24-28 JULY 2016 MAASTRICHT

CONGRESS PROGRAMME

GAME THEORY SOCIETY 5TH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY

CONGRESS PROGRAMME // SUNDAY 24 JULY 2016

09:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS – B: AUCTIONS - C: IO D: IO SEARCH E: BARGAINING - F: MATCHING G: STRATEGY H: DYNAMIC J: EQUILIBRIUM - K: LEARNING L: CONTESTS N: NETWORKS P: PSYCHOLOGY Q: EPISTEMICS R: COOPERATIVE - S: STOCHASTIC T: TEAMS U: PREDICTION 10:30 SESSIONS DESIGN APPLICATION EXPERIMENTS PROOFNESS GAMES LARGE GAMES NUCLEOLUS GAMES SUN9 LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.09 C-1.07 G0.03 D0.03 G1.15 Lecture Hall H0.04 H0.06 G1.01 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008

09:00 Tomasz Sadzik and Younghwan In Nicolas Fugger, Dhruva Bhaskar Alex Possajennikov Mu Zhang Yu Zhou and Pieter Collins and Xiang Sun, Yeneng Burkhard Schipper Caleb Koch and Catherine Moon and Nick Janetos Yasuo Sasaki Tamas Solymosi and Mickael Randour Aodi Tang Xi Alice Gao, Andrew Pavel Andreyanov Jump bidding in FCC Florian Gössl and Tempting and Test- and Rene Saran Multi-period Shigehiro Serizawa Frank Thuijsman Sun and Haomiao Yu Strategic teaching Heinrich Nax Vincent Conitzer Fads and changing Unawareness of Balázs Sziklai Reconciling Optimal Contracts Mao, Yiling Chen and Robust Mechanism spectrum auctions Joachim Heinzel ing Through Costly Private Value Matching with Strategy-Proofness Interior-Point Type-Symmetric and learning in Contests Evolving Maximal Cooper- tastes Decision Criteria in Characterization sets Rationality and for team Ryan Adams Design of Exchange Credence goods Monitoring Bargaining with Commitment and Efficiency for Methods for Randomized games ation in Repeated Multicriteria Games for the nucleolus in Stochasticity: Rich experimentation Trick or Treat: markets with hetero- Naive Players: Theory Tiered Objects Dynamic Markov Equilibrium Games on Social balanced games Behavioral Models in Putting Peer geneous experts and Experiment Preferences Games Networks Two-Player Games Prediction to the Test 09:30 Sergei Izmalkov, Simon Loertscher and Nejat Anbarci and Karl Schlag and Matthew Embrey, Britta Hoyer and Timo Mennle and Wei He and Peter Hammond Ai Takeuchi, Christian Seel Pramod Mane, Kapil Stefanie Schmitt Kemal Yildiz Javier Martinez- Dipti Dubey and Alex Gershkov, Yiling Chen and Bo Dilyara Khakimova Cedric Wasser Nick Feltovich Andriy Zapechelnyuk Kyle Hyndman and Nadja Maraun Sven Seuken Yeneng Sun A Notion of Yukihiko Funaki, The Reverse War of Ahuja and Nagarajan Rational Allocation Choice Regularities De-Albeniz, S. K. Neogy Jianpei Li and Paul Waggoner and Gleb Romanyuk Optimal Structure Market Institutions, Robust Sequential Arno Riedl Matching Strategies Partial Dynamic Games Statistical Mamoru Kaneko Attrition Krishnamurthy of Attention in Relative identifi- Carlos Rafels Completely Mixed Schweinzer Informational Position auctions and Dissolution of Efficiency and Prices Search Bargaining with a of Heterogeneous Strategyproofness: with Almost Perfect Equilibrium for and Jeffrey Kline Unique Stability Decision-Making cation of choice and Neus Ybern Strategies for How to share it out: Substitutes for with endogenous Partnerships Residual Claimant: Agents in a An Axiomatic Information Games with Many An Experiment on Point in Social theories Insights into the Generalized Bimatrix The value of Prediction and Play and Switching Controller supply An Experimental University Approach to Players Behavior, Learning, Storage nucleolus of the Stochastic Game using information in Study Clearinghouse Relaxing and Forgetfulness assignment game Vertical Linear teams Strategyproofness in Inductive Game Complementarity for Assignment Theory Problem Mechanisms 10:00 Shuchi Chawla, Yair Tauman and Cristian Bartolucci Suntak Kim and Paula Jaramillo, Lars Ehlers Guilherme Carmona Chiara Margaria Greg Kubitz Mikhail Raskin and Aïleen Lotz, Michael Greinecker Yin-Fang Ye, S. K. Neogy and Dipti Nikhil R. Devanur, Chang Zhao and Ignacio Monzon Enseen Tang Cagatay Kayi and Strategy-Proofness Nearly-Pure Queueing to learn Repeated Contests Nikita Nikitenkov Pierre Gosselin Typology of beliefs Deng-Feng Li and Dubey Anna Karlin and Patent Licensing, Frictions Lead to An Experimental Santiago Velez and Essentially Equilibria of Large with Private Paradoxical and Marc Wambst and rationalizability Xun-Feng Hu Linear Comple- Balasubramanian Entry and the Sorting: a Partnership Study of Proposal Matching Problems Single-Valued Cores Games Information examples of From Rationality with many players A monotonity-based mentarity and the Sivan Incentive to Innovate Model with On- Power in Legislative with Priorities Revisited games on social to Irrationality: simplified method for class of Structured Simple Pricing the-Match Search Bargaining and Preferences: networks Dynamic Interacting computing interval least Stochastic Games square prenucleolus Schemes for Compulsory Social Structures of interval cooperative Consumers with Service Allocation in games Evolving Values Colombia 11:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: AUCTIONS - C: IO R&D D: CONTRACTS E: BARGAINING - F: MATCHING G: STRATEGY H: DYNAMIC J: EQUILIBRIUM K: LEARNING L: CONTESTS M: COMMUNICATION N: NETWORKS P: BIASES Q: EPISTEMICS R: COOPERATIVE - S: POLITICAL T: SHARING U: FUZZY, 12:30 SESSIONS PRICE PROCUREMENT DELAY PROOFNESS GAMES STABLE SETS ECONOMY QUANTUM SUN11 DISCRIMINATION

LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.09 C-1.07 G0.03 D0.03 G1.15 Lecture Hall H0.04 H0.06 G1.01 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008

11:00 Georgios Petropoulos Jeannette Brosig-Koch Shin Kishimoto Akifumi Ishihara Jean-Jacques Herings Stefano Duca, Patrick Harless Leon Petrosyan Ibrahim Inal Ye Du and Alexandros Rigos Thomas Rivera Vincent Boucher and Jakub Steiner and Pierfrancesco Guarino Weibin Han and Frederik Toscani Ruben Juarez, Ulrich Faigle and Optimal Selling and Timo Heinrich Stable Licensing On Multitasking and and Harold Houba Dirk Helbing and From behind the Strongly Time- Purification without Ehud Lehrer A Beauty Contest Incentives and Marion Goussé Olivier Gossner The Universal Adrain van Deemen and Daniel Quigley Chiu Yu Ko and Michel Grabisch Mechanisms for Promises and Schemes in Job Design in Costless Delay in Heinrich H. Nax veil: Evaluating Consistent Solutions Common Knowledge Constrained No with Flexible the Structure of Wage Dynamics Illusion of Control Type Space with On Generalized The roles of Jingyi Xue Quantum Analysis On-line Services I: Social Distance in Technology Transfer Relational Contracts Negotiation Assortative matching allocation rules by in N-person of Priors Regret Learning Information Communication and Peer Referrals and Related Unawareness for Stable Sets transparency in Sharing sequential of Decision and Price Discrimination Buyer-Determined with inequality ex-ante properties Differential and Acquisition Perception Biases Conditional regime change: profits in a network Interaction Systems and the Risk of Inter- Procurement in voluntary Dynamic Games. Probability Systems Striking when the ruption Auctions contribution games iron’s gone cold 11:30 Nima Haghpanah Daniel Z. Li and Herbert Dawid and Daniel Danau and Deepal Basak Chia-Ling Hsu Haris Aziz, Florian Dmitry Khlopin Rongyu Wang Annie Liang Aidas Masiliunas, Vessela Daskalova Mehrdad Nojoumian Roee Teper and Jayant Ganguli, Parkash Chander Daron Acemoglu, Eric Bahel and Dian Qing Yang and and Jason Hartline Minbo Xu Tim Hellmann Annalisa Vinella Transparency and Promoting Diversity Brandl, Felix Brandt On Tauberian Information Games of Friederike Mengel and Nicolaas J. Vriend and Douglas Stinson Ehud Lehrer Aviad Heifetz and An Infinitely Georgy Egorov and Christian Trudeau Deng Feng Li Multi-dimensional Competition in R&D Investments On the optimal Delay in Bargaining of Talents: A Market and Markus Brill Theorems for Correlation in a Incomplete and J. Philipp Reiss Categorization and From Rational Secret Who is a Bayesian? Byung Soo Lee Farsighted Konstantin Sonin From spanning trees Multilinear extension Virtual Values and Procurement under Endogenous use of correlated Design Approach On the Tradeoff Dynamic Games Strategic- Information Behavioural Coordination Sharing to Social Universal Interactive Stable Set Social Mobility to arborescences: of tau-values for Second-degree Price Auctions with Cluster Formation information in con- between Complements Game Played by Variation in and Socio-Rational Preferences and Stability of new and extended cooperative games Discrimination Corruption tractual design under Efficiency and and the Extension of Statisticians Tullock Contests Secret Sharing Democracy: cost sharing with fuzzy coalitions limited liability Strategyproofness Purification Theorem Re-evaluating solutions De Tocqueville

12:00 Matthew Ellman and Dongkyu Chang P. Jean-Jacques William Thomson Janos Flesch and Rohan Dutta, In-Koo Cho and Damian Damianov, János Flesch, Toshiyuki Hirai Jiabin Wu Ruben Juarez and Jie Yang and Sjaak Hurkens Delay in Herings and Jo Cho Arkadi Predtetchinski David Levine and Anna Rubinchik Shane Sanders and Dries Vermeulen Single-payoff Homo-Politicus: Lining Han Deng-Feng Li Optimal Bargaining with Equilibrium and Strategy-proofness A characterization Salvatore Modica Contemplation vs. Anil Yildizparlak and Anna Zseleva farsighted stable Evolution of Money-Sharing and Parameterized Bilinear Crowdfunding Outside Options Matching under in private good of subgame–perfect Collusion intuition. A rein- Asymmetric Zero-sum games sets in strategic Behavior Under Intermediation in Programming Design Price Controls economies with equilibrium plays Constrained forcement learning endogenous with charges games with Political Institutions Networks Methodology for linear economies in Borel games of Equilibrium perspective. prize contests dominant Solving Triangular perfect information punishment Intuitionistic Fuzzy strategies Number Bimatrix Games 14:00- SEMI- SP1: MATCHING AND MARKETS / VOTING VERSUS LOBBYING SP2: CONTINUOUS-TIME AND STOCHASTIC GAMES SP3: ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR 15:30 PLENARY SESSIONS I

LOCATION > Lecture Hall Concert Hall Greek Aula

14:00 Chris Shannon Pierre Cardaliaguet Jeff Shamma Matching and Markets Learning in nonatomic continuous time games Higher order evolutionary dynamics in population games

14:45 David Levine Eilon Solan Arthur Robson Voting versus Lobbying Multiplayer Stochastic Games: Techniques, Results, Rapidly Adaptive Hedonic Utility and Open Problems 16:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: AUCTIONS - C: IO PRICE D: CONTRACTS E: BARGAINING F: MATCHING G: STRATEGY H: REPEATED J: EQUILIBRIUM - K: LEARNING L: CONTESTS M: COMMUNICATION N: NETWORKS P: RISK AND Q: EPISTEMICS R: COOPERATIVE S: POLITICAL T: SHARING U: ENVIRONMENT 17:30 SESSIONS OPTIMAL EXPERIMENTS COMPETITION PROOFNESS GAMES EXISTENCE AMBIGUITY ECONOMY SUN16

LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.09 C-1.07 G0.03 D0.03 G1.15 Lecture Hall H0.04 H0.06 G1.01 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008

16:00 Saeed Alaei, Joyce Delnoij R. Emre Aytimur Daniel Danau and S. Nageeb Ali, Philip Marx and James Schummer and Lawrence Blume and Maria Carmela Jesper Rudiger and Ayse Gul Mermer Tom Potoms and Penelope Hernandez, Takashi Ui Elias Tsakas and Yukihiko Funaki, Kaj Thomsson and Tatsuya Iwase and Eugen Kovac and Jason Hartline, Compare and Salience and Annalisa Vinella David Miller and James Schummer Rodrigo Velez Klaus Ritzberger Ceparano and Adrien Vigier Effort Provision Tom Truyts Guillem Martinez, Ambiguity and Risk Andres Perea Koji Yokote and Richard Bluhm Takahiro Shiga Robert Schmidt Rad Niazadeh, despair: social Horizontal Sequential screening David Yilin Yang Revenue from Sequential The Curse of Poverty Federico Quartieri Pundits and Quacks: and Optimal Prize On Symbols and Manuel Monos- in Global Games Local reasoning in Takumi Kongo Ethnic divisions, Pure Nash A simple dynamic Emmanouil comparison Differentiation and the relationship Is multilateral Matching Platforms preference and the Blessings of Nash equilibrium Learning about Structure in Contests Cooperation Herrera and dynamic games The balanced political institutions Equilibrium and climate cooperation Pountourakis and concerns in between principal’s enforcement revelation in Wealth uniqueness in nice Analysts when with Loss-Averse Angel Sanchez contribution and the duration of Coordination of model with large Yang Yuan auctions preferences and vulnerable to incomplete games with isotone Fundamental Players Individual property for declines Players in Ride coalitions and deep Optimal Auctions vs. agent’s incentives bilateral information best replies Asset Values preferences and equal contributors Sharing Games emissions cuts Anonymous Pricing renegotiation? settings are Unobserved networks 16:30 Takehiro Oyakawa, Gali Noti, Noam Abhimanyu Khan and Andrei Barbos Armando Gomes Orhan Aygun and Peter Biro, Flip Klijn Kutay Cingiz, János Rabah Amir and Rahul Deb and Alex Smolin Juan Carlos Carbajal Michel Grabisch, Satoshi Nakada and Nadine Chlass and Colin Rowat, Shyh-Fang Ueng Jason Marden, Raga- Adam Lampert, Amy Greenwald and Nisan and Ilan Yaniv Ronald Peeters Optimal Contracts Coalitional Bertan Turhan and Szilvia Papai Flesch, Jean-Jacques Luciano De Castro Colin Stewart Optimal Feedback Inconspicuous Antoine Mandel, Kohei Sashida Andrés Perea Manfred Kerber and Perception and vendran Gopalakris- Alan Hastings and Vasilis Syrgkanis An Experimental Imitation and price with Random Bargaining: A New Dynamic Reserves Circulation under Herings and Arkadi Nash Equilibrium Optimal Design Conspicuous Agnieszka Rusinowska Risk and Ambiguity How Do People Naoki Yoshihara Inclusiveness hnan and Adam James Sanchirico Optimal Auctions Evaluation of competition in a Auditing Concept of Value in Matching Markets Responsive Predtetchinski in Games with Adaptive Testing: Consumption and Emily Tanimura in the Twin Crises Reason In Dynamic Asymmetric three Wierman Ecosystem with Convex Bidders’ Behavior differentiated and Coalition With Contracts: Preferences Perfect information Quasi-Monotonic Informativeness Strategic influence Games? agent majority Potential Games restoration by Perceived Payments in Ad Auctions market Formation Theory and games with infinitely Best-Responses and Incentives in social networks pillage games are Necessary to multiple agents Applications many players each Ensure Pure Nash acting only once Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games 17:00 Shuchi Chawla, Hu Fu Dirk Engelmann, Sarah Auster and Mantas Radzvilas Antonio Romero- Oscar Volij and Takahiro Watanabe Alan Beggs Gleb Polevoy, Stojan Michael Mandler Hannu Salonen Toomas Hinnosaar Miklos Pinter Jose-Manuel Jidong Chen and Arnold Polanski and Anna Karlin Jeff Frank, Alexander Piero Gottardi Hypothetical Medina and Casilda Lasso de Existence of Pure Reference Points Trajanovski and Piracy versus Bonacich Measures On the A new epistemic Giménez-Gómez Yiqing Xu and Fernando Simple, Koch and Marieta Competing Bargaining and Matteo Triossi La Vega Strategy Equilibria in and Learning Mathijs de Weerdt monopoly in the as Equilibria in impossibility model and Cori Vilella How Does an Vega-Redondo Approximately Valente Mechanisms in Envy-Free Gameplay Take-it-or-leave-it The value of a draw Finite Quasiconcave Equilibria and market for Network Models of protecting Recursive methods Authoritarian Coalition formation Optimal Auctions Does a Buyer Markets for Lemons contracts in many- in quasi-binary Games Efficiency in Shared conspicuous risk-takers for discrete claims Regime Allow and surplus sharing for Interdependent Benefit from Bad to-many matching matches Effort Games consumption problems with social Citizens to Voice in repeated Value Settings Reputation? Theory markets constraints Opinion Publicly? multi-coalitional and Experiments on games Auctions with Default 18:00- WELCOME AND PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS David Schmeidler 19:30 LOCATION > Vrijthof theatre 5TH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY

CONGRESS PROGRAMME // SUNDAY 24 JULY 2016

09:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS – B: AUCTIONS - C: IO D: IO SEARCH E: BARGAINING - F: MATCHING G: STRATEGY H: DYNAMIC J: EQUILIBRIUM - K: LEARNING L: CONTESTS N: NETWORKS P: PSYCHOLOGY Q: EPISTEMICS R: COOPERATIVE - S: STOCHASTIC T: TEAMS U: PREDICTION 10:30 SESSIONS DESIGN APPLICATION EXPERIMENTS PROOFNESS GAMES LARGE GAMES NUCLEOLUS GAMES SUN9 LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.09 C-1.07 G0.03 D0.03 G1.15 Lecture Hall H0.04 H0.06 G1.01 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008

09:00 Tomasz Sadzik and Younghwan In Nicolas Fugger, Dhruva Bhaskar Alex Possajennikov Mu Zhang Yu Zhou and Pieter Collins and Xiang Sun, Yeneng Burkhard Schipper Caleb Koch and Catherine Moon and Nick Janetos Yasuo Sasaki Tamas Solymosi and Mickael Randour Aodi Tang Xi Alice Gao, Andrew Pavel Andreyanov Jump bidding in FCC Florian Gössl and Tempting and Test- and Rene Saran Multi-period Shigehiro Serizawa Frank Thuijsman Sun and Haomiao Yu Strategic teaching Heinrich Nax Vincent Conitzer Fads and changing Unawareness of Balázs Sziklai Reconciling Optimal Contracts Mao, Yiling Chen and Robust Mechanism spectrum auctions Joachim Heinzel ing Through Costly Private Value Matching with Strategy-Proofness Interior-Point Type-Symmetric and learning in Contests Evolving Maximal Cooper- tastes Decision Criteria in Characterization sets Rationality and for team Ryan Adams Design of Exchange Credence goods Monitoring Bargaining with Commitment and Efficiency for Methods for Randomized games ation in Repeated Multicriteria Games for the nucleolus in Stochasticity: Rich experimentation Trick or Treat: markets with hetero- Naive Players: Theory Tiered Objects Dynamic Markov Equilibrium Games on Social balanced games Behavioral Models in Putting Peer geneous experts and Experiment Preferences Games Networks Two-Player Games Prediction to the Test 09:30 Sergei Izmalkov, Simon Loertscher and Nejat Anbarci and Karl Schlag and Matthew Embrey, Britta Hoyer and Timo Mennle and Wei He and Peter Hammond Ai Takeuchi, Christian Seel Pramod Mane, Kapil Stefanie Schmitt Kemal Yildiz Javier Martinez- Dipti Dubey and Alex Gershkov, Yiling Chen and Bo Dilyara Khakimova Cedric Wasser Nick Feltovich Andriy Zapechelnyuk Kyle Hyndman and Nadja Maraun Sven Seuken Yeneng Sun A Notion of Yukihiko Funaki, The Reverse War of Ahuja and Nagarajan Rational Allocation Choice Regularities De-Albeniz, S. K. Neogy Jianpei Li and Paul Waggoner and Gleb Romanyuk Optimal Structure Market Institutions, Robust Sequential Arno Riedl Matching Strategies Partial Dynamic Games Statistical Mamoru Kaneko Attrition Krishnamurthy of Attention in Relative identifi- Carlos Rafels Completely Mixed Schweinzer Informational Position auctions and Dissolution of Efficiency and Prices Search Bargaining with a of Heterogeneous Strategyproofness: with Almost Perfect Equilibrium for and Jeffrey Kline Unique Stability Decision-Making cation of choice and Neus Ybern Strategies for How to share it out: Substitutes for with endogenous Partnerships Residual Claimant: Agents in a An Axiomatic Information Games with Many An Experiment on Point in Social theories Insights into the Generalized Bimatrix The value of Prediction and Play and Switching Controller supply An Experimental University Approach to Players Behavior, Learning, Storage nucleolus of the Stochastic Game using information in Study Clearinghouse Relaxing and Forgetfulness assignment game Vertical Linear teams Strategyproofness in Inductive Game Complementarity for Assignment Theory Problem Mechanisms 10:00 Shuchi Chawla, Yair Tauman and Cristian Bartolucci Suntak Kim and Paula Jaramillo, Lars Ehlers Guilherme Carmona Chiara Margaria Greg Kubitz Mikhail Raskin and Aïleen Lotz, Michael Greinecker Yin-Fang Ye, S. K. Neogy and Dipti Nikhil R. Devanur, Chang Zhao and Ignacio Monzon Enseen Tang Cagatay Kayi and Strategy-Proofness Nearly-Pure Queueing to learn Repeated Contests Nikita Nikitenkov Pierre Gosselin Typology of beliefs Deng-Feng Li and Dubey Anna Karlin and Patent Licensing, Frictions Lead to An Experimental Santiago Velez and Essentially Equilibria of Large with Private Paradoxical and Marc Wambst and rationalizability Xun-Feng Hu Linear Comple- Balasubramanian Entry and the Sorting: a Partnership Study of Proposal Matching Problems Single-Valued Cores Games Information examples of From Rationality with many players A monotonity-based mentarity and the Sivan Incentive to Innovate Model with On- Power in Legislative with Priorities Revisited games on social to Irrationality: simplified method for class of Structured Simple Pricing the-Match Search Bargaining and Preferences: networks Dynamic Interacting computing interval least Stochastic Games square prenucleolus Schemes for Compulsory Social Structures of interval cooperative Consumers with Service Allocation in games Evolving Values Colombia 11:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: AUCTIONS - C: IO R&D D: CONTRACTS E: BARGAINING - F: MATCHING G: STRATEGY H: DYNAMIC J: EQUILIBRIUM K: LEARNING L: CONTESTS M: COMMUNICATION N: NETWORKS P: BIASES Q: EPISTEMICS R: COOPERATIVE - S: POLITICAL T: SHARING U: FUZZY, 12:30 SESSIONS PRICE PROCUREMENT DELAY PROOFNESS GAMES STABLE SETS ECONOMY QUANTUM SUN11 DISCRIMINATION

LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.09 C-1.07 G0.03 D0.03 G1.15 Lecture Hall H0.04 H0.06 G1.01 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008

11:00 Georgios Petropoulos Jeannette Brosig-Koch Shin Kishimoto Akifumi Ishihara Jean-Jacques Herings Stefano Duca, Patrick Harless Leon Petrosyan Ibrahim Inal Ye Du and Alexandros Rigos Thomas Rivera Vincent Boucher and Jakub Steiner and Pierfrancesco Guarino Weibin Han and Frederik Toscani Ruben Juarez, Ulrich Faigle and Optimal Selling and Timo Heinrich Stable Licensing On Multitasking and and Harold Houba Dirk Helbing and From behind the Strongly Time- Purification without Ehud Lehrer A Beauty Contest Incentives and Marion Goussé Olivier Gossner The Universal Adrain van Deemen and Daniel Quigley Chiu Yu Ko and Michel Grabisch Mechanisms for Promises and Schemes in Job Design in Costless Delay in Heinrich H. Nax veil: Evaluating Consistent Solutions Common Knowledge Constrained No with Flexible the Structure of Wage Dynamics Illusion of Control Type Space with On Generalized The roles of Jingyi Xue Quantum Analysis On-line Services I: Social Distance in Technology Transfer Relational Contracts Negotiation Assortative matching allocation rules by in N-person of Priors Regret Learning Information Communication and Peer Referrals and Related Unawareness for Stable Sets transparency in Sharing sequential of Decision and Price Discrimination Buyer-Determined with inequality ex-ante properties Differential and Acquisition Perception Biases Conditional regime change: profits in a network Interaction Systems and the Risk of Inter- Procurement in voluntary Dynamic Games. Probability Systems Striking when the ruption Auctions contribution games iron’s gone cold 11:30 Nima Haghpanah Daniel Z. Li and Herbert Dawid and Daniel Danau and Deepal Basak Chia-Ling Hsu Haris Aziz, Florian Dmitry Khlopin Rongyu Wang Annie Liang Aidas Masiliunas, Vessela Daskalova Mehrdad Nojoumian Roee Teper and Jayant Ganguli, Parkash Chander Daron Acemoglu, Eric Bahel and Dian Qing Yang and and Jason Hartline Minbo Xu Tim Hellmann Annalisa Vinella Transparency and Promoting Diversity Brandl, Felix Brandt On Tauberian Information Games of Friederike Mengel and Nicolaas J. Vriend and Douglas Stinson Ehud Lehrer Aviad Heifetz and An Infinitely Georgy Egorov and Christian Trudeau Deng Feng Li Multi-dimensional Competition in R&D Investments On the optimal Delay in Bargaining of Talents: A Market and Markus Brill Theorems for Correlation in a Incomplete and J. Philipp Reiss Categorization and From Rational Secret Who is a Bayesian? Byung Soo Lee Farsighted Konstantin Sonin From spanning trees Multilinear extension Virtual Values and Procurement under Endogenous use of correlated Design Approach On the Tradeoff Dynamic Games Strategic- Information Behavioural Coordination Sharing to Social Universal Interactive Stable Set Social Mobility to arborescences: of tau-values for Second-degree Price Auctions with Cluster Formation information in con- between Complements Game Played by Variation in and Socio-Rational Preferences and Stability of new and extended cooperative games Discrimination Corruption tractual design under Efficiency and and the Extension of Statisticians Tullock Contests Secret Sharing Democracy: cost sharing with fuzzy coalitions limited liability Strategyproofness Purification Theorem Re-evaluating solutions De Tocqueville

12:00 Matthew Ellman and Dongkyu Chang P. Jean-Jacques William Thomson Janos Flesch and Rohan Dutta, In-Koo Cho and Damian Damianov, János Flesch, Toshiyuki Hirai Jiabin Wu Ruben Juarez and Jie Yang and Sjaak Hurkens Delay in Herings and Jo Cho Arkadi Predtetchinski David Levine and Anna Rubinchik Shane Sanders and Dries Vermeulen Single-payoff Homo-Politicus: Lining Han Deng-Feng Li Optimal Bargaining with Equilibrium and Strategy-proofness A characterization Salvatore Modica Contemplation vs. Anil Yildizparlak and Anna Zseleva farsighted stable Evolution of Money-Sharing and Parameterized Bilinear Crowdfunding Outside Options Matching under in private good of subgame–perfect Collusion intuition. A rein- Asymmetric Zero-sum games sets in strategic Behavior Under Intermediation in Programming Design Price Controls economies with equilibrium plays Constrained forcement learning endogenous with charges games with Political Institutions Networks Methodology for linear economies in Borel games of Equilibrium perspective. prize contests dominant Solving Triangular perfect information punishment Intuitionistic Fuzzy strategies Number Bimatrix Games 14:00- SEMI- SP1: MATCHING AND MARKETS / VOTING VERSUS LOBBYING SP2: CONTINUOUS-TIME AND STOCHASTIC GAMES SP3: ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR 15:30 PLENARY SESSIONS I

LOCATION > Lecture Hall Concert Hall Greek Aula

14:00 Chris Shannon Pierre Cardaliaguet Jeff Shamma Matching and Markets Learning in nonatomic continuous time games Higher order evolutionary dynamics in population games

14:45 David Levine Eilon Solan Arthur Robson Voting versus Lobbying Multiplayer Stochastic Games: Techniques, Results, Rapidly Adaptive Hedonic Utility and Open Problems 16:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: AUCTIONS - C: IO PRICE D: CONTRACTS E: BARGAINING F: MATCHING G: STRATEGY H: REPEATED J: EQUILIBRIUM - K: LEARNING L: CONTESTS M: COMMUNICATION N: NETWORKS P: RISK AND Q: EPISTEMICS R: COOPERATIVE S: POLITICAL T: SHARING U: ENVIRONMENT 17:30 SESSIONS OPTIMAL EXPERIMENTS COMPETITION PROOFNESS GAMES EXISTENCE AMBIGUITY ECONOMY SUN16

LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.09 C-1.07 G0.03 D0.03 G1.15 Lecture Hall H0.04 H0.06 G1.01 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008

16:00 Saeed Alaei, Joyce Delnoij R. Emre Aytimur Daniel Danau and S. Nageeb Ali, Philip Marx and James Schummer and Lawrence Blume and Maria Carmela Jesper Rudiger and Ayse Gul Mermer Tom Potoms and Penelope Hernandez, Takashi Ui Elias Tsakas and Yukihiko Funaki, Kaj Thomsson and Tatsuya Iwase and Eugen Kovac and Jason Hartline, Compare and Salience and Annalisa Vinella David Miller and James Schummer Rodrigo Velez Klaus Ritzberger Ceparano and Adrien Vigier Effort Provision Tom Truyts Guillem Martinez, Ambiguity and Risk Andres Perea Koji Yokote and Richard Bluhm Takahiro Shiga Robert Schmidt Rad Niazadeh, despair: social Horizontal Sequential screening David Yilin Yang Revenue from Sequential The Curse of Poverty Federico Quartieri Pundits and Quacks: and Optimal Prize On Symbols and Manuel Monos- in Global Games Local reasoning in Takumi Kongo Ethnic divisions, Pure Nash A simple dynamic Emmanouil comparison Differentiation and the relationship Is multilateral Matching Platforms preference and the Blessings of Nash equilibrium Learning about Structure in Contests Cooperation Herrera and dynamic games The balanced political institutions Equilibrium and climate cooperation Pountourakis and concerns in between principal’s enforcement revelation in Wealth uniqueness in nice Analysts when with Loss-Averse Angel Sanchez contribution and the duration of Coordination of model with large Yang Yuan auctions preferences and vulnerable to incomplete games with isotone Fundamental Players Individual property for declines Players in Ride coalitions and deep Optimal Auctions vs. agent’s incentives bilateral information best replies Asset Values preferences and equal contributors Sharing Games emissions cuts Anonymous Pricing renegotiation? settings are Unobserved networks 16:30 Takehiro Oyakawa, Gali Noti, Noam Abhimanyu Khan and Andrei Barbos Armando Gomes Orhan Aygun and Peter Biro, Flip Klijn Kutay Cingiz, János Rabah Amir and Rahul Deb and Alex Smolin Juan Carlos Carbajal Michel Grabisch, Satoshi Nakada and Nadine Chlass and Colin Rowat, Shyh-Fang Ueng Jason Marden, Raga- Adam Lampert, Amy Greenwald and Nisan and Ilan Yaniv Ronald Peeters Optimal Contracts Coalitional Bertan Turhan and Szilvia Papai Flesch, Jean-Jacques Luciano De Castro Colin Stewart Optimal Feedback Inconspicuous Antoine Mandel, Kohei Sashida Andrés Perea Manfred Kerber and Perception and vendran Gopalakris- Alan Hastings and Vasilis Syrgkanis An Experimental Imitation and price with Random Bargaining: A New Dynamic Reserves Circulation under Herings and Arkadi Nash Equilibrium Optimal Design Conspicuous Agnieszka Rusinowska Risk and Ambiguity How Do People Naoki Yoshihara Inclusiveness hnan and Adam James Sanchirico Optimal Auctions Evaluation of competition in a Auditing Concept of Value in Matching Markets Responsive Predtetchinski in Games with Adaptive Testing: Consumption and Emily Tanimura in the Twin Crises Reason In Dynamic Asymmetric three Wierman Ecosystem with Convex Bidders’ Behavior differentiated and Coalition With Contracts: Preferences Perfect information Quasi-Monotonic Informativeness Strategic influence Games? agent majority Potential Games restoration by Perceived Payments in Ad Auctions market Formation Theory and games with infinitely Best-Responses and Incentives in social networks pillage games are Necessary to multiple agents Applications many players each Ensure Pure Nash acting only once Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games 17:00 Shuchi Chawla, Hu Fu Dirk Engelmann, Sarah Auster and Mantas Radzvilas Antonio Romero- Oscar Volij and Takahiro Watanabe Alan Beggs Gleb Polevoy, Stojan Michael Mandler Hannu Salonen Toomas Hinnosaar Miklos Pinter Jose-Manuel Jidong Chen and Arnold Polanski and Anna Karlin Jeff Frank, Alexander Piero Gottardi Hypothetical Medina and Casilda Lasso de Existence of Pure Reference Points Trajanovski and Piracy versus Bonacich Measures On the A new epistemic Giménez-Gómez Yiqing Xu and Fernando Simple, Koch and Marieta Competing Bargaining and Matteo Triossi La Vega Strategy Equilibria in and Learning Mathijs de Weerdt monopoly in the as Equilibria in impossibility model and Cori Vilella How Does an Vega-Redondo Approximately Valente Mechanisms in Envy-Free Gameplay Take-it-or-leave-it The value of a draw Finite Quasiconcave Equilibria and market for Network Models of protecting Recursive methods Authoritarian Coalition formation Optimal Auctions Does a Buyer Markets for Lemons contracts in many- in quasi-binary Games Efficiency in Shared conspicuous risk-takers for discrete claims Regime Allow and surplus sharing for Interdependent Benefit from Bad to-many matching matches Effort Games consumption problems with social Citizens to Voice in repeated Value Settings Reputation? Theory markets constraints Opinion Publicly? multi-coalitional and Experiments on games Auctions with Default 18:00- WELCOME AND PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS David Schmeidler 19:30 LOCATION > Vrijthof theatre 5TH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY

CONGRESS PROGRAMME // MONDAY 25 JULY 2016

09:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: AUCTIONS - C: IO APPLIED D: FINANCIAL; E: BARGAINING F: MATCHING G: STRATEGY H: REPEATED J: EQUILIBRIUM - K: EXPERIMENTATION L: CONTESTS M: COMMUNICATION N: NETWORKS P: RISK - BIDDING Q: EXTENSIVE R: COOPERATIVE S: VOTING T: GROUPS 10:30 SESSIONS ASYMMETRIC ALL-PAY INVESTMENT PROOFNESS GAMES INDEX - DISCLOSURE GAMES MON9

LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.09 C-1.07 G0.03 D0.03 G1.15 Lecture Hall H0.04 H0.06 G1.01 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 09:00 Andrew Mcclellan Lucas Rentschler and Pim Heijnen, Marco Marcelo Griebeler and Leyla Derin Karakas Fatma Aslan and Alfredo Valencia- Inga Deimen and Rahul Savani and Yi Chen Jean-Francois Mercier Elchanan Ben-Porath, Niccolo Lomys Philippos Louis and Larry Blume and Seckin Ozbilen Hans Gersbach, Christopher Kops and Knowing Your Theodore Turocy Haan and Martin Elisa Wagner Bargaining Under Jean Laine Toledo and Juan Julia Wirtz Bernhard von Stengel Strategic Selecting Eddie Dekel and Sequential Dimitrios Xefteris Martin Meier Coalitional Nash Philippe Muller and Abhinash Borah Opponent: Two-bidder all- Obradovits A signaling model Institutional Job Mobility of Vidal-Puga A Bandit Model of Unit Vector Games Experimentation Contestants for Barton Lipman Collective Search in Others' risk Perfect quasi- stability in hedonic Oriol Tejada Self-Categorization, Asymmetries and pay auctions with A theory of of foreign direct Challenges Couples when Non-manipulable Two-Dimensional on a Common a Rent-Seeking Disclosure and Networks attitudes: lessons perfect equilibrium coalition formation A Dynamic Model Depersonalization Auction Design interdependent recommended price investment Distance Matters rules for land rental Uncertainty - Threshold Contest: a Choice from a game of games of Electoral and Rational Choice valuations, dispersion attraction problems Rationalizing Mechanism Design poker. Competition with including the highly Mindsets Approach Costly Policy competitive case Changes

09:30 Nina Bobkova Marcin Waniek, Long Moritz Meyer-Ter- Lukasz Drozd and Debasmita Basak, Christopher Kah and Kentaro Tomoeda János Flesch, Anne Balthasar and Kaustav Das Ryuji Sano Stefan Penczynski László Kóczy Zhuoqiong Chen, Sune K. Jakobsen, Dinko Dimitrov and R. Pablo Arribillaga Aidas Masiliunas First Price Auction Tran-Thanh and Vehn, Simon Board Ricardo Serrano- Andreas Hoefele and Michael Greinecker Implementation Zsombor Méder, Bernhard von Stengel The Role of Iterative Revelation and Sihong Zhang Core-stable David Ong and Ella Troels B. Lund and Emiliya Lazarova and Jordi Massó Overcoming with Asymmetrically Tomasz Michalak and Tomasz Sadzik Padial Arijit Mukherjee Pairwise matching in of Efficient Ronald Peeters and Strategic Heterogeneity in a Mechanisms Disclosure Networks with Segev Vincent Conitzer Inducing stability in Comparing Voting Coordination Failure Budget Constrained Repeated Dollar A Human Resource Financial Contracting Union bargaining large economies Investments in Yianis Safaridis Characterization model of Strategic of Verifiable Widespread Heterogeneous Timeability of hedonic games by Committees in a Critical Mass Bidders Auctions: A Theory of Persistent with Enforcement power and product Mechanism Design Dynamic of the Equilibrium Experimentation Information under Externalities risk/loss aversion Extensive-Form According to their Game Multi-Armed Productivity Externalities innovation: relevance inconsistency in Index in Symmetric Competition in complete Games Manipulability Bandit Approach Dispersion of the preference games Games information all-pay function auction

10:00 Carolina Manzano Oliver Kirchkamp and Mehmet Barlo and Péter Csóka and P. Zhe Wang and Yi Josue Ortega Battal Dogan and Benjamin Bernard Andrew McLennan Daria Khromenkova Anna Moskalenko Keiichi Kawai and Pak Mihai Suciu, Rodica Philippe Gillen, Roger Myerson and Marieke Musegaas, Willemien Kets and and Xavier Vives Wladislaw Mill Omer Koru Jean-Jacques Herings Chen The Tinder Stable Bettina Klaus Continuous- The Index +1 Restless Strategic A mechanism to pick Hung Au Ioana Lung and Christopher Philip Reny Peter Borm and Alvaro Sandroni Market Power Spite and Spillovers between Decentralized Initiation of Merger Marriage Problem Object Allocation Time Games with Principle Experimentation the deserving winner Competition Noémi Gaskó Zeppenfeld, Open Sequential Marieke Quant Challenging and Welfare overbidding in Skilled and Low Clearing in Financial and Acquisition via Immediate- Imperfect and in Information About Nash Alexander Rasch and Equilibria of Multi- Step out - Step in Conformity: A Case in Asymmetric second price Skilled Labor Networks Negotiation with Acceptance Abrupt Information Disclosure Equilibrium, Nicolas Fugger Stage Games with Sequencing Games for Diversity Divisible Good all-pay auctions. Migration in a Multi- Two-Sided Private Modularity Preferences and Infinite Sets of Types Auctions A theoretical and Regional Setting Information Optimization, and Decision Support in and Actions experimental Network Community Competitive Bidding investigation Structure Detection

11:00- SURPRISE ACT AND NOBEL SESSION 12:30 Robert Aumann Why Consciousness?

Roger Myerson Multiple Equilibria

Eric Maskin Improving U.S. Presidential Elections LOCATION > VRIJTHOF THEATRE 14:00- SEMI- SP1: “DEMAND TYPES” / INFORMATION RESALE SP2: MECHANISM DESIGN SP3: SOCIAL CHOICE 15:30 PLENARY SESSIONS II

LOCATION > Lecture Hall Concert Hall Greek Aula

14:00 Paul Klemperer Vasiliki Skreta Shmuel Zamir "Demand types", Equilibrium, and Auctions Selling with Evidence Some thoughts on judgment aggregation

14:45 Mihai Manea Michal Feldman Hervé Moulin Information Resale in Networks Welfare Maximization via Posted Prices Fair division with additive utilities

16:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: AUCTIONS C: IO D: FINANCIAL; E: BARGAINING F: MATCHING G: STRATEGY H: REPEATED J: EVOLUTIONARY K: PUBLIC GOOD L: CONTESTS M: COMMUNICATION N: NETWORKS P: AMBIGUITY Q: EXTENSIVE R: COOPERATIVE S: VOTING T: FORECASTING 17:30 SESSIONS MONOTONICITY SUBSTITUTES INVESTMENT PROOFNESS GAMES DYNAMICS GAMES GAMES MON16

LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.09 C-1.07 G0.03 D0.03 G1.15 Lecture Hall H0.04 H0.06 G1.01 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 16:00 Ahuva Mu'Alem Diego Moreno, Jason Carlos Alós-Ferrer Romeo Matthew Luís Carvalho Naomi Utgoff Tomoya Kazumura Jaeok Park Bary Pradelski Renee Bowen, George Qian Jiao, Jaimie Lien Michele Dell'Era Gabrielle Demange Adam Dominiak and Andrés Perea Gustavo Bergantiños, Volker Britz and Dean Foster and Monotonicity, Shachat and John and Johannes Balanquit A Perfect Mitigating Matching and Shigehiro Repeated Games Decentralized Georgiadis and and Jie Zheng Talking to Influence Optimal targeting Juergen Eichberger Forward induction Youngsub Chun and Hans Gersbach Sergiu Hart Revenue Wooders Buckenmaier Threshold Bank- Equilibrium Concept Externalities Via The Serizawa with Recursive Dynamics and Fast Nicolas Lambert Managing strategy in a Equilibrium under reasoning versus Leticia Lorenzo Information Smooth Calibration, Equivalence and Reserve Prices Cournot vs. Walras: run Equilibrium in for the Multiplayer "Old Boys' Club" When are strategy- Utility Convergence in the Collective Choice Competitions network under Ambiguity (EUA) for equilibrium Minimum cost Aggregation Leaky Forecasts, Budgets in Private Value A Reappraisal Dynamic Games Bargaining Game proof and efficient Assignment Game in Dynamic Public Using Information: complementarities Belief Functions reasoning spanning tree in Democratic Finite Recall, and Auctions with Entry: through Simulations rules possible in Good Provision: Disclosure Policy problems with Mechanisms Nash Dynamics Theory and Evidence objects allocation Real versus Formal in Contests with multiple sources: with money? Authority Heterogeneous the folk rule Players 16:30 Markus Walzl Alia Gizatulina Rodrigo Harrison and Rui Gong and Frank Francesca Flamini Bertan Turhan Jorge Alcalde-Unzu Chantal Marlats Dai Zusai Andreas Reischmann Chu-Han Cheng, Andres Salamanca Moshe Babaioff, Liad Philippe Bich Christina Pawlowitsch Loe Schlicher, Marco Dimitrios Xefteris and Luciano Pomatto Competing Trade Betting on Others' Pedro Jara-Moroni Page A Non-cooperative Welfare and and Marc Vorsatz Perturbed repeated Gains in evolutionary Conditional Po-An Chen and The Value Blumrosen and Noam Ambiguity in and Rida Laraki Slikker and Geert-Jan Nicholas Ziros Testable Forecasts Mechanisms Bets: Unions of Global Games With Shadow Banks and Approach to Incentives in Strategy-proof games dynamics: a unified Contribution Wing-Kai Hon of Mediated Nisan Discontinuous Invariant van Houtum Strategic vote and Monotone Surplus Extraction Strategic Substitutes Systemic Risk Dynamic Bargaining Partitioned Matching location of public rational framework Mechanisms for the Budget-Constrained Communication Networks of Games extensive-form Spare parts pooling trading in power- Mechanism Choice Mechanisms Markets facilities Provision of Public Multi-Battle Complements rationalizability games under a sharing systems Goods in Dynamic Contests: A New critical level policy Settings - Theory Perspective and and Experimental Analysis Evidence 17:00 Juan Carlos Carbajal Vitali Gretschko and Stefanos Leonardos Cheng-Zhong Qin, Jens Gudmundsson Antonio Nicolo and Galit Ashkenazi- David Leslie, Steven Edward Cartwright Lambert Schoonbeek Martin Gregor Gaëtan Fournier and Ilan Nehama Peter Sudhölter and Steve Alpern and and Rudolf Mueller Helene Mass and Costis Guofu Tan and Adam and Helga Habis Salvador Barberà Golan and Ehud Perkins and Zibo Xu and Federica Alberti Information and Bilateral transactions Marco Scarsini Analyzing games José Zarzuelo Bo Chen Monotonicity Robust Bidding Melolidakis Wong Assignment Games Information Lehrer Convergence of Full agreement and endogenous with evidence Hotelling Games on with ambiguous Characterizations of Who Should and Revenue Cournot competition Characterization with Externalities Disclosure under What You Get is “Best-response the provision of delegation in a rent- Networks: Existence types using the solutions to highway Cast the Casting Equivalence with an external and Implementation Strategy-proof What You See; Dynamics" in threshold public seeking contest and Efficiency of MINthenMAX cost allocation Vote? Using Domains by supplier under of Nash Bargaining Social Choice Rules Repeated Games Zero-sum Stochastic goods Equilibria decision model problems Sequential Voting Monotonic capacity constraints Solutions with Non- with Observable Games to Amalgamate Transformations and demand Convex Problems Payoff Information in Differences uncertainty

18:00- 19:00 PRESIDENT-ELECT ADDRESS Larry Samuelson

LOCATION > Vrijthof theatre 5TH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY

CONGRESS PROGRAMME // MONDAY 25 JULY 2016

09:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: AUCTIONS - C: IO APPLIED D: FINANCIAL; E: BARGAINING F: MATCHING G: STRATEGY H: REPEATED J: EQUILIBRIUM - K: EXPERIMENTATION L: CONTESTS M: COMMUNICATION N: NETWORKS P: RISK - BIDDING Q: EXTENSIVE R: COOPERATIVE S: VOTING T: GROUPS 10:30 SESSIONS ASYMMETRIC ALL-PAY INVESTMENT PROOFNESS GAMES INDEX - DISCLOSURE GAMES MON9

LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.09 C-1.07 G0.03 D0.03 G1.15 Lecture Hall H0.04 H0.06 G1.01 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 09:00 Andrew Mcclellan Lucas Rentschler and Pim Heijnen, Marco Marcelo Griebeler and Leyla Derin Karakas Fatma Aslan and Alfredo Valencia- Inga Deimen and Rahul Savani and Yi Chen Jean-Francois Mercier Elchanan Ben-Porath, Niccolo Lomys Philippos Louis and Larry Blume and Seckin Ozbilen Hans Gersbach, Christopher Kops and Knowing Your Theodore Turocy Haan and Martin Elisa Wagner Bargaining Under Jean Laine Toledo and Juan Julia Wirtz Bernhard von Stengel Strategic Selecting Eddie Dekel and Sequential Dimitrios Xefteris Martin Meier Coalitional Nash Philippe Muller and Abhinash Borah Opponent: Two-bidder all- Obradovits A signaling model Institutional Job Mobility of Vidal-Puga A Bandit Model of Unit Vector Games Experimentation Contestants for Barton Lipman Collective Search in Others' risk Perfect quasi- stability in hedonic Oriol Tejada Self-Categorization, Asymmetries and pay auctions with A theory of of foreign direct Challenges Couples when Non-manipulable Two-Dimensional on a Common a Rent-Seeking Disclosure and Networks attitudes: lessons perfect equilibrium coalition formation A Dynamic Model Depersonalization Auction Design interdependent recommended price investment Distance Matters rules for land rental Uncertainty - Threshold Contest: a Choice from a game of games of Electoral and Rational Choice valuations, dispersion attraction problems Rationalizing Mechanism Design poker. Competition with including the highly Mindsets Approach Costly Policy competitive case Changes

