SERBIA: MAINTAINING PEACE IN THE PRESEVO VALLEY

Europe Report N°186 – 16 October 2007

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS...... i I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 II. ETHNIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE COMPOSITION ...... 2 III. NATIONAL GAINS, LOCAL LOSSES...... 5 A. PROBLEMATIC PARLIAMENTARY PARTICIPATION...... 5 B. WHY THE BOYCOTT? ...... 6 C. A NEW DECLARATION ...... 7 IV. THE FLOUNDERING COORDINATION BODY...... 8 V. KOSOVO AND PRESEVO ...... 10 A. TIT FOR TAT: THE VALLEY AND MITROVICA ...... 10 B. WILD CARDS: GNJILANE/GJILAN AND ETHNIC CLEANSING...... 11 VI. OUTSTANDING ISSUES...... 13 A. ALBANIAN CONCERNS ...... 13 B. SERBIAN CONCERNS ...... 14 C. EVERYONE’S CONCERN: THE ECONOMY...... 15 VII. CONCLUSION ...... 17 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SERBIA ...... 18 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ...... 19 C. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON EUROPE...... 20 D. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES...... 22

Europe Report N°186 16 October 2007

SERBIA: MAINTAINING PEACE IN THE PRESEVO VALLEY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Southern Serbia’s Albanian-majority Presevo Valley is one All Presevo Valley Albanian politicians want to join of the rare conflict resolution success stories in the former Kosovo and have adopted a platform demanding that the Yugoslavia. Outwardly, it is increasingly normal, with no valley’s three municipalities be awarded to it in the event major incidents in over three years. Yet, tensions linger: Kosovo is partitioned. But those same politicians mostly massive unemployment is still the single largest problem know this is not realistic: Belgrade and its security forces but the shadow of Kosovo’s future status darkens will not permit it. In the event anti-Serb violence breaks the political landscape. How Kosovo’s final status is out in Kosovo, both Albanian and Serbian extremists may determined in the next months will have a profound impact. wish to foment incidents in the valley, Albanians in the If formal partition or large-scale violence accompanies hope of uniting it with Kosovo or pressuring Belgrade independence, the peace could unravel; in a worst case to give up partition and Serbs with the hope of using the scenario, ethnic cleansing in southern Serbia would be cover of violence next door to ethnically cleanse the valley. accompanied by significant, cross-boundary, two-way Some in Serbia wish to see population transfers between refugee flows. All parties – local Albanian politicians, the Kosovo’s Serbian enclaves and southern Serbia. Serbian government and the international community – need to work with greater urgency on developing the Kosovo’s unresolved status and Belgrade’s resulting lack region’s economy and ensuring that developments in of clear policy direction are hampering the political and Kosovo do not disrupt its peaceful progress. economic changes needed to move forward on many critical issues in the area, for Serbs and Albanians alike. In 2001 the international community – NATO, the U.S. As life has seemed to become more normal, donor and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in interest has declined; Belgrade wants to close the special Europe (OSCE) in particular – working in close cooperation Coordination Body (CB) that supervises implementation with Serbia’s authorities, successfully negotiated an end to of the Konculj Agreement and transfer its competencies an armed Albanian insurgency in the valley (the Konculj to the regular government institutions. Agreement). Since then substantial donor and Serbian government investment has created noticeable albeit slow For now at least, southern Serbia’s Albanian politicians and progress, including the formation of multi-ethnic local population eschew any violent attempts to achieve union governments, joint Albanian-Serb police patrols with an independent Kosovo, but rogue elements operating and improvements in the Albanian-language media. from Kosovo may wish to stir the pot. To maintain the hard- Importantly, for the first time since 2000 Albanians won peace in the difficult days ahead, the international participated in national politics, electing a representative community will need to be engaged, pressing both to Serbia’s parliament in the January 2007 elections. Belgrade and Albanian politicians to fulfil all aspects of the Nevertheless, education reform and integration of Konculj Agreement, while focusing more attention on the Albanians into the judiciary and other public organs remain local economy. At the same time, the Serbian government disappointing. should revitalise the Coordination Body (CB), which despite its problems, performs a valuable function. Grievances abound on both sides. Most local Albanians feel peace has not delivered an end to tensions with Serb RECOMMENDATIONS security forces or the promised prosperity. Serbs feel the Albanians are a disloyal, irredentist minority, which To Contact Group Embassies (France, Germany, continues to flout Serbian sovereignty and endanger what Italy, Russia, the UK and U.S.) in Belgrade and has traditionally been an economically important north- the OSCE: south trade route. In some instances Albanians, when exercising their newly found majority power against Serbs, 1. Continually urge all parties in southern Serbia to fuel charges of reverse discrimination. refrain from violence, no matter what happens in Kosovo. Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page ii

To the NATO Mission in Kosovo (KFOR): organisations in its operations, and extend its life until at least 2010. 2. Prevent in all circumstances Albanians from ethnically cleansing Serbs from the Kosovo enclaves 5. Prevent security forces, both formal and informal, and any would-be insurgents from crossing the from taking revenge on southern Serbia’s boundary between Kosovo and southern Serbia. Albanian population in the event Kosovo declares independence. To UNDP and International Donors: 6. Stop and begin to reverse the impact of discriminatory employment and investment 3. Extend the life of the MIR2 development program practices in southern Serbia. and work with the governments of Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia on programs to develop the To Albanian Politicians in Southern Serbia: economies in Vranje, Skopje and Pristina in order to better and more fully integrate the multi-ethnic 7. End the boycott of the Coordination Body, population of southern Serbia into economic, social cooperate fully with it, participate in Serbian and political life in those urban centres. political life, particularly national elections, and avoid provocative display of Albanian national To the Government of Serbia: symbols. 4. Improve the effectiveness of the Coordination Belgrade/Pristina/Brussels, 16 October 2007 Body, including by involving civil society

Europe Report N°186 16 October 2007

SERBIA: MAINTAINING PEACE IN THE PRESEVO VALLEY

I. INTRODUCTION 1992, an overwhelming majority of ethnic Albanians in the Presevo Valley expressed the desire that their part of southern Serbia join Kosovo. During and after the Kosovo In May 2001, the Serbian republic government and what conflict, state security forces and police harassed this local was then still the Yugoslav government1 – helped by strong population, in some cases torturing and executing civilians. NATO mediation – reached a settlement with commanders The history of abuse, combined with the 1999 success of of the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and their ethnic kin in Kosovo, gave many Albanians reason Bujanovac (UCPMB), thus ending a seventeen-month, to support the small groups of fighters who began to low-grade insurgency by ethnic Albanians in the three organise under the banner of the UCPMB in early 2000, Serbian municipalities east of the Kosovo boundary with support from Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) line.2 The Albanians signed what became known as elements inside Kosovo, to attack police and army units. the “Konculj Agreement” and pledged to “demilitarise, demobilise, disarm and disband” the UCPMB in exchange In 2001, after fighting in which about 100 people were for guarantees that their fighters would be amnestied, killed and 12,500 Albanians fled the area, NATO convinced refugees allowed to return, a multi-ethnic police force UCPMB commanders to lay down their arms in exchange formed and Albanians integrated into public institutions for Serbian government guarantees. In May of that year, from which they had been excluded for decades.3 A the Yugoslav army (VJ) and interior ministry units (MUP) detailed blueprint, with goals and timelines, was drawn began a phased reoccupation of the Ground Security Zone up by Serbia’s then deputy premier, Nebojsa Covic (the (the area within five kilometres of Kosovo, demilitarised “Covic Plan”).4 by Serbian forces after the 1999 Kosovo war), in which the post-Milosevic government demonstrated that it had Albanians are a majority in Presevo and Bujanovac and largely abandoned the former regime’s heavy-handed – at least on paper – a sizeable minority in Medvedja. tactics. Since then, a significant number of Albanian Decades of institutionalised discrimination were extended refugees have returned to the three municipalities, 5 and sharpened by Slobodan Milosevic in the late 1980s. primarily their more mountainous, western regions. In an unofficial referendum organised by their leaders in Serbian military deployments – present and projected – emphasise defence of Presevo as apparently the country’s 6 highest defence priority. 1 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which included only Montenegro and Serbia, was formed in 1992 and replaced in Travelling to the Presevo Valley today, one cannot help 2003 by the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, which in but observe that, outwardly, there have been remarkable turn dissolved into its component republics in June 2006 after changes since the insurgency ended. A visitor with no Montenegro voted in a referendum for independence. See Crisis knowledge of that period would be hard pressed to find Group Europe Briefing N°44, Montenegro’s Referendum, 30 May 2006. 2 Crisis Group has written three earlier reports on the Presevo Valley: Europe Report N°116, Peace in Presevo: Quick Fix 5 There is no official tally of the refugees, and estimates vary. or Long Term Solution?, 10 August 2001; Europe Report The situation is complicated by the inability to count precisely N°152, Southern Serbia’s Fragile Peace, 9 December 2003; who has gone abroad as a guest worker and who has resettled and Europe Briefing N°43, Southern Serbia: In Kosovo’s in Kosovo. Many who have permanently resettled elsewhere Shadow, 27 June 2006. returned temporarily for the 2002 census, primarily in Medvedja. 3 The demilitarisation statement was signed by Shefqet Musliu of The OSCE estimates that very few have permanently returned the UCPMB and Shawn F. Sullivan, NATO Head of Office in to Medvedja and that as many as 2,500 still remain outside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in Konculj, 20 May 2001. that municipality. Figures for Bujanovac and Presevo are more 4 The pledges of the Serbian and Yugoslav authorities were difficult to calculate given the constant flux of students and outlined in a May 2001 joint statement of the government’s guest workers and family members that come and go between Coordination Body (CB) for Southern Serbia and the Republican Kosovo and the Presevo Valley. Crisis Group interview, and Federal governments. The complete Covic Plan was publicly Martin Brook, OSCE field officer, Bujanovac, October 2007. released as a small booklet, “Program for the Solution of the 6 See Crisis Group Europe Report N°174, An Army for Kosovo? Crisis in the Pcinja District”, 2001. 28 July 2006, p. 25 Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 2 signs of anything out of the ordinary. The anti-tank barriers II. ETHNIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE and police checkpoints are gone. Substantial infrastructure COMPOSITION investments seem to have paid off: the formerly deeply pot-holed roads have been repaved, even away from the 7 main urban areas. The police and army presence, though The Presevo Valley is a region of strategic economic still significant, is far less obtrusive. New construction is importance to Serbia. More properly known as the upper everywhere: private homes, gas pumps, hotels, restaurants, Morava Valley, it is relatively fertile, with tall mountains even the occasional business or shop. The valley seems to the east separating it from Bulgaria and lower mountains at peace, its towns and villages vital, its markets lively. to the west separating it from Kosovo. Part of the range With each passing year there is an increased feeling of and basin topography that characterises the Balkans, it is security and normalcy. an increment of the historic land corridor that leads from Central Europe’s Pannonian plain and gives Serbia access During summer months the streets are crowded with the via Macedonia to the Greek port of Thessaloniki, long late model, expensive German cars of guest workers a key transhipment point for its imports and exports. returning on holiday from the European Union (EU). It contains Serbia’s main north-south rail line and is Long lines of vehicles in wedding processions seem the the route for a projected major motorway, Corridor 10, rule, as the vacationing returnees choose the summer connecting Greece to Central Europe. It could also be months for courtship and marriage. The impression is of the route of possible future oil or natural gas pipelines. peace, calm and energy. The municipalities of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac But off the beaten path, in the mountains to the west, many are located in the Republic of Serbia, bounded by Kosovo small villages are still empty, their residents having either to the west and Macedonia to the south. Presevo and fled, been driven out by Serbian security forces or departed Bujanovac are part of the Pcinje administrative district for economic reasons. Along the top of these mountains (Pcinjski Okrug) centred in Vranje; Medvedja is part runs the boundary with UN-governed Kosovo, which of the Jablanica district. They have Serbia’s largest is likely to declare independence shortly after the 10 concentration of ethnic Albanians. According to the 2002 December 2007 reporting deadline for the Contact census, the ethnic composition is:9 Group’s troika.8

