Afghanistan Country Risk Profile

Afghanistan

Country Risk Profile 2000

Country Risk Profile

 2000 Swiss Peace Foundation ⋅ Institute for Conflict Resolution and Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) ⋅ Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

Swiss Peace Foundation ⋅ Institute for Conflict Resolution

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R. Yusufzai: Afghanistan Country Risk Profile

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface 1 1 Executive Summary 2 2 Policy Options 5 3 Risk Assessment 9 3.1 Domestic Risk Assessment 10 3.1.1 Background and historical factors 10 3.1.2 Environmental factors 13 3.1.3 Economic factors 15 3.1.4 Social factors 17 3.1.5 Political factors 17 3.1.6 Military and security factors 19 3.1.7 Local actors 21 3.2 International Risk Assessment 28 End Notes 36 Bibliography 38

R. Yusufzai: Afghanistan Country Risk Profile

Preface

The present series of case studies on Afghanistan, India and Pakistan were presented and discussed at the “Second Workshop on Conflict Dynamics in South Asia: Early Warning in Practice” in Septem- ber 2000 in Bern, Switzerland. The workshop was organized by the Swiss Peace Foundation's early warning unit FAST (Early Recognition of Ten- sion and Fact Finding) and brought together scholars, local experts, and representatives of NGOs dealing with the South Asian region.

FAST's main objective is the early recognition of impending or potential crisis situations for the purpose of early action towards the prevention of armed conflict and – if given – seizing opportunities for peace building. Combined with a collection of statistic evidence and systematic monitoring of conflictive and cooperative events, the present Country Risk Profile is part of FAST's early warning methodology linking early warning and early action by relevant decision makers. FAST is mandated by the Swiss Agency for Development and Coop- eration (SDC).

The case studies on Afghanistan (Rahimullah Yusufzai), India (Navnita Chadha Behera) and Pakistan (I.A. Rehman) shed light on the various political, socio-economic and demographic causes of specific ongoing conflicts in the South Asian region.

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1 Executive Summary*

After a generation of conflict, Afghanistan lies in ruins as the world's most outlawed and ostracised state. Abandoned and left to fend for itself against heavy odds, it has gone back in time after serving as a battlefield for two superpowers. Out of venge- ance, the Soviet Union, and its successor Russia, as the defeated superpower never had any interest in bailing out Afghanistan what to speak of paying war reparations to help in its reconstruc- tion. The U.S. as the victorious superpower has until now acted more out of self-interest than as a world leader which cares for the 16 million Afghans. Afghanistan's neighbours, in particular Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and China, pursue self-serving agendas and are concerned more in shoring up their defences against the fallout of the Afghan conflict than going beyond rhetoric to secure the future of the poverty-ridden Afghan children who are growing up illiterate in a culture of violence, hate and extremism. Outside interference continues blatantly in Af- ghanistan not as means of promoting peace but as a tool to advance interests which have little concern for the hapless Afghans.

The hope generated by the Taliban as the harbingers of peace when they first appeared on the scene in the autumn of 1994 is almost extinguished because they too, like the mujahideen before them, in their lust for power have become involved in the game of death and destruction which has been Afghanistan's fate for 22 long years. Corruption by Taliban officials is growing and the law and order situation, though still far better than during communist and mujahideen rule and once their proudest achievement, is deteriorating. To make matters worse, the Taliban are still determined to conquer the whole country and subjugate every Afghan in keeping with the now well-known dreams of their supreme leader Mulla Mohammad Omar. Even if they manage to achieve that - and their summer offensive in 2000 in northeastern Afghanistan is an indication of their urge for an outright military victory over opponents instead of trying a peaceful political option -, there is little hope of an end to their

* The views expressed in this study are those of the author and not necessarily those of FAST and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC).

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woes as well as those of the Afghan people. There would still be opposition to their rule, as is happening even now in Taliban-held areas, and leading military commander Ahmad Shah Masood would easily relocate his military bases to Iran, Tajikistan or another neighbouring Central Asian country which consider Taliban as a destabilizing force in the region. The Taliban demand that their Mulla Omar be accepted as the country's supreme leader is unacceptable to the opposition and, therefore, a stumbling block in reaching a power-sharing agreement. Beside, it is highly unlikely for Afghan combatants in view of their bitter blood-feuds to share power with each other in a coalition or accept an infe- rior position in a government of national reconciliation. Abandon- ing the military option would also deprive warlords of their importance in a country where war has become big business. To ex- pect the Taliban to step down in favour of former Afghan king Zahir Shah and pave the way for a Loya Jirga (grand assembly) to effect reconciliation in the country or agree to a lesser role in a coalition government is unrealistic as it is uncommon for an Af- ghan ruler to willingly and peacefully give up something which he has gained by force. Despite their shortcomings and isolation, the Taliban have shown remarkable resilience in staying in power and holding on to places hostile to their rule like Herat, Kabul and much of northern Afghanistan. Even though most commentators attribute their longevity to their repressive policies, it is unlikely that a force which is unpopular can sustain itself in power for so long. The Afghan longing for peace after years of bloodshed and insecurity paved the way for the rise of the Taliban and their fears of a return to the chaos of the early 1990s seems to be influenc- ing their acceptance of the harsh Taliban policies. The prospects of an Afghanistan once again split among foreign-backed factions and the misery it would inflict in case of a Taliban defeat also scares away not only the Afghan people but also the neighbouring states.

The fractious Northern Alliance has fared no better and is, in fact, even less-equipped to steer Afghanistan out of its troubles in the unlikely scenario of its comeback as a dominant military force. Its inability to inspire the trust of the majority Pashtoon population could raise concerns about Afghanistan's unity, a scenario which causes alarm bells to ring in neighbouring countries which are home to some of the same Afghan ethnic groups.

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It is apparent that neither the Taliban nor the Northern Alliance represent hope for either peace or stability. Both are holding the Afghan people hostage and there is little progress in breaking their stranglehold.

First through their unwanted interference and now because of their indifference, the world’s super, major and regional powers have turned Afghanistan into a pariah state. The Islamist zealots who were encouraged by the U.S. and its allies to come and fight the Soviets in Afghanistan are now termed terrorists because their interests clash with those of the West and their client Arab and Is- lamic countries. For no fault of theirs, the Afghan people are pun- ished through economic sanctions, which have mostly hurt the poor as conceded in a recent UN report, because their rulers happen to be Taliban. Rather than shunning the Taliban, in the short-term efforts ought to be made to interact with them in a bid to reduce the sufferings of the Afghan people. Experience has shown that Taliban are amenable to reason and willing to be pragmatic if given due importance as the country’s rulers and once convinced of the utility of a proposal or demand. In the long-term, one has to look beyond the Taliban and the Northern Alliance because the Afghan conflict would only be resolved once the country’s civil war as well as the transnational battle it has triggered is stopped and an international campaign is launched to revive Afghanistan’s national institutions to enable it to emerge as a viable modern state. Otherwise, the Afghan conflict could spin out of control and influence more territories after having left its impact in Algeria, Egypt and some other Arab countries as well as in the Philippines, Chechnya, Kashmir, Tajiki- stan, Uzbekistan and rest of the Central Asian republics.

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2 Policy Options

1) Despite its inadequacies and past failures, the UN is still the most credible peacemaker in Afghanistan and its accept- ability ought to be strengthened to enable it to play a more effective role in the Afghan peace process. The UN ought to have a defining and coordinating role in every peace initiative concerning Afghanistan as other peacemakers, whether the Organi- zation of Islamic Conference (OIC), Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Japan and private Afghan and non-Afghan groups and indi- viduals, either lack stature and influence to undertake a task of such magnitude or are shorn of credibility after having taken sides in the Afghan conflict. To start with, the UN should declare Afghanistan’s seat vacant instead of retaining the government of ousted president Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani as a member of the world body. The OIC has already done so and certain countries practice the same policy of neutrality toward the Afghan combatants without making it public. Right now, the ruling Tali- ban perceive the UN as a biased body which ignores the ground realities and recognizes the non-existent Rabbani government as Afghanistan’s legitimate central authority. By derecognizing the Rabbani government and treating the Taliban and the Northern Alliance as equals the UN would loudly and effectively proclaim its neutrality in the Afghan conflict and become more acceptable not only to the Taliban but also to some of the Islamic elements worldwide who support them. Even otherwise, no mediator not perceived as even-handed, such as Pakistan and Iran, can inspire the required confidence to be able to effect reconciliation.

2) Since the last few years, the UN has tried to shift its peacemaking strategy in a bid to stop outsiders from aiding and abetting their favourites by focusing less on the Afghan warring factions and more on the countries, both Afghanistan’s neighbours as well as world powers like the U.S. and Russia, which have become entangled in the Afghan conflict. The Six Plus Two concept institutionalized this strategy and though it has met with little success there is no harm in strengthening this effort and making it more credible in the eyes of the Afghan combatants and

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people. A recent call for an international conference on Afghani- stan by Peter Tomsen, who served as a U.S. envoy to the Afghan resistance during the jehad, appears to be somewhat similar, or an elaboration, of the Six Plus Two concept. If not properly han- dled, it could only add to the confusion and inject more com- plexities and players into the Afghan conflict.