09:30 Nina Bobkova Marcin Waniek, Long Moritz Meyer-Ter- Lukasz Drozd and Debasmita Basak, Christopher Kah and Kentaro Tomoeda János Flesch, Anne Balthasar and Kaustav Das Ryuji Sano Stefan Penczynski László Kóczy Zhuoqiong Chen, Sune K. Jakobsen, Dinko Dimitrov and R. Pablo Arribillaga Aidas Masiliunas First Price Auction Tran-Thanh and Vehn, Simon Board Ricardo Serrano- Andreas Hoefele and Michael Greinecker Implementation Zsombor Méder, Bernhard von Stengel The Role of Iterative Revelation and Sihong Zhang Core-stable David Ong and Ella Troels B. Lund and Emiliya Lazarova and Jordi Massó Overcoming with Asymmetrically Tomasz Michalak and Tomasz Sadzik Padial Arijit Mukherjee Pairwise matching in of Efficient Ronald Peeters and Strategic Heterogeneity in a Mechanisms Disclosure Networks with Segev Vincent Conitzer Inducing stability in Comparing Voting Coordination Failure Budget Constrained Repeated Dollar A Human Resource Financial Contracting Union bargaining large economies Investments in Yianis Safaridis Characterization model of Strategic of Verifiable Widespread Heterogeneous Timeability of hedonic games by Committees in a Critical Mass Bidders Auctions: A Theory of Persistent with Enforcement power and product Mechanism Design Dynamic of the Equilibrium Experimentation Information under Externalities risk/loss aversion Extensive-Form According to their Game Multi-Armed Productivity Externalities innovation: relevance inconsistency in Index in Symmetric Competition in complete Games Manipulability Bandit Approach Dispersion of the preference games Games information all-pay function auction

10:00 Carolina Manzano Oliver Kirchkamp and Mehmet Barlo and Péter Csóka and P. Zhe Wang and Yi Josue Ortega Battal Dogan and Benjamin Bernard Andrew McLennan Daria Khromenkova Anna Moskalenko Keiichi Kawai and Pak Mihai Suciu, Rodica Philippe Gillen, Roger Myerson and Marieke Musegaas, Willemien Kets and and Xavier Vives Wladislaw Mill Omer Koru Jean-Jacques Herings Chen The Tinder Stable Bettina Klaus Continuous- The Index +1 Restless Strategic A mechanism to pick Hung Au Ioana Lung and Christopher Philip Reny Peter Borm and Alvaro Sandroni Market Power Spite and Spillovers between Decentralized Initiation of Merger Marriage Problem Object Allocation Time Games with Principle Experimentation the deserving winner Competition Noémi Gaskó Zeppenfeld, Open Sequential Marieke Quant Challenging and Welfare overbidding in Skilled and Low Clearing in Financial and Acquisition via Immediate- Imperfect and in Information About Nash Alexander Rasch and Equilibria of Multi- Step out - Step in Conformity: A Case in Asymmetric second price Skilled Labor Networks Negotiation with Acceptance Abrupt Information Disclosure Equilibrium, Nicolas Fugger Stage Games with Sequencing Games for Diversity Divisible Good all-pay auctions. Migration in a Multi- Two-Sided Private Modularity Preferences and Infinite Sets of Types Auctions A theoretical and Regional Setting Information Optimization, and Decision Support in and Actions experimental Network Community Competitive Bidding investigation Structure Detection

11:00- SURPRISE ACT AND NOBEL SESSION 12:30 Robert Aumann Why Consciousness?

Roger Myerson Multiple Equilibria

Eric Maskin Improving U.S. Presidential Elections LOCATION > VRIJTHOF THEATRE 14:00- SEMI- SP1: “DEMAND TYPES” / INFORMATION RESALE SP2: MECHANISM DESIGN SP3: SOCIAL CHOICE 15:30 PLENARY SESSIONS II

LOCATION > Lecture Hall Concert Hall Greek Aula

14:00 Paul Klemperer Vasiliki Skreta Shmuel Zamir "Demand types", Equilibrium, and Auctions Selling with Evidence Some thoughts on judgment aggregation

14:45 Mihai Manea Michal Feldman Hervé Moulin Information Resale in Networks Welfare Maximization via Posted Prices Fair division with additive utilities

16:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: AUCTIONS C: IO D: FINANCIAL; E: BARGAINING F: MATCHING G: STRATEGY H: REPEATED J: EVOLUTIONARY K: PUBLIC GOOD L: CONTESTS M: COMMUNICATION N: NETWORKS P: AMBIGUITY Q: EXTENSIVE R: COOPERATIVE S: VOTING T: FORECASTING 17:30 SESSIONS MONOTONICITY SUBSTITUTES INVESTMENT PROOFNESS GAMES DYNAMICS GAMES GAMES MON16

LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.09 C-1.07 G0.03 D0.03 G1.15 Lecture Hall H0.04 H0.06 G1.01 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 16:00 Ahuva Mu'Alem Diego Moreno, Jason Carlos Alós-Ferrer Romeo Matthew Luís Carvalho Naomi Utgoff Tomoya Kazumura Jaeok Park Bary Pradelski Renee Bowen, George Qian Jiao, Jaimie Lien Michele Dell'Era Gabrielle Demange Adam Dominiak and Andrés Perea Gustavo Bergantiños, Volker Britz and Dean Foster and Monotonicity, Shachat and John and Johannes Balanquit A Perfect Mitigating Matching and Shigehiro Repeated Games Decentralized Georgiadis and and Jie Zheng Talking to Influence Optimal targeting Juergen Eichberger Forward induction Youngsub Chun and Hans Gersbach Sergiu Hart Revenue Wooders Buckenmaier Threshold Bank- Equilibrium Concept Externalities Via The Serizawa with Recursive Dynamics and Fast Nicolas Lambert Managing strategy in a Equilibrium under reasoning versus Leticia Lorenzo Information Smooth Calibration, Equivalence and Reserve Prices Cournot vs. Walras: run Equilibrium in for the Multiplayer "Old Boys' Club" When are strategy- Utility Convergence in the Collective Choice Competitions network under Ambiguity (EUA) for equilibrium Minimum cost Aggregation Leaky Forecasts, Budgets in Private Value A Reappraisal Dynamic Games Bargaining Game proof and efficient Assignment Game in Dynamic Public Using Information: complementarities Belief Functions reasoning spanning tree in Democratic Finite Recall, and Auctions with Entry: through Simulations rules possible in Good Provision: Disclosure Policy problems with Mechanisms Nash Dynamics Theory and Evidence objects allocation Real versus Formal in Contests with multiple sources: with money? Authority Heterogeneous the folk rule Players 16:30 Markus Walzl Alia Gizatulina Rodrigo Harrison and Rui Gong and Frank Francesca Flamini Bertan Turhan Jorge Alcalde-Unzu Chantal Marlats Dai Zusai Andreas Reischmann Chu-Han Cheng, Andres Salamanca Moshe Babaioff, Liad Philippe Bich Christina Pawlowitsch Loe Schlicher, Marco Dimitrios Xefteris and Luciano Pomatto Competing Trade Betting on Others' Pedro Jara-Moroni Page A Non-cooperative Welfare and and Marc Vorsatz Perturbed repeated Gains in evolutionary Conditional Po-An Chen and The Value Blumrosen and Noam Ambiguity in and Rida Laraki Slikker and Geert-Jan Nicholas Ziros Testable Forecasts Mechanisms Bets: Unions of Global Games With Shadow Banks and Approach to Incentives in Strategy-proof games dynamics: a unified Contribution Wing-Kai Hon of Mediated Nisan Discontinuous Invariant van Houtum Strategic vote and Monotone Surplus Extraction Strategic Substitutes Systemic Risk Dynamic Bargaining Partitioned Matching location of public rational framework Mechanisms for the Budget-Constrained Communication Networks of Games extensive-form Spare parts pooling trading in power- Mechanism Choice Mechanisms Markets facilities Provision of Public Multi-Battle Complements rationalizability games under a sharing systems Goods in Dynamic Contests: A New critical level policy Settings - Theory Perspective and and Experimental Analysis Evidence 17:00 Juan Carlos Carbajal Vitali Gretschko and Stefanos Leonardos Cheng-Zhong Qin, Jens Gudmundsson Antonio Nicolo and Galit Ashkenazi- David Leslie, Steven Edward Cartwright Lambert Schoonbeek Martin Gregor Gaëtan Fournier and Ilan Nehama Peter Sudhölter and Steve Alpern and and Rudolf Mueller Helene Mass and Costis Guofu Tan and Adam and Helga Habis Salvador Barberà Golan and Ehud Perkins and Zibo Xu and Federica Alberti Information and Bilateral transactions Marco Scarsini Analyzing games José Zarzuelo Bo Chen Monotonicity Robust Bidding Melolidakis Wong Assignment Games Information Lehrer Convergence of Full agreement and endogenous with evidence Hotelling Games on with ambiguous Characterizations of Who Should and Revenue Cournot competition Characterization with Externalities Disclosure under What You Get is “Best-response the provision of delegation in a rent- Networks: Existence types using the solutions to highway Cast the Casting Equivalence with an external and Implementation Strategy-proof What You See; Dynamics" in threshold public seeking contest and Efficiency of MINthenMAX cost allocation Vote? Using Domains by supplier under of Nash Bargaining Social Choice Rules Repeated Games Zero-sum Stochastic goods Equilibria decision model problems Sequential Voting Monotonic capacity constraints Solutions with Non- with Observable Games to Amalgamate Transformations and demand Convex Problems Payoff Information in Differences uncertainty

18:00- 19:00 PRESIDENT-ELECT ADDRESS Larry Samuelson

LOCATION > Vrijthof theatre 5TH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY

CONGRESS PROGRAMME // TUESDAY 26 JULY 2016

09:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: IO ESPIONAGE C: IO TIMING D: FINANCIAL; E: BARGAINING F: MATCHING G: STRATEGY H: REPEATED J: EVOLUTIONARY K: PUBLIC GOOD L: CONTESTS M: COMMUNICATION N: NETWORKS - IO P: DECISION Q: SEQUENTIAL R: COOPERATIVE S: VOTING T: FAIRNESS U: EXPERIMENTS 10:30 SESSIONS BAYESIAN INVESTMENT PROOFNESS GAMES DYNAMICS THEORY RATIONALITY TUE9 LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.09 C-1.07 G0.03 G1.01 A1.23 D0.03 H0.04 H0.06 A1.22 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008

09:00 Elnaz Bajoori Alex Barrachina, Yair Thomas Weber Yong Chao, Chen Yao Haruo Imai and Aaron Bodoh-Creed Frank Karsten, Marco Takuo Sugaya Panayotis Abhinaba Lahiri, Antoni Rubí-Barceló Valeria Burdea, Maria Vladimir Matveenko, Massimo Scotti and Marciano Siniscalchi Giorgos Steven Brams and Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Tibor Neugebauer, Distributional Tauman and Amparo Optimal and Mao Ye Hannu Salonen and Brent Hickman Slikker and Peter The Characterization Mertikopoulos and Hans Peters and Ton and Daniel Cardona Montero and Martin Alexei Korolev and Filippo Pavesi Sequential Stamatopoulos and Marc Kilgour Sabine Hügelschäfer Abdolkarim Sadrieh Perfect Equilibrium Urbano Commitment What drives Bargaining and College assignment Borm of the Limit William Sandholm Storcken Group-contests with Sefton Anastasia Alfimova Good Lies preferences Paraskevas Lekeas Paths to Victory and Maria Theobald and Reinhard Selten in Bayesian Games Entry with Two price dispersion Rentseeking as a large contest Cost allocation rules Communication Riemannian game Locating public bads endogeneous claims Communication On dynamic stability and sequential Cooperative games in Presidential Unexpected, Taming Selten’s with Applications to Correlated Signals and market for elastic single- Equilibrium Payoff dynamics and in an interval situations with of equilibrium in rationality with externalities Elections: The hence unfair? The Horse with Impulse Auctions fragmentation attribute situations Set with General reinforcement partially verifiable network game with and probabilistic Setup Power of neural response Response across U.S. stock Monitoring learning information: an production and coalitional beliefs Noncompetitive to expectancy exchanges? experimental externalities States violations in the approach Ultimatum Game

09:30 Christian Koch and Maria Kozlovskaya Steven Slutsky and Yunus Topbas and Cesarino Bertini, Koji Yokote William Phan and Mitri Kitti Man Wah Cheung Swarnendu Uriel Feige, Ron Caroline Thomas Nikolas Tsakas and Hande Erkut Sophie Bade Zhigang Cao, Carlos Alós-Ferrer Takeshi Nishimura, Carlos Alos-Ferrer and Stefan Penczynski Industrial Espionage Jon Hamilton Unal Zenginobuz Cristina Bonzi, Cumulative offer Patrick Harless Equilibrium Payoffs Imitative Dynamics Chatterjee, Hans Lavi and Moshe Career Concerns and Emmanuel Petrakis Individual Weak Dynamic Chengzhong Qin and and Georg Granic Akira Okada and Alexander Ritschel The Winner’s in Duopoly Games Optimal income Horizontal Gianfranco process with For the Object for Pure Strategies in for Games with Peters and Ton Tennenholtz Policy Intransigence The Effect of Entry preferences across Consistency Xiaoguang Yang The effects of polling Yasuhiro Shirata Multiple Decision Curse: Conditional taxation with Coordination and Gambarelli, Nicola continuous transfers Allocation Problem, Repeated Games Continuous Strategy Storcken Contests for - A Dynamic on R&D Networks contexts Shapley's Conjecture systems on electoral Evolution of Processes in Cournot Reasoning & Belief no government Transparency of Gnocchi and Ignazio Efficiency, the Space Locating a public Revenue Share Signalling Model on the Cores of competition Fairness and Group Oligopolies: Evidence Formation commitment Information Panades Partial Endowment good on a sphere Abstract Market Formation in Multi- from Response Times Transforming Games Lower Bound, and Games Player Ultimatum with Affinities from Decomposability Games Characteristic into Characterize TTC Normal Form

10:00 Matthew Gentry, Suvi Vasama Lin Lin, Wei Zheng Joosung Lee Mustafa Oguz Afacan Ethem Akyol Asaf Plan Erik Mohlin and Axel Alexey Savvateev, Ezra Einy, Diego Bartosz Redlicki Sonja Brangewitz, Eran Hanany, Peter María Gómez-Rúa Javier Rivas and Andrea Isoni, Anders Tatiana Komarova, Dynamics of and Yan Pan Bargaining and School Choice with Welfare Comparison Stability of the Bernergård Constantine Sorokin Moreno and Rumours and Cheap Claus-Jochen Klibanoff and Sujoy and Juan Vidal-Puga Friederike Mengel Poulsen, Robert Pasquale Schiraldi Innovation: Game Analysis Buyout Voucher of Allocation Equilibrium Payoff Evolutionary and Shlomo Weber Benyamin Shitovitz Talk Haake and Philipp Mukerji A monotonic and Common value Sugden and Kei Tsutsui and Wiroy Shin Cooperation and of the Corporate Mechanisms Set in Repeated Selection against Multidimensional The Value of Public Möhlmeier Incomplete merge-proof rule elections with Focal points and On Monotone Retardation Internet Information under Incomplete Games Iteratively Weakly free-mobility Information in Strategic Formation Information Games in minimum cost private information payoff information in Strategy Equilibria Disclosure Information Dominated equilibrium: Tiebout Common-Value of Customer with Ambiguity spanning tree and informative tacit bargaining in Simultaneous Strategies revisited Tullock Contests Relationship Averse Players situations priors Auctions for Networks Complementary Goods

11:00- SEMI- SP1: COMPUTATION SP2: DYNAMIC MATCHING SP3: MONOPOLY PRICING / PRISONER’S DILEMMA 12:30 PLENARY SESSIONS III LOCATION > Lecture Hall Concert Hall Aula Gothic

11:00 Christos Papadimitriou Leeat Yariv Balázs Szentes The Unreasonably Productive Interaction of the Theories of Games Optimal Dynamic Matching Buyer-Optimal Demand and Monopoly Pricing and Computation

11:45 Rakesh Vohra Alessandro Pavan Guillaume Fréchette Scarf's Lemma and Stable Matchings Dynamic Matching Auctions: Experimentation and Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Cross-Subsidization