Whether the Presevo Valley avoids negative spillover Serbs Albanians Roma from Kosovo independence depends on several factors. These include whether Serbia’s dysfunctional and Presevo 2,984 31,098 322 distracted government is willing and able to be proactive (8.55%) (89.09%) (0.92%) in providing adequate institutional mechanisms to resolve Albanian grievances and rein in nationalist paramilitary Bujanovac 14,782 23,681 3,867 elements and their sympathisers within its security (34.14%) (54.69%) (8.93%) structures; whether Kosovo is formally partitioned and, if so, whether ethnic violence results; and how Presevo Medvedja 7,163 2,816 109 Valley Serbs and Albanians respond to the developments. (66.57%) (26.17%) (1.0%)

This report assesses the security and political situation in Medvedja, completely rural, has only about 10,000 southern Serbia and the potential for spillover from the residents. Prior to the recent conflict, some 70 per cent Kosovo status negotiations. It also addresses economic were Serbs, the remainder Albanians. However, almost development, which all observers consider the single most all the Albanians fled to Kosovo, and only some 800 have important factor impacting on long-term stability. returned. Albanians came back by bus to vote in the 4 June 2006 municipal elections, but in relatively small numbers, and their parties won only seven of the 35 council seats.10

9 See “Zavod za statistiku ‘Saopstenje CH31’”, Republic of 7 Since 2001 the lion’s share of investment in the three Serbia, Br. 295, god.LII, 24 December 2002. Each municipality municipalities has gone to infrastructure projects, in particular also has a statistically insignificant number of other minorities. road work. See the Serbian Government Coordination Body’s 10 The two Albanian parties are the Party for Democratic Action publication “Socio-ekonomska analiza opstina Presevo, (PDD), which won four seats, and the Party for Democratic Bujanovac i Medvedja”, August 2007. Integration (PDI), which won three seats. Crisis Group interview, 8 See Crisis Group Europe Report Nº185, Breaking the Kosovo Martin Brook, OSCE field officer, Bujanovac, September 2007. Stalemate: Europe’s Responsibility, 21 August 2007. The PDI is a marginal party that advocates uniting the Presevo

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 3

The top four vote getters for mayor were all Serbs. Given depopulated, entirely through natural processes. Nine the demographics in Medvedja and the lack of enthusiasm Albanian villages in the Ground Security Zone were also among Albanian refugees in Kosovo for returning, depopulated.14 there seems little possibility of a destabilising irredentist movement in the municipality. Its politics largely falls The Serbian government is often perceived as biased into patterns seen in similar regions of Serbia, where against Albanians. In the past this was certainly true. local politicians form coalitions often distinct from ethnic Since the Konculj Agreement, tensions have decreased considerations, based largely on local needs and conditions. substantially but official discrimination continues in some Indeed, in Medvedja the mayoral post was won not areas, and the legacy of decades of discrimination will not by an ethnic party but by the leader of a local citizens’ be undone overnight. group, “For Upper Jablanica”. The regional administrative centre in Vranje is dominated Bujanovac has the most complex ethnic balance, by Serbs, most of whom continue to support extreme approximately 55 per cent Albanian, 34 per cent Serb nationalist political parties and policies and are often and 9 per cent Roma. Mayor Nagip Arifi claims that virulently anti-Albanian. Its government is still controlled in addition to the 42,330 residents counted in the census, by the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and the Serbian there are 10,760 Albanian guest workers in Western Radical Party (SRS), whose leaders – the late Slobodan Europe, who, if included, would change the ethnic balance Milosevic and Vojislav Seselj, respectively – were indicted to 64 per cent Albanian and 27 per cent Serb.11 In the for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for 15 town centre, the three groups live in almost equal numbers, the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. The though the large settlement of Veliki Trnovac (around interior ministry still has police in Vranje who served in 10,000) is almost entirely Albanian. Presevo is almost Kosovo and may have been associated with war crimes 90 per cent Albanian. and atrocities there during 1998-1999. Their presence concerns many Albanians. The usually absent guest workers have a significant impact on economic life. Each municipality also has a statistically Official discrimination is most evident in the Serbian insignificant number of other ethnicities. government’s investment in the three municipalities, which clearly favours areas where Serbs have a prospect of Long-term demographic trends seem to favour the maintaining their majority. In 2006 Belgrade invested Albanians. Serbia is a greying nation, with an average substantially more per capita in Medvedja municipality age of 38.9 years in central regions and Vojvodina. In than in the two Albanian majority municipalities. Presevo, southern Serbia the average age is even greater, with the with an 8.5 per cent Serbian population, received only exception, due to the high Albanian birth rates there, of 35 per cent of the per capita investment of Medvedja, Bujanovac and Presevo.12 Of Bujanovac’s 1,400-plus high where Serbs are 68 per cent of the population. Bujanovac, school students, slightly over 900 are Albanians, and only some 500 are Serbs. There is a similar imbalance in the 13 six Albanian and four Serbian elementary schools. 14 “Nestaju Sela na jugu Srbije”, Politika, 27 February 2007. The entire south of Serbia is impoverished, across ethnic 15 In the January 2007 parliamentary elections, the SRS received lines. Many villages lack electricity, telephones, water and 31.7 per cent, the SPS 12.63 per cent in Vranje. In the December paved roads. The absence of economic opportunities and 2002 Serbian presidential elections, Seselj received 73 per cent of the closure of state-owned companies have forced many the vote in Vranje, B92, 26 December 2003. All statistics local residents to seek jobs in urban areas or abroad. This are from the CeSID web site, http://www.cesid.org/rezultati/sr_ population outflow, combined with ethnic cleansing jan_2007/img/opstine_srbija-rezultati_107.xls. Vranje is during the 2000-2001 insurgency and an aging Serbian dominated politically and economically by a former Milosevic population, seems to be taking its toll throughout the ally, Dragan Tomic, who controls the city’s most significant employer, the Simpo Company. The court system is notoriously region. In recent years seven Serbian villages, all without corrupt, and local Serb human rights activists assert that collusion electricity and outside the Ground Security Zone, were between officials is rampant. Under Milosevic’s constitution, Serbia became far more centralised, as Belgrade removed all real budgetary and revenue control from the local Valley with Kosovo. Its voters are primarily Medvedja refugees municipal administrations. Serbian domination of the regional who have settled permanently in Kosovo. administration in Vranje means that Albanians from the three 11 Crisis Group interview, Nagip Arifi, Bujanovac Mayor, July municipalities often feel they have little prospect of gaining a fair 2007. hearing from regional institutions. Faced with the corrupt and 12 “Vojvodina kao gerontoloski centar”, Dnevnik, 23 September anti-Albanian administration in Vranje, they increasingly call 2007. for decentralisation similar to what they see proposed for Serbs 13 Crisis Group interview, Nagip Arifi, Bujanovac Mayor, July inside Kosovo. Crisis Group interviews, Suzana Anti-Ristic, 2007. human rights activist, and Vojkan Ristic, journalist, July 2007.

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 4

34 per cent Serb, received only 32 per cent of the per capita seven in the criminal court. The health and other municipal investment of Medvedja.16 inspection services employ no Albanians. In the local tax administration, only four of 34 are Albanians. Two of 38 2006 CB17 2000-2006 CB in the police administration are Albanian. The police force itself, however, is far better integrated, with 105 Albanians Investment per Investment per 19 capita (Euros) capita (Euros) and 185 Serbs, though all commanders are Serbs. The perceptions of bias is aggravated in Bujanovac by Presevo 71.76 374.17 the nature of the current governing coalition. In the 4 June 2006 city assembly election, Albanian parties took Bujanovac 65.86 327.73 22 of the 41 seats (Party of Democratic Action, PDD, thirteen; Party for Democratic Progress, PDP, nine), Medvedja 205.72 1786.17 while Serb parties won seventeen (SRS, twelve; DOS coalition, five).20 This suggests Belgrade is using state funds to favour areas on the basis of ethnicity, while expecting donors to make Rather than create a multi-ethnic coalition government with up shortfalls. Some of this substantial discrepancy may Serbs and Roma, the two Albanian parties, headed by come from the difference in population, making any unit Mayor Nagip Arifi (PDD) and Jonuz Musliu (PDP) acted of investment appear somewhat greater in Medvedja than against the advice of the Organisation for Security and it otherwise might (e.g., a kilometre of road), but Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and created a mono-ethnic indications available to Crisis Group suggest the city government. This has resulted in Serbs being replaced community does indeed receive a disproportionate share in many key functions, particularly in the city assembly. of public investment in the region. This does not go unnoticed by the Albanians, and it makes them feel like This Albanian government has begun to shift employment second-class citizens. patterns to reflect local demographics. Whereas in 2002 only four of 120 municipal employees were Albanians Another area where bias is all too evident is employment. and one Roma, today 58 of 137 are Albanians and five In Bujanovac, the effects of decades of discrimination are Roma. Few, if any, Serb municipal employees speak clearly visible. Yet, while old tensions endure, new ones Albanian, especially those who interface with the public. are being created as the Albanian mono-ethnic municipal government tries to wrestle, often ham-fistedly, with the This increase in minority representation has come with a legacy of decades of institutionalised discrimination. price. To change the ethnic balance on a limited municipal budget, the Serb director of the health centre, the president The numbers are telling in the municipality’s state-owned of the governing board of the kindergarten, the secretary and recently privatised enterprises. The water bottler Heba of the municipal assembly and the directors of the has 518 employees, of whom 500 are Serbs; the non-Serbs governing boards of the directorate for construction were all work on the loading dock. The tobacco factory employs dismissed. 21 200, of whom 195 are Serbs, even though most of the tobacco is grown by Albanians. The Megal company 18 employs 189, of whom only thirteen are Albanians. 19 Ibid. In Presevo, where Albanians make up nearly 90 per The figures are similarly striking in municipal and cent of the population and have long controlled the municipal governmental bodies. In the local Red Cross, 49 of 53 government, the ethnic balance in municipal and public sector employees are Serbs. In the health centre, Albanians are jobs roughly reflects local demographics. For example, its pre- only 48 of the 245 employees. In public companies such schools have 64 employees, of whom 56 are Albanian, seven as the post office (PTT), electric distribution (EPS) and Serb and one Roma. In the public company Moravia, 41 of forestry, approximately 5 per cent are Albanians. One of 47 employees are Albanian. At the Cultural Centre 28 of 32 ten judges in the municipal court is Albanian and one of employees are Albanian, four are Serbs. Crisis Group interview, Ragmi Mustafa, July 2007. 20 Both the Serb and Albanian blocs lost one seat to the Roma, who had previously either not voted, split their votes among 16 See the CB document “Socio-ekonomska analiza opstina different Roma parties that failed to pass the threshold, or had Presevo, Bujanovac i Medvedja”, August 2007. To try and voted for Serb or Albanian parties. balance out these discriminatory practices, between 2000 and 21 The municipal assembly also wanted to dismiss the directors 2005 international donors invested €314 per capita in Presevo, of the pharmacy, the sports centre and the tourism organisation €276 in Bujanovac and €395 in Medvedja. but a split within Musliu’s LDP caused four of its delegates to 17 Coordination Body (CB) of the Serbian government. leave the party and boycott sessions, leaving it unable to function, 18 Crisis Group interview, Nagip Arifi, Bujanovac Mayor, July as the Albanian parties refuse to create a working majority with 2007. the Serbs. Crisis Group interview, Martin Brook, OSCE field

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 5

This prompted an outcry from a local human rights III. NATIONAL GAINS, LOCAL LOSSES organisation and the local Orthodox Church, which feel that Serbs are now the targets of reverse discrimination.22 Members of a number of Serbian political parties (DSS, In 2007 southern Serbia’s Albanian population took a DS, SPO, G17+, SDP and SPS) sent a protest letter to significant step towards further integration into national Belgrade in February 2007 complaining that 80 per cent political life with the election of Riza Halimi to Serbia’s 23 of municipal financing is going to Albanians. Albanian parliament. The election showed not only a willingness politicians respond that this is necessary to undo decades to pursue closer political engagement with Belgrade but of discrimination. It is not surprising that Serbs, who ran also perhaps a growing acceptance that Presevo’s future Bujanovac unilaterally for most of the twentieth century, lies within Serbia, not Kosovo. The election illustrated complain when they begin to lose their jobs, particularly clearly the political fault lines among local Albanians. given the poor local economy and the resultant inability to use those positions to award political patronage. But the Albanians in the Presevo Valley are far from unified heavy-handed manner in which the Albanians have taken politically; most of their disputes are a legacy of the over the municipality has not helped matters. 2000-2001 insurgency. Halimi, then Presevo’s mayor, led moderate forces urging cooperation with Belgrade, while the UCPMB, impatient with his non-confrontational style, was divided into Presevo and Bujanovac wings, which supported Ragmi Mustafa’s Democratic Albanian Party (PDA) and Jonuz Musliu’s PDP. A PDA founder, Shaqir Shaqiri, told Crisis Group that the UCPMB branch in Presevo “invested in PDA and its leader against Riza Halimi”.24

The split continues and has been aggravated by the emergence of splinter parties, such as Skender Destani’s Democratic Union of the Valley (DUD), made up of those who opposed Halimi’s allegedly authoritarian leadership of the PDD, and Orhan Rexhepi’s PDP faction, comprised of former UCPMB insurgents and their sympathisers, as well as defectors from Musliu’s PDP. The primary reasons for fragmentation often involve how “patriotic” one side is, or how willing it is to cooperate with Belgrade on integrating Albanians into Serbian political life. Other differences involve personalities and possibly business interests.

