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Appeal Statement

Prepared on behalf of

Ms Catrina Clulow

In Respect of

The Oasis 16 Road RG26 3PX

Against

Basingstoke and Deane Borough Council For Non-Determination Of Planning Application

17/02371/ROC

Prepared by John Hunt of Pike Smith & Kemp Rural & Commercial Ltd

December 2017

1 Introduction

1.1 This statement has been prepared in support of a planning appeal made by Ms Catrina Clulow (the Appellant) against the non-determination of application reference 17/02371/ROC, (the application,) which sought to vary a condition attached to approved planning permission 16/02593/FUL (the permitted development), which allows the construction of a new dwelling at The Oasis, 16 Silchester Road, Tadley, RG26 3PX (The Property).

1.2 Specifically the application sought:

“Variation of condition 1 of 16/02593/FUL to allow amendments to the approved plans to relocate dwelling within site.”

1.3 The application was received by and Deane Borough Council (B&DBC) on the 6th July 2017, with a letter confirming validation sent on the 17th July 2017 confirming that the application was valid as at the 6th July 2017. A determination deadline was given of the 31st August 2017.

1.4 As the application was made under s73, it was in full and contained a number of supporting documents. This documentation is submitted to the Planning Inspectorate as part of the appeal and includes:

 Site and elevation plans relating to the approved dwelling  Site and elevation plans relating to the relocated dwelling  Detailed planning statement  Original decision notice.  Communications with case officer during application process

1.5 The original planning statement contained detailed justification for the proposal and as such it is not proposed to repeat this in detail here.

2 The Site

2.1 The Oasis is located off Silchester Road within Tadley in . Silchester Road is relatively long and connects Tadley in the west with Heath to the east. The subject property is located on the southern side of the western section of the road and is situated towards the edge of the settlement area of Tadley. The land use immediately surrounding the subject property is a mix of residential with a builder’s merchant yard located on the western boundary.

2.2 The majority of houses on this part of Silchester Road have direct road frontage with front and rear gardens, the subject property differs in this respect as it is set well back from the road and accessed via a longer access drive located between numbers 14 and 18 The access drive is owned freehold as part of The Oasis and this currently forms the only routine access to the property.

2.3 The adjacent builder’s merchant yard occupies a large area with both internal and external storage areas. External storage comprises building, civils and drainage materials, these can include, pallets of bricks, blocks, insulation and attenuation crates amongst other items.

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2.4 The property currently comprises of an existing single storey dwelling located close to the northern boundary of the plot. The dwelling permitted under 16/02593/FUL is a more modern, thermally efficient two storey building located more centrally in the plot. The remainder of the land slopes gently from north to south widening at the bottom to form a reverse L shape. The sloping topography of the site means that The Oasis is situated quite a bit lower than the dwellings along the front of Silchester Road.

2.5 Overall the property extends to approximately 0.75 acres (3,035 square metres) mostly laid to lawn with a number of mature trees on the boundary and on adjacent properties. To the east, north and south the spacing of the residential properties along with the existing vegetation, creates a relatively “open” feeling. To the west there is a more commercial feel created by the builder’s merchant yard and retail elements beyond, albeit this is very well screened from the subject property by existing vegetation. The appellant has also recently undertaken a number of improvements to the site, including planting scores of new specimen trees and shrubs on the property.

3 Relevant Planning History

3.1 The planning history for the property is relatively straightforward. There are two recent planning applications which are relevant to this appeal which relate both to the newly permitted dwelling and the existing bungalow located on the site.

3.2 The first application is B&DBC reference 13/00788/HSE which was for “Erection of side extensions, conversion of loft to living accommodation involving raising of the roof and construction of 8 no. dormer windows and 1 no. roof light”. This application relates to the existing bungalow and was ultimately permitted. Importantly, the permission is extant as the planning permission has been implemented. The implementation of this consent has been acknowledged by B&DBC both by way of a building regulations inspection and written confirmation in the planning application referred to below.

3.3 The second planning application is B&DBC reference 16/02593/FUL which was for the “Erection of a replacement dwelling”, and permitted the dwelling which is the subject to the s73 application for which this appeal is submitted.

