MEMORANDUM K)R: The Director, 2d Year c las8, Comm.and and General Staff School, Port Leaveuvorth,Kansas• SUBJECT: The Geman Supply System,

I. PAPERS ACCOMPANYING: 1. Bibliography for this study* 2. Two sketches: 1st - showing railway routes leading from Gennany to theWestern Front; 2d - railway route* leading into tli« ealieht* II• THE STUDY PRESENTED*— TSU) German Supply syst6ai .• as it affected operations in the offensive of March 21-27 against Amiens; the offensive of May 21 to July 16, 1913, in the Marne salient• HISTORICAL FACTS RELATING TO THE STUDY.-- In 191S six great trunk line railways, which ran generally east to west with numer­ ous connecting lines, were operated by the Germans in supplying their armies on the Western Front, This vast net afforded exoel. lent supply and communication systems and was composed of the following lines: (i) 1st - Cologne-LaChappelle~Xiege-N8maur~Compeigne~Pari8 Railway; double track with connecting line from LaChappelle to Bruee els-Lille and Arra8 with second connecting line from Liege and Brussels to Bruges and Ostend* 2d - Cologne-Sedan-Mezierec--SoiesonB-Pari8 Railway with connecting line from Solasons to Chateau Thierry, also between Uezieree encl llajnaur with a third connecting line between l i 3d - Coblenz-Trevers-Mets^Verdun Railway* 4th - Mayence-Sarreluls-Hetz Railway*

5th - Mayence-Sarreguemines*Nanoy Bailwayt 6th - MannheJjn-Wie8€inbou-Stras8'burg-Colmar Railway• However, with this excellent supply system, the "Peace Drive" of March 21, 1018, made by the German High Command to imj>os# a German peace on the Allies, failed in its two main strategical A objectives, not only was this due to the Geman nnyt but tlit German people were in a etate of ebulation oaused by hunger and discontentment • [l) (2) (3)U)

Map on last page) 251-286) 99-1Q0• 103) Operations map) -2­

The first strategical objective was planned to break through to the sea, thus cutting the British Army into two parts, one segment to be driven back into tho northwest chanel ports which would handicap the British and French Supply from LeHarve and Cherbourg, the other part forced southeast in disorder upon the French Armies* (2)(3) The offensive was launched Karoh 21st towards Aliens and one v/eek later, March 27thf Montidier had been captured and eight miles of Auied front lines penetrated. Great quantities of supplies and materialo and ammunition were captured which were a GocUsend to the German Ajtny. As Von Hindenburg said:"The great push wae held up by the Gexman soldiers at every captured provision depot until everything eatable was eaten and every bottle was drained" indicating a supply shortage which is further vouched by Captain Von Schwink on the staff of General Von Bslew in an article published in the New York ^imes^ Jan. 21, 1919, which states: "In the north where Ludendorff hoped to drive the British back to the Atlantic, he made littl e progress; in the south where he made his big advance, it was considered of little importance. The artillery preparations were inadequate and airimunition was not supplied fast enough". (2) (3) attack, however, failed to secure the Amiens railway center, which connected the British and French Annies, and could not be continued as no Geman Reserves were-available. In the interim the Allied Reserves had closed the gap and the attack was stopped. Although -Amiens had but one rail line from the north, the same being true of Perone area with no connecting lines within sixty miles to the rear, it was necessary to capture this railway center in order to correct their precarious supply situation. (2)(3) The first objective having failed, Von Hindenburg then attempted his second strategical objective - that of capturing Paris also the great rail center of . (3) The attack, which started May 27th in the direction of -Chateau Thierry-Paris came to a stand stil l July 17th after having penetrated the Allied lines some forty kilometers between Reims and Compiegne. Having crossed the Marne, the Crown Prince's amies were again back to their old line of advance of 1914, and were confronted with the difficult problem of supply within the salient. (2) (3) The daily requirements of the forty divisions in the Marne salient approximated 8229 tons, which necessitated some twenty- two daily trains, all of which had to pass through Soissons rail center which was oaby ;some twelve kilometers behind the front on the extreme western iace of the salient. Practically all supplies had to be hauled direct from depots to troops by animal transport due to the scarcity of trucks and lack of gasoline. In many cases the hauls were from twenty to thirty-five kilometers. The main

