Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments

No Dream in ? WP Domestic Quarrels and Local Elections Show: “Winner Takes All” Likely to Continue

Sonja Schiffers and Franziska Smolnik S

Even though the country is a regional frontrunner, Georgian democracy is not yet con- solidated. Parliamentary elections in 2016 saw the governing returned with a constitutional majority. The October 2017 local elections brought the ruling party another sweeping victory. Despite Georgian Dream’s overwhelming electoral suc- cesses, the country faces voter apathy. Alongside lack of parliamentary controls and a fragmentation of the party-political spectrum this does not bode well for consolidating democracy in the near future.

The governing Georgian Dream (GD) scored West – failed to win a seat between them. a resounding victory in the October 2016 Potentially even worse for their future parliamentary election, winning 115 of the prospects is the departure of many leading 150 seats. That just exceeds the threshold figures after the defeat. It remains in the of 113 required to amend the constitution. balance whether these parties can recover The result dashed hopes that the transition from the blow, or whether new formations from a presidential to a parliamentary sys- emerging from the election aftermath might tem would foster stable party politics with gain an earnest footing. In the first place, at least two strong camps. It had been widely the founding of new groups suggests fur- expected that former President Mikheil ther fragmentation. Saakashvili’s United National Movement (UNM) would mount an earnest challenge. Instead the UNM collapsed from 65 to 27 Weak Opposition – seats (but remained the second-largest party). Inadequate Controls Rather than by disagreement with the UNM’s Georgian Dream benefits in particular from policies, however, the defeat was driven by discord within the main opposition party. In voters’ personal rejection of ex-president January 2017 21 of the UNM’s 27 deputies in a political environ- quit their parliamentary group to form the ment strongly fixated on individuals. breakaway Movement for Liberty – Euro- Other political forces were largely wiped pean Georgia (EG). The split was preceded out. The and the Republi- by months of conflict within the party re- can Party – both small but courted by the volving largely around the role of its founder

Sonja Schiffers is a Visiting Fellow, Dr. Franziska Smolnik an Associate in SWP’s Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division SWP Comments 43 November 2017

1 Saakashvili. The breakaway group had been through an election board. Moreover, the calling for more distance from the UNM’s future role of the president will be a rather mastermind. Internal rivalries were only ceremonial one. The governing party argues one aspect; they also felt a realignment was that both these changes are appropriate in essential to win back support beyond the a parliamentary system, while the opposi- party’s core base. Supporters of the rump tion and the current head of state regard UNM continue to stress their loyalty to them as an attempt to abolish independent Saakashvili. Although he has been stripped institutions with popular legitimacy of of his Georgian citizenship and remains their own. Although the reform would no abroad, the leadership is kept open for him. longer affect the current President Giorgi The post is likely to remain vacant for some Margvelashvili, it nevertheless appears to time to come, given that Saakashvili faces represent an affront because he has become prosecution for abuse of power if he returns, one of the government’s foremost critics. and possible imprisonment. The opposition and various NGOs also The dominance of Georgian Dream accuse Georgian Dream of tailoring the places question marks over the effective- parliamentary voting system to serve its ness of (parliamentary) control over govern- own needs. Under the new constitution, ment, the long-term stability of the division parliamentary elections will move to an of powers and ultimately the consolidation exclusively proportional system. While the of democracy as a whole. Critics of Georgian opposition supports this provision, it sees Dream see the danger of de facto one-party no reason to wait until 2024 for the change rule – as previously under Saakashvili’s UNM. to come into effect. As matters currently The depth of the divisions and the ubiqui- stand, the next parliament would still tousness of zero-sum thinking is illustrated be elected under the current arrangement very clearly by two central domestic issues: that combines proportional representa- the constitutional reform process and the tion and first-past-the-post – which could conflict over ownership and control of again secure a large majority for Georgian broadcaster Rustavi 2. Dream. Perhaps even more than disputes over sub- stance, the procedural fight demonstrates Constitutional Reform – the deep divide between ruling party and op- Uncompromising Stances position. The president boycotted the reform Constitutional reform is a central project commission from the moment it was estab- for Georgian Dream’s second term. The lished by Georgian Dream, and European declared goal is to complete the transition Georgia collected 150,000 signatures calling from a presidential to a parliamentary for a referendum on the new constitution. system, which was initiated in 2010 and The governing party forced first and second passed by parliament in 2013. Georgian readings through parliament in June 2017. Dream is in a very comfortable position, Attempts by the Council of Europe’s Venice possessing a majority large enough to pass Commission to mediate between the two constitutional amendments on its own. Op- sides came to nothing. Just days after the ponents of reform accuse Georgian Dream president and twenty opposition parties of exploiting its legislative dominance to presented a counter-proposal, Georgian rewrite the constitution in a manner that Dream passed the constitutional amend- will primarily boost its own power. ments with only marginal concessions in a New modalities for presidential and par- third reading on 26 September. President liamentary elections are especially contro- Margvelashvili vetoed the draft bill – albeit versial. According to the new constitution to no avail. After Georgian Dream used its the president will no longer be chosen parliamentary majority to override the presi- directly by the populace, but indirectly dent’s veto, Margvelashvili ultimately gave