3.4 It should also be noted that the appellant has also submitted two pre-application submissions to B&DBC. The first was submitted prior to the submission of the 2016 planning application, which sought advice in relation to the now permitted dwelling. It is also relevant that during the application process for the new dwelling, the planning officer dealing with the case at that time commented that given the size and location of the site it would be more than capable of accommodating at least two dwellings.

3.5 Following on from the approval of the new dwelling, the appellant was very interested to investigate the potential for two dwellings on the site, one potentially for her parents in later years, and instructed an architect to draw up designs for a modern contemporary house proposed to have been located in the north eastern part of the site.

3.6 The one potential pitfall to a second dwelling in this location is that the newly permitted house was itself located in a position which may have caused the two dwellings to be relatively close to each other and as such did not make the best use of the whole site.

3.7 A second pre-application was therefore submitted to B&DBC which sought to relocate the permitted dwelling to the south of the site and erect a new second dwelling on the site.

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3.8 The response to the second pre-application was generally favourable in terms of the relocation of the dwelling, but raised a number of minor concerns with regards to a second dwelling on site. None of these issues were however considered to be insurmountable. Indeed one was to allow the two dwellings greater amenity space between them. Upon that advice, the Appellant agreed the extra amenity space is desirable.

3.9 Amid some local negativity involving a member of the DC Committee and threats made by him to the Appellant, in September 2017 the appellant also sought clarity as to their ability to retain the existing bungalow, or repurpose it, along with the newly permitted dwelling, and what mechanism, if any, the LPA had to enforce the demolition of the bungalow. The legal advice obtained is highly relevant and comment on this is contained later in this statement.

4 The Proposal

4.1 Following on from the pre-application responses the appellant was keen to move forwards with relocating the permitted dwelling further south down the site. An application was therefore submitted to amend the approved plans to show the permitted dwelling relocated approximately 12m to the south. Plans for a new second dwelling to replace the extant bungalow were put on hold pending the outcome of the s73 application.

4.2 No other alterations to the external appearance of the permitted dwelling were proposed, with the only other slight change being that as the dwelling in the relocated position would be on naturally lower ground, it was not proposed to significantly lower the ground level artificially, as indicated in the 2016 location. There is no objection to this, and the closest neighbours have written letters in support.

5 The Application Progress

5.1 Initially the progress of the application went well. Given that the proposal was to relocate a dwelling that already had permission, it was not believed that there would be any major opposition to the proposal. It was therefore surprising that within a couple of weeks of the application “going live” that an e-mail from Councillor Leeks to the case officer was then showing on the B&DBC website. This e-mail stated:

“I feel because of the amount of public concerns about this development if you feel like granting this then I would like a committee decision perhaps nearer the time of your decision we could talk.”

5.2 This was surprising because as at the date of the e-mail, 25th July, only one public comment objecting to the development had been made, this on its own would not appear to represent a particularly high level of public concern.

5.3 A number of representations were eventually made to B&DBC, all objecting to the application – these representations will be referred to later in this statement. It should also be noted that later within the application process a number of neighbours wrote letters in support of the application, which they provided directly to the applicant, these letters of support were sent directly to the case officer.

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5.4 On the 26th July an e-mail was received from the case officer relating to the treatment of the southern boundary of the site, which due to a boundary dispute with the neighbouring property had not been shown on the block plans showing the relocation of the dwelling. A telephone call and e-mail with the case officer concluded that the issue of the southern boundary was not a planning issue, as the original location plan showing a red line around the whole site and which was submitted with the original application was not being varied as part of the s73 application.

5.5 An e-mail was sent to the case officer after the consultation period had expired on the 9th August offering to go through the representations which had been received to date, no response to this e-mail was received.

5.6 On the 25th August an e-mail was received from the case officer seeking access to the site on the 31st August (the original determination deadline date).

5.7 The appellant advised a few days later through her agent, that this was not possible as she was not available to allow access. An e-mail response to the case officer was sent on the 29th August explaining that the 31st was not possible, but to organise a site visit for week commencing 11th September. This e-mail also set out that as it was understood that by not being able to allow access, the appellant was willing to agree an extension of time to the 15th September to allow enough time for a decision to be made.

5.8 On the 4th September a further email was sent to the case officer seeking clarification on the time and date of the proposed site visit. In that e-mail it was also requested that no photographs could be taken as the appellant was particularly concerned about photographs taken from her property being in the public domain, especially in light of boundary disputes that were ongoing at that time. This e-mail also sought to establish what, if any, discussions had been had with Councillor Leeks, in light of the communication he had sent regarding the application going to committee and his recorded threat to the appellant previously.

