Racism As Dissent? Harmonious Society, Internet Sovereignty, and Discussing Ethnic Minority in State- Regulated Cyberspace Written by Lin Zihao

Mapping China Working Paper Series, 2017, No. 5

Racism as Dissent? Harmonious Society, Internet Sovereignty, and Discussing Ethnic Minority in State- Regulated Cyberspace Written by Lin Zihao

Abstract In this essay, the author wants to explore how discussions of ethnic minority are embedded in a wider public discursive field in Chinese domestic digital sphere in contrast to the global cyberspace. Before carving out the netizen mentality, the concepts of “harmonious society” (Chinese: hexie shehui) and “Internet sovereignty”, two defining official discourses developed by Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the ruling entity of PRC, since the new millennium, are introduced. Under the moral stances of social harmony guarded through means of state-sponsored online regulation, Chinese netizens are positioned in a state where certain boundaries of free speech are pinned down: ethnic hatred and religious discrimination become heavily censored issues. To fulfill a harmonious socialist vision, the state actors take pain to promulgate positive images of ethnic minorities in digital media. With strict online content regulation on the other hand, overt racism/ ethnic hatred is prohibited and hugely marginalized. This is in no way asserting Chinese blogosphere as a trouble- free utopia: the author illustrates further how certain netizens shun perceived punishment or social pressure, negotiate their counterattacks on state- dominant narratives and, eventually, racialize heated discussions.

Zihao finished his Bachelor in Communication at Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, and is current- ly a Master candidate in Media and Political Communication at Freie Universität Berlin. As part of the studies, he also stayed in Taipei and Helsinki. Zihao’s research interests include contemporary Chinese media system, cultural politics and the making of deaf collectivity in post-reform PRC.

Introduction bedded in a vast geography. Other than twenty- In this essay, I want to explore how discussions three provinces, five autonomous regions (In- of ethnic minority are embedded in a wider ner Mongolia, Guangxi, Tibet, Ningxia, and public discursive field in Chinese domestic Xinjiang) are reserved because of a higher digital sphere in contrast to the global cyber- population of ethnic minorities (The State space. Before carving out the netizen mentality, Council, 2014). Scholarly review over multicul- I introduce the concepts of “harmonious socie- turalism in PR China is divided. While one ty” (Chinese: hexie shehui) and “Internet sov- school argues that Chinese nationalism is ereignty”, two defining official discourses de- based on the very imagination of a biological veloped by the Chinese Communist Party specific entity (“the yellow river origin and the (CCP), the ruling entity of contemporary Peo- yellow skin pigment“, see Dikötter, 1994) and ple’s Republic of China (PRC). Under the that cultural marginalization and blocked mo- moral stances of social harmony guarded bility of ethnic minorities are taking place through means of state-sponsored online regu- (Kaltman, 2014), others offer more context- lation, Chinese netizens are positioned in a specific demonstrations. As McKarthy (2009) state where certain boundaries of free speech documented, instead of “enforcing conformi- are pinned down: ethnic hatred and religious ty”, state actors actively participated in the eth- discrimination become heavily censored issues. nic revival of Dai, Bai, and Hui minorities in To fulfill a harmonious socialist vision, the post-Mao southwest China. In this essay, I will state actors take pain to promulgate positive discuss Chinese multiculturalism not so much images of ethnic minorities in digital media. as a social reality but more as a policy-oriented With strict online content regulation on the construction. That is, I will try to carve out other hand, overt racism/ ethnic hatred is pro- how the state agency orients itself in governing hibited and hugely marginalized. This is in no tensional issues regarding Chinese nationality, way asserting Chinese blogosphere as a trou- ethnic minorities and multicultural mediation. ble-free utopia: I illustrate further how certain The Communist Party has been developing its netizens shun perceived punishment or social own narrative in legitimizing the one-party rule pressure, negotiate their counterattacks on in China. Under Hu Jingtao’s leadership, state-dominant narratives and, eventually, ra- “harmonious society/world” became the defin- cialize heated discussions. ing discourse in response to an increasingly disparate society (Zheng & Tok, 2007) and was Harmonious Society in post-Mao China later also embedded into the “Chinese Dream” When talking about China, a crucial but narrative in Xi’s age (Kivimäki, 2014). This commonly ignored context is that it is a cultur- discourse foregrounds the coordination be- ally and ethnically inhomogeneous society em- tween diverging social units: regional, ur-