14:00- POSTER SESSION 15:30 LOCATION > Lounge SBE

16:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: IO COASE C: IO D: AGENCY E: BARGAINING F: MATCHING G: SOLUTION H: REPEATED J: EVOLUTIONARY K: PUBLIC GOOD L: CONTESTS M: COMMUNICATION N: NETWORKS P: PSYCHOLOGY Q: DEPTH OF R: COOPERATIVE S: VOTING T: FAIRNESS U: EXPERIMENTS - 17:30 SESSIONS COMMUNICATION CONJECTURE MODELS CONCEPTS GAMES DYNAMICS REASONING MONEY TUE16

LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.09 C-1.07 G0.03 G1.01 A1.23 D0.03 H0.04 H0.06 A1.22 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008

16:00 Peter Troyan Vitali Gretschko and Jan Bouckaert and Matthias Lang David Lagziel and Azar Abizada Xiao Luo Yonatan Aumann and Cars Hommes, Marius Péter Bayer Marco Serena Tymofiy Mylovanov Norma Olaizola and Claudia Cerrone Adam Brandenburger, Parkash Chander and Stephan Lauermann M. Josune Albizuri and Miguel Fonseca, Collusion and Achim Wambach Geert Van Moer Communicating Ehud Lehrer Random paths to A Unified Approach Erel Segal-Halevi Ochea and Jan Sophisticatedly Harnessing Beliefs to The sender-payoff Federico Valenciano Doing it when others Amanda Friedenberg, Myrna Wooders and Mehmet Ekmekci J. Carlos Santos Francesco Giovannoni Signaling in Auctions Common Values Mergers with Subjective Reward Schemes exchange-stability to Iterated Repeated Games Tuinstra Stable Equilibria Stimulate Efforts approach to A `marginalist´ do: a strategic model Terri Kneeland and The Subgame Manipulated Claims-separable and Miltiadis Makris with Interdependent and the Coase Horizontal Evaluations Elimination Revisited: An Ordinal Evolutionary in the Local Public signaling and the model of network of procrastination Willemien Kets Perfect Core Electorates and consistency and Auctions with Values Conjecture: Subcontracting Procedures in Perspective Competition Goods Game informed-principal formation Cognition and Information potential for claims External Incentives: Inefficiencies in Strategic Games between Adjustment problem Rationality Aggregation problems Experimental Frictionless Contract Processes in Cournot Evidence (Re-) Negotiation Oligopoly: Instability and Complex Dynamics

16:30 Philippe Jehiel, Peter Basak Altan Panos Toulis and Andreas Asseyer Andrzej Baranski John P. Dickerson and Mehmet Ismail Artem Baklanov Hsiao-Chi Chen and Anna Stepanova and Irem Bozbay and Yi Chen, Maria Renaud Foucard and Aviad Heifetz and Bernardo García- Fanni Bobák and Irem Bozbay and Florian Navarro Markus Kinateder, Katuscak and Fabio Damaged Durable David Parkes Optimal Information Pre-Distribution: Tuomas Sandholm Maximin Nash Equilibria in Yunshyong Chow Edward Cartwright Alberto Vesperoni Goltsman, Johannes Jana Friedrichsen Enrico Minelli Pola, Nagore Iriberri Zsolt Udvari Hans Peters Weak necessary Hubert Kiss and Ágnes Michelucci Goods, Upgrades Long-term Causal Disclosure and Bargaining over FutureMatch: Equilibrium: A Reactive Strategies Evolution of Cournot Efficiency in a A contest success Horner and Gregory Bidding for network Gratification and and Jaromir Kovarik Games in partition Information players, Myerson Pintér How to Boost and the Coase Effects in Multiagent Collusion Incentives with Combining Human Minimal Extension of and Bertrand Firms forced contribution function for Pavlov size flourishing: well- Non-Equilibrium function form aggregation with fairness and the Would Depositors pay Revenues in First- Conjecture Economies Endogenous Value Judgments Maximin Strategies Under A Replicator threshold public networks Multi-stage being in interaction Play in Centipede with restricted multiple issues and concept of equality to show that they do Price Auctions? The Production and Machine Dynamic good game unmediated Games cooperation continuum of types not withdraw? Theory Magic of Disclosing Learning to Match communication in and Experiment Only Winning Bids in Dynamic a sender-receiver from Past Auctions Environments model

17:00 Gyula Seres Amparo Urbano and Xiaogang Che Gustavo Bergantiños Jan Christoph Toshimasa Maruta, Fedor Sandomirskiy Hamed Markazi Anne Van Den Subhasish Modak- Francesc Dilme Rui Gong, Jieshuang Romain Gauriot, Hakan Inal Addison Pan Jingyi Xue Olga Gorelkina and Auction cartels Ivan Arribas Collusion and and Leticia Lorenzo Schlegel Takuya Iimura and On repeated Moghadam Nouweland and Chowdhury, Anwesha Slightly Biased He and Frank Page Lionel Page and John Existence of a A Generalisation Efficiency and Alia Gizatulina and the absence Multiproduct Optimal Contract How to apply Ex-Ante Stable Takahiro Watanabe zero-sum games The Nonparametric Myrna Wooders Mukherjee and Communication Incentive Wooders Unique Core of Feddersen and fairness in claims Selling Money on of efficient trading with a in a Hierarchy with penalties for Lotteries Have Small Two-person Pairwise with incomplete Approach to Existence of Share Theodore Turocy Compatible Wimbledon Partition in Coalition Pesendorfer (1998): problems under EBay: A Field Test for communication common agent Multiple Agents avoiding delays Support Solvable Games information and Evolutionary Equilibrium in Equivalence in Networks and Revisited Formation Games Voting Under uncertainty Social Preferences under complete in projects asymptotically Oligopoly Symmetric Local multi-winner contest the Delegated Ambiguity information: bounded values Public Good mechanisms: An Networking Principle Existence and Economies experiment characterization of Nash equilibrium

18:00- 19:00 VON NEUMANN LECTURE Sylvain Sorin Asymptotic Value of Dynamic Games

LOCATION > Lecture Hall 5TH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY

CONGRESS PROGRAMME // TUESDAY 26 JULY 2016

09:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: IO ESPIONAGE C: IO TIMING D: FINANCIAL; E: BARGAINING F: MATCHING G: STRATEGY H: REPEATED J: EVOLUTIONARY K: PUBLIC GOOD L: CONTESTS M: COMMUNICATION N: NETWORKS - IO P: DECISION Q: SEQUENTIAL R: COOPERATIVE S: VOTING T: FAIRNESS U: EXPERIMENTS 10:30 SESSIONS BAYESIAN INVESTMENT PROOFNESS GAMES DYNAMICS THEORY RATIONALITY TUE9 LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.09 C-1.07 G0.03 G1.01 A1.23 D0.03 H0.04 H0.06 A1.22 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008

09:00 Elnaz Bajoori Alex Barrachina, Yair Thomas Weber Yong Chao, Chen Yao Haruo Imai and Aaron Bodoh-Creed Frank Karsten, Marco Takuo Sugaya Panayotis Abhinaba Lahiri, Antoni Rubí-Barceló Valeria Burdea, Maria Vladimir Matveenko, Massimo Scotti and Marciano Siniscalchi Giorgos Steven Brams and Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Tibor Neugebauer, Distributional Tauman and Amparo Optimal and Mao Ye Hannu Salonen and Brent Hickman Slikker and Peter The Characterization Mertikopoulos and Hans Peters and Ton and Daniel Cardona Montero and Martin Alexei Korolev and Filippo Pavesi Sequential Stamatopoulos and Marc Kilgour Sabine Hügelschäfer Abdolkarim Sadrieh Perfect Equilibrium Urbano Commitment What drives Bargaining and College assignment Borm of the Limit William Sandholm Storcken Group-contests with Sefton Anastasia Alfimova Good Lies preferences Paraskevas Lekeas Paths to Victory and Maria Theobald and Reinhard Selten in Bayesian Games Entry with Two price dispersion Rentseeking as a large contest Cost allocation rules Communication Riemannian game Locating public bads endogeneous claims Communication On dynamic stability and sequential Cooperative games in Presidential Unexpected, Taming Selten’s with Applications to Correlated Signals and market for elastic single- Equilibrium Payoff dynamics and in an interval situations with of equilibrium in rationality with externalities Elections: The hence unfair? The Horse with Impulse Auctions fragmentation attribute situations Set with General reinforcement partially verifiable network game with and probabilistic Setup Power of neural response Response across U.S. stock Monitoring learning information: an production and coalitional beliefs Noncompetitive to expectancy exchanges? experimental externalities States violations in the approach Ultimatum Game

09:30 Christian Koch and Maria Kozlovskaya Steven Slutsky and Yunus Topbas and Cesarino Bertini, Koji Yokote William Phan and Mitri Kitti Man Wah Cheung Swarnendu Uriel Feige, Ron Caroline Thomas Nikolas Tsakas and Hande Erkut Sophie Bade Zhigang Cao, Carlos Alós-Ferrer Takeshi Nishimura, Carlos Alos-Ferrer and Stefan Penczynski Industrial Espionage Jon Hamilton Unal Zenginobuz Cristina Bonzi, Cumulative offer Patrick Harless Equilibrium Payoffs Imitative Dynamics Chatterjee, Hans Lavi and Moshe Career Concerns and Emmanuel Petrakis Individual Weak Dynamic Chengzhong Qin and and Georg Granic Akira Okada and Alexander Ritschel The Winner’s in Duopoly Games Optimal income Horizontal Gianfranco process with For the Object for Pure Strategies in for Games with Peters and Ton Tennenholtz Policy Intransigence The Effect of Entry preferences across Consistency Xiaoguang Yang The effects of polling Yasuhiro Shirata Multiple Decision Curse: Conditional taxation with Coordination and Gambarelli, Nicola continuous transfers Allocation Problem, Repeated Games Continuous Strategy Storcken Contests for - A Dynamic on R&D Networks contexts Shapley's Conjecture systems on electoral Evolution of Processes in Cournot Reasoning & Belief no government Transparency of Gnocchi and Ignazio Efficiency, the Space Locating a public Revenue Share Signalling Model on the Cores of competition Fairness and Group Oligopolies: Evidence Formation commitment Information Panades Partial Endowment good on a sphere Abstract Market Formation in Multi- from Response Times Transforming Games Lower Bound, and Games Player Ultimatum with Affinities from Decomposability Games Characteristic into Characterize TTC Normal Form

10:00 Matthew Gentry, Suvi Vasama Lin Lin, Wei Zheng Joosung Lee Mustafa Oguz Afacan Ethem Akyol Asaf Plan Erik Mohlin and Axel Alexey Savvateev, Ezra Einy, Diego Bartosz Redlicki Sonja Brangewitz, Eran Hanany, Peter María Gómez-Rúa Javier Rivas and Andrea Isoni, Anders Tatiana Komarova, Dynamics of and Yan Pan Bargaining and School Choice with Welfare Comparison Stability of the Bernergård Constantine Sorokin Moreno and Rumours and Cheap Claus-Jochen Klibanoff and Sujoy and Juan Vidal-Puga Friederike Mengel Poulsen, Robert Pasquale Schiraldi Innovation: Game Analysis Buyout Voucher of Allocation Equilibrium Payoff Evolutionary and Shlomo Weber Benyamin Shitovitz Talk Haake and Philipp Mukerji A monotonic and Common value Sugden and Kei Tsutsui and Wiroy Shin Cooperation and of the Corporate Mechanisms Set in Repeated Selection against Multidimensional The Value of Public Möhlmeier Incomplete merge-proof rule elections with Focal points and On Monotone Retardation Internet Information under Incomplete Games Iteratively Weakly free-mobility Information in Strategic Formation Information Games in minimum cost private information payoff information in Strategy Equilibria Disclosure Information Dominated equilibrium: Tiebout Common-Value of Customer with Ambiguity spanning tree and informative tacit bargaining in Simultaneous Strategies revisited Tullock Contests Relationship Averse Players situations priors Auctions for Networks Complementary Goods

11:00- SEMI- SP1: COMPUTATION SP2: DYNAMIC MATCHING SP3: MONOPOLY PRICING / PRISONER’S DILEMMA 12:30 PLENARY SESSIONS III LOCATION > Lecture Hall Concert Hall Aula Gothic

11:00 Christos Papadimitriou Leeat Yariv Balázs Szentes The Unreasonably Productive Interaction of the Theories of Games Optimal Dynamic Matching Buyer-Optimal Demand and Monopoly Pricing and Computation

11:45 Rakesh Vohra Alessandro Pavan Guillaume Fréchette Scarf's Lemma and Stable Matchings Dynamic Matching Auctions: Experimentation and Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Cross-Subsidization

14:00- POSTER SESSION 15:30 LOCATION > Lounge SBE

16:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: IO COASE C: IO D: AGENCY E: BARGAINING F: MATCHING G: SOLUTION H: REPEATED J: EVOLUTIONARY K: PUBLIC GOOD L: CONTESTS M: COMMUNICATION N: NETWORKS P: PSYCHOLOGY Q: DEPTH OF R: COOPERATIVE S: VOTING T: FAIRNESS U: EXPERIMENTS - 17:30 SESSIONS COMMUNICATION CONJECTURE MODELS CONCEPTS GAMES DYNAMICS REASONING MONEY TUE16

LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.09 C-1.07 G0.03 G1.01 A1.23 D0.03 H0.04 H0.06 A1.22 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008

16:00 Peter Troyan Vitali Gretschko and Jan Bouckaert and Matthias Lang David Lagziel and Azar Abizada Xiao Luo Yonatan Aumann and Cars Hommes, Marius Péter Bayer Marco Serena Tymofiy Mylovanov Norma Olaizola and Claudia Cerrone Adam Brandenburger, Parkash Chander and Stephan Lauermann M. Josune Albizuri and Miguel Fonseca, Collusion and Achim Wambach Geert Van Moer Communicating Ehud Lehrer Random paths to A Unified Approach Erel Segal-Halevi Ochea and Jan Sophisticatedly Harnessing Beliefs to The sender-payoff Federico Valenciano Doing it when others Amanda Friedenberg, Myrna Wooders and Mehmet Ekmekci J. Carlos Santos Francesco Giovannoni Signaling in Auctions Common Values Mergers with Subjective Reward Schemes exchange-stability to Iterated Repeated Games Tuinstra Stable Equilibria Stimulate Efforts approach to A `marginalist´ do: a strategic model Terri Kneeland and The Subgame Manipulated Claims-separable and Miltiadis Makris with Interdependent and the Coase Horizontal Evaluations Elimination Revisited: An Ordinal Evolutionary in the Local Public signaling and the model of network of procrastination Willemien Kets Perfect Core Electorates and consistency and Auctions with Values Conjecture: Subcontracting Procedures in Perspective Competition Goods Game informed-principal formation Cognition and Information potential for claims External Incentives: Inefficiencies in Strategic Games between Adjustment problem Rationality Aggregation problems Experimental Frictionless Contract Processes in Cournot Evidence (Re-) Negotiation Oligopoly: Instability and Complex Dynamics

16:30 Philippe Jehiel, Peter Basak Altan Panos Toulis and Andreas Asseyer Andrzej Baranski John P. Dickerson and Mehmet Ismail Artem Baklanov Hsiao-Chi Chen and Anna Stepanova and Irem Bozbay and Yi Chen, Maria Renaud Foucard and Aviad Heifetz and Bernardo García- Fanni Bobák and Irem Bozbay and Florian Navarro Markus Kinateder, Katuscak and Fabio Damaged Durable David Parkes Optimal Information Pre-Distribution: Tuomas Sandholm Maximin Nash Equilibria in Yunshyong Chow Edward Cartwright Alberto Vesperoni Goltsman, Johannes Jana Friedrichsen Enrico Minelli Pola, Nagore Iriberri Zsolt Udvari Hans Peters Weak necessary Hubert Kiss and Ágnes Michelucci Goods, Upgrades Long-term Causal Disclosure and Bargaining over FutureMatch: Equilibrium: A Reactive Strategies Evolution of Cournot Efficiency in a A contest success Horner and Gregory Bidding for network Gratification and and Jaromir Kovarik Games in partition Information players, Myerson Pintér How to Boost and the Coase Effects in Multiagent Collusion Incentives with Combining Human Minimal Extension of and Bertrand Firms forced contribution function for Pavlov size flourishing: well- Non-Equilibrium function form aggregation with fairness and the Would Depositors pay Revenues in First- Conjecture Economies Endogenous Value Judgments Maximin Strategies Under A Replicator threshold public networks Multi-stage being in interaction Play in Centipede with restricted multiple issues and concept of equality to show that they do Price Auctions? The Production and Machine Dynamic good game unmediated Games cooperation continuum of types not withdraw? Theory Magic of Disclosing Learning to Match communication in and Experiment Only Winning Bids in Dynamic a sender-receiver from Past Auctions Environments model

17:00 Gyula Seres Amparo Urbano and Xiaogang Che Gustavo Bergantiños Jan Christoph Toshimasa Maruta, Fedor Sandomirskiy Hamed Markazi Anne Van Den Subhasish Modak- Francesc Dilme Rui Gong, Jieshuang Romain Gauriot, Hakan Inal Addison Pan Jingyi Xue Olga Gorelkina and Auction cartels Ivan Arribas Collusion and and Leticia Lorenzo Schlegel Takuya Iimura and On repeated Moghadam Nouweland and Chowdhury, Anwesha Slightly Biased He and Frank Page Lionel Page and John Existence of a A Generalisation Efficiency and Alia Gizatulina and the absence Multiproduct Optimal Contract How to apply Ex-Ante Stable Takahiro Watanabe zero-sum games The Nonparametric Myrna Wooders Mukherjee and Communication Incentive Wooders Unique Core of Feddersen and fairness in claims Selling Money on of efficient trading with a in a Hierarchy with penalties for Lotteries Have Small Two-person Pairwise with incomplete Approach to Existence of Share Theodore Turocy Compatible Wimbledon Partition in Coalition Pesendorfer (1998): problems under EBay: A Field Test for communication common agent Multiple Agents avoiding delays Support Solvable Games information and Evolutionary Equilibrium in Equivalence in Networks and Revisited Formation Games Voting Under uncertainty Social Preferences under complete in projects asymptotically Oligopoly Symmetric Local multi-winner contest the Delegated Ambiguity information: bounded values Public Good mechanisms: An Networking Principle Existence and Economies experiment characterization of Nash equilibrium

18:00- 19:00 VON NEUMANN LECTURE Sylvain Sorin Asymptotic Value of Dynamic Games

LOCATION > Lecture Hall 5TH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY

CONGRESS PROGRAMME // WEDNESDAY 27 JULY 2016

09:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: IO MONOPOLY C: IO D: AGENCY E: BANKRUPTCY F: SCHOOL CHOICE G: SOLUTION H: IMPLEMENTATION J: EVOLUTIONARY K: LEARNING L: TOURNAMENTS M: COMMUNICATION N: NETWORKS - P: LEGAL Q: DEPTH OF R: SHAPLEY VALUE S: VOTING T: FAIR DIVISION U: EXPERIMENTS - 10:30 SESSIONS DESIGN MODELS CONCEPTS DYNAMICS ATTACK REASONING COORDINATION WED9 LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.09 C-1.07 G0.03 G1.01 A1.23 D0.03 H0.04 H0.06 A1.22 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 09:00 Moshe Babaioff, Daniele Condorelli Tatsuya Kitagawa, Martin Pollrich Arantza Estevez Joana Pais, Flip Klijn Bram Driesen Naoki Yoshihara and Noémi Gaskó, Rodica Itai Arieli, Moran Allen Io Kuan Vong Maria Goltsman, Victor Luna, Ivan Vatsalya Srivastava Luke Lindsay Silvia Lorenzo-Freire Stefano Vannucci Christian Trudeau Michael Maes and Yannai A. and Balazs Szentes Yasushi Masuda and Mediated Audits Fernandez, Peter and Marc Vorsatz Truncated Leximin Michele Lombardi Ioana Lung and Mihai Koren and Rann Strategic Maxim Ivanov and Arribas and Amparo The Sorry Clause Adaptive Loss New Weakly unimodal From the bankruptcy Heinrich Nax Gonczarowski and Buyer-Optimal Masashi Umezawa Borm and M. Gloria Static versus Solutions Partially- Suciu Smorodinsky Manipulation in Gregory Pavlov Urbano Aversion and Market characterizations domains, problem and its A behavioral study of Noam Nisan Demand and Optimal Two-part Fiestras-Janeiro Dynamic Deferred honest Nash Approximation of Bayesian learning Tournament Games When does simple Network Experience of the Owen and antiexchange Concede-and-Divide `noise' in coordination The Menu-Size Monopoly Pricing Tariff Licensing for Nontransferable Acceptance in implementation Generalized Nash in markets with mediation improve performance under Banzhaf-Owen properties, and solution to the games Complexity Incumbent Innovator utility bankruptcy School Choice: with non-connected Equilibria by Means common value upon cheap talk? attacks values using the coalitional strategy assignment problem of Revenue in Differentiated games A Laboratory honesty standards of Evolutionary intracoalitional proofness of voting and its Fair Division Approximation Product Markets Experiment Computation balanced rules solution contributions property

09:30 Debasis Mishra and Robert Somogyi Filippo Balestrieri, Albin Erlanson and Jiawen Li and Yuan Ju Thayer Morrill and Florian Brandl Michele Lombardi Linh Chi Nguyen Volodymyr Kuleshov Julia Wirtz Shih En Lu Robert Gilles and Hagen Schwerin Christian Nauerz, Hans Peters and José Kirill Pogorelskiy Anna Bogomolnaia Tridib Sharma Monopoly Pricing Sergei Izmalkov and Andreas Kleiner Divide and Choose: Umut Dur The Distribution of Implementation in Evolution of and Okke Schrijvers Feedback and Monotonic Cheap Owen Sims Swap Bonds Frauke Meyer and Zarzuelo Correlated Equilibria and Herve Moulin Balanced Ranking with Dual Capacity Joao Leao Costly Verification in A strategic approach What you don't Optimal Strategies partial equilibrium Behavior in the Inverse Game Learning in Talk The Formation of or Stocks! A Marion Collewet An axiomatic in Voter Turnout Competitive Fair Mechanisms Constraints The Market for Collective Decisions to bankruptcy know can help you in in Symmetric Zero- Repeated Nash Theory: Learning Tournaments Extractive Structures Game of Implicit Sophistication in characterization of Games Division under linear Surprises: Selling problems school assignment sum Games Demand Game. Utilities in Succinct in Networks Environmental Strategic One- the Owen-Shapley preferences Substitute Goods A Computer Games Policy Shot Interactions: spatial power index through Lotteries Simulation. A nonparametric approach for identifying reasoning concepts

10:00 Cemil Selcuk V Bhaskar and Nikita Michael Kramm and Erik Madsen Genjiu Xu, Cuiying Felix Brandt, Markus Makoto Hagiwara, Mareen Hallier and Min Zhang Timo Hoffmann Andreas Blume Uri Weiss and Joseph Irenaeus Wolff Nicola Maaser Erel Segal-Halevi and Auctions vs. Fixed Roketskiy Maximilian Conze Optimal project Zhu, Jun Su and Hao Brill and Warut Hirofumi Yamamura Carsten Hartmann Non-Monotone Performance Failure of Common Agassi On the salience- Simple vs. Balázs Sziklai Pricing: Competing Dynamic Demand The termination with an Sun Suksompong and Takehiko Yamato A Markov state Observational Pay, Sorting and Knowledge of How Game Theory based level-k model sophisticated rules Resource- for Budget and Sequential Recommendation informed agent A bankrupt approach An Ordinal Minimax An Outcome modeling approach Learning Employers’ Choice: Language in Encourages for weight allocation monotonicity Constrained Buyers Monopoly: A Model Effect of Niche to solutions of TU Theorem Mechanism to characterizing Are Tournaments an Common-Interest Cooperation in a two-tier voting and Population- of Endogenous Products - How Games for Partially the punctuated Attractive Payment Communication model monotonicity in Screening Consumer Learning Honest Nash equilibrium Method? Games Cake-cutting in a Hotelling Implementation dynamics of Framework Leads to stochastic Differentiation evolutionary games

11:00- SEMI- SP0: EC PLENARY / KALAI PRIZE SP1: GAME THEORY AND BIOLOGY SP2: ORGAN EXCHANGE / INFORMATION SP3: LAW 12:30 PLENARY ACQUISITION SESSIONS IV LOCATION > Lecture Hall Concert Hall Greek Aula Aula Gothic

11:00 Keith Chen Colin Camerer Utku Ünver Wojciech Załuski Dynamic Pricing in a Labor Market: Surge Neural circuitry of strategic thinking Multi-Donor Organ Exchange Law as a Convention: Remarks on a Game-Theoretical Insight into Pricing and Flexible Work on the Uber Legal Ontology Platform

11:45 Tim Roughgarden Avi Shmida Hülya Eraslan Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy Game theory and evolution Information Acquisition under Persuasive Precedent versus Binding Precedent

14:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: IO TRADE C: IO LEARNING D: REPUTATION E: PRIVACY F: SCHOOL CHOICE G: EQUILIBRIUM H: IMPLEMENTATION J: EVOLUTIONARY K: LEARNING L: TOURNAMENTS M: PERSUASION N: ATTACK AND P: LEGAL Q: DEPTH OF R: SHAPLEY VALUE S: VOTING, SOCIAL U: EXPERIMENTS 15:30 SESSIONS COMBINATORIAL DYNAMICS DEFENCE REASONING CHOICE WED14

LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.07 C-1.09 G0.03 G1.01 A1.23 D0.03 H0.04 H0.06 A1.22 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.008 14:00 Gian-Marco Kokott, Saara Hamalainen Alexei Parakhonyak Nuh Aygun Dalkiran Ronen Gradwohl and Li Chen and Juan Shiran Rachmilevitch Rene Saran Sung-Ha Hwang and Christoph March and Alex Krumer, Reut Jonas Hedlund Dan Kovenock and Bharat Goel and Arijit Fabrizio Germano, Ayse M. Derya Alexander K. Wagner Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Martin Bichler and Per Competition in store and Nick Vikander and Serdar Yuksel Rann Smorodinsky Pereyra Monotonic epsilon- Bounded Depths Luc Rey-Bellet Anthony Ziegelmeyer Megidish and Aner Bayesian persuasion Brian Roberson Sen Jonathan Weinstein A characterization of and Dura-Georg Jaume Garcia-Segarra Paulsen complexity takes us Inducing Herding Perfect Bayesian Perception Games Self-selection in equilibria in strongly of Rationality and Positive feedback Altruistic Sela by a privately Generalizations of Value Creation vs. and Peio Zuazo-Garin the Myerson value Granic and Alexander Ritschel Equilibrium halfway between with Capacity Equilibria in and Privacy School Choice symmetric games Implementation in coordination Observational First-Mover informed sender the General Lotto Appropriation, and Uncertain Where Power Performance, Bidding Strategies Diamond and Constraints Reputation Games with Complete games: stochastic Learning Advantage in Round- and Colonel Blotto the Evolution of Rationality, Depth Resides: Evidence Curiosity, and Gender: in Combinatorial Bertrand with Nested Information evolutionary Robin Tournaments Games Property Rights of Reasoning from the Chairman's She Just Wants To Procurement Information dynamics and the and Robustness Paradox Know Auctions with Structure logit choice rule in Games with Diseconomies of Incomplete Scale Information

14:30 Marissa Beck and Evangelia Chalioti Chris Wallace and Benjamin Sperisen Mariann Ollar, Umut Dur, Ozgur János Flesch and Ville Korpela Yuval Heller and Erik Ennio Bilancini, Elham Nikram and Wolfgang Gick and Yini Gao, Chung-Piaw Martin Van der Adam Brandenburger, Anna Khmelnitskaya, Z. Emel Ozturk Xiaochuan Huang, Marion Ott and Konstantinos David Myatt Bounded Memory, Marzena Rostek and Yilmaz and Arda Arkadi Predtetchinski Pure Strategy Nash Mohlin Leonardo Boncinelli Dieter Balkenborg Thilo Pausch Teo and Huan Zheng Linden Alex Danieli and Ozer Selcuk and Dolf Alternative Takehito Masuda, Nash Equilibria Serfes Information Use and Reputation, and Ji Hee Yoon Gitmez Subgame-perfect Implementation with Observations on and Jiabin Wu Tournament Game Bayesian Persuasion Sequential Attacker- Levelling the playing Amanda Friedenberg Talman characterizations of Yoshitaka Okano and of Sealed-Bid Strategic Incentives Acquisition in Price- Impatience Privacy Preserving School Choice under epsilon-equilibria in Finite Mechanisms Cooperation The Interplay of with Incumbent by Stress Test Defender Game with field in jury selection How Many Levels The Shapley value the plurality rule Tatsuyoshi Saijo Combinatorial for Innovations and Setting Oligopolies Market Design Partial Fairness perfect information Cultural Aversion Disclosure Redeployment: A Do Players Reason? for directed graph Cooperation Auctions Market Competition games with and Assortativity for Conic Approach An Observational games among behaviorally sigma–discrete the Emergence of Challenge and heterogeneous discontinuities Cooperation Solution players in social dilemma with stay or leave decisions

15:00 Thomas Kittsteiner, Jan-Henrik Steg and Joyee Deb and Yuhta János Flesch, Dries Papatya Duman and Takako Fujiwara- Daehong Min Christoph Luis Miller, Maria Federica Briata, Xu Lang Sander Renes and Marion Ott and Jacco Thijssen Ishii Vermeulen and Anna Walter Trockel Greve and Masahiro Bayesian Persuasion Schottmueller and Montero and Andrea Dall'Aglio, Characterization Timo Hoffmann Richard Steinberg Quick or Persistent? Reputation Building Zseleva On Non-Cooperative Okuno-Fujiwara under Partial Ole Jann Christoph Vanberg Marco Dall'Aglio and of the Minimal That’s impossible: Competing On the Feedback under Uncertain A game highlighting Foundation and Diverse Behavior Commitment How Jeremy Legislative Vito Fragnelli Norm Solution An Experiment Combinatorial Effects between Monitoring the difference Implementation of Patterns in a Bentham would Bargaining with The Shapley Value with Incomplete on Participation Auctions First and Second between countably the Nash Solution Symmetric Society defend against Heterogeneous in the Knaster Gain Information Constraints Mover Advantages and finitely additive in Subgame Perfect with Voluntary coordinated attacks Disagreement Game in a Stochastic strategies Equilibrium via Partnerships Values: Theory and Investment Game Rubinstein's Game Experiments

16:00- 17:00 MORGENSTERN LECTURE Thomas Palfrey Trading Votes for Votes - A Decentralized Matching Algorithm

LOCATION > Lecture Hall

17:15- 18:15 ELSEVIER PUBLISHING CONNECT AUTHOR WORKSHOP

LOCATION > A1.23. 5TH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY

CONGRESS PROGRAMME // WEDNESDAY 27 JULY 2016

09:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: IO MONOPOLY C: IO D: AGENCY E: BANKRUPTCY F: SCHOOL CHOICE G: SOLUTION H: IMPLEMENTATION J: EVOLUTIONARY K: LEARNING L: TOURNAMENTS M: COMMUNICATION N: NETWORKS - P: LEGAL Q: DEPTH OF R: SHAPLEY VALUE S: VOTING T: FAIR DIVISION U: EXPERIMENTS - 10:30 SESSIONS DESIGN MODELS CONCEPTS DYNAMICS ATTACK REASONING COORDINATION WED9 LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.09 C-1.07 G0.03 G1.01 A1.23 D0.03 H0.04 H0.06 A1.22 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 09:00 Moshe Babaioff, Daniele Condorelli Tatsuya Kitagawa, Martin Pollrich Arantza Estevez Joana Pais, Flip Klijn Bram Driesen Naoki Yoshihara and Noémi Gaskó, Rodica Itai Arieli, Moran Allen Io Kuan Vong Maria Goltsman, Victor Luna, Ivan Vatsalya Srivastava Luke Lindsay Silvia Lorenzo-Freire Stefano Vannucci Christian Trudeau Michael Maes and Yannai A. and Balazs Szentes Yasushi Masuda and Mediated Audits Fernandez, Peter and Marc Vorsatz Truncated Leximin Michele Lombardi Ioana Lung and Mihai Koren and Rann Strategic Maxim Ivanov and Arribas and Amparo The Sorry Clause Adaptive Loss New Weakly unimodal From the bankruptcy Heinrich Nax Gonczarowski and Buyer-Optimal Masashi Umezawa Borm and M. Gloria Static versus Solutions Partially- Suciu Smorodinsky Manipulation in Gregory Pavlov Urbano Aversion and Market characterizations domains, problem and its A behavioral study of Noam Nisan Demand and Optimal Two-part Fiestras-Janeiro Dynamic Deferred honest Nash Approximation of Bayesian learning Tournament Games When does simple Network Experience of the Owen and antiexchange Concede-and-Divide `noise' in coordination The Menu-Size Monopoly Pricing Tariff Licensing for Nontransferable Acceptance in implementation Generalized Nash in markets with mediation improve performance under Banzhaf-Owen properties, and solution to the games Complexity Incumbent Innovator utility bankruptcy School Choice: with non-connected Equilibria by Means common value upon cheap talk? attacks values using the coalitional strategy assignment problem of Revenue in Differentiated games A Laboratory honesty standards of Evolutionary intracoalitional proofness of voting and its Fair Division Approximation Product Markets Experiment Computation balanced rules solution contributions property

