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The Tea Party Movement, Framing, and the US Media

JULES BOYKOFF* & EULALIE LASCHEVER** *Department of Politics and Government, Pacific University, Forest Grove, OR, USA, **Department of Sociology, University of California, Irvine, CA, USA

ABSTRACT In February 2009, the Tea Party Movement (TPM) burst onto the political scene in the USA. Emerging out of popular unrest over the economic downturn of 2008 and the perceived radical agenda of President Barack Obama, the Tea Party quickly captured the imagination of disenchanted conservatives. Media coverage of the movement was abundant, with a frame contest between the TPM and its political opponents swiftly surfacing. Media frames bracketed discussions over the authenticity of the Tea Party, the composition of its members, the movement’s message, and whether the TPM was poised for a long-term impact. This study systematically analyzes the predominant media frames that materialized in 882 news packets from nine major print and television news sources between 19 February 2009 and 30 November 2010 in order to better understand the role the US media played in defining the Tea Party, and to determine whether Tea Party perceptions of its media coverage were accurate. Four sets of diametric frames appeared in the media—the Everyday American vs. Non-Mainstream, Grassroots vs. Establishment-Affiliated, Fiscal-Federal Frustrations vs. Amalgam of Grievances, and Election Impact vs. Flash in the Pan. Overall, the TPM succeeded in mobilizing symbolic media representations to advance their goals, achieving politically propitious coverage. US media depicted the TPM with supportive frames more than twice as often as the deprecatory characterizations the activists opposed. This study investigates how the media used these frames and discusses implications of Tea Party coverage as it relates to journalistic norms, social activism, and overarching framing processes.

KEY WORDS: Tea Party Movement, mass media, framing, framing contests

Introduction Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 On 19 February 2009, Rick Santelli of CNBC Business Network railed against President Barack Obama’s Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan, ultimately calling for ‘a Chicago Tea Party in July’ to protest. Video of Santelli’s impassioned outburst caught fire on the Internet and in the blogosphere, and he appeared on NBC’s Today Show the following morning to elaborate on the issue. The energy was catching and the term ‘Tea Party’ spread across the USA. Within months of its inception, the Tea Party Movement (TPM) garnered regular television and newspaper attention—accompanied by con- troversy—including accusations of racism, extremism, and doubts about the movement’s ‘grassroots’ bona fides.

Correspondence Address: Jules Boykoff, Department of Politics and Government, Pacific University, 2043 College Way, Forest Grove, OR 97116, USA. Email: boykoff@pacificu.edu 1474-2837 Print/1474-2829 Online/11/040341-26 q 2011 Taylor & Francis http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2011.614104 342 J. Boykoff & E. Laschever

The TPM swiftly and successfully disseminated its socio-political opinions to a wide audience. Tarrow (1998, p. 110) explains the strategic logic undergirding claims-making processes: ‘social movements are deeply involved in the work of “naming” grievances, connecting them to other grievances, and constructing larger frames of meaning that will resonate with a population’s cultural predispositions and communicate a uniform message to power holders and others’. The TPM tapped into extant ‘cultural predispositions’; journalist John B. Judis (2010, pp. 20–21) identified three ideological strands inherent in Tea Party messaging that stretch back to the USA’s founding: apprehension over social and economic decline; a Jeffersonian propensity for ‘staunch anti-statism’; and a producerist mentality whereby hard-working people should enjoy the fruits of their labors rather than be forced to share them. While TPM ideas resonated with historical traditions of US political culture, the movement needed media to disseminate its vision to the wider public. As Gamson, (2004, p. 243) notes, ‘the mass media arena is the major site of contests over meaning because all of the players in the policy process assume its pervasive influence—whether it is justified or not’. While some view any media coverage as positive for social movements, others question this assumption (e.g. Rosie & Gorringe, 2009) and examine how media coverage can suppress social movements (e.g. Boykoff, 2007). However, as Cottle, (2008, p. 859) notes, ‘[t]oday’s media ecology arguably contains more political opportunities for dissenting voices and views from around the world than in the past’. The TPM garnered attention from mass-media critics, with right-wing analysts at the Media Research Center (2010) contending that activists were ‘hit with [a] hostile and crude media response’, while left-wing researchers at Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (Hart & Rendall, 2010) critiqued the corporate media for lavishing the movement with extensive coverage. Despite TPM-favorite Sarah Palin dismissing mainstream media as ‘lamestream’, a survey by the Washington Post found that 76% of local TPM organizers believed mainstream media coverage of their movement was ‘very fair’ or ‘somewhat fair’ (Gardner, 2010). In this article we systematically assess the dominant media frames that mainstream print and television outlets used when covering the TPM, beginning in February 2009 and concluding at the end of November 2010 when the activists’ influence on Washington, DC’s political topography was clear. In the process, we explore Gamson’s ‘contests over meaning’ on the US media terrain.

The TEA Party Movement

Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 Since this study explores the relationship between US media coverage and the TPM’s stated identity and objectives, we first analyze the Tea Party-produced literature and how the movement defines itself. The Tea (Taxed Enough Already) Party Movement1 is a collection of grassroots groups sparked in early 2009 by the perceived progressivism of the Obama administration. These decentralized groups share a loose set of beliefs and are sometimes linked with national-level organizations such as the Tea Party Patriots and the Tea Party Express, though largely they operate independently. While sometimes funded by political heavy-hitters like FreedomWorks and Americans for Prosperity, local Tea Party groups enjoy relative autonomy (Williamson et al., 2011, pp. 28–29). Rasmussen and Schoen (2010, pp. 146–160) distinguish the TPM into four major components. First, ‘Organizational Backers’ such as FreedomWorks provide infrastructural support for the movement. Second, the ‘Individual Organizers’ conduct on-the-ground planning and Media Framing and the Tea Party Movement 343

solidarity work. Third, ‘Symbolic Leaders’—nationally recognized figures identifiable to outsiders (e.g. Sarah Palin)—echo the movement’s sentiments. Finally, ‘The Base’ is the bulk of the movement: ‘a cross section of America’ that ‘represents a solid one-third of the electorate, if not considerably more, perhaps right up to 50 per cent’ (pp. 156, 158– 159). However, others question the movement’s pervasiveness (Williamson et al., 2011, pp. 27, 36). TPM activists credit the multibillion-dollar government bailouts of auto and finance industries—and underwater homeowners—with catalyzing the original protests. However, they emphasize that concern over out-of-control federal spending had mounted since the Reagan era. The first wave of protests occurred on 15 April 2009 because, according to TPM proponent John O’Hara (2010, p. 13), ‘on Tax Day every American is fiscally conservative’. Coalitions quickly formed over shared disdain for the ‘ObamaCare’ health care bill progressing through Congress in summer 2009. TPM members viewed the bill as fiscally irresponsible federal-government overreach. The activists’ penchant for the ‘broad principles of fiscal responsibility and limited government as pillars of the movement’ (O’Hara, 2010, p. 205) coheres with a Washington Post canvass released ahead of the 2010 midterm elections. When asked to offer ‘the single most important issue for the group’, the top two replies were government spending/the deficit (24%) and limited government/the size of government (20%) (Washington Post Canvass, 2010). While TPM activists and their supporters unite around a policy agenda of fiscal responsibility and limited government, many acknowledge consistency ends there. Members boast affiliates from across the political and ideological spectrum, claiming a widespread appeal to ‘common sense’. O’Hara (2010, p. 208) proclaims the group consists of ‘Democrats, Republicans, Libertarians, independents, and everything in between’ who ‘agree that government is not always the answer’. The TPM often defines itself by what it is not. Self-describing as the antithesis of left-wing protesters, TPM activists stress that they are everyday, mainstream citizens—stay-at-home moms who have never before protested. As one supporter explained, ‘[t]hese aren’t masked anarchists smashing windows and setting fires at a G-20 summit. They aren’t angry, “Bush Lied, People Died” sixties throwbacks using a political rally to score some pot from their grandkids’ classmates’ (Graham, 2010, p. 2). Rather, they ‘were middle-class Americans of all ages talking about fiscal sanity’ (Armey & Kibbe, 2010, p. 15). Proponents describe the TPM as a conglomerate of retirees, military vets, small business owners, suburban farmers, grandmothers, office managers, and churchgoers disillusioned with out-of-touch political elites (Graham, 2010, pp. 1–3). Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 However, an extensive poll carried out by the New York Times/CBS in April 2010 determined TPM members fair better than the average American. Only 35% of Tea Partiers reported making less than $50,000 a year, compared with 48% of the general population. TPM members also boast higher educational attainment, with 70% having at least some college education, compared with 53% of the population at large. And with 75% of respondents 45 years or older—including 29% of the respondents 65 years and older—they are older than the general population, which is 50% and 16%, respectively (Zernike, 2010, pp. 195–227; also CBS News & New York Times Poll, 2010). McVeigh’s (2009) ‘power-devaluation model’, which focuses on ‘relatively advantaged’ right-wing movements aiming ‘to preserve, restore, and expand their collective privileges’, helps explain TPM mobilization. McVeigh theorizes, ‘power devaluation, resulting from structural change, produces shifts in interpretive processes, which, in turn, lead to 344 J. Boykoff & E. Laschever

