Towards Fair Representation in Crowdsourced Top-K Recommendations
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Are Condorcet and Minimax Voting Systems the Best?1
1 Are Condorcet and Minimax Voting Systems the Best?1 Richard B. Darlington Cornell University Abstract For decades, the minimax voting system was well known to experts on voting systems, but was not widely considered to be one of the best systems. But in recent years, two important experts, Nicolaus Tideman and Andrew Myers, have both recognized minimax as one of the best systems. I agree with that. This paper presents my own reasons for preferring minimax. The paper explicitly discusses about 20 systems. Comments invited. [email protected] Copyright Richard B. Darlington May be distributed free for non-commercial purposes Keywords Voting system Condorcet Minimax 1. Many thanks to Nicolaus Tideman, Andrew Myers, Sharon Weinberg, Eduardo Marchena, my wife Betsy Darlington, and my daughter Lois Darlington, all of whom contributed many valuable suggestions. 2 Table of Contents 1. Introduction and summary 3 2. The variety of voting systems 4 3. Some electoral criteria violated by minimax’s competitors 6 Monotonicity 7 Strategic voting 7 Completeness 7 Simplicity 8 Ease of voting 8 Resistance to vote-splitting and spoiling 8 Straddling 8 Condorcet consistency (CC) 8 4. Dismissing eight criteria violated by minimax 9 4.1 The absolute loser, Condorcet loser, and preference inversion criteria 9 4.2 Three anti-manipulation criteria 10 4.3 SCC/IIA 11 4.4 Multiple districts 12 5. Simulation studies on voting systems 13 5.1. Why our computer simulations use spatial models of voter behavior 13 5.2 Four computer simulations 15 5.2.1 Features and purposes of the studies 15 5.2.2 Further description of the studies 16 5.2.3 Results and discussion 18 6. -
Black Box Voting Ballot Tampering in the 21St Century
This free internet version is available at www.BlackBoxVoting.org Black Box Voting — © 2004 Bev Harris Rights reserved to Talion Publishing/ Black Box Voting ISBN 1-890916-90-0. You can purchase copies of this book at www.Amazon.com. Black Box Voting Ballot Tampering in the 21st Century By Bev Harris Talion Publishing / Black Box Voting This free internet version is available at www.BlackBoxVoting.org Contents © 2004 by Bev Harris ISBN 1-890916-90-0 Jan. 2004 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form whatsoever except as provided for by U.S. copyright law. For information on this book and the investigation into the voting machine industry, please go to: www.blackboxvoting.org Black Box Voting 330 SW 43rd St PMB K-547 • Renton, WA • 98055 Fax: 425-228-3965 • [email protected] • Tel. 425-228-7131 This free internet version is available at www.BlackBoxVoting.org Black Box Voting © 2004 Bev Harris • ISBN 1-890916-90-0 Dedication First of all, thank you Lord. I dedicate this work to my husband, Sonny, my rock and my mentor, who tolerated being ignored and bored and galled by this thing every day for a year, and without fail, stood fast with affection and support and encouragement. He must be nuts. And to my father, who fought and took a hit in Germany, who lived through Hitler and saw first-hand what can happen when a country gets suckered out of democracy. And to my sweet mother, whose an- cestors hosted a stop on the Underground Railroad, who gets that disapproving look on her face when people don’t do the right thing. -
Governance in Decentralized Networks
Governance in decentralized networks Risto Karjalainen* May 21, 2020 Abstract. Effective, legitimate and transparent governance is paramount for the long-term viability of decentralized networks. If the aim is to design such a governance model, it is useful to be aware of the history of decision making paradigms and the relevant previous research. Towards such ends, this paper is a survey of different governance models, the thinking behind such models, and new tools and structures which are made possible by decentralized blockchain technology. Governance mechanisms in the wider civil society are reviewed, including structures and processes in private and non-profit governance, open-source development, and self-managed organisations. The alternative ways to aggregate preferences, resolve conflicts, and manage resources in the decentralized space are explored, including the possibility of encoding governance rules as automatically executed computer programs where humans or other entities interact via a protocol. Keywords: Blockchain technology, decentralization, decentralized autonomous organizations, distributed ledger technology, governance, peer-to-peer networks, smart contracts. 1. Introduction This paper is a survey of governance models in decentralized networks, and specifically in networks which make use of blockchain technology. There are good reasons why governance in decentralized networks is a topic of considerable interest at present. Some of these reasons are ideological. We live in an era where detailed information about private individuals is being collected and traded, in many cases without the knowledge or consent of the individuals involved. Decentralized technology is seen as a tool which can help protect people against invasions of privacy. Decentralization can also be viewed as a reaction against the overreach by state and industry. -
