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Voting Systems in Maryland, 1980-2000

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Voting Systems in Maryland, 1980-2000 Special Committee on Voting Systems and Election Procedures in Maryland Report and Recommendations February, 2001 Special Committee on Voting Systems and Election Procedures in Maryland The Honorable John T. Willis, Chair Secretary of State The Honorable F. Vernon Boozer The Honorable Julian L. Lapides Vice Chair Vice Chair The Honorable Michael J. Collins The Honorable Joan Carter Conway Senate of Maryland Senate of Maryland The Honorable John S. Arnick The Honorable Robert H. Kittleman Maryland House of Delegates Maryland House of Delegates The Honorable Raymond G. Thieme The Honorable Janet Owens Member at Large Member at Large H. Harry Basehart, Ph.D. Frances Murphy Draper Member at Large Member at Large Lt. Gen. Emmett Paige, Jr. (Ret.) Linda Bowler Pierson Member at Large Member at Large Ex-Officio Member Ex-Officio Member Helen Koss, Chair Marvin L. Cheatham, President State Board of Elections Maryland Association of Election Officials1 Staff: Office of the Secretary of State Nikki Baines Trella, Esq. Lauren Frush State Board of Elections 1 Richard Goehler of the Montgomery County Board of Elections was originally designated an ex-officio member as President of the Maryland Association of Election Officials. Marvin L. Cheatham of the Baltimore City Board of Elections became President of the Association upon Mr. Goehler’s retirement from his position on January 1, 2001. Table of Contents Preface ...................................................................1 Executive Summary .........................................................4 Description of Special Committee Proceedings .....................................9 Overview - Administration of Elections in Maryland ...............................11 Certification of Voting Systems ..........................................13 Ballot Design and Certification ..........................................14 Vote Canvassing .....................................................15 Recounts and Contested Elections ........................................16 Evaluation and Review ......................................................17 Voting Systems ......................................................17 Mechanical Lever Machines .......................................19 Datavote ......................................................21 Optical Scan Systems ............................................22 Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems ..........................25 Election and Recount Procedures .........................................28 Election Procedures .............................................28 Recount Procedures .............................................32 Data Collection and Reporting ....................................34 Administrative and Judicial Remedies .....................................35 Review of Maryland’s Election Case Law ............................35 Judicial Challenges ..............................................37 Presidential Electors .............................................38 Absentee and Provisional Ballots ...................................39 Funding Formula and Mechanisms .......................................39 Recommendations ..........................................................42 Voting Systems ......................................................42 Election and Recount Procedures .........................................44 Election Procedures .............................................44 Recount Procedures .............................................45 Administrative and Judicial Remedies .....................................46 Funding Formula and Mechanisms .......................................47 Conclusion ...............................................................48 Appendices Appendix A: Executive Order 01.01.2000.25 .....................................52 Appendix B: National Association of Secretaries of State Election Reform Resolution ......55 Appendix C: Invited Speakers Providing Comment to the Special Committee .............57 Appendix D: List of Individuals Providing Public Comment ..........................89 Appendix E: Samples of Improper Markings on Optical Scan Ballots ...................91 Appendix F: History of Voting in Maryland ......................................96 Appendix G: Table of Relevant Maryland Case Law ................................99 Appendix H: Table of Relevant Federal Case Law ................................100 Appendix I: Glossary of Selected Election Terms .................................101 Appendix J: Abbreviated Bibliography .........................................103 List of Tables and Maps Table 1: Percentage of “No Vote” For President by Subdivision (1980-2000) ............104 Table 2: Percentage of “No Vote” by State in the 1996 General Election ...............105 Table 3: “No Vote” for President by Subdivision (1980-2000) .......................106 Table 4: Date Jurisdictions First Used Current Voting System .......................107 Table 5: Polling Place Voting Systems in Maryland, 1980-2000 ......................108 Table 6: Absentee Ballot Voting Systems in Maryland, 1980-2000 ....................110 Table 7: Summary of Expenditures by Local Boards of Elections for Voting Systems and Election Day .................................................112 Table 8: Cost Comparison of Leased Voting Systems in Maryland ....................114 Table 9: Percentage of “No Vote” by Voting System ..............................115 Table 10: Polling Place Voting Systems in Maryland in 2000 General Election ...........17 Table 11: Table of “No Votes” for Harford County in the 1988 General Election ..........31 Table 12: Prince George’s County “No Vote” Selected Precinct ......................116 Map 1: Maryland “No Vote” Percentages by County in the 1980 General Election ........117 Map 2: Maryland “No Vote” Percentages by County in the 1984 General Election ........118 Map 3: Maryland “No Vote” Percentages by County in the 1988 General Election ........119 Map 4: Maryland “No Vote” Percentages by County in the 1992 General Election ........120 Map 5: Maryland “No Vote” Percentages by County in the 1996 General Election ........121 Map 6: Maryland “No Vote” Percentages by County in the 2000 General Election ........122 Map 7: National “No Vote” Percentages by State in the 1996 General Election ...........123 Map 8: Voting Systems in Maryland: 2000 Presidential Election .....................124 PREFACE The right to vote is the essence and foundation of the constitutional framework of our federal and state governments in the United States. The American Revolution was sparked by the desire for self-determination to choose governmental leaders and to retain control over the form and substance of government. The paramount nature of the right of self-determination was clearly manifested in the 1776 Annapolis deliberations which resulted in the adoption of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Constitution of the State of Maryland. The first article of the Maryland Declaration of Rights expressly provides “that all Government of right originates from the People,” recognizing the fundamental right of citizens to participate fully in their government. The right of suffrage is set forth in Article I of the Constitution of Maryland, placed significantly ahead of the provisions outlining the branches and levels of government and their respective duties and responsibilities. The continuous expansion of suffrage in Maryland — prompted by social change, moral imperatives, economic reality, and often bloody conflict — defines, in many respects, the history and maturation of our state as well as our country. The recognition of the sanctity and power of the right to vote requires that its exercise not be diminished or impaired. The “right to vote” is at the center of the controversy surrounding the 2000 Presidential Election, an election which was marred by the denial and exclusion of eligible citizens from voting, dubious ballot designs which misled or confused many voters, inadequate voting systems which failed to count votes accurately, and both flawed election procedures and judicial processes which failed to provide adequate and timely remedies. Accordingly, it is mandatory that all possible steps be taken to ensure that every eligible citizen in Maryland, at least, has the unfettered opportunity to vote and that the mechanics of voting and election procedures facilitate – not frustrate – the free exercise of the right to vote. It has been a pleasure and an honor to serve as the Chair of the Governor’s Special Committee on Voting Systems and Election Procedures. I appreciate the trust and confidence of 1 the Governor in assigning me this task and responsibility. It was enjoyable to work with the Special Committee members who approached this assignment with keen interest and diligence. I commend the sincere, hard working, and dedicated members and staff of the State Board of Elections and the Local Boards of Election; I thank them for their prompt, thorough and cooperative responses to the Special Committee’s requests. This report could not have been compiled and completed without their assistance. Special recognition is due for Nikki Baines Trella, counsel to the Special Committee, whose organizational skills, conscientiousness, and dedication to the project kept the Special Committee’s work moving forward in an orderly and timely manner. There is a substantial body of research, analysis, and publications relating to voting systems and election procedures that
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