2320-5407 Int. J. Adv. Res. 5(6), 413-418
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Cityspace, Cyberspace, and the Spatiology of Information
Vol. 1. No. 1 ISSN: 1941-8477 “Virtual Worlds Research: Past, Present & Future” July 2008 Cityspace, Cyberspace, and the Spatiology of Information By Dr. Michael L. Benedikt, ACSA Distinguished Professor, Director, Center for American Architecture and Design,University of Texas at Austin Abstract Published in 1996* but not widely read, this article argues that space and information are so deeply related that the universe at every moment is exactly and only as large as it needs to be to “contain” the information it in fact is. Using three thought experiments—one about data visualization, one about cellular automata and consciousness, and one about the analysis of architectural space using isovists, each experiment blurring (or rather, uniting) the phenomena of psychological and physical space, the article argues that what we experience as “space” is that set of dimensions which provides the largest capacity for the world’s other qualities, objects, and events to express their variety most fully. The natural universe is incompressible, expanding only as, and because, it becomes richer in information (i.e. cools and evolves). Imaginary and virtual worlds obey the same rule: they are “naturally” as big as they are rich in information. But the possibility exists in cyberspace—as it does not in nature—to choose which dimensions will serve as the spatial framework, and which will become/appear as properties of the things themselves. Data visualizers know this well. One wonders why virtual worlds to this day look so similar to ours, then, rather than to the one envisaged by William Gibson in 1984 and 1986 and which he called “cyberspace.” A failure of architectural nerve? A constraint upon computation? Or has cyberspace proper yet to evolve? Keywords: cityspace, cyberspace, virtual worlds, architecture, information. -
What's in a Mental Model of a Dynamic System? Conceptual Structure and Model Comparison
What’s in a mental model of a dynamic system? Conceptual structure and model comparison Martin Schaffernicht Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales Universidad de Talca Avenida Lircay s/n 3460000 Talca, CHILE [email protected] Stefan N. Groesser University of St. Gallen Institute of Management System Dynamics Group Dufourstrasse 40a CH - 9000 St. Gallen, Switzerland Tel: +41 71 224 23 82 / Fax: +41 71 224 23 55 [email protected] Contribution to the International System Dynamics Conference 2009 Albuquerque, NM, U.S.A. Abstract This paper deals with the representation of mental models of dynamic systems (MMDS). Improving ’mental models’ has always been fundamental in the field of system dynamics. Even though a specific definition exists, no conceptual model of the structure of a MMDS has been offered so far. Previous research about the learning effects of system dynamics interventions have used two methods to represent and analyze mental models. To what extend is the result of these methods comparable? Can they be used to account for a MMDS which is suitable for the system dynamics methodology? Two exemplary MMDSs are compared with both methods. We have found that the procedures and results differ significantly . In addition, neither of the methods can account for the concept of feedback loops. Based on this finding, we propose a conceptual model for the structure of a MMDS, a method to compare them, and a revised definition of MMDS. The paper concludes with a call for more substantive research. Keywords : Mental models, dynamic systems, mental model comparison, graph theory, mental model measurement Introduction Mental models have been a key concept in system dynamics from the beginning of the field (Forrester, 1961). -
Psychology, Meaning Making and the Study of Worldviews: Beyond Religion and Non-Religion
Psychology, Meaning Making and the Study of Worldviews: Beyond Religion and Non-Religion Ann Taves, University of California, Santa Barbara Egil Asprem, Stockholm University Elliott Ihm, University of California, Santa Barbara Abstract: To get beyond the solely negative identities signaled by atheism and agnosticism, we have to conceptualize an object of study that includes religions and non-religions. We advocate a shift from “religions” to “worldviews” and define worldviews in terms of the human ability to ask and reflect on “big questions” ([BQs], e.g., what exists? how should we live?). From a worldviews perspective, atheism, agnosticism, and theism are competing claims about one feature of reality and can be combined with various answers to the BQs to generate a wide range of worldviews. To lay a foundation for the multidisciplinary study of worldviews that includes psychology and other sciences, we ground them in humans’ evolved world-making capacities. Conceptualizing worldviews in this way allows us to identify, refine, and connect concepts that are appropriate to different levels of analysis. We argue that the language of enacted and articulated worldviews (for humans) and worldmaking and ways of life (for humans and other animals) is appropriate at the level of persons or organisms and the language of sense making, schemas, and meaning frameworks is appropriate at the cognitive level (for humans and other animals). Viewing the meaning making processes that enable humans to generate worldviews from an evolutionary perspective allows us to raise news questions for psychology with particular relevance for the study of nonreligious worldviews. Keywords: worldviews, meaning making, religion, nonreligion Acknowledgments: The authors would like to thank Raymond F. -