A. PROBLEMATIC PARLIAMENTARY PARTICIPATION

Serbia’s January 2007 parliamentary elections were held under new rules that permitted minority parties to avoid the 5 per cent threshold. In practical terms it meant that Albanians had a chance of gaining one or two seats, depending on voter turnouts.25

Albanian parties had boycotted all parliamentary elections officer, Bujanovac, October 2007; “Albanci na svim pozicijama”, since the insurgency in 2000, concerned that participation Glas Javnosti, 10 February 2007. 22 Svetislav Velickovic, president of the Committee for Human Rights, and Bogoljub Milosavljevic, representing the local Orthodox Church, sent a letter to the Serbian government 24 Crisis Group interview, Shaqir Shaqiri, July 2007. in February 2007 protesting the sacking of Serbs and their 25 Had such a threshold been in place earlier, it would have replacement by Albanians. “Albanci na svim pozicijama”, been approximately 15,400 votes for the December 2003 Glas Javnosti, 10 February 2007. parliamentary elections and 19,100 for the December 2000 23 “Program razvoja Bujanovca neprihvatljiv za Srbe”, Politika, parliamentary elections. Voter turnout could have made the 20 February 2007. threshold higher or lower.

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 6 would signal acquiescence to Serbian sovereignty, a minority parties formed a deputies club in parliament to calculation similar to that of Kosovo Albanians under maximise their influence on minority issues.30 Ibrahim Rugova in the 1990s. The international community saw this election as an opportunity to integrate Albanians more fully into Serbia’s political life and urged the Albanian B. WHY THE BOYCOTT? parties to form a coalition with a single list. The OSCE and the U.S. and UK embassies in Belgrade offered support. Musliu and Mustafa claimed a boycott was the only Yet, old enmities and partisan calculations made it difficult way to do something about the gendarmerie’s presence, for the major players to agree. economic underdevelopment, failure to achieve collective rights for Albanians and problems over use of the Albanian On 22 November 2006, the OSCE brought together the language and national symbols.31 The boycott reopened old representatives of the Albanian political parties in the wounds between the PDD, PDA and PDP and left many Bujanovac and Presevo municipal assemblies in an effort speculating about Mustafa’s and Musliu’s inconsistent to get them to agree to form a coalition to contest the behavior. Two factors were frequently cited: the influence elections. Only Halimi’s PDD was prepared to declare its of exiled former UCPMB members in Gnjilane/Gjilan in intent to participate, and then only provisionally, while it Kosovo, and the Presevo-based Fluidi trading company, waited to see what others would do.26 Another OSCE- operated by Mustafa Selajdin, which does extensive sponsored meeting a week later brought no result, other business with Kosovo. than Halimi saying his party would enter the elections alone if no agreement was reached with the other parties.27 Both Musliu and Mustafa were involved in the political arm of the UCPMB during 2000-2001 and maintain close Continued arm-twisting by OSCE and the two embassies ties to the exiles. Halimi, Destani and Arifi claim that the paid off on 4 December, when the four main parties signed two often do the the bidding of those exiles, who tend to an agreement in the OSCE’s Bujanovac office to form be more extreme than those who remained in the valley.32 a coalition, “the Albanians of the Presevo Valley”, with Mustafa told Crisis Group he has close contact with Halimi first on the list, Mustafa second, Musliu third and the Gnjilane/Gjilan exiles but they have no influence in Destani fourth. If the coalition won two only seats, the Presevo.33 second would be shared by Mustafa and Musliu, who would each serve two years.28 As with most Presevo Valley politicians, Mustafa identified with a Kosovo political party, in this case But the coalition rapidly fell apart. On 15 December Hashim Thaci’s PDK.34 His original decision to participate Mustafa pulled out, followed a week later by Musliu, who may have been caused by pressure from Thaci and said in a press release that participation “could be very Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu, who reportedly urged destructive, especially after the resolution of the status of him to cooperate with the U.S. embassy.35 In addition to Kosovo as an independent state”.29 Despite efforts by the maintaining good relations with the Americans, the OSCE and significant private arm-twisting by the U.S. former UCPMB associated with the PDK may have had embassy, neither could be persuaded to return. That left another motive: not wishing to see Halimi, an ally of only Halimi’s PDD and Destni’s DUD in the coalition, the PDK’s rival LDK, win a seat.36 However, Mustafa’s with Destani replacing Mustafa and Presevo Mayor Nagip decision to participate hurt his image in Presevo, where Arifi replacing Musliu on the list. he had run for mayor by portraying Halimi as a “Belgrade-

U.S. Ambassador Michael Polt and UK Ambassador Steven Wordsworth publicly urged the Albanians to vote, 30 as did many other EU embassies. The coalition received The three parties are: the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians 16,953 votes, just sufficient to pass the threshold of 16,077 (SVM), List for Sandzak (LzS), Union of Roma of Serbia and gain one seat. Had Musliu and Mustafa not boycotted, (URS). 31 “Halimi: Podrska proevropskoj opciji”, B92, 4 January 2007. the Albanians would probably have won a second. After 32 Crisis Group interviews, Halimi, Destani and Arifi, 2003, the election, Halimi and representative of three other 2005, 2006, 2007. 33 Crisis Group interview, Ragmi Mustafa, July 2007. Yet others claim that he is under the influence of Fluidi (see below). 26 “Albanske stranke danas o izborima”, Agencija Vranje Press, 34 PDK is the Democratic Party of Kosovo. Halimi admits 28 November 2006. his PDD was always close to Ibrahim Rugova’s LDK, and he 27 “Albanci bez dogovora o zajednickoj listi”, Agencija Vranje profited from this relationship for many years. Press, 29 November 2007. 35 Crisis Group interview, Martin Brook, OSCE field officer, 28 “Halimi nosilac liste za republicke izbore”, Agencija Vranje Bujanovac, July 2007. Press, 5 December 2006. 36 LDK is the Democratic League of Kosovo. Crisis Group 29 “I PDP napustio Koaliciju Albanaca”, Agencija Vranje Press, interviews, former UCPMB members, Gnjilane/Gjilan, July 22 December 2006. 2007.

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 7 controlled politician”.37 UCPMB veterans and other have seen the Fluidi compound bombed” as a result of activists became very vocal. The preseva.com web page dissatisfaction had Mustafa’s stayed in the elections.45 carried “numerous expressions of anger”.38 Mustafa, in other words, was subjected to conflicting pressures.39 Mustafa’s decision to boycott – although strengthening his standing with the UCPMB veterans and other hardliners In discussions with Presevo Valley politicians and – may have made him vulnerable on another front. Thaci Gnjilane/Gjilan UCPMB exiles, the Presevo-based Fluidi and the PDK appear to have frozen relations with the PDA trading company was frequently cited. Destani, Halimi and as a consequence.46 In the meantime, Mustafa has been Arifi have maintained for years that it finances Mustafa and replacing many old UCPMB activists with persons Musliu and also maintains close ties with the UCPMB without a UCPMB background. The U.S. and UK exiles in Gnjilane/Gjilan. Similar views were expressed by embassies have refused to meet with either Musliu or international observers based in the valley. All indicated Mustafa since the boycott. U.S. prestige is very high that Fluidi had significant behind-the-scenes influence in among the Albanians, and interlocutors indicated that local politics.40 A former UCPMB member claimed to its displeasure is weakening Mustafa at the grassroots Crisis Group that Fluidi “cannot run business in Gnjilane/ level, where Albanians see America as a guarantor of Gjilan without the protection of Mustafe Shaqiri and two eventual Kosovo independence. other local commanders”.41 Shaqiri told Crisis Group he was “close” to Fluidi;42 two prominent Albanian politicians said Mustafa took the decision to withdraw C. A NEW DECLARATION from the coalition under pressure from the exiles. On 29 September 2007, representatives of the valley’s five Others are more uncertain and focus on Fluidi itself. largest parties met to discuss forming the long-anticipated Members of the UCPMB exile community in Gnjilane/ national council. Prior to the meeting it was evident that Gjilan told Crisis Group that Fluidi, whose business mostly consensus was still lacking, and it was thought little would operates in Kosovo, strongly suggested to Mustafa that he emerge. However, fourteen men were elected to serve as stay out of the election. A close relative said Mustafa was an Albanian “presidency” until a consensus can be reached under Fluidi’s “permanent control” in the period leading on a national council. The meeting also produced a political up to the elections.43 Inside Kosovo the story is being declaration, to serve as the new political bottom line for spread that Mustafa was physically beaten inside the the valley’s Albanian politicians. It hailed the Ahtisaari Fluidi compound.44 Former UCPMB members in Gnjilane/ plan as the only possible compromise for Kosovo, called Gjilan claimed Fluidi’s business in Kosovo could have for implementing the principles of that plan also in the experienced difficulties had Mustafa participated in the valley and an increase in the international presence elections. An UCPMB exile told Crisis Group that “since in the valley, said the parties would continue working all know Fluidi is financing Ragmi Mustafa, you could towards a national council and criticised the government’s Coordination Body as dysfunctional.47

While establishing a political lowest common 37 Crisis Group interview, former UCMPB member, July 2007. denominator, the meeting and resulting declaration The municipal assembly initiated a recall vote, which Halimi underlined the deep divisions among the Presevo lost. Halimi’s party boycotted the subsequent mayoral election, Albanians that will no doubt continue to weaken for which the turnout was an unusually low 6,489 voters (21 per their position vis-à-vis Belgrade. Serbia dismisses the cent). Crisis Group correspondence, Tom Thorogood, MIR2 declaration as merely an attempt to increase pressure on Program Manager, September 2007. it over Kosovo status.48 38 Crisis Group interview, former UCPMB member, July 2007. 39 Crisis Group interviews, former UCPMB members, Gnjilane/Gjilan, July 2007. Although Sejdiu and Thaci advised them to participate in the elections, others in the PDK suggested a boycott. 40 Crisis Group interviews, Riza Halimi, Skender Destani and Nagip Arifi, July 2007. Crisis Group interviews, Martin Brook, OSCE field officer, Bujanovac, July 2007. 41 Crisis Group interview, former UCMPB member, Gnjilane/ Gjilan, July 2007. 42 A former UCPMB commander told Crisis Group he was 45 Crisis Group interview, former UCMPB member, Gnjilane/ “close” to Fluidi. Crisis Group interviews, Gnjilane/Gjilan, July Gjilan, July 2007. 2007. 46 Crisis Group interviews, former UCPMB members, Gnjilane/ 43 Crisis Group interview, July 2007. Gjilan. July 2007. 44 Crisis Group interview, former UCPMB member, Gnjilane/ 47 Deklarate Politike e KKSHLP, 29 September 2007. Gjilan, July 2007. 48 “Reakcije na deklaraciju Albanaca”, B92, 1 October 2007.