3) The proposal for an arms embargo to the Afghan warring factions has been mooted from time to time but it is only now that some interest is being shown in its practicability. More importantly, the Taliban have welcomed the proposal because their consent as the ruling group is vital for the success of any initiative. The Taliban believe it would help cut-off military supplies to the Northern Alliance from Iran, Russia and Tajikistan and make it eas- ier for them to crush the opposition. The Northern Alliance, on the other hand, should also back the proposal as it has time and again accused Pakistan of supplying the Taliban with not only arms and ammunition but also manpower. To materialise an arms embargo, the stationing of international observers and the backing of neighbouring countries is essential. Unfortunately and rather inexplicably, the deployment of UN peacekeepers or observers to help halt a conflict as old and bloody as Afghanistan has never really been considered seriously. Such an attitude has been lamented by common Afghans who often point how more recent conflicts like East Timor, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Democratic Congo have attracted more international sympathy and elicited quicker response both in terms of humanitarian assistance and stationing of peacekeeping forces. In fact, U.S. State department spokesman Richard Boucher said recently that Washington was exploring further UN sanctions against the Tali- ban including an arms embargo, a travel ban on Taliban officials and closing of their representative offices abroad on account of their refusal to expel Saudi militant Osama bin Laden as de- manded by the UN Security Council resolution 1267 in October, 1999. However, imposing an arms embargo as part of sanctions to punish the Taliban rather than as a means to restrict flow of weapons into Afghanistan to help end the conflict would have a negative effect. The proposed arms embargo should be enforced by seeking the much-needed Taliban cooperation, as well as from their opponents, to ensure its implementation.

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4) World and regional powers need to rethink their Afghani- stan policies and priorities if they are really keen to help the Af- ghan people overcome their miseries and prevent Afghanistan from becoming an even more isolated haven for Islamic militants and those on their wanted lists. The U.S. obsession with Bin Laden, Russia’s fear of Chechens and Central Asian Islamists allegedly trained and financed through an international network centred in Afghanistan, and China’s paranoia over the separatist agenda of Uighur Muslims in its Xianjiang province have largely influenced the course of their policies on Afghanistan. These and other countries are focusing on problems which, according to their un- derstanding, emanate from Afghanistan but are unwilling to focus on the much-battered and strategically sited country and its hapless people. Scared of militancy and eager to secure their own interests, they talk at length about the need to stem terrorism originating from Afghanistan, end Afghan narcotics production and trafficking and protect human and women rights but no initiative is undertaken to restore the rights of the Afghan people to decide their own future. Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey and certain other countries, which have been interfering in Afghanistan and have become em- broiled in the Afghan conflict, have also pursued self-serving policies based on narrow objectives and largely oblivious to the needs and interests of the Afghans. The outsiders have for long dictated as to what needs to be done to recreate a peaceful Afghanistan. It is time the Afghan people are empowered to decide what suits them and how best to achieve that goal.

5) The OIC, in keeping with its reputation of a talking-club instead of becoming an assertive forum to put into practice aspirations of over one billion Muslims in the world, has been unable to play any meaningful role during all these 22 years of the Afghan conflict. Its most recent peace effort, made possible by Iran as the rotating chairman of the OIC in cooperation with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, faltered as usual when an agreement reached on swapping of prisoners between the Taliban and Northern Alli- ance in Jeddah couldn’t be implemented. In fact, it was bound to fail as the proxy rather than direct talks between the Afghan combatants didn’t focus on first achieving a ceasefire and agreeing on other confidence-building measures and instead in a desperate move made them agree to an exchange of prison-

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ers. As past events have proved, the Afghan warring groups swap prisoners whenever it suits them without foreign mediation. It was only two weeks ago that a Taliban military commander Mulla Mohammad held by the opposition was swapped for a top Masood loyalist Abdul Saboor despite the fact that fighting was raging between the two sides in northeastern Afghanistan. How- ever, OIC inactivity and ineffectiveness shouldn’t be made a basis for keeping it out of Afghan peacemaking and it would be advisable to keep it involved as a UN partner to help restore peace in Afghanistan.

6) Economic activity can accelerate peacemaking as more and more people are able to give up fighting as a means of livelihood once they are able to secure jobs or undertake small busi- nesses. Sadly enough, no thought has been given to this option in context of Afghanistan on one pretext or another and big pro- spective investors like the American Unocal and the Argentinian Bridas had to give up plans to build gas and oil pipelines from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and beyond via Afghanistan on account of U.S. government pressure and subsequently due to the UN economic sanctions. This would have been the largest foreign investment in Afghanistan’s history and would have generated much-needed economic activity and created significant number of jobs in a country where the monthly income averages about $ 10. Those advocating sanctions on the poverty-ridden, drought-stricken Afghan people should instead help them to make a living without serving as fodder for war so that they are empowered to defy their warlords and break free of their shack- les. Countries which sent bombs and guns to Afghanistan to help defeat the Soviet superpower and, in the process, destroyed Af- ghanistan’s infrastructure are now unwilling to pay for its recon- struction. Nobody in the so-called Free World pressured the Soviet Union or Russia to pay war reparations to Afghanistan to rebuild its devastated infrastructure, rehabilitate its displaced people and reassure its widows, orphans and the disabled. A coordi- nated international effort should be launched to revive Afghani- stan’s shattered economy as a means to serve the cause of peace.

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3 Risk Assessment

Afghanistan is one of the world’s longest running conflicts as well as one of the most ignored. Once in a while it catches attention of the international media, that too for all the wrong and negative reasons. Presence of Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and issues of terrorism ensure that the war-ravaged country and its long-suffering people aren’t al- together forgotten. Afghanistan also managed to remain relevant to the international community by becoming the world’s largest producer of opium in 1999 with an estimated yield of 4,600 tonnes. The controversial Taliban policies on girls’ education and working women, their questionable record on human rights, and their strict enforcement of Shariah (Islamic law) also made them of interest to the media and, in the process, to the readers and viewers.

However, the negative image of Afghanistan as a land torn apart by an unending civil war and yet a sanctuary of some of the most wanted men in the world doesn’t help to inspire much sympathy from international donors as well as major powers capable of ending the Afghan conflict. The so-called “donor fa- tigue” in context of Afghanistan is understandable in view of questions often raised as to why a country and a nation should be helped whose self-imposed and heavily-armed leaders are not only bleeding it to death but also refuse to indulge in a meaningful peace dialogue or abide by past power-sharing agreements. This neglect is most visible when resource-starved Afghanistan is hit by natural calamities like an earthquake and a drought and still it doesn’t trigger an adequate outpouring of grief and assistance from the world at large. Rather than being helped, the war-weary and voiceless Afghan people are sub- jected to further punishment by imposing economic sanctions against Afghanistan on the plea that their Taliban rulers refuse to turn over bin Laden to the United States to face trial on terrorism charges. The United States-sponsored sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council last November are termed Tali- ban-specific but there is no evidence yet that they have hit the ruling Taliban more than their hapless Afghan subjects.

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3.1 Domestic Risk Assessment

3.1.1 Background and historical factors

The conflict between the reformists and conservatives in Af- ghanistan is quite old. It dates back to Afghan ruler Amir Amanul- lah and even earlier to his father Amir Habibullah and grandfa- ther Amir Abdur Rahman. Amanullah led Afghanistan to complete independence from Britain by fighting the Third Anglo- Afghan War or the War of Independence in May 1919 to become a national hero but he soon fell foul of the powerful conservative forces in the country by building lavishly and, more importantly, by curtailing the power of the religious establishment, introducing co-education and ordering the Afghan women to unveil.(1) He was forced to abdicate in 1929 in the face of a growing revolt but the lessons weren’t learnt and about 50 years later the Peo- ples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), better known by the names of its Khalq and Parcham factions, committed the same mistake as Amanullah by forcing reforms much-too-soon on an unwilling, deeply conservative population. The PDPA, lacking grassroots support and largely confined to urban centres, was also burdened by the widespread belief that it took orders from Moscow and was committed to establishing godless communism in Islamic Afghanistan. Well-meaning reforms such as an adult lit- eracy programme which won appreciation from international organizations, an end to usury and sale of women through bride- price, and land distribution to benefit landless tenants all fell prey to politics as overzealous Khalqis and Parchamis went about im- plementing them without caring for the sensibilities of their subjects and the clergy-led opposition began to condemn every decision made by the communists. Before long the standard of revolt had been raised and armed rebellions, by now made ho- lier by calling it jehad, had erupted in eastern and southern Af- ghanistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 to sustain the crumbling PDPA regime in power and install a more pliable Babrak Karmal as the new president in place of the unpredictable, headstrong Hafizullah Amin further fuelled the up- rising. The jehad or holy war grew in intensity as it was now aided

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by resistance against foreign occupation. Islam and liberation of the homeland formed a heady combination as poorly-armed Afghans bravely fought the mighty Red Army and eventually forced the then Soviet Union to pullout its troops in February 1989 under the cover of the Geneva Accords. Though the feat was accomplished with generous help from the so-called Free World led by the U.S. and Pakistan, there was no way it could have been achieved without the unparalleled sacrifices by the mujahideen and the Afghan people. The Afghan communists under president Dr Najibullah surprisingly hung on to power for another three years before giving up in April 1992 and hoping that a UN peace plan would ensure a peaceful transition. However, the UN faltered in its assessment of the situation and it could neither ensure a smooth transition nor save Dr Najibullah’s life.

