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Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets
1/25/2018 Nick Szabo -- Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets Copyright (c) 1996 by Nick Szabo permission to redistribute without alteration hereby granted Glossary (This is a partial rewrite of the article which appeared in Extropy #16) Introduction The contract, a set of promises agreed to in a "meeting of the minds", is the traditional way to formalize a relationship. While contracts are primarily used in business relationships (the focus of this article), they can also involve personal relationships such as marraiges. Contracts are also important in politics, not only because of "social contract" theories but also because contract enforcement has traditionally been considered a basic function of capitalist governments. Whether enforced by a government, or otherwise, the contract is the basic building block of a free market economy. Over many centuries of cultural evolution has emerged both the concept of contract and principles related to it, encoded into common law. Algorithmic information theory suggests that such evolved structures are often prohibitively costly to recompute. If we started from scratch, using reason and experience, it could take many centuries to redevelop sophisticated ideas like property rights that make the modern free market work [Hayek]. The success of the common law of contracts, combined with the high cost of replacing it, makes it worthwhile to both preserve and to make use of these principles where appropriate. Yet, the digital revolution is radically changing the kinds of relationships we can have. What parts of our hard-won legal tradition will still be valuable in the cyberspace era? What is the best way to apply these common law principles to the design of our on-line relationships? Computers make possible the running of algorithms heretofore prohibitively costly, and networks the quicker transmission of larger and more sophsiticated messages. -
Is Bitcoin Really Untethered?
THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE • VOL. LXXV, NO. 4 • AUGUST 2020 Is Bitcoin Really Untethered? JOHN M. GRIFFIN and AMIN SHAMS∗ ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether Tether, a digital currency pegged to the U.S. dollar, influenced Bitcoin and other cryptocurrency prices during the 2017 boom. Using al- gorithms to analyze blockchain data, we find that purchases with Tether are timed following market downturns and result in sizable increases in Bitcoin prices. The flow is attributable to one entity, clusters below round prices, induces asymmetric auto- correlations in Bitcoin, and suggests insufficient Tether reserves before month-ends. Rather than demand from cash investors, these patterns are most consistent with the supply-based hypothesis of unbacked digital money inflating cryptocurrency prices. INNOVATION, EXCESSIVE SPECULATION, AND DUBIOUS behavior are often closely linked. Periods of extreme price increases followed by implosion, commonly known as “bubbles,” are often associated with legitimate inventions, technolo- gies, or opportunities. However, they can be carried to excess. In particu- lar, financial bubbles often coincide with the belief that a rapid gain can be ∗John M. Griffin is at the McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin. Amin Shams is at the Fisher College of Business, Ohio State University. Helpful comments were received from Stefan Nagel (the editor); an associate editor; two anonymous referees; Cesare Fracassi; Sam Kruger; Shaun MaGruder; Gregor Matvos; Nikolai Roussanov; Clemens Sialm; and seminar and conference -
Cryptocurrency: the Economics of Money and Selected Policy Issues
Cryptocurrency: The Economics of Money and Selected Policy Issues Updated April 9, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R45427 SUMMARY R45427 Cryptocurrency: The Economics of Money and April 9, 2020 Selected Policy Issues David W. Perkins Cryptocurrencies are digital money in electronic payment systems that generally do not require Specialist in government backing or the involvement of an intermediary, such as a bank. Instead, users of the Macroeconomic Policy system validate payments using certain protocols. Since the 2008 invention of the first cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, cryptocurrencies have proliferated. In recent years, they experienced a rapid increase and subsequent decrease in value. One estimate found that, as of March 2020, there were more than 5,100 different cryptocurrencies worth about $231 billion. Given this rapid growth and volatility, cryptocurrencies have drawn the attention of the public and policymakers. A particularly notable feature of cryptocurrencies is their potential to act as an alternative form of money. Historically, money has either had intrinsic value or derived value from government decree. Using money electronically generally has involved using the private ledgers and systems of at least one trusted intermediary. Cryptocurrencies, by contrast, generally employ user agreement, a network of users, and cryptographic protocols to achieve valid transfers of value. Cryptocurrency users typically use a pseudonymous address to identify each other and a passcode or private key to make changes to a public ledger in order to transfer value between accounts. Other computers in the network validate these transfers. Through this use of blockchain technology, cryptocurrency systems protect their public ledgers of accounts against manipulation, so that users can only send cryptocurrency to which they have access, thus allowing users to make valid transfers without a centralized, trusted intermediary. -
