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Caesar’s Civil War 49-44 BC
Brittany Babineau
History 503: Roman History
April 30, 2018
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This StoryMap, which showcases Caesar’s significant battles during the Civil War, is
best shown in a spatial format because the real lack of strategy can be seen. Caesar fought the
Civil War, with only tactical awareness of how to win each battle, not with a mind to conquer.
Caesar had a sometimes uncanny ability to win in battles and succeed in more massive
campaigns against various odds. The StoryMap presentation of the Civil War he fought from 49
to 44 BC, reveals that even though Caesar knew how to succeed strategically in war, he chose to
respond tactically to each battle. He was reacting to the moves made against him by those in
Rome who opposed him.1 Not only is the overlay of the war going to present this case, but how
Caesar chose to conclude any battle he was involved in will make the case as well. Additionally,
the reason I chose the icon I did as my point icon, is because it is a posthumous bust of Julius
Caesar done some time between 44 and 30 BC.2 Caesar has managed to capture people’s hearts
and minds even though he died long ago. Something made him stand out and has managed to
keep him alive even passed the Ides of March, when he was brutally murdered. Julius Caesar
was a unique human being, perhaps too modern for the times he lived in, with his overwhelming
capability to proffer forgiveness even to the point of ignoring mortal danger to himself. When
Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 BC,3 he was opposing not only the elitist of Rome in the
Senate, but also what the Senate had framed as the ideal Roman. However, Caesar’s choice to cross the Rubicon and march on Rome with his legions caused a massive Civil War, one of the last that the Republic had. When he was denied the ability to run in absence for a consulship in order to ride into Rome and regale the people with his long overdue triumph, Caesar marched
1 Robert Morstein-Marx, “Caesar’s Alleged Fear of Prosecution and His ‘Ratio Absentis’ in the Approach to the Civil War,” Historia: Zeitschrift fur Alte Geschichte 56, no. 2 (2007): 160-1. 2 "Julius Caesar," Wikipedia, April 21, 2018, , accessed April 23, 2018, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julius_Caesar#/media/File:Gaius_Iulius_Caesar_(Vatican_Museum).jpg. 3 Jeffrey Beneker, “The Crossing of the Rubicon and the Outbreak of Civil War in Cicero, Lucan, Plutarch, and Suetonius,” Pheonix 65, no. ½ (2011): 74. 3
into Rome in direct response to the Senate’s continual obstinance toward him and his growing
popularity. 4 The people loved Caesar, and when he was killed in 44 BC,5 the people did not
celebrate the death of a tyrant as his conspirators believed. They were outraged at the deed and
rose up against the Senate as an angry mob.6 Julius Caesar was a populist, or anti-establishment; he recognized what the Roman patricians and Senators did not, that Rome was becoming increasingly divided between the plebian class and the patrician class. He did not seek to please the Senate, but rather sought to empower the people, and in doing so he became a symbol for the masses. Underestimating the value of such a symbol is where the elitists of Rome gravely miscalculated. Caesar did not cause the Civil War that ensued by crossing the Rubicon, but after the Senate’s mistreatment of him, he was forced to respond or lose his dignitas.7 His response to
actions by his political rivals created a rift that his opposition felt could only be mended through
bloodshed.8 Caesar did not want a Civil War with Rome. He did not want to change or conquer it or its people. When the battles are mapped out chronologically as they are on this StoryMap, it becomes abundantly clear that Caesar was fighting in defense of his honor. He was not fighting pre-emptively or strategically, but rather reacting tactically.
When Caesar crossed the Rubicon and marched on Rome with his Legions to claim what he thought were his rights, the Senate aligned with Pompey, fled Rome, and went south to
Brundisium and then to Dyrrhachium.9 Caesar, as he came to realize that the Senate had fled
4 Morstein-Marx, “Caesar’s Alleged Fear of Prosecution and His ‘Ratio Absentis’ in the Approach to the Civil War,” 168-9. 5 C. J. Simpson, “Why March? The Hereditary Julian ‘Pontifices Maximi’ and the Date of Julius Caesar’s Assassination,” Latomus, 66, Fasc. 2 (2007), 334. 6 Suetonius, "The Life of Julius Caesar," Suetonius • Life of Julius Caesar, accessed March 29, 2018, http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Julius*.html#84. 7 G. R. Stanton, "Why Did Caesar Cross the Rubicon?" Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte 52, no. 1 (2003): 67, accessed March 29, 2018, doi:10.18411/a-2017-023. 8 Frank A. Siranni, “Caesar’s Decision to Cross the Rubicon,” L’Antiquite Classique 48, Fasc. 2 (1979), 637. 9 Suetonius, "The Life of Julius Caesar,” http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Julius*.html#34. 4
Rome, left Marc Antony in charge as Tribune of the Plebs and then he himself went West to
amass support for his cause.10 His actions were not typical of a conqueror. As the war played out, Caesar followed Pompey’s generals, Pompey himself, and the Senators who amassed armies of their own. It became clear he was fighting a defensive war through offensive battles.