The installation of an Afghan mujahideen government failed to restore either peace or stability as a bloody struggle for power ensued between the fractious armed groups. The Afghans had lived true to their reputation - closing ranks to fight foreign ag- gressors as they did in case of the Soviets and resuming their in- ternal conflicts as soon as the threat from outside was removed. A strange and flawed power-sharing formula brokered by Paki- stan, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and known as the Peshawar Ac- cord fanned instead of curbing the lust for power among the claimants to the throne in Kabul. The Afghan Shiite factions were excluded from sharing power with the more powerful Sunni group much to the chagrin of Iran, thereby contributing to the distrust which Tehran still harbours regarding Islamabad’s designs in Af- ghanistan. The Peshawar Accord, and subsequently similar power-sharing accords in Jalalabad and Islamabad primarily mediated by Pakistan, were openly flouted and even a pledge undertaken by the factional leaders in the holy Khana Ka’aba in Mekkah to put an end to bloodshed was quickly forgotten. There was much shifting of alliances by the mujahideen leaders during this period as various and often unbelievable coalitions were formed to capture power. Jamiat-i-Islami’s Prof Rabbani and his military commander Ahmad Shah Masood, Hezb-i-Islami leader Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, Ittehad-i-Islami’s Prof Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf and the Shiite Hezb-i-Wahdat led by the late Abdul Ali Mazari were the prominent actors in this unfolding drama in which Kabul suffered more death and destruction than during

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the war against the Soviet troops and their Afghan communist allies and violations of human rights was committed with an un- heard brutality and impunity. Uzbek warlord Abdur Rasheed Dos- tum, who had fought against the mujahideen as part of the communist militias, too became part of these unnatural, shortlived alliances as he began to be courted by almost every mujahideen leader in their bid for power.

By the autumn of 1994, Afghanistan in general and cities like Kabul, Kandahar and Jalalabad in particular had been carved out into fiefdoms ruled by rival warlords. Though Prof Rabbani as president and Masood as defence minister ruled the seat of central government in Kabul, their writ was challenged even in the capital by Hekmatyar, Dostum and Mazari. Kandahar was controlled by at least four mujahideen warlords and Jalalabad by a Shura (council) of commanders owing allegiance to the seven jehadi groups headquartered in Peshawar during the war. It was during this period that Afghans used to say they needed visas to travel from one part of Kabul or Kandahar to another. The country had plunged into lawlessness and bands of mujahideen had set up checkpoints on roads to demand illegal taxes in either cash or kind. Stories of travellers and traders being looted and killed and young girls and boys being kidnapped and raped were told and retold all over Afghanistan. The mujahideen had become so unpopular that they were now referred to as To- pakyan (gunmen) rather than as holy warriors. The time was ripe for a new force to emerge and fill the vacuum in the wake of the rapid mujahideen decline. Any force, even the former communists, would have been welcomed by the Afghan people had it dared to challenge the mujahideen. Of all the people, the lowly- rated and humble Taliban led by Mulla Mohammad Omar accepted the challenge and took on the mujahideen first in Kan- dahar and later in rest of southern, western and eastern Afghani- stan. Predictably, the mujahideen failed to put up much of a fight due to lack of popular support and even their famed military commanders fled or surrendered to provide a walkover to the Taliban. Almost by default, the Taliban won military victories and the people heaved a sigh of relief as their life, honour and prop- erty were protected, checkpoints were dismantled and roads opened for travel and trade. The Taliban also disarmed the population despite lack of resources to undertake a task of such mag-

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nitude, unified divided cities, and gave the areas under their control a single central authority by smashing different centres of power presided by warlords like Ismail Khan in Herat, Haji Abdul Qadeer in Jalalabad, Karim Khalili in Bamiyan and Dostum in Ma- zar-i-Sharif. Only Masood was able to stand up to the Taliban, primarily Sunni and ethnic Pashtoons, on account of his superior military tactics, grassroots support in his native Panjsher valley and other areas populated by his fellow ethnic Tajiks, and substantial outside assistance from countries like Iran, Russia and Tajikistan. Their battle for supremacy isn’t yet over and Masood by occupy- ing about 10 per cent of Afghanistan remains the last remaining hurdle for the Taliban to overcome before they can claim control over the whole country.

3.1.2 Environmental factors

The damage to the infrastructure due to the war in Afghani- stan is widespread, more so in southern, eastern, western and central Afghanistan. Northern Afghanistan has suffered relatively less than rest of the country, a fact which prompted the mujahideen elsewhere to taunt their counterparts and the general population in the north for not making enough of an effort on the battlefield against the Red Army. However, the situation could change if the Masood-led Northern Alliance manages to spark more revolts against Taliban rule as they have done in provinces like Samangan and Bamiyan. In fact, places which largely es- caped fighting and destruction during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and later during the inter-mujahideen battles were finally engulfed by the flames of war in recent months and years. A marked animosity was witnessed in camps for Afghan refugees in Peshawar between those who migrated to Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the ones who came much later after the withdrawal of Red Army troops from the country. Those who were displaced in the early 1980s considered themselves better Muslims than the Afghans who sided with the communist Afghan regime until the end or preferred to stay on in urban centres like Kabul by accepting Khalqi and Parchami rule. To avoid clashes between them, Pakistani authorities kept the old

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and new refugees apart in camps like Nasir Bagh, Katcha Garhi and Akora Khattak near Peshawar. Bitterness still characterises their interaction with each other and the old refugees, being well-entrenched, are better-off than the new arrivals. If translated in terms of resource distribution, the population in northern Af- ghanistan was apparently better-off during the Soviet occupation as their towns and villages suffered less destruction compared to rest of the country. However, they seem to have been left behind in subsequent years due to frequent road blockades which disrupted their access to markets in Pakistan, Iran and the Gulf states and made it impossible for them to obtain a better price for their produce, especially fresh and dry fruit, carpets and qarakul (lambskin). The closure of the Termez-Hairatan border on the Oxus (Amu Darya) river by Uzbekistan fearing influx of Afghan refugees and arms has also denied northern Afghanistan a natural and accessible market for both exports and imports.

Deforestation took place on a large-scale due to lack of checks in absence of a strong central authority. The dense forests in Paktia and Kunar provinces bordering Pakistan were mercilessly denuded owing to the easy and unhindered access to busy timber markets across the Durand Line in Pakistan’s Federally Admin- istered Tribal Areas (FATA). A ban imposed by Pakistan government some years ago on timber exports from FATA to the down- country has helped check the flow of Afghan wood to Pakistan through the traditional routes and thus saved the remaining forests in Paktia, Kunar and other border provinces from further deforestation. However, traders as always have found alternate routes to smuggle Afghan timber to Pakistan and now heavily- laden trucks drive from Paktia and Kunar all the way to Kabul and Kandahar before emptying their cargo of wood at Spin Boldak bordering Chaman in Pakistan’s Balochistan province. The situation is a lot better now due to certain controls put in place by the Taliban compared to the past when mujahideen commanders who ruled Jalalabad before them not only encouraged smuggling of Afghan timber to Pakistan but also used to fly it to Dubai and stuff the chartered aircraft on the return journey with cloth, electronic goods and other luxury goods for sale at the lucrative smuggled goods Pakistani markets. However, logging of timber for profit and as a means of firewood cannot be stopped com-

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pletely in war-ravaged Afghanistan for want of other means of livelihood.

Nature also hasn’t been kind to the Afghan people as quite a few devastating earthquakes have hit the country in recent years and right now a crippling drought is ravaging southern, western and central Afghanistan. If that wasn’t enough, the landmines have caused much damage and continue to do so in most of Afghanistan. According to a UN official Mr K M Sharif, Af- ghanistan is the world’s biggest minefield. “Over 1,200,000 mines, one-third of the total mines in the world, were defused in Afghani- stan in the past decade. But 100,000 acres of land in that country is still mined. Beside, about 30 deminers were killed and 534 in- jured in mine-sweeping operations in Afghanistan since 1990,” he said. (2)

3.1.3 Economic factors

Economically, Afghanistan is the world’s foremost outlaw state. (3) One of its largest source of income is opium poppy whose cultivation has spread even to those Afghan provinces where it was never grown. The increase in area under poppies has been matched only by the destruction of the economy due to Afghanistan’s endless armed conflict and the resultant rise in poverty levels. The poor poppy farmers may get only $ 30 for a kilo of opium which when processed into heroin would fetch prices ranging between $ 100,000 to 500,000 in the U.S. and Europe. Drought and poor yield have also made opium poppy less lucrative and yet it remains the major cash crop for Afghan growers practising subsistence-level farming. The Islamic Ushar tax on all land produce is also applicable on opium poppy and the Taliban by receiving it in kind have attracted much criticism from the UN and others. Lately, there has been a move by the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) to ar- range a barter deal under which Iran would provide food to the Taliban in return for the opium collected by them as tax.