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 8

IV. THE FLOUNDERING resulted in specific action plans, building on which COORDINATION BODY the OSCE suggested reconstructing the CB to include permanent members representing all relevant ministries, the army and police, a secretariat with ten community members, the mayors of the three municipalities as vice- Presevo Valley’s current administrative status was 50 established by the “Covic Plan”,49 which sought to redress presidents and a president. This was done in early 2005. years of institutionalised discrimination and convince The reorganisation proved problematic for some Albanian ethnic Albanians they had an interest in abandoning politicians. Those who decided to cooperate openly found dreams of “eastern Kosovo” and becoming good citizens that when the CB failed to deliver, they lost credibility of Serbia. Due to numerous failures by Belgrade with their electorate. This affected then Presevo Mayor authorities, however, many Albanians feel that the peace Halimi, who lost a recall vote, and caused a split within plan has not fully delivered on either an end to tensions Musliu’s nationalist PDP in Bujanovac. with the security forces or increased prosperity. The present head of the CB is Minister for Labour and The lead institution for dealing with southern Serbia is Social Policy Rasim Ljajic, who is also president of the Coordination Body (CB), which originated in 2000 Serbia’s Council on Cooperation with The Hague as the joint Yugoslav Federal and Serbian Republic Tribunal.51 A Bosniak from the Sandzak region, his is Coordination Body to manage counter-insurgency in the the unenviable role of mediator between an uninterested valley. It had six generals and four civilians then, all Belgrade, which often views southern Serbia through the Serbian/Yugoslav officials, who were to coordinate the prism of the Kosovo conflict and whose security organs activities of the Joint Security Forces (army and interior tend to treat the Albanians as a hostile population, and ministry). After the Konculj Agreement, its focus shifted, and it became responsible for the Covic Plan, with Covic himself as head. The CB initially had final say in all 50 events – political, cultural and social – in the valley but From the outset of its operation, significant problems existed, this has been modified to reflect decreased tensions and and by early 2003 it was apparent the CB was functioning poorly, the unlikelihood of renewed armed conflict. due also to Serbia’s increasing preoccupation with Kosovo and the fact that CB head Nebojsa Covic was trying to juggle both portfolios, with Presevo usually getting the short end. The CB For the first few years, there were no Albanians on the suffered further after Premier Vojislav Kostunica’s Democratic CB, as its main purpose was to coordinate the efforts Party of Serbia (DSS) took office in early March 2004 and began of the Serbian government and its security forces. Many a power struggle with Covic. In late December 2004, the CB was Albanians considered cooperation with it traitorous. In placed under the control of the Coordination Centre for Kosovo, January 2002 the OSCE began roundtable discussions which Covic also led. This failed to improve matters. The CB with three to four representatives from each side on issues received new life only in January 2005, following the shooting such as recognition of diplomas, amnesty for former death of Dashnim Hajrullahu, a sixteen-year old Presevo fighters, economic aid grants and human rights. These Albanian youth, by the army in the border zone with Macedonia. In response to Albanian protests, the Serbian government radically changed its composition, appointing six deputy chairmen, who included then State Union Minister for 49 The plan’s four pillars were: 1) “elimination” of threats to “state Human and Minority Rights Rasim Ljajic, the mayors of the sovereignty” and “territorial integrity”; 2) security, freedom three municipalities, a retired general, Ninoslav Krstic, a police of movement and the right to return to the Presevo Valley, representative, Milisav Markovic, and representatives from line conditioned on the disarmament and disbanding of “terrorists” ministries. Covic continued to serve as its head amid worsening and “demilitarisation of the region”; 3) “development of a relations between him and Kostunica until he was dismissed on multiethnic and multi-confessional society”; and 4) economic 25 August 2005 and replaced on 1 September by Ljajic. On 18 and social development.49 It foresaw a three-year implementation March 2006 a key Albanian political group, the PDP (Democratic period and “integration of the Albanians in[to] the political, Movement for Progress), withdrew in protest over what its leader, government and social system” within two years, including Jonuz Musliu, said was failure to “fulfil the political, economic changes in the laws on elections and self-government and and other expectations of Albanians”. The CB suffered a worse ethnically mixed police patrols. Belgrade offered to end blow on 12 April 2006, when Ljajic resigned. His resignation discrimination against Albanians in politics and public sector was followed by that of the CB vice-president, Dusan Spasojevic, employment. The international community – particularly OSCE, and an announcement from the acting Presevo mayor, Ragmi NATO and the U.S. embassy in Belgrade – has played a crucial Mustafa, that he was suspending cooperation with it. It remained role in keeping the peace and implementing the plan, along with leaderless until June 2006 when, following Montenegro’s two key donor agencies, UNDP, including the MIR programas independence referendum, Belgrade transferred it from the State it leads, and the Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF). Union to the Republic government and asked Ljajic to return. Many non-governmental and multilateral organisations 51 Because he is a Bosniak, Ljajic is often given responsibilities have played important supporting roles in reconstruction, that ethnic Serb politicians shy away from for fear of negative refugee return, democratisation and media training. voter reaction.

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 9 dissatisfied local Albanian politicians, who complain about The Albanians, however, share some of the blame for the unfulfilled economic promises, the slow pace of integration CB’s dysfunctional status. Beginning with the January and hostile police behaviour. With only limited policy 2005 reorganisation, the Serbian government acted in influence, he frequently finds his most effective good faith to improve it but was undermined by Albanian interlocutors in embassies and the international politicians who saw advantage in a more confrontational organisations and agencies dealing with southern Serbia. stance. This has led to gamesmanship, with many His other responsibilities prevent him from devoting full jockeying to avoid being branded as collaborationist. Even energies to the CB. though Presevo Mayor Mustafa, considered to have close ties to the UCPMB, has officially withdrawn support from Ljajic is assisted by two vice-presidents with strong the CB, he continues to work closely with it behind the Belgrade connections, the newcomer Nenad Popovic, scenes. Several Albanian politicians claimed he meets responsible for economic and security matters, and Nenad frequently with Popovic.57 Djurdjevic, responsible for investment. Both also have other government portfolios.52 Belgrade further weakened the CB’s prestige on 8 September 2007, when it announced a decision to Ljajic enjoys respect and goodwill among Serbs, Albanians reorganise and streamline it. This decision was undertaken and the international community alike; there is really no without consulting the three mayors, all of whom were one else in Serbia with similar credibility among ethnic vice-presidents of the CB, or the local Albanian and Serb minorities. International observers in the region, however, political parties. Halimi, the lone Albanian deputy in claim he is too busy with other duties and that the latest Serbia’s parliament, loudly protested not the substance of reorganisations robbed the CB of strong local leadership. the reorganisation but the manner in which it had occurred, They fear there are no longer strong personalities inside in particular that his PDD, the largest Albanian party in the body who could defuse a crisis. There is a sense among the valley, had not been consulted. The party’s leadership Albanian leaders that Ljajic does not have Covic’s political voted demonstratively to withdraw cooperation. In fact, clout, and they want a contact who is both more engaged that withdrawal was only rhetorical.58 The Albanian and powerful.53 mayors of Presevo and Bujanovac subsequently agreed to the government’s plans, although they agreed with Belgrade continues to ignore the CB and often fails Halimi’s criticism of the procedure.59 to engage Albanian politicians seriously. Presevo Mayor Mustafa told Crisis Group he has better access to The recent reorganisation, as well as the inclusion of government ministries in Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo Djurdjevic, indicates that Belgrade is, at least publicly, than in Belgrade and has been able to get the latter to still serious about making the CB function. Yet, the CB receive him only with OSCE help.54 Musliu claims all was supposed to operate for only three years, and the attempts to get Serbian officials at ministerial level or Serbian government is increasingly asking itself when higher to visit meet with silence.55 it will be able to close it and incorporate its activities into the regular line ministries.60 Albanian politicians want The CB is frequently attacked by Albanian politicians, who to keep it,61 and given the often unresponsive nature of rightly charge it fails to live up to its responsibilities. Some Serbia’s institutions and the communication difficulties fear too close cooperation might earn them a reputation as between the security forces and Albanians, it still serves a Quislings. This has led to several boycotts over the years. very valuable function. Belgrade should not rush to shut it Significantly, however, all Albanian politicians interviewed down, especially as difficult days are ahead with Kosovo. by Crisis Group acknowledged a clear need for a functional institution and said they wanted to support the CB but hoped Belgrade would invest the political capital to make it work properly.56

57 Crisis Group interviews, Skender Destani, Ragmi Mustafa, 52 Popovic also runs a thriving private company, ABS Holding, Rasim Ljajic, Nenad Popovic and Riza Halimi, July and as well as dealing with Kosovo economic development September 2007. 53 Crisis Group interviews, two international interlocutors, July 58 Crisis Group interview, Riza Halimi, PDD leader, September 2007. 2007. 54 Crisis Group interview, Ragmi Mustafa, Presevo Mayor, 59 Crisis Group interviews, Rasim Ljajic, Riza Halimi and July 2007. Nenad Popovic, September 2007, Martin Brook, OSCE field 55 Crisis Group interview, Jonuz Musliu, PDP leader, July 2007. officer, Bujanovac, October 2007. 56 Crisis Group interviews, Ragmi Mustafa, Presevo Mayor, 60 Crisis Group interview, Rasim Ljajic, July 2007. Nagip Arifi, Bujanovac Mayor, Riza Halimi, PDD leader, and 61 Crisis Group interviews, Nagip Arifi, Riza Halimi and Ragmi Jonuz Musliu, PDP leader, July and September 2007. Mustafa, July and September 2007.

