NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS

REPORT: THE MULTIPOLAR MOMENT?

Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva tnlroduces his officials lo Indian president A.PJ. Abdul Kalam (second from rljht) and Prime Minister Manmohan 5insh (far right) at Rashtrapali Bhavan, India's presidential paiace. in New DeihI.

Middle Powers: IBSA and the New South-South Cooperation

By Gladys Lechini

N THE 1970s, THE WORLD'S UNDERDEVELOPED From IBSAs perspective, the current interna- nations launched the idea of South-South tional economic and financial architecture has I cooperation. Following in the spirit of ill-served the interests of the poor in developing Bandung, they aimed to strengthen their ca- countries, with economic globalization having pacity to negotiate with the North and to solve exacerbated income inequality both within and problems of trade and development in the new across emerging markets. The alliance's objective international economic order. Though the over- is to maximize joint actions as part of a coherent all project met with some modest success, it ul- strategy within international organizations like timately failed because of its loose nature and the World Trade Organization (WTO) on vari- broad scope: The fallacy of its argument was its Gladys lechini ous issues, including pubhc health, pharmaceu- is professor of basic assumption that all underdeveloped coun- tical patents, and government subsidies. international tries have more in common than they really do, The process that led to IBSA began in the reiations al the and that all solutions can be uniformly applied 1990s, when South African minister of trade Notiomi [University 0/ with equal success. and industry Alec Erwin had already envi- Rosario, Argentina. She is (he author Today, a new, more selective South-South co- sioned a G7 for the South to solidify areas of of Argentina y operation has appeared, bringing some hope to common interest within the United Nations and Africa en el espejo the people of our regions. The trilateral alhance the WTO. The idea developed during a series of de Brasil (CUCSO. known as the India, Brazil, and South Africa international meetings attended by representa- 2006). Dialogue Forum, or IBSA, exemplifies the trend. tives from the three countries, and culminated 28 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2007

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with the first high-level summit in June 2003, in the run- We can see this in the case of South Africa, IBSAs small- up to the WTO ministerial in Canciin, Mexico, the est member in terms of population and GDP, but a giant in following September. the African context, considered the continent's most pow- Gathered in Brasilia, the three ministers issued a dec- erful pohtical and economic force. The United States re- laration announcing their intention "to hold mains its primary trade partner, exporting more Brazil has been regular political consultations on international goods to the country than to any other African agenda items, as well as to exchange informa- the driving nation, a relationship formalized in agreements tion on areas of mutual cooperation in order to like a generalized preferential trade agree- force behind coordinate their positions on issues of common ment (which grants duty-free status to some interest." Their ultimate goal, they said, was to IBSA, and its 4,650 South African goods) and a irade and make the diverse processes of globalization "a foreign policy investment framework arrangement, which positive force for change for all peoples" that addresses private sector concerns requiring "must benefit the largest number of countries." is itself a good government interventions. A month before the Cancun meeting, IBSA, example of South Africa is thus entangled in a web of U.S. together with China and Argentina, began orga- the new commercial interests that constrain its autono- nizing an alliance among developing countries my. The United States has also courted India, to oppose the North's agricultural protectionism modalities in an attempt to counterbalance China's regional Since its inception, IBSA and China have formed of a more influence, most notably in last year's United the core of the Group of 22 (G22) bloc of de- States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coopera- veloping countries, which led the fight against productive tion Act, under which Washington is supplying global neoliheral policies at Cancun, As thou- South-South New Delhi with civilian nuclear technology, de- sands of protesters clashed with police outside spite India's not having acceded to the Nuclear cooperation. the meeting's barricades, the G22 refused to ac- Non-Proliferation Treaty For Brazil, which has cept a "precooked deal" that would consolidate U.S. and long identified itself as South America's principal regional EU positions. Following Brazilian foreign minister Celso power, the United States is not only a global but a hemi- Amorim's maxim that "trade must be a tool not only to spheric hegemon. Whether or not U.S. global dominance create wealth but also to distribute it in a more equita- continues, Brazil will continue suffering the influence ble way," the G22 preferred to let the negotiations break of its regional "big brother," as in the recent Bush-Lula down rather than come to an agreement detrimental to agreement on ethanol and biodiesel' us interests. Other countries that may be interested in joining worry Although the G22 emerged from Canain triumphant, it about the exclusionary nature of IBSA, since granting them has not held together well since then. The heterogeneous membership would be an intrinsically political decision. group—including hoth strong exporting countries like Ar- These include, in their respective regions, Mexico and Ar- gentina and Brazil, which want to dissolve tariff harriers to gentina; Nigena, Algeria, and Egypt; and China, Pakistan, their agro-products, and very protectionist ones like India, and Malaysia. But until now the most obvious candidate, China, and Pakistan, which strive to maintain subsidies to Russia, has shown no interest in joining any group, es- protect their small tarmers—had to be renamed the G20+ pecially given Its instability m the G8, while China has to reflect fluctuations in membership. aggressively pursued its own trade interests unilaterally, IBSA, however, has remained strong. The three member though its role as a free rider at Cancun—associating countries face the same problems and have similar interests. with the G20 because circumstances warranted it—did All three consider themselves "middle powers" and leaders not upset a setting conducive to negotiations. of their respective regions, yet they have also been subject to pressures from the North. Indeed, given the associated RAZIL HAS BEEN THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND IBSA, AND strength of its members, IBSA has not gone unnoticed by , its foreign policy is itself a good example of the the great powers, and its potential role has become an ob- Bnew modalities of a more productive South-South ject of surveillance. The United States, for example, has at- cooperation. Engaging m the international arena by in- tempted to establish privileged bilateral relations with each creasing its participation in multilateral institutions, Bra- of these growing engines (in a hub-and-spokes model), zil widens its margins of maneuver, and in doing so has creating committments that could discourage present or structured a network of cooperation among many of the future horizontal links among them. same partners within different forums. 29 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS