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Another major source of earning for Afghans is smuggling between the Persian Gulf and Central Asian countries and Paki- stan. A booming “motor-car smuggling” of vehicles bought in Japan and Dubai and smuggled to Pakistan via Iran, Turkmeni- stan and Afghanistan is flourishing much to detriment of the Paki- stani economy. The removal of the mujahideen checkpoints by the Taliban has boosted transportation of both cargo and people and generated some much-needed economic activity. It is thus not surprising that traders remain the biggest supporters of the Taliban. In fact, it were Afghan traders who helped the Taliban get through their difficult early days by generously donating for their cause.

The poor state of the economy could be gauged from the value of the Afghani, Afghanistan’s beleaguered national currency, which sells for about 60,000 to a U.S. dollar and has to be carried in briefcases and bags to transact business. It is thus hardly surprising that Afghans prefer to deal in the Pakistani Ru- pee rather than own worthless currency. The Rupee has almost become legal tender in Afghanistan and Pakistani goods, together with those from Iran, dominate the market.

Agriculture remains the mainstay of the Afghan economy even though the produce and yield is much below pre-war figures. The small industrial sector was destroyed by war and revival has been slow and confined to factories producing plastic goods, soap, matches, etc. An exception are the fertilizer and textiles mills in Mazar-i-Sharif in northern Afghanistan which continued to operate during the war and are still operational. The natural gas deposits in Shiberghan, again in the north, also continue to be exploited for industrial and domestic use. Rural areas are in a way better-equipped to cope with poverty owing to the gradual revival of the agricultural and irrigation system and on account of the closely-knit tribal and family structure. The urban centres have been turned into huge slums as households displaced by war have flocked to major cities in search of shelter, security and livelihood.

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3.1.4 Social factors

The war damaged the existing social structures and reduced the role and importance of tribal elders, feudals, notables and the like. Instead, it threw up new leadership largely comprising military commanders and the clergy. Outsiders sponsoring the war also preferred the religious elements as they were said to be fired with Islamic zeal in combat against the Soviet army. Funda- mentalists and hardliners got the lion’s share in terms of arms and money that flowed into Afghanistan from all over the world. This explains why nationalist and liberal Afghans have become weak compared to the clergy. The mujahideen no doubt were Islamists but the Taliban have gone a step ahead and are determined to establish a puritanical system of Islamic governance and justice. Some of their edicts including those concerning personal freedom were also implemented by the mujahideen but the Taliban have put them in writing and promulgated them so often that they are now ridiculed and criticised the world over by human rights organizations and governments. Canadian foreign minister Mr Axworthy rather undiplomatically called them a bunch of crooks and Mavis Leno, wife popular American television come- dian Jay Leno and leader of a group of prominent U.S. feminists who have been campaigning against the Taliban over women’s issues, described them as sociopaths. This characterization obviously is of no real help to the Afghan people and nobody knows it better than well-meaning Western aid workers but it explains the hate for the Taliban in many Western minds. The positive as- pects of the Taliban rule have seldom been highlighted and it is probably due to the fact that their negative image far outweighs whatever good they may have done. Beside, the Taliban inability to maintain friendly relations with the media has also damaged their cause.

3.1.5 Political factors

There are certain universal facts with regard to Afghanistan which could serve as an indicator for the future. First, Afghanistan has never been colonized and at least two superpowers of their

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era, i.e. the British Empire and the Soviet Union, have suffered at the hands of the Afghans while unsuccessfully trying to subjugate them. In fact, many Afghans and all the Taliban are often fond of boasting that the U.S. too would meet a similar fate if it repeated its August 1998 air-strikes against Afghanistan and continued to provoke the Afghan people. “We have already buried the British and the Russians and now we are preparing a third grave in Af- ghanistan for the Americans,” is how a group of young Taliban remarked while talking to me in Khost, southern Afghanistan, im- mediately after the U.S. cruise missiles attack on nearby training camps run by Bin Laden, Kashmiri fighters and their Pakistani and Afghan supporters. Second, the Afghans are brave and hard- working and are capable of rebuilding their devastated homeland with the same vigour with which they destroyed it both while fighting the Soviet occupation troops during 1979-89 or among themselves afterwards. Third, all the countries whose interference in Afghanistan has prevented a quick end to the conflict should never hope to install and sustain a puppet government in Kabul because all Afghan rulers ranging from Shah Shuja to Babrak Karmal were doomed the moment they were deemed to be taking orders from abroad. Fourth, change of ruler or government in modern Afghanistan has mostly occurred by the use of force and it is, therefore, a bit optimistic to hope that a peaceful political settlement could take place or a broad-based coalition of rival factions, both armed and unarmed, may be cobbled together for an interim period.

Afghanistan’s prevailing political system is unique in the sense that an all-powerful leader presides all levers of power as the Amirul Momineen (Commander of the Faithful). Mulla Omar’s position and authority is unchallengable and his Taliban Islamic Movement is the only lawful political force in the country. There is no concept of democracy and all levers of state and government are unanswerable to Mulla Omar and his Shura (council). The media, which comprises only radio and some newspapers and periodicals as television is banned, is state-controlled and is used as a vehicle of government propaganda and religious ser- monising. Dissent is unthinkable and punishable. Neither the small labour class nor the huge numbers of agricultural workers are organized to fight for their rights even though there is a level of democracy at the village level while taking decisions of local im-

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portance or working through NGOs on area development pro- jects.

The situation is even worse in areas under the control of Northern Alliance as individual military commanders there still call the shots in all conceivable matters. The alliance leaders cannot touch them as they are indispensable as far as the war effort is concerned. Thus commanders and fighters are allowed to do whatever fancies them and the common people are left at their mercy.

It also needs to be mentioned that almost all Afghan political parties and movements, or more precisely armed groups as that is how most of them have functioned during the past two decades of war, lacked grassroots support and, therefore, looked outside Afghanistan’s borders for guidance and assistance. The PDPA was inspired by the Russian communist model and it largely owed the survival of its shaky regime in Kabul to Moscow’s military support. The mujahideen groups were raised and nurtured in Pakistan or Iran and their leadership handpicked, groomed and vested with office by non-Afghans rather than by Afghans. The Taliban and Northern Alliance leaders too are accused of taking orders from abroad as they allegedly owe their power and position to outsiders. It would be expecting too much from such parties and leaders whose survival depends on outside support to protect the interest of their own people and country. Such a weak leadership has found it to its own advantage to facilitate foreign intervention and interference in Afghanistan.

3.1.6 Military and security factors

Afghanistan’s national army, like so many other institutions, no longer exists and its police now mostly comprise Taliban who are neither trained for the job nor subject to any discipline. The Taliban appear to have little interest in reviving a professional army as it suits them to have an ideologically-motivated force like they have right now to fight religious battles on their behalf. The Afghan army had become much politicised, as was the case

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in 1973 and 1978 when they led coups to oust King Zahir Shah and President Sardar Daoud, respectively, and handed over power to likeminded progressive politicians and later played a key role in the “palace coups” which removed communist presi- dents Nuruddin Taraki, Hafizullah Amin and Babrak Karmal from power. The Taliban are worried that a professional Afghan army may be tempted to overthrow their government and hastened their fall. The fighters who make up the present Taliban army have all been trained on the job for a duration and place of their choice. The remnants of the Afghan Army for want of other jobs still fight for both Taliban and the Northern Alliance and among them are pilots, tank crews and other specialised fighters. Their salaries are meagre but they have few choices to change ca- reers so late in life. Both the Taliban and Northern Alliance need many more fighters than they possess and fears of conscription force most young men to escape to Pakistan and other countries. This is the reason for the preponderance of young, able- bodied men in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. The exact strength of the Taliban fighting force and the opposition isn’t known. At one stage the Taliban army was estimated to be about 25,000 but it would have grown by now due to induction of mostly non-Taliban fighters for their never-ending military cam- paigns. Prior to the recent fighting in northeastern Afghanistan, analysts had pointed out that the Taliban had enough fighters but lacked resources while the Northern Alliance had lot of money and weapons but were facing a shortage of manpower. Pakistani Taliban, estimated to be several hundred, also fight alongside their Afghan comrades and some Arabs, stranded in Afghanistan after the end of the jehad, occasionally take part in battles against the Northern Alliance.