activation of organizational resources and exploitation of political opportunities’ (p. 39). The explanatory model features three central dimensions: economic, political, status- based devaluation. Power devaluation does not automatically translate to collective action, but triggers ‘a shift in interpretive processes’, potentially prompting those threatened ‘to activate preexisting organizational resources and exploit preexisting political opportu- nities in an effort to reverse devaluation’ (pp. 46–47). The TPM’s strength comes partially from shared mobilizing structures with right-of- center predecessor movements such as Grover Norquist’s Americans for Tax Reform (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2004) and the Christian Right (Diamond, 1995, 1998), although the TPM focuses on fiscal issues while the Christian Right’s bailiwick is social issues. Also, the TPM does not share the Christian Right’s built-in hindrance to growth because it does not proffer theological tenets that anti-tax, anti-government folks might find off-putting. The TPM is sensitive about its portrayal in the mainstream media, or what it often derides as the ‘liberal, elite media’. Accusations of media bias range from under- representation to defamatory intimations of racism. Activists contested allegations linking the movement with extremists, decried outright name-calling and sexualized jokes about ‘teabagging’, and questioned their ‘anti-tax’ characterization as oversimplifying the message of fiscal responsibility and limited government (O’Hara, 2010, pp. 76–89, 215). O’Hara, (2010, pp. 210–211) asserts, ‘the tea parties were simultaneously couched by the liberal media and politicians as small and insignificant but out of control, populist mobs’. Supporters also opposed claims that the TPM was manufactured by the conservative establishment (Taibbi, 2010). Dick Armey and Matt Kibbe (2010, p. 76) protested a particular portrayal by New York Times columnist Paul Krugman (2009) who asserted that TPM was an ‘AstroTurf’ group funded by ‘the usual group of right-wing billionaires’ and ‘being promoted heavily by Fox News’. Jane Mayer (2010) outlined in the New Yorker how Koch Industries bankrolled Americans for Prosperity, a big TPM funder. Quickly, TPM activists met many of the preconditions for successful collective action—attracting fresh recruits, sustaining solidarity, generating support from bystander audiences, cultivating leaders, securing media coverage, and procuring tactical space to pursue political goals (McAdam, 1996; Boykoff, 2006a). Regarding media coverage, the TPM benefited from a propitious media environment, with the rise of advocacy journalism featured on Fox News Network (FNN) and MSNBC. In an academic article, Williamson et al. (2011, p. 30) assert, ‘Fox News provides much of what the loosely interconnected Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 Tea Party organizations otherwise lack in terms of a unified membership and communications infrastructure’. In this article we examine the role FNN—and others— played in framing the TPM.

Framing Scholars have used the term framing in numerous ways, leading Entman (1993, p. 51) to call it a ‘scattered conceptualization’ in need for clarification. Meanwhile, D’Angelo (2002, p. 871) contended that news framing should be ‘multiparadigmatic’, and Reese (2007, p. 148) argued that, ‘[f]raming’s value [ ...] does not hinge on its potential as a unified research domain’ but instead ‘as a provocative model that bridges parts of the field that need to be in touch with one another’. Media Framing and the Tea Party Movement 345

Framing is a complex process in which contending political actors interrelate. Social- movement scholars often use the term to mean ‘the conscious, strategic efforts of movement groups to fashion meaningful accounts of themselves and the issues at hand in order to motivate and legitimate their efforts’ (McAdam, 1996, p. 339). Social-movement activists engage in what Gamson (2004, p. 245) dubs as ‘framing contests’, with established political actors discursively jockeying for political advantage by expressing their grievances to journalists (Ryan, 1991), fellow activists (Rohlinger & Quadagno, 2009), political elites, and the general public (Reinsborough & Canning, 2010) as persuasively as possible. A second way in which scholars use the term framing is to indicate the process by which journalists organize the whirling swirl of empirical reality into consumable news packages. In this research, journalists place figurative picture frames around the ever- moving target of events and actions, thereby focusing our attention on particular issues, ideas, and individuals while obscuring what lies outside the frame. Such framing processes yield media frames that organize events and issues through tenets of selection and emphasis. Gitlin (1980, p. 7, emphasis in original) defines media frames as ‘persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse’. Thus, frames are analytical constructs with normative implications. This normativity is highlighted by the definition of framing given by Entman (2004, p. 5): ‘selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution’. Media frames both organize and set the stage for real-world politics, leading to a third way in which scholars research framing: media effects. D’Angelo (2002, p. 873) summarizes common lines of framing-effects inquiry at the micro- and macro-levels: scholars ‘examine how news frames activate, and interact with, an individual’s prior knowledge to affect interpretations, recall of information, decision making, and evaluations’ and explore ‘how news frames shape social-level processes such as public opinion and policy issue debates.’2 Scholars have investigated how media frames affect public opinion (Nelson & Oxley, 1999; Winter, 2008), sometimes engaging in controlled experiments to test how media framing affects attitudes such as tolerance (Nelson et al., 1997). Scheufele’s (1999, p. 105) observation that ‘[m]ass media actively set the frames of reference that readers or viewers use to interpret and discuss public events’ captures how media coverage can lead to framing effects, channeling an analytical path between what he distinguishes as ‘media frames’ and ‘audience frames’. Figure 1 depicts these three ways of construing the concept of framing. The left side of Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 the figure denotes the terrain of ‘framing contests’ where political actors—social- movement organizations, elected officials, and others—make their claims and stake out policy positions. Such contestation is bounded by the political opportunity structure of time and geography. Political claims must pass through two filters before becoming news: cultural resonance and journalistic norms. If a group’s or individual’s claims resonate with established US political culture, it will more likely be converted into a media frame, especially if it coheres with the journalistic norms and values guiding news production. Therefore, social movement organizations often attempt to self-represent in ways that both chime with the predominant octaves of political history and that compel journalists and their ingrained news-making predilections, organizational dictates, and temporal pressures. The media frames at the center of Figure 1 can also lead to framing effects—located at the right side of the figure—such as public opinion shifts, collective action repertoire adjustment, 346 J. Boykoff & E. Laschever

Figure 1. The framing process.

and altered public-policy discourse. The ‘Cultural Congruence’ filter comes from Entman (2004, p. 14, emphasis in original) who notes about news frames:

The more congruent the frame is with schemas that dominate political culture, the more success it will enjoy. The most inherently powerful frames are those fully congruent with schemas habitually used by most members of society. Such frames have the greatest intrinsic capacity to arouse similar responses among most Americans.