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 10

V. KOSOVO AND PRESEVO This remains the official position of all Albanian political parties. Albanian politicians refer to it regularly, particularly when the Serbian media discusses partition of The southern Serbia question involves more than the fate Kosovo, and they occasionally refer to their region as “East of three small municipalities. There is a potential for wider Kosovo”. It was reiterated in the 29 September 2007 regional instability stemming from events in and around declaration of the Albanian party assembly. Kosovo Presevo. Spillover from the southern Serbia conflict was a Albanian politicians in Pristina draw a link between key factor in the outbreak of the 2001 crisis in Macedonia the future of the Serb-inhabited territory north of the and again in the brief September 2003 clash in the northern River Ibar in Kosovo and that of the valley, primarily as Macedonian town of Vaksince.62 In 2001 the then UN a counterweight to Belgrade’s effort to divide the UN- 65 Special Envoy for the Balkans, Carl Bildt, warned that any administered territory. Presevo Valley Albanians believe escalation of fighting in the valley could lead to renewed the Pristina politicians are using their cause to score points ethnic cleansing of non-Albanians from Kosovo and drag in Kosovo, to help the Albanians in Presevo and to sober in the ethnic Albanian regions of northern Macedonia.63 Belgrade about partition. After the Kosovo Assembly members unanimously Several factors make the Presevo Valley potentially 66 unstable. Although the insurgency ended six years ago, adopted the Ahtisaari plan on 5 April 2007, many sporadic armed attacks on Serbian security forces Kosovo Albanian politicians tended to agree that the continued well into 2003. Former Presevo Valley valley would have to remain in Serbia. Yet, many of insurgent commanders have told Crisis Group they them see it as a chess piece in the larger game. If formal sent approximately 50 men to Vaksince during the brief partition occurs, Presevo could become a national cause altercation that year between Albanians and Macedonian for Kosovo Albanians. Their parties would likely then security forces. The former UCPMB insurgents maintain compete with each other to champion compensation for the loss, while Presevo Albanian politicians would likely close ties with the former UCK; a partcularly vocal group 67 is located in and around the Kosovo town of Gnjilane/ respond by asserting unification with Kosovo. Gjilan. A senior official in the Albanian southern half of Mitrovica, the divided city in northern Kosovo, reflected this when A. TIT FOR TAT: THE VALLEY AND he told Crisis Group that “the only way to let northern MITROVICA Serbs go with Serbia is if the Gazivode [Gazivoda] Lake remains in Kosovo and the entire Presevo Valley is Southern Serbia’s Albanians are united in their desire to joined to Kosovo, while at the same time no new [Serb] join Kosovo but also realise it is unlikely to happen. On municipalities would be added south of the Ibar….if the north is not compensated with Presevo Valley, I will join 14 January 2006 all the Albanian assembly members from 68 the three municipalities adopted a platform calling for Vetevendosje”, the nationalist movement led by Albin 69 Albanians in southern Serbia to be given a high degree Kurti. An official of Ramush Haradinaj’s AAK party of decentralisation and territorial autonomy, strikingly told Crisis Group that if Kosovo was partitioned, “we will not give it up for nothing”, clearly referring to similar to what Belgrade seeks for Kosovo Serbs. They 70 stated that “in the case of…eventual changes of [Kosovo] Presevo, while a PDK official said that “if Belgrade borders, the assemblymen will work towards the unification of the Presevo Valley with Kosovo”.64 The document referenced the outcome of the 1992 referendum. Martin Brook, OSCE field officer, Bujanovac, and Riza Halimi, PDD leader, 2006 and 2007. 65 Crisis Group Europe Report Nº165, Bridging Kosovo’s Mitrovica Divide, 13 September 2005. 62 Crisis Group interview, former UCPMB commander. 66 Europe Crisis Group Report Nº182, No Good Alternatives The best analysis of the links between southern Serbia and the To The Ahtisaari Plan, p. 6. Macedonia conflict of 2001 is “Crisis in Macedonia: Minority 67 Crisis Group interviews, Halil Selimi and Sadik Ademi, Politics in Southeast Europe”, Ethnobarometer, working paper Pristina, July 2007. 6, Rome, January 2002. 68 Crisis Group interview, Mitrovica, 13 September 2007. 63 Crisis Group Europe Report No149, Macedonia: No Room 69 Former Kosovo Liberation Army commander Ramush for Complacency, 23 October 2003. Haradinaj was briefly Kosovo’s prime minister before being 64 Presevo Declaration, 14 January 2006, in Crisis Group’s indicted for war crimes in March 2005. See Crisis Group possession. The signatories appeared well aware of political Europe Report N°163, Kosovo after Haradinaj, 26 May realities: only five of the 65 favoured the term “East Kosovo”, 2005. His Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) partners indicating a willingness to use language less inflammatory to the larger LDK in Kosovo’s provisional government. Serbs. The document was clearly prepared with assistance from 70 Crisis Group interview, AAK officials, July and September Pristina, in particular from Veton Surroi. Crisis Group interviews, 2007.

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 11 supports the north, the international community cannot politicians as a sign that this issue has little popularity at pressure Pristina to refrain from supporting the Presevo present among the majority of Albanians in the valley.76 Valley”.71 Indeed, that population appears unhappily reconciled to Some Kosovo Albanian politicians have sought to help remaining in Serbia, even if Kosovo becomes independent. their ethnic kin in the valley. A member of Veton Surroi’s Mustafa publicly stated in April 2006 that “Albanians ORA party72 noted that “we are seeking opportunities have said farewell to weapons forever” and committed to help them that will be regulated by law”, while another himself and his party to acting within the political noted that the most Kosovo could realistically do is process.77 More recently, both Mustafa and Musliu told offer an education assistance fund. Pristina is planning Crisis Group there will be no violence, even if Kosovo is to support a number of Presevo Valley students at its formally partitioned, and that though they will not give up university, provided they agree to return and work in the the goal of joining Kosovo, they will work for change valley for at least five years. The hope is that this will through political means.78 Musliu did add, however, that build capacity in the local municipalities.73 if Serbs used violence against them, Albanians would respond with violence. There are significant differences between Kosovo and southern Serbia, however, most noticeably that the latter For all the heat being generated by the Kosovo status issue, is separated from Kosovo by mountains and does not valley Albanians have done little to organise politically fall within its natural geographical boundaries. Serbian for their goals. Serbia’s constitution and laws permit ethnic security forces are posted along the tops of ridge lines, minorities to form national councils, which Bosniaks, controlling transit. Hungarians and Croats have done. The issue of an Albanian national council has been a political hot potato Serbia has made good faith efforts to end the insurgency in the valley. Some say it is a good thing and would help peacefully and accommodate the Albanian population’s Albanians gain further influence in Serbian politics. Others demands. This has occurred with careful international consider it collaborationist and brand those who favour it supervision, which has generally given Belgrade a passing as traitors. Interestingly, the positions of politicians tend grade. Any attempt to join the Presevo Valley to Kosovo to vary, depending on whether they are in power. Mustafa would meet strong international opposition. Yet pressures opposed a national council for years. Now that he is still exist for unification. On 1 April 2007, Sali Salihu of Presevo’s mayor, he has been trying to bring the Albanian the Bujanovac branch of Ragmi Mustafa’s DPA called for parties together to form one. His opponent, Halimi, who unification of “East Kosovo” with Kosovo. In so doing, he for years pressed for a national council, still favours it, seems to have gone too far for Mustafa, who called him but the two are deadlocked over how their parties would on the carpet and referred publicly to his comments as be represented.79 An attempt to form a national council an April Fool’s joke.74 on 29 September 2007 again failed, due to the parties’ inability to agree on power sharing. On 15 June 2007, the two most nationalist of the Albanian politicians, Presevo Mayor Mustafa and Bujanovac Deputy Mayor Musliu, called for UCPMB veterans and B. WILD CARDS: GNJILANE/GJILAN AND their supporters to rally in Presevo for union with Kosovo. ETHNIC CLEANSING Only approximately 100 persons showed up, waving the Albanian flag and singing the Albanian national anthem.75 In spite of the commitment of local politicians to peaceful The low turnout has been interpreted by other Albanian means, outside factors could destabilise the valley. There is a significant diaspora of refugees and ex-UCPMB members in exile in Kosovo, primarily around the town of Gnjilane/Gjilan. Former UCK and UCPMB insurgents retain close ties and are known to be somewhat more radical than those who remained behind. Close ties also 71 Crisis Group interview, Fehmi Mujota, Pristina, September exist between some Presevo Valley politicians and Kosovo 2007. 72 Newspaper publisher, TV station owner and journalist Veton Surroi’s ORA (“Time” or “Clock”) party won 6 per cent 76 Crisis Group interviews, Skender Destani, Nagip Arifi, of the vote in the October 2004 elections. It is considered to Bujanovac Mayor, and Riza Halimi, PDD leader, July 2007. represent the urban intelligentsia. 77 As quoted in “Izgradnja poverenja na jugu Srbije”, B92, 23 73 Crisis Group interviews, Pristina, June-July 2007. April 2006. 74 “Mustafa: Salihu je postupio naivno”, Politika, 4 April 2007. 78 Crisis Group interviews, Ragmi Mustafa, Presevo Mayor, “Autonomija ili specijalni status”, Blic, 3 April 2007. and Jonuz Musliu, PDP leader, July 2007. 75 “Veterani traze pripajane Kosovo juga Srbije”, Politika, 16 79 “Poziv Muslijua nije stigao”, Glas javnosti, 7 June 2007; June 2007. “Halimi: Musliju Skuplja poena”, Politika, 7 June 2007.

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 12 political parties. Some of the organised crime figures and The exiles disagree on the steps that should be taken businessmen who operate between Kosovo and the valley if Kosovo independence is accompanied by formal or could find circumstances in which heightened tensions violent partition. While some hope Presevo might gain and instability might work in their favour, and might be something with the resolution of Kosovo status, “it is tempted to instigate actions to that end. Serbian security not the right time to think of the valley, today. Kosovo forces allied with nationalist political elements inside status has to be resolved first”.86 Some think the valley Serbia could respond in the event of Kosovo Albanian should only fight politically, others that Albanians there attacks on Kosovo Serb enclaves by driving Albanians should prepare to take up arms in the event Kosovo is out of the valley, in the hope this would be tolerated partitioned or Serbian security forces act aggressively. internationally as an unavoidable consequence of the Kosovo status process. Should there be a formal partition of Kosovo following a declaration of independence, or if the small Albanian Ragmi Mustafa claims that over 6,500 people left Presevo communities in north Mitrovica and the three Kosovo for Kosovo during the insurgency, and there are at least municipalities above it are expelled,87 it is possible Kosovo 100 former UCPMB members left in the Gnjilane/Gjilan Albanians may try to drive inhabitants of the Serbian area who are associated with UCK veterans associations enclaves south of the Ibar out of Kosovo. In February 2007 in the region. They have been separated from the valley the influential Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences for six years and have by and large established themselves released a book entitled Kosovo and Metohija: Past, economically inside Kosovo.80 Some are involved in Present and Future.88 It contains a large article with maps trading with the valley. Crisis Group interviewed a number discussing partition and desired population flows, including of these ex-fighters for this report. the movement of the Serb enclaves’ inhabitants to the Presevo Valley.89 A senior figure close to Premier A former UCPMB commander in Gnjilane/Gjilan claims Kostunica told Crisis Group “a humanitarian exchange to have intensified contacts with Kosovo and Macedonia of populations” was desirable.90 Very few Kosovo Serbs veterans associations in recent months,81 which could be would wish to move to Presevo but such an artificially significant since the insurgencies in Macedonia, the directed movement would face the valley’s Albanians with Presevo Valley and Kosovo have usually drawn on a a new, radicalised and far larger Serb population. common pool of recruits. A former UCPMB member noted that if anything happens in the valley, it will have Many Albanians with whom Crisis Group spoke expressed to come from outside, and “those willing to take up arms fear that Serbian security forces and paramilitary groups have to come to Kosovo or Macedonia” to organise.82 associated with nationalist parties might decide to Another thought it would be appropriate to “build an ethnically cleanse the Presevo Valley under cover of events impression of violence … in the valley” in order to in Kosovo, or at the very least introduce an increasingly motivate and mobilise its Albanians.83 A yet more strict police regime. Most Albanians, however, are extremist former insurgent said, “after Kosovo status, the confident that the international community would be able Presevo Valley is next”.84 to prevent an ethnic cleansing.

Yet, most former insurgents seem to have lost their A former UCPMB member noted that it would not be easy appetite for further violence. One noted that “realistically to drive the Albanians out of the valley and that Serbia Presevo Valley is lost … I am not going to support fights would need to use major force.91 If the valley’s Albanians anymore. I am now taking care of my family, and the only were forced to leave, some in the Presevo municipality help I can offer will be political”.85 Two said there was might flee to Macedonia, while many others might no support for violence from Kosovo political parties. go towards Kosovo.92 Another former UCPMB member

80 Crisis Group interview, former UCPMB member in Gnjilane/ 86 Crisis Group interview, former UCPMB member, Gnjilane/ Gjilan, July 2007. He stated: “I have no property in Presevo. All Gjilan, July 2007. my property is in the Karadak and in Gnjilane/Gjilan”. 87 For background, see Crisis Group Report, Bridging Kosovo’s 81 Crisis Group interview, former UCPMB member, Gnjilane/ Mitrovica Divide, op. cit. Gjilan, July 2007. 88 Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Kosovo and 82 Crisis Group interview, former UCPMB member, Gnjilane/ Metohija: Past, Present and Future (Belgrade, 2006). Gjilan, July 2007. 89 Milomir Stepic, “The Territorial Division of Kosovo and 83 Crisis Group interview, former UCPMB member, Gnjilane/ Metohija: The Question of Geopolitical Merit”, in ibid, pp. Gjilan, July 2007. 485-509. 84 Crisis Group interview, former UCPMB, UCK, and NLA 90 Crisis Group interview, Belgrade, February 2007. member in Gjnilane/Gjilan, July 2007. 91 He failed to note that such force is, however, already in place. 85 Crisis Group interview, former UCPMB member, Gnjilane/ 92 Crisis Group interview, former UCPMB member, Gnjilane/ Gjilan, July 2007. Gjilan, July 2007.