Joseph Gao EAS 499: Senior Thesis Advisor: Brett Hemenway [DRAFT]
Joseph Gao EAS 499: Senior Thesis Advisor: Brett Hemenway [DRAFT] Introduction to Cryptocurrencies for Retail Investors 1. ABSTRACT In the year 1998, roughly seven years before the smartphone revolution, (2007 marked the release of the iPhone, which arguably kicked off the ‘always online’ era that we live in today), Wei Dai published a proposal for an “anonymous, distributed electronic cash system”.(http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt). In the paper, Dai introduced two protocols to achieve his proposal - the first using a proof of work function as a means of creating money, and the second defining a set of servers responsible for keeping accounts, which must be regularly published, and verify balances for the other participants in the decentralized system. While B-money never took off, in part due to the impractical requirement of the first protocol that asks for a broadcast channel that is synchronous and unjammable, Wei Dai’s proposal planted the seeds of an idea that would later inspire Satoshi Nakamoto to publish the Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System white paper. This publication sparked a renewed wave of interest in distributed payment systems and resulted in thousands and thousands of new proposals and protocols to be developed in the next ten years. 2. INTRODUCTION The year of 2017 showed immense mainstream adoption in a number of cryptocurrencies. However, while mainstream chatter of these various cryptocurrencies has become nearly impossible to avoid, many retail investors are unfamiliar with the underlying technology powering each coin, according to studies performed by CoinDesk, Blockchain Capital, and The 1 University of Cambridge . -
Read the Report Brief
A REVOLUTION IN TRUST Distributed Ledger Technology in Relief & Development MAY 2017 “The principal challenge associated with [DLT] is a lack of awareness of the technology, especially in sectors other than banking, and a lack of widespread understanding of how it works.” - Deloitte Executive Summary1 The Upside In 2016, the blockchain was recognized as one of the top 10 In a recent report, Accenture surveyed emerging technologies by the World Economic Forum.2 The cost data from eight of the world’s ten potential of the blockchain and distributed ledger technology largest investment banks, with the goal of putting a dollar figure against potential (hereinafter “DLT”) to deliver benefits is significant. Gartner cost savings that might be achieved with estimates that DLT will result in $176 billion in added business DLT. The report concluded that the value by 2025; that total reaches $3.1 trillion by 2030.3 banks analyzed could reduce infrastructure costs by an average $8 to Investment in the field reflects the widespread belief that the $12 billion a year. The survey mapped technology can deliver value. Numerous trials, and some more than 50 operational cost metrics deployments, can be found across multiple sectors. and found the savings would break down as follows: Over two dozen countries are investing in DLT 70% savings on central financial More than 2,500 patents have been filed in the last 3 reporting 4 30-50% savings on compliance years 50% savings on centralized operations As of Q4, 2016, 28 of the top 30 banks were engaged in 50% savings on business blockchain proofs-of-concept operations. -
On Trade-Offs of Applying Block Chains for Electronic Voting Bulletin
On Trade-offs of Applying Block Chains for Electronic Voting Bulletin Boards Sven Heiberg1, Ivo Kubjas1, Janno Siim3;4, and Jan Willemson2;3 1 Smartmatic-Cybernetica Centre of Excellence for Internet Voting Ulikooli¨ 2, 51003 Tartu, Estonia fsven,[email protected] 2 Cybernetica AS, Ulikooli¨ 2, 51003 Tartu, Estonia [email protected] 3 Software Technology and Applications Competence Center Ulikooli¨ 2, 51003 Tartu, Estonia 4 Institute of Computer Science, University of Tartu Ulikooli¨ 18, 50090 Tartu, Estonia [email protected] Abstract. This paper takes a critical look at the recent trend of building electronic voting systems on top of block chain technology. Even though being very appealing from the election integrity perspective, block chains have numerous technical, economical and even political drawbacks that need to be taken into account. Selecting a good trade-off between de- sirable properties and restrictions imposed by different block chain im- plementations is a highly non-trivial task. This paper aims at bringing some clarity into performing this task. We will mostly be concentrating on public permissionless block chains and their applications as bulletin board implementations as these are the favourite choices in majority of the recent block chain based voting protocol proposals. 1 Introduction In virtually all of the modern democratic societies, democracy (translated from Greek roughly as rule of the people) is implemented via some sort of public opinion polling e.g. voting on the elections of representative bodies. Regrettably, the process of public polling is very fragile. Many things can go wrong, and have gone wrong in the history of elections. To address the his- torically experienced problems, many requirements have been put forward and many measures have been developed to meet them. -
