A Technical Introduction to the Use of Trusted Platform Module 2.0 with Linux
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Front cover A Technical Introduction to the Use of Trusted Platform Module 2.0 with Linux Last Update: 8 September 2017 Introduces the new features and Demonstrates the use of Intel TXT functions of TPM 2.0 and Trusted Boot Lists the available TPM 2.0 tools on Provides the example of utilizing data Linux encryption and signature verification Neo Cui Abstract The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a cryptographic component of many Lenovo® servers that provides additional security features. The TPM is an integral part of hardware-based security in Lenovo servers related to tasks such as user authentication, remote access, and data protection. Some system functions, such as Intel Trusted Execution Technology (Intel TXT), make use of TPM enhancements to strengthen system security. This document covers a brief introduction to TPM 2.0 technology. It provides step-by-step instructions on how to enable TPM 2.0 on Lenovo servers running Linux. The document assumes the reader is already familiar with TPM 1.2 and the administration of Linux systems. At Lenovo Press, we bring together experts to produce technical publications around topics of importance to you, providing information and best practices for using Lenovo products and solutions to solve IT challenges. See a list of our most recent publications at the Lenovo Press web site: http://lenovopress.com Do you have the latest version? We update our papers from time to time, so check whether you have the latest version of this document by clicking the Check for Updates button on the front page of the PDF. Pressing this button will take you to a web page that will tell you if you are reading the latest version of the document and give you a link to the latest if needed. While you’re there, you can also sign up to get notified via email whenever we make an update. Contents Introduction . 3 TPM 2.0 deployment . 7 Using TPM 2.0 under Linux on Lenovo servers . 12 Change history . 26 Authors. 26 Notices . 27 Trademarks . 28 2 A Technical Introduction to the Use of Trusted Platform Module 2.0 with Linux Introduction TPM 2.0 is defined by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) as the replacement for TPM 1.2. TPM 2.0 enhances the security of a server to prevent hacking and malware damage. TPM 2.0 is a feature available in most ThinkSystem™, System x® and ThinkServer® systems. Major changes in TPM 2.0 The TPM 2.0 specification introduces new features beyond those in the existing TPM 1.2 specification, as summarized below1: No Opt-in/Opt-out: The choice of whether the administrator can enable or disable TPM is typically provided through opt-in or opt-out mechanisms. In addition, the platform manufacturer (Lenovo) can specify whether or not the administrator can disable the TPM 2.0 functions. Seeds and keys: The keys in TPM 2.0 are derived from seeds stored in the TPM. The Key Derivation Function (KDF) is used to create Endorsement Keys (EKs) and Storage Root Key (SRKs). – The EK is a 2048-bit RSA key pair used as a cryptographic identity to distinguish and authenticate an individual TPM. – The SRK is used for Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) which provides protection for data held in external storage devices. The RTS provides confidentiality and integrity for the external data. Algorithm flexibility: TPM 2.0 allows greater flexibility and even “field upgrades” to the algorithms that the TPM supports. Field upgrade means the platform manufacturer (Lenovo) can upgrade the TPM firmware according to their specific methods. The algorithms available in TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 are listed in Table 1. Table 1 Algorithms changes Algorithm type Algorithm name TPM 1.2 TPM 2.0 Asymmetric RSA 1024 Yes Yes RSA 2048 Yes Yes ECC P256 No Yes ECC BN256 No Yes Symmetric AES 128 Yes Yes AES 256 No No Hash SHA-1 Yes Yes SHA-2 256 No Yes HMAC SHA-1 Yes Yes SHA-2 256 No Yes Remote Attestation (RA): EKs do not necessarily contain the platform identity. ECC-based Direct Anonymous Attestation (ECDAA) is an alternative method to achieve the remote attestation. 1 Challener, D., Yoder, K., Catherman, R., Safford, D., & Van Doorn, L. (2007). A practical guide to trusted computing. Pearson Education. © Copyright Lenovo 2017. All rights reserved. 