Vl "A COMMON PRIDE and FAME" , Ctuim&Wib the Attack and Repulse of Pickett's Division July
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H b & Crn-i^ „ vl "A COMMON PRIDE AND FAME" , c t U i M & W i b The Attack and Repulse of Pickett‘s Division July 3, 1863 PART I- ‘ Kathleen P . Georg Research Historian GNMP 1/81 1 n Ji \ "A COMMON PRIDE AND FAME" The Attack and Repulse Of Pickett's Division at Gettysburg July 3, 1863 Kathleen R. Georg Research Historian Gettysburg National Military Park They faltered not who stood that day And held this post of dread; Nor cowards they who wore the gray Until the gray was red For every wreath the victor wears The vanquished half may claim; And every monument declares A common pride and fame. --James J. Roche (Gettysburg Compiler, June 4, 1901) TABLE OF CONTENTS Forward and Acknowledgments Preface 1 Chapter 1: The Morning--Union 7 Chapter 2: The Morning--Confederate 29 Chapter 3: "Death Was in Every Foot of Space"--Cannonade 49 Chapter 4: The Advance--"They are Virginia's ornament 85 and pride" Chapter 5: The Advance:--"The love of country guides us" 117 Chapter 6: "No Coward's Blood"--The Confederate Attack 132 Chapter 7: "Keep Cool Boys"--Union Opposition to Attack 153 Chapter 8: "Change Front Forward"--The Vermont Attack 178 Chapter 9: The Repulse--"Oh, my country'. My country'." 219 Appendices 425 Appendix A--Mounted Officers in Pickett's Charge 426 / / Appendix B--The Objective Point of the Assault: 427 The Clump of Trees or Ziegler's Grove? Appendix C--Statistics and Casualties 466 Appendix D--Honor to Whom Honor is Due: Monumentation 481 Appendix E--Tactics and Terms 511 Appendix F--Maps 512 Appendix G--Iconographies and Illustrations 520 Appendix H--Modern Photographs and - Commentary : 555 Bibliography 592 Index 607 Foreword and Acknowledgments Because of the nature of the interpreter and the historian, subtle meanings, emotions, and sentiments which originally occur in an historic document or manuscript are often lost in paraphrase and circumspect in terpretation by the historian. Many of us would scarce recognize the source of many well-intentioned statements of "fact" because they have been so bastardized over the years by multitudinous secondary sources. In addition, the historian has not yet been invented who can tell us better about the events of a battle than the participants themselves. The historian can interpret the sentences through hindsight and maps, but he can never, capture the immediacy, poignancy, or intimacy of those reminiscences penned by the Civil War veteran in letters and memoirs. Because this historian believes this to be true, there will be utmost restraint in paraphrasing the documentation for this paper. To be sure, it will not be a book like that put out by A'l a n Collingsworth and James Cox (which was little more than a compilation of a select few primary accounts of the Battle of Gettys burg). We will try to tie together the primary narratives with any needed explanation, maps, and transition. Yet, still, it is the primary recollec tions which will carry this paper, and we beg the reader's indulgence for the many direct quotations which we believe are the heart of any understanding of the battle or empathy for the soldiers who fought in it. This study arose because of a request by an individual, Seward Osborne, Jr., for a marker to be placed on the battlefield honoring the Third Day services of the 20th N.Y.S.M. Therefore, in a circuitous way, we are grateful to Mr. Osborne for providing the stimulus to undertake such a much-needed study of this small area and time. We thank all those insti tutions which provided copies of resources at their disposal, and plead for an "open-door policy" for researchers, so that the almost insurmountable obstacles now in the way of copying such documents for use in other insti tutions for all people be set aside. The U.S. copyright law and restrictions imposed by various universities and historical societies are elements of the Dark Ages, impeding serious research and the dissemination of truth to the interested public. We hope someday that these selfish restrictions are lifted for the benefit of those seeking that truth, or at least facts. Individually, we specifically thank Richard Sauers and Bill Matter, both of whom were forever ferreting manuscript materials for the author from faraway places. John Busey, working independently on a statistical study of the campaign, provided invaluable statistics for Pickett's Division. The late Dr. Frederick Tilberg left a treasure heap of manuscript copies and articles he had acquired over the years, which provided information and many leads. Finally,’ the "chief" of this division, Thomas Harrison, was the one person who "kept the faith" over the long progress of this study. His encouragement made it possible to take trips to libraries for research, and to provide some time to write and type the manuscript when other