There is a feedback-loop feature to this model, with the media effects becoming the initial inputs to the system, affecting what becomes news (media frames). As D’Angelo (2002, p. 882) puts it, ‘framing effects, then, are not one way.’3 In this research we adopt a critical-constructionist approach that focuses on mass-media frames, treating journalists as processors of information and ideas who produce interpretive representations of reality rooted in the norms, values, and routines of newsgathering (D’Angelo, 2002, pp. 876–877). Therefore, we are working in the center and left-hand zone of Figure 1, focusing primarily on the construction of media frames and secondarily on their congruence with the TPM’s self-representation. Borrowing from Reese (2007, p. 150), we view media frames as ‘structures that draw boundaries, set up categories, define some ideas as out and other as in’. These frames form ‘persistent patterns’ that ‘organize discourse’ (Gitlin, 1980, p. 7), structuring ideas, issues, and events into digestible news packets. So, media frames are consistent, coherent bundles of information that journalists provide to imbue real-world events with structure and meaning. Media frames organize issues, pointing both backward at what happened and

Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 forward, offering interpretive cues for what it all means. We zero in on media frames, or what Scheufele (2004, p. 402) calls ‘the textual structure of discourse products’, treating them as the dependent variable. Along the way we examine how the TPM represents itself in terms of its policy preferences, membership, and style to examine whether or not the movement was successful in converting its self-representation into media frames. Sometimes journalists pipe activists’ self-representations unadulterated to the public via media frames, but often the desired characterizations of the movements face blockages and alterations while zinging through the news-making processes. Media reflect and reproduce the political culture and ultimately act as the arbiter of what Koopmans and Statham (1999, p. 228) call the ‘discursive opportunity structure’, or the set of variables ‘determining which ideas are considered “sensible”, which constructions of reality are seen as “realistic”, and which claims are held as “legitimate” within a certain polity at a Media Framing and the Tea Party Movement 347

specific time’. Through framing, media construct discursive brackets classifying certain ideas and political actors as rational and thus to be taken seriously, while others are framed as extremist and therefore unacceptable. As such, the quality and quantity of media coverage of activism is significant. Such coverage can help activists disseminate their ideas to bystander publics and potential recruits while legitimating these ideas in the public sphere. However, an array of scholars have found that mass media distort social movements or portray them in deprecatory terms, whether they are feminist movements (Bronstein, 2005; Barakso & Schaffner, 2006), anti-war movements (Small, 1994; Klein et al., 2009), racial justice groups (Jeffries, 2007; Rhodes, 2007), or the modern-day Global Justice Movement (Boykoff, 2006b; Rauch et al., 2007). The preponderance of scholarly research on media coverage of activism focuses on left-of-center social movements; this paper provides a counterweight to that trend. Mass media tend to proffer more positive portrayals of activists whose tactics and strategies remain within the boundaries of the rules and laws of the socio-political system while belittling dissident citizens who eschew such rules and laws (Small, 1994; Snow et al., 2007). For example, Hallin (1986, p. 197) found that media covering anti-Vietnam war activists ‘would frequently plug opponents of the war who chose to “work within the system”’, thereby creating ‘boundaries marking the limits of acceptable political activity’. Thus, groups operating within the institutionalized political system and adopting ‘contained’ tactics fare better under the media spotlight than those eschewing institutional politics and adopting ‘transgressive’, outside-the-box tactics (Tarrow, 1998). To understand framing—and in particular what Scheufele (1999, p. 115) distinguishes as media ‘frame building’—one must consider the journalistic norms affecting what is considered newsworthy and how the newsworthy information is depicted. As mentioned above, these professional norms act as a filter in the media framing process. Boykoff and Boykoff (2007, p, 1192) identify ‘first order norms’ as personalization, dramatization, and novelty; highlighting how personalities, conflict, and newness are key factors—or ‘baseline influences’—in what becomes news. ‘Second order norms’ include balance and authority-order, where journalists turn to authority figures as sources who assure the public that social disorder will soon be addressed and order will prevail (also Bennett, 2002, pp. 45–50). In electoral politics, the journalistic norms filter can lead to what Lawrence (2010, p. 272) dubs as the ‘game frame’ whereby covering the complexity of issues becomes secondary to describing the machinations of political strategy.

Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 Methodology We assembled the data set for this study by conducting database searches on LexisNexis Academic and Proquest for television news reports and newspaper articles referencing ‘Tea Party’. Selection was limited to the New York Times (NYT), the Washington Post (WP), the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), and USA Today (USA), as well as the FNN, CNN, MSNBC, CBS News, and ABC News. We chose these newspapers because they represent four of the top five newspapers in national circulation.4 Newspaper op-eds were included to provide balance to ‘hard news’ stories and because of their influence on policy-making, while letters to the editor were excluded because news organizations did not actually produce them. We included television in light of a recent Pew Research Center (2009) poll finding 71% of the US population turns to television for its national and international news and 64% rely on television for local news. FNN, CNN, and MSNBC were selected because 348 J. Boykoff & E. Laschever

of their high viewership, while CBS and ABC were included to expand perspective. We analyze traditional media because, despite rising consumption of social media, traditional sources still lead the news industry (Ahlers, 2006). While newspaper and television, and ‘hard’ news and op-eds, may be guided by varying assumptions or intentions, they all share space in the US mediascape, competing as meaning-creators. We aggregated them in this analysis due to this direct competition. Also, polls during this study’s time frame showed that over 50% of TPM members viewed FNN’s opinion shows as hard news (CBS News & New York Times Poll, 2010; Zernike, 2010, p. 221). For the purpose of analyzing meaning-creation in the media, if news consumers considered a source news, it makes sense to analyze it as such. Our 22-month time frame ranges from 19 February 2009—when Santelli issued his plea for a ‘New Chicago Tea Party’—to 30 November 2010 in order to capture a significant slice of the midterm post-election coverage concerning the TPM’s electoral impact and projections for long-term influence.5 3362 items met the selection criteria, and Graph 1.1 summarizes the longitudinal breakdown of the data. Early coverage spiked around the 15 April 2009 Tax Day Tea Party Protests—the first major event organized by TPM coalitions—and rose meteorically with the spring 2010 primaries and the general election in fall 2010. Coverage peaked the month before the midterm elections. Graph 1.2 illustrates the distribution of the data set by source. In terms of frequency, CNN reports nearly doubled those of FNN, the source with next greatest prevelance.6 Meanwhile, CBS offered the least coverage, one-tenth of CNN’s. Graph 1.3 shows data by breaking down the sample between television reports and newspaper articles.

Graph 1.1. Number of articles and reports by month. Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011

Graph 1.2. Number of articles/reports about Tea Party by media source. Media Framing and the Tea Party Movement 349

Graph 1.3. Number of articles vs. reports.

After compiling a data set of eligible transcripts and articles, we randomly selected a 45-article mini-sample7 to run an open–closed coding for inductively identifying predominant frames (Glaser, 1978, pp. 56–61). Each author independently read the sample and noted all emergent frames. For the sake of parsimony, we then compacted related themes and tropes, resulting in eight predominant frames for our closed coding, with four sets of competing frames. In the following section, the introduction to each frame includes the frame definitions we used when coding. To measure validity of the coding structure, the authors tested inter-coder reliability by independently closed-coding the sample for the eight dominant frames. We then ran a statistical comparison to ensure each frame attained statistically significant agreement. Overall, our reliability test achieved 93.6% coder agreement, well within the acceptable range of reliability coefficients (Riffe et al., 1998, p. 131; Neuendorf, 2002, pp. 142–143).8 After achieving inter-coder reliability we analyzed a representative sample of 882 news packets, compiling it by arranging the full data set chronologically and selecting every fourth item. The sample almost perfectly mirrors longitudinal distribution, and distribution by source.9 The unit of analysis for this study was the news packet, with each packet potentially exhibiting up to eight frames. While the two frames in each framing set are dichotomous and distinct, news packets frequently displayed competing frames in accordance with the balance norm. We included each news packet as one account of each frame it used, regardless of the frequency of the frame’s appearance, or its appearance with competing frames. Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011

Results Everyday American Frame versus Non-Mainstream Frame Tea Party proponents describe their movement as comprising everyday Americans, and the media mirrored this self-representation. Articles and reports including the Everyday American Frame represented TPM members as new to politics and not being political activists; proponents were portrayed as patriots or as individuals operating on the basis of common sense. By contrast, TPM members lamented that media unfairly portrayed them as outside-the-mainstream racists, freaks, and right-wing extremists. We found that media did indeed use what we call the Non-Mainstream Frame, which appeared in discussions 350 J. Boykoff & E. Laschever

of the TPM, its members, and candidates as ignorant, naive, freaky, racist or extremist (Table 1).

Table 1. Everyday American Frame vs. Non-Mainstream Frame

Everyday American Frame Non-Mainstream Frame No. of Percentage of total No. of Percentage of total News sources articles/reports articles/reportsa articles/reports articles/reports ABC 2 5.7 8 22.9 CBS 2 8.3 8 33.3 CNN 51 18.3 108 38.7 FNN 50 34.0 19 12.9 MSNBC 11 9.2 83 69.2 NYT 9 8.3 36 33.0 USA 4 16.0 6 24.0 WP 6 6.5 28 30.1 WSJ 9 18.0 10 20.0 Total 144 16.3 306 34.7

aThe percentage of total articles/reports for that source within the representative sample.

