The Second Island Cloud a Deeper and Broader Concept for American Presence in the Pacific Islands
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Annual air combat tactics, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief exercise Cope North increases readiness and interoperability of U.S. Air Force, Japan Air Self-Defense Force, and Royal Australian Air Force (U.S. Air Force/ Matthew Bruch) The Second Island Cloud A Deeper and Broader Concept for American Presence in the Pacific Islands By Andrew Rhodes n the early 20th century, the vision- challenges to the U.S. position in Ellis mastered its geography, he saw ary Marine officer Earl “Pete” Asia, and it is time for Washington not a “chain,” but a “cloud.” He wrote I Ellis compiled remarkable studies to develop a coherent strategy, one in 1921 that the “Marshall, Caroline, of islands in the Western Pacific and that will last another 100 years, for and Pelew Islands form a ‘cloud’ of considered the practical means for the the islands of the Western Pacific. islands stretching east and west.” His seizure or defense of advanced bases. It has become common to consider apt description of these archipelagoes A century after Ellis’s work, China the second island chain as a defining serves well for a broader conception presents new strategic and operational feature of Pacific geography, but when of the islands in, and adjacent to, traditional definitions of the second island chain. A new U.S. strategy Andrew Rhodes wrote this essay while a student at the U.S. Naval War College. It won the Strategic should abandon the narrow lens of Research Paper category of the 2019 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition. the “chain” and emphasize a broader 46 Essay Competitions / The Second Island Cloud JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 second island cloud that highlights in eastern Indonesia. The second island as vice chairman of the Central Military the U.S. regional role and invests in chain lies to the east; the first island Commission in the 1990s. One leading a resilient, distributed, and enduring chain, which is also imprecise, generally Chinese scholar on seapower references presence in the Pacific. comprises a line from southern Japan control over the Pacific islands as key The United States has often been through the Ryukyus and Taiwan, ter- to U.S.-led efforts to “contain China,” of two minds about its role in Asia, and minating in the Philippines or Borneo. invokes the operational imperative to recent heated debate on the future of The island chains took on strategic “break through” the island chains, and U.S. security commitments in the region importance for the United States when also highlights the power of small islands is no exception. This pendulum has it annexed the Philippines and Guam to confer broad “jurisdictional sea area.”8 swung before, from the heavy presence after the Spanish-American War. The Andrew Erickson and Joel Wuthnow lasting from World War II through fortification of these outposts was a catalog these discussions of the island Vietnam to a partial retrenchment under central feature of negotiations in the chains concept in Chinese sources and lay Richard Nixon’s Guam Doctrine, and 1920s that vainly sought to prevent mil- out three ways that Chinese authors have back toward statements of a greater itary competition and conflict between thought about island chains: as barriers, strategic emphasis on the region under the United States and Japan. Michael springboards, and benchmarks.9 These the Obama administration’s “Rebalance Green notes that as much as many plan- three concepts provide a useful frame- to Asia.”1 Despite some inconsistent ners of the interwar period regretted the work for not only understanding Chinese messaging on military alliances and trade decision not to establish robust fortifica- perspectives but also analyzing U.S. relationships, the Trump administration tions of strategic points such as Guam, interests in the region. A durable U.S. has indicated a major focus on Asia in the the restrictions of the Washington Naval regional strategy should reject what have 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) Treaties incentivized key innovations in become Chinese concepts of the islands and its strategy for a “Free and Open fleet mobility, such as underway replen- and redefine the geography as a cloud, Indo-Pacific.”2 Regardless of whether the ishment, to mitigate against the threat then consider the various roles of the sec- United States pursues broad engagement to fixed fueling points.4 ond island cloud as a barrier, springboard, with the region, focuses on military con- The notorious geopolitician Karl and benchmark. tainment of China, or decides to allow a Haushofer was one of the first to describe These three perspectives are already larger Chinese sphere of influence in the the island chain concept, calling them inherent in some of the debates on U.S. Western Pacific, the second island cloud “offshore island arcs.”5 Haushofer served relationships and force posture in the represents critical geography for what as German military attaché in Tokyo Western Pacific. The argument for “ar- Vice President