Smart Contracts and Distributed Ledger Technology: a Lawyer’S Guide
Smart Contracts and Distributed Ledger Technology: A Lawyer’s Guide Presented by: Ken Moyle Clear Law Institute | 4601 N. Fairfax Dr., Ste 1200 | Arlington | VA | 22203 www.clearlawinstitute.com Questions? Please call us at 703-372-0550 or email us at [email protected] All-Access Membership Program ● Earn continuing education credit (CLE, CPE, SHRM, HRCI, etc.) in all states at no additional cost ● Access courses on a computer, tablet, or smartphone ● Access more than 75 liVe webinars each month ● Access more than 750 on-demand courses Register within 7 days after the webinar using promo code “7member” to receive a $200 discount off the $799 base price. Learn more and register here: http://clearlawinstitute.com/member Clear Law Institute, © 2018 Smart Contracts and Distributed Ledger Technology A Lawyer’s Guide Agenda Smart Contracts: Theory and Reality Concepts and Confusion • Legal vs. Technical viewpoints The Lexicon • Common Accord • Distributed Ledger Initial Coin Offerings and SAFTs • Blockchain Regulatory Developments • Cryptocurrency • State blockchain statutes • Smart Contracts • Delaware Resources www.ClearLawInstitute.com (703) 372-0550 Clear Law Institute, © 2018 “ The digital revolution is radically changing the kinds of relationships we can have. What parts of our hard- won legal tradition will still be valuable in the cyberspace era? ” - Nick Szabo, 1996 “What is the best way to apply these common law principles to the design of our on-line relationships?” Integrity of record Trust in the Enforceability outcome -
What Is the Upper Limit of Value?
WHAT IS THE UPPER LIMIT OF VALUE? Anders Sandberg∗ David Manheim∗ Future of Humanity Institute 1DaySooner University of Oxford Delaware, United States, Suite 1, Littlegate House [email protected] 16/17 St. Ebbe’s Street, Oxford OX1 1PT [email protected] January 27, 2021 ABSTRACT How much value can our decisions create? We argue that unless our current understanding of physics is wrong in fairly fundamental ways, there exists an upper limit of value relevant to our decisions. First, due to the speed of light and the definition and conception of economic growth, the limit to economic growth is a restrictive one. Additionally, a related far larger but still finite limit exists for value in a much broader sense due to the physics of information and the ability of physical beings to place value on outcomes. We discuss how this argument can handle lexicographic preferences, probabilities, and the implications for infinite ethics and ethical uncertainty. Keywords Value · Physics of Information · Ethics Acknowledgements: We are grateful to the Global Priorities Institute for highlighting these issues and hosting the conference where this paper was conceived, and to Will MacAskill for the presentation that prompted the paper. Thanks to Hilary Greaves, Toby Ord, and Anthony DiGiovanni, as well as to Adam Brown, Evan Ryan Gunter, and Scott Aaronson, for feedback on the philosophy and the physics, respectively. David Manheim also thanks the late George Koleszarik for initially pointing out Wei Dai’s related work in 2015, and an early discussion of related issues with Scott Garrabrant and others on asymptotic logical uncertainty, both of which informed much of his thinking in conceiving the paper. -
Cryptocurrency and the Blockchain: Technical Overview and Potential Impact on Commercial Child Sexual Exploitation
Cryptocurrency and the BlockChain: Technical Overview and Potential Impact on Commercial Child Sexual Exploitation Prepared for the Financial Coalition Against Child Pornography (FCACP) and the International Centre for Missing & Exploited Children (ICMEC) by Eric Olson and Jonathan Tomek, May 2017 Foreword The International Centre for Missing & Exploited Children (ICMEC) advocates, trains and collaborates to eradicate child abduction, sexual abuse and exploitation around the globe. Collaboration – one of the pillars of our work – is uniquely demonstrated by the Financial Coalition Against Child Pornography (FCACP), which was launched in 2006 by ICMEC and the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children. The FCACP was created when it became evident that people were using their credit cards to buy images of children being sexually abused online. Working alongside law enforcement, the FCACP followed the money to disrupt the economics of the child pornography business, resulting in the virtual elimination of the use of credit cards in the United States for the purchase of child sexual abuse content online. And while that is a stunning accomplishment, ICMEC and the FCACP are mindful of the need to stay vigilant and continue to fight those who seek to profit from the sexual exploitation of children. It is with this in mind that we sought to research cryptocurrencies and the role they play in commercial sexual exploitation of children. This paper examines several cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, and the Blockchain architecture that supports them. It provides a summary of the underground and illicit uses of the currencies, as well as the ramifications for law enforcement and industry. ICMEC is extremely grateful to the authors of this paper – Eric Olson and Jonathan Tomek of LookingGlass Cyber Solutions. -
