative sources of military what it was that Thailand had done to anger the U.S.-Thai relationship hardware, to question some elements of the Washington enough that it would stand by leveled off as a result security relationship with the United States, and allow Thailand to feel so much economic of Thai perceptions to contemplate procurement arrangements pain without stepping in to help. The Thai that did not necessarily accord with U.S. inter- of Washington military felt the economic pinch, and its con- ests, to be publicly more critical of elements of cerns escalated to a fever pitch over shortfalls inaction in the face American policy in the region, and to search for in accounts dedicated to managing FMS. of serious economic balance between independence and “proxim- Probably the most painful and bilater- times for Bangkok ity” to any single country. ally sensitive of these three benchmark issues Importantly, these growing pains have was Prime Minister Chuan’s effort to terminate not yet undermined bilateral security coopera- the F/A–18 sale. In his view, the contract to pur- U.S. positions were based on trade policy inter- tion or had a negative impact on U.S. access to chase the fighter was an irrational one. Indeed, ests, and as such should not negatively affect the critical facilities or the ability to conduct joint Chuan’s decision to press for a termination of bilateral relationship. Thai officials were increas- exercises. The Thai value the security relation- the F/A–18 sale was part of his commitment ingly convinced that the United States was the ship with the United States, but believe that to scrub the military budget and reverse what only hard line opposition to Suphachai. It was Thailand’s security is increasingly of marginal he saw as unnecessary weapons acquisitions. not until the middle of the year that an accept- interest to Washington. They understand that Even after the Presidential decision to release able alternative emerged, according to which the lion’s share of dividends (access and train- Thailand from further financial obligations in Suphachai would succeed the Canadian candi- ing opportunities) go to the United States and this contract, bad feelings remained within the date for the WTO presidency with a 2-year term believe that Washington has tended to take the Thai officer corps about the lengthy, excessively of his own. But even after the issue was at least relationship for granted. In instances where legalistic deliberations and the manner in which nominally put to rest, there was still a distinct Washington and Bangkok do not have a com- financial determinations overrode friendship aftertaste that impacted the bilateral relationship. monality of interest, or where Thailand does and the spirit of alliance cooperation—feelings not see its defense equities as being at stake, evidenced by audible Thai complaints about Evolving Relationship it has indeed become harder to get Thailand U.S. reliability as a treaty ally. to support U.S. positions. The increasing com- In this atmosphere, bilateral issues that In the first years of the 21st century, the U.S.- plexity of regional relations, and growing polit- would have been otherwise manageable were Thai relationship remained proper and posi- ical sophistication of the members of ASEAN in viewed as crisis points in the relationship. Issues tive, though it had clearly begun to evolve away diplomacy, have combined to yield a Thailand such as the late March 1999 discovery of a chem- from the enthusiastic and vigorous pro-American that does not feel the compunction to automat- ical spill at Hua Hin airport traced to autho- views that characterized Thailand’s link with the ically support U.S. positions on regional and rized U.S. use of that facility during the 1960s as United States during the Vietnam War, and had global challenges, to make contributions to
4 Strategic Forum No. 241, June 2009 international peacekeeping efforts at the level as the first among equal relationships cultivated New Roles the United States feels is appropriate, to sup- by Thailand. In Ambassador Krit’s words: port U.S. positions on regional arms procure- One way of looking at what Thailand ment issues, or to accommodate U.S. access [A]s a country caught up in a fast-chang- might mean by this is to review what and prepositioning requirements. ing geopolitical landscape, Thailand, as Bangkok may have in mind regard- Senior Thai officials had recognized has historically always been the case, must ing Burma. The Thai were one of the first that with the end of the Cold War, and the remain open to engagement and interac- responders to cyclone Nargis, which crip- emergence of a range of regional issues and tion with a spectrum of countries. Where pled Burma in 2008. They moved a C–130 transnational challenges that had seized the the United States fits in that spectrum into Rangoon early in the aftermath of the attention of the United States, Thailand in depends on its own actions. These actions cyclone’s deadly foray through the Irrawaddy particular and Southeast Asia more gener- should, however, not merely be a gesture Delta. Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej lent ally had receded in Washington’s ranking of goodwill, but they must come from the his voice to the international effort to nudge of foreign and defense policy priorities. Thai realization or indeed, cold strategic calcu- the Burmese military leadership to begin officials believed that the United States had lation of the United States’ own interests in issuing visas to international aid experts, and been slow to recognize the importance of Thailand and Southeast Asia.4 to allow aircraft into Burma with special- Southeast Asia in the face of the rapid emer- ists who could facilitate the distribution of gence of India in South Asia and the rise of Attempts to restore normal U.S.-Thai relief commodities. The Burmese rebuffed the China, and remiss at identifying the strategic defense and security relations, deepen the strate- international community, insisted that they relevance, increasing importance, and adapt- gic relationship, and sustain attention to capa- could handle the consequences of the cyclone, ability of ASEAN, which in some Asian minds bility development took place in the context of and continued to allow only select relief was well placed to serve as a bridge between diminished vigor in bilateral defense relations, flights by the United Nations and, beginning and among the emerging powers in the Thai distress over Washington’s inattentiveness, on May 9, the United States. Prime Minister region and a link between the two oceans.2 and the growing Thai sense that its own stra- Samak, initially snubbed by the junta, vis- Moreover, Bangkok’s vigorous commit- tegic interests would be better served by foreign ited Burma on May 14. He was instrumental ment to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and and defense relations with a range of countries in getting an agreement in principal from the the East Asia Dialogue, and the fact that for- beyond the United States. Senior U.S. defense Burmese to receive an ASEAN disaster assess- mer Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan, a distin- policy officials have told Thai military interlocu- ment team. Thailand worked closely with guished Thai diplomat, had assumed the posi- tors that the goal is to “renew” bilateral military Singapore in organizing the ASEAN effort tion of ASEAN Secretary General in early 2008, interactions, emphasize multilateral cooperation to press the Burmese toward flexibility on suggested to many Thai officials that Bangkok in maritime security, continue counterterror- relief flights and access for regional assess- is a “natural partner” for a reinvigorated U.S. ism cooperation, support Thai military transfor- ment teams and disaster response experts. relationship with the region. Thailand’s will- mation, and enhance Thailand’s humanitarian Thailand provided a staging area at Utapao ingness to adapt the showcase military exer- assistance and disaster response capabilities. for the U.S. Pacific Command joint task cise with the United States to reflect the evolv- To the Thai side, however, this sounds like force and accommodated the presence of the ing nature of relations in the region by adding little more than returning to the status quo ante. U.S. Agency for International Development more countries to the mix each year (including While that would be welcome in Thailand in Disaster Assistance Response Team. Moreover, Japan and China), and incorporating peace- terms of the resources, financial commitments, in late May, the Thai hosted the 27th annual keeping and disaster relief scenarios, coupled practical programs, military sales, and real Cobra Gold exercise, with a significant with Thailand’s readiness to serve as an anchor training that this would entail, it does not key humanitarian disaster response component for regional responses to natural disaster dem- into the perspective that Thailand is not merely to its command post dimension. onstrated during the 2004 tsunami, placed an old treaty ally and a convenient port of call. The Thai have long felt that they had Thailand in a particularly strategic position to Thailand believes that it is a significant player something to offer the United States in terms accomplish critical American goals, including with which the United States could do much to of perspectives regarding, and access to, the coping with the perceived tide of anti-American achieve strategically meaningful advantages in leadership of Burma. The Thai have urged sentiment in the Muslim countries of Southeast the region. The Thai have attempted to make flexibility, understanding, a certain amount Asia, as former Ambassador to Washington Krit clear that they have something to bring to the of accommodation, and real recognition Garnjana-Goonchorn has pointed out.3 Finally, table and that