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74 Anthony P. Andres lr' ~ i i,l I 'I , Anthony P. Andres Argument for the Handbook Tradition Before we take up our main business, we should briefly re­ THE PLACE OF CoNVERSION view the order of Aristotelian logic. The scholastic logicians divide and order the parts of logic according to the division IN ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC and order of three operations of the human intellect. There­ Anthony P. Andres fore they teach that the ftrst part of logic aids the intellect in understanding indivisibles, the second in composing and dividing them, and the third in reasoning discursively. On this basis they divide the treatises of the Organon into three: the From at least the time of John of St. Thomas, scholastic Categories belongs to the ftrst part oflogic, On Interpretation to philosophers have usually learned logic from scholastic hand­ the second, and the rest, beginning with the Prior Analytics, books. If there were no significant differences between the belongs to the third. 1 handbook tradition and Aristotle's Organon, that would not Aristotle gives the rules for the conversion of propositions be a problem. But since there are many differences, especially in the second and third chapters of the Prior Analytics. 2 For in the order and manner ofteaching, the careful Thomist must example, he states that the universal negative proposition is ask himself whether the changes proposed by handbooks are a converted universally, so that if it is true that 'No A is B,' it is development of the Aristotelian tradition in logic. By reflect­ also true that 'NoB is A.' Similarly, the particular affirmative ing on the place of propositional conversion in Aristotelian proposition is convertible, so that 'SoJ?e A is B' implies that logic, this essay takes a step toward a negative answer to that 'Some B is A.' Notice that in each case what is the subject question. of the first proposition becomes the predicate of the second, The handbooks, followingJohn of St. Thomas, teach con­ and what is the predicate likewise becomes the subject. From version in the second part of logic, but the Organon teaches such examples, St. Albert draws the following definition of it in the third. This essay argues that Aristotle teaches con­ conversion: "Conversion in terms is a transposition of terms, version in the right place and that in this respect the hand­ so that the subject becomes the predicate, and the predicate books corrupt the tradition. The ftrst part of this essay will the subject." 3 Thus Aristotle puts the transposition of the examine the implicit argument for the modern placement of parts of the proposition into the third part oflogic. conversion; the second part will argue in favor of its place­ As noted above, the handbook tradition moves the teach­ ment within the Organon; and the third will answer a serious ing of conversion out of the third part of logic and into the objection against Aristotle. second, which Aristotle expounds in On Interpretation. The handbooks do not explicitly justify this change, but from cer- 1 Cf St. Thomas Aquinas, I Peri Herm., proem., n. 2. 2 Aristotle, On Interpretation, zsar. Anthony Andres is a graduate ofThomas Aquinas College. He is now 3 St. Albert the Great, I Prior Anal., tract. 1, c. 8 (all translations are Associate Professor of Philosophy at Christendom College. my own). 74 75 ---------=== r '' THE PLACE OF CONVERSION IN ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC Anthony P. Andres tain passages in John of St. Thomas we can reconstruct a plau­ not overlook the fact; by his principles, as explained by St. sible argument for it. Thomas, the enunciation cannot be converted. Before we can In his Cursus Philosophicus John writes, "We take the propo­ understand why, however, we need to understand the parts sition and the enunciation as the same thing, since such a use of the enunciation. obtains even among the wise, just as happens in common dis­ putations."4 That is, although 'enunciation' and 'proposition' are two different words, John believes that they mean the The Noun and Verb same thing, as the usage of both the common run of schol­ In the second chapter of the Categories, while identifying its ars and of the wise attests. Three chapters later he begins to subject, Aristotle makes a distinction between two kinds of teach about conversion itself "The properties which follow "things said." 7 The first kind includes things said "with in­ the whole proposition are three: opposition, conversion, and tertwining," the complex expressions, examples of it being equivalence." 