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 13 threatened that “if the valley Albanians are forced to leave, VI. OUTSTANDING ISSUES we will force Kosovo Serbs to leave in the direction of Macedonia”.93 Perhaps the single greatest achievement in the Presevo Whether a distracted international community would be Valley involves the sharp reduction in human rights abuses, able to protect the valley’s Albanians is uncertain, as is such as beatings, killings and arbitrary detentions. Almost whether the refugees would willingly permit the Serbian without exception, Albanians in politics and human rights government to channel them in that direction. What is organisations told Crisis Group the situation continues certain is that there are no significant present threats to improve. Asked to cite high-profile, negative incidents, to the valley’s stability. The Albanian politicians, fearing every Albanian interlocutor said that with the exception of reprisals and possible ethnic cleansing, seem to wish to the January 2005 shooting of Dashnim Hajrullahu, they keep it that way; Halimi and Musliu go out of their way to 94 could think of nothing in the previous three years. The stress that the Albanians are peaceful. Serbia’s security combined efforts of the Serbian government, international forces appear confident they have matters well in hand. community and Albanian politicians have made real Interior Minisiter Dragan Jocic noted that in 2006 and progress. 2007 “there have been no terrorist attacks on the army 95 and police”. Defence Minister Dragan Sutanovac and That progress can be seen in the Presevo municipality, Ljajic insist the situation is peaceful and there are no where on 12 January 2007 the army turned responsibilities 96 present threats. for the Macedonian border over to the police at Cakanovac, not far from where Hajrullahu was killed two years earlier. This was welcomed by Albanian politicians, including Presevo Mayor Mustafa.97 Nonetheless, a host of problems remain. The ability to resolve them and so achieve a state of self-sustaining security is hampered by the refusal of the LDP and PDA to engage openly with the Coordination Body, and by the lacklustre performance of that institution.

A. ALBANIAN CONCERNS

Many of the concerns of Albanian politicians have been documented in previous Crisis Group reports.98 In spite of the improved behaviour of the security forces, there are still complaints about the occasionally heavy-handed tactics of the interior ministry’s paramilitary gendarmerie special units that patrol the roads and towns, and raid homes of persons suspected of engaging in insurgency-related matters, such as hiding military weapons.99 There are also complaints about the basing of army and gendarmerie units in town centres and civilian buildings. Albanians do, however, give high marks to the multi-ethnic police force, the result of an OSCE-led effort, although they would like it to take over more of the serious police work from the gendarmerie.

The Serbian government is constructing a large military base at Cepotin, five kilometres outside Bujanovac, with the intention of relocating its security forces away from the town centres and so reducing opportunities for

93 Crisis Group interview, former UCPMB member, Gnjilane/ 97 “Policija preuzela karaulu”, Politika, 13 January 2007. Gjilan, July 2007. 98 See Crisis Group Report Southern Serbia’s Fragile Peace 94 “Halimi: na jugu Srbije stabilno”, Danas, 31 August 2007. and Crisis Group Briefing, In Kosovo’s Shadow, both op. cit. 95 “Bezbedno u kopnenoj zoni”, Politika, 11 July 2007. 99 Serbs, too, complain that the police treat them in a heavy- 96 “Na jugu Srbije Stabilno”, Glas Javnosti, 11 July 2007; handed fashion, indicating that the problem may not be entirely “Ljajic: bezbedno na jugu Srbije”, Blic, 10 August 2007. ethnically motivated.

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 14 provocation. Work was halted for two years due to a lack formation of the new government but such cards are now of funds but the government has announced that new being issued, although there is substantial confusion, and money has become available and construction will Albanian politicians are not satisfied.102 resume.100 Until it is completed, however, complaints will continue. Ironically, Albanian politicians oppose the base, Perhaps one of the greatest Albanian fears is of being cut fearing it will cement the security forces’ grip on the valley. off from Kosovo, economically and culturally. Many worry Belgrade might close the border after independence, Education remains another area of contention, although making contact with family and business partners more improvements are slowly being made. The lack of difficult. A border closure is likely but Serbian companies Albanian-language textbooks harmonised with the export significant quantities of food to Kosovo, and internal Serbian school year is a problem. On the positive side, pressure would probably force Belgrade to open the border a new Albanian high school has opened in Bujanovac, to commercial traffic or face losing a valuable market. and in December 2006, then Serbian Education Minister Slobodan Vuksanovic, in cooperation with the OSCE, reached an agreement to open a teachers college in B. SERBIAN CONCERNS Bujanovac as a branch of the University of Nis. It will enable prospective Albanian teachers to receive training in Serbs in the valley also have complaints about the their own language. The program appears to be on hold, behaviour of the security forces, although they welcome however, until the new Belgrade government confirms it. them as a buffer against what they consider Albanian lawlessness. Serbs also complain about the education The lack of university instruction in Albanian at present system and the lack of textbooks harmonised to the school- results in approximately 350 valley students studying in year curriculum. They harbour grievances against the Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia. Universities in Albania Albanians, which – because of their status as the official have set aside 52 places for students from the valley.101 majority group inside their mother country – are often Recently a dispute erupted in Medvedja over the local high inadequately addressed or passed off as bias against the school’s refusal to accept two Albanian students who had minority. Their main concerns are twofold: they feel returned from Kosovo, on the claim that Serbia does not Albanians are disloyal and that the Albanians wish to recognise documents from Kosovo schools. Although overwhelm them demographically and join Kosovo. the issue was resolved in favour of the students, Serbia’s longstanding refusal to recognise Kosovo documents and The repeated references of Albanian politicians to “East diplomas continues to cause problems. Kosovo” worry Serbs. Calls for linkage between a possible Kosovo partition and the fate of the valley concern many, Serbian attitudes toward Albanians are highly visible as does Albanian support for the unpopular Ahtisaari plan. in the Belgrade media, both print and electronic, which consistently carry stories that portray them negatively Serbs see Albanian disloyalty in numerous incidents. The and frequently refer to them as “Islamic fundamentalist Albanian flag flying over the large marble grave of Ridvan terrorists”. This alienates the Albanians and spreads fear Cazimi, known as Commander Leshi, on the main road among Presevo Valley Serbs. The government could at the entrance to Veliki Trnovac, is considered an open reduce tensions in southern Serbia by encouraging provocation. When the Serbian government opened the the state-influenced media to tone down anti-Albanian new Albanian-language high school in Bujanovac, remarks. Unfortunately, these will only increase when the Albanian national anthem was played, much to the Kosovo declares independence. consternation of donors and Serbian government officials in attendance. On 28 November 2006, Albanian national The issue of refugee return to the areas along the boundary day, Albanian students removed the Serbian flag from the with Kosovo is also touchy for Albanians but they seem Vuk Karadzic Cultural Centre in Bujanovac, then broke unwilling to push it, in part because there are few economic into the Bujanovac municipal building across the street, opportunities, and many have now established themselves beat up the Serb doorman and hung the Albanian flag from elsewhere. Albanians are pressing for the introduction the upper floor. The same day in Presevo a crowd gathered of bilingual identity cards for the three municipalities. on the main square to listen to a Mustafa speech, then A project was delayed by the January elections and the

102 Application forms are bilingual, and the cards have the 100 Minister of Defence Sutanovac estimates the cost of phrase “Identity Card” in Serbian and Albanian on the outside. completing the base is one billion dinars (€12.65 millon). Inside all data is still in Serbian, albeit in the Latin alphabet. “VS treba Cepotin”, Glas javnosti, 2 July 2007; “Spremni za Crisis Group interviews, Skender Destani, Martin Brook, Rusiju,” Vecernje novosti, 27 February 2007. OSCE field officer, Bujanovac, and Riza Halimi, PDD leader, 101 “Jezicke i druge barijere”, Danas – Vikend, 5 May 2007. September 2007.

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 15 entered the municipal building and replaced the Serbian bomb was thrown at the Presevo municipal building. On 1 flag with the Albanian one. On 20 April 2007 the Presevo June a hand grenade was thrown into the yard of Bujanovac municipal assembly attempted to rename the main square Mayor Arifi. On 7 August two brothers were gunned down as the Square of Fallen Warriors, a clear reference to the in a café in Presevo over a question of family honour. The UCPMB.103 Albanian reluctance to learn Serbian and the cumulative effect of such incidents creates a climate of unwillingness of some politicians, such as Musliu, to speak distrust towards Albanians that could enable extremists to it without an interpreter also cause consternation. mobilise local Serbs against the valley’s Albanians at the time of Kosovo independence. Many incidents have the effect of intimidating local Serbs. In Presevo in December 2006, two Albanians attacked a Serb in a café for no apparent reason. Both were merely C. EVERYONE’S CONCERN: THE ECONOMY fined the equivalent of €100. In April 2007 three masked Albanians crossed from Kosovo into the Medvedja Regardless of nationality, everyone agrees the economy is municipality, beat a 74-year-old man and a 69-year old in terrible condition. This is in large part due to the Tito-era woman and stole 150 sheep, ten cows and several goats program of economic development, which promoted from them.104 The fourteenth-century Serbian Orthodox the construction of state and socially-owned enterprises Church of St. Constantine the Great and St. Jelena near throughout the countryside, as opposed to clusters in urban Veliki Trnovac is repeatedly vandalised by local Albanians areas. This created an incentive for people to remain in and has been attacked twice in 2007, most recently in rural areas instead of moving to urban centres to seek September. work. As a result, the former Yugoslavia did not begin urbanisation in earnest until the mid-1980s. Most troubling, on 4 August approximately ten armed men wearing the black uniforms and masks associated with the A more traditional form of development would have UCPMB/UCK stopped and robbed numerous vehicles meant that many of the twelve socially-owned enterprises on the mountainous road near the Konculj border crossing and factories Presevo had and the fourteen Bujanovac had with Serbia. During the 2000-2001 insurgency UCPMB would have been in nearby urban centres, such as Skopje, members in this area were notorious for extorting money Vranje or Pristina. The Presevo Valley would then and robbing Albanians who wished to pass between have become depopulated through a natural process of Kosovo and Presevo Valley. After pinning down a regular urbanisation, and the rural Albanian and Serb population police patrol sent to investigate, they engaged in a fire would have been largely assimilated into the urban fight with the gendarmerie, which killed one of the populations, leaving Presevo and Bujanovac as villages robbers. The UCPMB sympathiser Jonuz Musliu, who with only a few hundred residents. was driving to Kosovo at the time, was among those shot at by the bandits. Instead the two municipalities are kept alive economically by the presence of the old, socially-owned enterprises The appearance of this group, which is said to have (some of which are now privatised), which employ operated like a military unit, led some Serbian analysts to primarily Serbs, and by the remittances of the many guest say it was designed to send a message to Belgrade about workers. The latter keep the Albanian population up but the fragility of peace in the valley and the risks it would the local Serbs, who tend to emigrate to the major urban run should it try to partition Kosovo.105 There can be little centres within Serbia, have been dwindling in numbers.106 doubt the bandits hoped to profit from the heavy traffic of returning guest workers in fancy cars carrying large sums Albanian politicians claim that unemployment in of undeclared euros, Swiss francs and U.S. dollars. The Bujanovac is close to 60 per cent107 and in Presevo 108 vast majority of those robbed were ethnic Albanians. around 70 per cent. CB figures indicate that Presevo’s unemployment is actually 60 per cent and Bujanovac 42 Serbs are also concerned about what they view as Albanian per cent109 But the figures do not reflect the many persons lawlessness. Albanians in the region frequently rely employed only on paper in idle, socially-owned enterprises. on extra-legal means to settle disputes. Several incidents in 2007 have raised attention throughout Serbia. On 3 April a

106 Serbs and Albanians lived in roughly equal numbers in 103 “Umalo trg OVK u Presevu”, Kurir, 14 June 2007. Presevo at the end of World War II. 104 “Grupa Albanaca napala porodicu Zdravkovic”, Agencija 107 Crisis Group interview, Nagip Arifi, Bujanovac Mayor, Vranje Press, 4 April 2007. July 2007. 105 “Zoran Dragisic: Pljacku iskoristili za slanje poruke”, 108 Crisis Group interviews, Riza Halimi, July and September Danas, 7 August 2007; “Drumski razbojnici“ nose poruku 2007. Pristine”, Glas javnosti, 7 August 2007; “Juzni divlji zapad”, 109 See the CB document “Socio-ekonomska analiza opstina Politika, 7 August 2007. Presevo, Bujanovac i Medvedja”, August 2007.