5.9 On the 5th September the case officer responded suggesting the 12th September for a site visit and indicating it was essential that photographs should be taken. A request to extend the decision date to the 22nd of September was also made. It was also stated that if the appellant did not agree to an extension of time that the application would become a lower priority for determination. No confirmation regarding communications with Councillor Leeks were received. For the avoidance of doubt the appellant did not agree to extend the determination deadline beyond the 15th September.

5.10 Confirmation of the site visit was e-mailed back to the case officer on the 6th September, again confirming no photographs. On the 7th September an e-mail was sent to the case officer enclosing recent photographs taken by the appellant’s agent of the site, which could be used for planning purposes.

5.11 The site visit was conducted on the 12th September and the case officer wrote later that day that he was looking to recommend the application for approval, however as there had been 8 objections received the application had to be determined by DC Committee. A request to extend the determination deadline to the 6th October to allow this was made.

5.12 A detailed response to the case officer was sent on the 13th September indicating that whilst there had been a number of representations made (a total of 11 recorded online to include Tadley Town Council), some had been made by the same person, and in some cases individual representations from members of the same household or trust had been submitted, making it look as though there had been more objections made. It was argued that when the double counting had been taken out of the equation there were only 7 negative representations, and of these only 2 really could be considered to raise any material planning matters. It was also indicated at this time that an appeal against non-determination was being considered. Moreover, the appellant has legal advice that the vote held by Tadley Town

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Council should be disregarded as Councillor Bounds did not recuse himself and also sits on the B&DBC Development Control Committee. Councillor Bounds must have been aware of his position given Councillor Leeks did not vote as he is also on the DC Committee.

5.13 Also in the September 13th response, reference was made to the Council’s Constitution, an extract of which is included in appendix 1 which stated that officers, rather than members should determine applications under delegated powers where applications are within settlement boundaries and attract less than 5 letters of objection which raise material planning objections. Again for the avoidance of doubt the appellant did not agree to any extension of time beyond the 15th September.

5.14 On the 14th September an e-mail from the case officer was received confirming that there were 8 individual objections which were considered to raise issues that did constitute material objections to the application and therefore the application was to be determined at the Council meeting on the 4th October. The case officer also confirmed that Councillor Leeks had the option to call the application to committee, on which he sits, as he had previously indicated, although the case officer indicated he was awaiting confirmation of this at the time. A further request for an extension of time was made. On the basis that the application was to be determined on the 4th October, it was not deemed necessary to agree to such an extension as a deadline was effectively already in place.

5.15 On the 20th September an e-mail was received from the case officer indicating that he was aware that the appellant had put the property up for auction with the benefit of planning for a new dwelling and the ability to retain the existing bungalow in line with the legal advice she had received (detailed below). The case officer indicated that new conditions to seek the demolition of the extant bungalow would be imposed if the current s73 application were to be approved.

5.16 On the 26th September the case officer’s report to committee was published, which did recommend the application for approval, however also contained suggestions for new conditions to be imposed, which not only sought to demolish the existing bungalow, they also sought to remove a number of permitted development rights and removed the rights for external lighting.

5.17 The imposition of these new conditions contradicted the legal advice the appellant had sought and on the 2nd October an e-mail was sent to the case officer indicating that the appellant had sought professional advice and that it was advised that the LPA should do likewise, along with an offer to reciprocate such advice. It was also pointed out that the appellant had made her intention to seek two dwellings on the property perfectly clear before the s73 application had been made, specifically seeking pre-application advice for such development.

5.18 On the 4th October an e-mail response was received from the case officer indicating that the imposition of a condition to remove the bungalow was considered necessary, on the basis that the revised plans did not indicate the removal of the existing dwelling. It was also indicated that this was the first indication of the appellant’s intention for two dwellings on the site.

5.19 In response to this, an e-mail was sent to the case officer on the 4th October with the advice the appellant had been given by Counsel attached.