5 Since, however, he has already said that the "man runs" and "man wins." The second includes things said proposition and enunciation are the same, we can conclude "without intertwining," simple expressions, examples being with John that conversion is also a property of the enuncia­ "man," "runs," and "wins." Since the Categories helps us to tion. understand indivisibles, it is concerned with the second kind We can now argue that conversion belongs in the second of "things said," not the first. And thus Aristotle goes on part oflogic. In the proemium to his commentary on Aristo­ in the Categories to divide simple "things said" according to tle's On Interpretation, St. Thomas notes that the enunciation what they signify. is the subject of the second part of logic. 6 And since every At the beginning of On Interpretation, however, he distin­ science discusses the properties of its subject, the second part guishes two kinds of simple "things said," not according to oflogic should discuss the properties of the enunciation. John what they signify, but according to how they signify. He calls of St. Thomas, however, teaches that conversion is a property them the noun and the verb. 8 The noun and verb are both sim­ of the enunciation. Therefore treatises on logic should teach ple expressions signifying something by convention, but the conversion in the second part, as indeed the handbooks do. former signifies something without implying any time, while The writers of the handbooks might have used such an the latter necessarily signifies something according to some argument to claim that they have developed the Aristotelian time. For example, 'man' is a noun and 'runs' is a verb, the tradition in logic. Their claim, however, rests on the con­ former not implying any time, the latter implying the present. tention that the conversion is a property of the enunciation, This initial distinction between the noun and verb, how- a fact they assume was overlooked by Aristotle. But he did ever, is rooted in a deeper one. St. Thomas notes: 4 John of St. Thomas, Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus (Taurini: Ma­ Time itself, insofar as it is a certain thing, can be signified rietti, r82o), p. 23. John does acknowledge that St. Thomas draws a by a noun like any other thing. In another way, however, distinction between the enunciation and the proposition, but he ignores that which can be measured by time can be considered as it in his own treatment. 5 Ibid., p. 28. 7 Aristotle, Categories, rar6. 6 Cf St. Thomas Aquinas, I Peri Henri., proen1., n. 2. 8 Aristotle, On I11terpretation, r6a20 and r6b6. 77 1 I THE PLACE OF CONVERSION IN ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC Anthony P. Andres The Enunciation and Conversion such; and since what is first and chiefly measured by time is motion, in which action and suffering consist, then the verb, The handbooks place conversion in the second part of logic which signifies action and suffering, signifies with time. 9 as being a property of the enunciation, but here we will argue St. Thomas is here establishing a connection between 'signi­ the opposite, that enunciations cannot be converted. That ar­ fying with time' and 'signifying action and being acted upon.' gument depends upon our understanding that the noun and The verb signifies 'with time' because it in some way signifies verb are the essential parts of the enunciation. Thus our con­ what is measured by time, motion. But it signifies motion be­ sideration falls into three parts: first, we will determine and cause it signifies action and suffering, which are constituted clarify the definition of the enunciation; second, we will ar­ by motion. Thus the verb signifies with time because it sig­ gue that it must be composed of a noun and verb; and third, nifies an action or a suffering. we will argue that it cannot be converted. Of course, not only verbs proper, but also participles, infini­ In the fourth chapter of On Interpretation, Aristotle develops tives, and even some nouns signify actions and sufferings. In a definition of the enunciation by first establishing and defin­ order to distinguish the verb proper from these, St. Thomas ing its genus, speech ( oratio, logos). Speech, like the noun and draws a second distinction. He says that the verb not only verb, is vocal sound signifying something by convention, but signifies action and suffering, it "signiftes action through the it differs from the other two because it is complex, that is, its mode of action, the nature of which is that it inheres.'' 10 The parts signify something separately. Speech is among what Aris­ noun, however, "signifies something as existing by itself" 11 totle calls in the Categories "things said with intertwining," That is, the verb differs from the noun and similar expressions such as "man runs" and "man wins.'' The parts "man" and because the former signiftes something as inhering in another, "runs" signify something when taken by themselves in such while the latter signifies it as existing by itself. a way that their meaning as parts contributes to the meaning A consequence of the aforesaid distinction is that the noun of the whole speech.
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