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 16

The only bright spots in the local economy seem to be the municipalities from 2000 to 2004 but began to fall in 2005 Heba bottled water plant in Bujanovac, which is expanding though it was continuing to rise in the rest of Serbia. The production, the Bujanovac tobacco processing factory, the extreme poverty is shared by Serbs and Albanians. In construction of a new customs zone at the border crossing eleven municipalities (including Medvedja, Presevo and with Macedonia inside Presevo municipality and the Bujanovac) in the two southern Serbian counties of Pcinje hoped-for completion of Serbia’s stretch of the Corridor and Jablanica, numerous villages lack electricity, running 10 motorway that connects Thessaloniki to Belgrade. water, paved roads and telephones.115

Private investors appear to be staying away due to the Economic reality appears to dictate that without substantial valley’s reputation for instability, questions about the foreign or central government support, both Presevo and loyalty of the Albanians, the poor infrastructure and paucity Bujanovac must empty out, as is now happening in other of resources. The extent of disinterest was evident on 16 rural parts of Serbia and the former Yugoslavia. Serbs, with February 2007, when the auction of the socially-owned their aging population and educational and employment Presevo glass processing factory Kristal failed because opportunities in urban areas of Serbia, are likely to be no one showed up. a smaller and smaller minority in Bujanovac and Presevo, while maintaining their numerical superiority in Medvedja. Since the insurgency ended, donors have played a significant While Albanians will win the demographic struggle role in addressing the valley’s concerns, providing 45 per in Bujanovac and Presevo, those municipalities will shrink cent of the total investment in both Bujanovac and Presevo if guest worker remittances fall. Without the tensions municipalities between 2000-2005, as well as 17 per associated with Kosovo independence, the valley would cent in Medvedja. They have included the U.S. Agency for merely be another rural area struggling with the challenges International Development (USAID) and a number of of modern economics and urbanisation. EU governments, as well as the UNDP-led MIR program, which consists of UNDP, the EU, Austria, Norway, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the Serbian government. Foreign donations have been in gradual decline, dropping 69 per cent by the end of 2005 from their 2002 peak. CB donations also peaked in 2002, then dropped by 72 per cent over the next three years, though registering a slight increase in 2006.110 The current CB budget is not yet available but Halimi claims it was cut in half from 2006.111 The 2007 MIR2 budget is €1.09 million for all three municipalities.112

In addition to the funds donated by the CB and foreign donors, the Serbian government’s controversial, off-budget National Investment Plan has earmarked or already spent €6.7 million for the three municipalities in 2006-2007. Yet again, the pattern is discriminatory, with Bujanovac getting €36 per capita, Presevo €91 and Medvedja €199.113

All this assistance may represent nothing more than a bandage on an arterial wound. On the basis of the value added tax, Serbian authorities calculate that the country’s gross national income in 2005 was $2,057 per capita, while in Bujanovac it was 27 per cent that, $571; in Medvedja 16 per cent, $347; in Presevo 14 per cent, $288.114 Gross income actually rose in the three

110 Ibid. 111 “Nema vise nesuglasica medju albanskim politicarima”, Danas, 1 October 2007. 112 Crisis Group correspondence, Tom Thorogood, MIR2 program manager, September 2007. 113 “Socio-ekonomska analiza”, op. cit. 114 These numbers may be wildly misleading, as compliance 115 The other municipalities are Bojnik, Lebane, Leskovac, with tax laws in Bujanovac and Presevo is very low. Bosilegrad, Vladicin Han, Vranje, Surdulica and Trgoviste.

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 17

VII. CONCLUSION as to how out of touch Belgrade is with diplomatic currents – that the government is not touting its success at turning around insurgency in southern Serbia as a potential model Any future instability in southern Serbia could come from for perpetuating its continued authority in Kosovo. All either the Presevo Valley exiles in the Gnjilane/Gjilan together, however, there are numerous factors in both region of Kosovo or Serbia’s response to Kosovo Kosovo and southern Serbia that could trigger ethnic independence. It is difficult to imagine Rasim Ljajic, with cleansing and new refugee flows. all his other responsibilities, being able to take the necessary steps to make the CB function much better by the end of Given the dangers on the horizon, the international 2007. Belgrade, which seems intent on pursuing a course community should step up its political engagement in the that could lead to partition of Kosovo, may enter a Presevo Valley. Donors, however, are weary, and interest prolonged state of confusion following an independence is waning. Programs such as MIR2 are declining and decision. It is also quite likely Kosovo independence would projected to be phased out over the next two years. This find Serbia with an angry government and populace, sends the wrong message to both Serbs and Albanians. tempted to lash out at vulnerable targets. Instead, donors should maintain their programs and engage representatives of civil society from all ethnic groups, Following the March 2004 Kosovo riots, in which including women and youth groups, in implementing Albanians engaged in an anti-Serb pogrom,116 Belgrade existing ones and creating additional ones. Projects should permitted Serb mobs to torch two mosques, although to emphasise education, economic enterprise and agricultural its credit it acted responsibly in stopping paramilitary development. groups that were en route to Kosovo.117 The internal reaction to Kosovo independence could prove to be far Much depends on reactivating the CB. Although not a more visceral, irrational and violent, with some Serbs cure-all, it is needed to facilitate dialogue between Serbs wishing to take revenge or launch ethnic cleansing to and Albanians in what are certain to be tense months. The prevent a loss of more territory. How the government international community will need to pressure the Presevo would respond, if able to respond at all, is uncertain, Valley Albanian politicians who are boycotting the much less what Serbia’s notoriously independent-minded institution, particularly Ragmi Mustafa and Jonuz Musliu, security structures might do. At the least, minorities, to participate openly in its work. At the same time, the particularly Albanians, could find themselves the object Serbian government should be urged both to involve civil of revenge attacks. society organisations more in the CB’s operations and to create institutional safeguards that would give the Presevo So too, UCPMB exiles in Kosovo may wish to foment Valley Albanians a secure environment in the event a trouble in the valley in response to a formal or violent Kosovo status decision brings an unwanted backlash. partition of Kosovo, even though this would be at the Again the CB is crucial, given the strong representation expense of the local Albanian population. of Serbia’s security structures in its membership. Belgrade/Pristina/Brussels, 16 October 2007 The Pcinje District is home to many Kosovo Serb refugees, over 3,500 in Bujanovac alone. There are also numerous former and current police and paramilitary members who served in Kosovo during the 1998-1999 war. The Serbian Radical Party and its associated paramilitary formations are a wild card. The Kosovo government and international community should discourage Kosovo Albanians from attacking Kosovo Serbs, either as a reaction to perceived threats of partition or out of the perception that their ethnic kin in Presevo are being mistreated.

The Serbian army, MUP and government appear to be acting far more responsibly towards southern Serbia’s minority populations than in the not distant past. Indeed, it is slightly surprising – and perhaps also an indication

116 See Crisis Group Europe Report Nº55, Collapse in Kosovo, 22 April 2004. 117 Crisis Group interview, Serbian security official, 11 May 2006.

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 18

APPENDIX A

MAP OF SERBIA

HUNGARY Szeged SERBIA a ) n e Subotica Pécs u b u featuring the Presevo Valley D n Kanjiza T a i Mohács (D s a Bajmok Senta National capital Backa Republic capital Topola C Kikinda Sombor i Autonomous province capital k Ada Timisoara D Sivac Town, village ra

va VOJVODINAV K Apatin e i

Crvenka li k Major airport k Becej i

i n Kula K. al d an s K International boundary Osijek k i Titov Vrbas i sk Srbobran K. ej Republic boundary M Elemir eg CROATIA a B l Temerin i K Autonomous province boundary a n Backa a Highway Vinkovci l Zrenjanin Palanka Novi Sad Road is Vr as m ac F a ki Railroad ru ra T K Vrsac ska Go an Sid Alibunar al Canal Ruma Indija Sremska Stara Pazova Banatsko 0 20 40 60 km S Mitrovica Nova Pazova Novo Selo na a s va J Bela Crkva o Brcko a Pancevo B r 0 20 40 mi c i Beograd n Sabac a R Bijeljina Sa K (Belgrade) Kovin va . Zeleznik D O a n u v a i n a e r r M a D Smederevo v Obrenovac Pozarevac Golubac n a u n Kladovo A Loznica u

V D nava a

l Tam D N a r s Mladenovac Hom ic a olj b sk Majdanpek SERBIA P I la u e nin l P o V a K A Petrovac la Smed. Palanka e n l M Velika-Plana i . k l Negotin ( a av Zagubica D Ljubovija Valjevo a an M ube o ) S E R B r I A ok a B Bor im v e T Rogacica Kragujevac a lj a nic a Vidin Dr Gornji ina Milanovac Jagodina Cuprija Zajecar Cacak B Sarajevo Uzice Paracin r Pozega A Z -D o M h l et u a inj a J t o Kraljevo L BULGARIA BOSNIA AND i r Z L b a a Sokobanja i o v p m i ad a r c na av K a I Mor HERZEGOVINA b Aleksinac Ivanjica a Trstenik a Priboj r n A Krusevac i Knjazevac Nova s a N Foca Varos R i Jastre Prijepolje elik ba Nis Pljevlja U V c v M

a K D c Raska Prokuplje J T u a T o u r a k z Bela m r Sjenica s n Pirot S a a p a K i Toplica Palanka . to S R a M o r m a o S Novi Pazar o r a n a i n r n d v n Bijelo Polje z i a i ja a k k Leskovac ca j Vlasotince (Piv e a) vi Ib Kosovska lasin na ar a V a Medvedja ic Mitrovica n MONTENEGRO r e Vucitrn t Krupac Ivangrad e

Gazivoda S V Slano Niksic L it i Lake n Surdulica i m c i B a ov e Pristina Vlasinsko N Pec l g- i Priboj Jezero Presevo e D

CROATIA rc Kotorski r i KOSOVO Vranje Valley

e Zaljev m H s Gnjilane Bosilegrad Podgorica Alp ian -Dakovica Orahovac ban Bujanovac ka Kotor Cetinje th Al rs Nor Urosevac Presevo oto Boka K Sk D ada rin (L rs Prizren . S ko a cu J in ta e n r ze la Adriatic i r Bar ) o Shkodër P r a Skopje Sea ALBANIA S Tetovo MACEDONIA

Ulcinj

This map is adapted by the International Crisis Group from Map No. 4268 Rev. 1 (April 2007) by the Cartographic Section of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The town Medvedja has been added, Lake Gazivoda and the Presevo Valley have been indicated, and country and entity names have been changed to reflect Crisis Group terminology. The location of all additional features is approximate.

