Combinatorial Games
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A Combinatorial Game Theoretic Analysis of Chess Endgames
A COMBINATORIAL GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF CHESS ENDGAMES QINGYUN WU, FRANK YU,¨ MICHAEL LANDRY 1. Abstract In this paper, we attempt to analyze Chess endgames using combinatorial game theory. This is a challenge, because much of combinatorial game theory applies only to games under normal play, in which players move according to a set of rules that define the game, and the last player to move wins. A game of Chess ends either in a draw (as in the game above) or when one of the players achieves checkmate. As such, the game of chess does not immediately lend itself to this type of analysis. However, we found that when we redefined certain aspects of chess, there were useful applications of the theory. (Note: We assume the reader has a knowledge of the rules of Chess prior to reading. Also, we will associate Left with white and Right with black). We first look at positions of chess involving only pawns and no kings. We treat these as combinatorial games under normal play, but with the modification that creating a passed pawn is also a win; the assumption is that promoting a pawn will ultimately lead to checkmate. Just using pawns, we have found chess positions that are equal to the games 0, 1, 2, ?, ", #, and Tiny 1. Next, we bring kings onto the chessboard and construct positions that act as game sums of the numbers and infinitesimals we found. The point is that these carefully constructed positions are games of chess played according to the rules of chess that act like sums of combinatorial games under normal play. -
Call Numbers
Call numbers: It is our recommendation that libraries NOT put J, +, E, Ref, etc. in the call number field in front of the Dewey or other call number. Use the Home Location field to indicate the collection for the item. It is difficult if not impossible to sort lists if the call number fields aren’t entered systematically. Dewey Call Numbers for Non-Fiction Each library follows its own practice for how long a Dewey number they use and what letters are used for the author’s name. Some libraries use a number (Cutter number from a table) after the letters for the author’s name. Other just use letters for the author’s name. Call Numbers for Fiction For fiction, the call number is usually the author’s Last Name, First Name. (Use a comma between last and first name.) It is usually already in the call number field when you barcode. Call Numbers for Paperbacks Each library follows its own practice. Just be consistent for easier handling of the weeding lists. WCTS libraries should follow the format used by WCTS for the items processed by them for your library. Most call numbers are either the author’s name or just the first letters of the author’s last name. Please DO catalog your paperbacks so they can be shared with other libraries. Call Numbers for Magazines To get the call numbers to display in the correct order by date, the call number needs to begin with the date of the issue in a number format, followed by the issue in alphanumeric format. -
Alpha-Beta Pruning
Alpha-Beta Pruning Carl Felstiner May 9, 2019 Abstract This paper serves as an introduction to the ways computers are built to play games. We implement the basic minimax algorithm and expand on it by finding ways to reduce the portion of the game tree that must be generated to find the best move. We tested our algorithms on ordinary Tic-Tac-Toe, Hex, and 3-D Tic-Tac-Toe. With our algorithms, we were able to find the best opening move in Tic-Tac-Toe by only generating 0.34% of the nodes in the game tree. We also explored some mathematical features of Hex and provided proofs of them. 1 Introduction Building computers to play board games has been a focus for mathematicians ever since computers were invented. The first computer to beat a human opponent in chess was built in 1956, and towards the late 1960s, computers were already beating chess players of low-medium skill.[1] Now, it is generally recognized that computers can beat even the most accomplished grandmaster. Computers build a tree of different possibilities for the game and then work backwards to find the move that will give the computer the best outcome. Al- though computers can evaluate board positions very quickly, in a game like chess where there are over 10120 possible board configurations it is impossible for a computer to search through the entire tree. The challenge for the computer is then to find ways to avoid searching in certain parts of the tree. Humans also look ahead a certain number of moves when playing a game, but experienced players already know of certain theories and strategies that tell them which parts of the tree to look. -
Game Theory with Translucent Players
