Carnegie Corporation of New York Oral History Project
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK ORAL HISTORY PROJECT The Reminiscences of Patricia L. Rosenfield Columbia Center for Oral History Columbia University 2013 PREFACE The following oral history is the result of a recorded interview with Patricia L. Rosenfield conducted by Ronald J. Grele on February 22, 2012, March 9, 2012 and September 24, 2012. This interview is part of the Carnegie Corporation of New York Oral History Project. The reader is asked to bear in mind that s/he is reading a verbatim transcript of the spoken word, rather than written prose. Formatted: Right 3PM Session #1 Interviewee: Patricia L. Rosenfield Location: New York, NY Interviewer: Ronald J. Grele Date: February 22, 2012 Q: I wanted to take you back to 1998, when you had your earlier interview. And you had just gone through the transition, which you described rather interestingly. You said that it was particularly jarring, imposing, it was needlessly fraught with tension, et cetera. And I want to take you back to that moment in time and how that resolved itself. In that interview you had just had a conversation with Dr. [Vartan] Gregorian. And he had talked to you about the scatteration of your program [Strengthening Human Resources in Developing Countries] and talked about being an armchair chair. And that’s where we left off with that. You wanted to get it on the record as to what your program was doing that wasn’t scatteration. And we never got around to being an armchair chair, but that was the point at which we left you. Now, how did that resolve itself in terms of future conversations with Dr. Gregorian, through the McKinsey [& Company] report, through that period? Your thoughts on what that was all about. Rosenfield: I’d have to start by saying recently Dr. Gregorian has been as generous and kind and wonderful to me as any employer has ever been, and even more so. This is not coloring my remembrance of that period. The resolution has been a huge amount of respect and affection, I think, on both sides. But that was a particularly fraught period for a number of reasons, and I wasn’t, by far, the only one who felt that way. Rosenfield – 1 – 2 But in terms of the critique of the program, it shows how different perspectives—someone who knew nothing about Africa and knew nothing about development—would view something, whereas under the previous tenure of [David A.] Hamburg and [Barbara D.] Finberg, it was considered the most strategic of all the programs. And the board was always very positive, very enthusiastic. I would get more money, I’d get more kudos. Even though we weren’t talked about. The Education and Avoiding Nuclear War programs were still getting more attention. Every meeting, every review was over-the-top positive. So I said: scatteration? Yes, we have a lot going on but it’s all around the theme of access to knowledge and the mission of the organization. So I have a great deal of affinity for Frederick [P.] Keppel, whose chapter I’ve just finished revising in my book, because he was accused of the same thing. And he had the same response—I mean, I didn’t know this in ʼ98 and ʼ97—that there’s a big picture, and we’re looking at how we fill in those missing elements of that picture to come up with a whole. And we had lots of strategy sessions. So I couldn’t accept that criticism: an armchair chair. I did not do as much traveling to Africa, having spent the previous ten years excessively traveling in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, because I had two staff members who wanted to travel all the time and I was always looking at budget. So I handled the U.S. stuff, they handled Africa, and we would share the European visits. So I went occasionally, but not so much. And so I just thought, this is someone who doesn’t really—I couldn’t accept that comment. Rosenfield – 1 – 3 At the same time, he had something that I totally agreed with in that he wanted to have an African chair of the program. I couldn’t agree more. I found the best African possible for him. And at the same time, scatteration for him meant you’re not doing institutions, you’re doing projects. We had a different perspective. And I have, as I’ve done the history, seen in a historical trajectory how it probably didn’t fit in. It was much more a Ford Foundation program than a Carnegie Corporation [of New York] program. But that was Hamburg. It was very comfortable for Hamburg to have this program. Not only comfortable, but there was wild enthusiasm. Gregorian narrowed it to funding universities and libraries. All the development stuff disappeared because he was focusing on institutions, which is what he was comfortable with. He knew universities and he knew libraries. And I said if that’s what the president wants to do, that’s within his prerogative. Now that I look at the history of Carnegie, it sort of zigs and zags between that approach, but universities were always there. Libraries less so in Africa but they were certainly there at the beginning. So the evolution in my mind right away was: let’s find the best person. Because I’m very loyal to the Africa part of the program because it’s always fragile. Do we do away with it? There are some board members—and I probably said somewhere in that oral history—it was Warren [M.] Christopher, the [63rd United States] Secretary of State. Thank God he was appointed Secretary of State because he was going to do away with the Africa program. Not geopolitically important [spoken sarcastically]. Rosenfield – 1 – 4 So I said we’ll find the best university person. And we did. As it turned out, Narciso Matos, who became the chair—and I don’t know if you’re going to be interviewing him—but he was the best choice. A senior university administrator. Our grantee as the head of the Association of African Universities. And he did a great job. And we got him here. Q: What was the understanding of what would happen to you then? Rosenfield: Well, I think basically—to be frank, Gregorian would have loved it if I had left. I know he would have. And I wasn’t going to. I had a child who was growing up, I was in the middle of getting a divorce, I was not about to leave. And my grandmother had just died, my mother was very sick. I said, I don’t need a new job and I love being at Carnegie Corporation. I feel that it’s someplace where I—and it used to be you stay for five years, you’re here for life. No one left unless they got a better position, and most people didn’t leave. And so he appointed a very nice man as vice-president, Neil [R.] Grabois. And they were going to do the [Carnegie] Scholars program. Now, I knew how to run a scholars program because when I was at WHO [World Health Organization], I had been very instrumental in our Ph.D. grants program. Q: He hired Neil Grabois. But that as a result of the reorganization from the McKinsey report. Rosenfield: No. Before McKinsey. Rosenfield – 1 – 5 Q: It wasn’t? Rosenfield: No, he was— Q: Organizationally, they had urged him— Rosenfield: No, nobody paid attention to the McKinsey–– Q: Let’s talk about that for a while. Rosenfield: The McKinsey report had no impact, no impact. Except on the trustee part. The McKinsey report—these were novices. Thank goodness it was pro bono, and we got what we paid for. Pardon me, this is my perspective. It’s never been mentioned. It did change the trustees. It limited staff contact with the trustees. It changed the role of the trustees, not vis-à-vis their traditional role in policy setting. But it did change the relationship of staff to trustees. I think that’s the main thing. They were useless. Carter [F.] Bales, all those guys. I mean—just to explain how useless they were—and I don’t mind who reads this part. Anybody can read this part. After they finished this report, Carter Bales calls me and he says, “Oh, I’ve just joined this NGO [nongovernmental organization] board.” They didn’t even know what NGO meant when they started. “I need some Rosenfield – 1 – 6 help as to how to be a good board member on this not-for-profit board.” I said, are you kidding me? Are you kidding me, Carter Bales? And I see him from time to time. What did they want us to do? They did not understand the nature of private grantmaking foundations in contrast to operating foundations. What they said—and everybody was aghast: you need to get in the trenches and do the work with the grantees. Carnegie, Ford, you don’t do that. If you think they’re [the grantees] good enough to get a grant, you may want to make site visits to make sure they’re doing it, you may want to evaluate them. But you’ve given them the money. The conflict of interest inherent in that statement! So it had no impact. And I don’t know. On the hiring part, I have no idea. But he needed a vice president. He had one vice president, Ed [Edward M.] Sermier, but he was handling administration.