they welcome U.S. assistance and that the equation of power in Burma sug- the one critical point that Thai officials stressed packaged “capacity building” initiatives. But gests that the military will be in a leader- during 2007–2008 was that though the rela- Thailand needs to be seen as a regionally signifi- ship role for a long time. From the days of tionship with the United States was vigorous cant country poised to make real contributions to General Suchinda Kraprayoon’s close and and would thrive in the face of a renewed com- the vision of a peaceful, integrated, economically friendly relations with the original State Law mitment by Washington to reengage fully with vibrant Southeast Asia that is increasingly capable and Order Restoration Council leadership, the Thailand, it would no longer necessarily stand of managing new defense and security challenges. United States has rebuffed those views, which
No. 241, June 2009 Strategic Forum 5 struck a succession of U.S. administrations to stabilize the region. Senior Thai officials of Thailand’s continuing commitment to as deriving from individual relations between pointed out that China, Japan, and Korea had shared goals. However, while the relation- the Thai military and their Burmese counter- all played a galvanizing role in meetings with ship is sound and stable, there is a dimension parts. That Thai perspective, to Washington’s the region, but there has been no U.S.–ASEAN to it that bears ill-concealed scars from some way of thinking, placed a primacy on using summit in the 30-year life span of the orga- tough moments and difficult-to-manage these channels of communication to estab- nization, and the first glimmer of the idea issues that grow harder to heal with age. lish peace and quiet rather than determining for such a meeting derived from the ASEAN– Thailand’s preoccupation since the coup ways to press the Burmese toward the vision U.S. Enhanced Partnership, not the United of September 2006 with the complex issues of of a democratic state capable of conduct- States. Similarly, from the Thai perspective, national governance, political power, social ing free and fair elections, willing to achieve one shared by many ASEAN observers, the U.S. justice, stability, and the viability of demo- peace with the ethnic groups seeking inde- Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) and the cratic institutions has diverted Bangkok’s pendence, and prepared to allow the popula- ASEAN Cooperation Plan both derived their attention from the effective management of tion to engage in trade and commerce. primary inspiration from the 2002 meeting foreign policy without dulling the strategic It is not clear that the current Thai gov- of the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation value of the U.S.-Thai alliance, and without ernment is in a position to add more to the mix (APEC) meeting. ASEAN, as Surin Pitsuwan devaluing the strong economic partnership now, but it is clear that the Thai have grown puts it, is an afterthought to APEC. that makes bilateral trade and commerce so closer to the Singaporean view of how Burma Thailand and other regional coun- important to both Bangkok and Washington. should be managed in the ASEAN context 5 than tries viewed the U.S.–ASEAN relationship as It is not clear how the fundamental institutes to Washington’s perspective over the last 15 years a perfunctory expression of commitment to of democracy and the Thai monarchy will that placed a primacy on achieving the junta’s Southeast Asia and shared their confusion emerge from the bewildering contests between eventual replacement by a coalition of some sort about why the United States remained the domestic political forces that were vying cha- that integrates a wide range of players into the only ASEAN dialogue partner that had not otically for influence and power through mid formula for a national government in Burma. yet announced intentions to accede to the 2009. It does appear that the military will The Thai appear confident in the perspective, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast remain a key, strong, and powerful institu- increasingly shared as the ASEAN point of view, Asia through late 2008, only edging toward tion; that the Thai defense establishment and that places a primacy on sustaining lines of this decision under the new administration foreign policy leadership will value its rela- communication with the junta because it is the of President Barack Obama. To paraphrase tionship with the United States; and that the only source of power in the country. Importantly, former Foreign Minister Surin, if the United cumulative conflicts and issues that have Thailand and other ASEAN friends have ceased States is intent on maintaining the momen- shaped bilateral defense and security issues efforts to justify Burma’s domestic policies. tum and trajectory of its relationship with will have to be managed cleverly by both sides Thailand, it cannot