Game Theory with Translucent Players Joseph Y. Halpern and Rafael Pass∗ Cornell University Department of Computer Science Ithaca, NY, 14853, U.S.A. e-mail: fhalpern,[email protected] November 27, 2012 Abstract A traditional assumption in game theory is that players are opaque to one another—if a player changes strategies, then this change in strategies does not affect the choice of other players’ strategies. In many situations this is an unrealistic assumption. We develop a framework for reasoning about games where the players may be translucent to one another; in particular, a player may believe that if she were to change strategies, then the other player would also change strategies. Translucent players may achieve significantly more efficient outcomes than opaque ones. Our main result is a characterization of strategies consistent with appro- priate analogues of common belief of rationality. Common Counterfactual Belief of Rationality (CCBR) holds if (1) everyone is rational, (2) everyone counterfactually believes that everyone else is rational (i.e., all players i be- lieve that everyone else would still be rational even if i were to switch strate- gies), (3) everyone counterfactually believes that everyone else is rational, and counterfactually believes that everyone else is rational, and so on. CCBR characterizes the set of strategies surviving iterated removal of minimax dom- inated strategies: a strategy σi is minimax dominated for i if there exists a 0 0 0 strategy σ for i such that min 0 u (σ ; µ ) > max u (σ ; µ ). i µ−i i i −i µ−i i i −i ∗Halpern is supported in part by NSF grants IIS-0812045, IIS-0911036, and CCF-1214844, by AFOSR grant FA9550-08-1-0266, and by ARO grant W911NF-09-1-0281. -
Girls' Elite 2 0 2 0 - 2 1 S E a S O N by the Numbers
GIRLS' ELITE 2 0 2 0 - 2 1 S E A S O N BY THE NUMBERS COMPARING NORMAL SEASON TO 2020-21 NORMAL 2020-21 SEASON SEASON SEASON LENGTH SEASON LENGTH 6.5 Months; Dec - Jun 6.5 Months, Split Season The 2020-21 Season will be split into two segments running from mid-September through mid-February, taking a break for the IHSA season, and then returning May through mid- June. The season length is virtually the exact same amount of time as previous years. TRAINING PROGRAM TRAINING PROGRAM 25 Weeks; 157 Hours 25 Weeks; 156 Hours The training hours for the 2020-21 season are nearly exact to last season's plan. The training hours do not include 16 additional in-house scrimmage hours on the weekends Sep-Dec. Courtney DeBolt-Slinko returns as our Technical Director. 4 new courts this season. STRENGTH PROGRAM STRENGTH PROGRAM 3 Days/Week; 72 Hours 3 Days/Week; 76 Hours Similar to the Training Time, the 2020-21 schedule will actually allow for a 4 additional hours at Oak Strength in our Sparta Science Strength & Conditioning program. These hours are in addition to the volleyball-specific Training Time. Oak Strength is expanding by 8,800 sq. ft. RECRUITING SUPPORT RECRUITING SUPPORT Full Season Enhanced Full Season In response to the recruiting challenges created by the pandemic, we are ADDING livestreaming/recording of scrimmages and scheduled in-person visits from Lauren, Mikaela or Peter. This is in addition to our normal support services throughout the season. TOURNAMENT DATES TOURNAMENT DATES 24-28 Dates; 10-12 Events TBD Dates; TBD Events We are preparing for 15 Dates/6 Events Dec-Feb. -
Season 6, Episode 4: Airstream Caravan Tukufu Zuberi
Season 6, Episode 4: Airstream Caravan Tukufu Zuberi: Our next story investigates the exotic travels of this vintage piece of Americana. In the years following World War II, Americans took to the open road in unprecedented numbers. A pioneering entrepreneur named Wally Byam seized on this wanderlust. He believed his aluminium-skinned Airstream trailers could be vehicles for change, transporting Americans to far away destinations, and to a new understanding of their place in the world. In 1959, he dreamt up an outlandish scheme: to ship 41 Airstreams half way around the globe for a 14,000-mile caravan from Cape Town to the pyramids of Egypt. Nearly 50 years later, Doug and Suzy Carr of Long Beach, California, think these fading numbers and decal may mean their vintage Airstream was part of this modern day wagon train. Suzy: We're hoping that it's one of forty-one Airstreams that went on a safari in 1959 and was photographed in front of the pyramids. Tukufu: I’m Tukufu Zuberi, and I’ve come to Long Beach to find out just how mobile this home once was. Doug: Hi, how ya doing? Tukufu: I'm fine. How are you? I’m Tukufu Zuberi. Doug: All right. I'm Doug Carr. This is my wife Suzy. Suzy: Hey, great to meet you. Welcome to Grover Beach. Tukufu: How you doing? You know, this is a real funky cool pad. Suzy: It's about as funky as it can be. Tukufu: What do you have for me? Suzy: Well, it all started with a neighbor, and he called over and said, “I believe you have a really famous trailer.” He believed that ours was one of a very few that in 1959 had gone on a safari with Wally Byam. -
Fluid-Structure Interaction in Coronary Stents: a Discrete Multiphysics Approach
chemengineering Article Fluid-Structure Interaction in Coronary Stents: A Discrete Multiphysics Approach Adamu Musa Mohammed 1,2,* , Mostapha Ariane 3 and Alessio Alexiadis 1,* 1 School of Chemical Engineering, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK 2 Department of Chemical Engineering, Faculty of Engineering and Engineering Technology, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa University, Bauchi 740272, Nigeria 3 Department of Materials and Engineering, Sayens—University of Burgundy, 21000 Dijon, France; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected] or [email protected] (A.M.M.); [email protected] (A.A.); Tel.: +44-(0)-776-717-3356 (A.M.M.); +44-(0)-121-414-5305 (A.A.) Abstract: Stenting is a common method for treating atherosclerosis. A metal or polymer stent is deployed to open the stenosed