Introducing Ethereum and Solidity Foundations of Cryptocurrency and Blockchain Programming for Beginners — Chris Dannen Introducing Ethereum and Solidity
Introducing Ethereum and Solidity Foundations of Cryptocurrency and Blockchain Programming for Beginners — Chris Dannen Introducing Ethereum and Solidity Foundations of Cryptocurrency and Blockchain Programming for Beginners Chris Dannen Introducing Ethereum and Solidity: Foundations of Cryptocurrency and Blockchain Programming for Beginners Chris Dannen Brooklyn, New York, USA ISBN-13 (pbk): 978-1-4842-2534-9 ISBN-13 (electronic): 978-1-4842-2535-6 DOI 10.1007/978-1-4842-2535-6 Library of Congress Control Number: 2017936045 Copyright © 2017 by Chris Dannen This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Trademarked names, logos, and images may appear in this book. Rather than use a trademark symbol with every occurrence of a trademarked name, logo, or image, we use the names, logos, and images only in an editorial fashion and to the benefit of the trademark owner, with no intention of infringement of the trademark. The use in this publication of trade names, trademarks, service marks, and similar terms, even if they are not identified as such, is not to be taken as an expression of opinion as to whether or not they are subject to proprietary rights. While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made. -
How Bitcoin Functions As Property Law Eric D
College of William & Mary Law School William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans 2019 How Bitcoin Functions As Property Law Eric D. Chason William & Mary Law School, [email protected] Repository Citation Chason, Eric D., "How Bitcoin Functions As Property Law" (2019). Faculty Publications. 1896. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1896 Copyright c 2019 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs How Bitcoin Functions As Property Law Eric D. Chason* Bitcoin replicates many of the formal aspects of real estate transactions. Bitcoin transactions have features that closely resemble grantor names, grantee names, legal descriptions, and signatures found in real property deeds. While these “Bitcoin deeds” may be interesting, they are not profound. Bitcoin goes beyond creating simple digital deeds, however, and replicates important institutional aspects of real estate transactions, in particular recordation and title assurance. Deeds to real property are recorded in a central repository (e.g., the public records office), which the parties (and the public) can search to determine title. When one grantor executes more than one deed covering the same property, recordation acts (race, notice, and race-notice) determine which grantee wins. The Bitcoin blockchain replicates the public records office, giving anyone with a computer the ability to see any Bitcoin transaction. Bitcoin mining replicates the recording of deeds, a process by which formally valid transactions between two parties become essentially a public record. When one grantor executes more than one transaction covering the same Bitcoin, a miner determines which grantee wins simply by moving one transaction to the blockchain before the others. -
A R E S E a R C H Agenda
Cooperation, Conflict, and Transformative Artificial Intelligence — A RESEARCH AGENDA Jesse Clifton — LONGTERMRISK.ORG March 2020 First draft: December 2019 Contents 1 Introduction 2 1.1 Cooperation failure: models and examples . .3 1.2 Outline of the agenda . .5 2 AI strategy and governance 8 2.1 Polarity and transition scenarios . .8 2.2 Commitment and transparency . .8 2.3 AI misalignment scenarios . 10 2.4 Other directions . 10 2.5 Potential downsides of research on cooperation failures . 11 3 Credibility 12 3.1 Commitment capabilities . 13 3.2 Open-source game theory . 13 4 Peaceful bargaining mechanisms 16 4.1 Rational crisis bargaining . 16 4.2 Surrogate goals . 18 5 Contemporary AI architectures 21 5.1 Learning to solve social dilemmas . 21 5.2 Multi-agent training . 24 5.3 Decision theory . 25 6 Humans in the loop 27 6.1 Behavioral game theory . 27 6.2 AI delegates . 28 7 Foundations of rational agency 30 7.1 Bounded decision theory . 30 7.2 Acausal reasoning . 31 8 Acknowledgements 35 1 1 Introduction Transformative artificial intelligence (TAI) may be a key factor in the long-run trajec- tory of civilization. A growing interdisciplinary community has begun to study how the development of TAI can be made safe and beneficial to sentient life (Bostrom, 2014; Russell et al., 2015; OpenAI, 2018; Ortega and Maini, 2018; Dafoe, 2018). We present a research agenda for advancing a critical component of this effort: preventing catastrophic failures of cooperation among TAI systems. By cooperation failures we refer to a broad class of potentially-catastrophic inefficiencies in interactions among TAI-enabled actors.