continue to view things in order to engineer sustained commitment through the prism of Thailand of the past; to common goals in a changing regional and the Thai have long felt mere military and other assistance are not global strategic context. The future of bilat- that they had something enough to allow the United States to main- eral defense and security cooperation will be 6 to offer the United States tain its presence in the region. shaped by how effectively Thailand and the Over time, it has grown more difficult United States manage the treaty relationship in terms of perspectives to manage issues in the defense relationship in the face of diverging strategic interests. regarding, and access to, and to persuasively articulate the core goals the leadership of Burma and values of the alliance without bumping What Is to Be Done? up against the misunderstandings that have dotted the landscape of the relationship for It is not clear how much energy each Another area where the Thai believe the last two decades. None of this means that side is prepared to invest in bridging the gap that they have something to offer is in over- Thailand is any less important to the United between the legacy of strong and histori- all regional relations, and especially the U.S. States or that the bilateral relationship has cally meaningful defense ties and the trend relationship with ASEAN. The Thai, perhaps grown cold and irrelevant. Thailand remains toward separate and unequal strategic goals more than any other Southeast Asian coun- a good friend, deserving its status as a major in the region. try, believed that the U.S. refusal to lend help non-NATO Ally, clearly willing to make sac- Thailand is preoccupied with domes- during the 1997 Asian financial crisis was a rifices to support continued U.S. presence in tic political issues and internal contests for serious strategic error in judgment, and dem- the region and to team up with the United power, and is experiencing a transition that onstrated Washington’s “too little, too late” States and others in prosecuting the war on has begun to yield new roles in the political relationship with ASEAN. The Thai took the terror. Indeed, two Thai troops made the system for a wider range of interest groups, position that the United States, rather than ultimate sacrifice in Iraq while deployed a continuing generational change in leader- Japan, should have formed the monetary fund as part of the coalition, a serious reminder ship, and new rules for conducting politics
6 Strategic Forum No. 241, June 2009 in this evolving environment. The military port, focusing on efficient unit structure, pull its weight in coastal patrols alongside of has eschewed its traditional and practiced force management, and development of effec- contributing ASEAN neighbors. Thailand also “defense of the Kingdom” rationalization for tive doctrine and codes of conduct supporting needs to focus on developing the naval where- strong, reactive behavior in the face of large laws, orders, and regulations. withal to support the Proliferation Security public displays of political activism. The ■ Joint work in the area of military educa- Initiative, rather than fixing its attention on defense establishment and the foreign policy tion, both in terms of pursuing long-term train- procuring one discrete defense system (the making apparatus are weighing new security ing opportunities for Thai officers and modern- coastal radars). Continued work with the options, agreeing to increased proximity to izing the national military education system. DRMS project should help raise Thailand’s China through specialized naval and military vision from military hardware-focused solu- joint training and operations, and looking There is a natural basis for sustained tions to narrow problems to more effective for a central role in the emergence of a new cooperation in these areas and clear ways ways of factoring strategic variables and pol- regional architecture, an increasingly active, to reflect the need for a new responsiveness icy priorities into procurement choices. The strategically meaningful ASEAN. to complex strategic equities with impacts United States needs to follow up on that prom- The United States continues to empha- beyond the narrow bilateral stakes for ise for specific systems such as the coastal size the strength, resilience, and adaptability of Thailand and the United States. For exam- radar, but the acquisition needs to be wed- the original relationship focusing on interoper- ple, the United States and Thailand need ded to strategic goals, and in this environment ability, facility access, and joint and combined to move ahead with plans for Phase Two of of fiscal caution and overall diminishing training, though the two countries have come the Defense Resources Management System resources as well as the shifting of attention to the shared realization of the need to multi- (DRMS) program aimed at offering Thailand to the threats