(263.258.287.290 (104-105. 107) supply depots in the salient were located as follows: (')(5) General Supply Depot at Soieaons, General Supply Depot at , Advance General Supply Depot at Oulohy-le~Chateau, Advance General Supply Depot at Fere-en-Tardenois. (6) From the Advance Depot at Fere-en-Tardenois to the extreme east of the salient, it was approximately thirty-five kilometers, and to the southern face of the salient between Donnans and Chateau Thierry twenty kilometers• t*$m Oulchy-le-Chateau to the western face it was some twelve kilometers and from Sennoise to the ex­ treme eastern face, it was approximately thirty-five kilometers, about an equal distanfce to the southern face and approximately fourteen kilometers to the western face. From the General Supply Depot at Soissons to the eastern and southern faces of the salient it was approximately forty kilometers and to the western face twelve kilometers* To shorten the haul to the troops at the front, the Geunan engineers about the middle of June built a switoh line from north of Soissons to Seimoise, a distance of about ten kilometers, thereby shortening the hauls to the western and shouthern face, but it still left long hauls to the troops therein. («} (4) The local supply and transport system within the salient was based on sector supply rather than upon any particular division or unit* This permitted the supply and transport system to function well when tactical conditions were stabilized, but when­ ever troop movement from one part oof the sector to another became necessary, the supply and transport system was inadequate to handle this additional burden. (2)(5) The security of their supply centers and the supply situation within the salient presented a critical problem for the Germans and likewise formed a critical objective of any Allied attack* General Pershing recogonized this inherent weakness which offered an opportunity for counter-offensive, and if successful, would relieve the threat against the Paris-Nancy railway, and also it would restore the morale of the Allies and ranove the profound depression and fear then existing. With the failure of the July 15th attack, the Geiman High Command saw the critical position of the Crown Prince's Aimy and plans for its evacuation was commenced on July 22nd. (2)(5)(7) Geitnan communications paralleled the front, the main supply feeder being the railway from Soissons to south through Fere-en-Tardenols to and the 60 C#M. line from Breny to Chateau Thierry and if cut anywhere north of Rozoy, the position in the salient would be impossible and leave the Geiman Annies practically without supplies. Hie railway communications were the4only means of supply between the salient, the north depending upon the Soissons railway center. If this was captured or render­ ed untenable, the Germans would suddenly find themselves seme thirty miles from a railroad without adequate means of supply for more than forty divisions. (8)

258.287.290)(333) 6 122-123) 6 112) * Operations Map) (7) 34) (8)(265) -4­ The insufficient railroad net within the salient presented a vital disadvantage to the supply situation. The only standard gauge railroad was a double track line from Pismes (through Pere­ ©n-*ardenois) to Breny with a single track line south to Chateau Thierry, the latter being subject to constant French and American artillery fire. Another double track line from Soissons to was also under Allied artillery fire as far north as Noyand and consequently was of littl e use for supply purposes. Germany actually had but one single track line into the salient and with no turnaround on the Hsmes-Breny line, it had to be used as a tiro-way line. The 60 C.M. line from Noyant to Breny was also under constant artillery interdiction south of Hartennes as was the 60 C.M. line south from tfianes to Chambrecy and with artillery interdiction from Savigny-sur-Andre. These rail lines were entirely inadequate to properly supply the mass of troops in the peak of the salient or the offensive maneuver to­ wards £ppernayj(2) Deeming i t necessary to maintain the Marne salient, a branch railroad line was attempted from the north to the v;est of Reims, connecting with the Reims-Soissons Rail­ road. Work was pushed day and night but abandoned to defend the salient against General Fochfs great counter-offensive.(2)(&) While May 27th won the Marne salient for Gennany, the single (double track) railroad through Scissons w&s insufficient for communications and efficient maintenance within the salient and, therefore, a new offensive could not bt launched from this base. (2) The June 9th offensive was intended to correct this situation by Capturing Compiegne. Having failed in this, another offensive was planned in the direction of Fismes-Eppernay and thereby se­ curing the railway center at Reims, thus insuring an additional sapply route into the salient. ^his attack which was launched July 15th was haulted July 17th on the south bank of the Marne between St. Aignan and Comblitzy without gaining their objective ­ Reims railway center. **ad this been successful, the German supply problem on the Marne-Champagne front would have been solved. On the contrary, this position increased the area to be 8Ur>pliedj(2)xhe ten divisions which had crossed the south bank of the Marne by canvas pontoon bridges were now under constant Allied interdiction b,v both light and mediun artillery. Supplies, includU ing ammunition, could not be moved to the south bank of the Marne, and the men were forced to live on their "iron rations11 j(2)With no artillery, an unfordable river to their back and increasing volume of French and American fire in their front, Von Hindenburg directed the attack be discontinued and these divisions were withdrawn on the night 19-20 July. { The boundary of the Marne salient, when the German offensive of July 15th had been stopped ran ao follows: From Pontenoy (west of soissons) a littl e east of south to the Marne near Chateau Thierry; thence along the north bank of the Marne River to near Gland; thence south of the Marne via St. Aignan and Comblizy, to the Marne west of Bppernay near Oeuilly; thence a littl e east of north via Peurcy and Vrigny, to west of Reims near . The base of the salient from Fontenoy to Thillois was about sixty kilometers and the depth was about forty kilometers. (2)(4)