Despite opposition allegations, no evidence has yet been provided of Pakistani soldiers or militiamen fighting on Taliban side. Similarly, Pakistan is accused of supplying arms and ammunition to the Taliban but again a clinching evidence hasn’t yet been made available. It is possible that Pakistan is providing some military supplies to the Taliban but the state of the Pakistani economy is so precarious that it cannot spare much in terms of weapons and money to reinforce the Taliban. However, Pakistan has assisted the Taliban with fuel and food supplies. In contrast, military supplies destined for the anti-Taliban alliance have been

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intercepted on at least two occasions. Once a train carrying arms for Masood was seized in Kyrgyzstan while on the way to Ta- jikistan for onward delivery to Afghanistan and earlier a Russian plane bringing ammunition from Albania for Masood was force- landed by the Taliban at Kandahar airport.

There is no proper salary structure for Taliban soldiers though they are now being paid after an initial period when everybody was a volunteer. Families in Kandahar, Urozgan, Helmand, Ghazni and other southern and western provinces where Taliban enjoy their strongest support provide one son at a time for the army and often different sons take turns to report at the frontlines. The Taliban haven’t forgotten their military commanders who laid down their lives in previous battles. Madrassas have been spe- cially built in their memory and an exclusive cemetery in Kanda- har set aside for their graves. Kandahar is also home to another big cemetery where the remains of almost 4,000 Taliban allegedly killed by Uzbek warlord General Abdul Malik and his Shiite Hazara allies in 1997 have been buried.

Masood’s troops are raised around a core of fighters belonging to his native Panjsher valley. His soldiers are battle- hardened and have always given a good account of themselves on the battlefield. Masood himself is a shrewd military strategist and so often in the recent past he has struck painful blows by ex- ploiting the naivety of Taliban fighters. He is too proud to surren- der or quit the battle against Taliban. He is thus expected to fight till the last man.

3.1.7 Local actors

As has been the case since the April 27, 1978 communist military takeover, commonly called the Saur Revolution after the month in the Afghan calendar in which it happened, events in present-day Afghanistan are primarily being influenced by armed groups. The most important among them are the ruling Taliban Is- lamic Movement, which controls over 90 per cent of the country, and the Northern Alliance, a loose coalition of opposition parties

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having support among non-Pashtoon ethnic groups largely in- habiting northern and central Afghanistan. The elements support- ing former Afghan king Zahir Shah, who has been living in Rome, Italy since his dethronement in a military-backed coup d’etat led by his former prime minister and cousin Sardar Mohammad Daoud in 1973, constitute the so-called third force. Unlike the Tali- ban and the Northern Alliance, the Zahir Shah supporters don’t have any military presence in Afghanistan and are, therefore, unable to shape the course of events in a country which best ex- emplifies the aptness of the saying “might is right.”

There are also several other smaller groups and organizations which claims to speak for the voiceless Afghan people. The PDPA, or the Watan Party as it was called during its last years in power, had a history of factionalism almost from its inception when it split into the Khalq and Parcham factions. It suffered further splits before and after its ouster from power mostly on account of personality clashes or vested interest. Like all former ruling parties in authoritarian societies, the PDPA was turned into a non-entity once it was deprived of state patronage and nowadays its former luminaries cannot operate openly, especially in countries like Pakistan and Iran where most of them took refuge after losing power in Afghanistan in April 1992. The nationalist Af- ghan Mellat, much splintered like the PDPA, strives to make its presence felt in camps for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and in the West among the Afghan diaspora but its appeal and reach is confined to sections of the Pashtoon population. Former mujahideen parties like Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami, once a powerful force on account of disproportionate assistance channelled to it by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the American CIA, a rival faction of Hezb-i-Islami led by Maulvi Younis Khalis and Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi’s Harkat-i-Inquilab-i-Islami, were marginalised once most of their military commanders and fighters joined the Taliban. The moderate mujahideen groups like Professor Sebghatullah Mojadeddi’s Afghan National Liberation Front and Pir Sayed Ahmad Gaillani’s National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, both of which comprise elements who are royalist and nationalist, are struggling to maintain their existence but they are likely to suffer attrition in their ranks once the Zahir Shah option becomes a more credible alternative. Professor Sayyaf’s Itte- had-i-Islami has remained loyal to ousted president Prof Rabbani

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and the Northern Alliance but it is at best a fringe player and faces problems in adjusting itself in an alliance which also has its bitter rival, Hezb-i-Wahdat, as a component. The Shiite Hezb-i- Wahdat has also experienced divisions due to differences between its factional leaders Karim Khalili, who is pro-Masood, and Ustad Akbari who has reached a compromise with the Taliban. The smaller Shiite group, Harkat-i-Islami, is now split into two factions led by the Iran-based Sheikh Asef Mohseni and Syed Hussain Anwari, who is pro-Masood.

Numerous small organizations with different agendas also mushroomed during various stages of the Afghan conflict. Former Afghan army officers, lawyers, labourers, students, musicians and people from various tribes and areas formed associations to protect and advance their interest. But all these bodies were formed and run in Peshawar rather than in Afghanistan, where such ac- tivities aren’t allowed. And then there were peace movements which often boasted that they were capable of resolving the Af- ghan problem by mediating between the combatants. Needless to say that their offers of mediation evoked little response as largely unknown tribal elders or religious figures hardly stood a chance to end a conflict which has become transnational and involves so many local and international actors. In fact, Afghan peace missions at one stage in the mid-1990s became as common and fashionable as there were mujahideen commanders during the jehad against the Soviet occupation troops. Every fighter would proclaim himself a commander to show his importance even if he happened to command only five or ten persons. In recent times, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) run by Afghans have thrived in the same manner in which mujahideen commanders and peace missions once held the centre- stage. It won’t be wrong to conclude that the mujahideen commanders, peace missions and NGOs have all strived hard to make themselves eligible for outside support, whether it came from the ISI and the CIA during the jehad or from international donors in present times.

The Northern Alliance is a motley collection of opposition forces who still like to call themselves mujahideen as most of them, except men loyal to pro-communist militia generals Rash- eed Dostum and Abdul Malik, were members of the jehadi

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groups which took part in the war against Soviet occupation troops between 1979-89. Beside Dostum and Malik, other prominent leaders of Northern Alliance components are Prof Rabbani and former defence minister Masood, Prof Sayyaf, Karim Khalili, Haji Qadeer, and a faction of Hekmatyar’s party led by his es- tranged son-in-law Humayun Jareer. However, the real force behind the alliance is Masood as the others are either inactive or lack manpower and resources to fight the Taliban. The alliance also props up the deposed Rabbani regime and some of the party leaders have been assigned ministerial portfolios in a government which exists only in name. The alliance also suffers from rivalries dating back to the jehad or on account of religious, sectarian, ethnic and linguistic factors. Dostum and Malik became sworn enemies when the latter revolted against the former in Northern Afghanistan in 1997 and their enmity hasn’t gone despite the best efforts of Iranian mediators as well as those of Masood. Prof Sayyaf hates Dostum and Malik as he says he cannot forget their communist past. As a staunch Sunni, Sayyaf is also at loggerheads with the Shiite groups due to sectarian reasons. The Shiites are as much divided as the Sunnis. All this makes it ex- tremely difficult for Masood to rally the alliance behind him as he courageously faces up to the Taliban challenge. As an ethnic Ta- jik, Masood also is handicapped while seeking support from the majority Pashtoon population. The dominance of non-Pashtoons in Northern Alliance also makes it less of an attraction for Pash- toons who don’t like the Taliban. In fact, the Pashtoon domina- tion in Taliban ranks and the preponderance of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and other minorities in Northern Alliance has contributed to the growing ethnic divide in Afghanistan and is dangerous for the landlocked country’s unity. The only positive note in this de- pressing situation is that the majority of common Afghans, unlike the armed groups, still don’t think in terms of ethnicity and sec- tarianism and would want their homeland to remain united.