Effectiveness of Holistic Mental Model Confrontation in Driving Conceptual Change
Learning and Instruction xxx (2011) 1e15 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Learning and Instruction journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/learninstruc Effectiveness of holistic mental model confrontation in driving conceptual change Soniya Gadgil a,*, Timothy J. Nokes-Malach a, Michelene T.H. Chi b a Department of Psychology, Learning Research and Development Center, University of Pittsburgh, United States b Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, United States article info abstract Article history: Prior research on conceptual change has identified multiple kinds of misconceptions at different levels of Received 17 July 2010 representational complexity including false beliefs, flawed mental models, and incorrect ontological Received in revised form categories. We hypothesized that conceptual change of a mental model requires change in the system of 5 June 2011 relations between the features of the prior model. To test this hypothesis, we compared instruction aimed Accepted 8 June 2011 at revising knowledge at the mental model level called holistic confrontation e in which the learner compares and contrasts a diagram of his or her flawed mental model to an expert model e to instruction Keywords: aimed at revising knowledge at the false belief level e in which the learner is prompted to self-explain Learning Conceptual change the expert model alone. We found evidence that participants who engaged in holistic confrontation were Comparison more likely to acquire a correct mental model, and a deeper understanding of the systems of relations in Mental models the model than those who were prompted to self-explain the expert model. The results are discussed in Self-explanation terms of their implications for science instruction. -
Discourse Analysis As Theory and Method
Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method Marianne Jorgensen Louise J. Phillips eBook covers_pj orange.indd 67 21/4/08 14:52:02 prelims.qxd 9/12/02 5:02 PM Page i Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method prelims.qxd 9/12/02 5:02 PM Page ii prelims.qxd 9/12/02 5:02 PM Page iii Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips SAGE Publications London • Thousand Oaks • New Delhi prelims.qxd 9/12/02 5:02 PM Page iv © Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips 2002 First published 2002 Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, this publication may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form, or by any means, only with the prior permission in writing of the publishers, or in the case of reprographic reproduction, in accordance with the terms of licences issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside those terms should be sent to the publishers. SAGE Publications Ltd 6 Bonhill Street London EC2A 4PU SAGE Publications Inc 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320 SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd 32, M-Block Market Greater Kailash - I New Delhi 110 048 British Library Cataloguing in Publication data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 0 7961 7111 4 ISBNISBN: 0 79610761971114 7112 2 (pbk) Library of Congress Control Number available Typeset by C&M Digitals (P) Ltd., Chennai, India Printed in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall prelims.qxd 9/12/02 5:02 PM Page v Contents Preface vii Acknowledgements ix 1. -
Mental Models in Expert Physics Reasoning. INSTITUTION California Univ., Berkeley
DOCUMENT RESUME ED 285 736 SE 048 324 AUTHOR Roschelle, Jeremy; Greeno, James G. TITLE Mental Models in Expert Physics Reasoning. INSTITUTION California Univ., Berkeley. SPONS AGENCY Office of Naval Research, Washington, D.C. Personnel and Training Branch. REPORT NO GA-2 PUB DATE Jul 87 CONTRACT N00014-85-K-0095 NOTE 29p.; For related documents, see SE 048 323-327. PUB TYPE Reports Research/Technical (143) EDRS PRICE MF01/PCO2 Plus Postage. DESCRIPTORS *Physics; *Problem Solving; Science Education; *Science Instruction; Sciences IDENTIFIERS *Experts; *Mental Models ABSTRACT Proposed is a relational framework for characterizing experienced physicists' representations of physics problem situations and the process of constructing these representations. A representation includes a coherent set of relations among: (1) a mental model of the objects in the situation, along with their relevant properties and relations; (2) a mental model of theoretical idealizations of objects; and (3) parameter histories based on mental simulations of both models. Evidence from protocols and a small experiment support a conclusion that experienced physicists' processes of representing problem situations (a) use informal commonsense knowledge, including envisionment of objects in the situations, and (b) are interactive, with mutual. influences between informal knowledge and their technical, theorc.t.cal knowledge. Also described are characteristics of the mental models that represent problem situations and the process of constructing them, drawing from work by artificial intelligence researchers on qualitative process models, and specifying several categories of rules that would be needed for an implementation of the system as a simulation program. (Author/RH) ********************k****2********************************************* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document. -
Constructing Mental Model Paradigms for Teaching Electronic Resources