Caesar’s actions of forgiveness, compassion, and offering reluctant chances for his opponents to redeem themselves, showcase Caesar’s mentality going into the war. He celebrated the victories he had, such as the all-famous “Veni, Vidi, Vici” after winning the Battle of Zela.11 However,
Caesar continually forgave his enemies, often asking his soldiers to “Spare [their] fellow
citizens” such as at the Battle of Pharsalus after his legions beat Pompey’s, and racing to reach
Cato and Scipio before they committed suicide.12 He was a populist and if he had wanted
absolute power, Caesar’s uncanny abilities and skills in the art of warfare, no doubt, would have
allowed him to do so. He destroyed Pompey at the Battle of Pharsalus while his troops were
outnumbered five to one, even after suffering a major loss at the Battle of Dyracchium, the battle
prior. 13 Caesar’s leadership and willingness to put himself on the frontlines with his troops,
such as him rushing the enemy by himself in the Battle of Munda,14 and his ability to stop
mutinies of his troops with a single word, “Citizens,” shows that Caesar was not a tyrant. 15 He
10 Julius Caesar, Aulus Hirtius, and Cynthia Damon, The Landmark Julius Caesar: The Complete Works: Gallic War, Civil War, Alexandrian War, African War, and Spanish War, trans. Kurt A. Raaflaub, ed. Robert B. Strassler, The Landmark Series (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 2017), 337. 11 Suetonius, "The Life of Julius Caesar,” http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Julius*.html#37. 12 Plutarch, "The Life of Julius Caesar," Plutarch • Life of Caesar, accessed March 29, 2018, http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Caesar*.html#54; Suetonius, "The Life of Julius Caesar," http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Julius*.html#75. 13 Julius Caesar, The Landmark Julius Caesar, 416. 14 Phillip Barlag, The Leadership Genius of Julius Caesar: Modern Lessons from the Man Who Built an Empire (Oakland, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2016), 22. 15 Suetonius, "The Life of Julius Caesar” http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Julius*.html#70; Plutarch, "The Life of Julius Caesar,” http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Caesar*.html#51. 5
was an influential individual for sure, but he was no tyrant. Caesar understood the people, and in
doing so, he recognized the increasing divide between the masses and the elite that ran the
government. He wanted Rome to be for Romans again. In the Civil War, Caesar’s naivety with
trying to meet with Pompey face-to-face, and his willingness to allow Massilia to remain
untouched nearly cost him dearly.16 The layout of the battles Caesar fought during this Civil
War, clearly shows that, while he might have been trying to establish some sense of order to the
Civil War he was involved with, ultimately Caesar was attacking where he saw armies of
opposition raised against him. When the Ides of March of 44 BC came along, the conspirators knew that if they did not have Brutus on their side, their assassination would not work. Brutus was from a family that symbolized all the correct traits a good Roman was supposed to have.17
After all, the Brutus that played a crucial role in destroying the tyranny and exiling the royal
family was the ancestor of the Brutus of Caesar’s day.18 They needed Brutus on their side to
make the assassination legitimate and cement Caesar as a tyrant. Brutus, getting the final blow
to Caesar, boiled down to an elitist killing the populist. Caesar’s actions during the Civil War
were not indicative of a tyrant, but instead of someone reacting to a slight against them and
attempting to restore peace.
Caesar’s actions as outlined in this StoryMap will showcase a man, not a tyrant, who
merely responded to elitist actions taken against him. Caesar was apparently a different kind of
Roman, and ultimately this resulted in his death, as Rome had no idea how to accept someone so
dichotomous. A StoryMap best fits this narrative because it will help to explain better Caesar’s
16 Julius Caesar, Aulus Hirtius, and Cynthia Damon, The Landmark Julius Caesar, 337, 416. 17 Suetonius, "The Life of Julius Caesar," http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Julius*.html#80. 18 Plutarch, "The Life of Julius Caesar," http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Caesar*.html#61. 6
actions and show that despite Caesar’s attempt to create some semblance of order in the war, he
was ultimately at the mercy of responding to his enemies, many of whom opposed him to their
death. Caesar was not a tyrant; he was a populist.
The Rubicon is a key location in Caesar’s Civil War because it is the thought to be the
instigating action of the Civil War, one that shows Caesar as a power-hungry madman.
However, Caesar crossed the Rubicon not to conquer Rome, but rather to force an unreasonable
Senate to reason with him. This would not occur, however, as after crossing the Rubicon, Caesar
realized that Pompey and his opponents in the Senate had fled south and were heading to
Brundisium and even Dyrrhachium. This first point on the map is situated on the Rubicon River.
It was here that Caesar made the fateful decision to respond to undue treatment from the Senate
and political rivals such as Pompey. While it is undeniable that Caesar made the decision,
knowing that Rome would be plunged into a Civil War that would either end with his death or
that of his opponents, he also did not make this decision in a vacuum. He chose this, and through
the ancient sources, we can get an idea as to how major this event was for those who came after
and even a glimpse into what Caesar might have been feeling.19 Caesar likely deliberated with
himself and his head generals for hours, days, maybe even longer, but the insight given us by the
ancient sources is not so forthcoming. They both refer to some supernatural, pre-destined happenstance that landed him at the water’s edge and forced him to move further south, leading his armies into Rome.20 Caesar willingly allowed those who did not believe in what he was
about to undertake to leave without prejudice. Caesar demanded loyalty, but he knew the
19 Suetonius, "The Life of Julius Caesar," http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Julius*.html#31; Plutarch, "The Life of Julius Caesar," http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Caesar*.html#32. 20 Beneker, “The Crossing of the Rubicon and the Outbreak of Civil War in Cicero, Lucan, Plutarch, and Suetonius,” 75. 7
importance and significance of his actions and allowed those that did not believe in his actions to
walk away.21 This shows that Caesar knew what he was doing, but also that he did not intend to
cause violence and division in the Roman Empire. He was solely trying to reclaim the honor
which he felt elites of Rome and the Senate had been denying him for so long.22 On January 10,
49 BC, Julius Caesar leads his army across the Rubicon and into Rome. While Caesar’s own
writings do not stress the importance of the event or make it clear whether he had any hesitation
at the river’s edge, other later sources, most notably the biographies of Caesar written by Lucan,
Suetonius and Plutarch, do.23 Caesar’s decision to cross the Rubicon is the subject of a large
scholarly debate regarding that of Caesar’s prosecution which Suetonius mentions in his The Life
of Julius Caesar.24 Essentially, this would give Caesar defensive reason for going on the offense
and crossing the Rubicon, but as Morstein-Marx reveals the evidence for this alleged prosecution
case against Caesar seems flimsy at best. Both Plutarch and Suetonius showcase a Caesar who,
when he reaches the water’s edge, is hesitant to move forward. Suetonius discloses that Caesar
had little choice to do it as everything was preordained by divinity.25 Plutarch exposes a much
more humanized version of the event, discussing Caesar’s possible mental turmoil when he stood
there. Plutarch reveals that Caesar might have been weighing the pros and cons of the action in
terms of what the future may hold for him should he move forward, but ultimately brings in a
divine aspect as though to diminish what Caesar must have been truly feeling at that point.26
21 Barlag, The Leadership Genius of Julius Caesar, 57-8. 22 Barlag, The Leadership Genius of Julius Caesar, 54-5. 23 Jeffrey Beneker, “The Crossing of the Rubicon and the Outbreak of Civil War in Cicero, Lucan, Plutarch, and Suetonius,” 75. 24 Robert Morstein-Marx, “Caesar’s Alleged Fear of Prosecution and His ‘Ratio Absentis’ in the Approach to the Civil War,” 168-170. 25 Suetonius, "The Life of Julius Caesar," http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Julius*.html#31. 26 Plutarch, "The Life of Julius Caesar," http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Caesar*.html#32. 8
Another possibility as to why Caesar crosses the Rubicon is that he was trying to “…take by
force the rights that the Senate had denied him, those rights centering on the dignitas he was
owed on the basis of his achievements.”27 Caesar’s decision was by no means careless. He
obviously had to put a lot of thought into this one act, as even Suetonius alludes to some
hesitation. However, the reason surrounding why he ultimately crossed is up for debate in
contemporary scholarship.
