Windows 7® Administrator's Pocket Consultant Prepress
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1 Table of Contents List of Figures
Table of Contents List of Figures ..................................................................................................................... 4 List of Tables ...................................................................................................................... 5 Chapter 1: Introduction....................................................................................................... 6 1.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................6 1.2 Problem Statement .......................................................................................................12 1.3 Thesis Objective...........................................................................................................12 1.4 Thesis Organization.....................................................................................................14 Chapter 2: Intrusion Detection.......................................................................................... 15 2.1 Introduction..................................................................................................................15 2.2 What is an IDS .............................................................................................................15 2.2.1 The Basic Concepts of Intrusion Detection......................................................16 2.2.2 A Generic Intrusion-Detection System.............................................................17 2.2.3 Characteristics of -
The Rise of Autorun- Based Malware by Vinoo Thomas, Prashanth Ramagopal, and Rahul Mohandas Report the Rise of Autorun-Based Malware
Report The Rise of AutoRun- Based Malware By Vinoo Thomas, Prashanth Ramagopal, and Rahul Mohandas Report The Rise of AutoRun-Based Malware Table of Contents Abstract 3 The Return of Removable-Disk Malware 3 Distribution of AutoRun-Based Malware 4 AutoRun Woes 6 Incomplete autorun.inf cleaning 7 Traditional detection methods 8 Smart removal of autorun.inf 8 Leveraging In-the-Cloud Computing Technology 10 The Road Ahead 11 About the authors 12 Report The Rise of AutoRun-Based Malware Abstract Most people associate today’s computer viruses and other prevalent malware with the Internet. But that’s not where they started. Lest we forget, the earliest computer threats came from the era of floppy disks and removable media. With the arrival of the Internet, email and network-based attacks became the preferred infection vector for hackers to spread malicious code—while security concerns about removable media took a back seat. Now, however, our attention is returning to plug-in media. Over the years, floppy disks have been replaced by portable hard drives, flash media cards, memory sticks, and other forms of data storage. Today’s removable devices can hold 10,000 times more data than yesterday’s floppy disks. Not only can they store more data, today’s devices are “smart”—with the ability to run portable software programs1 or boot operating systems. 2,3 Seeing the popularity of removable storage, virus authors realized the potential of using this media as an infection vector. And they are greatly aided by a convenience feature in operating systems called AutoRun, which launches the content on a removable disk without any user interaction. -
Using Remote Desktop Services with Ifix 1
Proficy iFIX 6.5 Using Remote Desktop Services GE Digital Proficy Historian and Operations Hub: Data Analysis in Context 1 Proprietary Notice The information contained in this publication is believed to be accurate and reliable. However, General Electric Company assumes no responsibilities for any errors, omissions or inaccuracies. Information contained in the publication is subject to change without notice. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, or stored in a database or retrieval system, or transmitted or distributed in any form by any means, electronic, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of General Electric Company. Information contained herein is subject to change without notice. © 2021, General Electric Company. All rights reserved. Trademark Notices GE, the GE Monogram, and Predix are either registered trademarks or trademarks of General Electric Company. Microsoft® is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corporation, in the United States and/or other countries. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. We want to hear from you. If you have any comments, questions, or suggestions about our documentation, send them to the following email address: [email protected] Table of Contents Using Remote Desktop Services with iFIX 1 Reference Documents 1 Introduction to Remote Desktop Services 2 Using iClientTS 2 Understanding the iFIX and Remote Desktop Services 3 File System Support 5 Where to Find More Information on Remote Desktop Services 5 Getting -
Investigating Powershell Attacks
