IDENTIFYING STREAMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS WITHOUT APPEALING TO SUBJECTS OF EXPERIENCE
As A Thesis submitted to the faculty of 3G San Francisco State University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree
*
Master of Arts
In
Philosophy
by
Allison Keiko Allen
San Francisco, California
January 2016 Copyright by Allison Keiko Allen 2016 CERTIFICATION OF APPROVAL
I certify that I have read Identifying Streams of Consciousness without Appealing to
Subjects of Experience by Allison Keiko Allen, and that in my opinion this work meets the criteria for approving a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree Master of Arts in Philosophy at San Francisco State University.
Carlos Montemayor, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Philosophy
Isabelle Peschardf Ph.D. Associate Professor of Philosophy
Ezequiel Morsella, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Psychology IDENTIFYING STREAMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS WITHOUT APPEALING TO SUBJECTS OF EXPERIENCE
Allison Keiko Allen San Francisco, California 2016
What are the identity conditions for streams of consciousness? Elizabeth Schecter poses this question in her paper, “The unity of consciousness: subjects and objectivity.” In particular, she is interested in the capacity of a recent thesis about the unity of consciousness, one posed by Tim Bayne in the book, The Unity o f Consciousness. In this paper, I take into consideration the main limitations Schecter finds with Bayne’s view. I use her main points to formulate a new unity thesis—one which addresses a kind of unity that neither Bayne nor Schecter describe, and yet belongs in a complete account of the unity of consciousness.
I certify that the Abstract is a correct representation of the content of this thesis.
/JL / 2 /X o]5_ Chair, Thesis Committee Date ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis is dedicated in loving memory to my grandmother, Keiko Sutton. I am especially grateful to my advisors, Dr. Carlos Montemayor and Dr. Ezequiel Morsella, for their outstanding guidance and support over the last few years. Having the opportunity to work with them has been the most enriching experience. I am also thankful to Dr. Isabelle
Peschard for her assistance on this project, as well as her support and guidance in related areas of research. Finally, special thanks are due to Dr. Alice Sowaal and Dr. Shelley
Wilcox for inspiring me as an undergraduate to pursue studies in philosophy. Without their encouragement I may not have had to courage to try my hand at being a philosopher.
v TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction...... 7
The Unity of Consciousness...... 9
The Subjective-Objective Distinction...... 12
Token Streams and Phenomenal Unity...... 14
Subjects Cannot Distinguish Token Streams...... 16
Using Causal Streams for Token Streams...... 17
The Action Unity Thesis ...... 18
Assessing the Action Unity Thesis...... 25
Conclusion...... 28
References...... 30
Footnotes...... 32 7
I. Introduction
What are the identity conditions for streams of consciousness? In Elizabeth
Schecter’s (2012) paper, “The unity of consciousness: subjects and objectivity,” she considers the role subjects of experience may play in individuating and providing identity conditions for streams of consciousness. The question arises as she examines Tim Bayne’s
(2010) tripartite account of phenomenal unity in his book, The Unity o f Consciousness. In
Bayne’s book, the unity of consciousness is regarded as a three part relationship between the subject of experience, representational content, and phenomenal unity. However,
Bayne provides two accounts of the subject of experience which lend themselves to two different interpretations of the unity thesis. For most of the book, Bayne relies on an animalist, or biological, account, according to which subjects are organisms. Then, in the last chapter of his book, he provides a phenomenalist account, according to which subjects are intentional entities.
These two accounts come with their own set of limitations. Schecter argues that
Bayne must pick between the two accounts:
Going the [phenomenal] route allows the tripartite account to articulate the
subjective structure of consciousness, but no more; it cannot be used to
individuate streams of consciousness or subjects of experience. Going the
[biological] route, forgoing a subjective account of the identity of
experiences, requires foregoing the conceptual connection between our 8
identities of first-personal perspectives on our own conscious experiences
(691).
Keeping a clear distinction between subjective explanations and objective explanations of
consciousness places pressure on Bayne to select only one of the versions of his account.