Caesar found himself faced with a choice. While he did remain in Rome for a time, he
noticed that a significant portion of Pompey’s army was amassing in the west while Pompey
himself was in the east. With a mind for victory and to end the dispute quickly, he went west
after some deliberation. Caesar had it in his mind, to both win supporters of the provincial towns
and to stop the growing resistance to him. On his way west to Ilerda, where a majority of the
opposition to him amassed, he stopped off in Massilia.28 On April 19, 49 BC, Caesar laid siege
to the town of Massilia. Initially, he stopped there to ask for their support, but the city refused,
saying that as both Pompey and Caesar were the town’s patrons, they could offer Caesar no more
help than they could Pompey. Nonetheless, Caesar was not the only one who had it in their mind
to proffer support from the town, and Domitius, one of Pompey’s generals, had come into the city by the sea. While Caesar was discussing and willing to allow Massilia to remain neutral and was ready to move on to Ilerda, he found that the town was giving support to Domitius and by extension Pompey. Caesar was outraged and felt betrayed. Caesar’s decision to cross the
Rubicon might have been the start of the Civil War for Rome, but for Caesar, this was an appropriate response to an obstinate Senate who had already declared him an enemy of Rome.
27 G. R. Stanton, "Why Did Caesar Cross the Rubicon?" 67. 28 Julius Caesar, Aulus Hirtius, and Cynthia Damon, The Landmark Julius Caesar, 337-8. 9
The Siege of Massilia is the first battle of the Civil War. This Battle was started when
Caesar came to the town and asked for their support. He would have allowed them to remain
neutral, but Domitius forced his hand. His siege of Massilia was underway. Suetonius gives
minimal reference to this siege, only stating that it is what delayed his final advance on Ilerda
and that he emerged victorious at Massilia.29 Caesar’s account of it, on the other hand, discusses
the tactics and event with much detail. The report shows Caesar as trying to reason with the
“…fifteen leading men of Massilia. He tried to persuade them not to let the people of Massalia
be responsible for the outbreak of a war.”30 Caesar was in Massalia because he was pursuing a large portion of Pompey’s army which was in Spain. Suetonius quotes him as saying, “I go to
meet an army without a leader, and I shall return to meet a leader without an army.”31 Further
reading in Caesar’s account shows that the people of Massilia were originally hesitant to help
either side on the basis that both Gnaeus Pompey and Julius Caesar were patrons of their city,
supporting both of them equally. Domitius, an enemy of Caesar and a general in Pompey’s
army, arrived by ship to take the city himself and was even welcomed by the people who lived
there. Caesar is angry when he realizes the treachery and ultimate betrayal Massalia showed him
and further uses this to justify his cause for laying siege to the city. While Caesar laid siege to
this city, he sent ahead cavalry to Spain to confront the armies there and take the Pyrenes to
restrict the movement of the enemy, since he received word that a large contingent of Pompey’s
army was quickly coming his way.32 At Massilia, Caesar had siege towers constructed and
29 Suetonius, "The Life of Julius Caesar," http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Julius*.html#34. 30 Julius Caesar, Aulus Hirtius, and Cynthia Damon, The Landmark Julius Caesar, 337. 31 Suetonius, “The Life of Julius Caesar,” http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Julius*.html#34. 32 Julius Caesar, Aulus Hirtius, and Cynthia Damon, The Landmark Julius Caesar, 338-40. 10
“…mobile protective roofs brought up for a siege of the city…”33 While the siege was underway, Caesar left his armies under the charge of Gaius Trebonius and Decimus Junius
Brutus Albinus and moved on to Ilerda.34 Ultimately, Caesar’s account, which is in part supported by Suetonius’ brief sentence, was one of defense. He saw that the people in the city had slighted him by informing him they could support neither party, while later shutting their gates to him and celebrating and even aiding Domitius, a general of Pompey’s army. Caesar’s desire to reason with the leaders of this town before laying siege to the city shows his reluctance to carry out bloodshed and further adds clout to the point that Caesar was merely in a defensive mentality for the war while conducting offensive tactics in battles. Caesar, while the siege was going in his favor, left the town to lend leadership to his armies he sent ahead to Spain, where they were now engaged in Ilerda. Additionally, Caesar might have had a strategic reason for heading to Ilerda first, in the interest of a quick quarrel and lasting peace but ended up stopping in Massilia to respond to a slight against him.