Investigating PowerShell Attacks Black Hat USA 2014 August 7, 2014 PRESENTED BY: Ryan Kazanciyan, Matt Hastings © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. Background Case Study WinRM, Victim VPN SMB, NetBIOS Attacker Victim workstations, Client servers § Fortune 100 organization § Command-and-control via § Compromised for > 3 years § Scheduled tasks § Active Directory § Local execution of § Authenticated access to PowerShell scripts corporate VPN § PowerShell Remoting © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 2 Why PowerShell? It can do almost anything… Execute commands Download files from the internet Reflectively load / inject code Interface with Win32 API Enumerate files Interact with the registry Interact with services Examine processes Retrieve event logs Access .NET framework © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 3 PowerShell Attack Tools § PowerSploit § Posh-SecMod § Reconnaissance § Veil-PowerView § Code execution § Metasploit § DLL injection § More to come… § Credential harvesting § Reverse engineering § Nishang © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 4 PowerShell Malware in the Wild © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 5 Investigation Methodology WinRM PowerShell Remoting evil.ps1 backdoor.ps1 Local PowerShell script Persistent PowerShell Network Registry File System Event Logs Memory Traffic Sources of Evidence © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 6 Attacker Assumptions § Has admin (local or domain) on target system § Has network access to needed ports on target system § Can use other remote command execution methods to: § Enable execution of unsigned PS scripts § Enable PS remoting © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 7 Version Reference 2.0 3.0 4.0 Requires WMF Requires WMF Default (SP1) 3.0 Update 4.0 Update Requires WMF Requires WMF Default (R2 SP1) 3.0 Update 4.0 Update Requires WMF Default 4.0 Update Default Default Default (R2) © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. -
Security Assessment Security Policy Assessment
Security Assessment Security Policy Assessment Prepared for: Jonathan Doe Prepared by: Austin Archer 3/23/2018 CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: The information contained in this report is for the exclusive use of the client specified above and may contain confidential, privileged and non-disclosable information. If the recipient of this report is not the client or addressee, such recipient is strictly prohibited from reading, photocopying, distributing or otherwise using this report or its contents in any way. Scan Date: 4/1/2014 Security Policy Assessment SECURITY ASSESSMENT Table of Contents 1 - Summary 1.1 - Sampled Systems 2 - Local Security Settings (Sampled Systems) 2.1 - Account Policies 2.1.1 - Password Policy 2.1.2 - Account Lockout Policy 2.2 - Local Policies 2.2.1 - Audit Policy 2.2.2 - User Rights Assignment 2.2.3 - Security Options PROPRIETARY & CONFIDENTIAL Page 2 of 14 Security Policy Assessment SECURITY ASSESSMENT 1 - Summary 1.1 - Sampled Systems IP Addresses Computer Name Operating System 10.0.7.28 tandem Windows 7 Enterprise 172.20.1.3, 10.0.1.3 DC01 Windows Server 2012 Standard PROPRIETARY & CONFIDENTIAL Page 3 of 14 Security Policy Assessment SECURITY ASSESSMENT 2 - Local Security Settings (Sampled Systems) 2.1 - Account Policies 2.1.1 - Password Policy Policy Setting Computers Enforce password history 0 passwords remembered TANDEM 24 passwords remembered DC01 Maximum password age 42 days All Sampled Minimum password age 1 days All Sampled Minimum password length 7 characters All Sampled Password must meet complexity requirements -
Run-Commands-Windows-10.Pdf
Run Commands Windows 10 by Bettertechtips.com Command Action Command Action documents Open Documents Folder devicepairingwizard Device Pairing Wizard videos Open Videos Folder msdt Diagnostics Troubleshooting Wizard downloads Open Downloads Folder tabcal Digitizer Calibration Tool favorites Open Favorites Folder dxdiag DirectX Diagnostic Tool recent Open Recent Folder cleanmgr Disk Cleanup pictures Open Pictures Folder dfrgui Optimie Drive devicepairingwizard Add a new Device diskmgmt.msc Disk Management winver About Windows dialog dpiscaling Display Setting hdwwiz Add Hardware Wizard dccw Display Color Calibration netplwiz User Accounts verifier Driver Verifier Manager azman.msc Authorization Manager utilman Ease of Access Center sdclt Backup and Restore rekeywiz Encryption File System Wizard fsquirt fsquirt eventvwr.msc Event Viewer calc Calculator fxscover Fax Cover Page Editor certmgr.msc Certificates sigverif File Signature Verification systempropertiesperformance Performance Options joy.cpl Game Controllers printui Printer User Interface iexpress IExpress Wizard charmap Character Map iexplore Internet Explorer cttune ClearType text Tuner inetcpl.cpl Internet Properties colorcpl Color Management iscsicpl iSCSI Initiator Configuration Tool cmd Command Prompt lpksetup Language Pack Installer comexp.msc Component Services gpedit.msc Local Group Policy Editor compmgmt.msc Computer Management secpol.msc Local Security Policy: displayswitch Connect to a Projector lusrmgr.msc Local Users and Groups control Control Panel magnify Magnifier -
Hunting Red Team Activities with Forensic Artifacts