The TPM was portrayed as Non-Mainstream in approximately 35% of the sample, doubling that of the Everyday American Frame. MSNBC led sources in the attack, with 69% of their reports invoking the Non-Mainstream Frame, often laced with invective, as with this excerpt from MSNBC’s Keith Olbermann:

If racism is not the whole of the Tea Party, it is in its heart, along with blind hatred, a total disinterest in the welfare of others, and a full-flowered, self-rationalizing refusal to accept the outcomes of elections, or the reality of democracy, or of the narrowness of their minds and the equal narrowness of their public support.10

MSNBC did not shy away from strong language in discussing the TPM, and was responsible for the controversial ‘teabagging’ innuendo in spring 2009. Among other sources, however, the Non-Mainstream Frame was more commonly posed as an inquiry about whether or not the movement exhibited elements outside the mainstream. In the case Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 of FNN, the frame frequently occurred as a straw-man argument on the road to refuting the claim. The frame often arose as sources debated whether or not the TPM was actually racist. This passage from the Washington Post typifies the balance many articles adopted as journalists represented both sides of the movement—the ostensibly racist fringe and the rest of the movement:

tea party members are not seething, ready-to-explode racists, as some liberal commentators have caricatured them. Some are extremists and bigots, sure. The crowd was almost entirely white. I differ strenuously with the protesters on about 95 per cent of the issues. Nevertheless, on the whole, they struck me as passionate conservatives dedicated to working within the system rather than dangerous militia types or a revival of the Ku Klux Klan.11 Media Framing and the Tea Party Movement 351

Despite declaring no association with the Klan, describing the movement as predominantly white with a fringe of bigotry offers some deprecatory bite. Overall, though, this passage highlights that while fringe elements may exist, they do not constitute the bulk of the movement. While incarnations of the Non-Mainstream Frame outweighed the Everyday American Frame, the latter played prominently, particularly within FNN. Breaking with the trend from other news sources, FNN used the Everyday American Frame in 34% of the reports (more than 2.5 times its use of the Non-Mainstream Frame). This frame conjured images of American flags flying over middle-town USA and frequently referenced the founding fathers, as with this comment on FNN’s Hannity: ‘I’ve been to some tea-party rallies [ ...] they are some of the best people. They are patriotic people. They believe in America. They believe in the values of the founders. And you can’t bad-mouth these people, because they are [ ...] decent American people’.12 With this frame the TPM was heralded as middle- class Americans struggling to make the most of the country they love, as a populist movement of small business owners, nurses, veterans, and mothers.13 News outlets also showed that TPM members were Everyday Americans by describing them as new to the political process—as individuals who, despite never having voted previously, became so concerned about the direction of the country that they were spurred into action, as with this Wall Street Journal article:

The ‘tea-party’ movement brewing in the 2010 elections is being driven in part by a potent force: first-time activists [ ...] Matthew Clemente, a 20-year-old college junior, says he wasn’t politically active until recently. But working at his family’s Purchase Street Market in Worcester, Mass., in 2008, he says, he saw that business was down because many of the regulars were in hard-hit construction and contracting businesses.14

This passage typifies media portrayal of the TPM as a collection of individuals provoked into political action for lack of options. As the New York Times noted, ‘it is not uncommon to meet Tea Party advocates who say they have never voted’.15 Other newspapers reported that TPM seeks a similar ‘fresh face, an everyday Joe new to politics’16 in their candidates.

Grassroots Frame versus Establishment-Affiliated Frame Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 The Grassroots Frame and the Establishment-Affiliated Frame represent the second framing battle in the data set. The TPM adamantly professes being a genuine grassroots movement arising bottom-up and operating in a decentralized manner. One of the TPM’s chief complaints is its media portrayal as an Astroturf tool of the Republican Party. The Grassroots Frame was present if the news outlet depicted a genuine and authentic movement, independent of the Republican Party. The frame applied when the group was portrayed as decentralized, lacking in formal leadership, or safe from co- optation by the establishment. Alternatively, the Establishment-Affiliated Frame occurred if the TPM was described as an Astroturf group, a tool of the Republican Party, co-opted by existing powers, or as connected with the Washington, DC political establishment (Table 2). 352 J. Boykoff & E. Laschever

Table 2. Grassroots Frame vs. Establishment-Affiliated Frame.

Grassroots Frame Establishment-Affiliated Frame No. of Percentage of total No. of Percentage of News sources articles/reports articles/reports articles/reports total articles/reports ABC 4 11.4 5 14.3 CBS 6 25.0 2 8.3 CNN 69 24.7 37 13.3 FNN 54 36.7 8 5.4 MSNBC 24 20.0 42 35.0 NYT 19 17.4 18 16.5 USA 6 24.0 3 12.0 WP 17 18.3 10 10.8 WSJ 14 28.0 2 4.0 Total 213 24.1 127 14.4

While the TPM correctly noted that media sometimes portrayed them as Establishment- Affiliated—particularly MSNBC, with 35% of its reports—the majority of news outlets strongly favored the Grassroots Frame. CBS and CNN both used the Grassroots Frame with roughly double the frequency of the Establishment Affiliated Frame; FNN and the WSJ used the Grassroots Frame a whopping seven times as often as the Establishment- Affiliated Frame. Defending his controversial depiction of the movement as ‘unsophisticated’, Karl Rove explained on FNN that this word referred to the movement’s Grassroots and Everyday American nature. He used multiple manifestations of the Grassroots Frame:

They’re [ ...] not comfortable in a cocktail party in Georgetown or a lobbyist meeting on K Street. This [ ...] wasn’t formed by elitist think tanks. This was a spontaneous uprising that began in February of 2009 when Rick Santelli went on television in a rant about why should people who were prudent about their mortgages have to bear the cost of bailing out people who were not. You know, this isn’t clever TV ads focused- grouped by some Madison Avenue thing. This is [ ...] leaflets and hand-written posters and homemade placards. This is not [ ...] a manifesto drafted by a bunch of intellectuals[ ...]You know, this is common sense of America. And [ ...] seasoned political operatives are not running this. It’s mom and pop. It’s ordinary Americans around the kitchen table or in a coffee shop. This is not [ ...] run by some central Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 headquarters from the top down. It is from the bottom up.17

Not only did Rove argue against the Establishment-Affiliated Frame, but he also emphasized the bottom-up, authentic nature of the movement and buttressed it with a heavy dose of the Everyday American Frame. This quote also displays an underpinning feature of the movement: a distrust of those viewed as elite, particularly intellectuals and academics. Other invocations of the Grassroots Frame were subtler, often arising as sources discussed the decentralized nature of the movement and its rejection of insider politics and incumbent politicians. CNN’s Jessica Yellin reported:

I’m not dismissing the fact that they have national funding, but there is a grass roots quality, and in each of the races you described Ali [Velshi of CNN], each of the Media Framing and the Tea Party Movement 353

people who either lost or suffered most were people who were part of the insider, the establishment, people who maybe voted for T.A.R.P [ ...] people are so angry, Wall Street got saved when regular folk didn’t.18

This excerpt illustrates how journalists discounted funding streams, preferring to portray the movement as anti-establishment grassroots. When identifying connections to well- heeled national organizations, news outlets disregarded implications of the Establishment- Affiliation Frame possibly arising from FreedomWorks’ President Dick Armey being the former Republican Speaker of the House. In fact, FreedomWorks—a well-funded, well- connected, DC-based think tank—was described as ‘a conservative grassroots group’ or ‘a nonprofit group that mounts grassroots campaigns’.19 On the flip side of the framing contest, the Establishment-Affiliated Frame often occurred through discussion of how this authentically grassroots movement might be co- opted by financial heavyweights. Journalists speculated that members of the establishment provided funding and organizational support to exploit the movement’s raw power for their own interests. For example, on CNN, in response to Kathleen Parker’s question why the TPM is doing ‘the legwork for the Big Banks’, Matt Taibbi acknowledged the movement is grassroots ‘in some respects’ before asserting, ‘the Koch brothers and other financiers, once they saw this movement happening, were more than willing to push it along and give it the energy and the resources that they needed to spread around the country’.20 In a relatively rare moment in the TPM coverage, a journalist noted that the movement was tied to some of the biggest names in high-stakes finance and politics, ‘powerful interests’ that help promote the TPM to achieve their own ends. While many cases of the Establishment-Affiliated Frame contended that TPM’s genuine roots were co-opted or exploited, others went further. In USA Today, former President Jimmy Carter demonstrated his opinion of the TPM by placing scare quotes around the term ‘grassroots’, denoting spuriousness:

Much of the financial support for the ‘grassroots’ Tea Party movement has come from extremely wealthy owners of petroleum and energy companies whose profits depend on preventing strict environmental standards and regulations that promote safety and competition. Another is that a powerful news organization has provided the requisite publicity and promotion for the Tea Party movement.21

Carter’s tenor was mirrored by Frank Rich in the New York Times, when he described Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 the TPM as ‘an indisputable Republican subsidiary’ that ‘was created by prominent G.O.P. political consultants in California and raises money for G.O.P. candidates’.22 Some journalists saw connections between the TPM and the Republican Party, FNN, and wealthy financial backers as indications the movement is Establishment-Affiliated. However, this version of the frame appeared less frequently than those describing the Tea Party as inadvertently or tenuously affiliated with the establishment.