3 Hierarchies: TPM 2.0 has the same functionality (EK for signing/attestation and SRK for encryption) as TPM 1.2. However, the control is split into three different hierarchies in 2.0: Platform, Storage, and Endorsement. TPM 2.0 also contains a Null Hierarchy. Each hierarchy has its own unique “owner” for authorization, as shown in Figure 1. TPM2.0 Hierarchies Platform Endorsement Storage Null Hierarchy Hierarchy Hierarchy Hierarchy Figure 1 TPM 2.0 hierarchies The hierarchies are as follows: – Platform Hierarchy (PH): The platform hierarchy is under the control of the platform manufacturer, achieved by the early boot code shipped with the platform. – Storage Hierarchy (SH): The storage hierarchy is used by the administrator. It is for non-privacy-sensitive operations. The policy and authorization value are persistent through reboots. – Endorsement Hierarchy (EH): The endorsement hierarchy is under the control of a privacy administrator, who may be the end user. The owner can disable the endorsement hierarchy while still utilizing the storage hierarchy for TPM applications. – Null Hierarchy: The Null hierarchy is analogous to the three persistent hierarchies. It has primary keys from which descendants can be created. There are several different properties. The authorization value is null, the policy is empty (can't be satisfied), and it can't be disabled. It has a seed from which keys and data objects can be derived. The seed isn't persistent. It and the proof are regenerated with different values on each reboot. 4 A Technical Introduction to the Use of Trusted Platform Module 2.0 with Linux TPM 2.0 software stack The TPM 2.0 Software Stack (TSS) is shown in Figure 2. Feature API(FAPI) Enhanced System API(ESAPI) System API(SAPI) TCTI TCTI TCTI (Trusted Access (Trusted Access (Trusted Access Broker)TAB Broker)TAB Broker)TAB Resource Resource Resource Manager(RM) Manager(RM) Manager(RM) TPM Driver Simulator Driver TPM Driver TPM Remote Local TPM Virtual TPM Simulator TPM Local Simulator Remote code unimplemented code implemented Figure 2 TPM 2.0 Software Stack (https://github.com/01org/TPM2.0-TSS) The software stack consists of the following layers from the bottom to top level: TPM device driver: The device driver handles the data transmission to and from the TPM in physical layer. Data is in binary format in this layer. TPM Access Broker (TAB)/ Resource Manager (RM): TAB and RM are optional components. This layer sits between the system API library code and the TPM. A daemon handles all multi-process coordination by TAB, and manages the internal resources of TPM transparently to applications by RM. TPM Command Transmission Interface (TCTI): TCTI transmits TPM commands and receives responses. Sends and receives data in this layer in assembly language. System API (SAPI): Functions of TPM are accessible in this layer. The programming language is similar to C. 5 Enhanced System API (ESAPI): This layer is under development and has not been implemented yet. This layer requires much TPM knowledge but provides some sessions management and support for cryptographic capabilities. Feature API (FAPI): This layer is under development and has not been implemented yet. Most user applications should be achieved in this layer. To do the programming, use Java, C++, or some other higher-level language. TPM 2.0 functions The main functions of TPM 2.0 are shown in Figure 3. factory implementation Manufacturer/ Platform/ available operation for user Provision Verify Hash TPM NV Storage Integrity Seeds Algorithms CreatePrimary Data Primary Asymmetric Symmetric Keys Certify Create Encryption 'HFU\SWLRQ Certificate Signing Keys Encryption Sign/Encrypt/Decrypt/Certify 'HFU\SWLRQ .H\V Certifying Keys Figure 3 TPM 2.0 functions (Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1: Architecture[S]. TCG Published, 2006-2015) 6 A Technical Introduction to the Use of Trusted Platform Module 2.0 with Linux The functions shown in Figure 3 on page 6 are as follows: Provisioning: The TPM can be used once it has been provisioned. Provisioning includes all TPM setup that occurs perhaps only once in a typical TPM lifetime. The provisioning process includes generating keys and secrets, inserting certificates, and enabling or disabling certain TPM features. The provisioning process covers three parties: the TPM manufacturer, the platform, and the end user. Keys: TPM keeps the data safe through keys. The TPM can both generate and import external keys and it supports both symmetric and asymmetric keys. Primary keys are the root keys in the hierarchy. TPM 2.0 achieves multiple SRKs by primary seeds in TPM NV Storage. TPM 2.0 can create an unlimited number of primary keys combining key-derivation function (KDF). TPM 2.0 creates different attribute keys by primary keys and algorithms, such as keys for signing, encryption/decryption, or certifying. Data safe: The signing keys can sign the data to confirm the authenticity of data. The ability of an application or data to use the encryption/decryption keys while keeping them safe is the TPM’s greatest strength. The hash function of TPM can verify the integrity of data. TPM 2.0 deployment This section introduces detailed information about the TPM 2.0 chipset on Lenovo servers and how to enable TPM 2.0 in UEFI. TPM 2.0 in Lenovo servers The TPM 2.0 chip used in Lenovo servers is produced by Nuvoton, model NPCT650LB2WX.