This campaign was delayed by Caesar’s siege of Massilia, which took place earlier in
July. The Battle of Ilerda commenced because of the advantages the site offered Pompey’s forces from a tactical perspective as they were there before Caesar or his troops, who were sent ahead while the occurrences in Massilia delayed Caesar and a portion. Pompey’s forces had built bridges across the Sicoris River in an attempt to reach the nearby villages and persuade them to join their cause. Caesar heard that Pompey, who was south of Rome at the time, was on his way to Spain and left Massilia to lead his forces in the Battle of Ilerda in Spain in hopes of getting a face-to-face meeting with the other general.35 Pompey however, never showed in
33 Julius Caesar, Aulus Hirtius, and Cynthia Damon,The Landmark Julius Caesar, 337-8. 34 "Battle of Ilerda," Wikipedia, March 25, 2018, accessed March 29, 2018, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Ilerda. 35 Julius Caesar, Aulus Hirtius, and Cynthia Damon, The Landmark Julius Caesar, 338-9. 11
Ilerda and remained where he was. At first, both sides “…clashed in cavalry skirmishes.”36
Once a bridge collapse brought major numbers of the enemy together, a Legion of Caesar’s army
led by Lucius Plancus immediately took the high ground in defense and ancient sources indicate
that even “…though he was outnumbered in the encounter, he was able to withstand the massive
attacks by the enemy legions and cavalry.”37 Caesar arrived at the camp about two days later and ordered that the repairs to the bridge be conducted at night so that his men could use the cover of darkness for safety. He knew and understood what it took to win the battle by suggesting this. Caesar also had defensive positions between his soldiers and the enemy constructed so they could repair the bridges. Caesar’s defensive positions were to include a flat piece of terrain, which would give them access to the town of Ilerda and further prevent the enemy’s movement. Once the enemy realized Caesar’s intentions, they quickly seized the upper- hand and stole the field for themselves causing Caesar’s troops to retreat to their fixed stronghold. Eventually, though the troops that were forced to draw back earlier, they later returned with a vengeance, fighting and winning the battle while driving them uphill.38 In the
end, “[Caesar] certainly showed admirable self-restraint and mercy, both in his conduct of the
civil war and in the hour of victory.”39 He made it clear that he considered all those of neither or
neutral party as his friends and could not order the execution of the enemy troops his men had captured.40 This battle and its aftermath adds further support the argument that while Caesar was prepared in every way to fight, he was on the defensive, or at the very least, unwilling to maneuver offensively. He may have ended up in Ilerda with the intention of fighting Pompey’s
36 Julius Caesar, Aulus Hirtius, and Cynthia Damon, The Landmark Julius Caesar: 340. 37 Julius Caesar, Aulus Hirtius, and Cynthia Damon, The Landmark Julius Caesar: 341-2. 38 Julius Caesar, Aulus Hirtius, and Cynthia Damon, The Landmark Julius Caesar: 342-4. 39 Suetonius, "The Life of Julius Caesar," http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Julius*.html#75. 40 Suetonius, "The Life of Julius Caesar," http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Julius*.html#75. 12
forces and supporters that were amassing there, as his quote that he goes to meet an army without
a leader and return to a leader without an army suggests. Nonetheless, words aside, Caesar’s actions show his true intentions. No matter what arrogance he demonstrated on his way to
Ilerda, once he won the battle, he immediately set about trying to dole out peace and reconciliation to those that opposed him and had fought against him. Caesar came to Spain to secure terrain and prevent Pompey’s forces from advancing. He heard about how Pompey’s legions had a stronghold in the region which had risen against him. Pompey might not have shown, as Caesar wanted in the beginning, but that did not stop Caesar. While Ilerda was a decisive victory, the bloodshed at Massilia was still taking place. Caesar could not return to
Massilia but had managed to send ahead his orders in his stead. His ability to command both fronts in two different locations shows us that Caesar was an unflappable and skilled military commander, but his continuous optimism toward the intentions of his enemies undermined his capabilities as he refused to fight them like a conqueror would.
Caesar left Massilia when he thought it was nearly over and took his forces to Ilerda to join the ensuing fight there. By moving on, so quickly without waiting for a confirmation of the battle’s end, he showed his desire to reach an end other than bloodshed and his disinclination to be a conqueror of Rome, and bathe in the blood of his people, even those that fought him. While
there, Caesar soon discovered that the Battle of Massilia had re-opened on a new front, the water.
Caesar ordered Decimus Brutus to continue to thwart the enemy in Massilia and ordered ships to be built in haste, in a quick attempt to meet the enemy’s naval maneuvering. In the ancient sources, the vessels Caesar’s men built were bulky and hard to maneuver. The troops that were left under Brutus’ command, and even Brutus himself, lacked naval warfare expertise.
Ultimately, this battle was won, just the same as the land portion of the siege due to the quick 13
thinking of Caesar’s forces. Said forces knew what they could and could not do and what the
enemy could and could not do and used this knowledge to their advantage. They managed to
keep the enemy ships, which outnumbered them, close and boarded them, opting for a hand-to-
hand fight rather than a true naval war. The enemy forces were not adequately able to cope with
the method of battle forced on them; they were more capable of naval maneuvering and naval
warfare than the brutishness of hand-to-hand combat of a land army. Caesar heard about this
victory while still in Ilerda after the repair to the local bridges.41 Caesar’s tactical knowledge
allowed him to succeed on two fronts in two different locations, but the layout of these three
battles show more than most others how little Caesar was thinking strategically and
systematically about the war in which he was engrossed. In fact, he was not interested in
bloodshed when he first arrived at Massilia, which was conveniently on his way to Ilerda to
combat known Pompeian troops there. Caesar was merely responding to Domitius’ back-handed
treachery in Massilia, which was the cause of the battle at this location. The naval battle, where
Caesar’s troops had to adapt to the changing environment rapidly, shows their adaptability, but it
also shows another aspect of Caesar’s lack of strategic planning and perhaps his naivety in
hoping for peace with an opposition that had consistently frustrated him and his attempts to
attain it. Caesar, having subdued but not decimated the enemy in the west, could head east to
where Pompey and other big-name opponents of his were. They had set up camp in
Dyrrhachium, a town in modern-day Albania.42 Caesar would head back to Rome and sail
across from Brundisium to Dyrrhachium with the hope and desire of finally getting the chance
that had eluded him for so long already. He wanted to meet face-to-face with Pompey.
41 Julius Caesar, Aulus Hirtius, and Cynthia Damon, The Landmark Julius Caesar, 349-51. 42 "Siege of Dyrrhachium (49/48 BCE)," Siege of Dyrrhachium (49/48 BCE) - Livius, 2018, , accessed April 23, 2018, http://www.livius.org/articles/battle/siege-of-dyrrhachium-48-48-bce/. 14
In 49 BC, after the start of the Civil War, Caesar went west, and Pompey went east.