W5: Manipulability & Weighted Voting Systems
MATH 181 D2: A MATHEMATICAL WORLD W5: Manipulability & Weighted Voting Systems Objectives: SWBAT Manipulate a given election to produce the desired winner under any manipulable voting system. r Recognize which voting systems are manipulable. r Describe a weighted voting system using the quota and the voting weights r Determine which players are dictators or dummy voters r Recall Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: With three or more candidates and any number of voters, there does not exist{and there never will exist{a voting system that always produces a winner, satisfies the Pareto condition and IIA, and is not a dictatorship. So how badly do the suggested voting systems do? We are going to start by looking more closely at the manipulability of the system. Group Activity: Worksheet W5.1 Def: A voting system is said to be manipulable if there exist two sequences of preference list ballot and a voter (call the voter Jane) such that 1. Neither election results in a tie. 2. The only ballot change is by Jane. 3. Jane prefers{assuming that her ballot in the first election represents her true preferences{the outcome of the second election to that of the first election. We see this illustrated in the example from the worksheet. Note: Neither majority rule, in the case of two candidates, nor Condorcet's method, in the case of three or more candidates are manipulable. What about the Borda Count? We saw earlier that with four candidates and 2 voters it was manipulable, what about with 3 candidates? Group Activity: Worksheet W5.2 1 Example: Suppose the candidates are A; B, and C, and that you prefer A to B, but B is the election winner using the Borda count. -
Absentee Voting and Vote by Mail
CHapteR 7 ABSENTEE VOTING AND VOTE BY MAIL Introduction some States the request is valid for one or more years. In other States, an application must be com- Ballots are cast by mail in every State, however, the pleted and submitted for each election. management of absentee voting and vote by mail varies throughout the nation, based on State law. Vote by Mail—all votes are cast by mail. Currently, There are many similarities between the two since Oregon is the only vote by mail State; however, both involve transmitting paper ballots to voters and several States allow all-mail ballot voting options receiving voted ballots at a central election office for ballot initiatives. by a specified date. Many of the internal procedures for preparation and mailing of ballots, ballot recep- Ballot Preparation and Mailing tion, ballot tabulation and security are similar when One of the first steps in preparing to issue ballots applied to all ballots cast by mail. by mail is to determine personnel and facility and The differences relate to State laws, rules and supply needs. regulations that control which voters can request a ballot by mail and specific procedures that must be Facility Needs: followed to request a ballot by mail. Rules for when Adequate secure space for packaging the outgoing ballot requests must be received, when ballots are ballot envelopes should be reviewed prior to every mailed to voters, and when voted ballots must be election, based on the expected quantity of ballots returned to the election official—all defer according to be processed. Depending upon the number of ballot to State law. -
April 7, 2021 To: Representative Mark Meek, Chair House Special
The League of Women Voters of Oregon is a 101-year-old grassroots nonpartisan political organization that encourages informed and active participation in government. We envision informed Oregonians participating in a fully accessible, responsive, and transparent government to achieve the common good. LWVOR Legislative Action is based on advocacy positions formed through studies and member consensus. The League never supports or opposes any candidate or political party. April 7, 2021 To: Representative Mark Meek, Chair House Special Committee On Modernizing the People’s Legislature Re: Hearing on Ranked Choice Voting Chair Meek, Vice-Chair Wallan and committee members, The League of Women Voters (LWV) at the national and state levels has long been interested in electoral system reforms as a way to achieve the greatest level of representation. In Oregon, we most recently conducted an in-depth two-year study (2016) to update our Election Methods Position. That position was (in part) the basis for a similar update to the LWV United States position in 2020. In League studies around the nation, our current system (called either ‘plurality’ or ‘First Past the Post’) where ‘whoever gets the most votes wins’ has been found the least-desirable of all electoral systems. The Oregon position is no different. It further lays out criteria for best systems; and states our support of Ranked Choice Voting (RCV). Several of the related criteria are: • Encouraging voter participation and voter engagement. • Encouraging those with minority opinions to participate. • Promote sincere voting over strategic voting. • Discourage negative campaigning. For multi-seat elections (a.k.a. at-large or multi-winner elections), the LWV Oregon position currently supports several systems. -
Contingent Election of the President and Vice President by Congress: Perspectives and Contemporary Analysis
