Philosophy 565 October 2, 2008 Prof. Clare Batty

Searle, ”Proper Names”

1. Russell’s Name Claim: The Simple Description Theory of Names

The Name Claim: The meaning of a name is given by an associated definite description.

Problems i. Interpersonal Disagreement: It seems that different speakers will often associate different descriptions with the same name. YOU: Aristotle [the most famous pupil of Plato] was the teacher of Alexander the Great. ME: I agree, although it’s odd that you would tell me something that’s analytically true. Of course Aristotle [the teacher of Alexander the Great] was the teacher of Alexander the Great. By the way, I hear that, contrary to popular belief, Aristotle never met Plato.

ii. Intrapersonal Uncertainty: I’m quite at a loss to tell you which description I use the name to abbreviate. It can’t be ‘the most famous student of Plato’ since I’m prepared to entertain the suggestion that he never met Plato (and I’m not prepared to entertain the suggestion that the most famous student of Plato never met Plato). Similar considerations eliminate just about every other candidate. Maybe “the person I call ‘Aristotle’ ”? If that definite description is all there is to my name ‘Aristotle’, then I’ve got problems. There had better be some independent account here of what it is to call someone ‘Aristotle’. It’s one thing to defer to others, attaching the reference of my name to whoever everyone else picks out with that name (there’s nothing circular about that), but it’s quite another to defer to myself and try to attach the reference of my name to whoever I pick out with that very name.

3. Searle’s Cluster Theory of Names

Kripke on the cluster theory: “It really is a nice theory. The only defect I think it has is probably common to all philosophical theories. It’s wrong. You may suspect me of proposing another theory in its place; but I hope not, because I’m sure it’s wrong too if it is a theory.”

The nice but wrong theory: 1. Each agent A associates each name N, with a certain cluster of properties, the φs. 2. One of the φs, or some conjointly, are believed by A to uniquely pick out some individual. 3. If most, or a weighted most, of the φs are satisfied by by a unique object, it is the referent of N . 4. If it’s not the case that (a weighted) most of the φs are satisfied by a unique object, N fails to refer to anything. 5. I can know a priori that if Aristotle exists, then Aristotle has at least some of the φs. 6. It is necessary that if Aristotle exists, then Aristotle has at least some of the φs.

3. Kripke’s Critique of the theory Let’s grant (1.) for now. What about (2.)? “Most people, when they think of Cicero, just think of a famous Roman orator.” — And they don’t suppose that that description picks out anyone uniquely. But Kripke would insist that were someone to associate ‘Cicero’ with only a famous Roman orator (and surely that’s possible), they would still succeed in referring to Cicero with the name. What about (3.)? Counterexamples: Gödel and Schmidt (fictional), Peano and Dedekind, Columbus. What about (4)? Counterexample: Gödel (fictional), Jonah.

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Modal Problem Suppose that I associate ‘Aristotle’ with the following φs: Most famous student of Plato, most famous teacher of Alexander the Great, author of “Metaphysics”, called ‘Aristotle’ by philosophers… Still, I think that all of these properties are contingent properties of Aristotle. I think that Aristotle could have failed to have every single one of these. Consider the possible world where Aristotle gets run over by a chariot on his way to his first lesson with Plato. Such a world is one where Aristotle isn’t the most famous student of Plato or the most famous teacher of Alexander the Great or the author of Metaphysics or called ‘Aristotle’ by philosophers. On the cluster theory, this can’t be. The theory implies that I should be able to know a priori that if Aristotle exists, then Aristotle has at least some of the φs. Indeed, it’s necessary that, if he exists, he has some of the φs. So the cluster theory is wrong.

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