After quelling the resistance and stabilizing Spain, Caesar moved east to confront Pompey’s
forces directly in 48 BC. Whereas Caesar was making his way from battlefront to battlefront in
the west, Pompey set up camp in Dyrrhachium, where he built fortifications and strengthened his
navy. By the time Caesar started looking eastward, Pompey had been there for the same amount
of months Caesar had been traversing all over the western half of the continent.
When Caesar arrived in Italy, ready to cross to Dyrrhachium, he found he only had “…enough
ships for half the fleet.”43 Caesar decided to cross anyway. His hopes of dislodging Pompey from Dyrrhachium were wrecked when efforts on Pompey’s part created turmoil for his tactics.44
Leading up to Dryrrhachium, two envoys from Pompey’s camp came under the guise of offering to negotiate terms for a truce between Pompey and Caesar. Caesar quickly learned that this was for the sole purpose of eluding his navy and escaping an unfortunate position.45 Caesar decided
to let go of his want for a truce, realizing that it was not something in which Pompey had mutual
interest. In sending his fleet and setting up an encampment at Dyrrhachium, Caesar used the
wintertime to surprise Bibulus, one of Pompey’s commanders who was in charge of his fleet and
set up a blockade. Once again, despite previous events, Caesar tried to send word to Pompey
asking for peace, but these attempts like the previous, were disregarded. Caesar and Antony decided to surround Pompey’s camp with their inferior force, and due to the intelligence given to
Pompey by defectors, Pompey was able to break through Caesar’s fortifications by exploiting a hole in Caesar’s troops to the south. Caesar had to retreat to save his army from complete
43 Mike Anderson, " The Battle of Dyrrhachium – Caesar’s Greatest Risk," Mike Anderson's Ancient History Blog, July 28, 2012, accessed March 29, 2018, http://www.mikeanderson.biz/2012/07/the-battle-of-dyrrhachium- caesars.html. 44 "Caesar, Julius." 1996, The Reader's Companion to Military History. 45 Julius Caesar, Aulus Hirtius, and Cynthia Damon, The Landmark Julius Caesar, 416. 15
destruction.46 He knew full well his inclination for mercy was not something Pompey or those
with him shared. Before the battle, Caesar vehemently tried to get Pompey to agree to peace.
Pompey rebuffed each attempt made, and Caesar allowed his desire for harmony to blind him to
Pompey’s backhanded efforts to destroy him and his command. This battle and the attempt to
pursue peace on Caesar’s part, reveals Caesar’s overwhelming reluctance to fight, which lends
its support to the overarching theme that he was fighting reactively and tactically not proactively
and strategically. Now, defeated for the first time in the Civil War, Caesar was on the run and at
least for now was at the non-existent mercy of Pompey’s forces. He knew that when he would
meet Pompey next, Pompey’s troops would severely outnumber his own.
Caesar, by this time, was on the run, having just been defeated in the Battle of
Dyrrhachium. His armies, severely outnumbered were now to face Pompey at Pharsalus. Caesar
knew his hopes for victory were minimal at best, but he had troops eager for redemption under
his command. Although time had passed, his forces were more than ready for redemption and
came at Pharsalus with new energy. While Caesar’s account differs from other historical
sources, most notably from Plutarch, Livy, and Appian, who claim to use Pollio as a source one
thing is for sure, Caesar knew how to attain a victory even against overwhelming odds.47 The
battle was won, no doubt, from the leadership abilities and audacity that Julius Caesar had.
Caesar knew well how the Romans fought, and not just because he was one. He used these
tactics and experimented with unusual ones during the Gallic Wars, a campaign Caesar was
partaking in before marching on Rome in 49 BC. Once Pompey realized his troops were being
outmaneuvered and losing, he quickly retreated silently from the rear. Caesar chased after him,
46 Mike Anderson, " The Battle of Dyrrhachium – Caesar’s Greatest Risk." 47 William E. Gwatkin, "Some Reflections on the Battle of Pharsalus," Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 87 (1956): 109-10, accessed March 29, 2018, doi:10.2307/283876. 16
but failed to catch up with him, and instead boarded an enemy vessel and demanded complete
surrender. The enemy, realizing that their leader wordlessly had left them in haste, surrendered
to Caesar.48 Caesar quickly called for another unprecedented show of mercy, telling his men that
they should spare their fellow citizens and therefore, most of the enemy deaths were a direct
result of the battle, not the aftermath.49 This battle and its conclusion only lends further clout to
the argument that Caesar had good intentions, at least from his perspective. Caesar was not
interested in needless bloodshed or in destroying the enemy. He did want peace, but his
opponents forced his hand, and he responded in kind. Caesar's tactics in this battle and the
resulting victory demonstrate that even though conquering Rome was well-within his capabilities
as a military leader, it was not his goal. A conqueror would have slaughtered those who opposed
him, but Caesar did not do this. Additionally, after Pharsalus, Caesar found himself once again
chasing after Pompey in a futile attempt to sue for peace.
When Caesar followed Pompey to Alexandria on October 2, 48 BC, following the
decisive victory at the Battle of Pharsalus, he found that his great enemy had been slain by
Egyptians, who were hoping to please him.50 The Caesarian Civil War had likely come to an
end, and Plutarch indicates that this should have been the case but that “…Caesar’s passion for
Cleopatra…” drove him to wage war on the city. However, Plutarch also brings in another
reason, which lays the blame on the king’s party, as his eunuch Potheinus killed Pompey and
furthermore was “…plotting against Caesar.”51 No matter the reason, he apparently found great
satisfaction in the siege as he was able to “…save the lives of fellow citizens who had fought
48 Barlag, The Leadership Genius of Julius Caesar, 25-6. 49 Suetonius, "The Life of Julius Caesar," http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Julius*.html#75. 50 Adrian Goldsworthy, Caesars Civil War 49-44 BC (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013), 35, October 01, 2003, accessed March 29, 2018. 51 Plutarch, "The Life of Julius Caesar," http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Caesar*.html#48. 17
against him.”52 Plutarch then goes on to share that during Caesar’s affair with Cleopatra, a plot
led by the king and his party against Caesar was discovered and that is when Caesar moved to replace the king with Cleopatra. 53 The scheme consisted of blocking the water and food supply
off from Caesar, his troops, and his supporters. The king and his men succeeded in blockading
Caesar’s men for six months, but Caesar managed to avert the crisis by digging his wells.54
Whatever the reasoning behind the siege of Alexandria, it is clear that by his actions and the
emotion he showed when he saw Pompey’s head presented to him by the king, that he did want
peace. Furthermore, Caesar was disturbed as well because Pompey was a former friend.