Bayne’s primary project is to explain the subjective, ‘what it is like,’ structures of
consciousness. However Schecter suggests that Bayne’s biological account of the subject
introduces an error that confuses the above distinction because it implies there are at least
some physical structures (e.g., organisms) at play in delineating boundaries of the subject
and, by extension, streams of consciousness. Schecter then considers whether either
formulation of Bayne’s unity thesis can identify streams of consciousness, ultimately
concluding that his biological account is inadequate but preferred. She explains why within the context of her own proposal one should appeal to causal streams to identify streams of consciousness.
I agree with Schecter that the phenomenal formulation of Bayne’s unity thesis is
not capable of identifying streams of consciousness, and that one must appeal to something
objective in order to do so. Despite this agreement, I think that Schecter dismisses Bayne’s
unity thesis too quickly. In this paper, I defend the view that the phenomenal formulation
of Bayne’s unity thesis is not at odds with Schecter’s formulation of co-consciousness
(which includes her method for individuating streams of consciousness). In addition, I
consider some of the strengths of Bayne’s unity thesis in light of Schecter’s criticisms and use some of these insights to formulate a third unity thesis, the action unity thesis. I argue 9
in support of the claims that the action unity thesis is compatible with Bayne and Schecter’s theses and that it is needed for a more complete account of the unity of consciousness.
Section II begins by exploring Bayne and Schecter’s different formations of the unity of consciousness. Section III goes on to explain the distinction between subjective and objective explanations of consciousness, a distinction on which Schecter’s criticisms rest. Section IV formulates the problem of tokening streams of consciousness and the main limitations Schecter finds with purely phenomenal accounts of the unity of consciousness.
Section V focuses on problems associated with both kinds of subject and is followed by a review of Schecter’s suggestion to use causal systems to identify streams of consciousness in Section VI. With Schecter’s position outlined, Section VII introduces the action unity thesis and its place in the causal system (relative to Bayne and Schecter’s theses). Finally,
Section VIII assess the action unity thesis.
II. The unity of consciousness
Both Bayne and Schecter are concerned in particular with phenomenal consciousness, also referred to as subjective experience, or ‘what it is like’ to be an organism (Block, 1995). The unity of consciousness, then, is ‘what it is like’ to experience two or more conscious states or properties in the same conscious field at the same time.1
Although Bayne and Schecter provide different approaches to this problem, most generally the concern is about how two or more conscious states are experienced at the same time: 10
What kind of relationship holds between two conscious states so that they appear together?
To demonstrate this concern more clearly, consider the experience one has while watching a film. Broadly speaking, there are a set of visual experiences one has of the film and another set of auditory experiences one has of the film’s score. According to Bayne, there is something it is like to have each of these experiences independently,
For Schecter, this formulation of the unity of consciousness runs into particular problems (discussed below) by focusing on the subjective aspects of consciousness. She opts instead for a definition, inspired in part by Susan Hurley (1998) which regards unity as an objective relation held between experiences. In particular, the relation is identified as, “whatever relation it is that holds between experiences in virtue of which there is something it is like to undergo their characters together” (Schecter, 682). On this account, one does not experience the unity relation directly. Instead, subjective experience serves as a liaison that permits one to “pick out” the objective relation. Importantly, the “relation” between conscious experiences is deliberately left open for future scientific investigations to define. Although much of this paper will focus on Schecter’s discussion of Bayne’s account of the unity of consciousness, the difference between these two formulations will be significant for understanding Schecter’s criticisms of Bayne’s view and the alternative method of identifying streams of consciousness that she proposes. 11
Based on the purely subjective formulation of the unity of consciousness, how does
Bayne account for the problem of two conscious states occurring conjointly in a conscious field? Like other accounts of the unity of consciousness (Tye, 2003), Bayne treats unity as a relation that holds between different subjective aspects of consciousness. In particular,
Bayne regards unity as a three part relation between subject unity, representational unity, and phenomenal unity. First, subject unity is the feeling or inference that all conscious states and properties are had by a subject; all of the experiences in my conscious field are represented as belonging to me. Second, representational unity is the relationship conscious contents share with their properties, and their relation to other conscious contents. For example, one way of describing the relationship a conscious content can share with a property is how color appears as attached to an object (e.g., red triangle), also referred to as feature binding. It also includes how objects are represented in space in relation to each other and to the perceiver. The final, and most important, kind of unity for
Bayne is phenomenal unity. Phenomenal unity captures the main problem associated with the unity of consciousness; it includes subject unity and representational unity, but also a unity above and beyond these two.