REPORT: THE MULTIPOLAR MOMENT?

The IBSA countries have decided to articulate their ini- part of a global strate^ meant to build an international tiatives within the framework of WTO negotiations, they presence by diversifying extemal relations and building say, in order to address their countries' high vulnerabil- alliances with the new states in the South, thus allowing ity to fluctuations in global commodity prices. In their Brazil to have a say in global issues. negotiations, they stress the importance of establishing Even though Brazilian officials resorted to a "cultural a predictable, rule-based, and transparent international discourse" in their diplomacy in the 1970s, recalling Bra- trading system that would enable Southern countries zil's African heritage—Brazil has the largest population of to maximize their development through gains from en- Afro-descendants outside of Africa—new commitments hanced exports. These concerns aside, there is an unde- were necessary to gain the trust of African states, which always demanded that Brazil end diplomatic relations with the South African apartheid govemment. But Brazil did not need to resort to such a drastic action to demonstrate its anti-apartheid commitment. In 1975 Brazil became the first country to rec- ognize Angola's independence and its govemment, and although it never completely broke diplomatic relations with apartheid South Africa, political and commercial relations were kept to a minimum, demonstrating Brazil's commitment to the rest of the con- tinent. Furthermore, Brazil opened embassies, sent high-level missions, developed technical and academic cooperation, and established research centers throughout Africa. The 1970s Luta and former Nigerian presidenl Olusegun Obasanjo at Ihe 2006 Africa-South America Summit were termed the "golden period" of Brazilian-African relations,^ niable geopolitical dimension to the alliance: The IBSA After the end of the apartheid regime, the new South nations have agreed to back each other up in their bids Africa offered an opportunity for mutually beneficial de- as regional representatives to the UN Security Council, velopment and the chance to act jointly in multilateral with Brazil competing with Mexico and Argentina, South groups. Today, in selecting South Africa as its primary Africa with Nigeria and Egypt, and India viath Pakistan African ally, the Brazilian govemment has gone a step be- and Indonesia. yond its traditional strategies, using Mercosur as a negoti- Brazil's relationship with South Africa has been ai the ating tool. Since Brazil had already implemented an Afri- center of its negotiating strategy. By pushing forward bi- can policy and had other partners in the southern region lateral cooperation with Pretoria, Brazil drives Argentina, of Africa, it began to promote a more complex association its main regional partner, to negotiate through Mercosur between the Mercosur and the African trade blocs. with the Southem African Customs Union (Sacu), which But the difference between the Lula government's Af- led to a 2004 preferential commercial agreement with rican policy and that of its predecessors goes beyond the Mercosur, Brazil also pursued this strategy with India, South Africa alliance, given its more emphatic posture thereby setting the stage for IBSA, and then, in a final toward defending national sovereignty and searching for step, brought these countries together in the G20, privileged alliances. The Brazil-Africa Forum, held in the In doing this, Brazil was building on years of African city of Fortaleza m June 2003, had the greatest impact diplomacy dating back to the 1960s. Both political and in demonstrating the Lula administration's decision to re- economic considerations informed this earlier diplomatic establish and deepen relations with Africa. The forum, effort. Although justified with the principle of develop- which brought together academics, politicians, diplo- ing South-South solidarity, Brazil's African diplomacy was mats, and high-level functionaries, came about after For- 30 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2007

