MEMORANDUM K)R: the Director, 2D Year L a S 8 , Comm.And And
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MEMORANDUM K)R: The Director, 2d Year c las8, Comm.and and General Staff School, Port Leaveuvorth,Kansas• SUBJECT: The Geman Supply System, I. PAPERS ACCOMPANYING: 1. Bibliography for this study* 2. Two sketches: 1st - showing railway routes leading from Gennany to theWestern Front; 2d - railway route* leading into tli« Marne ealieht* II• THE STUDY PRESENTED*— TSU) German Supply syst6ai .• as it affected operations in the offensive of March 21-27 against Amiens; the offensive of May 21 to July 16, 1913, in the Marne salient• HISTORICAL FACTS RELATING TO THE STUDY.-- In 191S six great trunk line railways, which ran generally east to west with numer ous connecting lines, were operated by the Germans in supplying their armies on the Western Front, This vast net afforded exoel. lent supply and communication systems and was composed of the following lines: (i) 1st - Cologne-LaChappelle~Xiege-N8maur~Compeigne~Pari8 Railway; double track with connecting line from LaChappelle to Bruee els-Lille and Arra8 with second connecting line from Liege and Brussels to Bruges and Ostend* 2d - Cologne-Sedan-Mezierec-Laon-SoiesonB-Pari8 Railway with connecting line from Solasons to Chateau Thierry, also between Uezieree encl llajnaur with a third connecting line between l i 3d - Coblenz-Trevers-Mets^Verdun Railway* 4th - Mayence-Sarreluls-Hetz Railway* 5th - Mayence-Sarreguemines*Nanoy Bailwayt 6th - MannheJjn-Wie8€inbou-Stras8'burg-Colmar Railway• However, with this excellent supply system, the "Peace Drive" of March 21, 1018, made by the German High Command to imj>os# a German peace on the Allies, failed in its two main strategical A objectives, not only was this due to the Geman nnyt but tlit German people were in a etate of ebulation oaused by hunger and discontentment • [l) (2) (3)U) Map on last page) 251-286) 99-1Q0• 103) Operations map) -2 The first strategical objective was planned to break through to the sea, thus cutting the British Army into two parts, one segment to be driven back into tho northwest chanel ports which would handicap the British and French Supply from LeHarve and Cherbourg, the other part forced southeast in disorder upon the French Armies* (2)(3) The offensive was launched Karoh 21st towards Aliens and one v/eek later, March 27thf Montidier had been captured and eight miles of Auied front lines penetrated. Great quantities of supplies and materialo and ammunition were captured which were a GocUsend to the German Ajtny. As Von Hindenburg said:"The great push wae held up by the Gexman soldiers at every captured provision depot until everything eatable was eaten and every bottle was drained" indicating a supply shortage which is further vouched by Captain Von Schwink on the staff of General Von Bslew in an article published in the New York ^imes^ Jan. 21, 1919, which states: "In the north where Ludendorff hoped to drive the British back to the Atlantic, he made littl e progress; in the south where he made his big advance, it was considered of little importance. The artillery preparations were inadequate and airimunition was not supplied fast enough". (2) (3) attack, however, failed to secure the Amiens railway center, which connected the British and French Annies, and could not be continued as no Geman Reserves were-available. In the interim the Allied Reserves had closed the gap and the attack was stopped. Although -Amiens had but one rail line from the north, the same being true of Perone area with no connecting lines within sixty miles to the rear, it was necessary to capture this railway center in order to correct their precarious supply situation. (2)(3) The first objective having failed, Von Hindenburg then attempted his second strategical objective - that of capturing Paris also the great rail center of Reims. (3) The attack, which started May 27th in the direction of Soissons-Chateau Thierry-Paris came to a stand stil l July 17th after having penetrated the Allied lines some forty kilometers between Reims and Compiegne. Having crossed the Marne, the Crown Prince's amies were again back to their old line of advance of 1914, and were confronted with the difficult problem of supply within the salient. (2) (3) The daily requirements of the forty divisions in the Marne salient approximated 8229 tons, which necessitated some twenty- two daily trains, all of which had to pass through Soissons rail center which was oaby ;some twelve kilometers behind the front on the extreme western iace of the salient. Practically all supplies had to be hauled direct from depots to troops by animal transport due to the scarcity of trucks and lack of gasoline. In many cases the hauls were from twenty to thirty-five kilometers. The main (263.258.287.290 (104-105. 