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Congress Programme 24-28 JULY 2016 MAASTRICHT CONGRESS PROGRAMME GAME THEORY SOCIETY 5TH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY CONGRESS PROGRAMME // SUNDAY 24 JULY 2016 09:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS – B: AUCTIONS - C: IO D: IO SEARCH E: BARGAINING - F: MATCHING G: STRATEGY H: DYNAMIC J: EQUILIBRIUM - K: LEARNING L: CONTESTS N: NETWORKS P: PSYCHOLOGY Q: EPISTEMICS R: COOPERATIVE - S: STOCHASTIC T: TEAMS U: PREDICTION 10:30 SESSIONS DESIGN APPLICATION EXPERIMENTS PROOFNESS GAMES LARGE GAMES NUCLEOLUS GAMES SUN9 LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.09 C-1.07 G0.03 D0.03 G1.15 Lecture Hall H0.04 H0.06 G1.01 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 09:00 Tomasz Sadzik and Younghwan In Nicolas Fugger, Dhruva Bhaskar Alex Possajennikov Mu Zhang Yu Zhou and Pieter Collins and Xiang Sun, Yeneng Burkhard Schipper Caleb Koch and Catherine Moon and Nick Janetos Yasuo Sasaki Tamas Solymosi and Mickael Randour Aodi Tang Xi Alice Gao, Andrew Pavel Andreyanov Jump bidding in FCC Florian Gössl and Tempting and Test- and Rene Saran Multi-period Shigehiro Serizawa Frank Thuijsman Sun and Haomiao Yu Strategic teaching Heinrich Nax Vincent Conitzer Fads and changing Unawareness of Balázs Sziklai Reconciling Optimal Contracts Mao, Yiling Chen and Robust Mechanism spectrum auctions Joachim Heinzel ing Through Costly Private Value Matching with Strategy-Proofness Interior-Point Type-Symmetric and learning in Contests Evolving Maximal Cooper- tastes Decision Criteria in Characterization sets Rationality and for team Ryan Adams Design of Exchange Credence goods Monitoring Bargaining with Commitment and Efficiency for Methods for Randomized games ation in Repeated Multicriteria Games for the nucleolus in Stochasticity: Rich experimentation Trick or Treat: markets with hetero- Naive Players: Theory Tiered Objects Dynamic Markov Equilibrium Games on Social balanced games Behavioral Models in Putting Peer geneous experts and Experiment Preferences Games Networks Two-Player Games Prediction to the Test 09:30 Sergei Izmalkov, Simon Loertscher and Nejat Anbarci and Karl Schlag and Matthew Embrey, Britta Hoyer and Timo Mennle and Wei He and Peter Hammond Ai Takeuchi, Christian Seel Pramod Mane, Kapil Stefanie Schmitt Kemal Yildiz Javier Martinez- Dipti Dubey and Alex Gershkov, Yiling Chen and Bo Dilyara Khakimova Cedric Wasser Nick Feltovich Andriy Zapechelnyuk Kyle Hyndman and Nadja Maraun Sven Seuken Yeneng Sun A Notion of Yukihiko Funaki, The Reverse War of Ahuja and Nagarajan Rational Allocation Choice Regularities De-Albeniz, S. K. Neogy Jianpei Li and Paul Waggoner and Gleb Romanyuk Optimal Structure Market Institutions, Robust Sequential Arno Riedl Matching Strategies Partial Dynamic Games Statistical Mamoru Kaneko Attrition Krishnamurthy of Attention in Relative identifi- Carlos Rafels Completely Mixed Schweinzer Informational Position auctions and Dissolution of Efficiency and Prices Search Bargaining with a of Heterogeneous Strategyproofness: with Almost Perfect Equilibrium for and Jeffrey Kline Unique Stability Decision-Making cation of choice and Neus Ybern Strategies for How to share it out: Substitutes for with endogenous Partnerships Residual Claimant: Agents in a An Axiomatic Information Games with Many An Experiment on Point in Social theories Insights into the Generalized Bimatrix The value of Prediction and Play and Switching Controller supply An Experimental University Approach to Players Behavior, Learning, Storage nucleolus of the Stochastic Game using information in Study Clearinghouse Relaxing and Forgetfulness assignment game Vertical Linear teams Strategyproofness in Inductive Game Complementarity for Assignment Theory Problem Mechanisms 10:00 Shuchi Chawla, Yair Tauman and Cristian Bartolucci Suntak Kim and Paula Jaramillo, Lars Ehlers Guilherme Carmona Chiara Margaria Greg Kubitz Mikhail Raskin and Aïleen Lotz, Michael Greinecker Yin-Fang Ye, S. K. Neogy and Dipti Nikhil R. Devanur, Chang Zhao and Ignacio Monzon Enseen Tang Cagatay Kayi and Strategy-Proofness Nearly-Pure Queueing to learn Repeated Contests Nikita Nikitenkov Pierre Gosselin Typology of beliefs Deng-Feng Li and Dubey Anna Karlin and Patent Licensing, Frictions Lead to An Experimental Santiago Velez and Essentially Equilibria of Large with Private Paradoxical and Marc Wambst and rationalizability Xun-Feng Hu Linear Comple- Balasubramanian Entry and the Sorting: a Partnership Study of Proposal Matching Problems Single-Valued Cores Games Information examples of From Rationality with many players A monotonity-based mentarity and the Sivan Incentive to Innovate Model with On- Power in Legislative with Priorities Revisited games on social to Irrationality: simplified method for class of Structured Simple Pricing the-Match Search Bargaining and Preferences: networks Dynamic Interacting computing interval least Stochastic Games square prenucleolus Schemes for Compulsory Social Structures of interval cooperative Consumers with Service Allocation in games Evolving Values Colombia 11:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: AUCTIONS - C: IO R&D D: CONTRACTS E: BARGAINING - F: MATCHING G: STRATEGY H: DYNAMIC J: EQUILIBRIUM K: LEARNING L: CONTESTS M: COMMUNICATION N: NETWORKS P: BIASES Q: EPISTEMICS R: COOPERATIVE - S: POLITICAL T: SHARING U: FUZZY, 12:30 SESSIONS PRICE PROCUREMENT DELAY PROOFNESS GAMES STABLE SETS ECONOMY QUANTUM SUN11 DISCRIMINATION LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.09 C-1.07 G0.03 D0.03 G1.15 Lecture Hall H0.04 H0.06 G1.01 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 11:00 Georgios Petropoulos Jeannette Brosig-Koch Shin Kishimoto Akifumi Ishihara Jean-Jacques Herings Stefano Duca, Patrick Harless Leon Petrosyan Ibrahim Inal Ye Du and Alexandros Rigos Thomas Rivera Vincent Boucher and Jakub Steiner and Pierfrancesco Guarino Weibin Han and Frederik Toscani Ruben Juarez, Ulrich Faigle and Optimal Selling and Timo Heinrich Stable Licensing On Multitasking and and Harold Houba Dirk Helbing and From behind the Strongly Time- Purification without Ehud Lehrer A Beauty Contest Incentives and Marion Goussé Olivier Gossner The Universal Adrain van Deemen and Daniel Quigley Chiu Yu Ko and Michel Grabisch Mechanisms for Promises and Schemes in Job Design in Costless Delay in Heinrich H. Nax veil: Evaluating Consistent Solutions Common Knowledge Constrained No with Flexible the Structure of Wage Dynamics Illusion of Control Type Space with On Generalized The roles of Jingyi Xue Quantum Analysis On-line Services I: Social Distance in Technology Transfer Relational Contracts Negotiation Assortative matching allocation rules by in N-person of Priors Regret Learning Information Communication and Peer Referrals and Related Unawareness for Stable Sets transparency in Sharing sequential of Decision and Price Discrimination Buyer-Determined with inequality ex-ante properties Differential and Acquisition Perception Biases Conditional regime change: profits in a network Interaction Systems and the Risk of Inter- Procurement in voluntary Dynamic Games. Probability Systems Striking when the ruption Auctions contribution games iron’s gone cold 11:30 Nima Haghpanah Daniel Z. Li and Herbert Dawid and Daniel Danau and Deepal Basak Chia-Ling Hsu Haris Aziz, Florian Dmitry Khlopin Rongyu Wang Annie Liang Aidas Masiliunas, Vessela Daskalova Mehrdad Nojoumian Roee Teper and Jayant Ganguli, Parkash Chander Daron Acemoglu, Eric Bahel and Dian Qing Yang and and Jason Hartline Minbo Xu Tim Hellmann Annalisa Vinella Transparency and Promoting Diversity Brandl, Felix Brandt On Tauberian Information Games of Friederike Mengel and Nicolaas J. Vriend and Douglas Stinson Ehud Lehrer Aviad Heifetz and An Infinitely Georgy Egorov and Christian Trudeau Deng Feng Li Multi-dimensional Competition in R&D Investments On the optimal Delay in Bargaining of Talents: A Market and Markus Brill Theorems for Correlation in a Incomplete and J. Philipp Reiss Categorization and From Rational Secret Who is a Bayesian? Byung Soo Lee Farsighted Konstantin Sonin From spanning trees Multilinear extension Virtual Values and Procurement under Endogenous use of correlated Design Approach On the Tradeoff Dynamic Games Strategic- Information Behavioural Coordination Sharing to Social Universal Interactive Stable Set Social Mobility to arborescences: of tau-values for Second-degree Price Auctions with Cluster Formation information in con- between Complements Game Played by Variation in and Socio-Rational Preferences and Stability of new and extended cooperative games Discrimination Corruption tractual design under Efficiency and and the Extension of Statisticians Tullock Contests Secret Sharing Democracy: cost sharing with fuzzy coalitions limited liability Strategyproofness Purification Theorem Re-evaluating solutions De Tocqueville 12:00 Matthew Ellman and Dongkyu Chang P. Jean-Jacques William Thomson Janos Flesch and Rohan Dutta, In-Koo Cho and Damian Damianov, János Flesch, Toshiyuki Hirai Jiabin Wu Ruben Juarez and Jie Yang and Sjaak Hurkens Delay in Herings and Jo Cho Arkadi Predtetchinski David Levine and Anna Rubinchik Shane Sanders and Dries Vermeulen Single-payoff Homo-Politicus: Lining Han Deng-Feng Li Optimal Bargaining with Equilibrium and Strategy-proofness A characterization Salvatore Modica Contemplation vs. Anil Yildizparlak and Anna Zseleva farsighted stable Evolution of Money-Sharing and Parameterized Bilinear Crowdfunding Outside Options Matching under in private good of subgame–perfect Collusion intuition. A rein- Asymmetric Zero-sum games sets in strategic Behavior Under Intermediation in Programming Design Price Controls economies with
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