Whatever the reason for the Siege on Alexandria, the result ended the same as his other victories,
Caesar showing his genuine care and concern for his troops and ordering they extend mercy to
those who opposed him. Caesar’s battle was one of necessity, and he did not want needless
bloodshed. Even Plutarch reveals this when he hedges in his assertion that Caesar’s affair with
Cleopatra probably was not the sole cause of the battle here. Additionally, despite Plutarch’s
statement that the Civil War was over with the death of Pompey, there were still those who
opposed Caesar, and they were still amassing armies in hostility to him.
Caesar found himself moving northeast from Alexandria in a move of response to the
growing resentment to him at Zela. In mid- 47 BC, Caesar became embroiled in the Battle of
Zela.55 Ida Ostenberg says that while his victory at Zela was decisive, the famous words of
“Veni, Vidi, Vici,” which were written and paraded around were probably more for political
clout than anything else. Caesar’s victory was quick, “Caesar arrived in Pontus more or less
52 Plutarch, "The Life of Julius Caesar.” http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Caesar*.html#48. 53 Plutarch, "The Life of Julius Caesar.” http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Caesar*.html#48. 54 Goldsworthy, Caesars Civil War 49-44 BC, 35-6. 55 "Battle of Zela," Wikipedia, February 28, 2018, accessed March 30, 2018, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Zela. 18
directly from his cruise on the Nile with Cleopatra and defeated King Pharnaces at Zela within
five days after his arrival and after only four hours of fighting.”56 Caesar’s victory at the Battle
of Zela was also a way for him to bring up Pompey and explain that Pompey received much of
his fame from fighting the cowards in the area.57 Caesar celebrated his victory at Zela not only by parading around those famed words but also by giving “…each and every foot-soldier of his
veteran legions…” rewards in land and “…booty…”58 However, when it came to the land, he
took care to avoid giving them land “…side by side, to avoid dispossessing any of the former
owners.”59 Despite his celebrations, Caesar most likely paraded around the bombastic phrase,
“Veni, Vidi, Vici,” in response to the quickness of the victory, rather than the victory itself.
Caesar’s awareness of others around him only shows his overall value on war. While he was
quick to seize and celebrate his victories, and Suetonius makes it clear that he had many, he also
made sure to not forget his enemies and continue needless bloodshed. However, this was not the
end of Caesar’s Civil War and had to move south-west, passed Alexandria, to fight another
harbinger of resentment to him growing in North Africa. Notice here, that Caesar was already
closer to the battlefront here while he was in Alexandria. He was, by this time, further away,
having been in modern-day Turkey fighting at Zela before having to move back in the direction
of and beyond Alexandria to respond to yet another army gathering against him. Before he
would even reach North Africa, he had to return to Rome where he would find his own troops, in
their obstinance, refusing to follow him. Up until this point in the Civil War, Caesar had had
56 Ida Ostenburg, "Veni Vidi Vici and Caesar's Triumph," Classical Quarterly 63, no. 2 (December 2013): 818, accessed March 29, 2018, doi:10.3897/bdj.4.e7720.figure2f. 57 Ostenburg, "Veni Vidi Vici and Caesar's Triumph," 819 58 Suetonius, "The Life of Julius Caesar," http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Julius*.html#38. 59 Suetonius, "The Life of Julius Caesar," http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Julius*.html#38. 19
numerous victories and had shown countless instances of mercy to his enemies. Pompey was
dead, but the Civil War still continued.
Caesar’s penchant for leniency and mercy to those who stood against him, did not just
extend toward his enemies in battle, but also to his soldiers who rose up in mutiny. He had to
return to Rome to deal with his mutinous soldiers, but he did not execute them. Instead he shows his own soldiers the same leniency he gave to those who fought against him in battle. It was 47
BC; his soldiers had been fighting their fellow Romans for over two years by this point and had fought under him in the Gallic Wars prior to ever following him across the Rubicon. His soldiers were weary and tired and refused to press on as their commander called them to do so. They wanted to receive their back pay, land, and everything else they were promised by this point.60
Both Suetonius and Plutarch’s account of this explain that Caesar, with one word, was able to
quell the mutiny.61 However, in contemporary scholarship, historians are overlooking
“…elements of the historical tradition which contradict the conclusion to the traditional
story…”62 There were other mutinies Caesar wrote about in his Gallic campaigns. Apparently, this story does not quite match up with independent sources who talk about the same events.
Additionally, Caesar did, in fact, use the ringleaders of the mutiny of 47 on dangerous assignments in 46 BC, as a sort of punishment for their actions the previous year. Nonetheless, he did not crucify them or execute them as an example to other wont seditionists. He points out that because of this form of later punishment, Caesar obviously wanted to punish his soldiers in
47, but could not because of the precarious position the mutiny put him in.63 There could be
60 Stefan G. Chrissanthos, "Caesar and the Mutiny of 47 B.C.," The Journal of Roman Studies 91 (2001): 63, accessed March 29, 2018, doi:10.18411/a-2017-023. 61 Suetonius, "The Life of Julius Caesar," http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Julius*.html#70; Plutarch, "The Life of Julius Caesar," http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Caesar*.html#51. 62 Chrissanthos, "Caesar and the Mutiny of 47 B.C.,” 63. 63 Chrissanthos, "Caesar and the Mutiny of 47 B.C.,” 74. 20
room for a debate on the veracity of the traditional accounts of the mutiny and whether or not the
Caesarian legend of “Citizens” is really how it happened at all and if that was in fact the end of
it. Whatever the case for the mutiny, it cannot be denied that any other commander in Caesar’s
position would have crucified the so-called ringleaders of this ill-timed mutiny as a show to other troops that a mutiny was intolerable. Caesar did not do this, and despite the historical record giving credence to the idea that Caesar pushed those “ring-leaders” into dangerous situations in order to punish them for their instigating actions a year later, Caesar still showed at worst that he was capable of patience in waiting for the appropriate time for punishment. Caesar’s restraint and ability to command a crowd’s loyalty with just one word, despite skepticism, which
Suetonius and Plutarch both say is what happened, reveals that Caesar’s desire for peace was not a façade. He truly wanted it, and when even his own troops stood against him, he used his legendary powers of command and managed to quell the mutiny and still move forward to North
Africa where he would face his enemies in bloodshed once again.