Fiscal-Federal Frustrations Frame versus Amalgam of Grievances Frame The TPM’s central message is the need to limit a federal government that is taking too much power from the states and individuals. This relates to demands for lower taxes and reduced government spending, and concerns over a ballooning federal deficit. These 354 J. Boykoff & E. Laschever

matters manifested in the media as the Fiscal-Federal Frustrations Frame. Other times the movement was portrayed as having a hodgepodge of grievances or no unified message; this was the Amalgam of Grievances Frame (Table 3).

Table 3. Fiscal-Federal Frustrations Frame vs. Amalgam of Grievances.

Fiscal-Federal Frustrations Frame Amalgam of Grievances No. of Percentage of No. of Percentage of News sources articles/reports total articles/reports articles/reports total articles/reports ABC 11 31.4 2 5.7 CBS 10 41.7 0 0.0 CNN 118 42.3 17 6.1 FNN 67 45.6 10 6.8 MSNBC 29 24.2 8 6.7 NYT 27 24.8 4 3.7 USA 10 40.0 1 4.0 WP 23 24.7 5 5.4 WSJ 23 46.0 1 2.0 Total 318 36.1 48 5.4

The Fiscal-Federal Frustrations Frame was the second most predominant media frame in this study, surfacing in 36% of all news packets. The Amalgam of Grievances Frame, conversely, appeared with the lowest frequency. This indicates the TPM was resoundingly successful at defining their purpose and that the media accurately conveyed their central grievances. When addressing the movement’s political objectives, news outlets defined them as being focused on aspects of fiscal responsibility. As John Avlon explained on CNN, ‘there are many different tributaries to this movement. But the bottom line, the common ground that exists is fiscal conservatism. It is a reaction against overspending and the growth of government’.23 While others agree that the TPM concentrates on taxation and governmental overreach, they believe concern about the federal deficit drives the movement. A front-page USA Today article explained that ‘typical Americans are growing anxious about the nation’s mounting debt, which is helping to fuel the rise of the anti-tax, anti-big-government “Tea Party” movement’.24 As one protester explained on CNN, ‘the

Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 government has grown too big, it’s gotten too out of control in their spending and the taxes are just way too high. And I’m sick and tired of government growing and spending and taxing everybody into oblivion’.25 Most incarnations of the Fiscal-Federal Frustrations Frame took this approach, defining the movement at the fiscally responsible nexus of spending, taxation, and debt. Many Fiscal-Federal Frustrations framings made special note that the TPM’s focus did not extend to social issues, tacitly distinguishing it from conservative movements such as the Christian Right. As Amy Kremer of the Tea Party Express explained on CNN, ‘we are focused completely on the fiscal aspect of the economy. We’re not focused on the social issues’.26 Some see this focus on fiscal over social issues as a key to the movement’s success in not alienating possible recruits, supporters, and bystander publics who wanted to steer clear of the ‘culture war’. Sources often painted the TPM not only as tightly Media Framing and the Tea Party Movement 355

defined around concerns of fiscal responsibility, but also as consciously so—noting intentional efforts to organize on politically unifying concerns. Despite the prevalence of the Fiscal-Federal Frustrations Frame, not everyone agreed that the TPM held tight to a unified message of fiscal fears: 5.5% of the news packets used the Amalgam of Grievances Frame in expressing confusion over the hodgepodge of frustrations or in censuring the TPM for having no real message outside of anger. Reports described how at TPM rallies there was ‘anger being voiced against the president on a number of issues [ ...] that go far beyond taxes’27 and that ‘it’s a very amorphous group of people who don’t all ... agree with the same things.’28 Many of those using the Amalgam of Grievances Frame argued that despite claims to the contrary, the TPM is just as focused on social and cultural issues.29 Following the 2010 midterm elections, media commentators also discussed how ‘powerful factions within the movement are actively debating whether or not to tackle hot button social issues’, and that this would ‘definitely alter the movement.’30 The other predominant incarnation of the Amalgam of Grievances Frame stated that the TPM offered only amorphous, meaningless rage, without providing a clear message or solutions.31 A few pundits argued that TPM outrage was interchangeable with any political hot-button issue-du-jour that right-wing elites conjured to rile up their base. As Eugene Robinson remarked on MSNBC, ‘[p]erhaps for the right, it was an organizing tool, but it didn’t really have much of an aim except, you know, we’re mad as hell and not going to take this anymore, whatever “this” is’.32

Election Impact Frame versus Flash in the Pan Frame Social movements aim to affect policy, elections, and/or public opinion. Early on, the TPM expressed the desire to unseat incumbent politicians who members felt were entrenched, corrupted, and no longer representing their constituents’ interests. The Election Impact Frame describes articles and reports portraying the movement as influential or important in elections, as a significant player in horse-race politics, or as playing a key role in legislative action. The diametric frame in this framing contest was the Flash in the Pan Frame whereby media speculated on the limited impact of the movement, describing the TPM as ill-equipped for the reality of DC politics, as a group with transitory (if that) influence, or as torn apart and weakened by factions and infighting (Table 4). Table 4. Election Impact Frame vs. Flash in the Pan Frame.

Election Impact Frame Flash in the Pan Frame Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 No. of Percentage of total No. of Percentage of total News sources articles/reports articles/reports articles/reports articles/reports ABC 31 88.6 1 2.9 CBS 17 70.8 0 0.0 CNN 192 68.8 25 9.0 FNN 80 54.4 5 3.4 MSNBC 77 64.2 19 15.8 NYT 74 67.9 8 7.3 USA 17 68.0 1 4.0 WP 63 67.7 11 11.8 WSJ 39 78.0 2 4.0 Total 590 66.9 72 8.2 356 J. Boykoff & E. Laschever

The Election Impact Frame was virtually absent from 2009 media coverage. First appearing after the special elections in winter 2009–2010, it climbed steadily through the primaries, before spiking and becoming the predominant frame in summer 2010. Nearly, every article after 1 May 2010 included some discussion of ‘Tea Party candidates’ or how TPM energy drove voter activity. In total, 67% of the news packets featured the Election Impact Frame, by far the most prevalent frame in the study. By contrast, the Flash in the Pan Frame appeared in only 8% of the data set and was effectively absent from about half of the media sources. Agreement existed across news outlets that the TPM heavily impacted the November 2010 midterm elections. Even movement critics like President Carter told CNN that TPM ‘will be very influential in the upcoming election’.33 In post-election coverage, predictions turned into mantras, with the media crediting the TPM for the Republican tidal wave, describing it as ‘a high octane rock band’ that ‘propelled the Republicans to historic wins’.34 The most common version of the Election Impact Frame, however, was the description of ‘Tea Party candidates’. When Chris Matthews stated on MSNBC, ‘Rand Paul, the Tea Party candidate, has defeated the establishment Republican Trey Grayson, the candidate of Mitch McConnell’,35 this implied that the TPM was a player in electoral politics, with the Tea Party candidate challenging the Republican establishment’s candidate. As Jim Acosta said about Rand Paul on CNN, ‘[h]e almost has a “T” next to his name instead of an “R”’.36 Most media interpreted the TPM’s energy as a positive factor increasing the political participation of the Republican Party’s base. However, others argued that it forced the Republican Party to field candidates who were unelectable over moderate Democrats, as captured by the title of this front-page New York Times article: ‘For G.O.P., Fervor of Tea Party Holds Promise, and Problems’.37 Many asserted that primary victories for the Tea Party candidates spelled electoral defeat in the general election where more moderate voters held sway.38 Nevertheless, journalists regularly conveyed that the TPM indubitably influenced the election. After the midterms, the Election Impact Frame morphed slightly as the media began addressing the potential legislative influence of the Tea Party in Congress. One of the Tea Party’s first initiatives was to ban earmarks in Congress; one reporter commented, ‘[i]t was entertaining to watch Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell reluctantly capitulate to the Tea Party by supporting a two-year ban on requests for earmarks from his chamber’s Republicans’.39 However, not everyone agreed that the TPM would have lasting influence. About 8% of news packets used the Flash in the Pan Frame to indicate they felt the TPM was a passing Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 fad. As Jonathan Martin remarked while on Hardball, ‘a lot of Americans in this country are not following this at all. New numbers from Pew today, 30 per cent of those surveyed hadn’t even heard of Tea Parties. So let’s not make it more than what it actually is’.40 Some felt that people overinflated a movement that they believed had limited scope and support. Others felt that the movement’s incoherent message and absence of solutions decreased its long-term power and potential effectiveness in the Beltway: ‘[y]ou can win an election on screaming and anger, but you cannot hold and govern for a significant period of time on screaming and anger’.41 Still others opined that philosophical inconsistency would break the TPM from the inside out. Reporters claimed that in some states infighting prevented the TPM from coming together to forward their cause, ‘instead of uniting in a final push toward election day, the movement in Colorado has begun to splinter, with rival camps accusing one another of betrayal, naivete´ and failure of Media Framing and the Tea Party Movement 357