Hunting Red Team Activities with Forensic Artifacts By Haboob Team 1 [email protected] Table of Contents 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 5 2. Why Threat Hunting?............................................................................................................................. 5 3. Windows Forensic.................................................................................................................................. 5 4. LAB Environment Demonstration ..................................................................................................... 6 4.1 Red Team ......................................................................................................................................... 6 4.2 Blue Team ........................................................................................................................................ 6 4.3 LAB Overview .................................................................................................................................. 6 5. Scenarios .................................................................................................................................................. 7 5.1 Remote Execution Tool (Psexec) ............................................................................................... 7 5.2 PowerShell Suspicious Commands ...................................................................................... -
Netop Remote Control User's Guide
USER'S GUIDE 27 September 2017 Netop Remote Control User's Guide Copyright© 1981-2017 Netop Business Solutions A/S. All Rights Reserved. Portions used under license from third parties. Please send any comments to: Netop Business Solutions A/S Bregnerodvej 127 DK-3460 Birkerod Denmark E-mail: [email protected] Internet: www.netop.com Netop™ is a trademark of Netop Business Solutions A/S. All other products mentioned in this document are trademarks of their respective manufacturers. Netop Business Solutions A/S denies any and all responsibility for damages caused directly or indirectly as a result of using this document. The content of this document is subject to change without notice. Netop Business Solutions A/S retains the copyright to this document. The document is optimized for double-sided printing. 27 September 2017 Netop Remote Control User's Guide Contents 1 Overview ....................................................................................................................................................4 1.1 Remote Control modules ...............................................................................................................................................4 1.2 Security ...........................................................................................................................................4 1.3 Communication profiles ...............................................................................................................................................5 2 Managing Hosts ........................................................................................................................................6 -
Microsoft Active Platform: a Development Platform for Internet-Based Distributed Computing
Microsoft Active Platform: A Development Platform for Internet-Based Distributed Computing Backgrounder March 19977 Intent on increasing online efficiency while reducing development and training costs, businesses are demanding a single solution for storing, publishing and retrieving information, as well as for running line-of-business applications on internal networks and the Internet. The Microsoft® Active Platform meets this demand by providing a foundation for distributed computing. An integrated, comprehensive set of client and server development technologies, the Active Platform makes it easy for developers to integrate the connectivity of the Internet with the power of the personal computer. The Active Platform is based on the leading standards-based implementation of HTML from Microsoft, open scripting and component architecture. It allows developers to use the same tools and components they know and use today to build powerful applications easily for the Internet and intranets. This comprehensive set of tools and technologies provides a new application development approach across clients and servers using a single component model. By making optimal use of today’s tools and tomorrow’s Internet technologies, the Active Platform enables developers to make the transition into the new paradigm for desktop computing and capitalize on the new opportunities it presents. The Active Platform offers users and administrators a graphically rich, intuitive, easy-to-manage and consistent experience across platforms. Developers benefit from rich services built into the system and a uniform programming model across the client and the server that can be accessed from a consistent, integrated set of tools. Figure1. The Microsoft Active Platform brings information to the desktop from the Internet and intranets under the comprehensive interface of the Active Desktop. -
Copyrighted Material