With these three kinds of unity delineated, Bayne defines their relation to each other in the unity thesis:
“Necessarily, for any conscious subject of experience (S) and any time (/),
the simultaneous conscious states that S has at t will be subsumed by a 12
single conscious state—the subject’s total conscious state” (Bayne, 16; see
also Bayne & Chalmers, 2003).
In other words, phenomenal unity is the subsumption of simultaneous conscious states
(which themselves are representationally unified) for a subject of experience. The subsumption of simultaneous conscious states is a part-whole conception of consciousness—where conscious states are the parts which comprise the total conscious field. What is the nature of the subject for whom these contents are unified? For the majority of Bayne’s book, the subject is regarded as the human organism—a biological account of the self. However, in the last chapter of his book, Bayne reconceives the self as a kind of intentional entity—a phenomenal account of the self. According to Schecter, this will result in two different versions of the unity thesis that encounter problems when used to identify token streams of consciousness. Before elaborating on these problems, it is important to say more about the subjective-objective distinction.
III. The subjective-objective distinction
With two different versions of Bayne’s unity thesis (one biological and one phenomenal) in hand, Schecter poses an important question: “is phenomenal unity a subjective or an objective relation?” (672). To answer this, let us first consider what
Schecter means by this subjective-objective distinction. For an explanation to be subjective is for it to concern questions about the apparent subjective structure of consciousness, 13
‘what it is like’ for a subject. For an explanation to be objective is for it to concern questions about the actual structure of consciousness; these explanations are typically about the physical, functional, or causal features of consciousness. Although it may seem inevitable for subjective and objective accounts of consciousness to influence and inform each other—for example, one may look for clues in subjective structure to inform how objective consciousness might be structured, or (vice versa) look for clues in objective structures to account for how consciousness is subjectively structured—it is important to keep the two kinds of explanation distinct so that the structures of one kind are not inadvertently attributed to the other kind.
I think Schecter is correct to draw this distinction between subjective and objective explanations of conscious structures. Even for the optimist who might hope, at some point, to rely on a single explanation (perhaps solely physical, solely subjective, or some blend of the two) to capture the structure of consciousness, it is wise, for now, to rely on this distinction because of the ‘explanatory gap’ apparent in answering questions about the nature of consciousness (Chalmers, 2002). Schecter is also correct to point out that the two are not completely distinct, because the different explanations do inform each other in important ways. However, one should be careful not to mistake one explanation for another in one’s account. In what follows, we will examine some of the errors which arise from confusing this distinction in Bayne’s account—particularly when his account is faced with the question of how to individuate streams of consciousness. 14
IV. Token streams and phenomenal unity
Bayne’s account of consciousness relies on the relation between experiences. This relation leads Schecter to pose two different identity questions for Bayne. Her first concern is how to identify or individuate experiences. Schecter calls this the token experience question: “What distinguishes, from each other, conscious tokens that are nonetheless
“unified” within a single stream of consciousness?” (674). Bayne explores this question in his book and comes to a pluralistic conclusion, where there may be more than one way to distinguish conscious tokens. However, there is another question, what Schecter calls the token stream question, that he does not consider: “What distinguishes, from each other, conscious tokens that are not “unified” with each other—or what distinguishes, from each other, conscious tokens that belong to, or that are, different streams of consciousness?”