Volume 2, 1999 Approved January 1999 ISSN: 1523-4320 www.ala.org/aasl/slr Constructing Mental Model Paradigms for Teaching Electronic Resources Julie I. Tallman, Associate Professor, Department of Instructional Technology, The University of Georgia, and Lyn Henderson, Senior Lecturer, School of Education, James Cook University of North Queensland, Australia Library media specialists activate numerous mental models when teaching electronic information literacy database access, research, and retrieval in the context of authentic school assignments. The paper identifies these models and examines what occurred when the mental models in a study sample interconnected in the complex changing environment of a lesson. Discussion focuses on the changes to the mental models the library media specialists held with respect to the electronic database, the role of the library media specialist, the lesson goals, and their teaching strategies. Findings suggest that (a) most of the library media specialists’ mental models of teaching with electronic databases were influenced by their models of teaching access, research, and retrieval with print resources and (b) even though many library media specialists identified the necessity to incorporate mental model changes for more effective teaching, these were not sufficient to counteract their habituated teaching behaviors. New policy thrusts in education are increasing the range of electronic learning technologies for use by students, placing them as central to the core curriculum, and calling for equitable access to information via these technologies (Tallman 1998). Part of this equity includes individualized instruction to help students “develop a systematic mode of inquiry to gain physical and intellectual access to information and ideas that reflect diversity of experiences, opinions, and social and cultural perspectives” (American Association of School Librarians and Association for Educational Communications and Technology 1988, 29). -
Models in the Mind the Mental Models Theory of Reasoning
Models in the Mind The Mental Models Theory of Reasoning: Refinements and Exten- sions. Edited by Walter Schaeken, Andr´eVandierendonck, Walter Schroyens, and G´eryd'Ydewalle. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. How do people reason about the what follows from certain assumptions? How do they think about implications between statements. According to one theory, people try to use a small number of mental rules of inference to construct an argument for or proof of a relevant conclusion from the assump- tions (e.g., Rips 1994). According to a competing theory, people construct one or more mental models of the situation described in the assumptions and try to determine what conclusion fits with the model or models constructed (e.g., Johnson-Laird 1983, 2006). The present collection offers eleven con- tributions to the mental models theory. Specific theories about such reasoning can be tested by asking subjects what follows from certain assumptions. Subjects can also be asked whether a particular stated conclusion follows or is implied by the assumptions. And subjects can be given problems that seem to require such reasoning, such as the familiar the Wason (1966) selection task. In this task, four cards are placed before a subject on the table. The subject is told that the cards have a letter on one side and a number on the other wide. The subject sees only one side of the cards, e.g. \A 3 B 4". The subject is asked to indicate which of the cards need to be turned over in order to determine whether a certain claim about the cards is correct: for example, the claim that, if there is a vowel on one side, there is an even number on the other side. -
Redeeming Philosophy: a God-Centered Approach to the Big Questions Copyright © 2014 by Vern S
REDEEMING PHILOSOPHY REDEEMING WHO AM I? WHY AM I HERE? WHERE DO I FIND MEANING? Life is full of big questions. The study of philosophy seeks to answer such questions. In his latest book, prolific author Vern Poythress investigates the foundations and limitations of Western philosophy, sketching a distinctly Christian approach to A God-Centered Approach answering basic questions about the nature of humanity, the existence of God, the search for meaning, and the basis for morality. to the Big Questions For Christians eager to engage with the timeless philosophical issues that have perplexed men and women for millennia, this is the place to begin. “This volume makes a timely and welcome contribution to the age-old debate on the relationship between Christian theology and philosophy. I commend Redeeming Philosophy to all concerned with ‘taking every thought captive to obey Christ.’” RICHARD B. GAFFIN JR., Professor of Biblical and Systematic Theology, Emeritus, Westminster Theological Seminary “Poythress has again gotten it right. This book contains a great deal of fresh thinking and REDEEMING careful Christian philosophical work.” JOHN M. FRAME, J. D. Trimble Chair of Systematic Theology and Philosophy, Reformed Theological Seminary, Orlando “Matters of philosophy are often complex and laden with challenging issues. Poythress has written a PHILOSOPHY useful introductory exploration of the relationship between philosophy and the teachings of Scripture.” J. V. FESKO, Academic Dean and Professor of Systematic and Historical Theology, Westminster Seminary California POYTHRESS \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ VERN S. POYTHRESS (PhD, Harvard University; ThD, Stellenbosch University) is professor of New Testament interpretation at Westminster Theological Seminary, where he has taught for over 35 years. -