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cign Secretary Amorim visited various African countries The strategy is not without its problems. When Brazil in May 2003, in preparation for Lula's first 'visit to Africa led negotiations between Mercosur and Egypt in 2004, ihe following November, when he traveled to Sao Tom6 and later with Morocco the same year, proposed regula- and Principe, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, and tions were exchanged, but contacts were not taken up Namibia. The next year Lula partici- again. This lack of substantial results in these South-South These three pated in the fifth conference of heads negotiations became a source of tension among Mercosur middle powers, of state from the Community of Por- members, leading to some in the Uruguayan government providedthey ^^gu^se-Speaking Countries, and in to propose signing a free trade agreement with the United 2005 he traveled to Cameroon, Nige- States, independent of Mercosur. act in concert, ria, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, and Sene- This would fit well into Washington's strategy, which, could have a S^^- ^^^^^ President Abdoulaye Wade after the failure of the Free Trade Area of the Americas, called him "the first black president has centered on pursuing bilateral agreements with Latin systemic impact ^f B^^^^I - pu^^g the trip Lula began American countries as means of disruptmg the process of on global discussions on transferring technol- regional integration. ogy to African countries so they can governance produce their own AIDS drugs. HESE THREE MIDDLE POWERS, PROVIDED THEY ACT IN in the future, Finally, in February 2006, the pres- concert, could have a systemic impact on global impeding some ^"^^^^ ^^"^ °^ ^^^ fourth African tour, T governance in the future, impeding some of the visiting Algeria, Benin, Botswana, and North's attempts to maintain an exclusive and elitist inter- of the Norths South Africa, whose governments national order. They aim to develop a strong negotiating attempts to signed a series of cooperation treaties power through a "soft balancing" strategy, with no counter- in the areas of agriculture, health, and hegemonic confrontation, as in Chavez's Bolivarian Al- maintain an education. Lula has now traveled to ternative for the Americas—that is, to participate in exclusive 17 African countries, more than those establishing the rules of the game, whicb until now and elitist visited by all previous Brazilian presi- have only benefited the most powerful. Their conversion dents combined. Brazil has also wel- from rule takers into rule "conditioners," though hardly international corned heads of state from 16 African rule makers, in the international system will depend on order. countries. better mutual knowledge and building confidence among Of the 284 treaties that link Bra- the governments that comprise the group. zil with 37 of the 54 African nations (in technological In addition to forming a geopolitical alliance, the IBSA cooperation, cultural exchanges, health, and agricul- countries have also identified the diverse areas of excel- ture), 112 were signed between December 2002 and lence in their societies, especially in the fields of biotech- December 2006- Business leaders accompanied Lula on nology, alternative energy sources, outer space, aeronau- these African tours, organizing parallel business forums tics, information technology, and agriculture, offering a to negotiate contracts. Commerce between Brazil and broad range of potential opportunities for trade, invest- .\frica progressively grew throughout this period, more ment, travel, and tourism. Yet they are not natural trading than doubling from $5 million in 2002 to $12.6 mil- partners. On the whole, India, Brazil, and South Africa lion in 2005.^ The most important African exports to produce similar products and compete for access to the Brazil include oil, minerals, and agricultural products, same OECD markets. And even their political interests while Brazils principal exports to Africa are sugar and do not always converge. In contrast to India, for example, its derivatives, meats, and manufactured goods. Brazil and South Africa have both renounced nuclear In this context of growing commercial links, Brasilia weapons programs and share positions advocating non- has constructed a framework agreement for creating free- proliferation and disarmament. South Africa, because of irade areas with the African countries that it maintains Its regional alliances within the African Union, is barred commercial relations with, like those in the Sacu, which from joining Brazil and India (together with Germany as mentioned established an agreement with Mercosur in and Japan) in the United Nations' Group of Four, which 2004. The final objective is to negotiate with each coun- support each other's candidacies for permanent Security try through the bilateral committees, establish preference Council seats. agreements on fixed tariffs, and later come to an agreement Given these tensions, they will have to make some sac- on a free trade area linking Brazil and its African allies. rifices and make a strong political determination not to 31 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS

REPORT: THE MULTIPOLAR MOMENT?

agreements on agriculture subsidies, intellectual prop- erty, and public health. Another prospect is the coordination among social movements of the three IBSA countries, all of which are home to an active and mobilized civil society The democratic advances in these three countries generated a new associa- tion between the state and civil society, as a result of ^he actions of movements and NGOs dedicated to the struggle against human rights abuses, envirormien- tal degradation, and social inequality After all, it was in Brazil where the peculiar institutionalization of glohal Bush and Lula al a Petrobras facility in March 2007. Whether or not U.S. global dominance lessens, Brazil will slill be subject lo its hemispheric "big brother." civil society organizing took shape in 2001 as the World forsake the agreement if they are to expand both their Social Forum, in Porto Alegre. Proposing an alternative commercial ties and their leverage in international in- agenda to that of neoliberal globalization, also known as stitutions. Whether they accomplish this remains to he aheiinundialismo (another-world-ism), the forum was later seen; the increasingly unstable post-Cold War inter- held in Mumbai, India, and Nairobi, Kenya. national scene offers no certainties, both in terms of But as Derghougassian argues, there still exist no reaching a lasting peace and of improving our people's critical links between the NGOs that favor consohdat- economic conditions. ing the IBSA alliance.'* In his study of organizations in Partners should be selected not only because of their Brazil, India, and South Africa dedicated to two issues, current and future power base, but also because of their HIV/AIDS prevention and controlling small arms, he common values and interests in order to influence the concludes that there are no economic nexuses between global order effectively For these middle powers, inter- the three regions, nor any common projects between national institutions represent the opportunity to build their respective civil societies. Thus the social mobi- a pohtical space in which to create rules according to lization in India, Brazil, and South Africa still reveals their own interests. In the process, they will face the an important "deficit" in civil society—if there do exist decision between, on the one hand, tying themselves vibrant social mobilizations within the three countries, to the world's hegemon (i.e., "hand wagoning" with the forcing the state to be more responsive to its citizens, United States) or, on the other hand, creating more au- grassroots diplomacy has still not been generated in tonomous processes together with smaller states. This the South-South direction. This is no minor task, but is the principal dilemma that the coalition will face in one that would provide another substrate to IBSA and the future. South-South cooperation. Neither are internal conditions very favorable, given Even that may depend on the willingness of these che consequences ofthe neoliheral model, which, among governments of the South, which have the capacity to other things, deprived the state of its capacity to ensure build regional institutions, to find an effective way to citizen welfare. Only by acting cohesively and in unison challenge the prevailing imperial hierarchy, and to trans- can they overcome common handicaps on the still un- form themselves into pillars of a new multipolar system. resolved, critical issues facing the South, like securing Will they be v/illing to go that far? Q] 32