(ibid.). Schecter predicts that Bayne will be motivated to provide more precise identity conditions for this second question. This is because, for an account in which unity and subjects are tightly woven together, the identity of streams of consciousness will determine how many subjects of experience exist. This high stakes question is the focus of Schecter’s paper.
Schecter’s central claim is that, in order to answer the token identity question, a purely phenomenal account of the unity of consciousness like Bayne’s will not be sufficient. First, she considers two subjects whose phenomenal experiences at each moment are qualitatively identical to each other. Using Bayne’s unity thesis to describe the phenomenal structure for one of the subjects would mean automatically describing the 15
phenomenal content of the other subject. Importantly, as Schecter points out, in order for one to be aware that the phenomenal content of the second subject was automatically described, it would require that one had already appealed to an objective description to distinguish the two subjects.
Schecter then appeals to Hurley’s (1998) account of unity to demonstrate some of the limitations of a purely phenomenal account. For the second limitation, consider a creature that has three experiences: A, B, and C. A and B are experienced together, and B and C are experienced together while A and C are not experienced together. There are two possible models to represent this creature’s consciousness. In model one there are two streams of consciousness, one with A and B, and one with B and C. Content B is duplicated in each stream. In model two there are two partially unified streams. One stream contains contents A and B, and the other contains B and C. Content B is shared by both streams, but contents A and C remain disunified. Again, phenomenally, these two models are indistinguishable because they have the same conditions for which contents are experienced together (A and B; B and C) and which experiences are not (A and C).
However, it is only by examining the objective structure that one can see that the identity conditions for model one would differ from the identity conditions for model two. 16
V. Subjects cannot distinguish token streams
Using either formulation of Bayne’s account, the types—phenomenal character and time—are parts of a token stream of consciousness in virtue of their belonging to the same subject of experience. The phenomenal formulation runs into trouble because the subject of experience is a merely a phenomenal entity-one which does not stand alone from the phenomenal character and the time. The phenomenal subject of experience is also a type and cannot, therefore, be used to token the stream of consciousness2. This reveals how
Bayne’s tripartite account may actually be a bipartite account. (This “broken” bipartite account is one I will pick up in Section VII.) Again, Schecter thinks we must appeal to something objective in order to token the stream of consciousness.
Bayne’s biological formulation of the unity thesis offers an objective entity capable of holding the important relation mentioned above, making it a more promising candidate for answering the token stream question. The major problem with using organisms to distinguish streams is that the organism is too general; in picking out an organism, one picks out the causal system which gives rise to streams of consciousness, but one also potentially picks out an array of causal systems irrelevant to phenomenal consciousness.
Furthermore, recall one problem mentioned above, in which for two subjects of experience with qualitatively identical phenomenal content an account detailing the phenomenal structure of one automatically describes the phenomenal structure of the other. This problem has an intra-organism counterpart where “subjects of experience” can be replaced with “left hemisphere” and “right hemisphere.” In this version, two hemispheres in the 17
same organism do not differ qualitatively in phenomenal character. Using Bayne’s unity thesis to describe the phenomenal structure for one of the hemispheres would mean automatically describing the phenomenal content of the other hemisphere, unless a more precise objective structure than the organism is identified. In addition, this makes apparent the problem of phenomenal duplication at the token stream level. Homing in on something more specific, and perhaps abandoning a well-defined subject for now, will provide a more informative means for distinguishing streams.
VI. Using causal systems to token streams
Schecter is confident that her argument can avoid the problem of phenomenal duplication by appealing to causal systems. To begin, we know that if experiences and streams of consciousness are real, then the causal systems giving rise to them must also be real. The identity of conscious streams, then, is determined, at least in part, by the causal system to which they belong. The causal system in this case being the causal systems,
“within each o f which all experiences are unified (and across which no experiences are)”
(689). Schecter deliberately leaves the boundaries of the system vague. It seems plausible that the systems could be defined as existing within a particular region of the brain, perhaps it is the whole brain, perhaps it is the whole organism, or numerous other possibilities. The boundaries of this system are left open for science to explore and define. Wherever the 18
boundaries of the system are drawn, so too will the boundaries of the subject. So, for now, the account leaves open the nature of the subject of experience.