ban/rural, and ethnical. Social harmony, com- of digital industry, CCP officials see Internet paring to the notion of multiculturalism, priori- technology critically as a potentially destabiliz- tizes unifying collaboration instead of cross- ing factor of domestic social order. This con- sectional differentialism. It is articulated as a cern is legitimate, as identity politics in western settlement after the land has witnessed wide social media become fragmented and, disturb- ideological gaps and various forms of govern- ingly, radicalized. Internet, despite the promise ments in a short century: the collapse of Man- of world connections, nurtures the culture of chu-governed Qing Dynasty (1912), the civil white supremacism (Burris et al., 2000), online war between KMT and CCP regimes (1945- Islamophobia (Ekman, 2015) and the far-right 1948), the foundation of People’s republic of populist family (Chris Hale, 2012; Titley, 2014; China (1949), cultural revolution (1966-1976), Siapera & Veikou, 2016). Studies of group the political reform (since 1978) and the mar- polarization (Schafer, 2002; Yardi & Boyd, ket reform (since 1992). Such governing order, 2010), echo chamber (Wallsten, 2005; Gilbert I contend, is not so much “authoritarian” but et al., 2009; Colleoni, et al., 2014) and filter rather “paternalistic”: the center state is a bubble (Pariser, 2011; Nguyen et al., 2014) needed guardian and ultimate arbitrator of show the technological features of the Internet harmonious social order. It is a fundamental that actually hinder individual netizens from departure from western-style democracy based becoming tolerant to different mindsets. In on the assumptions of liberalism, civic auton- 2010, the State Council Information Office omy, and individualism. (SCIO) of the PRC put forward the concept of Chinese officials see information communica- “Internet sovereignty” (SCIO, 2010), claiming tion technologies primarily from a utilitarian that “[w]ithin Chinese territory the Internet is perspective and locate them as a state-regulated under the jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty. conductive tool for economic and social de- […] Citizens of the People’s Republic of China velopment (Jiang, 2010:74). The latest figure in and foreign citizens, legal persons and other 2014 shows that the number of mainland organizations within Chinese territory must netizens has reached 632 million, and almost obey the laws and regulations of China and doubled compared to 338 million in 2009 conscientiously protect Internet security” (as (CNNIC, 2016). This shows the socialist gov- cited in Jiang, 2010). According to Weibo ernment’s endeavor to make technology acces- Community Regulation (2015), certain infor- sible to different social layers rather than taking mation is deemed illicit. it away. While embracing the economic boon

Users have the right to publish the in- that netizens are warned, in the name of na- formation, but are prohibited from tional harmony, not to propagate superstition, publishing information containing the pornography, and ethnic hatred. Albeit being following: (1) against the basic princi- “not free enough”, information flow on Sina ples established by the Constitution; (2) Weibo was criticized as the “world's best ru- harming national unity, sovereignty and mor-mongering machine ever” (Larson, 2011; territorial integrity; (3) disclosing state Larson, 2012). Starting from March 2012, secrets and endangering national secu- SCIO took a harsh punishment to a number rity or harming national honor and in- of websites according to the rule of law terests; (4) inciting ethnic hatred, ethnic (Xinhuanet, 2012). Roughly during the same discrimination, undermining national period, Sina Weibo introduced the real-name unity, or against ethnic customs and registration (RnR) and the verification system habits; (5) violating the state religion that urged new users to hand in personal in- policies or propagating cult and super- formation to the service provider. Punishments stition; (6) spreading rumors, disturb- on the platform will follow when misconduct is ing social order or undermining social detected (Weibo Community Regulation, stability; (7) advocating obscenity, gam- 2015). bling, violence, pornography, murder, The site will actively probe Weibo mis- terrorism or abetting a crime; (8) incit- conduct and accept the report from ing illegal assembly, association, pro- verified users. (Article 24) cession and demonstration to disturb Misconduct sanction includes: content social order; (9 )other content against sanction and account sanction. Content national laws and administrative regula- sanction includes: deletion of content, tions. (Article 13) prohibition of being forwarded, prohi- A close look at the regulation reveals the logic bition of comments, sanction label, and of content censorship. The ban of certain so on. Account sanction includes: pro- speech serves both in the legal and moral hibition of publishing content, prohibi- grounds; it constitutes fluid boundaries of so- tion from being followed, and so on, cial values and positions a sovereign identity until cancellation. (Article 26) around them. For example, what differentiates This government-sponsored gesture of censor- Chinese cyberspace from its global counterpart ship, in the eyes of liberal scholars, is an intru- created by transnational capitalistic giants is sion of individual freedom and causes chilling