11_783269 bindex.qxp 11/10/06 11:15 AM Page 209 Index applications (defined), 205. See also programs Numerics arranging windows, 43–44 100% button (Internet Explorer 7), 99–100 assigning sounds to program events, 24 audio visualizations, 186 A Windows Media Player 11, 183, 185–186 accessibility options, 156 audio CDs. See CDs accessories, 205 Audio Description feature, 157 account types, 169 AutoComplete feature (Internet Explorer 7), 101 accounts (administrative), 169 automatic updates with Windows Update, 161–162, 167 accounts (e-mail), 124 AutoPlay, 13, 148, 151 accounts (user) Autosearching feature (Internet Explorer 7), 113 account types, 169 adding, 169 creating, 169 B deleting, 170 backgrounds for desktop, 24 managing, 168, 170 Backup and Restore Center, 140–143, 146 names, 169 Backup Files dialog box, 141 Parental Controls, 170 backups passwords, 169 CompletePC Backup utility, 140–142 pictures, 169–170 DVD discs, 142 switching, 74 File and Folder Backup utility, 140–142 User Account Control (UAC), 170 Send To shortcut menu command, 64–65 activity reporting, 165 stopping, 141 activity reports, 166 BitLocker drive encryption, 163–164 Add Printer Wizard, 149–151 blocking Add to Library dialog box, 187 computer use, 165 adding Web sites, 165 bookmarks to Favorites Center, 102 blog, 208 gadgets, 31–32 bookmarks (Internet Explorer 7) icons, 35 adding to Favorites Center, 102 languages, 155–156 deleting, 104 music, 187 importing, 101 printers, 149–151 moving, 103–105 user accounts, 169 organizing, 103–105 address bar, 15–16 renaming, 104 address book, 128–130 selecting, 103 Address toolbar, 41 browser (defined), 208. See also Internet Explorer 7 adjusting volume, 152 browsing offline. -
Management Console Reference Guide
Secure Web Gateway Management Console Reference Guide Release 10.0 • Manual Version 1.01 M86 SECURITY SETUP AND CONFIGURATION GUIDE © 2010 M86 Security All rights reserved. 828 W. Taft Ave., Orange, CA 92865, USA Version 1.01, published November 2010 for SWG software release 10.0 This document may not, in whole or in part, be copied, photo- copied, reproduced, translated, or reduced to any electronic medium or machine readable form without prior written con- sent from M86 Security. Every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of this document. However, M86 Security makes no warranties with respect to this documentation and disclaims any implied war- ranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. M86 Security shall not be liable for any error or for incidental or consequential damages in connection with the furnishing, performance, or use of this manual or the examples herein. Due to future enhancements and modifications of this product, the information described in this documentation is subject to change without notice. Trademarks Other product names mentioned in this manual may be trade- marks or registered trademarks of their respective companies and are the sole property of their respective manufacturers. II M86 SECURITY, Management Console Reference Guide CONTENT INTRODUCTION TO THE SECURE WEB GATEWAY MANAGEMENT CONSOLE .................................................................... 1 WORKING WITH THE MANAGEMENT CONSOLE................ 3 Management Console . 3 Main Menu . 4 Using the Management Console . 6 Management Wizard . 10 User Groups Wizard . 11 Log Entry Wizard . 28 DASHBOARD............................................................... 33 Dashboard Console . 33 Functionality. 34 Device Gauges . 35 Performance Graphs . 38 Messages (SNMP). 40 Device Utilization Graphs. 41 USERS ...................................................................... -
Dolphin Power Tools User's with Windows Embedded Handheld 6.5
Dolphin™ Power Tools with Windows® Mobile 6.X for the Dolphin 6000 Scanphone User’s Guide Disclaimer Honeywell International Inc. (“HII”) reserves the right to make changes in specifications and other information contained in this document without prior notice, and the reader should in all cases consult HII to determine whether any such changes have been made. The information in this publication does not represent a commitment on the part of HII. HII shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein; nor for incidental or consequential damages resulting from the furnishing, performance, or use of this material. This document contains proprietary information that is protected by copyright. All rights are reserved. No part of this document may be photocopied, reproduced, or translated into another language without the prior written consent of HII. © 2011 Honeywell International Inc. All rights reserved. Microsoft® Windows®, Windows NT®, Windows 2000, Windows ME, Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows .NET Framework, Windows ActiveSync®, and the Windows logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation. The Bluetooth® word mark and logos are owned by Bluetooth SIG, Inc. Other product names or marks mentioned in this document may be trademarks or registered trademarks of other companies and are the property of their respective owners. Web Address: www.honeywellaidc.com Table of Contents Chapter 1 - Introduction Dolphin Power Tools Overview............................................................................................1-1