09:30 Debasis Mishra and Robert Somogyi Filippo Balestrieri, Albin Erlanson and Jiawen Li and Yuan Ju Thayer Morrill and Florian Brandl Michele Lombardi Linh Chi Nguyen Volodymyr Kuleshov Julia Wirtz Shih En Lu Robert Gilles and Hagen Schwerin Christian Nauerz, Hans Peters and José Kirill Pogorelskiy Anna Bogomolnaia Tridib Sharma Monopoly Pricing Sergei Izmalkov and Andreas Kleiner Divide and Choose: Umut Dur The Distribution of Implementation in Evolution of and Okke Schrijvers Feedback and Monotonic Cheap Owen Sims Swap Bonds Frauke Meyer and Zarzuelo Correlated Equilibria and Herve Moulin Balanced Ranking with Dual Capacity Joao Leao Costly Verification in A strategic approach What you don't Optimal Strategies partial equilibrium Behavior in the Inverse Game Learning in Talk The Formation of or Stocks! A Marion Collewet An axiomatic in Voter Turnout Competitive Fair Mechanisms Constraints The Market for Collective Decisions to bankruptcy know can help you in in Symmetric Zero- Repeated Nash Theory: Learning Tournaments Extractive Structures Game of Implicit Sophistication in characterization of Games Division under linear Surprises: Selling problems school assignment sum Games Demand Game. Utilities in Succinct in Networks Environmental Strategic One- the Owen-Shapley preferences Substitute Goods A Computer Games Policy Shot Interactions: spatial power index through Lotteries Simulation. A nonparametric approach for identifying reasoning concepts

10:00 Cemil Selcuk V Bhaskar and Nikita Michael Kramm and Erik Madsen Genjiu Xu, Cuiying Felix Brandt, Markus Makoto Hagiwara, Mareen Hallier and Min Zhang Timo Hoffmann Andreas Blume Uri Weiss and Joseph Irenaeus Wolff Nicola Maaser Erel Segal-Halevi and Auctions vs. Fixed Roketskiy Maximilian Conze Optimal project Zhu, Jun Su and Hao Brill and Warut Hirofumi Yamamura Carsten Hartmann Non-Monotone Performance Failure of Common Agassi On the salience- Simple vs. Balázs Sziklai Pricing: Competing Dynamic Demand The termination with an Sun Suksompong and Takehiko Yamato A Markov state Observational Pay, Sorting and Knowledge of How Game Theory based level-k model sophisticated rules Resource- for Budget and Sequential Recommendation informed agent A bankrupt approach An Ordinal Minimax An Outcome modeling approach Learning Employers’ Choice: Language in Encourages for weight allocation monotonicity Constrained Buyers Monopoly: A Model Effect of Niche to solutions of TU Theorem Mechanism to characterizing Are Tournaments an Common-Interest Cooperation in a two-tier voting and Population- of Endogenous Products - How Games for Partially the punctuated Attractive Payment Communication model monotonicity in Screening Consumer Learning Honest Nash equilibrium Method? Games Cake-cutting in a Hotelling Implementation dynamics of Framework Leads to stochastic Differentiation evolutionary games

11:00- SEMI- SP0: EC PLENARY / KALAI PRIZE SP1: GAME THEORY AND BIOLOGY SP2: ORGAN EXCHANGE / INFORMATION SP3: LAW 12:30 PLENARY ACQUISITION SESSIONS IV LOCATION > Lecture Hall Concert Hall Greek Aula Aula Gothic

11:00 Keith Chen Colin Camerer Utku Ünver Wojciech Załuski Dynamic Pricing in a Labor Market: Surge Neural circuitry of strategic thinking Multi-Donor Organ Exchange Law as a Convention: Remarks on a Game-Theoretical Insight into Pricing and Flexible Work on the Uber Legal Ontology Platform

11:45 Tim Roughgarden Avi Shmida Hülya Eraslan Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy Game theory and evolution Information Acquisition under Persuasive Precedent versus Binding Precedent

14:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: IO TRADE C: IO LEARNING D: REPUTATION E: PRIVACY F: SCHOOL CHOICE G: EQUILIBRIUM H: IMPLEMENTATION J: EVOLUTIONARY K: LEARNING L: TOURNAMENTS M: PERSUASION N: ATTACK AND P: LEGAL Q: DEPTH OF R: SHAPLEY VALUE S: VOTING, SOCIAL U: EXPERIMENTS 15:30 SESSIONS COMBINATORIAL DYNAMICS DEFENCE REASONING CHOICE WED14

LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.07 C-1.09 G0.03 G1.01 A1.23 D0.03 H0.04 H0.06 A1.22 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.008 14:00 Gian-Marco Kokott, Saara Hamalainen Alexei Parakhonyak Nuh Aygun Dalkiran Ronen Gradwohl and Li Chen and Juan Shiran Rachmilevitch Rene Saran Sung-Ha Hwang and Christoph March and Alex Krumer, Reut Jonas Hedlund Dan Kovenock and Bharat Goel and Arijit Fabrizio Germano, Ayse M. Derya Alexander K. Wagner Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Martin Bichler and Per Competition in store and Nick Vikander and Serdar Yuksel Rann Smorodinsky Pereyra Monotonic epsilon- Bounded Depths Luc Rey-Bellet Anthony Ziegelmeyer Megidish and Aner Bayesian persuasion Brian Roberson Sen Jonathan Weinstein A characterization of and Dura-Georg Jaume Garcia-Segarra Paulsen complexity takes us Inducing Herding Perfect Bayesian Perception Games Self-selection in equilibria in strongly of Rationality and Positive feedback Altruistic Sela by a privately Generalizations of Value Creation vs. and Peio Zuazo-Garin the Myerson value Granic and Alexander Ritschel Equilibrium halfway between with Capacity Equilibria in and Privacy School Choice symmetric games Implementation in coordination Observational First-Mover informed sender the General Lotto Appropriation, and Uncertain Where Power Performance, Bidding Strategies Diamond and Constraints Reputation Games with Complete games: stochastic Learning Advantage in Round- and Colonel Blotto the Evolution of Rationality, Depth Resides: Evidence Curiosity, and Gender: in Combinatorial Bertrand with Nested Information evolutionary Robin Tournaments Games Property Rights of Reasoning from the Chairman's She Just Wants To Procurement Information dynamics and the and Robustness Paradox Know Auctions with Structure logit choice rule in Games with Diseconomies of Incomplete Scale Information

14:30 Marissa Beck and Evangelia Chalioti Chris Wallace and Benjamin Sperisen Mariann Ollar, Umut Dur, Ozgur János Flesch and Ville Korpela Yuval Heller and Erik Ennio Bilancini, Elham Nikram and Wolfgang Gick and Yini Gao, Chung-Piaw Martin Van der Adam Brandenburger, Anna Khmelnitskaya, Z. Emel Ozturk Xiaochuan Huang, Marion Ott and Konstantinos David Myatt Bounded Memory, Marzena Rostek and Yilmaz and Arda Arkadi Predtetchinski Pure Strategy Nash Mohlin Leonardo Boncinelli Dieter Balkenborg Thilo Pausch Teo and Huan Zheng Linden Alex Danieli and Ozer Selcuk and Dolf Alternative Takehito Masuda, Nash Equilibria Serfes Information Use and Reputation, and Ji Hee Yoon Gitmez Subgame-perfect Implementation with Observations on and Jiabin Wu Tournament Game Bayesian Persuasion Sequential Attacker- Levelling the playing Amanda Friedenberg Talman characterizations of Yoshitaka Okano and of Sealed-Bid Strategic Incentives Acquisition in Price- Impatience Privacy Preserving School Choice under epsilon-equilibria in Finite Mechanisms Cooperation The Interplay of with Incumbent by Stress Test Defender Game with field in jury selection How Many Levels The Shapley value the plurality rule Tatsuyoshi Saijo Combinatorial for Innovations and Setting Oligopolies Market Design Partial Fairness perfect information Cultural Aversion Disclosure Redeployment: A Do Players Reason? for directed graph Cooperation Auctions Market Competition games with and Assortativity for Conic Approach An Observational games among behaviorally sigma–discrete the Emergence of Challenge and heterogeneous discontinuities Cooperation Solution players in social dilemma with stay or leave decisions

15:00 Thomas Kittsteiner, Jan-Henrik Steg and Joyee Deb and Yuhta János Flesch, Dries Papatya Duman and Takako Fujiwara- Daehong Min Christoph Luis Miller, Maria Federica Briata, Xu Lang Sander Renes and Marion Ott and Jacco Thijssen Ishii Vermeulen and Anna Walter Trockel Greve and Masahiro Bayesian Persuasion Schottmueller and Montero and Andrea Dall'Aglio, Characterization Timo Hoffmann Richard Steinberg Quick or Persistent? Reputation Building Zseleva On Non-Cooperative Okuno-Fujiwara under Partial Ole Jann Christoph Vanberg Marco Dall'Aglio and of the Minimal That’s impossible: Competing On the Feedback under Uncertain A game highlighting Foundation and Diverse Behavior Commitment How Jeremy Legislative Vito Fragnelli Norm Solution An Experiment Combinatorial Effects between Monitoring the difference Implementation of Patterns in a Bentham would Bargaining with The Shapley Value with Incomplete on Participation Auctions First and Second between countably the Nash Solution Symmetric Society defend against Heterogeneous in the Knaster Gain Information Constraints Mover Advantages and finitely additive in Subgame Perfect with Voluntary coordinated attacks Disagreement Game in a Stochastic strategies Equilibrium via Partnerships Values: Theory and Investment Game Rubinstein's Game Experiments

16:00- 17:00 MORGENSTERN LECTURE Thomas Palfrey Trading Votes for Votes - A Decentralized Matching Algorithm

LOCATION > Lecture Hall

17:15- 18:15 ELSEVIER PUBLISHING CONNECT AUTHOR WORKSHOP

LOCATION > A1.23. 5TH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY

CONGRESS PROGRAMME // THURSDAY 28 JULY 2016

09:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: IO DYNAMIC C: IO SCREENING D: REPUTATION E: ASSIGNMENT F: UNIVERSITIES G: EQUILIBRIUM H: IMPLEMENTATION J: EVOLUTIONARY K: EXPERIMENTATION L: CONTESTS M: COMMUNICATION N: CONGESTION P: DETERRENCE Q: EQUILIBRUM R: SHAPLEY VALUE S: POLITICAL T: SOCIAL CHOICE U: EXPERIMENTS 10:30 SESSIONS DESIGN DYNAMICS GAMES COMPUTATION ECONOMY THU9

LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.07 C-1.09 G0.03 G1.01 A1.23 D0.03 H0.04 H0.06 A1.22 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008

09:00 Liad Blumrosen and Jan-Henrik Steg Thomas Daske Daniel Hauser Tomoya Kazumura Anna Panova Guillaume Vigeral Christian Basteck Diodato Ferraioli and Christoph Wolf Xiaoyu Cheng, Jie Anton Kolotilin and Ivan Arribas and Elham Nikram and Markus Brill, Rupert Xun-Feng Hu and Yiming Liu Christopher Florian Engl Shahar Dobzinski Preemptive Pooling hawks and Promoting a and Shigehiro Governance in and Yannick Viossat Scoring Rules and Carmine Ventre Informative Zheng and Jaimie Lien Hongyi Li Amparo Urbano Dieter Balkenborg Freeman and Vincent Deng-Feng Li Income Inequality Chambers and Alan Causal Responsibility (Almost) Efficient Investment under doves: Interim- Reputation for Serizawa university A characterization Implementation Metastability of Milestones in A Fairness Condition Relational Local coordination Inspection Game Conitzer On the relationship and Political Miller in Games Mechanisms for Uncertainty efficient labor Quality Efficiency and of the sets of in Iteratively Asymptotically Experimentation for Unfair Contests: Communication with and global with Partial Computing Possible between Shapley Polarization Benchmarking Bilateral Trading contracts for other- strategy-proofness equilibrium payoffs Undominated Well-Behaved Multi-Dimensional Transfers congestion in Inspections and Necessary and configuration regarding agents. in object assignment of finite games Strategies Potential Games Favoritism with random networks Equilibrium Actions values problems with Asymmetric Players (and Bipartisan Set multi-demand Winners) preferences

09:30 Nicolas Fugger, Vitali Shinji Kobayashi and Nemanja Antic and Emilia Oljemark Alexei Parakhonyak Mike Peacey and Claudia Meroni and Mikhail Safronov Reinoud Joosten and Matthew Embrey, Charlène Cosandier Simon Schopohl Philip Brown and Artyom Jelnov Kimmo Berg and Ben Mcquillin and Joseph McMurray Benny Moldovanu Paul Healy, Ritesh Jain Gretschko, Helene Koji Takenaka Kai Steverson Reputation and the and Sergey Popov Gervas Huxley Carlos Pimienta Efficient Coalition- Berend Roorda Friederike Mengel and Intermediaries Communication Jason Marden Proportional use of Tuomas Sandholm Robert Sugden Polarization and and Andreas Kleiner and Ryan Oprea Mass and Achim Conjectures Screening Through value of information Same Sex Marriage, How do universities The structure of Proof Full Meta-stability Ronald Peeters versus Trolls in Games with Optional Optimal force in counter- Exclusion Method Backward induction Pandering in a Sophisticated An Experimental Wambach and Equilibrium Coordination in a trust game The Great Equalizer differentiate Nash equilibria in Implementation of attractive Strategy Revision Contests for Patents Verification Mechanisms for terrorism for Finding Nash foundations of the Spatial Model of sincerity with Test of Belief Free The imitation in Dynamic themselves? Poisson games evolutionary Opportunities and Robust Coordination Equilibrium in Multi- Shapley value Common-Value incomplete Strategies in a game: A simple Differentiated equilibria Collusion in Congestion Games Player Games Elections information Repeated Game with rule to prevent Duopoly Games Stochastic Private discrimination in Monitoring procurement

10:00 Takeharu Sogo Agnieszka Aleksey Tetenov Emiliano Catonini Francisco Robles Julien Combe, Olivier Rida Laraki William Sandholm Shintaro Miura André Casajus and Charles Zheng Tilman Borgers and Alexander Coutts Effects of Seller's Wiszniewska- An Economic Theory and Sergey Stepanov Jiménez and Marina Tercieux and Camille Necessary and and Mathias Staudigl Equilibrium Frank Huettner The Optimal Degree Yan Min Choo Good News and Information Matyszkiel, Marek of Statistical Testing Reputation Concerns Nunez Terrier Sufficient Conditions Large Deviations and Selection in Decomposition of of Centralization Revealed Relative Bad News are Still Disclosure in Equity Bodnar and Fryderyk and Information Core and The Design of for Existence of Stochastic Stability Persuasion Games solutions and the Utilitarianism News: Experimental Auctions Requiring Mirota Aggregation competitive Teacher Assignment: Maximal Elements with Binary Actions Shapley value Evidence on Belief Post-Auction Dynamic oligopoly equilibria in one- Theory and Evidence and Coalitional Updating Investment with sticky prices seller assignment Equilibria under - off-steady-state markets with multi- Discontinuous analysis item demands Preferences 11:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: IO D: REPUTATION E: ASSIGNMENT F: MEASURING G: STRATEGY H: IMPLEMENTATION J: EVOLUTIONARY K: LEARNING L: PRISONER'S M: PERSUASION N: CONGESTION P: PROSPECT Q: EQUILIBRIUM, R: SPORTS S: POLITICAL T: SOCIAL CHOICE U: EXPERIMENTS - 12:30 SESSIONS APPLICATIONS RESPONSIBILITY PROOFNESS DYNAMICS DILEMMA GAMES THEORY COMPUTATION ECONOMY VOTING THU11

LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.09 G0.03 G1.01 A1.23 D0.03 H0.04 H0.06 A1.22 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 11:00 Francisco Robles Tomoya Tajika Ayca Ozdogan Ata Atay and Marina William Zwicker and Sonal Yadav, Tsuyoshi Adachi Akira Okada and Katharina Schüller Bin Xu, Yanran Zhou, Ronen Gradwohl and Tobias Harks, Marc Florian Herold and Youcef Askoura and Sam Ganzfried Mario Gilli and Li Bezalel Peleg and Aaron Kamm An implementation Concealments Occurrence of Nunez Josep Freixas Arunava Sen, Souvik Strategy-proofness Ryoji Sawa and Frank Thuijsman Jaimie Lien, Jie Zheng Timothy Feddersen Schröder and Dries Nick Netzer Antoine Billot Reflections on Yuan Hans Peters Plurality Voting of the Vickrey of Problems: An deception in the Multi-sided Scale-invariant Roy and Huaxia Zeng and double An evolutionary The Advantage of and Zhijian Wang Persuasion and Vermeulen Second-best Utilitarian Nash the First Man vs. Reciprocal Feasible elimination versus Proportional outcome for buyers- Incentive of Avoiding presence of a assignment games citation indices Adjacent non- implementation approach to social Sex and Selfish Extortion can Transparency Optimal price caps in Probability Equilibrium for Machine No-Limit Accountability with procedures in social Representation in the submodular one- the Responsibility regulator with on m-partite graphs manipulability and with minimax and choice problems Alleles outperform congested networks Weighting Games with Texas Hold 'em Multidimensional choice: an axiomatic Citizen-Candidate seller markets reputation concerns strategy-proofness maximax strategies with q-quota rules generosity in the Incomplete Competition Policies characterization Model: An Experiment in voting domains: iterated Prisoner's Preferences equivalence results Dilemma 11:30 Alexander Heczko Lisa Planer-Friedrich Umberto Grandi and Johannes Hofbauer Karol Szwagrzak and Matúš Mihalák, Paolo Peter Eccles and Nora Matjaz Steinbacher Omer Edhan, Ziv Hitoshi Matsushima, Jacopo Bizzotto, Jasper de Jong, Bart Marcus Pivato and Noam Brown and Steven Brams and Hans Gersbach and Onur Dogan and Jean Yukio Koriyama and Ali Partnership and Marco Sahm Paolo Turrini d-dimensional Rafael Treibich Penna and Peter Wegner and Mitja Steinbacher Hellman and Dana Yutaka Kayaba and Jesper Rüdiger and De Keijzer, Marc Uetz Vassili Vergopoulos Tuomas Sandholm Mehmet Ismail Oriol Tejada Lainé Ihsan Ozkes Dissolution, Strategic Corporate A network-based Stable Matching with Co-authorship and Widmayer Robustness of Opinion Formation Sherill-Rofe Tomohisa Toyama Adrien Vigier and Jose Correa Subjective Simultaneous Making the Rules of A Reform Dilemma Strategic Condorcet Jury Auctions and Social Responsibility rating system and its Cyclic Preferences the Measurement Bribeproof Subgame Perfect with Imperfect Sex With No Accuracy and The Optimal Timing The curse of expected utility Abstraction and Sports Fairer in Polarized Manipulation of Theorem and Differences between resistance to bribery of Individual mechanisms for Implementation Agents as an Regrets: How Sexual Retaliation in of Persuasion sequentiality in representations for Equilibrium Finding Democracies Social Welfare Cognitive Hierarchies: Willingness to Pay Productivity two-values domains Evolutionary Process Reproduction Repeated Games routing games Savage preferences in Games Functions via Theory and and Willingness to Uses a No Regret with Imperfect on topological Strict Preference Experiments Accept Learning Algorithm Private Monitoring: spaces Extensions for Evolutionary Experiments and Advantage Theory 12:00 Nozomu Muto, Stefan Napel and David Ong, Yu Yang Andy Zapechelnyuk Ennio Bilancini and Jason Hartford, James Lars Metzger and Yin Chen and Jacopo Perego and Miguel Costa-Gomes, Yasuhiro Shirata and Dominik Welter and Junsen Zhang How to score Leonardo Boncinelli Wright and Kevin Marc Rieger Chuangyin Dang Sevgi Yuksel Yuan Ju and Jiawen Li Takuro Yamashita Responsibility- Hard to get: The multiple-choice The Evolution Leyton-Brown Non-cooperative A Smooth Path- Media Competition Expected-Norm Revenue-capped based allocation of scarcity of women tests: an axiomatic of Conventions Deep Learning for games with prospect Following Method and the Source of Consistency: An efficient auctions cartel damages and the competition approach under Condition- Human Strategic theory players and for Determining Disagreement Experimental for high-income men Dependent Mistakes Modeling dominated strategies Perfect Equilibria Study of Trust and in Chinese cities Trustworthiness

13:00- 14:00 SHAPLEY LECTURE Bruno Ziliotto Limit Value in Stochastic Games

LOCATION > Lecture Hall 5TH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY

CONGRESS PROGRAMME // THURSDAY 28 JULY 2016

09:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: IO DYNAMIC C: IO SCREENING D: REPUTATION E: ASSIGNMENT F: UNIVERSITIES G: EQUILIBRIUM H: IMPLEMENTATION J: EVOLUTIONARY K: EXPERIMENTATION L: CONTESTS M: COMMUNICATION N: CONGESTION P: DETERRENCE Q: EQUILIBRUM R: SHAPLEY VALUE S: POLITICAL T: SOCIAL CHOICE U: EXPERIMENTS 10:30 SESSIONS DESIGN DYNAMICS GAMES COMPUTATION ECONOMY THU9

LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.07 C-1.09 G0.03 G1.01 A1.23 D0.03 H0.04 H0.06 A1.22 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008

09:00 Liad Blumrosen and Jan-Henrik Steg Thomas Daske Daniel Hauser Tomoya Kazumura Anna Panova Guillaume Vigeral Christian Basteck Diodato Ferraioli and Christoph Wolf Xiaoyu Cheng, Jie Anton Kolotilin and Ivan Arribas and Elham Nikram and Markus Brill, Rupert Xun-Feng Hu and Yiming Liu Christopher Florian Engl Shahar Dobzinski Preemptive Pooling hawks and Promoting a and Shigehiro Governance in and Yannick Viossat Scoring Rules and Carmine Ventre Informative Zheng and Jaimie Lien Hongyi Li Amparo Urbano Dieter Balkenborg Freeman and Vincent Deng-Feng Li Income Inequality Chambers and Alan Causal Responsibility (Almost) Efficient Investment under doves: Interim- Reputation for Serizawa university A characterization Implementation Metastability of Milestones in A Fairness Condition Relational Local coordination Inspection Game Conitzer On the relationship and Political Miller in Games Mechanisms for Uncertainty efficient labor Quality Efficiency and of the sets of in Iteratively Asymptotically Experimentation for Unfair Contests: Communication with and global with Partial Computing Possible between Shapley Polarization Benchmarking Bilateral Trading contracts for other- strategy-proofness equilibrium payoffs Undominated Well-Behaved Multi-Dimensional Transfers congestion in Inspections and Necessary and configuration regarding agents. in object assignment of finite games Strategies Potential Games Favoritism with random networks Equilibrium Actions values problems with Asymmetric Players (and Bipartisan Set multi-demand Winners) preferences

09:30 Nicolas Fugger, Vitali Shinji Kobayashi and Nemanja Antic and Emilia Oljemark Alexei Parakhonyak Mike Peacey and Claudia Meroni and Mikhail Safronov Reinoud Joosten and Matthew Embrey, Charlène Cosandier Simon Schopohl Philip Brown and Artyom Jelnov Kimmo Berg and Ben Mcquillin and Joseph McMurray Benny Moldovanu Paul Healy, Ritesh Jain Gretschko, Helene Koji Takenaka Kai Steverson Reputation and the and Sergey Popov Gervas Huxley Carlos Pimienta Efficient Coalition- Berend Roorda Friederike Mengel and Intermediaries Communication Jason Marden Proportional use of Tuomas Sandholm Robert Sugden Polarization and and Andreas Kleiner and Ryan Oprea Mass and Achim Conjectures Screening Through value of information Same Sex Marriage, How do universities The structure of Proof Full Meta-stability Ronald Peeters versus Trolls in Games with Optional Optimal force in counter- Exclusion Method Backward induction Pandering in a Sophisticated An Experimental Wambach and Equilibrium Coordination in a trust game The Great Equalizer differentiate Nash equilibria in Implementation of attractive Strategy Revision Contests for Patents Verification Mechanisms for terrorism for Finding Nash foundations of the Spatial Model of sincerity with Test of Belief Free The imitation in Dynamic themselves? Poisson games evolutionary Opportunities and Robust Coordination Equilibrium in Multi- Shapley value Common-Value incomplete Strategies in a game: A simple Differentiated equilibria Collusion in Congestion Games Player Games Elections information Repeated Game with rule to prevent Duopoly Games Stochastic Private discrimination in Monitoring procurement

10:00 Takeharu Sogo Agnieszka Aleksey Tetenov Emiliano Catonini Francisco Robles Julien Combe, Olivier Rida Laraki William Sandholm Shintaro Miura André Casajus and Charles Zheng Tilman Borgers and Alexander Coutts Effects of Seller's Wiszniewska- An Economic Theory and Sergey Stepanov Jiménez and Marina Tercieux and Camille Necessary and and Mathias Staudigl Equilibrium Frank Huettner The Optimal Degree Yan Min Choo Good News and Information Matyszkiel, Marek of Statistical Testing Reputation Concerns Nunez Terrier Sufficient Conditions Large Deviations and Selection in Decomposition of of Centralization Revealed Relative Bad News are Still Disclosure in Equity Bodnar and Fryderyk and Information Core and The Design of for Existence of Stochastic Stability Persuasion Games solutions and the Utilitarianism News: Experimental Auctions Requiring Mirota Aggregation competitive Teacher Assignment: Maximal Elements with Binary Actions Shapley value Evidence on Belief Post-Auction Dynamic oligopoly equilibria in one- Theory and Evidence and Coalitional Updating Investment with sticky prices seller assignment Equilibria under - off-steady-state markets with multi- Discontinuous analysis item demands Preferences 11:00- PARALLEL A: AUCTIONS - B: IO D: REPUTATION E: ASSIGNMENT F: MEASURING G: STRATEGY H: IMPLEMENTATION J: EVOLUTIONARY K: LEARNING L: PRISONER'S M: PERSUASION N: CONGESTION P: PROSPECT Q: EQUILIBRIUM, R: SPORTS S: POLITICAL T: SOCIAL CHOICE U: EXPERIMENTS - 12:30 SESSIONS APPLICATIONS RESPONSIBILITY PROOFNESS DYNAMICS DILEMMA GAMES THEORY COMPUTATION ECONOMY VOTING THU11

LOCATION > C-1.03 C-1.05 C-1.09 G0.03 G1.01 A1.23 D0.03 H0.04 H0.06 A1.22 A0.23 A0.24 E0.04 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 11:00 Francisco Robles Tomoya Tajika Ayca Ozdogan Ata Atay and Marina William Zwicker and Sonal Yadav, Tsuyoshi Adachi Akira Okada and Katharina Schüller Bin Xu, Yanran Zhou, Ronen Gradwohl and Tobias Harks, Marc Florian Herold and Youcef Askoura and Sam Ganzfried Mario Gilli and Li Bezalel Peleg and Aaron Kamm An implementation Concealments Occurrence of Nunez Josep Freixas Arunava Sen, Souvik Strategy-proofness Ryoji Sawa and Frank Thuijsman Jaimie Lien, Jie Zheng Timothy Feddersen Schröder and Dries Nick Netzer Antoine Billot Reflections on Yuan Hans Peters Plurality Voting of the Vickrey of Problems: An deception in the Multi-sided Scale-invariant Roy and Huaxia Zeng and double An evolutionary The Advantage of and Zhijian Wang Persuasion and Vermeulen Second-best Utilitarian Nash the First Man vs. Reciprocal Feasible elimination versus Proportional outcome for buyers- Incentive of Avoiding presence of a assignment games citation indices Adjacent non- implementation approach to social Sex and Selfish Extortion can Transparency Optimal price caps in Probability Equilibrium for Machine No-Limit Accountability with procedures in social Representation in the submodular one- the Responsibility regulator with on m-partite graphs manipulability and with minimax and choice problems Alleles outperform congested networks Weighting Games with Texas Hold 'em Multidimensional choice: an axiomatic Citizen-Candidate seller markets reputation concerns strategy-proofness maximax strategies with q-quota rules generosity in the Incomplete Competition Policies characterization Model: An Experiment in voting domains: iterated Prisoner's Preferences equivalence results Dilemma 11:30 Alexander Heczko Lisa Planer-Friedrich Umberto Grandi and Johannes Hofbauer Karol Szwagrzak and Matúš Mihalák, Paolo Peter Eccles and Nora Matjaz Steinbacher Omer Edhan, Ziv Hitoshi Matsushima, Jacopo Bizzotto, Jasper de Jong, Bart Marcus Pivato and Noam Brown and Steven Brams and Hans Gersbach and Onur Dogan and Jean Yukio Koriyama and Ali Partnership and Marco Sahm Paolo Turrini d-dimensional Rafael Treibich Penna and Peter Wegner and Mitja Steinbacher Hellman and Dana Yutaka Kayaba and Jesper Rüdiger and De Keijzer, Marc Uetz Vassili Vergopoulos Tuomas Sandholm Mehmet Ismail Oriol Tejada Lainé Ihsan Ozkes Dissolution, Strategic Corporate A network-based Stable Matching with Co-authorship and Widmayer Robustness of Opinion Formation Sherill-Rofe Tomohisa Toyama Adrien Vigier and Jose Correa Subjective Simultaneous Making the Rules of A Reform Dilemma Strategic Condorcet Jury Auctions and Social Responsibility rating system and its Cyclic Preferences the Measurement Bribeproof Subgame Perfect with Imperfect Sex With No Accuracy and The Optimal Timing The curse of expected utility Abstraction and Sports Fairer in Polarized Manipulation of Theorem and Differences between resistance to bribery of Individual mechanisms for Implementation Agents as an Regrets: How Sexual Retaliation in of Persuasion sequentiality in representations for Equilibrium Finding Democracies Social Welfare Cognitive Hierarchies: Willingness to Pay Productivity two-values domains Evolutionary Process Reproduction Repeated Games routing games Savage preferences in Games Functions via Theory and and Willingness to Uses a No Regret with Imperfect on topological Strict Preference Experiments Accept Learning Algorithm Private Monitoring: spaces Extensions for Evolutionary Experiments and Advantage Theory 12:00 Nozomu Muto, Stefan Napel and David Ong, Yu Yang Andy Zapechelnyuk Ennio Bilancini and Jason Hartford, James Lars Metzger and Yin Chen and Jacopo Perego and Miguel Costa-Gomes, Yasuhiro Shirata and Dominik Welter and Junsen Zhang How to score Leonardo Boncinelli Wright and Kevin Marc Rieger Chuangyin Dang Sevgi Yuksel Yuan Ju and Jiawen Li Takuro Yamashita Responsibility- Hard to get: The multiple-choice The Evolution Leyton-Brown Non-cooperative A Smooth Path- Media Competition Expected-Norm Revenue-capped based allocation of scarcity of women tests: an axiomatic of Conventions Deep Learning for games with prospect Following Method and the Source of Consistency: An efficient auctions cartel damages and the competition approach under Condition- Human Strategic theory players and for Determining Disagreement Experimental for high-income men Dependent Mistakes Modeling dominated strategies Perfect Equilibria Study of Trust and in Chinese cities Trustworthiness

13:00- 14:00 SHAPLEY LECTURE Bruno Ziliotto Limit Value in Stochastic Games

LOCATION > Lecture Hall GAMES 2016 PARTNERS

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