(e)(265) (2)(329-330 (9)(310) ( 4)(Operations map) -5­ With the great difficulty of supplying the Marne salient, the French net around it was well adapted to the consentration and maintenance of the vast number of troops needed to reduce the salient« The railroad from Bpernay to Reims on the south face paralleled the front approximately five miles, while the great lines on the west face leading east from Compiegne to Soissons, al3o from Paris to Chateau Thierry together with the two "branch lines to Fere-en-Tardenois and Soissons supplied the Allies with four railroad lines of approach at nearly equal intervals of about eight miles. The Paris-Chalons railroad east of Chateau Thierry to Epernay was in possession of the Germans ^outh of the Marne until the morning of July 20th while the nearest railroad back of the Prenoh line was the Paris- Vitry line, approximately thirty kilometers to the south* (2) The spearhead of the Allied attack was the Ifrenoh XX Corps whose mission was to reach the high plateau northeast of Hardnnes thereby dominating Soissons and cutting the Soissons- Fismes rail line which was the single supply line of the German troops in the salient. (2) Von Hindenburg remarks relative to the insecure position of the Marne salient: ttWe could not remain there permanently. The lines of communication into the mighty semicircle were defective* They were just good enough for a state of relative inactivity, but threatened serious complications if a great battle lasting any length of time should flare up. We had only one railway of very slight capacity at our disposal as the principal line of supply of our great mass of troops to an area which was relatively confined. Moreover the deep salient obviously invited our enemy to attack it from all sides*. (&) (9)

IV. OPINION OF THE AUTHOR: 1. Discussion,-- In view of the success of May 27th, their rapid advance and capture of French territory, the Gennan morale at this time was very high and had the Crown Prince pushed the attack of June £th against Compiegne or the attack of June 15th against Rei/nb vrith every available means, it would doubtless have been successful. These attacks lacked the last-little-punch to complete the mission and resulted in the eventual defeat of the German Army. In both cases the attack had reached light artil­ lery range of these two great railway centers and no doubt would have been successful had strong reserves been thrown in the line and the attacjco pushed to the utmost. Nevertheless the security of these two centers and the supply situation presented a critical problem for the Germans and for the same reason constituted the critical objective of any Anied attack* The capture of Compiegne would have opened the great trunk line from Liege and would have solved the supply situation, how­ ever, through failure on the part of the Crown Prince to realize the vital importance of the Compiegne railway center and his failure to mass his troops back of this object, using all available means at his disposal, the attack was unsuccessful.