VII. The action unity thesis
Schecter provides a viable account for identifying streams of consciousness, focusing primarily on the objective aspects of the process, proposing that the identity conditions for a stream of consciousness can be determined, at least in part, by the causal system to which it belongs. What makes Schecter’s account objective, in addition to her appeal to causal streams, can be found in her definition for the unity of consciousness, referred to henceforth as ‘co-consciousness’ (her preferred label for the view). As mentioned before, co-consciousness is a “relation that holds between experiences in virtue of which there is something it is like to undergo their characters together” (Schecter, 682).
Experiences are understood as things that give rise to phenomenal character, and they cannot be individuated in terms of ‘what it is like’ to experience one versus another. It seems possible for one stream of consciousness to have two qualitatively identical experiences in objective terms, two experiences which cannot be individuated via introspection (as some passages from Bayne suggest). One must appeal to something beyond the subjective structure to individuate experiences, making objective features essential to their identity and to the identity of co-consciousness. 19
One limitation of this version of co-consciousness is that, in identifying streams of consciousness, Schecter’s account is best suited for explaining the relation between experiences that “give rise” to unified experience. Bayne’s project addressing phenomenal unity is prematurely abandoned because, on the purely phenomenal account, the subject of experience seems collapses into the content when attempting to identify streams. Schecter suggests two ways to solve this: (1) appeal to a third entity that can serve to identify phenomenal streams of consciousness, and (2) appeal to something objective. So, if there is a thing that can fulfill both of these roles, perhaps there is another way to identify streams of consciousness using some of the subjective features Schecter avoids.
Recent theorizing (Merker, 2010; Morsella, Jantz, Godwin, & Krieger, in press) in psychology suggests that the subjective aspects of consciousness have an important role to play in explaining the function of consciousness. These accounts also suggest that the mechanisms which “give rise” to phenomenal character are only one part of the picture; there are additional questions to be asked about what function phenomenal character itself might play for an organism, in particular, the geometric structure (i.e., the first-person perspective) and how an organism’s affect and motivation toward a given experience can change depending on which other contents are present in the field—call this the contextual nature. It is not clear whether looking at the objective features “giving rise” to unified experience alone can account for these aspects of phenomenal experience. At the very least, what Schecter’s account lacks is a consideration of what phenomenal experience might contribute for an organism. Importantly though, if the distinction between subjective 20
and objective explanations is taken seriously, then Schecter’s account does not need amending (not due to this limitation, anyway). Instead, this suggests that subjective accounts of unity, like Bayne’s, may sit alongside objective accounts, like Schecter’s. This also suggests that there is third way to think about the unity of consciousness, one that compliments Bayne’s thesis and Schecter’s thesis.
Before considering what this new proposal of unity might look like, we should return to the two ways Schecter suggests we fix Bayne’s account. As mentioned before, if
Bayne can appeal to a different entity, an objective entity—one different from the phenomenal subject of experience—then the “bipartite” account can be restored to a tripartite account. Perhaps clues can be found by considering these criticisms in light of what phenomenal consciousness contributes to the functioning of an organism.