The Taliban Islamic Movement is presently the most powerful military and political force in Afghanistan. Founded in the autumn of 1994 by Mulla Mohammad Omar, who was an unknown fighter with Yunis Khalis’ Hezb-i-Islami during the jehad, it has over the past six years made spectacular military gains at home but at the same time become the world’s most controversial organization. Its ranks have been strengthened by non-Taliban primarily due to

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the fact that many Afghans have nowhere else to go and fighting is the only skill that they possess. The Taliban welcome such recruits as they have to constantly raise new fighting units and replenish the old ones to defend newly-acquired territory. Edu- cated in religious seminaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Taliban haven’t come out of the blue as some commentators think because they have always been an essential part of the Afghan society - living in madrassas attached to mosques, knock- ing from door to door to collect food for their meals and entirely dependent on the generosity of the faithful for their education and upkeep. They had actively taken part in the Afghan jehad as members of various mujahideen groups and most of them re- turned to their madrassas once the Soviet troops retreated from Afghanistan. For them the jehad ended on February 15, 1989 when the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan. Others remained in the battlefield until the fall of Dr Najibullah’s regime in April 1992, hoping to install a true Islamic government in Kabul. However, the fratricidal battles which erupted soon afterwards between the power-hungry mujahideen groups disappointed all Afghans, including the Taliban. “I spent many agonizing days before decid- ing to pick up the gun again, this time to fight our former com- rade-in-arms, i.e. the mujahideen. We were forced to take this decision as stories of mujahideen loot and plunder and moral degradation had become unbearable. Certain commanders like Nadir Jan, Saleh Mohammad and Daro Khan who had set up roadblocks and bases near my village, Singesar, in Mewand dis- trict on the Kandahar-Herat road crossed all limits when they started abducting and raping both girls and boys. We began fighting Muslims who had gone astray. How could we remain quiet when we heard and saw crimes being committed against the innocent, the poor and women?” explained Mulla Omar in an interview in February 1995. (4)

Omar, a crack marksman who was wounded four times during the jehad and also lost his right eye, invited about 30 Taliban to his modest mud-built madrassa in Singesar in September 1994 to launch the Taliban Islamic Movement. He was chosen leader of the movement not because he was more learned or charis- matic than the assembled Taliban but due to the simple fact that he taken the initiative to challenge the mujahideen. In fact, Omar was never able to complete his religious education due to

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the war and even now he prefers to call himself a Talib, a seeker of knowledge, rather than a Mulla, a giver of knowledge. Son of a poor farmer, he neither owned house nor land and earned his livelihood by working as Imam (prayer-leader) of the Singesar mosque. But circumstances had forced him to lead a rag-tag group of resourceless Taliban who survived on dole-outs from the people and received their first consignment of arms from a sym- pathetic mujahideen commander Haji Bashar Nurzai. (5)

According to the 41-year old Omar, he never intended his movement to capture power as its initial objective was to dismantle all the mujahideen checkpoints which had become a source of trouble for road travellers. In fact, the Taliban convened a meeting of all the mujahideen commanders of Kandahar and Helmand provinces and requested them to remove the checkpoints as they were un-Islamic. Upon their refusal, the Taliban de- cided to forcibly dismantle these roadblocks. (6)

The Taliban started drawing popular support once they were able to smash a few checkposts and defeat some mujahideen commanders. After capturing Kandahar city without much effort, the Taliban realized that the mujahideen could be easily defeated in other provinces as well and it was at this stage that they started harbouring ambitions of extending their rule. Already, they were getting messages of support from neighbouring provinces like Urozgan, Helmand, Nimruz, Zabul and Ghazni. One after another these and other provinces came under Taliban control and now their four stated objectives were to disarm the armed bands, restore peace in the country, enforce Shariah (Islamic law) and defend the sovereignty, integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan. A movement which was supposed to play the role of the referee between the Afghan combatants and was deemed a saviour by most Afghans was now aspiring to absolute power. Omar was later elevated to the status of Amirul Momi- neen in the style of the early Muslim rulers by a congregation of pro-Taliban religious scholars in Kandahar and his followers accepted him as the supreme authority. Henceforth, his word was to be the law of the land and disobeying him a sin.

Omar is assisted by a Shura (council) with a varying strength of about a dozen to 30 depending on the availability of its mem-

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bers in Kandahar, the spiritual capital of the Taliban. However, the top decision-makers include Mulla Mohammad Rabbani, the number two man in the Taliban Islamic Movement and a trusted lieutenant of Omar, Kandahar governor Mulla Mohammad Hasan, foreign minister Mulla Wakil Ahmad Mutawwakil and his deputy Mulla Abdul Jalil, justice minister Mulla Nooruddin Turabi, Herat governor Mulla Khairullah Khairkhwa, Nangarhar governor Mulla Abdul Kabir, interior minister Mulla Abdur Razzaq, education minister Mulla Amir Khan Mutaqqi, military commanders Mulla Biradar, Mulla Fazil and the one-legged Mulla Dadullah, and member of Kabul’s ruling council Mulla Ghayasuddin Agha. The last-named is a Tajik from Badakhshan province and is one of the few high-ranking non-Pashtoons among Taliban. Also the majority of the above-mentioned Taliban leaders belong to Kanda- har where the movement originated. This causes heart-burning even among the Pashtoons in places like Jalalabad, Khost and Maidan-Shahr as they feel they aren’t trusted by the Kandahari and Helmandi Pashtoons who dominate the Taliban movement. Mulla Rabbani, who is the country’s de facto prime minister and head of government, is suffering from cancer and is unable to devote much time to his responsibilities. Mulla Turabi, who lost a leg in a landmine explosion during the jehad, is the ideologue of the movement and his inflexible views on strict enforcement of Shariah has made him a hardliner even among the Taliban. Un- compromising in his commitment to Shariah, here is a sample of his views to get an insight into his thinking : “We are the only fully Shariah country in the world. We don’t believe in doing things on a piecemeal basis. Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries are only partly Shariah. ….The Quran says there are specific punish- ments for specific crimes and that is the way it has to be done - and in public. A robber loses his hand and murder requires equal revenge. Public executions actually protect life because they warn public away from committing a similar crime. ….We think women are working as they should - at home. This is what we are taught by our culture and our faith. It is an imperative for us to implement Islamic law, otherwise we are committing a sin. It is not only a question of beards and veils; every vice has to be stopped and every virtue promulgated.” (7)

Mulla Hasan, who also lost a leg while fighting the Soviets troops in Kandahar, along with Mulla Mutawwakil, is the liberal

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and gentle face of the Taliban. Both have allowed themselves to be photographed despite the Taliban ban on taking pictures of living creatures and have no problem meeting Western and other foreign women who come as diplomats, aid workers and journalists. They have also been asked so often to do damage control in situations when baton-wielding men from the Depart- ment for Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, known as Amr Bil Ma’aruf Wa Nahi Anil Munkar, have created a crisis by of- fending expatriates. The religious or morality police as it is commonly called seeks inspiration from Mulla Turabi, functions like a parallel government and has raided private homes and offices to break up alleged mixed gatherings and catch persons it labels as spies. It also enforces the Taliban edicts by ordering women to observe the hejab (veil) and requiring men to wear long, proper- sized beards, cut their hair short and pray five times a day.

3.2 International Risk Assessment

The UN has had the longest period of involvement in Af- ghanistan following the eruption of the Afghan conflict in the spring of 1978 and it has and would be expected to play the paramount role in any settlement. There have been any number of mediators and peacemakers, some sincere in their endeav- ours, others involving themselves out of compulsion or because of fears that they would lose their influence in case of a settlement which ignores their interests in Afghanistan. The UN was the first to undertake the peacemaking task and despite failures it remains the best hope because it is the most acceptable to most Af- ghans and outsiders out of all the peacemakers and has vast resources at its disposal. The seven UN peace envoys todate have come from different countries and backgrounds. Peruvian diplomat Javier Perez de Cuellar, who later became the UN Secretary General was the first one to take up the job but his one-year ten- ure in 1981-82 passed off without much happening. Next was Ec- uador’s Diego Cordovez, who was appointed in 1982 and stayed the longest of all peace envoys. That could be the reason of his relative success as he mediated the long and tortuous proxy talks

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culminating in the Geneva Accords which facilitated the pullout of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1988-89. Then came Be- non Sevan who negotiated the botched UN plan for transfer of power from the communist regime of president Dr Najibullah to an interim government. Cyprus’ Sotorious Misouris came and went without any significant progress toward peace. Former Tuni- sian foreign minister Mahmoud Mestiri was also tried but he was old and frail when he got the job and, unlike a diplomat, made some unpleasant statements about the warring Afghan factions and neighbouring countries like Pakistan that cost him the good- will and respect of his hosts and interlocutors. (8) Germany’s Nor- bert Holl spoke Arabic and stood a good chance where others failed but his temper and bluntness often made his task difficult. (9) Lakhdar Brahimi, who had served as Algeria’s foreign minister and had to his credit some success in peacemaking in other conflicts, was given an exalted status as the UN secretary general’s special envoy. He also brought about a conceptual change in the UN approach and priorities while tackling the Afghan problem by shifting the focus of attention from the Afghan warlords to the countries which had become involved in the Afghan conflict. He authored the so-called “Six Plus Two” concept, which envis- aged seeking support of Afghanistan’s six immediate neighbours - Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China - as well that of Russia and the U.S. to end foreign interference and proxy war in Afghanistan and contribute to a durable Afghan settlement. It didn’t work and a frustrated Brahimi poured out his anger at all those who torpedoed his peace mission before quit- ting. Now a Spanish professor Francesc Vendrell has been assigned the job and there is little he can do if Afghanistan’s armed factions, some of which have made war a flourishing business, continue to defy peace moves. In a bid to succeed, the UN tried Muslim peacemakers in the hope that the Muslim Afghans would trust them more and a peace envoy from Germany was selected when it was pointed out that somebody from a powerful Western country stood a better chance of success compared to, say, Tu- nisia, Algeria and Cyprus.