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 19

APPENDIX B

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, Uganda, Western Sahara and Zimbabwe; in Asia, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, prevent and resolve deadly conflict. Phillipines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Teams of political analysts are located within or close by Kosovo and Serbia; in the Middle East, the whole region countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of from North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia, violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the rest of the Andean region and Haiti. the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision- Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve- foundations, companies and individual donors. The page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update following governmental departments and agencies currently on the state of play in all the most significant situations of provide funding: Australian Agency for International conflict or potential conflict around the world. Development, Austrian Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian Department Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canadian widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign International Development Agency, Canadian International ministries and international organisations and made available Development Research Centre, Czech Ministry of Foreign simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Affairs, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finnish Ministry Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who of Foreign Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis German Foreign Office, Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions. Japanese International Cooperation Agency, Principality of The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent Liechtenstein Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luxembourg figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the International Development, Royal Danish Ministry of reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy- Foreign Affairs, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired by the Affairs, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Swiss Federal former European Commissioner for External Relations Department of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Christopher Patten and former U.S. Ambassador Thomas affairs, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since January Office, United Kingdom Department for International 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Development, U.S. Agency for International Development. Evans. Foundation and private sector donors include Carnegie Crisis Group’s international headquarters are in Brussels, with Corporation of New York, Carso Foundation, Compton advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based Foundation, Ford Foundation, Fundación DARA as a legal entity), New York, London and Moscow. The Internacional, Iara Lee and George Gund III Foundation, organisation currently operates twelve regional offices William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Hunt Alternatives (in Amman, Bishkek, Bogotá, Cairo, Dakar, Islamabad, Fund, Kimsey Foundation, Korea Foundation, John D. & Istanbul, Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina, Seoul and Tbilisi) and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Charles Stewart Mott has local field representation in sixteen additional locations Foundation, Open Society Institute, Pierre and Pamela (Abuja, Baku, Beirut, Belgrade, Colombo, Damascus, Omidyar Fund, Victor Pinchuk Foundation, Ploughshares Dili, Dushanbe, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kampala, Kathmandu, Fund, Provictimis Foundation, Radcliffe Foundation, Sigrid Kinshasa, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria and Yerevan). Crisis Rausing Trust, Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors and Viva Group currently covers some 60 areas of actual or potential Trust. conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes October 2007 Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia,

Further information about Crisis Group can be obtained from our website: www.crisisgroup.org

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 20

APPENDIX C

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON EUROPE SINCE 2004

EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited, Europe Report N°160, Kosovo Status: Delay Is Risky, Europe Report N°177, 10 17 January 2005 November 2006 (also available in Albanian, Serbian and Russian) France and its Muslims: Riots, Jihadism and Depoliticisation, Kosovo’s Status: Difficult Months Ahead, Europe Briefing Europe Report N°172, 9 March 2006 (only available in French) N°45, 20 December 2006 (also available in Albanian, Russian Islam and Identity in Germany, Europe Report N°181, 14 March and Serbian) 2007 Ensuring Bosnia’s Future: A New International Engagement Strategy, Europe Report N°180, 15 February 2007 (also available BALKANS in Russian) Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan, Europe Monitoring the Northern Ireland Ceasefires: Lessons from Report N°182, 14 May 2007 (also available in Albanian and the Balkans, Europe Briefing Nº30, 23 January 2004 Serbian) Pan-Albanianism: How Big a Threat to Balkan Stability?, Europe Serbia’s New Government: Turning from Europe, Europe Report N°153, 25 February 2004 (also available in Albanian and Briefing N°46, 31 May 2007 Serbian) Breaking the Kosovo Stalemate: Europe’s Responsibility, Europe Serbia’s U-Turn, Europe Report N°I54, 26 March 2004 Report N°185, 20 August 2007 Collapse in Kosovo, Europe Report N°155, 22 April 2004 (also available in Albanian and Serbian) CAUCASUS EUFOR: Changing Bosnia’s Security Arrangements, Europe Briefing Nº31, 29 June 2004 (also available in Bosnian) Azerbaijan: Turning Over A New Leaf?, Europe Report N°156, 13 May 2004 (also available in Russian) Serbia’s Changing Political Landscape, Europe Briefing Nº32, 22 July 2004 (also available in Serbian) Saakashvili’s Ajara Success: Repeatable Elsewhere in Georgia?, Europe Briefing Nº34, 18 August 2004 (also available in Russian) Macedonia: Make or Break, Europe Briefing Nº33, 3 August 2004 (also available in Macedonian) Armenia: Internal Instability Ahead, Europe Report N°158, 18 October 2004 (also available in Russian) Kosovo: Toward Final Status, Europe Report N°161, 24 January 2005 (also available in Albanian, Russian and Serbian) Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia, Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004 (also available in Russian) Macedonia: Not out of the Woods Yet, Europe Briefing N°37, 25 February 2005 (also available in Macedonian) Georgia-South Ossetia: Refugee Return the Path to Peace, Europe Briefing N°38, 19 April 2005 (also available in Russian) Serbia’s Sandzak: Still Forgotten, Europe Report N°162, 7 April 2005 (also available in Serbian) Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing the Conflict from the Ground, Europe Report N°165, 14 September 2005 (also available in Serbia: Spinning its Wheels, Europe Briefing N°39, 23 May Armenian, Azeri and Russian) 2005 (also available in Serbian) Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace, Europe Report N°167, Kosovo After Haradinaj, Europe Report N°163, 26 May 2005 10 October 2005 (also available in Armenian, Azeri and Russian) (also available in Albanian, Russian and Serbian) Azerbaijan’s 2005 Elections: Lost Opportunity, Europe Briefing Bosnia’s Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU, Europe N°40, 21 November 2005 (also available in Russian) Report N°164, 6 September 2005 Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role, Bridging Kosovo’s Mitrovica Divide, Europe Report N°165, 13 Europe Report N°173, 20 March 2006 September 2005 (also available in Albanian, Russian and Serbian) Abkhazia Today, Europe Report N°176, 15 September 2006 EU Visas and the Western Balkans, Europe Report N°168, 29 (also available in Russian) November 2005 Georgia’s Armenian and Azeri Minorities, Europe Report Montenegro’s Independence Drive, Europe Report N°169, 7 N°178, 22 November 2006 (also available in Russian) December 2005 (also available in Russian and Serbian) Abkhazia: Ways Forward, Europe Report N°179, 18 January Macedonia: Wobbling Toward Europe, Europe Briefing N°41, 2007 (also available in Russian) 12 January 2006 (also available in Albanian and Macedonian) Georgia’s South Ossetia Conflict: Movement at Last?, Europe Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition, Europe Report N°170, 17 Report N°183, 7 June 2007 (also available in Russian) February 2006 (also available in Albanian, Serbian and Russian) Montenegro’s Referendum, Europe Briefing N°42, 29 May CYPRUS 2006 (also available in Russian) Southern Serbia: In Kosovo’s Shadow, Europe Briefing N°43, The Cyprus Stalemate: What Next?, Europe Report N°171, 8 27 June 2006 (also available in Russian) March 2006 (also available in Greek and Turkish) An Army for Kosovo?, Europe Report N°174, 28 July 2006 (also MOLDOVA available in Albanian, Russian and Serbian) Serbia’s New Constitution: Democracy Going Backwards, Europe Moldova: Regional Tensions over Transdniestria, Europe Report Briefing N°44, 8 November 2006 (also available in Russian) Nº 157, 17 June 2004 (also available in Russian)

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 21

Moldova’s Uncertain Future, Europe Report N°175, 17 August 2006 (also available in Russian) TURKEY Turkey and Europe: The Way Ahead, Europe Report N°184, 17 August 2007

OTHER REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS

For Crisis Group reports and briefing papers on: • Africa • Asia • Latin America and Caribbean • Middle East and North Africa • Thematic Issues • CrisisWatch please visit our website www.crisisgroup.org

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 22

APPENDIX D

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Co-Chairs Kim Campbell Christopher Patten Former Prime Minister of Canada; Former Secretary General, Club of Former European Commissioner for External Relations, Madrid Governor of Hong Kong and UK Cabinet Minister; Chancellor of Naresh Chandra Oxford University Former Indian Cabinet Secretary and Ambassador of India to the U.S. Thomas Pickering Joaquim Alberto Chissano Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Russia, India, Israel, Jordan, Former President of Mozambique El Salvador and Nigeria Victor Chu Chairman, First Eastern Investment Group, Hong Kong President & CEO Wesley Clark Gareth Evans Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Former Foreign Minister of Australia Pat Cox

Former President of European Parliament Executive Committee Uffe Ellemann-Jensen Morton Abramowitz Former Foreign Minister of Denmark Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Turkey Mark Eyskens Cheryl Carolus Former Prime Minister of Belgium Former South African High Commissioner to the UK and Secretary General of the ANC Joschka Fischer Former Foreign Minister of Germany Maria Livanos Cattaui* Former Secretary-General, International Chamber of Commerce Leslie H. Gelb President Emeritus of Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Yoichi Funabashi Editor in Chief, The Asahi Shimbun, Japan Carla Hills Former Secretary of Housing and U.S. Trade Representative Frank Giustra Chairman, Endeavour Financial, Canada Lena Hjelm-Wallén Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister, Stephen Solarz Sweden Former U.S. Congressman Swanee Hunt George Soros Chair, The Initiative for Inclusive Security; President, Hunt Chairman, Open Society Institute Alternatives Fund; former Ambassador U.S. to Austria Pär Stenbäck Anwar Ibrahim Former Foreign Minister of Finland Former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia *Vice-Chair Asma Jahangir UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief; Chairperson, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan Adnan Abu-Odeh Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah II and to King Hussein Nancy Kassebaum Baker and Jordan Permanent Representative to the UN Former U.S. Senator Kenneth Adelman James V. Kimsey Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and Founder and Chairman Emeritus of America Online, Inc. (AOL) Disarmament Agency Wim Kok Ersin Arioglu Former Prime Minister of Netherlands Member of Parliament, Turkey; Chairman Emeritus, Yapi Merkezi Ricardo Lagos Group Former President of Chile; President, Club of Madrid Shlomo Ben-Ami Joanne Leedom-Ackerman Former Foreign Minister of Israel Novelist and journalist, U.S. Lakhdar Brahimi Ayo Obe Former Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General and Algerian Chair of Steering Committee of World Movement for Democracy, Foreign Minister Nigeria Zbigniew Brzezinski Christine Ockrent Former U.S. National Security Advisor to the President Journalist and author, France

Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Presevo Valley Crisis Group Europe Report N°186, 16 October 2007 Page 23

Victor Pinchuk Douglas Schoen Founder of Interpipe Scientific and Industrial Production Group Founding Partner of Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, U.S. Samantha Power Thorvald Stoltenberg Author and Professor, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Former Foreign Minister of Norway University Ernesto Zedillo Fidel V. Ramos Former President of Mexico; Director, Yale Center for the Study Former President of Philippines of Globalization Ghassan Salamé Former Minister, Lebanon; Professor of International Relations, Paris

PRESIDENT’S CIRCLE Crisis Group's President’s Circle is a distinguished group of major individual and corporate donors providing essential support, time and expertise to Crisis Group in delivering its core mission. Canaccord Adams Bob Cross Ford Nicholson Neil Woodyer Limited Frank E. Holmes Ian Telfer Don Xia

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL Crisis Group’s International Advisory Council comprises significant individual and corporate donors who contribute their advice and experience to Crisis Group on a regular basis. Rita E. Hauser Chevron Sheikh Khaled Juffali Tilleke & Gibbins (Co-Chair) Citigroup George Kellner Baron Guy Ullens de Elliott F. Kulick Companhia Vale do Rio Amed Khan Schooten (Co-Chair) Doce VIVATrust Shiv Vikram Khemka Marc Abramowitz Richard H. Cooper Scott J. Lawlor Stanley Weiss Anglo American PLC Credit Suisse Statoil ASA Westfield Group APCO Worldwide Inc. Neil & Sandy DeFeo George Loening Yasuyo Yamazaki Ed Bachrach John Ehara McKinsey & Company Yapi Merkezi Equinox Partners Construction and Patrick E. Benzie Harriet Mouchly- Industry Inc. Frontier Strategy Group Weiss Stanley M. Bergman and Shinji Yazaki Edward J. Bergman Konrad Fischer Najib A. Mikati Sunny Yoon BHP Billiton Alan Griffiths Donald Pels

Harry Bookey and Charlotte and Fred PT Newmont Pacific Pamela Bass-Bookey Hubbell Nusantara (Mr. Robert John Chapman Chester Iara Lee & George Humberson) Gund III Foundation Michael L. Riordan

SENIOR ADVISERS Crisis Group’s Senior Advisers are former Board Members (not presently holding national government executive office) who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on from time to time. Martti Ahtisaari Stanley Fischer George J. Mitchell William Taylor (Chairman Emeritus) Malcolm Fraser (Chairman Emeritus) Leo Tindemans Diego Arria Bronislaw Geremek Surin Pitsuwan Ed van Thijn Paddy Ashdown I.K. Gujral Cyril Ramaphosa Shirley Williams Zainab Bangura Max Jakobson George Robertson Grigory Yavlinski Christoph Bertram Todung Mulya Lubis Michel Rocard Uta Zapf Jorge Castañeda Allan J. MacEachen Volker Ruehe Alain Destexhe Barbara McDougall Mohamed Sahnoun Marika Fahlen Matthew McHugh Salim A. Salim