Merker (2010) provides a functional account for the first-person perspective, which he refers to as the ‘orienting domain’ of an organism. The orienting domain organizes the world with respect to the organism and perceptually stabilizes the constant movements of the organism’s body (especially, the head and eyes for humans). In addition to orienting the organism’s body in space, consciousness serves as the “behavioral final common path” for the organism, combining different kinds of information (i.e., motivational, perceptual, and motor) into the same format. At one of the last stages in processing, quite near the execution of action, consciousness provides the organism with up-to-date information so that that the organism’s behavior can adapt accordingly. 21
Morsella et al. (in press) also suggest that there is something special about the relationship between consciousness and action selection. Morsella et al. (in press) argue that the primary function of the unity of consciousness (what the authors refer to as
‘conscious integration’) is for “action processes to influence skeletomotor action collectively” resulting in the ability for the organism to exhibit ‘voluntary’ control over its actions. The authors come to this conclusion by parsing apart cases where information is unified unconsciously, or objectively (both for action and perception), with cases where the information must be unified consciously. ‘Voluntary’ action in this case occurs when the organism experiences two conflicting action inclinations—for example, an organism holding its breath underwater will experience both the urge to inhale and to not inhale— along with the ability to choose which action inclination is most adaptable for that context.
On this account, the conscious contents are construed as a kind of language or format which enables activations in the skeletomotor output system. The skeletomotor system accesses the entire conscious field which is “read” contextually. That is, skeletomotor outputs, or actions, are determined not by individual contents—for instance, the percept that one is very high up from the ground—but by the collective information of the contents—the percept that one is very high up from the ground and in an airplane. The action one would take with only the information that one was high off of the ground is different from the action one would take knowing that one is high up from the ground and in an airplane
If Merker (2010) and Morsella et al. (in press) are correct about the close relationship between consciousness and actions, then perhaps a suitable entity for 22
amending Bayne’s unity thesis are skeletomotor action systems (simply referred to as
‘action systems’ from this point on). What happens if I use Bayne’s phenomenal unity
thesis to reflect this relationship? Let ‘action systems’ replace the subject of experience.
Necessarily, for any action system (A) and any time (/), the simultaneous
conscious states that A has at t will be subsumed by a single conscious state—the
action system’s total conscious state.
At this point, an important on-going structural feature of consciousness mentioned by both
Merker and Bayne has not yet been included. The most basic first-person perspective (the
orienting domain) is a structural feature, represented by streams of consciousness in how
the contents are presented (similar to unity). As such, I will amend the thesis to include
this feature:
Necessarily, for any action system (A) and any time (/), the simultaneous
conscious states that A has at t will be subsumed by a single conscious state—the
action system’s total conscious state—and be presented from a first-person
perspective.
Finally, action systems in this thesis are vague entities which science will need to define
through further exploration. One may find in this exploration that the conscious states as
they are accessed by action systems are not necessarily unified. A final revision of the
thesis is needed: 23
For any action system (A) and any time (t), the simultaneous conscious states that
A has at t will be subsumed by a single conscious state—the action
system’s total conscious state—and be presented from a first-person
perspective.
This final thesis is the one I will assess as a potential addition to Bayne and Schecter’s unity theses. It will be referred to as the action unity thesis.
The entity in the action unity thesis meets both of Schecter’s standards for replacing the subject as the thing which can individuate phenomenal streams of consciousness. Is it possible to use action systems as another means for individuating streams of consciousness? I think so. If what is essential to streams of consciousness is that they are in the format understood by action systems, then, from an objective perspective, the identity of the conscious stream would be determined by the accessibility of those contents to action systems. The new tripartite relationship holds between action systems, time of occurrence, and phenomenal character. Consistent with Schecter’s causal method of identifying objective streams of consciousness, the subjective stream of consciousness is also identified, in part, by the causal stream to which it belongs. The benefit of this account is that it is a more specific method for identifying which features, in addition to the causal stream, are essential to its identity.
I also think this new formulation retains the ability to do the some of the same work as Bayne’s unity thesis. This is because the action unity thesis 1 propose combines the two 24
subjects (biological and phenomenal) originally proposed, but with the additional benefit of being more specific about what processes within an organism are essential for the unity of consciousness. First, the purely phenomenal subject is explicitly mentioned as an on going structural feature of consciousness. And, second, the biological subject has been specified as an ‘action system.’ To demonstrate this point more clearly, let us consider the creature which Bayne appeals to as evidence for dismissing a biological (organism) account of unity: Ceberus. Ceberus is a creature which has two heads and one body. On a biological account, there is only one self, the body or organism that is Ceberus. However, if we are concerned with describing phenomenal unity, it seems that Ceberus has two distinct streams of consciousness, one stream in each head, which are not unified with respect to each other. By appealing to action systems, we can also physically divide
Ceberus into two action systems: the one belonging to the left stream of consciousness (on the left half of the body) and the one belonging to the right stream of consciousness (on the right half of the body). Ceberus, then, is two phenomenal subjects with two action systems in one body.