Some of the peacemakers made themselves controversial and, therefore, became unacceptable as neutral mediators. In fact, Vendrell who took his job as the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s special representative to Afghanistan only on February 1

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2000 has already attracted flak from the Taliban when he recently accused them of initiating the latest round of fighting in northern Afghanistan. The Taliban foreign minister, Mulla Wakil Ahmad Mutawwakil, who has been conducting most of the peace negotiations with Vendrell, angrily responded by advising him to be cautious with his remarks and warning that Vendrell’s “rash” comments could jeopardize the peace process. The UN also courted controversy when it became a vehicle for U.S. attempts to punish Taliban-ruled Afghanistan for giving sanctuary to Bin Laden, its “public enemy number one.” The U.S.-sponsored, UN-enforced sanctions against Afghanistan, as a recent UN sur- vey report said, had hurt the poorest and made most Afghans feel increasingly isolated and bitter. (10) By agreeing to impose the sanctions and in view of reports that their scope could be ex- tended further on the demand of the U.S. and Russia, the UN would make itself even more unpopular among the Afghan people and effect its peacemaking role. Compared to the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been able to retain its good reputation through some useful humanitarian work. Its officials are credited with braving it out along with the Afghans in risky places during fighting unlike the UN staffers who are accused of abandoning their duty-stations at the sound of the first shot being fired. The 100-plus NGOs, whether Western, Islamic or Afghans, have largely done a praiseworthy job in difficult circumstances even though many Islamic organizations view their presence and agenda with suspicion. Their work has rather generated the only significant economic and development activity in a country whose economy is primarily kept running by smuggling and illicit opium poppy-cultivation and is shunned by investors because doing so would invite American wrath.

Of the countries having a stake in Afghanistan, the Six Plus Two states which include Afghanistan’s six neighbours - Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China - and the U.S. and Russia are more important than the rest. Pakistan has suffered more than any other state due to the Afghan conflict, first as a so-called “frontline state” which served as the headquarters of the Afghan jehad and was often the target of acts of terrorism and cross-border bombing and artillery raids by Soviet and Af- ghan communist troops and now as the country of refuge for the largest number of displaced Afghans. By the same token, its in-

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volvement and interference in Afghanistan has been much more than others because of historical, political, economic, social, religious and logistic reasons and since it shares a long and porous border with that country. Pakistani commentators often blame the Afghans for the so-called “drug and gun culture” now ravaging Pakistan though lately articles in the media have started praising the Taliban for establishing the rule of law with far less resources than available to Pakistan’s police and other law- enforcing agencies. (11) Pakistan’s late military dictator General Ziaul Haq, on account of his Islamic beliefs and also to sustain himself in power with Western and Arab backing, allowed his country to be used as a staging-post for Afghan mujahideen and at the same time sponsored establishment of a record number of religious seminaries in a short period to provide motivated fighters for the jehad. The same seminaries in due course of time pro- duced the Taliban, both Afghan and Pakistani. The former have already found success in Afghanistan and the Pakistani Taliban, many of whom are fighting alongside the Afghan Taliban, are now keen to emulate this success in Pakistan. Already small Tali- ban movements have emerged in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province neighbouring Afghanistan and Pakistani Taliban have enforced Shariah in their areas and publicly burnt television sets, VCRs, video and audio cassettes not only in remote tribal towns Mirali, Kelaya and Hangu but also in a cosmopolitan city like Ka- rachi. However, the Talibanization of a nuclear Pakistan feared by many experts cannot become a reality if the Pakistani rulers and institutions succeed in checking the country’s drift toward lawlessness and economic bankruptcy and the state is able to respond to the aspirations of the people for justice, fairplay and good governance. Fascination with other models, including the Taliban, has grown among the people due to frustration caused by the failure of successive Pakistani governments, both democratic and dictatorial, to come up to their expectations.

The unaccounted Western and Arab funding for the jehad also enabled Pakistan military’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to upgrade and extend its operations and in due course of time the agency became so strong that it started dictating the country’s political forces and interfered with working of organs of the state.

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Pakistan’s role in the creation of the Taliban has been much debated and Islamabad hasn’t done enough to clarify its position but this author as the first journalist to visit Kandahar and report about the emergence of the Taliban in 1994-95 is still of the considered opinion that it is an indigenous movement thrown up by circumstances prevailing in lawless Afghanistan at that time. The timing of an experimental Pakistani trade convoy bound for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, its seizure by mujahideen commanders near Kandahar and its liberation by the Taliban force which was preparing to attack the city has contributed to strengthening of the theory that the Taliban were a brainchild of Pakistan. However, published material is becoming available now which refutes this theory and claims that the Taliban emerged as a reaction to the atrocities being committed by the mujahideen against their own people. (12) Unlike the mujahideen leaders who were headquartered in Peshawar and were dependent on Islamabad for everything, the Taliban leadership is based in Kandahar and Kabul and is, therefore, in a position to exercise greater freedom while making decisions. The fact that the Taliban have defied Pakistan on issues of Afghan Transit Trade, presence of Pakistani criminals and terrorists in Afghani- stan, free movement of Pakistani Taliban in and out of Afghani- stan, and military training camps for Pakistani Sunni militants on their soil shows to some extent the Taliban efforts to break free of Islamabad’s influence. In a recent interview, Mulla Omar also ad- vised Pakistan’s military ruler General Pervez Musharraf that the Bin Laden issue was none of Islamabad’s business as it concerned the Taliban and the U.S. (13) Pakistan on account of its bitter ri- varly with India cannot afford to have two hostile neighbours, hence its efforts to install a friendly government in Kabul. There is a strong lobby in Pakistan which believes a friendly Afghanistan would give Pakistan “strategic depth” while dealing with India and enable it to avoid the nightmare of having to contend with a two-front war situation on its eastern and western borders. Is- lamabad has recognized every government which held Kabul, including the communists and the one led by Rabbani-Masood, and it doesn’t want to offend the Taliban despite the fact that the Pakistani military and civil establishment is largely liberal and secular because it would not only provoke the vocal religious lobby in Pakistan but also provide Taliban with an excuse to cre- ate problems for Islamabad all along their unmanned border by

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sponsoring and giving refuge to criminals, smugglers and anti- Pakistan elements.

Shiite-ruled Iran is fearful of the Sunni Taliban due to religious reasons while it is concerned about the designs of Afghanistan’s Pashtoons who once captured and ruled Persia for seven years. For long, it considered the Taliban to be a creation of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia for the specific purpose of encircling Iran but subsequent events and the bitter American and Saudi animosity toward the Taliban nowadays has shown that Tehran’s fears on this count were misplaced. The visible Iranian tilt toward Afghani- stan’s Shiites and other non-Pashtoons has made Tehran controversial and like Pakistan it is unacceptable as a neutral peacemaker. Iranian support for Afghan Shiites has turned them into militants and fuelled armed strife with their Pashtoon, Tajik and Uzbeks, all Sunnis. A Shiite Hazara minority which has historically been persecuted and surrounded on all sides by Sunnis is now finding it difficult to co-exist with powerful neighbours and is often at the receiving end in conflicts and on account of food blockades. Often it is also said that Tehran has a vested interest in keeping Afghanistan destabilized as it offers the quickest route for the Central Asian oil, gas and other products and goods to reach the Arabian Sea via Pakistan and could minimise Iran’s importance as an outlet to the sea once there is an Afghan settlement.

The Central Asian republics, especially Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzistan and Kazakhstan, are worried that their own nascent Islamic movements are seeking inspiration and support from the Taliban and becoming a threat to their rulers, all of whom are former communists. Little thought is given to the fact that their own dictatorial policies and economic problems are pushing their people to embrace the Islamic opposition and take up arms against the government. As media reports indicate, the Islamic fighters are mostly based in Tajikistan and are able to freely operate from the mountains where the borders of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzis- tan and Uzbekistan meet. It is unlilkely that they would be able to survive in such a hostile terrain without the support of local sym- pathizers. Russia’s pro-active policy since the election of President Vladimir Putin and his attempts to keep Central Asia under Mos- cow’s strategic and economic influence is bound to fuel further Islamic militancy, as witnessed in Tajikistan where 25,000 Russian

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troops are deployed, and destabilize the region. The mutually beneficial relations between Turkmenistan and the Taliban and the former’s willingness to sell fuel and other goods to Afghani- stan, exchange visits and keep its consulate in Taliban-ruled Herat operational could serve as an example for other Central Asian states. Unlike Uzbekistan, Turkmen president Saparmurad Niazov has kept his country’s borders with Afghanistan and the Taliban until now have given him no cause to complain about the export of Islamic militancy to Turkmenistan. By remaining neutral, he has been able to maintain friendly ties with both the Taliban and Northern Alliance and made Turkmenistan an ideal candidate as a mediator in the Afghan conflict.