107) supply depots in the salient were located as follows: (')(5) General Supply Depot at Soieaons, General Supply Depot at Sermoise, Advance General Supply Depot at Oulohy-le~Chateau, Advance General Supply Depot at Fere-en-Tardenois. (6) From the Advance Depot at Fere-en-Tardenois to the extreme east of the salient, it was approximately thirty-five kilometers, and to the southern face of the salient between Donnans and Chateau Thierry twenty kilometers• t*$m Oulchy-le-Chateau to the western face it was some twelve kilometers and from Sennoise to the ex treme eastern face, it was approximately thirty-five kilometers, about an equal distanfce to the southern face and approximately fourteen kilometers to the western face. From the General Supply Depot at Soissons to the eastern and southern faces of the salient it was approximately forty kilometers and to the western face twelve kilometers* To shorten the haul to the troops at the front, the Geunan engineers about the middle of June built a switoh line from north of Soissons to Seimoise, a distance of about ten kilometers, thereby shortening the hauls to the western and shouthern face, but it still left long hauls to the troops therein. («} (4) The local supply and transport system within the salient was based on sector supply rather than upon any particular division or unit* This permitted the supply and transport system to function well when tactical conditions were stabilized, but when ever troop movement from one part oof the sector to another became necessary, the supply and transport system was inadequate to handle this additional burden. (2)(5) The security of their supply centers and the supply situation within the salient presented a critical problem for the Germans and likewise formed a critical objective of any Allied attack* General Pershing recogonized this inherent weakness which offered an opportunity for counter-offensive, and i f successful, would relieve the threat against the Paris-Nancy railway, and also it would restore the morale of the Allies and ranove the profound depression and fear then existing. With the failure of the July 15th attack, the Geiman High Command saw the critical position of the Crown Prince's Aimy and plans for its evacuation was commenced on July 22nd. (2)(5)(7) Geitnan communications paralleled the front, the main supply feeder being the railway from Soissons to Fismes south through Fere-en-Tardenols to Breny and the 60 C#M. line from Breny to Chateau Thierry and i f cut anywhere north of Rozoy, the position in the salient would be impossible and leave the Geiman Annies practically without supplies. Hie railway communications were the4only means of supply between the salient, the north depending upon the Soissons railway center. If this was captured or render ed untenable, the Germans would suddenly find themselves seme thirty miles from a railroad without adequate means of supply for more than forty divisions. (8) 258.287.290)(333) 6 122-123) 6 112) * Operations Map) (7) 34) (8)(265) -4 The insufficient railroad net within the salient presented a vital disadvantage to the supply situation. The only standard gauge railroad was a double track line from Pismes (through Pere ©n-*ardenois) to Breny with a single track line south to Chateau Thierry, the latter being subject to constant French and American artillery fire. Another double track line from Soissons to Vierzy was also under Allied artillery fire as far north as Noyand and consequently was of littl e use for supply purposes. Germany actually had but one single track line into the salient and with no turnaround on the Hsmes-Breny line, it had to be used as a tiro-way line. The 60 C.M. line from Noyant to Breny was also under constant artillery interdiction south of Hartennes as was the 60 C.M. line south from tfianes to Chambrecy and Dormans with artillery interdiction from Savigny-sur-Andre. These rail lines were entirely inadequate to properly supply the mass of troops in the peak of the salient or the offensive maneuver to wards £ppernayj(2) Deeming i t necessary to maintain the Marne salient, a branch railroad line was attempted from the north to the v;est of Reims, connecting with the Reims-Soissons Rail road. Work was pushed day and night but abandoned to defend the salient against General Fochfs great counter-offensive.(2)(&) While May 27th won the Marne salient for Gennany, the single (double track) railroad through Scissons w&s insufficient for communications and efficient maintenance within the salient and, therefore, a new offensive could not bt launched from this base. (2) The June 9th offensive was intended to correct this situation by Capturing Compiegne. Having failed in this, another offensive was planned in the direction of Fismes-Eppernay and thereby se curing the railway center at Reims, thus insuring an additional sapply route into the salient.