Contingent Election of the President and Vice President by Congress: Perspectives and Contemporary Analysis Updated October 6, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R40504 Contingent Election of the President and Vice President by Congress Summary The 12th Amendment to the Constitution requires that presidential and vice presidential candidates gain “a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed” in order to win election. With a total of 538 electors representing the 50 states and the District of Columbia, 270 electoral votes is the “magic number,” the arithmetic majority necessary to win the presidency. What would happen if no candidate won a majority of electoral votes? In these circumstances, the 12th Amendment also provides that the House of Representatives would elect the President, and the Senate would elect the Vice President, in a procedure known as “contingent election.” Contingent election has been implemented twice in the nation’s history under the 12th Amendment: first, to elect the President in 1825, and second, the Vice President in 1837. In a contingent election, the House would choose among the three candidates who received the most electoral votes. Each state, regardless of population, casts a single vote for President in a contingent election. Representatives of states with two or more Representatives would therefore need to conduct an internal poll within their state delegation to decide which candidate would receive the state’s single vote. A majority of state votes, 26 or more, is required to elect, and the House must vote “immediately” and “by ballot.” Additional precedents exist from 1825, but they would not be binding on the House in a contemporary election. -
Ballot Casting Assurance
Ballot Casting Assurance Ben Adida C. Andrew Neff MIT VoteHere Abstract Universal Verifiability. Since the early 1990s, many cryptographic voting protocols have been proposed to We propose that voting protocols be judged in part on provide universal verifiability [11, 6, 1, 9]. In these ballot casting assurance, a property which complements schemes, any observer can verify that only registered universal verifiability. Some protocols already support voters cast ballots and that cast ballots are tallied cor- ballot casting assurance, though the concept has not re- rectly. Universal verifiability uses cryptography to re- ceived adequate explicit emphasis. Ballot casting assur- store the bulletin board of yore. Ballots are encrypted ance captures two well known voting concepts – cast and posted along with the voter’s plaintext identity. Uni- as intended, and recorded as cast – into one end-to-end versal verifiability thus provides a public tally, patching property: Alice, the voter, should obtain immediate and a large portion of the audit-ability hole caused by the se- direct assurance that her intended vote has “made it” into cret ballot. the tally. We review Neff’s scheme, MarkPledge, and show that Ballot Casting Assurance. Universal verifiability it provides ballot casting assurance. We also briefly show does not provide complete audit-ability. In addition to how Chaum’s “Punchscan” system also provides ballot knowing that all votes were correctly tallied, Alice would casting assurance, though under more complicated de- like direct verification that her vote was properly cast and ployment assumptions. We show how ballot casting as- recorded into this tally. We define this principle as ballot surance opens the door to realistic failure detection and casting assurance and argue that it, too, fills an audit- recovery in the middle of an election, a topic which has ability gap left by the secret ballot. -
Security Evaluation of ES&S Voting Machines and Election
Security Evaluation of ES&S Voting Machines and Election Management System Adam Aviv Pavol Cernˇ y´ Sandy Clark Eric Cronin Gaurav Shah Micah Sherr Matt Blaze faviv,cernyp,saender,ecronin,gauravsh,msherr,[email protected] Department of Computer and Information Science University of Pennsylvania Abstract EVEREST was the first major study of ES&S voting sys- tems, despite the system’s popularity (ES&S claims to be This paper summarizes a security analysis of the DRE the world’s largest e-voting systems vendor [1], support- and optical scan voting systems manufactured by Election ing more than 67 million voter registrations with 97,000 Systems and Software (ES&S), as used in Ohio (and many touchscreen voting machines installed in 20 states and other jurisdictions inside and outside the US). We found 30,000 optical ballot readers present in 43 states [4]), and numerous exploitable vulnerabilities in nearly every com- only the second comprehensive study that examined all ponent of the ES&S system. These vulnerabilities enable components – from backend registration systems to fron- attacks that could alter or forge precinct results, install tend ballot casting – of any electronic voting system. In a corrupt firmware, and erase audit records. Our analysis ten week period, our seven-member team was tasked with focused on architectural issues in which the interactions analyzing the nearly 670,000 lines of source code that between various software and hardware modules leads to comprise the ES&S system, encompassing twelve pro- systemic vulnerabilities that do not appear to be easily gramming languages and five hardware platforms1. -
