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Evolutionary Approaches to Creativity

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Evolutionary Approaches to Creativity P1: OJL Trim: 7in × 10in Top: 0.498in Gutter: 0.871in CUUS1027-15 cuus1027/Kaufman ISBN: 978 0 521 51366 1 May 10, 2010 20:17 CHAPTER 15 Evolutionary Approaches to Creativity Liane Gabora and Scott Barry Kaufman 1. Introduction Studies at the intersection of creativity and evolution are not limited to investi- Many species engage in acts that could be gations into the biological evolution of a called creative (J.C. Kaufman & A.B. Kauf- highly creative species. Creative ideas them- man, 2004). However, human creativity is selves might be said to evolve through cul- unique in that it has completely transformed ture. Human creativity is distinctive because the planet we live on. We build skyscrap- of the adaptive and open-ended manner in ers, play breathtaking cello sonatas, send which change accumulates. Inventions build ourselves into space, and even decode our on previous ones in ways that enhance their own DNA. Given that the anatomy of the utility or aesthetic appeal, or make them human brain is not so different from that applicable in different situations. There is no of the great apes, what enables us to be so a priori limit to how a creative idea might creative? Recent collaborations at the fron- unfold over time. A cartoon character may tier of anthropology, archaeology, psychol- inspire the name and logo for a hockey team ogy, and cognitive science are culminating (the Mighty Ducks), which might in turn in speculative but increasingly sophisticated inspire toys, cereal shapes, cigarette lighter efforts to piece together an answer to this designs, or for that matter work its way into question. Examining the skeletons of our an academic book chapter. It is this procliv- ancestors gives cues as to the anatomical ity to take an idea and make it our own, or constraints that hindered or enabled vari- “put our own spin on it,” that makes creative ous kinds of creative expression. Relics of ideas appear to evolve. The next section of the past have much to tell us about the this chapter investigates in what sense cre- thoughts, beliefs, and creative abilities of ative ideas evolve through culture. the people who invented and used them. Finally, we address the question of why How the spectacular creativity of humans creativity evolved. What forces supported came about is the first topic addressed in this the evolution of creativity? Does being cre- chapter. ative help us live longer, or attract mates? 279 P1: OJL Trim: 7in × 10in Top: 0.498in Gutter: 0.871in CUUS1027-15 cuus1027/Kaufman ISBN: 978 0 521 51366 1 May 10, 2010 20:17 280 LIANE GABORA AND SCOTT BARRY KAUFMAN Do creative projects sometimes interfere with cut-marked bones, suggesting that they with survival and reproductive fitness; are were used to sharpen wood implements and there nonbiological factors that compel us butcher small game (M.D. Leakey, 1971; to create? This is a third topic addressed in Bunn & Kroll, 1986). this chapter. These early tools were functional but sim- ple and unspecialized; by our standards they were not very creative. Feist (2008) refers 2. The Birth of Human Creativity to the minds of these early hominids as pre- representational, suggesting that hominids at Looking at an artifact that was fashioned this time were not capable of forming rep- thousands or millions of years ago is an awe- resentations that deviated from their con- inspiring experience because it gives us a crete sensory perceptions; their experience glimpse into the lives and worldviews of our was tied to the present moment. Similarly, earliest ancestors. To be sure, creative works Mithen (1996) refers to minds at this time disintegrate. The farther back in time we as possessing generalized intelligence, reflect- look for signs of creativity, the fewer creative ing his belief that domain general learning works of that time remain with us today. mechanisms, such as Pavlovian conditioning But by corroborating theory and data from and implicit learning (e.g., A.S. Reber, 1993), different fields, we are on our way toward predominated. putting together a coherent picture of how Nevertheless, the early tools of this and when the creative abilities of humans period mark a momentous breakthrough for arose. our species. Today we are accustomed to We begin this section by examining the seeing everywhere the outcomes of what archaeological evidence for the earliest indi- began as a spark of insight in someone’s cations of human creativity, and the anthro- mind, but when the world consisted solely pological evidence for concurrent changes in of naturally formed objects, the capacity to the size and shape of the cranial cavity. We imagine something and turn it into a real- then examine various hypotheses that have ity may well have seemed almost magical. been put forward to explain these data. As de Baune (2004) puts it, “the moment whenahominin...producedacuttingtool