Mike Pence has called an before he established his Institute for chipelagic defense” typifies the barrier “ironclad commitment” to the region.3 Geopolitics at the University of Munich concept, seeking new ways to defend To demonstrate this commitment and and gained influence in the 1930s with the island chains in the face of daunting respond to operational imperatives, there Nazi leaders such as Adolf Hitler and Chinese capabilities.10 The second island is a compelling need to get serious about Rudolf Hess. Leading architects of the chain has served as a springboard for the second island cloud—we need to post–World War II Pacific security archi- the U.S. military for decades, launching identify the challenges to a sustained or tecture, including Douglas MacArthur strategic bomber strikes at the end of enhanced U.S. presence and to pursue and Dean Acheson, also invoked the World War II and in Vietnam, and sus- near-term opportunities that advance island chains. Chinese strategists have taining the Continuous Bomber Presence U.S. national interests. A strategy for the focused contemporary attention on the Mission from Guam’s Andersen Air second island cloud should deepen the island chains, and it is Chinese adapta- Force Base since 2004.11 Homeporting unique U.S. relationship with these is- tions and descriptions of the island chains submarines at Guam and redeployment lands and reframe the strategic discussion that have reintroduced the concept to of Okinawa-based Marines to the island with a broader definition that includes American strategists.6 Throughout the have enhanced the springboard aspect valuable islands excluded from the second remarkable modernization of China’s of one link in the second island chain.12 island chain. military since the 1990s, its leaders have Finally, the second island chain has been emphasized the military challenge of an important benchmark of China’s Origins and Interpretations U.S. and allied deployments in the island growing maritime power, both for those The second island chain has no offi- chains and the strategic importance of seeking to balance against Chinese ex- cial standing among geographers or the waters they enclose.7 A central figure pansionism and those advocating a more international organizations but has in the promulgation of the island chains conciliatory approach to China. Lyle served as shorthand for the line of in Chinese geostrategy and military plan- Goldstein, for example, argues that a islands extending from the Japanese ning was Admiral Liu Huaqing, often reduction of U.S. forces on Guam would mainland, through the Nanpõ Shotõ, referred to as the “Father of the People’s foster trust and greater cooperation with the Marianas, and the western Caroline Liberation Army Navy,” who served as China.13 Goldstein also employed the Islands, before terminating somewhere its commander in the 1980s and then benchmark concept to note Chinese JFQ 95, 4th Quarter 2019 Rhodes 47 focus on the Philippine Sea—between the subtly different statuses in U.S. law, and access to military facilities in the islands. two island chains—as nascent evidence of each has a non-voting representative in All three nations face development chal- an “evolving new multipolarity.”14 Congress. Both Guam and the CNMI lenges relating to their remote locations are unincorporated territories where the and undiversified economies and have Island Geography Constitution applies only partially. Both seen heavy outward migration, with The second island cloud lies to the territories have a non-voting member of nearly a quarter of FAS citizens living east of the first island chain, across the House of Representatives, but there in the United States.17 Palau has much the Philippine Sea. This cloud spans a are subtle differences in the application higher per capita gross domestic product complicated patchwork of sovereignty of Federal law in each territory. Guam is and has been more successful at investing arrangements, political contexts, and the largest, most populous, and most de- U.S. assistance than its neighbors. The economic challenges. The concept of veloped island in the Marianas and hosts economic outlook is more discouraging a second island cloud should build on a substantial U.S. military presence, while for the FMS and RMI as a 2024 deadline three basic types of islands in the tra- the CNMI—including the smaller and looms for both nations to transition away ditional chain definition: Japanese and less populous islands of Saipan, Tinian, from direct U.S. support in favor of dis- Indonesian territory at the northern and and Rota—hosts only small-scale U.S. bursements from a trust fund established southern ends, a core of U.S. territory military training. The CNMI has strug- in 2003.18 The trust fund sought to place in the Marianas, and the island groups gled economically in the last decade and the FMS and RMI on a more stable long- adjacent to the core consisting of the has started to rely for jobs and growth term financial footing; however, enduring Republic of Palau and portions of the on Chinese investment in casino tourism, structural challenges, weak performance, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM).