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Failing Oversight: Iraq's Unchecked Government

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Failing Oversight: Iraq's Unchecked Government FAILING OVERSIGHT: IRAQ’S UNCHECKED GOVERNMENT Middle East Report N°113 – 26 September 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION: RISING PUBLIC ANGER ............................................................. 1 A. INITIAL PROTESTS AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSE ........................................................................ 1 B. 100 DAYS WASTED ...................................................................................................................... 2 II. A SISYPHEAN BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION ................................................. 3 A. THE OVERSIGHT FRAMEWORK ..................................................................................................... 4 B. AN UNCHECKED GOVERNMENT ................................................................................................... 4 1. The lawlessness of 2003-2008 ..................................................................................................... 4 2. Government manipulation ........................................................................................................... 5 3. Failure to enact reform ................................................................................................................. 8 C. AN EXPLOSIVE RISE IN CORRUPTION ........................................................................................... 9 D. SECURITY SINCE 2008: SPACE FOR REFORM ............................................................................... 10 III. IMPAIRED OVERSIGHT AGENCIES ....................................................................... 11 A. THE BOARD OF SUPREME AUDIT: EMASCULATED AT THE WRONG TIME .................................... 12 B. THE INTEGRITY COMMISSION: THE CPA’S PAPER TIGER ........................................................... 13 C. THE INSPECTORS GENERAL: OVERSIGHT’S ACHILLES’ HEEL ..................................................... 14 D. THE URGENT NEED FOR REFORM ............................................................................................... 16 1. Bureaucratic inefficiencies ......................................................................................................... 16 2. A deficient legal framework ...................................................................................................... 16 IV. PARLIAMENTARY PARALYSIS ............................................................................... 18 A. POWERFUL ON PAPER ................................................................................................................ 18 B. AN IMPAIRED LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION ...................................................................................... 19 1. Inexperience, nepotism and sectarianism ................................................................................... 19 2. Parliament or conference centre? ............................................................................................... 20 C. OVERSIGHT: FEAR NOT PARLIAMENT’S WRATH ......................................................................... 22 V. THE JUDICIARY: WEAK AND VULNERABLE TO POLITICAL INTERFERENCE .......................................................................................................... 23 A. CENTRALISATION OF CONTROL .................................................................................................. 23 B. POLITICAL INTERFERENCE ......................................................................................................... 24 VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 26 APPENDICES A. MAP OF IRAQ ................................................................................................................................... 28 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 29 C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 2008 .................................... 30 D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 32 Middle East Report N°113 26 September 2011 FAILING OVERSIGHT: IRAQ’S UNCHECKED GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS After years of uncertainty, conflict and instability, the Today judges are protected by interior ministry forces. Iraqi state appears to be consolidating by reducing violence The Council of Representatives (parliament) is reliant solely sufficiently to allow for a semblance of normalcy. Yet in on local police and private contractors for its security. the meantime, it has allowed corruption to become en- The state has resumed most of its functions. trenched and spread throughout its institutions. This, in turn, has contributed to a severe decay in public services. Prime Despite this improved environment, public services continue Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government has exacerbated to be plagued by severe deficiencies, notably widespread the problem by interfering in anti-corruption cases, ma- corruption, which spread like a virus throughout state in- nipulating investigations for political advantage and in- stitutions during the years of lawlessness that prevailed timidating critics to prevent a replication of the type of until 2008. One of the major causes of this depressing popular movements that already have brought down three state of affairs is the state’s failing oversight framework, regimes in the region. The government’s credibility in the which has allowed successive governments to operate un- fight against corruption has eroded as a result, and this, checked. The 2005 constitution and the existing legal together with troubling authoritarian tendencies, is giving framework require a number of institutions – the Board of ammunition to the prime minister’s critics. To bolster its Supreme Audit, the Integrity Commission, the Inspectors faltering legitimacy, Maliki’s government will have to General, parliament and the courts – to monitor government launch a vigorous anti-corruption campaign, improve service operations. Yet, none of these institutions has been able delivery and create checks and balances in the state system. to assert itself in the face of government interference, in- transigence and manipulation, a deficient legal framework As violence spread following the 2003 U.S. invasion, the and ongoing threats of violence. state suffered in equal measure to the general population. In an environment of escalating kidnappings, explosions and These factors have caused senior officials to resign, in- assassinations, public services were thoroughly devastated. cluding most notably the head of the Integrity Commission In the wake of the dramatic February 2006 Samarra on 9 September 2011. Even civil society organisations – bombing, entire ministries were empty, as officials dared confronted by government intimidation in the form of not travel to work. Longstanding projects were abandoned anonymous threats, arrests of political activists and vio- overnight. Judges and parliamentarians found they had lence, including police brutality – have proved incapable of become targets. Oversight agencies, which should have placing a check on government. Although the perpetrators been less exposed to risk because of their lack of direct have yet to be found, the killing on 9 September 2011 of a contact with the general population, were forced to roll prominent journalist and leading organiser of weekly pro- back their operations, leaving state institutions without ef- tests against government corruption has contributed to ris- fective safeguards against corruption or abuse. As a result, ing fears of the Maliki government’s authoritarian streak. state output declined dramatically for a number of years, even as the annual budget steadily increased due to elevated The current oversight framework was established by the oil prices. The state’s paralysis contributed to the prolifera- U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2004. The tion of criminal elements and vested interests throughout CPA enacted a number of ill-considered reforms from the the bureaucracy. start. It stripped the Board of Supreme Audit, previously Iraq’s only such institution, of significant powers, including By 2009, a combination of factors allowed the state to re- the exclusive authority to oversee public procurement and assert itself. The U.S. surge (2007-2009) was an important refer suspected corruption cases to the courts. The CPA initial factor in improving security, but insofar as institu- transferred that authority to the Integrity Commission, tions were concerned, the rebuilt security forces sufficiently an institution established in 2004 to act as the focal point enhanced safety to enable officials to go back to work for all anti-corruption activities. Despite having overcome without protection or assistance from the U.S. military. serious threats to its existence in its early years, the Com- mission to this day cannot carry out its investigations in- Failing Oversight: Iraq’s Unchecked Government Crisis Group Middle East Report N°113, 26 September 2011 Page ii dependently, as a result of staffing problems and restricted work’s deficiencies and will not significantly improve the access to certain government departments. It has, therefore, state’s performance. Until these, as well as other, actions been dependent on the Inspectors
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