(2)(330-331)(338) (9)(330) (3)(107-108) -6­

The failure of the Compiegne undertaking brought about the decision to again attempt to ccrrect the supply situation by the oapture of Reims and deliver a decisive blow against the French between Paris and Verdun and had it been successful, it would have given Gemany the Reims-Mezieree and Reims-Laon rail­ ways, v/hich would also have corrected the supply situation for the Crown Prince's Armies and Undoubtedly caused the French to evacuate Verdun all in one operation• In brief, the plan was an excellent one* but like the Compiegne attack, it lacked the last-little­ punch to drive the attack home. Just a mile or so would have accomplished the mission. I believe had the Crown Prince directed all his efforts against cutting the Paris-Verdun railway, between Reims and Epernay, in­ stead of attempting the actual capture of Epernay and Chalons farther to the east and had used his mass for this purpose, the attack would have been a success. The Gemans were greatly handicapped by the insufficient means of supply for troops in the salient„ The lines of communication were not only defective but entirely inadequate to handle the nomal requirements of the troops therein, muchless provide neces­ sary reserve supplies for any great offensive* Due to their supply situation, Gemany was in no position for any further general offensive. The Soissons-Sermoise area from a supply and communication standpoint was the most sensitive area on the entire Western Front at this time and should have been the Allied strategical objeotive for the July 18th counter-offensive. Had Marshal Foch created a strong mass in a main effort in the direction of Cutry- Vaux Buin-Vemzel and pushed his attack to the utmost by passing tatallions through each other as the attadk was slowed up, it is very doubtful that the CrOwn Prince would have been able to e evacuate the forty German divisions from the Marne salient* It is certain that he v/ould have been unable to evacuate any supplies and rcderials. No great stretch of imagination is required to visualize the catastrophe that would have befallen the German Array had the Allies by a quick,powerful blow captured the supply and communi­ cation centers at Soissons on the first day and Semoise on the second. 2. CONCLUSION.— Careful consideration of the foregoing justi­ fies the conclusion that from a supply standpoint, the Geraan operations in the Marne salient were the crowning military mistake of the High Command which finally brought the mighty military structure crashing down upon their heads for they had placed the Crown Prince?s Annies in an impossible military situation. Throughout these entire operations, supply and communication were the dominating factors and in every move the High Command had realized these factors too late. Here again the German Aj^y had violated the "Principle of Security" in that they had failed to secure the hinges of the "supply gate11 - Compiegne and Reims. -7­

This failure oeemu to be all the more poignant when we realize that the Gasman Amy in the salient was without motor transport for supply and warn entirely dependent upon the use of animal transport for supply and transportation. It is inconceivable that the German High Command did not realize the extreme risk of their position in the Marne salient and the vital necessity of securing the railway centers of Compiegne and Reims or at l

V# RECOlH:ENDATIONS*-« None required*

VI# CONCURPEtfCES*-- None required

J* A. PORTER, ain,

, BIBLIOGRAPHY*

Key: (5-88) « No* 5 text (below) page 88#

1 # Organization of the Services of Supply* Prepared in the Historical Branch, War Plans Division General Staff, War Dept* Document No* 1009*(Author's library)

2, Military History of the World War. By C* R# Howland* Vol. I M 9403 B3 C73* C&GS School, Fo*-t Leavenworth, 3. ColoaaEal Blunders of the Y/ar* By William Seaver Woods* (Author's library) 4* A Guide to the American Battle Fields in Europe* Prepared by the American Battle Monuments Commission* (Author's library)

5« Review of Current Military Writings, No* 40* March 1931# C&GS School, Fort leavenworth, Kans* 6. The First World War 1914-1918. By Colonel Repington. K 9403 E3 342* C & Gs School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

7* Final Report of General Pershingt September 1919• (Author's library) 8* The Great Events of the Great War* Vol. IV* Published by The National Alumni* (Author's library) 9. Ludendorf ff8 Own Story* Vol« II* Published by Harper & Brothers* M9403 B4 B 92 (LU) C&GS School,Ft•Leavenmrth, Kansasv too W J l COLOGNE KILOMETERS ULOGNE COBUNZ ENCE

MANNHEIM

PARIS netz 5c im Chalons­

Nanteuil Epernay Nancy ne&ux UFerte­ Sus-Jouarre

parts ­

Scale in Kilometers -MARNE G 25 Aisne AisnS Ves le netz w Qeim

pari s vitry

Scale in Kilometers O 5 10 15 20 25 AISNE-MARNE

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