artery or vein. After the stent is deployed, the blood flow dynamics influence the mechanics by compressing and expanding the structure. If the stent does not respond properly to the resulting stress, vascular wall injury or re-stenosis can occur. In this work, a Discrete Multiphysics modelling approach is used to study the mechanical deformation of the coronary stent and its relationship with the blood flow dynamics. The major parameters responsible for deforming the stent are sorted in terms of dimensionless numbers and a relationship between the elastic forces in the stent and pressure forces in the fluid is established. The blood flow and the stiffness of the stent material contribute significantly to the stent deformation and affect its rate of deformation. The stress distribution in the stent is not uniform with the higher stresses occurring at the nodes of the structure. -
The Effective Minimax Value of Asynchronously Repeated Games*
Int J Game Theory (2003) 32: 431–442 DOI 10.1007/s001820300161 The effective minimax value of asynchronously repeated games* Kiho Yoon Department of Economics, Korea University, Anam-dong, Sungbuk-gu, Seoul, Korea 136-701 (E-mail: [email protected]) Received: October 2001 Abstract. We study the effect of asynchronous choice structure on the possi- bility of cooperation in repeated strategic situations. We model the strategic situations as asynchronously repeated games, and define two notions of effec- tive minimax value. We show that the order of players’ moves generally affects the effective minimax value of the asynchronously repeated game in significant ways, but the order of moves becomes irrelevant when the stage game satisfies the non-equivalent utilities (NEU) condition. We then prove the Folk Theorem that a payoff vector can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium out- come with correlation device if and only if it dominates the effective minimax value. These results, in particular, imply both Lagunoff and Matsui’s (1997) result and Yoon (2001)’s result on asynchronously repeated games. Key words: Effective minimax value, folk theorem, asynchronously repeated games 1. Introduction Asynchronous choice structure in repeated strategic situations may affect the possibility of cooperation in significant ways. When players in a repeated game make asynchronous choices, that is, when players cannot always change their actions simultaneously in each period, it is quite plausible that they can coordinate on some particular actions via short-run commitment or inertia to render unfavorable outcomes infeasible. Indeed, Lagunoff and Matsui (1997) showed that, when a pure coordination game is repeated in a way that only *I thank three anonymous referees as well as an associate editor for many helpful comments and suggestions. -
570: Minimax Sample Complexity for Turn-Based Stochastic Game
Minimax Sample Complexity for Turn-based Stochastic Game Qiwen Cui1 Lin F. Yang2 1School of Mathematical Sciences, Peking University 2Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, University of California, Los Angeles Abstract guarantees are rather rare due to complex interaction be- tween agents that makes the problem considerably harder than single agent reinforcement learning. This is also known The empirical success of multi-agent reinforce- as non-stationarity in MARL, which means when multi- ment learning is encouraging, while few theoret- ple agents alter their strategies based on samples collected ical guarantees have been revealed. In this work, from previous strategy, the system becomes non-stationary we prove that the plug-in solver approach, proba- for each agent and the improvement can not be guaranteed. bly the most natural reinforcement learning algo- One fundamental question in MBRL is that how to design rithm, achieves minimax sample complexity for efficient algorithms to overcome non-stationarity. turn-based stochastic game (TBSG). Specifically, we perform planning in an empirical TBSG by Two-players turn-based stochastic game (TBSG) is a two- utilizing a ‘simulator’ that allows sampling from agents generalization of Markov decision process (MDP), arbitrary state-action pair. We show that the em- where two agents choose actions in turn and one agent wants pirical Nash equilibrium strategy is an approxi- to maximize the total reward while the other wants to min- mate Nash equilibrium strategy in the true TBSG imize it. As a zero-sum game, TBSG is known to have and give both problem-dependent and problem- Nash equilibrium strategy [Shapley, 1953], which means independent bound. -
Metric Entropy and Minimax Rates