When Caesar sedated the mutiny, he wasted no time in heading off to North Africa to resume the next military campaign of the Civil War. The actions of the enemy had called for his response yet again. Caesar landed in Ruspina on the 3rd of January 46 BC and after days of sending his men out foraging, the enemy forces which were led by Labienus intercepted them.
Initially, seeing a large army led by Labienus, Caesar ordered his men to converge and march on line to face the enemy without a second or third line in the rear. In spreading out his troops,
Caesar hoped to forestall any attempts to flank. While the majority of Caesar’s army were made new recruits as most of the veterans were left in Rome after the mutiny, the new recruits quickly bunched up and restricted their own movements. They were afraid and were unseasoned by battle as the veteran troops back in Rome were. The enemy quickly outflanked them and caused 21
overall panic and loss of morale in Caesar’s troops.64 One account by Plutarch has Caesar,
during the chaos of the battle, spinning a young retreating soldier around and shouting, “Yonder
is the enemy.”65 Labienus and the other enemy leaders had to retreat due to injury and as a
result, the enemy lines were left without any major command. The battle dissipated and during
the next days, despite any taunting, Caesar controlled his forces, choosing to remain in the
headquarters tent. Caesar’s men were victorious in several of the skirmishes and when the two
main forces met again, neither side chose to start a major battle and by mutual agreement, the
dispute ended.66 While Caesar might have been eager at the outset, he did show restraint by not
engaging with the enemy once the skirmishes had dissipated. Caesar chose to avoid further, and
by extension, needless bloodshed. While the next battle would present Caesar in clear
contradiction to his earlier shows of mercy, it can be explained by the sources which say that
during the significant part engagement, Caesar was not present.
After Ruspina, Caesar’s troops were faced with another onslaught led and started by
Scipio and King Juba in Africa. Before the important battle on April 6, 46 BC, Caesar’s men
went hungry, and morale quickly started to dissipate. 67 Caesar’s troops were daily faced with
enemy onslaught as they tried to maneuver. Eventually, Caesar did manage to find food, coming
on an enemy stockpile in a local village. Caesar brought his forces to a coastal town, Thapsus
and faced off against the enemy in a nearby field. The troops were eager to engage, and despite
many attempts by Caesar’s centurions to subdue their enthusiasm the soldiers marched on an attacked.68 Furthermore, with Plutarch’s account, we can be reasonably confident that Caesar
64 Goldsworthy, Caesars Civil War 49-44 BC, 39-40. 65 Plutarch, "The Life of Julius Caesar," http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Caesar*.html#52. 66 Adrian Goldsworthy, Caesar: Life of a Colossus (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 458-461, accessed March 30, 2018. 67 Goldsworthy, Caesar, 461-2. 68 Goldsworthy, Caesar, 462-4. 22
had to be quickly rushed from his position and back to camp due to an epileptic attack that was
about to overtake him. Caesar’s eager troops were no longer kept under control by their
commander. To the skeptics of Caesar’s convenient or ill-timed epileptic attack, it is likely that we can infer that it happened because Plutarch mentions this attack with specificity. The mention of any precise epileptic seizure is rare.69 Furthermore, Caesar commonly forgave one
infraction, once the forgiven man was caught fighting again on the enemy’s lines against his
troops. He would face death if caught once more, and therefore some of the enemy forces would
not have been tendered mercy as they had already received it in the past. Caesar’s men, eager to
conclude the Civil War, refused to heed any of the enemy’s attempts to surrender, even those
who pleaded for the first time for capitulation and were not discriminatory in who they killed.70
While the battle did end in needless bloodshed, this was likely due to Caesar not being there.
Plutarch claims to be the case. Also, his soldier’s refusal to curtail their slaughter in their
eagerness to end the war shows just how much restraint Caesar might have been exterting.
Another one of the main reasons behind this line of thinking is that when Cato killed himself,
Caesar reluctantly said that he was ready to show mercy to the man. However, by this point
hindsight informs us that this was nearly the end of the war, as the next battle, the Battle of
Munda, would be the concluding battle and bring Caesar and his troops back to Rome.
Caesar would return to Spain, where he was during the start of the Civil War,
demonstrating once again Caesar’s lack of strategic thinking and penchant for response during
the Civil War. This course of action is hardly in the mindset of any conqueror. After Thapsus,
several of Pompey’s sons started to rise again in Spain. “Caesar at first felt the problem was a
minor one and hoped that his legates could deal with the Pompeians without requiring him to go
69 Goldsworthy, Caesar, 465-6. 70 Goldsworthy, Caesar, 466. 23
to Spain in person.”71 Caesar quickly figured out that this was not to be and traveled to Spain to
quell the new uprising and put a complete end to the Civil War that had started back when he
crossed the Rubicon in 49 BC. Even he was growing weary of the ongoing war. After several
small engagements in the surrounding area and towns and after the Pompeians faced many
defectors from their armies to Caesar’s, the two armies met in massive force in an open and hilly
field outside Munda. The Pompeians camped on a hilltop and Caesar and his men took the low
ground.72 When both sides came to a standstill, some accounts have it that Caesar rushed the
enemy on his own after realizing that his soldiers refused to move. It did not take long for
Caesar’s soldiers to recognize that their leader was in peril and had to face the enemy alone for
them to rush up to overtake the enemy themselves, protecting their leader in the process.73
Caesar’s ability to put his own life in jeopardy, primarily to run at an enemy army alone, shows
his real character. Caesar had no clue how his army would respond; if they would fight with him or in their obstinance, refuse to move. Caesar might have been ambitious, but he was not ruthless and was more than willing to give his own life for his cause. At the end of the battle, he returned to Rome where he spent the next months tirelessly attempting to fix the republic and offer his enemies an unprecedented show of mercy, one which arguably resulted in his brutal slaughter by an unmerciful enemy. His enemies did not see the Civil War as wholly ended.