effects (Chen et al., 2013; Fu et al., 2013; King neither a thief nor a terrorist / I am et al., 2013). It is true to some extent that Chi- from Xinjiang, but I’ve never eaten a nese netizens are faced with “the largest and cut cake1 / I am from Xinjiang, but I most sophisticated filtering systems in the am Chinese just as you are” world” (OpenNet Initiative, 2012) but the con- This start sets the tone of the whole video. It is tent regulation is far from arbitrary and serving a narrative of identificational sameness and only “the interest of communist dictatorship”. difference. Five characters, coming from cities In the following section I will infuse my obser- such as Ürümqi, Kashgar or Ili, identify them- vation of how space of free speech in terms of selves as “Xinjiang people” (Chinese: xinjiang multiculturalism is negotiated by state actors ren). Their imagined audience is Chinese liv- and Chinese netizens. ing outside the Xinjiang Autonomous Region who might misunderstand or have biased opin- Chinese as Ethnic Grand Integration ions toward people from that area. “I am just The Central Committee of the Communist as Chinese as you are” is a pivot assertion; it Youth League of China (CYLC) runs an iconic renders the identity of “Xinjiang people” sec- account in Sina Weibo that attracts over 4 mil- ondary to the overarching position of being lion subscribers. In May 11th, @CYLC posted a “Chinese people”, i.e, putting differentialism video with the description “What are Xinjiang after the value of social unification. After this people……? [emoticon: question face]”. The introduction, the video showcases more de- six-minute short documentary is a collection of tailed anecdotes of the interviewees. Jiang five students who are from Xinjiang Autono- commented on viewing Xinjiang as a region of mous Region and studying in mainland me- homogeneous ethnicity, tropolises (Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing). By “When fellow students in mainland talking about their personal experiences to the hear the word ‘Xinjiang people’, they camera, the interviewees provide a rich context tend to generalize it as a synonym for for a lot of heated issues regarding region- ‘minority ethnics’ (Chinese: shaoshu al/ethnical stereotypes in contemporary China. minzu); but actually we incorporate In the beginning, the transcript goes, “I am from Xinjiang, but I really don’t 1 know how to ride a horse / I am from “Cut cake scandal” took place in 2012. For reports in Eng- lish under http://www.businessinsider.com/xinjiang-nut- Xinjiang, but I know more than singing cake-scandal-in-china-2012-12?r=US&IR=T&IR=T, and http://offbeatchina.com/an-unbelievably-expensive-piece- and dancing / I am from Xinjiang; I am of-xinjiang-nut-cake-and-what-it-tells-about-the-ethnic- policy-in-china 4

both ethnic minorities and Han people. That is why Nijat was treated as a “for- ple”. eigner” (Chinese: waiguoren). Interesting, but Ailifeire addressed “silly questions” that pejo- also ironic, is the fact that Nijat felt better being ratively imagine Xinjiang as an undeveloped positioned in the role of a foreign citizen rather hinterland: “are you living in the dessert”, than a Xinjiang person 2 . But he altered his “how many times do you take a shower in a mind at last and took the initiative to make the year”, or “have you ever tasted a torte”. Nijat, image of Xinjiang better to mainland society. at first entrapped in these negative stereotypes, From here the theme of the video emerges. It illustrated his later shift in attitude. is not merely a call for the respect of difference “When I was in Beijing for my univer- but also an appeal to celebrate integration. The sity foundation year, people mistook character finds a third solution beyond the me as foreigners and spoke English to dichotomy of a helpless victim from discrimi- me; at that time I would rather play a nation and a confrontational extremist against foreigner, because I thought telling the rivals. National harmony, as is discussed them about my Xinjiang origin will re- earlier, must be rooted in the cooperation sult in me being treated like a terrorist from both sides of social tension. In the end of and thief. […] After I came to Nanjing, the documentary, Jiang added “to friends from never once more have I imitated a for- mainland: when you have time or vacation, eigner again. I initiatively introduced please do visit Xinjiang in person”. He finished myself as a Xinjiang person to strangers. his word by saying “When the music starts, we That will create an alternative impres- can dance and sing, together and freely; that is sion: Xinjiang people as a university a very happy thing.” “We” constructs an inclu- student, a fluent mandarin speaker who sive identity that incorporates Xinjiang people is polite. […] Changes start in details. and mainland people (Chinese: neidi ren). Let’s do what one can do slowly and The metaphor of dancing and singing is a fu- hope for some bits of influence.” ture-oriented vision of social harmony. This monologue provides a touching voice of The analysis of fine-grained textual details in the minority groups in China. Just as another @CLYC’s video post provides some vivid en- interviewee discussed, Chinese minority eth- tries for the understanding of Chinese multi- nics such as Uyghur carry idiosyncratic biologi- 2 cal features (physiognomy and oftentimes skin A similar story that discusses the identity of Uyghur Chinese and foreigner can be approached under color) different from the dominant Han peo- http://www.huffingtonpost.com/china-hands/an- outsiders-inside-look_b_9856680.html 5

