SOUTHERN THAILAND: THE IMPACT OF THE COUP Asia Report N°129 – 15 March 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. BACKGROUND: THE THAKSIN GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY ...... 1 II. POST-COUP POLICY CHANGES.............................................................................. 3 III. NATIONAL POLITICS................................................................................................. 4 IV. THE INSURGENT GROUPS ....................................................................................... 6 A. SURGE OF VIOLENCE.............................................................................................................8 B. PROPAGANDA .......................................................................................................................9 C. PROTESTS ...........................................................................................................................10 V. THE SBPAC.................................................................................................................. 13 A. FORGING COMMUNITY LINKS .............................................................................................13 B. THE COMPLAINTS MECHANISM...........................................................................................14 VI. RESTRUCTURING THE SECURITY APPARATUS............................................. 16 VII. JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS............................................................................. 17 A. THE CASE OF MUHAMMAD ARMING YUSOH .......................................................................17 B. JUSTICE FOR PAST ABUSES..................................................................................................18 VIII. EDUCATION................................................................................................................ 19 A. SCHOOL SECURITY..............................................................................................................19 B. ACCOMMODATING MALAY MUSLIM IDENTITY ...................................................................20 C. THE PRIVATE ISLAMIC SCHOOL SYSTEM.............................................................................20 D. ALIENATION OF FOREIGN GRADUATES................................................................................21 IX. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 23 APPENDICES A. MAP OF THAILAND .............................................................................................................24 B. MAP OF THAILAND’S THREE SOUTHERN PROVINCES ..........................................................25 C. SEPARATIST LEAFLETS........................................................................................................26 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................28 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2004 ............................................29 F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ...................................................................................31 Asia Report N°129 15 March 2007 SOUTHERN THAILAND: THE IMPACT OF THE COUP EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The September 2006 coup in Thailand, despite its damage at undermining conciliation efforts. There are also strong to democratic development, opened the way for improved indications they have contrived a rash of protests management of the conflict in the Muslim South. Prime demanding the release of separatist suspects and the Minister Surayud Chulanont’s interim government has withdrawal of security forces from some areas. The overhauled some of its predecessor’s worst policies and insurgents’ village-level political organisation has signalled willingness to address longstanding grievances. improved significantly in the last eighteen months but But verbal commitments in Bangkok have been difficult it is not clear how much this reflects an increase in local to translate into changes on the ground, and relations support. Many villagers fear both the insurgents and the between security forces and local communities continue security forces and are caught between the two. to be strained while violence mounts. Thais outside the South have exerted pressure for a return to heavy-handed Daily killings of civilians and security forces by well-armed crackdowns on suspected militants. The government insurgents clearly necessitate a military response but the must respond to the escalating attacks, but with care – clandestine nature of the groups and their tendency to widespread arbitrary arrests and civilian casualties would shelter among civilian populations mean a purely military only increase support for insurgents. strategy is bound to fail. The government needs to balance providing security with protecting human rights. Barely a month in office, Surayud made an historic apology to southern Muslims for past abuses, announced Martial law is still in force, alongside an unpopular an end to blacklisting of suspected insurgents leading to Emergency Decree granting police and military officers a significant decrease in arbitrary arrests, and revived key immunity from prosecution. The interim government conflict management institutions disbanded by Thaksin has made almost no progress on providing justice for past Shinawatra in May 2002. abuses, and credible reports of torture and extrajudicial killings persist. Arming civilians to defend themselves These steps, together with the acquittal of 56 Muslims in village defence volunteer programs is no solution detained for over two years on trivial charges, and the either, as the arms are as likely to fall into the hands granting of bail in several conflict-related cases, were of insurgents and increase the possibility of violence. welcomed in the South. However, some of the justice measures designed to assuage Muslim grievances have On the other hand, anything seen as appeasement would alienated the local Buddhist population, raising communal be politically suicidal for Thai leaders dependent for tensions and frustrating police. The restructuring of support on voters outside the South, most of whom had the security forces, designed to improve interagency no problem with Thaksin’s get-tough approach. cooperation, also appears in some cases to be exacerbating rather than easing tensions. Coup leader General Sonthi Boonyaratglin and Prime Minister Surayud have taken the critical step of backing Efforts to accommodate Malay Muslim identity, negotiations as the ultimate solution to the conflict but particularly in the education system, may help undercut acknowledge that meaningful talks with insurgent leaders militant claims the government is trying to destroy or dilute are a long way off. Preliminary discussions with exiled Malay culture and Islam. However, attempts to introduce separatists faltered in 2006 when it became clear they had the Patani Malay dialect as an additional language in state little influence on the ground. Ultimately, some form of primary schools and to promote its use in government negotiated autonomy may be the only answer, but the offices have fallen flat in the absence of high-level political conditions that would make dialogue possible are not in support. place: The government has been unable to identify the Insurgent groups have responded to the government’s new leadership of the insurgency. Indeed, it is not clear approach by stepping up violence and propaganda aimed that there even exists an overall leadership capable Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup Crisis Group Asia Report N°129, 15 March 2007 Page ii of controlling the various groups committing the 7. Empower the Southern Border Provinces violence. Administrative Centre’s justice maintenance centre (Soon Damrong Tham) to make decisions The Thai public is largely hostile to the idea of on complaints against officials without seeking negotiations, and the embattled interim government approval from the Internal Security Operations does not have a lot of political capital to spare. Command. Meaningful negotiations require a government with a democratic mandate. On education The Surayud government’s ability to focus on the conflict 8. Redesign the Malay language curriculum for has been limited by competing priorities in Bangkok, primary schools, using the local Patani Malay and pressure is mounting to deliver on the core issues dialect instead of standard Malay. used to justify the coup: restoring stability, getting the 9. Address the segregation of Buddhist and Muslim economy back on track and prosecuting former Prime youth by establishing joint science and language Minister Thaksin for alleged corruption and lèse majesté. labs for students of private Islamic and state-run The combined impact of bombings in Bangkok on New schools. Year’s Eve, a series of economic blunders and divisions within the government and the coup group has undermined 10. Tackle the alienation of religious studies graduates public confidence and pushed the South further down by: the agenda. (a) allowing students who attain zanawiyah (high With only six months remaining before democratic school) level to enrol for Islamic studies elections are scheduled to be held, there are obvious degrees at Thai government universities; limits on what the interim government can achieve. But and it can and should still initiate a number of measures