Once Caesar was declared dictator for life, his enemies’ fears that he was a conqueror came back in full, despite Caesar’s actions to the contrary.
Despite what historical accounts might say in contradiction, such as Suetonius’ claims that Caesar’s health was failing so badly that at this point Caesar almost wished for death to
71 Goldsworthy, Caesar, 482, accessed March 30, 2018. 72 Goldsworthy, Caesar, 483. 73 Barlag, The Leadership Genius of Julius Caesar, 22. 24
claim him, Caesar was still looking outward to the future.74 Furthermore, Goldsworthy says it is
not that simple because as he explains, no one else had an account of this being a wish of
Caesar’s.75 He does remark, however, that in the months post-Battle of Munda and pre-Ides of
March of the following year, Caesar was remarkably true to his word of not being another
Sulla.76 On an account of Brutus and Cicero writing post-mortem praises of Cato, a bitter
opponent of Caesar, Caesar read them. He did say that Brutus was too fanciful in his account but
said that Cicero’s “…improved his own literary style.”77 Rather than round the books up and
burn them, as any tyrant would have done, Caesar wrote his own work on Cato. While Caesar’s
work on Cato was damning and in striking contrast to Cicero’s and Brutus’s works of praise,
Caesar did not round up the works that supported his now-dead political rival and have them destroyed. He allowed the public to read them.78 Caesar, while occasionally hot-tempered, did
not execute his enemies or anyone who disagreed with him. “Caesar’s regime was not repressive
and, for all his flashes of temper and jibes at the dead Cato, or the living Pontius Aquila, it did
not become any more harsh after Munda.”79 Goldsworthy explains that with everything
deescalating after Munda, the Senate became anxious to see the true powers of the Senate
restored. Caesar was not in Rome much during those months between Munda and his
assassination and was even planning to leave for a three-year campaign soon after the Ides of
March.80 When Caesar was assassinated it was due to the fact that his supporters knew that days
later they were not going to get another chance to do so for a few years. Scholars commonly
74 Suetonius, "The Life of Julius Caesar," http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Julius*.html#86; Plutarch, "The Life of Julius Caesar," http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Caesar*.html#58. 75 Goldsworthy, Caesar, 491. 76 Goldsworthy, Caesar, 488. 77 Goldsworthy, Caesar, 487. 78 Goldsworthy, Caesar, 487-8. 79 Goldsworthy, Caesar, 489. 80 Goldsworthy, Caesar, 489-90. 25
express their distaste for the lost contemporary records that account for the political climate in
Rome in the five months of Caesar’s return from Spain to his death in 44 BC. “It is fatally easy
to take pieces of information…and to try to make out of them a composite historical picture.”81
Ultimately this section of history looks as though it may elude scholarship indefinitely, but
scholars continue to speculate, despite the fact that they might be partaking “…scissors-and- paste history of the most unconvincing sort.”82 Caesar died at the hands of a conspiracy to kill a tyranny in its infancy. It is up for almost philosophical debate for historians to try to figure out how events would have played out had Caesar been allowed to see his life come to a more peaceful end at the hands of old age.83 Nonetheless, one thing is abundantly clear, Caesar was
not interested in needless bloodshed during the Civil war, even if he chose to celebrate his Civil
War victories alongside his others in Gaul and elsewhere. He was also interested in peace and
forgiveness, looking towards a united future. While he might have been dictator and therefore
all power was ultimately his, he did not destroy his enemies, drive them from the public sphere,
or anything else of the sort. He allowed them to stay as they were, and Caesar’s life came to an
abrupt end. Caesar’s Civil War and assassination showcase a man who was brought to his own
end by his unconventional ability to forgive during a time far from ready for that approach.
Everything that led up to the Civil War and every action Caesar took therein all the way
up to his death could have been all a farce, and Caesar could have wanted a crown and to
conquer Rome. He demonstrated his capabilities in every battle of the Civil War, having lost
once during the war, at the Battle of Dyrrhachium, but this seems unlikely. Caesar was a
pragmatist so, therefore, while he did not show mercy to the same man twice, he did display an
81 J. P. V. D. Balsdon, "The Ides of March," Historia: Zeitschrift fur Alte Geschichte, 7, no. 1 (January 1958): 81, accessed March 30, 2018. 82 Balsdon, "The Ides of March," 81. 83 Goldsworthy, Caesar, 490-1. 26
inordinate amount of idealism in proffering mercy toward the first-time offenders. Even after the
Civil War had ended, Caesar did not exploit his Civil War victory by curtailing the opposition and filling the Senate with a bunch of “yes men” but instead, engaged in political discourse. He allowed the public to hear and read praise for his late enemies. Caesar did write his account of those enemies, but he wanted the people to have access to both. He even read the accounts that
by all intents could have been undesirable for him. Caesar was not a Sulla; he did not march on
Rome and start proscriptions. He marched on Rome to correct the wrongs done him by the
Senate and Pompey and then left Rome to chase after them, all over the provinces until the war’s end. If his campaign were strategic in any sense, Caesar would have thought about trying to conduct preemptive strikes and approaching it systematically, and not responsively. Based on this StoryMap and the details revealed at each battle or each point on the map, as not all of them are battles, Caesar was not faking it. He died for his convictions. Perhaps he might have lived had he called for the deaths of those who opposed him, but Caesar demonstrated whether it was in curtailing mutinies of his men, forgiving the enemy, or allowing his enemies to praise those who fought against him once upon a time, that proscriptions were just not in his character.
Caesar was a military prodigy of his day, but a ruthless dictator he was not.
27
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