culturalism. The Chinese state plays an active Alternative agendas: Racism as dissent? role in shaping the discourse of social harmony. The integration narrative supported by state It doesn’t mean a simplistic rejection of the agency is only part of the following online dis- existence of ethnical conflicts as an increasing cussions, or the very beginning of them. The social problem; on the contrary, the state con- documentary video received 2853 likes, 3872 fronts such hot potatoes. The posted video in reposts, and 1818 comments in Weibo (data in examination starts with depicting persistent December 2016). My second inquiry in this social discrimination that perpetuates Uyghur essay is to take a close look into the voice of citizens from Xinjiang. The interviewees who citizens: how they perceive, re-interpret, or feel unfairly treated are inviting the audience to negotiate the original messages implanted in touch their subjective experiences. But the the video. Using Hall’s encoding/decoding video isn’t a collection of one-sided complains. model (1980), I broadly group the commenta- Although the interviewees talk about their sto- tors into three groups: dominant/hegemonic ries in individual narratives, the whole trajecto- position, negotiated position, and oppositional ry is the soul searching for collective identity position. Those who express agreement to (from “I” to “we”). It assumes an imagined @CLYC’s documentary take the meaning of collectivity (“we”, “Chinese”) of which both messages directly. Xinjiang (“I”) and mainland people (“you”, the @Zhouyiyang: my impression of Xin- invisible audience as participant of the dialogue) jiang people is that they all look super are integral parts. The potentially destabilizing pretty [emoticon: love]/ factor is the tension and misunderstanding @Huangyugongzi: I am from Xinjiang between two subgroups in a greater entity and and I am crying watching it. So the solution is not so much fighting for each warm~~~/ @mohaimio: actually I be- pole’s own fragmented interest but rather to lieve a lot of people are deceived by seek common ground and mutual consensus. partial incidents. Like us Guangdong This narrative implicitly defines “Chineseness” people. I was questioned by others from civic sense rather than biological, racial whether I eat bugs and stuff, and I was or ethnical aspects (Dikötter, 1994). “Chinese” awkward. You will never understand is not portrayed as an exclusive tag for “yellow something if you didn’t experience it skinned, black haired” Han people, but a yourself. If you didn’t experience harmonious integration of different ethnic mi- something, don’t be misled by hearsays. norities. Let’s hope everybody can build discus-

sions on the basis on real personal ex- a homogenizing monolith but rather internally periences/ @Sunxiaohe: friends from diverse and allows room for regional, cultural, Xinjiang, Henan, Guangxi, my regards. and ethnical difference. In internet some people like to turn the discussion into regional attacks, but that In contrast to those who accept the whole only represents a tiny portion of people. package of information in the video, some Please don’t get angry [emoticon: love]. netizens remain skeptic. We are all sons and daughters of Chi- @huximi: I have to say, some Xinjiang nese family [emoticon: smile] [emoti- people are rather shameless [emoticon: con: smile]. sardonic grin]. Don’t have a glass heart. To these netizens, they comprehend the idea I mean it. [emoticon: sardonic grin]/ of social harmony and focus on the positive @Joyzhuoyue: good folks welcome. experiences (“so warm” to @Huangyugongzi) Thieves go back where you are from! / embedded in the video. @Zhouyiyang talks @xiemaoyan: isn’t it Shanghai people about the physiognomy (“look supper pretty”) that are under greater attack? / @kimi- of Xinjiang people, while not specifying their iqd: Even with this good publicity work, ethnic backgrounds (Uyghur, Hui, or Han, for those thieves on the street will ruin it example). @mohaimio adds a dimension of quickly. experience and hearsay in support of the ar- They acknowledge some parts of the video but gument that many stereotypes of Xinjiang peo- are not willing to accept all of it. A common ple come from ignorance and it needs to be point of negotiation is the level of substantial changed. @Sunxiaohe projects herself into the discrimination portrayed by the documentary role of participant in a cross-regional dialogue, interviewees. @huiximi and @joyzhuoyue both as is activated in the video. She further ex- make a differentiation between “good” and pressed the idea of “sons and daughters of “bad” Xinjiang people, and argue that discrim- Chinese family” (Chinese: zhonghua ernv), ination is legitimate as long as it is targeted at resembling what I interpreted as “the grand the “bad” ones. @xiemaoyan raises an interest- ethnic integration” in the last chapter. From ing view typical among other comments. While these comments, I would argue that multicul- admitting that discrimination against Xinjiang tural/multiethnic social harmony in China is people does exist, she sees regional stereotype buttressed by the consensus that there is an as not being singular in contemporary China overarching identity of “Chinese”. But it is not and points out the victims from other regions