proJects seemed more vital to other managers. Still in all, serious historical work can never be accomplished with ease under the auspices of the National Park Service. Monetary and manpower restrictions aside, the philosophy of the Service (geared to Operations) is a hindrance to any lengthy scholarly undertaking, due to the day-to-day pressures exerted on the resource as well as the historian. Without a sympathetic manage ment, the historian must do any serious work outside his office and on his own time. Fortunately, this historian has a "manager" who is aware of the value of accurate and detailed history in interpreting and preserving the scene of this foremost American battle. So I give thanks to all of the above. A special thank-you is extended to the spirits of those who fought this battle. Without appearing lachrymose, we respectfully dedicate this study to the likes of Benjamin Wright and Rawley Martin--soldiers on opposite sides who indeed shared a "common pride and fame". Preface Gettysburg has always attracted more than its share of "scholarly" study, and probably will continue to magnetize the growing throngs of buffs and serious A students, while other Civil War campaigns and subJects remain virtually ignored. Unfortunately, it has only been in recent years that any kind of comprehensive study of the 1863 battle has been undertaken, and none of these have satisfied the needs of those individuals who must rely on site-relation, troop positions and movement, and chronology of action for interpretive and preservation needs of the historic resource. Only Edwin Coddington approached the kind of study which is desperately needed by those concerned by the above requirements and the military scholar; but Coddington1s one-volume The Gettysburg Campaign can not carry the heavy and diverse load due to its brevity (821 pp. is brief?!). At best, his book can give us only an overview of the events. Still, Coddington was the only historian of the battle who attempted to survey and use long-ignored primary and manuscript sources . Each history of the battle up to this time, however, has based its whole concept and narrative on the same old, oft-repeated stories, handed down in so many secondary works of the past generations. There has been no concerted attempt to critically question certain basic facts or to deliberate upon and develop other incidents in relation to conincidental events. Too many authors sneer at or ignore the accounts of soldiers who did the fighting, but never would think to criticize a secondary author or an officer (or his wife) with motives other than truthfulness for writing. When a question arises about a specific phase of the action, or about the appearance and topography of that action area, there is virtually no pub lished history which will satisfy. Indeed, even a so-called "microhistory" of the great Confederate assault of the third day of the battle is wholly inadequate, when questions arise as to troop position, wartime site appearance and significance &c. Since latter-day authors must rely on the written word of past historians and soldiers, any history of the battle can only be an interpretation by one student of only those records he has seen. None of us has the advantage of being part of the historic event, so we must rely on those who did witness the action to relay facts accurately. The possibility of repeating errors increases every time a writer uses secondary works or "hand-me-down" recollections by relatives or des cendants. In other words, our history becomes not only "agreed upon lies", but, even worse, akin to those mutants produced by excessive in-breeding. The end product hardly resembles the original after this excessive overuse and repetition of the same sources; the original source becomse emasculated, shortened, mis quoted, and very often given too much importance through this long series of retellings--much like the old children's game of "gossip". An example of this kind of mutation and generalization of a very significant military moment in our history is our perception of "Pickett's Charge". The very name of the assault has been perverted because of the successive line of historians who repeat the heady accounts of the same Virginia elite who elevate Robert E. Lee to his god-like status.^ By giving the name of Pickett to this memorable assault, ^This opinion of the commanding general was not shared by the more perceptive realistic, and educated members of Lee's army. South Carolinian Major John Cheves Haskell blamed Lee and his Virginia cadre for much of the demoralization in the army, even including the Gettysburg Campaign: He had an apparent antipathy to anything partaking of pomposity and the vanity of war, but he had an utterly undue regard for the value of the elementary teaching of West Point and for the experience ^ ^ ] 4 ^ 7 J U ít l W jV -^ ---- ¿U om^ J Jtz, •vx>V'4^CA<CtLc<^i^0^ ^ > v úrsy\M t’V>0 e t (hn.