in the triborder area, the coastal lateralize Cobra Gold, shift resources to address the professional guidance on management radar system is not nearly as relevant as an regional threats and nontraditional challenges practices, methods for enhancing transpar- investment in blue water capabilities, and not such as avian flu and humanitarian disas- ency and accountability, means of acquir- nearly as pressing as the need to develop a ters, and take into account new requirements ing new capabilities, and steps that could nimble way to make strategic decisions rele- deriving from competing maritime claims and be taken to deepen bilateral staff and senior vant to Thailand’s status as a maritime power. China’s growing naval capabilities. The chal- level military exchanges.7 The Thai have, Thai resources need to be leveraged in a lenge will be to identify elements of the bilateral during the course of the last 5 to 7 years, rec- way that could bring both new bilateral rel- relationship that can offer an effective basis for ognized the need to do more effective work in evance to training and exercise cooperation, both continued bilateral cooperation and grow- the area of retaining trained officers and spe- and increased vigor to the multilateral aspect ing regional security and defense mindedness. cialists, especially as the economy began to of joint and combined training exercises such What kinds of initiatives could press offer highly trained technicians a much more as Cobra Gold. The Thai are clearly concerned bilateral defense cooperation beyond cur- lucrative alternative. The DRMS program is a about their capacity to conduct effective logis- rent constraints and define a trajectory for mechanism for focusing on such issues. tics in the context of contemporary multina- defense and security engagement that could The Thai have evinced long-term inter- tional planning efforts, disaster relief efforts, be embraced by both sides? Thailand and the est in developing counterterrorism capabili- and peacekeeping operations. That area holds United States should build on the record of ties and maritime security resources. During promise as a fertile field for expanded coopera- success in several areas: his June 2008 visit to Bangkok, Secretary tion. In 2008, the United States and Thailand of Defense Robert Gates promised contin- agreed to expand the field training exercise and ■ Specific, technical-level defense con- ued U.S. help with Thailand’s installation of to extend full partnership to other countries. sultations on issues such as strategic plans for a new coastal radar network. However, the Inviting the participation of capable navies of system acquisition, defense procurement bud- issue of strengthening Thailand’s coastal friends and allies such as South Korea would be geting, and rationalizing acquisition plans defense capabilities should not revolve a positive step in the direction of continuing to across services dating from the late 1990s. around U.S. ability to procure maritime invent ways of making Cobra Gold regionally ■ Cooperation on broad spectrum radars. Priority attention needs to shift to the relevant and strategically important. reform in areas such as the management of development of Thailand’s blue water naval The Philippines is enmeshed in a pro- security assistance that could conceivably be capabilities, capacity to conduct operations cess aimed at reforming the defense estab- the model on which larger bilateral defense that transcend local patrols, and willingness lishment, and invigorating the defense min- reform projects are formulated. to contribute in constructive ways to multi- istry, in the form of the Philippine Defense ■ Assistance in the form of advice and national maritime operations. Reform. Indonesia and the United States con- guidance for the military in its efforts to Joining MALSINDO (the Trilateral tinue to discuss the potential for a formal define an effective, appropriate, constitution- Coordinated Patrols) patrols and “Eyes in the plan aimed at uniting defense resources, tal- ally correct role against threats to sovereignty Sky” in the Strait of Malacca in 2008 was a ent, and capabilities with the goal of stream- and stability of Thailand posed by both indig- good start. However, Thailand needs to put its lining, modernizing, and professionaliz- enous forces and groups with external sup- efforts into readying the Royal Thai Navy to ing the Indonesian military. There has never