(“Shanghai people”). @kimi-iqd consents that there and he only has problems with two par- the documentary is good as “publicity work” ticular groups. He emphasized the conflicting (Chinese: xuanchuan, also meaning “propa- aspect of interethnic encounters in history (“ex- ganda” in a negative connotation) but he im- tremists”, “revolts and kills”) rather than seek- plies that it is deviant from the social reality ing mutual understanding (a crucial compo- (“thieves on the street”). nent of harmonious society narrative). Notice that in the comment, Han people are por- What’s more, there are voices that directly trayed as the true victims in the big picture. challenge the official narratives. @5anvey: The government is responsi- @Gangziniandeshabai: I don’t have a ble. Every time Xinjiang people com- regional discrimination problem. Out mit a crime, the police will release of tens of ethnicities in Xinjiang and in them rather than take harsh punish- a big country like China, I only look ment (it appears to be because of eth- down upon Uyghur and Hui people. nic harmony). These Xinjiang criminals One of them specializes in producing become increasingly rampant and extremists who only recognize Turkey commit more crimes. They will even and Saudi Arabia as their mother coun- use a knife to threat citizens after try; one of them revolts and kills Han caught stealing (I was once confronted people every time China encounters with a knife after stopping Xinjiang turbulence in the past hundred years thief’s’ action). The Xinjiang street bar- and now even relentlessly promulgates becue causes a smoke problem to the Islam law as superior to the state consti- neighborhood but the urban inspectors tution in densely populated regions in basically ignore it (my location: Luohu, China. […] I know there are good folks, Shenzhen). This kind of tolerance up- like rice picked out of a pot of rat shits. grades the interethnic hatred. This comment brings a clear logic contrary to @5anvey talks about stealing and minority poli- the social harmony narrative. tics in China. Using his own examples, he illus- @Gangziniandeshabai sees Uyghur and Hui trates how state agency “spoils” “Xinjiang crim- people as internal antagonists to the interest of inals” because of their minority ethnicity; this China (“a pot of rat shits”). Such doing, in his tilted policy of forced ethnic harmony would, articulation, is not regional discrimination of he argued, backfire on its original purpose, Xinjiang because there are “tens of ethnicities” creating more interethnic tension.

Conclusion Through the above analysis, it is telling that the discussion of ethnic minorities spins a wide ideational spectrum in Chinese social media. State actors promote the dominant discourse of social harmony as the starting point to frame interethnic issues. It is being accepted, negotiated, and refused by various individual netizens who add their personal feelings, experiences or knowledge as evidence into the public discourse. Although overt trolling is censored according to Weibo Community Regula- tion (2015), netizens who are unsatisfied by the state-supported minority politics still manage to find ways to express their grievance in cohesive logic and appropriate wording. While challeng- ing the discourse of harmonious society as a wishful thinking of escaping social tension, such doing reproduces anti-minority voices as marginalized dissident.