SWP Comments 43 November 2017

2 in and signed the amendments into law on the station was to be returned to its origi- 19 October 2017. nal owner. The ruling provoked vocal pro- tests, with many renowned civil society organisations questioning the impartiality Rustavi 2 and Fights Over of the courts over Rustavi 2. They saw the Media Ownership decision as an attempt by the government Changes in the media landscape provide to bring the main opposition media outlet further insights into the state of the coun- under its control. International watchdogs try’s democracy. It would seem strangely like Amnesty International and the Council coincidental that all three parties elected of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights to the Georgian parliament in October 2016 also criticise the Georgian judiciary’s lack enjoyed privileged access to broadcasting – of independence in this and other cases. television being Georgia’s most important As with the constitutional reform, the information medium. That explains the incident called an international body into great national and international attention play. In a legally binding interim measure, devoted to the dispute over ownership of which it issues only in exceptional cases, the TV station Rustavi 2. Kibar Khalvashi, the European Court of Human Rights called the station’s former owner, alleges he was for the Georgian Supreme Court ruling forced to sell it for less than its real value to be suspended indefinitely and urged in 2006. Rustavi 2 fell into the hands of sup- the Georgian government to “abstain from porters of then President Saakashvili, with interfering” in the “editorial policies” of repercussions for its political stance. After Rustavi 2. Whether or not political pressure Georgian Dream came to power in 2012 was actually exerted upon the Georgian and Saakashvili was voted out of office in Supreme Court, the future of Rustavi 2 – 2013, Rustavi 2 maintained its allegiance and of the country’s media pluralism as a to the UNM, and remained very critical whole – appears to remain uncertain. toward Georgian Dream. For some years Khalvashi – whose brother is a Georgian Dream deputy – has been pursuing legal Local Elections and the Electorate action to have the 2006 sale annulled. Despite garnering less (international) inter- The Rustavi 2 dispute needs to be seen in est than last year’s parliamentary elections, a wider context of changes in the Georgian Georgia’s recent local elections had been media landscape since 2012. Another sta- discussed as potential reality check for the tion, the very popular Imedi TV, had been ruling party’s popularity – in particular forced to close in 2007 under Saakashvili, given the domestic controversies. Special and reopened in 2009 under new leader- attention was accorded to the mayoral elec- ship, now loyal to him. After Georgian tions in the capital with its popula- Dream took power it was returned to the tion of 1.1 million (more than a quarter of heirs of the (meanwhile deceased) former Georgia’s overall 3.7 million). Here, as in owner. Imedi TV is now regarded as the three of the other four self-governed cities, mouthpiece of the Georgian Dream govern- the Georgian Dream candidate won in the ment. This makes Rustavi 2 the last influ- first round. Georgian Dream’s sweeping ential broadcaster within Georgia that is success was facilitated not least by the strong critical towards the government. Many fear fragmentation of the party landscape and that it would come too close to the state in particular of the opposition: In Tbilisi leadership if it were returned to the former eight candidates vied for the mayoral office, owner – as occurred with Imedi TV. four of them nominated by opposition par- The Rustavi 2 case went through all the ties with a decidedly pro-Western orienta- appeals. Finally, in early March 2017, tion. Country-wide, Georgian Dream won the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that almost 56 percent of the proportional vote

SWP Comments 43 November 2017

3 and all but six of the mayoral races. After powers. Fewer than 52 percent of the elec- the UNM’s withdrawal from the runoff, torate bothered to vote at all in the parlia- only four districts will see a second round. mentary vote (and less than 46 percent Given the campaign financing figures, in the local elections of October 2017). Of the election results come as little surprise: those who did vote in 2016, less than 50 Between 1 July and 15 October 2017 Geor- percent chose Georgian Dream in the PR gian Dream received 11.6 million Georgian ballot that decided 77 of the 150 seats. lari in donations (approximately €4 mil- Georgian Dream owes its narrow constitu- lion), compared to less than 1 million Geor- tion-amending majority to its success in the gian lari for European Georgia and approxi- first-past-the-post constituency ballot that mately 108 thousand for UNM. The National distributed the other 73 seats (of which it Democratic Institute criticised the uneven- won all but two). Yet Georgian Dream is still ness of the political playing field in the run- unwilling to seek broader consensus or make up to the elections, even though on election compromises with the opposition. With

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und day only minor violations were noted, and its huge majority it can always outvote the Politik, 2017 fundamental freedoms were generally parliamentary opposition and override All rights reserved respected. any veto by the critical president. Georgian These Comments reflect Before the local elections of October 2017 Dream’s recent success in the local elections the authors’ views. it seemed that support for the governing will likely further boost its resolve. But rid- SWP party had fallen. A survey by the National ing roughshod over its opponents will do Stiftung Wissenschaft und Democratic Institute published in June little for public confidence in parliamen- Politik German Institute for 2017 found only 23 percent support for tary democracy. At the same time, the oppo- International and Georgian Dream, compared to 40 percent sition is showing little willingness to com- Security Affairs in November 2016, shortly after the parlia- promise either. In the near future, Georgian Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 mentary election. Despite the crushing (domestic) politics will thus likely remain 10719 Berlin parliamentary majority won by Georgian characterised by fickleness and stalemate. Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 Dream, no Georgian party, however, has www.swp-berlin.org succeeded in securing a long-term electoral [email protected] base. That includes Georgian Dream, whose ISSN 1861-1761 performance in the recent local elections Translation by Meredith Dale should not be misread as proving other- wise. Indeed, political cleavages are vague (Updated English version of SWP-Aktuell 71/2017) and voters tend not to understand parties as committed advocates of particular inter- ests and programmes. According to a survey by the International Republican Institute published in March 2017, only 13 percent of respondents have faith in Georgian Dream to solve the country’s most urgent prob- lems; more than 70 percent are negative towards political parties in general.

Outlook The constitutional reform process and the Rustavi 2 dispute reveal a number of cen- tral obstacles to a consolidation of democ- racy. Politics remains a “winner takes all” affair, with vested and power interests coming before pluralism and division of

SWP Comments 43 November 2017

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