No. 241, June 2009 Strategic Forum 7 been a parallel attempt to work with the Thai of military education. The Thai have recognized relations for decades and building on the record to rationalize a swath of defense establish- the need for some “modernization” of their of success that has characterized the practical ment practices or to conduct a large-scale national military education system. In June dimensions of defense engagement between the review of the operating environment, minis- 2008, Secretary Gates told then–Prime Minister two. They should look to past successes in devel- terial organization and management prac- Samak that the United States would be strongly oping training and exercise regimens and tra- tices, or procurement processes. Parochial interested in helping with efforts to professional- ditions, the shared commitment to moderniz- service equities have militated against broad ize the country’s military officer corps through ing and professionalizing the Thai armed forces, defense reform cooperation with Thailand, the Thai National Defense College (NDC). Senior and close familiarity with procurement pro- and legislatively mandated cessations of secu- Thai military officers have expressed interest cesses and the innate sense of how to improve rity and economic assistance may have cooled in future partnerships regarding military edu- acquisition processes. Both countries should political support for anything so ambitious. cation. In late 2008, Supreme Commander work to shape those achievements in ways that Nevertheless, Thailand needs to ask itself General Boonsrang Niumpradit articulated his begin to serve more complex strategic require- whether the synergies and resources that the willingness to explore collaboration between the ments in a fiscally challenging moment. United States can bring would be sufficient NDC and the U.S. National Defense University. This work needs to be accomplished in a incentive to sit down at a planning table with Thailand’s Strategic Research Institute, estab- fashion that infuses the bilateral relationship some tailored version of this kind of defense lished as the think tank for the Royal Thai with greater strategic depth and acknowl- reform enterprise in mind. Armed Forces National Defence College in 2007, edges the increasing responsibilities that The current problems in southern was designed to be the equivalent of the NDU Thailand is capable of assuming in regional Thailand represent a special case, far different Institute for National Strategic Studies. That defense and security cooperation regarding than the Cold War efforts to meet the challenges connection needs to be energized. A concerted efforts to counter piracy and terrorism, cope posed by insurgencies, with a decidedly regional effort to cooperate on developing this institution with and prepare for humanitarian disasters dimension to the problem that has been lost in as the basis for a sustained strategic dialogue and pandemic threats, and deal with weapons efforts to localize and minimize the impact of would serve the interests of the relationship and proliferation and other unanticipated threats southern Thailand on broader ASEAN strategic should be a priority focus for the United States. to regional stability and prosperity. equities. The Thai have been sensitive to intro- Finally, there is a recognized commonal- ducing foreign military resources and personnel ity of interests regarding the ASEAN architec- Notes into the fray in a manner that could escalate the tural design and ARF role as a contributing fac- issue beyond its current parameters. However, tor to strengthen local cooperation on defense 1 The role of Royal Thai Army Commander in Chief General Wimon Wongwanit in thwarting this U.S. initiative without challenging those assumptions, or tres- and security issues that matter to the neigh- was hailed, and the episode was regarded by critics of the alli- passing against the Thai policy decisions regard- borhood. The United States should support ance as a Thai foreign policy Declaration of Independence ing the way to manage the southern unpleas- Thailand’s efforts to take a more prominent role from Washington. 2 Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn, “Thai-U.S. Relations in antness, the United States could do more than in the region through the activities and mech- the Regional Context,” Southeast Asia Bulletin, March 2008, current train and equip work with specific Thai anisms of the regional association, possibly by 1–2. armed forces units. Systematic assessments of co-hosting a future voluntary demonstration of 3 Krit, 2. the etiology of conflict beyond technical target- response humanitarian assistance and disas- 4 Ibid. ing and intelligence-sharing, organized scrutiny ter relief exercise that would be a positive step 5 K. Kesavanpany, “Myanmar, ASEAN’s Albatross,” Southeast Asia Bulletin, July 2008, 1–2. of the situation by strategic critics, more system- following the inaugural demonstration in May 6 Surin Pitsuwan, “U.S.-ASEAN Cooperation,” atic efforts to draw conclusions about the nature 2009 in the Philippines. Both the United States Southeast Asia Bulletin, February 2008, 1–2. of the fight in the south, and attempts to discern and Thailand should focus on finding the strate- 7 Thai Embassy Update, April 2008, available at the utility in lessons learned regarding build- gic commonalities that have informed bilateral
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