courage’.42 Fighting also surfaced among TPM leadership as they jostled for power and debated what issues should be included in the movement.43 Reports and articles often portrayed the TPM as influential in driving voter participation, but believed that the movement’s decentralized nature made it ill-equipped at providing cohesive and sustainable suggestions through Congress. Largely, media portrayed the TPM as a powerful political player and ‘the biggest dynamic of the campaign’,44 a dynamic with the potential to continue influencing the political landscape through legislative efforts and future elections.

Framing the Tea Party Movement In this study, we identified the predominant media frames in US media coverage of the TPM. We also traced framing contests between TPM supporters and their detractors as arbitrated by the US media. Overall, the US media depicted the TPM with supportive frames (Everyday American, Grassroots, Fiscal Federal Frustrations, and Election Impact) more than twice as often as the deprecatory characterizations the activists opposed (Non-Mainstream, Establishment-Affiliated, Amalgam of Grievances, and Flash-in-the- Pan). Usually, media portrayed the TPM as an electorally influential grassroots movement—albeit sometimes depicted with a non-mainstream fringe—primarily concerned with an overreaching, fiscally irresponsible federal government. The four frame pairs constituted discursive battles over how to define the emergent and burgeoning movement in the public sphere. With the onset of the primary elections, however, media slid into horse-race mode: election coverage concentrating on who is ahead in the race for votes and money while largely ignoring issues and policies (Flowers et al., 2003), which Lawrence (2010) calls the ‘game frame’. Eventually, the media grew overwhelmingly reliant on the Election Impact Frame, relegating the frame contest to background noise. But by then, the movement had been defined, and in generally favorable terms.45 Table 5 summarizes the framing contest and provides evidence supporting the TPM’s sentiment it benefited from advantageous coverage (Gardner, 2010).

Table 5. Framing contest.

Frames used by Tea Party in self- description Frames opposed by Tea Party Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 No. of Percentage of total No. of Percentage of Frames articles/reports articles/reports articles/reports total articles/reports EAF 144 16.3 N-MF 307 34.8 GF 213 24.1 E-AF 126 14.3 F-FFF 318 36.1 AoGF 48 5.4 EIF 590 66.9 FitPF 72 8.2 Total 1265 35.9 Total 553 15.7

The TPM succeeded in mobilizing symbolic media representations to advance their goals, fomenting a conducive ‘discursive opportunity structure’ where its ‘ideas are considered “sensible”’, its ‘constructions of reality are seen as “realistic”’, and its ‘claims 358 J. Boykoff & E. Laschever

are held as “legitimate” within a certain polity at a specific time’ (Koopmans & Statham, 1999, p. 228). Such affirmative coverage helped the TPM meet a number of key preconditions for successful collective action. In fact, the precondition that sits at the center of our analysis—obtaining preferably positive media coverage—fed other preconditions such as solidarity-building, movement-recruiting, securing the support of bystander publics, nurturing leadership structures, and carving out tactical space to pursue goals (McAdam, 1996; Boykoff, 2006a). This helps explain the movement’s remarkable impact on the 2010 midterm elections. One explanation for the TPM’s politically propitious media coverage is journalistic sourcing. Numerous TPM leaders—such as Dana Loesch, Mark Williams, and Representative Michele Bachmann—regularly appeared as guests or sources, allowing the movement to self-define on the contested media terrain in tune with TPM interests. These prominent guests—and many others of their ilk—actively refuted frames portraying the movement in a denigrating light, firing back with counternarratives that undercut potentially damaging frames. Other journalistic norms offer additional analytical leverage on our findings. Largely, media act as a conveyor belt of personalization, drama, and novelty; this usually translated into political profitability for the TPM. The movement featured an array of colorful, committed activists engaged in dramatic conflict not only with President Obama and his fellow Democrats, but also with the Republican Party, making for lively news. The TPM’s cross-country caravans were novel and unpredictable, their historical costumes were eye- catching, making them irresistible to the US media. As mentioned above, the media’s balance norm helped trigger more advantageous framing when movement detractors tried to air more critical frames. The contextual factor of the economy’s downward spiral helped give some of the movement’s grievances more heft. On the other hand, adherence to journalistic norms also led to coverage that undercut the movement. The TPM’s contention that media portrayed them as Non-Mainstream is accurate. This frame registered almost as frequently as the TPM’s stated mission of addressing Fiscal-Federal Frustrations, appearing in 35% of articles. However, this can be explained by the media’s attention to a few key dramatic imbroglios that triggered the Non-Mainstream Frame: TPM leader Mark Williams’ controversial ‘Letter to Lincoln’, an ostensible satire that thrummed with racist innuendo; a public accusation by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) that the TPM was composed of ‘racist elements’; and Tea Party Senate candidate Rand Paul’s questioning of

Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 central planks in the Civil Rights Act. The Non-Mainstream Frame also featured in numerous articles about the two Tea Party-backed candidates for Senate: Sharron Angle (Nevada) and Christine O’Donnell (Delaware). These candidates were plagued by gaffes (e.g. Angle remarked to a classroom of Hispanic students that they looked ‘a little more Asian’ than Latino and a videotape surfaced of O’Donnell asserting that she ‘dabbled into witchcraft’) and extreme policies out of tune with public opinion (e.g. abolishing the Department of Education). Thus, in many instances the media’s implementation of the Non-Mainstream Frame was logical,46 though it would be unfair to use these candidates as a synecdoche for the entire movement, as frequently happened on MSNBC. As evidence of the patterned concatenation of frames, the Flash in the Pan Frame often emerged in discussions of sectarian fractioning over the expulsion of Tea Party Express leader Mark Williams for his controversial ‘Letter to Lincoln’.47 Media Framing and the Tea Party Movement 359

Another key factor in the TPM’s media coverage is the role of FNN. Williamson et al. (2011, p. 29) assert, ‘the quality of coverage the Tea Party has received on Fox is fundamentally different from the coverage on other major networks’. Drawing particular attention to how early coverage from FNN galvanized the movement with large quantities of coverage directly proceeding and following their first major Tax Day Tea Party event in April 2009, the authors identify a peer-pressure effect of sorts: the climb in coverage from other networks partially in response to the push from FNN. They (2011, p. 30) argue, ‘Fox News in effect acts as a “national social movement organization”’ by providing a media megaphone through which the movement broadcast its message to potentially sympathetic bystander publics and by:

promoting the label and providing a venue for the leading voices, articulating a sense of pride and power among conservatives discouraged after November 2008, and spreading information about how people could get involved in national occasions to display solidarity and collective voice. All of these are invaluable aids to collective action among dispersed, not previously interconnected people.

Our study systematically examined differences in the quantity and quality of coverage from multiple news outlets, including FNN. Our findings support and add specificity to their contention that FNN used frames that legitimized and boosted the TPM, consistently providing airtime to TPM activists and leaders to articulate their political positions and to self-define the movement in politically positive ways. We also found that advocacy media mattered in another way: they disproportionately paid attention to—and critiqued—each other. This is another aspect of the peer-pressure effect. As noted earlier, the TPM members commented frequently on the media coverage of the movement, often lamenting what they perceived as unjust portrayals. This points to a Media Coverage of Media Coverage dynamic appearing prominently in our data set. This trend was present when a source included discussion of, or reference to stories occurring in the news, or evaluation of the coverage of the movement. It frequently invoked criticism of the source mentioned. References to ‘media’ coverage in general, ‘liberal media’, ‘mainstream media’, ‘conservative media’ or ‘Obama-mania media’ also constituted a significant portion of this trend (Table 6).

Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 Table 6. Media Coverage of Media Coverage Dynamic.

News sources No. of articles/reports Percentage of total articles/reports ABC 3 8.6 CBS 3 12.5 CNN 35 12.5 FNN 50 34.0 MSNBC 32 26.7 NYT 13 11.9 USA 2 8.0 WP 7 7.5 WSJ 5 10.0 Total 150 17.0 360 J. Boykoff & E. Laschever

Media Coverage of Media Coverage occurred in 17% of the sample. However, while most sources used the frame between 7% and 13% of the time, MSNBC’s usage jumped to 26.5% and FNN topped all other sources with 34%. Two themes arose most often: all news sources questioned FNN’s cozy relationship with the TPM, and FNN criticized the biased nature of movement coverage from all other news outlets. Peggy Noonan, a writer with the Wall Street Journal, summarized the ‘ideological breakdown’ in the media split while appearing on ABC News shortly after the TPM’s first major event—the 15 April 2009 Tax Day Tea Party Protests:

it’s hard for us who got most of this through TV and the newspapers and the web to understand exactly how big the TEA party thing was because the coverage itself was so politically charged [...] Liberal newspapers [ ...] were subtly dismissive. Conservative cable news houses were more than subtly supportive.48

This excerpt highlights a compelling feature of the movement’s coverage—sometimes the media’s back-and-forth made it difficult to discern an accurate picture of the TPM because of the mudslinging between news outlets. In fact, a number of sources met the criteria for inclusion in the data set purely because of the Media Coverage of Media Coverage dynamic. In other words, sometimes reports provided no description of the TPM’s aims, activities or composition; they only commented on the coverage of the movement in other news sources. As evidenced by the high frequency of this dynamic on MSNBC and FNN, it is perhaps unsurprising that these two networks—especially on their opinion-oriented advocacy journalism shows—often used the TPM to critique one another. MSNBC regularly lambasted the TPM as a construction of FNN, as Rachel Maddow did on MSNBC:

they’re called Fox News Channel tax day tea parties because all the big Fox News Channel personalities appeared at [ ...] tax day tea party events. They were Fox News endorsed and promoted and, in some cases, hosted events. They didn’t just cover the tea party protests. They ran ads for them. They used Fox News Channel staff production time and ad time on their air to promote the events. They ran tea party promotions.49

Many in the media, particularly MSNBC, saw FNN as not only failing to objectively report TPM news, but also as responsible for creating the TPM all together. Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 On the other hand, FNN expressed frustration—and at times outrage—at how news media first ignored and then misrepresented the TPM. While on a FNN show covering the 15 April 2009 Tax Day Tea Party protest, Michael Steele commented:

let’s not put too much in what the news agencies are going to be reporting. We witnessed the MSNBC’s of the world to denigrate these individuals, these men and women who have expressed real concern about where their hard earned tax dollars are going. We have watched them make fun of them and sort of dismiss them.50

FNN frequently complained that the ‘mainstream media’ failed to adequately cover the TPM, asserting that the movement should garner significantly more media attention. They Media Framing and the Tea Party Movement 361

also expressed frustration over the use of the Non-Mainstream Frame51 and the Establishment-Affiliated Frame52 by other news outlets. In addition to FNN’s and MSNBC’s preoccupation with the media coverage of other news outlets, one of our significant findings was the marked difference in frame employment not only between FNN and MSNBC, but also between FNN and the New York Times and Washington Post. This validates Williamson et al., (2011) speculation that the quality of coverage by FNN differed from other networks. In fact, it is this marked difference in the quality of the coverage that resulted in the emergence of our paired-frame research structure as well as the Media Coverage of Media Coverage dynamic. As our results clearly indicate, FNN frequently broke with the reporting trends of other news organizations (most notably on the Everyday American Frame vs. Non-Mainstream Frame). When this happened, they often highlighted this divergence explicitly, which contributed to the Media Coverage of Media Coverage trend. The significant disparity between FNN and other networks points to a possible trend in declining objectivity in twenty-first century news. With this in mind, it would be worthwhile to conduct a systematic frame analysis of avowedly partisan opinion producers, such as conservative talk radio, to determine the full extent of this potential shift toward media polarization. A frame analysis of talk radio in relation to the TPM is particularly important due to the mobilizing role this medium played in the movement. Covering the TPM is a complicated task for journalists due to the movement’s decentralized organizational structure. Media often rose to the challenge, digging into issues around the TPM with complexity, nuance, and depth, as when Rand Paul went teˆte-a`-teˆte with Eliot Spitzer.53 Nevertheless, there were numerous missed opportunities. Where were in-depth examinations of ostensibly grassroots organizations like FreedomWorks to see who was running and funding the group? Also, the media slid into the well-worn ruts of unimaginative horse-race coverage, where accounts became more rote and less textured. Meanwhile, the ideas behind the TPM descended into the background—even as they continued to evolve—while their use value in the realm of electoral politics became the dominant mode of media coverage. Castells (2005) notes, ‘[i]t is through media politics that non-state actors influence people and foster social change’. The TPM was able to ‘influence people’ through the media, though it remains to be seen whether it will ‘foster social change’ in ways its adherents demand. In any case, the movement will be a force to be reckoned with in the 2012 presidential election.54 Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the anonymous referees, Graeme Hayes, and Kaia Sand for their insightful feedback and for their encouragement. The authors thank Pacific University for a Story-Dondero faculty development grant that helped fund this project.

Notes

1. The TEA Party Movement’s name appears in many forms: TEA Party, Tea Party, Tea Party Movement. We treat the terms as synonymous and abbreviate it to TPM. 2. Bertram Scheufele (2004: 411) delineates four types of framing effects: ‘through media-framing, already existing schemata of recipients can be activated (activation effect) or modified (transformation effect). Schemata not yet existent can be established by media-framing ( formation effect), and, finally, already existing attitudes can be altered (attitudinal effect).’ 362 J. Boykoff & E. Laschever

3. This is a macro-model of framing. To convert it into a micro-model for the individual, we would add individual cognition processes and a filter next to the Cultural Resonance filter for Prior Knowledge and Cognitive Style. Scheufele (1999, p. 115) addresses the macro–micro question in part by differentiating between the ‘media frames’ and ‘audience frames’, but also by cordoning ‘individual-level effects of framing’ including ‘attributions of responsibility’ and individual attitudes and actions. 4. While the Los Angeles Times ranked fourth, it was excluded from the dataset because it was unavailable for a significant portion of our time frame. 5. The reports and articles must exhibit more than a passing reference to the TPM. This is operationally quantified with the requirement of four references to ‘Tea Party’ for news reports and two references for newspaper articles. Fewer references are required of newspaper articles because of their shorter length. This limit was necessary to simplify an otherwise unmanageably large data set and to weed out articles without actual content on the movement. We included op-ed style news reports—such as Glenn Beck and Bill O’Reilly—because of their consistently high comparative ratings within their own networks and in comparison with competing networks’ news shows (Ariens, 2010). 6. CNN repeats stories hourly; transcripts with directly duplicated content were excluded from the database. This holds true for duplicated content from all sources. 7. The mini-sample included articles from every month in the time frame and every source in the study. 8. Every frame had an acceptable coder agreement. The eight frames and their reliability coefficients were: Everyday American Frame (86.4%); Non-Mainstream Frame (100%); Grassroots Frame (92%); Establishment-Affiliated Frame (88.9%); Amalgam of Grievances Frame (100%); Fiscal-Federal Frustrations Frame (96.6%); Election Impact Frame (96%); and Flash in the Pan Frame (81.8%). 9. There is only slight overrepresentation of certain months in 2009 and slight underrepresentation of certain months in 2010, because of the astronomical jump in 2010 coverage. Regardless, no month was over- or underrepresented by more than 0.4%. Regarding source distribution, the NYT and the WSJ were overrepresented and underrepresented by about 1%. Source distribution for ABC News is 4% of the sample; CBS is 3%; CNN is 31.5%; FNN is 16.5%; MSNBC is 13.5%; NYT is 12.5%; USA is 3%; WP is 10.5%; and WSJ is 5.5%. 10. Olbermann, K. (2010) For 22 March 2010, Countdown, MSNBC, 22 March. 11. McCartney, R. (2010) Tea Partiers’ More Wacky Mavericks than Violent Threat, Washington Post, 18 April, p. C01. 12. Brittany, M. (2010) Will Massachusetts Election Kill Health Care Bill?, Fox Hannity, FNN, 18 January. 13. Jenkins, G. (2009) Analysis With Dick Morris, Fox Hannity, FNN, 31 August. 14. Fields, G. (2010) U.S. News: Tea-Party Drive Steeped in Political Novices—Movement Attracts First-Time Activists Mad About Debt, Expanding Government; Incumbents in Both Parties Face Risks, Wall Street Journal, 20 February, p. A4. 15. Zernike, K. (2010) A Young and Unlikely Activist Who Got to the Tea Party Early, New York Times,28 February, p. A1. 16. Simon, S. (2010) U.S. News: Tea Party Cools on Colorado Favorite, Wall Street Journal, 4 September, p. 4A. 17. Rove, K. (2010) ‘Karl Rove Says Tea Party is Unsophisticated’, Fox on the Record with Greta van Susteren, FNN, 26 October.

Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 18. Yellin, J. (2010) Stock Markets; Primary Elections; Walking Away from Mortgages’, Your Money, CNN, 22 May. 19. Steinhauser, P. (2010) Christine O’Donnell on the Defensive, The Situation Room, CNN, 20 September; Stelter, B. (2009) Reporter Says Outburst Was Spontaneous, New York Times, 3 March, p. B10. 20. Taibbi, M. (2010) Interview With Matt Taibbi; Lesson from Late Night Comedy, Parker Spitzer, CNN, 8 November. 21. Carter, J. (2010) Tea Party and Me; My Victory, Like the Angry Mood Today, Relied on Deep Dissatisfaction Among Voters. But Other factors, Especially Partisanship and Big Money, are Different, USA Today,29 September, p. 11A. 22. Rich, F. (2010) There’s a Battle Outside and It Is Still Ragin’, New York Times, 25 July, p. 8. 23. Avlon, J. (2010) Americans Charged with Kidnapping; Bank of America Outrage; Welcome to the TEA Party, Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, CNN, 4 February. 24. Wolf, R. (2010) A Soaring Debt, and Painful Choices; Erasing the USA’s Red Ink Won’t be Easy—or Popular, USA Today, 13 April, p. 1A. Media Framing and the Tea Party Movement 363

25. Unidentified Male, (2009) Tea Party Express Ends Tour At U.S. Capitol; Thousands Protest Government Spending, Health Care Reform; More Troops to Afghanistan? Interesting Technique for French Restaurants; Influence of Arthur Ashe, CNN Newsroom, CNN, 12 September. 26. Amy K. ‘Bermuda Bruised from Hurricane Igor; Dying to Help in Pakistan; Tea Party Gets Religious’, American Morning, CNN, 20 September. 27. Snow, M. (2009) Feds Warn of Right-Wing Threat; First Family Releases Tax Returns; ‘Tea Party’ Targets Taxes, President; President Obama’s Immigration Morass, The Situation Room, CNN, 15 April. 28. Carlson, T. (2009) Poll Says Tea Party Beats GOP but not Dems, Fox on the Record with Greta van Susteren, FNN, 7 December. 29. Blecher, C. (2010) Tea Party vs. NAACP; BP’s Well Cap, John King USA, CNN, 16 July. 30. Cameron, C. (2010) Political Headlines, Fox Special Reports with Bret Baier, FNN, 26 November. 31. Frank, T. (2010) The Tilting Yard: Here Come the Plastic Pitchforks, Wall Street Journal, 15 April, p. A13. 32. Robinson, E. (2009) ‘For August 3, 2009’, The Rachel Maddow Show, MSNBC, 3 August. 33. King, L. (2010) Interview with Jimmy Carter, Larry King Live, CNN, 26 September. 34. Todd, B. (2010) Famous Faces in NYC Marathon; Selling America in India, The Situation Room, CNN, 7 November. 35. Matthews, C. (2010) Hardball 1900 Hour for May 18, 2010, Hardball, MSNBC, 18 May. 36. Acosta, J. (2010) Primary Races Oust Well-Known Incumbents; Protestors in Thailand Burning Down Buildings After Government Crackdown, American Morning, CNN, 19 May. 37. Zernike, K. (2010) ‘For G.O.P., Fervor of Tea Party Holds Promise, and Problems’, New York Times,6 September, p. A1. 38. Rendell, E. (2010) Political Pressure Builds Over Oil Spill; Air India Crash Survivor Tells Her Story; Radical Cleric Threatens Violence; CNN Viewers Offer Oil Leak Fix Ideas; Sarah Ferguson Caught on Tape Asking for Bribe; Cyclist Landis Admits Drug Use, CNN Newsroom, CNN, 23 May. 39. Dionne, E. J. (2010) The Tea Party vs. Bush, Washington Post, 18 November. 40. Martin, J. (2010) For April 19, 2010, Hardball, MSNBC, 19 April. 41. Bennett, B. (2010) Tea Party Target; Movement Ousts Bennett in Utah, World News Sunday, ABC, 16 May; also: Hill, M. L. (2010) Midterm Election Results; Possible 2012 Contenders; Two Years of Gridlock? American Morning, CNN, 3 November. 42. Simon, S. (2010) Election 2010—Colorado: State Tea-Party Groups Splinter as Vote Nears, Wall Street Journal, 26 October, p. A4. 43. Shultz, E., (2010) The Ed Show for March 16, 2010, The Ed Show with Ed Shultz, MSNBC, 16 March. 44. Bash, D., (2010) Midterm ‘Shellacking’; A Divided Congress, John King USA, CNN, 3 November. 45. Occasionally Tea Partiers expressed frustration that the media ignored them or undervalued them. However, the sheer number of news packets discussing the TPM refutes the claim that the movement was ignored. 46. Such framing highlights that these are analytical frames with normative implications. 47. Lemon, D. (2010) Williams & Tea Party Express Booted; Alvin Greene Speaks Out; BP May Keep Cap in Place; Author Bill Clegg Talks About His Book, CNN Newsroom, CNN, 18 July. 48. Noonan, P. (2010) The Roundtable; Tax Tea Party, This Week, ABC, 19 April.

Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011 49. Maddow, R. (2010) The Rachel Maddow Show for April 7, 2010, The Rachel Maddow Show, MSNBC, 7 April. 50. Steele, M. (2009) Protesters Gather for Tax Day Tea Parties, Fox on the Record with Greta Van Susteren, FNN, 15 April. 51. Dobbs, L. (2009) Obama and the CIA; President Obama’s First 90 Days; U.N. Circus; War on the Middle Class; Signs of Recovery, Lou Dobbs Tonight, CNN, 20 April; van Susteren, G. (2009) President Obama Attends Summit of the Americas, Fox on the Record with Greta van Susteren, FNN, 17 April; Gibson, J. (2009) BECK for December 18, 2009, Beck, FNN, 18 December; O’Reilly, B. (2010) Talking Points Memo and Top Story, The O’Reilly Factor, FNN, 22 April. 52. Berkowitz, P. (2010) Why Liberals Don’t Get the Tea Party Movement, Wall Street Journal, 16 October, p. A17. 53. Spitzer, E. & Paul, R. (2010) Interview with Rand Paul, Parker Spitzer, CNN, 9 November. 54. Please refer to Tables 1–6. 364 J. Boykoff & E. Laschever

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Jules Boykoff is an associate professor of political science at the Pacific University in Oregon. He is the author of The Suppression of Dissent: How the State and Mass Media Squelch USAmerican Social Movements (Routledge 2006), Beyond Bullets: The Suppression of Dissent in the United States (AK Press 2007), and co-authored Landscapes of Dissent: Guerrilla Poetry and Public Space (Palm Press 2008) with Kaia Sand. His research on social movements has appeared recently in Human Geography, New Left Review, and Oregon Historical Quarterly.

Eulalie Laschever (BA Pacific University) is a first-year graduate student at the University of California-Irvine. She is pursuing her PhD in sociology with concentrations in social movement studies and political sociology. Downloaded by [Jules Boykoff] at 08:46 23 November 2011