Vote Splitting
Vote Splitting: Who benefits from better The Root of Electoral Evils voting methods? Our current choose-one Plurality Voting method allows voters to express an opinion about only one candidate. This works fine—when there are only two candidates. Add a third, and you get vote splitting: the most similar candidates split their common supporters’ votes, and can lose to another less preferred Major-party supporters candidate—possibly even the least preferred! • Better primaries, without vote The Vote-Splitting Cycle What Makes a Good Voting Method splitting and spoilers A good voting method has several essential Fear of being a “spoiler” deters many candidates • Less negative campaigning, qualities, starting with the fundamental two: from entering the race, denying voters a real choice. more post-primary unity Often enough more candidates run anyway, forcing Accuracy and Simplicity. Over the expected voters to play a game: guessing how other voters range of election scenarios, the voting method • No minor-party spoilers will vote. For this they consider candidates’ “viabilty” must produce results that accurately reflect the — not only their qualifications, but their popularity, will of the electorate, at an acceptable logistical Minor-party supporters funding, and media support. Campaign money cost. To produce such results, we need three more becomes necessary not just to make candidates qualities: Expressiveness, Sincerity, and Equality. • Other parties see minor-party candidates as allies, not spoilers known, but to signal that they are serious. Facing Voters must be able and willing to express a the “wasted-vote dilemma,” many voters abandon reasonably full and sincere opinion, and the • Results reflect a party’s true their favorite candidates for the few who seem to presence of similar candidates should not hurt or support have the best chances — the bandwagon effect. -
Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts Evan H
University of Michigan Law School University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository Articles Faculty Scholarship 1999 Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts Evan H. Caminker University of Michigan Law School, [email protected] Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/74 Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles Part of the Courts Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons Recommended Citation Caminker, Evan H. "Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts." Mich. L. Rev. 97, no. 8 (1999): 2297-380. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. SINCERE AND STRATEGIC VOTING NORMS ON MULTIMEMBER COURTS Evan H. Caminker* TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ............................................ 2298 I. SINCERE DECISIONMAKING IN SOLO AND COLLEGIAL ADJUDICATION ........................ 2303 A. Solo Judgment Formation ...................... 2304 1. Relational Judgment Criteria and Interconnecting Cases ...................... 2304 2. Sophisticated Consideration of Nonjudicial Actors' Views .............................. 2308 B. Sincere Judgment Formation on a Multimember Court .......................................... 2310 II. OPPORTUNITIES -
Flexible Representative Democracy: an Introduction with Binary Issues
Flexible Representative Democracy: An Introduction with Binary Issues Ben Abramowitz and Nick Mattei April 3, 2019 Abstract We introduce Flexible Representative Democracy (FRD), a novel hybrid of Representative Democracy (RD) and direct democracy (DD), in which voters can alter the issue-dependent weights of a set of elected representatives. In line with the literature on Interactive Democracy, our model allows the voters to actively determine the degree to which the system is direct versus representative. However, unlike Liquid Democracy, FRD uses strictly non-transitive delegations, making delegation cycles impossible, and maintains a fixed set of accountable elected representatives. We present FRD and analyze it using a computational approach with issues that are binary and symmetric; we compare the outcomes of various democratic systems using Direct Democracy with majority voting as an ideal baseline. First, we demonstrate the shortcomings of Representative Democracy in our model. We provide NP-Hardness results for electing an ideal set of representatives, discuss pathologies, and demonstrate empirically that common multi-winner election rules for selecting representatives do not perform well in expectation. To analyze the behavior of FRD, we begin by providing theoretical results on how issue-specific delegations determine outcomes. Finally, we provide empirical results comparing the outcomes of RD with fixed sets of proxies across issues versus FRD with issue- specific delegations. Our results show that variants of Proxy Voting yield no discernible benefit over RD and reveal the potential for FRD to improve outcomes as voter participation increases, further motivating the use of issue-specific delegations. arXiv:1811.02921v2 [cs.MA] 1 Apr 2019 1 Introduction Since the Athenian Ecclesia in 595 BCE Direct Democracy (DD) as an ideal collective decision making scheme has loomed large in the western imagination [18].