As stated elsewhere in this paper, the U.S., Russian and Chi- nese policies in context of Afghanistan are driven primarily by their concern over the spread of terrorism and extremism as a re- sult of the Taliban factor. India on the other hand is a marginal player in Afghanistan. Its major objective would obviously be Pakistan’s containment in the region, more so in context of the nexus between Afghan and Kashmiri militants. Saudi Arabia has seen active involvement in Afghanistan by serving, along with the U.S., as a paymaster to the Afghan mujahideen. The Bin Laden factor caused its estrangement with the Taliban even though it remains one of the three countries, along with Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates, to have recognized the Taliban- led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

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End Notes

1. Dupree, Nancy Hatch (1970), An Historical Guide to Afghanistan, Ka- bul, Afghan Tourist Organization, page 68.

2. The News, Islamabad, “Afghanistan is world’s biggest minefield : UN,” August 6, page 12.

3. Wright, Robin (2000) : “The Final Humiliation : Afghan Children Are Ig- nored,” Los Angeles Times, April 30.

4. Yusufzai, Rahimullah (1995) : “The third force to the rescue?,” The News, Islamabad, March 3, Page 10 (Special Report).

5. Taimuri, Mohammad Hasan (2000) : Da Afghanistan Tareekh (The His- tory of Afghanistan) in Pashto language, Quetta, Baryalai Composing, Quetta, page 36.

6. ibid., page 36.

7. The interview with Taliban justice minister Mulla Nooruddin Turabi, his first one with foreign journalists, was done by Time’s New Delhi-based South Asia bureau chief Michael Fathers and Rahimullah Yusufzai and first carried by the Time magazine website in March 2000.

8. A joke often told by Afghans after Mestiri’s appointment was that a mestri (meaning mason in local languages like Pashto and Dari) had been summoned to help achieve an Afghan settlement after the failure of all the “engineers” (which was a reference to mujahideen leaders like Ahmad Shah Masood, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai, etc who claimed to be qualified engineers even though none of them was able to complete his education or practice his skills.

9. According to a Western journalist, Norbert Holl was sometimes referred to as Little Napoleon by his staff on account of his hot temper.

10. An Associated Press story published in the Pakistani daily, The News, Islamabad, on August 23, 2000 and captioned, “UN Afghan sanctions hurt the poor : report.”

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11. Chaudhry, Javed (2000), “Police Reforms or Taliban,” Urdu language daily Jang, Islamabad, August 24, page B. The author narrates the story of a Pakistani businessman who got his stolen motor car traced and recovered in two days by the Taliban in Afghanistan unlike the Pakistani police which spent months investigating the case and finally closed it after allegedly taking bribe from the accused person. The author argues that Pakistanis cannot be blamed if they express a growing fondness for the Taliban and their quick and effective system of justice due to the poor performance of their own police, judiciary, parliament and other institutions.

12. Taimuri (2000), pp 30-56.

13. Yusufzai, Rahimullah (2000) : “Osama is US-Afghan issue : Mulla Omar,” The News, Islamabad, July 15, page 1.

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Bibliography

BOOKS

Arghandawi, Abdul Ali (1989) : British Imperialism and Af- ghanistan’s Struggle for Independence 1914-21, New Delhi, Mun- shiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd.

Arnold, Anthony (1983) : Afghanistan’s Two-Party Commu- nism : Khalq and Parcham, California, Standford University Press.

Bradsher, Henry S. (1985) : Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, Durham, Duke University Press.

Caroe, Olaf (1958) : : The Pathans : 550 B C - A D 1957, Lon- don, MacMillan and Co., Ltd.

Dupree, Louis (1980) : Afghanistan, Princeton, Princeton Uni- versity Press.

Dupree, Nancy Hatch (1977) : An Historical Guide to Af- ghanistan, Kabul, Afghan Tourist Organization.

Maley, William (editor), (1998) : Fundamentalism Reborn : Af- ghanistan and the Taliban, Lahore, Vanguard Books.

Marsden, Peter (1998) : The Taliban : War, religion and the new order in Afghanistan, London & New York, Zed Books.

Newell, Nancy Peabody, and Newell, Richard S., (1981) : The Struggle for Afghanistan, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press.

Taimuri, Mohammad Hasan (2000) : Da Afghanistan Tareekh (Pashto) (History of Afghanistan from Zahir Shah to Taliban), Quetta, Baryalai Composing.

38 R. Yusufzai: Afghanistan Country Risk Profile

MAGAZINES/DOCUMENTS

Afghanistan: Monthly magazine of the Afghan Information Center, Peshawar published quite regularly in Pashto and Persian (Dari) since 1981.

Afghanistan Outlook (Volume 1 and 2, June and December 1999) : Published by United Nations Special Mission to Afghani- stan, World Bank and Office of the UN Coordinator for Afghani- stan, Islamabad.

Aina (Spring 1999) : UN Afghanistan Magazine, Islamabad.

Amnesty International’s six briefing papers issued in London in 1999 to mark the 20th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Af- ghanistan and the ensuing 20 years of war. The papers are titled Women in Afghanistan : Pawns in men’s power struggles; Human Rights Defenders in Afghanistan : Civil society destroyed; Children Devastated by War : Afghanistan’s lost generations; Afghanistan : The human rights of minorities; Afghanistan : Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and Refugees from Afghani- stan : The world’s largest single refugee group.

Islamic Emirate (August 2000) : a new monthly magazine published by the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in English and Arabic from Kandahar.

Refugees (Number 117, 1999) : Published by the Public In- formation Section of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, Switzerland.

Saur Revolution (1978) : An account of the April 27, 1978 communist revolution in Pashto and Persian (Dari) reportedly penned by Hafizullah Amin, one of the coup leaders who later ousted and replaced the first communist president Nur Mohammad Tarakki. Amin was killed on December 27, 1979 when the Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan and installed Babrak Kar- mal as president.

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Shah, Maulana Dr Sher Ali (1996) : Taliban - Lashkar-i- Mohammadi, Miramshah, North Waziristan Agency, Pakistan, Jamia Manba-i-Uloom.

SPACH Newsletter (May 2000) : Published by the Society for Preservation of Afghanistan’s Cultural Heritage (SPACH) in Is- lamabad.

WUFA - a quarterly academic, socio-political and literary magazine published by the Writers Union of Free Afghanistan from Peshawar since 1989.

U.S. State Department’s special yearly reports on Afghani- stan published in Washington.

NEWSPAPERS/PERIODICALS

Kabul Times, Kabul.

Dawn, Karachi.

The Frontier Post, Peshawar.

The Muslim, Islamabad.

The Nation, Lahore.

The News, Islamabad.

Pashto language dailies Anis and Hewad, Kabul; Sahar, Shahadat and Wahdat, Peshawar; Shariat and Tulo-i-Afghan, Kandahar.

Urdu language dailies Aaj, Ausaf, Jang, Khabrain, Mashriq, Nawai Waqt and Pakistan.

Monitoring reports compiled by the Information department, Government of Pakistan, of the BBC and VOA.

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Publications of various Mujahideen groups during the Af- ghan war and those published now by the Taliban and the United Front or Northern Alliance.

Films and documentaries made by the American Broadcast- ing Corporation (ABC) News, Australian Broadcasting Corpora- tion (ABC), BBC TV, and several other television companies which I assisted as a consultant, producer and translator. It includes several films and reports on Afghan fighting, economy, politics and culture. It also includes interviews with most Afghan leaders and people like Osama bin Laden.

Time.

ARTICLES

Barker, Paul (1999) : Principled Engagement : Making a Dif- ference for Afghan Women, Aina, Spring 1999, pages 3-4. The argues that there is hope and a way forward through principled engagement in Afghanistan as it provides an interface with Tali- ban authorities as well as direct contact with the Afghan people. “One unintended yet positive contribution of the Taliban is that it had made the world aware of the brutal and oppressive nature of many traditional gender practices in Afghanistan, which pre- date and will outlive the Taliban. The suffering of Afghan women demands our attention and action. But the gala of the Feminist Majority last week in Hollywood is unlikely to bring any more changes in the lives of the Afghan women than did the previous year’s “A Flower for the Women of Kabul” campaign. Real change for Afghan women will come through icremental changes in the minds and attitudes of both the oppressors and the oppressed. These minds will not change when confronted with distant threats or foreign agendas. They can only change when they understand and accept the implications of their policies and when they understand that there are alternative policies that do not threaten their core values,” writes Paul Barker of CARE International.

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Frahi, Bernard (1999) : Drugs in Afghanistan : The New Deal, Aina, Spring 1999, pages 11-12. Frahi, who is the representative of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in this article also calls for a dialogue with the Taliban. Writing about ways and means to eliminate drug trafficking, he writes : “It is not the farmers of Ar- kansas, Surrey, Punjab or Lombardia who arrest drug traffickers or dismantle drug processing laboratories. In all countries around the world this is the task of drug law enforcement agencies belonging to the state authority. In Afghanistan the international community cannot do away with pursuing a dialogue with the local authorities.”

Le Duc, Carol A and Sabri, Homa (1996) : Room to Manoeu- ver : Study on Women’s Programming in Afghanistan, UNDP Ka- bul-Islamabad, July-September.

Rubin, Barnett R, (1999) : Conflict and peace in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Outlook, Volume No 2), pages 6-12.