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Arab Vote 21 Knesset Election

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Arab Vote 21 Knesset Election Summary of Arab and Druze vote in 2019 Knesset Election (Source of data: Central Election Committee) Compiled by Arik Rudnitzky Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies (MDC), Tel Aviv University Israel Democracy Institute (IDI), Jerusalem Election turnout, 1999-2019 Nationwide 78.7% Arab and Druze 72.3% 75.0% 67.8% 67.8% 68.5% 63.5% 64.7% 62.0% 63.5% 56.3% 56.5% 53.4% 49.2% 1999 2003 2006 2009 2013 2015 2019 Arab sector turnout, 2019 elections 52.0% 49.2% 49.9% 41.5% 37.5% General Northern district The Triangle Jerusalem Negev Bedouin Arab and Druze, turnout 49.2% List breakdown Arab / Jewish parties * Hadash-Taal 39.3% Raam-Balad 31.5% Jewish Meretz 8.7% Parties, 28.4% Blue & White 8.1% Likud 2.3% Kulanu 2.2% Arab Shas 2.0% Parties, Yisrael Beitenu 1.6% 71.6% Labor 1.3% * Including lists that did not pass the electoral threshold Northern District, turnout 52.0% List breakdown Arab / Jewish parties * Hadash-Taal 38.8% Raam-Balad 26.4% Jewish Meretz 7.8% Parties, Blue & White 10.8% 33.7% Likud 3.0% Kulanu 3.0% Arab Shas 2.6% Parties, 66.3% Yisrael Beitenu 2.4% Labor 1.7% * Including lists that did not pass the electoral threshold Galilee Bedouin, turnout 38.7% List breakdown Arab / Jewish parties * Hadash-Taal 21.2% Raam-Balad 26.7% Meretz 7.3% Blue & White 24.7% Jewish Arab Likud 3.2% Parties, Parties, 48.8% Kulanu 1.9% 51.2% Shas 3.9% Yisrael Beitenu 0.1% Labor 4.8% * Including lists that did not pass the electoral threshold Druze, turnout 56.6% List breakdown Arab / Jewish parties * Hadash-Taal 7.0% Arab Parties, Raam-Balad 3.8% 11.4% Meretz 15.2% Blue & White 34.3% Likud 10.7% Kulanu 7.8% Shas 4.1% Jewish Yisrael Beitenu 8.0% Parties, Labor 2.7% 88.6% * Including lists that did not pass the electoral threshold Christians, turnout 55.7% List breakdown Arab / Jewish parties * Hadash-Taal 45.2% Raam-Balad 8.7% Meretz 16.9% Blue & White 15.9% Jewish Parties, Likud 1.6% Arab 46.0% Parties, Kulanu 3.7% 54.0% Shas 1.7% Yisrael Beitenu 3.2% Labor 1.2% * Including lists that did not pass the electoral threshold The Triangle, turnout 49.9% List breakdown Arab / Jewish parties * Hadash-Taal 50.8% Jewish Raam-Balad 30.0% Parties, Meretz 13.6% 19.0% Blue & White 1.9% Likud 0.5% Kulanu 0.7% Shas 0.9% Arab Yisrael Beitenu 0.0% Parties, 81.0% Labor 0.5% * Including lists that did not pass the electoral threshold Northern Triangle, turnout 42.4% List breakdown Arab / Jewish parties * Hadash-Taal 58.7% Jewish Raam-Balad 26.1% Parties, 14.9% Meretz 8.8% Blue & White 2.0% Likud 0.5% Kulanu 0.9% Shas 1.1% Arab Yisrael Beitenu 0.0% Parties, Labor 0.4% 85.1% * Including lists that did not pass the electoral threshold Southern Triangle, turnout 60.0% List breakdown Arab / Jewish parties * Hadash-Taal 43.1% Jewish Raam-Balad 33.7% Parties, Meretz 18.2% 23.0% Blue & White 1.9% Likud 0.4% Kulanu 0.5% Shas 0.7% Arab Parties, Yisrael Beitenu 0.0% 77.0% Labor 0.5% * Including lists that did not pass the electoral threshold Jerusalem District, turnout 41.5% List breakdown Arab / Jewish parties * Hadash-Taal 28.0% Raam-Balad 15.6% Meretz 14.9% Arab Blue & White 18.7% Parties, Likud 8.8% Jewish 44.4% Parties, Kulanu 5.7% 56.6% Shas 1.2% Yisrael Beitenu 0.4% Labor 2.9% * Including lists that did not pass the electoral threshold Negev Bedouin, turnout 37.5% List breakdown Arab / Jewish parties * Hadash-Taal 19.3% Jewish Raam-Balad 66.7% Parties, 13.7% Meretz 3.9% Blue & White 4.4% Likud 1.0% Kulanu 0.6% Shas 1.3% Arab Yisrael Beitenu 0.0% Parties, Labor 0.7% 86.3% * Including lists that did not pass the electoral threshold Bedouin townships, turnout 42.3% List breakdown Arab / Jewish parties * Hadash-Taal 25.0% Jewish Parties, Raam-Balad 63.0% 11.8% Meretz 3.8% Blue & White 3.5% Likud 0.9% Kulanu 0.7% Shas 0.9% Arab Yisrael Beitenu 0.0% Parties, Labor 0.7% 88.2% * Including lists that did not pass the electoral threshold Bedouin villages of regional councils, turnout 42.6% List breakdown Arab / Jewish parties * Hadash-Taal 5.5% Raam-Balad 66.4% Jewish Parties, Meretz 5.7% 27.7% Blue & White 9.9% Likud 2.2% Kulanu 1.0% Arab Shas 4.7% Parties, Yisrael Beitenu 0.1% 72.3% Labor 0.9% * Including lists that did not pass the electoral threshold Bedouin tribes, turnout 25.5% List breakdown Arab / Jewish parties * Hadash-Taal 4.3% Jewish Raam-Balad 80.5% Parties, 14.8% Meretz 3.3% Blue & White 5.1% Likud 0.9% Kulanu 0.3% Shas 1.2% Arab Yisrael Beitenu 0.1% Parties, Labor 1.0% 85.2% * Including lists that did not pass the electoral threshold Turnout of Arab residents in Mixed Jewish-Arab Cities 58.7% Haifa 48.9% 56.1% Lod 33.7% 59.6% Maalot-Tarshiha 51.6% 55.2% Upper Nazareth 58.8% City 58.3% Arabs (est.) Akko 49.8% 58.9% Ramle 44.1% 63.0% Tel-Aviv - Jaffa 48.5% 68.5% Nationwide 49.2% Arab parties achievements 193,442 votes 200,000 6 seats 180,000 143,666 votes 160,000 4 seats 140,000 120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 - Hadash-Taal Raam-Balad Rest of country 9,036 4,414 Mixed Cities 22,002 9,156 Arab sector 162,404 130,096 Breakdown of Arab parties vote Hadash-Taal Raam-Balad 11.4% 4.5% 3.1% 4.7% 6.4% 0.4% Northern District Northern District The Triangle The Triangle Jerusalem District 21.0% 49.2% Jerusalem District 25.2% 53.8% Negev Bedouin Negev Bedouin Mixed Cities 20.1% Mixed Cities Rest of Country Rest of Country 0.3% Arab contribution to Jewish Parties * 23.0% 6.1% 3.8% 3.3% 3.0% 2.9% 2.3% Meretz Kulanu Yisrael Shas Blue & Labor Likud Beitenu White * The percentage of votes received by the Jewish parties in the Arab and Druze communities out of the total votes received by these parties in the elections .
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