Does this lead us to conclude that action systems are subjects of experience? On one hand, for those interested in a biological account of the self, appealing to action systems rather than entire organisms might help to address some of the problems which arise, such as those mentioned in the case of Ceberus. This specificity may also help to address some of the real-life intuitions one might have about selfhood in conjoined twins. Real-life instances of conjoined twins demonstrate that only the part of the body, the parts which a 25
given twin controls, are attributed to them, while the other parts, under the control of the other twin, are not attributed to them (see the case of the Hensel twins for these intuitions).
On the other hand, we now have two potential subjects of experience in a single thesis. Is it that there are two subjects of experience for every stream of consciousness? I am inclined to think that what we have a case of here is no actual subject of experience (Dennett, 1992;
Bayne, 2010) but two different phenomena (one objective and one subjective) which may find themselves more use in a framework if described as “subjects of experience3.”
VIII. Assessing the action unity thesis
As mentioned before, Schecter’s account of co-consciousness leaves out details about one of the most striking features of consciousness: its phenomenal character. By taking into consideration Schecter’s criticisms of Bayne’s dual-interpretation unity thesis,
I have used Bayne’s unity thesis to inspire the action unity thesis that compliments an account of the subjective aspects of the unity of consciousness. What have we learned about purely phenomenal accounts of the unity of consciousness? Schecter is correct when she argues that one must appeal to something objective when individuating streams of consciousness. Although the action thesis isn’t “purely” phenomenal, it borrows from
Bayne because one strength of his thesis is that it reveals the importance of accounting for the subjective aspects of experience. First, by conceding Schecter’s point and including the objective entity for which phenomenal consciousness is unified, I used Bayne’s unity 26
thesis as a spring-board to formulate the action unity thesis which can also individuate subjective streams of consciousness. In addition, Schecter’s point that subjects of experience cannot be essential to individuating streams of consciousness led to a formulation which can appeal to a specific, objective process (whether or not one wants to call it a subject does not seem to matter in this case) with the power to identify phenomenal streams of consciousness.
1 have claimed that the processes described by the action unity thesis are also within
(and, in part, identified by) a causal stream. This is also the case for Schecter’s account of co-consciousness. Although both accounts are about the unity of consciousness, the phenomena explained in each are different. As mentioned before, Schecter’s account is primarily about the objective processes which “give rise” to consciousness. Unity, or co consciousness, on this account is an objective relationship between experiences— experiences which are the objective entities that enable phenomenal character. Bayne’s account and the action unity thesis are primarily about ‘what it is like’ to have to experiences together, above and beyond ‘what it is like’ to have a single experience. This kind of ‘what it is like’ togetherness, especially if it is for action systems, seems to occur at a later stage of processing in the causal system relative to the phenomena described by
Schecter (Merker, 2010; Morsella et al., in press). This suggests that Schecter’s co consciousness framework does not exclude Bayne’s unity thesis, nor does Bayne’s unity thesis exclude Schecter’s co-consciousness framework. And, taken together with the action unity thesis, the current relationship between the three theses is that co- 27
consciousness occurs first in the conscious causal stream, then the action unity thesis occurs after. Bayne’s thesis complements and overlaps both accounts by explaining the purely subjective aspects of both accounts. When Bayne’s unity thesis is considered in relation to these two objective accounts of the unity of consciousness, it should not be faulted for failing to individuate streams of consciousness, as its merits lie elsewhere. At this point, in part because Schecter’s and my framework require further defining, the three accounts are compatible. Taken together, these three theses can provide a more complete account of the phenomena and processes involved in conscious organisms.
