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The Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy Had Yet to Be Properly Backed up by Facts

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The Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy Had Yet to Be Properly Backed up by Facts 63((&+ 'U)UDQ]),6&+/(5 Member of the European Commission responsible for Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries 7KH UHIRUP RI WKH &RPPRQ )LVKHULHV 3ROLF\ European Parliament - Fisheries Committee %UXVVHOV0D\ Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, Thank you for the invitation to speak before the Fisheries Committee. I would mainly like to use this opportunity to answer your questions. However, before I begin there are a few points I would like to clarify: (1) Neither in determining the content of my proposals on fisheries reform nor in delaying their submission was I in any way improperly influenced - any assertions to the contrary are incorrect and I reject them unreservedly. (2) There is no link whatsoever between the delay to the reform proposals and the personnel decision taken concerning Steffen Smidt. (3) That decision was in no way influenced from the outside. Assertions of this nature are simply not correct. However, because of the volume of speculation and conjecture on these issues in recent weeks, I would like to take the time to explain how I see the main stages involved in preparing the fisheries policy reforms and the staffing decision regarding my Director-General, Steffen Smidt. Let me begin by pointing out that discussions have been ongoing at all levels for a year, since the Green Paper on the future of the fisheries policy was published. Nobody, therefore, can seriously claim to have had insufficient opportunities or time to put forward their ideas or voice their doubts. It must be equally clear that one of the aspects of the Commission's independence is its freedom to decide which ideas to include in its proposals. Secondly, I would like point out that inter-departmental consultations were initiated by my staff on )HEUXDU\ and they subsequently incorporated many of the suggestions made by the other Directorates-General into the various drafts of the proposal. Thirdly, on 10 April discussions were initiated with the other cabinets in order to prepare for a decision by the Commission on 17 April. At this stage many new issues were raised, some of which required extensive further investigation and economic analysis. For example, questions were asked as to how the existing fleet policy would be transformed into the new one. The status of the stocks for various species was queried and calls were made for a socio-economic study on the impact of our proposals on the fishing industry. Some cabinets questioned the abolition of aid for fleet modernisation. Others called into question the need for additional budget appropriations to fund the reform. Finally there were requests to improve certain passages in the text, for example those relating to industrial fisheries and the link between scientific advice and follow-up action. Finally, however, the cabinets recommended that the reform package be deferred by one week until 24 April, to give time for the issues raised to receive the attention they deserve. As you can see, this debate took place before 21 April. The following week, on 17 April, a further meeting of the cabinets took place. Although we had in the meantime cleared up many of the issues, new questions emerged, for which an answer had to be prepared. This is not at all uncommon: the longer the time spent preparing proposals, the more one wishes to see the issues resolved in detail. 2 In addition, there were a number of real sticking points, for example the budget problem was still outstanding, and a number of other issues emerged that required clarification. We agreed to have another look at our calculations regarding the extra resources required for scrapping and social measures. Also, as far as some cabinets were concerned, we did not provide sufficient evidence of the scientific basis for our proposals. Indeed, for industrial fishing, exact figures were requested. The role of Community inspectors still remained to be sufficiently clearly defined. The issue of including a review clause for the new policy was also brought up. The outcome of the meeting was that we would have to clarify all these questions if the proposals were to be accepted by the Commission on 24 April. When I had time to look at the notes and minutes from the cabinet meetings more closely at the weekend, I had the impression that we had made good progress, but that some of the details of our memorandum on the reform of the common fisheries policy had yet to be properly backed up by facts. I also realised that we still needed to make our case more convincingly. And I attach great importance to being able to put forward properly reasoned proposals. I thought that we needed to take a bit more time to improve yet further certain crucial aspects of our communication. This mainly concerned the chapter on social measures and that on fleet policy. Our proposals in these fields were simply not yet clear enough. At the same time as I was coming to this conclusion, a quite unrelated development occurred. On Sunday 21 April , Mr Prodi called me at home. I told him that in my judgement we required more time to fine-tune my memorandum. He told me that he had spoken to Mr Aznar on the telephone, but did not mention any details of their conversation. There were therefore two unrelated reasons for deferring the decision on the fisheries reform again. At the meeting of the Heads of Cabinet on the following Monday it was announced that the reform would be dealt with on 28 May - the earliest possible opportunity, since in the next two weeks it was not going to be possible for me to attend the meetings of the Commission on account of the informal meeting of Agriculture Ministers and a visit to Germany, while on 14 May the Commission would be meeting in Strasbourg and on 22 May Prime Minister Lipponen would be visiting the Commission - therefore the next available date was 28 May. Taking advantage of the time available before 28 May I held four meetings with my staff in which we discussed the analyses, calculations and improvements to the reform package I had ordered. At the same time I also set my cabinet to work intensively on further improvements to the proposals. I would also like to remind you that I was invited here to Parliament on 24 April for a dinner along with various members of this Committee and representatives of the processing industry. I pointed out then that I thought it was necessary to postpone my reform package in order to make improvements to it, so the idea was not produced for the first time in response to the later oral question. As you see, therefore, I did not receive instructions from anyone at any time. I have not changed my intention of tabling a substantive reform of the common fisheries policy. Be patient for another five days, and you will see that my proposals to the Commission are more closely argued but no different in substance. The four-week delay will have no impact on the Council's decision-making process since, even if the Commission had adopted the proposals on 17 April, the date for the first discussions by fisheries ministers and in Parliament would be the same. 3 I should now like to turn to the issue of the reassignment of Director-General Steffen Smidt. It is important to review how this decision was taken. In November 2001, an informal and non-binding list of Directors-General due for rotation was circulated within the Commission. The name of Steffen Smidt figured on this list, although neither I nor my cabinet had been informed about it. My Head of Cabinet immediately communicated the fact to Mr Smidt. My reaction to this list at the time already made clear the following points. I was not seeking the reassignment of Mr Smidt, but if it was required as part of the new mobility policy in the interests of the Commission I did not want this to happen during the Council's deliberations nor during the implementation of the reforms: the move would have to be either beforehand or afterwards. Mr Smidt wrote to the Head of Cabinet of Commissioner Kinnock on 25 November to say that he wished to leave the Commission before the end of the Prodi Commission's period in office. On 23 January, the Commission decided in my absence on a rotation package as the basis for staffing changes to be adopted by 3 May at the latest. The name of Steffen Smidt was not included, but further modifications at director-general level were not ruled out. On 12 February my Head of Cabinet confirmed, in response to an inquiry from the Head of Cabinet of the President, that my position on a possible replacement of Mr Smidt had not altered since November, i.e. that Mr Smidt could be reassigned but then either before or after the reforms. No date was mentioned. At the end of April, just before the rotation package destined for 3 May was put forward, my Head of Cabinet again confirmed this stance to the cabinet of Mr Kinnock. My Head of Cabinet informed Mr Smidt immediately about renewed rumours of his possible replacement. In talks among the cabinets on 23 April, it transpired that a decision had been reached to include Mr Smidt on the rotation list. Neither my Head of Cabinet, nor I myself, nor Mr Smidt knew about this decision before it was taken. My Head of Cabinet therefore asked Mr Kinnock's cabinet to inform Mr Smidt accordingly. Mr Kinnock did so on the Tuesday evening, whereupon Mr Smidt came to see me.
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