Maintaining the Mental Model: an Exploratory Study of Dialogic Processes on Good Teaching Practice
Pedagogy and the Human Sciences Volume 3 Issue 1 Article 1 2013 Maintaining the Mental Model: An Exploratory Study of Dialogic Processes on Good Teaching Practice Margaret Koepke Fox Suffolk University, [email protected] Debra A. Harkins Suffolk University, [email protected] Kurt W. Fischer Harvard University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.merrimack.edu/phs Recommended Citation Fox, M. K., Harkins, D. A., & Fischer, K. W. (2013). Maintaining the Mental Model: An Exploratory Study of Dialogic Processes on Good Teaching Practice. Pedagogy and the Human Sciences, 3 (1), 1-23. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.merrimack.edu/phs/vol3/iss1/1 This Feature Article is brought to you for free and open access by Merrimack ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pedagogy and the Human Sciences by an authorized editor of Merrimack ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Fox et al.: Dialogic Processes on Teaching Practice Pedagogy and the Human Sciences, 1, No. 3, 2013, pp. 1-23 Maintaining the Mental Model: An Exploratory Study of Dialogic Processes on Good Teaching Practice Margaret Koepke Fox,1 Debra A. Harkins,2 and Kurt W. Fischer3 Abstract. This paper presents some outcomes of an exploratory, mixed-method study that examined mental models of teaching and understanding of learning processes in 26 educators from a small suburb in the Northeastern United States. Participants, in semi- structured written interviews, were asked to rate variables contributing to their mental model of effective teaching. They were then presented with a specific educational problem and asked to provide pedagogic solutions. -
Whitney Bauman CV
Whitney A. Bauman, Ph.D. 11200 SW 8th Street, DM 301A • Miami, FL 33199 • (305) 348-3348 • [email protected] EDUCATION GRADUATE THEOLOGICAL UNION at Berkeley, PhD, Theology and Religious Studies (2002-2007) Dissertation: “From Creatio ex Nihilo to Terra Nullius: The Colonial Mind and the Colonization of Creation.” VANDERBILT DIVINITY SCHOOL, MTS with an Emphasis on Ecological Concerns (1998- 2000) MTS Thesis: “The Illusion of the Isolated Self.” HENDRIX COLLEGE, BA, Psychology (1994-1998) PRINCIPAL FACULTY EXPERIENCE ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES, Florida International University Miami, FL (Fall 2014-Present) ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES, Florida International University Miami, FL (Fall 2008 – Spring 2014) As Associate (and previously Assistant) Professor of Religious Studies, I teach such courses as: Methods in Religious Studies, Religion and Science, Environmental Ethics, Technology and Human Values, BioEthics, and Religion and Queer Theory. Other teaching competencies include: Process Thought, Postcolonial Thought and Religious Studies, and Philosophy of Science. In addition to advising MA Students, I am also serve as the Undergraduate Advisor for our Department. I am affiliated faculty with Women’s Studies and Environmental Studies. FELLOW, HONORS COLLEGE, Florida International University, Miami, FL, (Fall 2011- Present) As a Fellow in the Honors College, I co-teach a two-semester course for first year students that introduces students to “epistemology.” This course focuses broadly on epistemology in the history of western traditions. Whitney A. Bauman 2 OTHER TEACHING/RESEARCH POSITIONS VISITING PROFESSORSHIPS • Summer 2010/2012, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia As Visiting Professor at Gadjah Mada University, I teach a six week graduate course on “Religion and Nature” through the University’s Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies. -
THINKING with MENTAL MODELS 63 and Implementation
Thinking with CHAPTER 3 mental models When we think, we generally use concepts that we it would be impossible for people to make most deci- have not invented ourselves but that reflect the shared sions in daily life. And without shared mental models, understandings of our community. We tend not to it would be impossible in many cases for people to question views when they reflect an outlook on the develop institutions, solve collective action problems, world that is shared by everyone around us. An impor- feel a sense of belonging and solidarity, or even under- tant example for development pertains to how people stand one another. Although mental models are often view the need to provide cognitive stimulation to shared and arise, in part, from human sociality (chapter children. In many societies, parents take for granted 2), they differ from social norms, which were discussed that their role is to love their children and keep them in the preceding chapter. Mental models, which need safe and healthy, but they do not view young children not be enforced by direct social pressure, often capture as needing extensive cognitive and linguistic stimu- broad ideas about how the world works and one’s place lation. This view is an example of a “mental model.”1 in it. In contrast, social norms tend to focus on particu- In some societies, there are even norms against verbal lar behaviors and to be socially enforced. There is immense variation in mental models across societies, including different perceptions of Mental models help people make sense of the way the world “works.” Individuals can adapt their mental models, updating them when they learn that the world—to interpret their environment outcomes are inconsistent with expectations.