References Kivimäki, T. (2014). Soft power and global govern- ance with Chinese characteristics. The Chi- Burris, V., Smith, E., & Strahm, A. (2000). White nese Journal of International Politics, pou033. supremacist networks on the Inter- Larson, C. (2011). The People's Republic of Ru- net. Sociological focus, 33(2), 215-235. mors. Foreign Policy, 201(1), 7. Chen, L., Zhang, C., & Wilson, C. (2013). Tweet- Larson, C. (2012). Still the People’s Republic of ing under pressure: analyzing trending topics rumors. Foreign Policy. Retrieved August 22, and evolving word choice on sinaweibo. In 2016, from http://blog. foreignpolicy. Proceedings of the first ACM conference on com/posts/2012/03/22/still_the_people_s_rep Online social networks (pp. 89-100). ACM. ublic_of_rumors. Chris Hale, W. (2012). Extremism on the world McCarthy, S. K. (2011). Communist multicultural- wide web: a research review.Criminal Justice ism: ethnic revival in southwest China. Uni- Studies, 25(4), 343-356. versity of Washington Press. CNNIC. (2016) . Jichu shuju [Basic Data]. Re- Nguyen, T. T., Hui, P. M., Harper, F. M., Ter- trieved from veen, L., & Konstan, J. A. (2014). Exploring https://www.cnnic.net.cn/hlwfzyj/jcsj/index.ht the filter bubble: the effect of using recom- m mender systems on content diversity. Colleoni, E., Rozza, A., & Arvidsson, A. (2014). In Proceedings of the 23rd international con- Echo chamber or public sphere? Predicting ference on World wide web (pp. 677-686). political orientation and measuring political ACM.on System Sciences, Waikoloa, Big Is- homophily in Twitter using big data. Journal land, HI. of Communication, 64(2), 317-332. OpenNet Initiative (2012). Internet Filtering in Dikötter, F. (1994). Racial identities in China: Con- China 2004–2005: A Country Study. Re- text and meaning. The China Quarterly, 138, trieved from 404-412. http://opennet.net/research/profiles/china. Ekman, M. (2015). Online Islamophobia and the Pariser, E. (2011). The filter bubble: How the new politics of fear: manufacturing the green personalized web is changing what we read scare. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 38(11), and how we think. Penguin. 1986-2002. Schafer, J. (2002). Spinning the web of hate: Web- Fu, K. W., Chan, C. H., & Chau, M. (2013). As- based hate propagation by extremist organiza- sessing censorship on microblogs in China: tions. Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Discriminatory keyword analysis and the real- Culture, 9, 68-98. name registration policy. IEEE Internet Siapera, E., & Veikou, M. (2016) The Digital Computing, 17(3), 42-50. Golden Dawn: Emergence of a nationalist- Gilbert, E., Bergstrom, T., & Karahalios, K. (2009). racist digital mainstream. The Digital Trans- Blogs are echo chambers, blogs are echo formation of the Public Sphere: Conflict, Mi- chambers. Paper presented at the proceedings gration, Crisis and Culture in Digital Net- of the 42nd Hawaii International Conference works, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Hall, S. (1980). Encoding/decoding. Culture, me- State Council Information Office of People’s Pub- dia, language, 128-138. lic of China [SCIO] (2010), Zhongguo hu lian Jiang, M. (2010). Authoritarian informationalism: wang zhuang kuang [The Internet in China]. China’s approach to Internet sovereign- People. Retrieved from ty. SAIS Review, 30(2),71-89. http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/101380/118 Kaltman, B. (2014). Under the heel of the dragon: 13818.html Islam, racism, crime, and the Uighur in China. The State Council. (2014). China ABC: Adminis- Ohio University Press. trative Division. Retreived from King, G., Pan, J., & Roberts, M. E. (2013). How http://english.gov.cn/archive/china_abc/2014/ censorship in China allows government criti- 08/27/content_281474983873401.htm cism but silences collective expres- Titley, G. (2014). No apologies for cross-posting: sion. American Political Science Re- European trans-media space and the digital view, 107(02), 326-343. circuitries of racism. Crossings: Journal of Migration & Culture, 5(1), 41-55.

Wallsten, K. (2005). Political blogs and the blog- gers who blog them: Is the political blogosphere and echo chamber. In American Po- litical Science Association’s Annual Meeting. Washington, DC September (pp. 1-4). Weibo Community Regulation. (2015). Retrieved from http://service.account.weibo.com/roles/gongyu e Xinhuanet (2012) yi pi chuanboyaoyan de huli- anwangzhanbeiyi fa chengchu [a number of rumor-spreading websites receive punishment according to the law].Xinhuanet. Retrieved August 22, 2016, fromhttp://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2012- 03/30/c_122911337.htm Yardi, S., & Boyd, D. (2010). Dynamic debates: An analysis of group polarization over time on twitter. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society,30(5), 316-327. Zheng, Y., &Tok, S. K. (2007). Harmonious society and harmonious world: China’s policy discourse under Hu Jintao. Briefing Series, 26.