One major objection to my reformulation of Bayne’s unity thesis is that the identities of the action systems which “read” the format of consciousness are not well- defined. The relationship between systems is discussed, but how it is that action systems are actually able to carry out the process of “reading” consciousness, such that it leads to voluntary actions, remains unclear. One benefit to framing the relationship between consciousness and action in this way is that it fits well with other well-supported theories about conscious processes (e.g., ideomotor theory, encapsulation). However, this criticism is ultimately correct, because it identifies one part of this theory which requires more investigation to clear up how (more precisely) it is possible for these processes to occur.
And, importantly, while this is a limitation for the action unity thesis, Schecter’s account is subject to a similar criticism because it also leaves certain features, for example the identity of experiences, open to more precise definitions, as scientific progress on this topic permits. 28
IX. Conclusion
Recall the passage I included from Schecter in the introduction of this paper in which she suggests Bayne must choose between his two accounts:
Going the [phenomenal] route allows the tripartite account to articulate the
subjective structure of consciousness, but no more; it cannot be used to
individuate streams of consciousness or subjects of experience. Going the
[biological] route, forgoing a subjective account of the identity of
experiences, requires foregoing the conceptual connection between our
identities of first-personal perspectives on our own conscious experiences
(691).
We can see now that Schecter favors Bayne’s biological account for identifying streams of consciousness. I favored instead Bayne’s purely phenomenal account as a complementary view to objective explanations of the unity of consciousness.
Although Schecter is right that only objective accounts of the unity of consciousness will be capable of identifying streams of consciousness, this certainly isn’t the only standard for deciding whether an account of unity has explanatory value. Bayne’s purely phenomenal account of unity should be considered alongside objective accounts of unity.
In this paper, I agreed with Schecter that, in identifying streams of consciousness, the subject of experience should not be the thing which tokens streams. Using this as a 29
starting point, I consider the merits and weaknesses Schecter finds with Bayne’s view to formulate a third, complementary account of the unity of consciousness. Schecter’s objective account of the unity of consciousness focuses on the conditions “giving rise” to phenomenal experience. The account I offer, the action unity thesis, complements this by explaining what the unity of consciousness might be for and provides an additional method for identifying streams of consciousness. Finally, I showed how Schecter’s and my account relate to each other within the same causal system—co-consciousness occurs first, permitting conscious experiences, and action unity occurs later, when those contents are used to facilitate action outputs. As for the choice Bayne should make between his two accounts, I think he should stick with a purely phenomenal account as it does not mix subjective and objective explanations, and it can serve to complement objective explanations of the unity of consciousness. 30
References
Bayne, T. The Unity o f Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Bayne, T. & Chalmers, D.J. “What Is the Unity of Consciousness?” The Unity o f
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Chalmers, D.J. “Consciousness and Its Place in Nature.” Philosophy o f Mind: Classical
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Dennett, D. “The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity.” Self and Consciousness: Multiple
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Hurley, S. Consciousness in Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.
Merker, B. “Nested Ontology and Causal Options: A Paradigm for Consciousness.”
(2010). Web. 8 Dec 2015. 31
Morsella, E., Godwin, C. A., Jantz, T. J., Krieger, S. C., & Gazzaley, A. “Homing in on
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Tye, M. Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003. 32
Footnotes
1. Bayne’s account is concerned with the unity of consciousness at a time, rather than over or across time. This paper will also limit itself to discussing the unity of consciousness at a time, referred to as synchronic unity.
2. In addition to the problems mentioned here, Schecter is concerned that the phenomenal formulation permits phenomenal duplicates, where a subject can have two or more of the same experiences at a time and not be aware that she is having more than one. Because this concern is about token experiences and not token streams, I am going to leave it by the wayside.
3. Ultimately, I don’t think that whether action systems are construed as subjects of experience will matter for the purposes of this paper.