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The Role of CMO and CEO Equity Compensation in Inducing Marketing Myopia

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The Role of CMO and CEO Equity Compensation in Inducing Marketing Myopia Marketing Science Institute Working Paper Series 2018 Report No. 18-105 How Incentives Shape Strategy: The Role of CMO and CEO Equity Compensation in Inducing Marketing Myopia Martin Artz and Natalie Mizik “How Incentives Shape Strategy: The Role of CMO and CEO Equity Compensation in Inducing Marketing Myopia” © Martin Artz and Natalie Mizik; Report Summary © 2018 Marketing Science Institute MSI working papers are distributed for the benefit of MSI corporate and academic members and the general public. Reports are not to be reproduced or published in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, without written permission. Report Summary Myopic management is a serious problem and a threat to firms because it entails inefficient decision making, which leads to a decline in future firm performance. In this study, Martin Artz and Natalie Mizik examine the role personal compensation incentives of CMOs and CEOs play in inducing myopic marketing management. They combine data from multiple sources (ExecuComp, Center for Research in Security Prices [CRSP], Compustat, and Thomson Reuters Insider Filing Data Feed). Their sample covers all public firms in these databases from 1993-2014. Their analyses use multiple methods designed to identify causal effects (e.g., inverse probability weighted regression adjustment, Heckman selection bias correction, endogenous treatment effects, control function, difference-in- differences), which allows for a causal interpretation of findings. Findings CEO equity incentives are largely unrelated to the incidence and severity of myopic marketing management. CMO equity compensation, on the other hand, is highly predictive of the incidence and severity of myopic marketing management. Contrary to the arguments that the presence of a CMO in the organization can help maintain customer focus and support for marketing departments, CMOs not only fail to prevent myopia, but further exacerbate the problem as the market-based (i.e., equity) portion of their personal compensation increases. Further, consistent with the CMO’s personal enrichment motivation, CMOs take advantage of artificially inflated stock valuation by exercising more stock options and selling more of their personal equity holdings in the years when myopic marketing management occurs and is more severe. Implications In contrast to a popular pessimistic view in the marketing literature questioning the ability of CMOs to influence firm strategy, these findings suggest CMOs have a significant influence on marketing budgets and firm strategy. However, this study also challenges the belief in the CMO as a central force to mitigate marketing resource misallocation and as the dominant advocate for a long-run-focused marketing strategy. On the contrary, these findings suggest that CMOs enable myopic marketing management and seek to derive personal gain when it occurs. They highlight the pitfalls and limitations of overreliance on equity in managerial compensation packages: Equity compensation can create perverse incentives for managers in their functional domain to engage in myopic practices. What are the solutions to the myopic management problem? One proposal suggests firms should pay their executives based on stock price performance but defer the payout until after the executive’s retirement in order to reduce the effects of equity compensation and provide optimal investment incentives during the latter part of the CEO’s tenure. Another proposal calls for tying executive compensation to long-run-oriented performance metrics (e.g., customer satisfaction or Marketing Science Institute Working Paper Series 1 brand equity). Yet another proposal advocates expanding disclosure of value-relevant non- financial performance indicators to curtail myopic management. In April 2015, the SEC issued a “pay versus performance” proposal (it has just been moved from the 2017 SEC rulemaking agenda to the long-term action list by the new administration) to require greater disclosure on compensation and to draw a direct link to performance (http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-78.html). Under this proposal, companies would be required to disclose the relationship between executive pay and a company’s financial performance and to report executive compensation relative to their financial performance and relative to their peer group of firms. Will this solution help remedy the problem? The answer remains to be seen. Martin Artz is Associate Professor of Management Accounting and Control at the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Germany. Natalie Mizik is Professor of Marketing and J. Gary Shansby Endowed Chair in Marketing Strategy, Foster School of Business, University of Washington. Acknowledgments The authors thank seminar participants at Goethe University, INSEAD, Northwestern University, Marketing Science Conference (Atlanta), Marketing Strategy Meets Wall Street Conference (Singapore), Theory + Practice in Marketing Conference (Kellogg School of Management), University of Georgia, University of Mannheim, University of Washington, and Washington State University for helpful comments. The first author gratefully acknowledges support from the Julius-Paul-Stiegler Memorial Foundation at the University of Mannheim. Marketing Science Institute Working Paper Series 2 INTRODUCTION The economic crisis of 2008 put a bright spotlight on executive compensation and its effects on the behavior of top management teams (TMTs). The critics have pointed to the unprecedented escalation in executive compensation, drawing a direct link to deteriorating business ethics, widespread excesses and abuses of power, and the lack of regard for customers’ and shareholders’ welfare (Ferguson, Beck, and Bolt 2010). Executive pay has quickly become the subject of public and media attention and heated debates in the US Congress. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was signed into law. It included several important new rules to govern executive pay at large public companies, for example, requiring large public companies to give shareholders a vote on executive pay. There has also been an explosion of research on managerial incentives and behavior in academic literature. Research in marketing and accounting has documented that under certain conditions, firms engage in earnings management (through accounting accruals and real activity manipulation) to temporarily inflate earnings, and such manipulation has significant negative consequences for the firm (Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Kothari at al. 2016, Bereskin et al. 2018). Standard economic models suggest that private managerial incentives play a significant role in inducing such behaviors. Specifically, theoretical models show that an overemphasis on stock price in managerial evaluation and compensation can induce myopic management and/ or accounting manipulation (e.g., Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles 1993; Croker and Slemrod 2007). Accounting research has seen a surge of interest in studying the links between executive compensation and accounting “irregularities” (i.e., accrual-based earnings manipulation). These studies find support for the conclusions from the theoretical economic models: equity incentives motivate executives to manipulate accounting information (Cheng and Warfield 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Jiang, Petroni, and Wang 2010). Marketing Science Institute Working Paper Series 3 In the marketing literature there has also been an increased interest in studying the effects of executive compensation (e.g., Bansal et al. 2016; Currim at al. 2012; Chakravarty and Grewal 2016). Some authors have suggested that executive equity compensation might serve to reduce myopic management such as cutting marketing spending to artificially inflate earnings (Currim at al. 2012; Luo et al. 2012; Chakravarti and Grewal 2016). We investigate this proposition in detail. Further, the role of chief marketing officers (CMOs) in preventing (or inducing) marketing myopia and the impact of CMO compensation on myopic marketing management are unknown. These two key aspects—the CMO compensation–myopic marketing management link and the relative role of CMOs in inducing marketing myopia—are the focus of our study. Specifically, we examine the role personal compensation incentives of a CMO and CEO play in inducing myopic marketing management. We find that CEO equity incentives are largely unrelated to the incidence and severity of myopic marketing management. CMO equity compensation, on the other hand, is highly predictive of the incidence and severity of myopic marketing management. Contrary to a common belief articulated in the marketing literature that the presence of a CMO in the organization helps maintain customer focus, support funding for marketing departments, and ensure consistent marketing strategy, we find CMOs not only fail to prevent myopia, but further exacerbate the problem as the market-based (equity) portion of their personal compensation package increases. Our analyses utilizing multiple methods designed to identify causal effects (e.g., inverse probability weighted regression adjustment, Heckman selection bias correction, endogenous treatment effects, control function, difference-in-differences) allow for a causal interpretation of these findings. Further, we find that CMOs seek to benefit financially and take advantage of inflated equity valuation. Consistent with the CMO’s personal enrichment motivation we find that CMOs exercise more stock options and sell more of their personal equity holdings
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