Journal of Machine Learning Research 22 (2021) 1-45 Submitted 6/20; Revised 12/20; Published 1/21 Optimal Structured Principal Subspace Estimation: Metric Entropy and Minimax Rates Tony Cai [email protected] Department of Statistics University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA Hongzhe Li [email protected] Department of Biostatistics, Epidemiology and Informatics University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA Rong Ma [email protected] Department of Biostatistics, Epidemiology and Informatics University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA Editor: Ambuj Tewari Abstract Driven by a wide range of applications, several principal subspace estimation problems have been studied individually under different structural constraints. This paper presents a uni- fied framework for the statistical analysis of a general structured principal subspace estima- tion problem which includes as special cases sparse PCA/SVD, non-negative PCA/SVD, subspace constrained PCA/SVD, and spectral clustering. General minimax lower and up- per bounds are established to characterize the interplay between the information-geometric complexity of the constraint set for the principal subspaces, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and the dimensionality. The results yield interesting phase transition phenomena concern- ing the rates of convergence as a function of the SNRs and the fundamental limit for consistent estimation. Applying the general results to the specific settings yields the mini- max rates of convergence for those problems, including the previous unknown optimal rates for sparse SVD, non-negative PCA/SVD and subspace constrained PCA/SVD. Keywords: Low-rank matrix; Metric entropy; Minimax risk; Principal component anal- ysis; Singular value decomposition 1. Introduction Spectral methods such as the principal component analysis (PCA) and the singular value decomposition (SVD) are a ubiquitous technique in modern data analysis with a wide range of applications in many fields including statistics, machine learning, applied mathematics, and engineering. -
Games with Hidden Information
Games with Hidden Information R&N Chapter 6 R&N Section 17.6 • Assumptions so far: – Two-player game : Player A and B. – Perfect information : Both players see all the states and decisions. Each decision is made sequentially . – Zero-sum : Player’s A gain is exactly equal to player B’s loss. • We are going to eliminate these constraints. We will eliminate first the assumption of “perfect information” leading to far more realistic models. – Some more game-theoretic definitions Matrix games – Minimax results for perfect information games – Minimax results for hidden information games 1 Player A 1 L R Player B 2 3 L R L R Player A 4 +2 +5 +2 L Extensive form of game: Represent the -1 +4 game by a tree A pure strategy for a player 1 defines the move that the L R player would make for every possible state that the player 2 3 would see. L R L R 4 +2 +5 +2 L -1 +4 2 Pure strategies for A: 1 Strategy I: (1 L,4 L) Strategy II: (1 L,4 R) L R Strategy III: (1 R,4 L) Strategy IV: (1 R,4 R) 2 3 Pure strategies for B: L R L R Strategy I: (2 L,3 L) Strategy II: (2 L,3 R) 4 +2 +5 +2 Strategy III: (2 R,3 L) L R Strategy IV: (2 R,3 R) -1 +4 In general: If N states and B moves, how many pure strategies exist? Matrix form of games Pure strategies for A: Pure strategies for B: Strategy I: (1 L,4 L) Strategy I: (2 L,3 L) Strategy II: (1 L,4 R) Strategy II: (2 L,3 R) Strategy III: (1 R,4 L) Strategy III: (2 R,3 L) 1 Strategy IV: (1 R,4 R) Strategy IV: (2 R,3 R) R L I II III IV 2 3 L R I -1 -1 +2 +2 L R 4 II +4 +4 +2 +2 +2 +5 +1 L R III +5 +1 +5 +1 IV +5 +1 +5 +1 -1 +4 3 Pure strategies for Player B Player A’s payoff I II III IV if game is played I -1 -1 +2 +2 with strategy I by II +4 +4 +2 +2 Player A and strategy III by III +5 +1 +5 +1 Player B for Player A for Pure strategies IV +5 +1 +5 +1 • Matrix normal form of games: The table contains the payoffs for all the possible combinations of pure strategies for Player A and Player B • The table characterizes the game completely, there is no need for any additional information about rules, etc. -
Trustworthy Whole-System Provenance for the Linux Kernel
Trustworthy Whole-System Provenance for the Linux Kernel Adam Bates, Dave (Jing) Tian, Thomas Moyer Kevin R.B. Butler University of Florida MIT Lincoln Laboratory {adammbates,daveti,butler}@ufl.edu [email protected] Abstract is presently of enormous interest in a variety of dis- In a provenance-aware system, mechanisms gather parate communities including scientific data processing, and report metadata that describes the history of each ob- databases, software development, and storage [43, 53]. ject being processed on the system, allowing users to un- Provenance has also been demonstrated to be of great derstand how data objects came to exist in their present value to security by identifying malicious activity in data state. However, while past work has demonstrated the centers [5, 27, 56, 65, 66], improving Mandatory Access usefulness of provenance, less attention has been given Control (MAC) labels [45, 46, 47], and assuring regula- to securing provenance-aware systems. Provenance it- tory compliance [3]. self is a ripe attack vector, and its authenticity and in- Unfortunately, most provenance collection mecha- tegrity must be guaranteed before it can be put to use. nisms in the literature exist as fully-trusted user space We present Linux Provenance Modules (LPM), applications [28, 27, 41, 56]. Even kernel-based prove- the first general framework for the development of nance mechanisms [43, 48] and sketches for trusted provenance-aware systems. We demonstrate that LPM provenance architectures [40, 42] fall short of providing creates a trusted provenance-aware execution environ- a provenance-aware system for malicious environments. ment, collecting complete whole-system provenance The problem of whether or not to trust provenance is fur- while imposing as little as 2.7% performance overhead ther exacerbated in distributed environments, or in lay- on normal system operation.