by using a thrusting percussion . marks a 2.1 The Earliest Evidence of Human break between our predecessors and the Creativity: Homo habilis specifically human” (p. 142). It is generally agreed that ancestral humans started diverging from ancestral apes 2.2 The Adaptive Larger-Brained approximately six million years ago. The Homo erectus first Homo lineage, Homo habilis, appeared approximately 2.4 million years ago in Homo habilis persisted from approximately the Lower Paleolithic. The earliest known 2.4 to 1.5 million years ago. Approximately human inventions, referred to as Oldowan 1.8 million years ago, Homo erectus appeared, artifacts (after Olduvai Gorge, Tanzania, followed by Homo ergaster, archaic Homo where they were first found), are widely sapiens,andHomo neanderthalensis. The size attributed to Homo habilis (Semaw et al., of the Homo erectus brain was approxi- 1997), although it is possible that they were mately 1,000 cc, about 25% larger than that of also used by late australopithecines (de Homo habilis,and75% of the cranial capac- Beaune, 2004). They were simple, mostly ity of modern humans (Aiello, 1996;Ruff, single faced stone tools, pointed at one Trinkaus, & Holliday, 1997;Lewin,1999). end (M.D. Leakey, 1971). These tools were Homo erectus exhibit many indications of most likely used to split fruits and nuts (de enhanced ability to creatively adapt to the Beaune, 2004), though some of the more environment to meet the demands of sur- recent ones have sharp edges, and are found vival, including sophisticated, task-specific P1: OJL Trim: 7in × 10in Top: 0.498in Gutter: 0.871in CUUS1027-15 cuus1027/Kaufman ISBN: 978 0 521 51366 1 May 10, 2010 20:17 EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES TO CREATIVITY 281 stone hand axes, complex stable seasonal tal states of others (Premack & Woodruff, habitats, and long-distance hunting strate- 1978). However, other species possess a gies involving large game. By 1.6 million theory of mind (Heyes, 1998) and imitate years ago, Homo erectus had dispersed as far (Byrne & Russon, 1998; Darwin, 1871), yet as Southeast Asia, indicating the ability to they do not compare to hominids with adjust lifestyle to vastly different climates respect to creativity. Moreover, although (Anton´ & Swisher, 2004; Cachel & Harris, these hypotheses may explain how new 1995; Swisher et al., 1994; Walker & Leakey, ideas, once in place, spread from one indi- 1993). In Africa, West Asia, and Europe, by vidual to another, they are inadequate as 1.4 million years ago Homo erectus developed an explanation of the enhanced capacity for the Aschulean hand axe (Asfaw et al., 1992), coming up with new ideas in the first place. a do-it-all tool that may even have had some Yet another proposal is that Homo under- function as a social status symbol (Kohn went a transition at this time from an episodic & Mithen, 1999). These symmetrical biface mode of cognitive functioning to a mimetic stone tools probably required several stages mode (Donald, 1991). The episodic mind of production, bifacial knapping, and con- of Homo habilis was sensitive to the sig- siderable skill and spatial ability to achieve nificance of episodes, and it could encode their final form. them in memory and coordinate appropriate Though the anatomical capacity for lan- responses. But it could not voluntarily access guage was present by this time (Wynn, them independent of cues. The enlarged 1998), verbal communication is thought to cranial capacity of Homo erectus enabled have been limited to (at best) presyntacti- it to acquire a mimetic form of cognition, cal protolanguage (Dunbar, 1996). Thought characterized by possession of what Donald during this time period was most likely only (1991) refers to as a “self-triggered recall and first order; the capacity for thinking about rehearsal loop,” or SRRL. The SRRL enabled thinking (i.e., metacognition) had not yet hominids to voluntarily access memories developed. independent of cues and thereby act out events that occurred in the past, or that could occur in the future (indeed the term 2.3 Possible Explanations for the Onset mimetic is derived from the word “mime”). of Human Creativity Thus not only could the mimetic mind It has been suggested that these early archae- temporarily escape the here and now, but ological finds do not reflect any underly- through gesture it could bring about a sim- ing biological change but were simply a ilar escape in other minds. The SRRL also response to climactic change (Richerson & enabled hominids to engage in a stream of Boyd, 2000). However, given the signifi- thought, such that attention is directed away cant increase in cranial capacity, it seems from the external world toward one’s inter- parsimonious to posit that this dramatic nal model of it, and one thought or idea encephalization allowed a more sophisti- evokes another, revised version of it, which cated mode of cognitive functioning and evokes yet another, and so forth recursively.
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