5.20 Later on the 4th the case officer responded indicating that given the legal advice the appellant had provided, that the LPA had no choice to withdraw the application from the DC meeting in order that they may seek their own legal advice on the matter. In closing, the case officer confirmed he would be in touch shortly in response. It is indeed true the matter was not discussed at the DC meeting, the subject was entirely omitted; no member queried this, suggesting there had been discussion about it prior to the public meeting. It is noted that Councillor Leeks left the meeting immediately after this matter was omitted and before the next matter.

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5.21 A further email was sent on the 10th October indicating that the appellant had sought a second legal opinion which concurred with the first. A reprographic error in the original legal advice had also been spotted and corrective text sent to the case officer at this time.

5.22 On the 17th October an e-mail was sent to the case officer asking for an update on the council’s position.

5.23 On the 18th October a response was received from the case officer indicating that the LPA were seeking a similar level of advice to the appellant and that this would take a “couple of weeks” This assumed that the Council would have legal opinion by late October/early November. A response was sent back indicating that an appeal for non-determination may be submitted if no response had been received by the end of October.

5.24 On the 30th October an e-mail was sent to the case officer indicating that a number of neighbours were in support of the proposal, but were concerned about making their support public, as they were aware of other neighbours trying to create negativity around the application and some of them indicated that they had been proactively visited by a member of the council asking whether they had issues with “The Oasis”. It was therefore asked that, if these neighbours were to express their support, whether their personal details could be kept confidential. A response confirming this was possible was received.

5.25 On the 31st October an e-mail was sent to the case officer enclosing seven letters of support for the application which had been written by the appellant’s neighbours and submitted directly to her. At the time of writing, these letters of support have not appeared on the B&DBC’s public access website, although this may be because those persons who had written the letters had asked if their personal details could be redacted. These letters are included in appendix 4. Again an update regarding the Council’s position was sought.

5.26 On the 3rd November the appellant’s agent contacted the case officer by telephone to seek an update on progress and also to discuss the possibility of discharging some of the pre- commencement conditions attached to the 2016 application, these conditions were also proposed to be carried on to the s73 decision, once made. It was again reiterated that the appellant was considering an appeal for non-determination at this time. The possibility of a meeting to discuss this application face to face was also suggested.

5.27 An e-mail was sent to the case officer on the 3rd November following on from the telephone call, and suggesting a meeting between the case officer, the appellant and her agent to try and find a positive way forwards to deal with the s73 application. This e-mail also indicated that unless the Council had their own legal advice in place, then the meeting would not be worthwhile. In the same e-mail it was again indicated that the appellant was very seriously considering an appeal for non-determination and to this end a draft copy of the appeal statement was sent through to confirm that she was actually in a position to submit an appeal, but importantly wanted to try and resolve this matter in a timely manner, hopefully making such an appeal unnecessary. This e-mail also confirmed the appellant’s position with regards to the lack of condition on the 2016 consent in relation to the demolition of the existing bungalow.

5.28 As no response was received from the Council a further e-mail was sent on the 7th November seeking a response, but also to indicate that the appellant may not be able to attend the suggested meeting, but that a meeting between her agent and the case officer would still be useful to discuss a way forwards.

5.29 An e-mail was received from the case officer on the 7th stating he would be happy to organise a meeting on the 10th November but was not certain that they would have received their legal advice by that time. It was also confirmed in this e-mail that the recommendation was still to approve the application, but the imposition of a condition to demolish the existing bungalow was still to be confirmed. An e-mail provisionally agreeing to the 10th November was sent back

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to the case officer – reiterating that the legal advice from the Council was critical to aid any useful discussion.

5.30 On the 8th November e-mail correspondence between the case officer and the appellant’s agent was sent, initially with the case officer offering to postpone the meeting provisionally agreed for the 10th November to the following week to allow more time for the legal advice to be received. This was taken as a positive indication that the legal advice would indeed be received by the Council imminently albeit a bit later than originally indicated. A response was sent through agreeing to postpone until the 13th November, but indicating that the appellant was reluctant to agree much more time as she had provided her legal opinion to the Council some five weeks previous. It was agreed that a meeting would take place on the 13th November on the proviso that the Council had their legal advice in place by this time.

5.31 On the 13th November further e-mail correspondence was sent between the case officer and the appellant’s agent, initially seeking confirmation as to whether legal advice had indeed been received by the Council. The response was negative, although the meeting was still offered. It was also indicated that the application would be dealt with at the December Committee Meeting. The offer of the meeting was ultimately declined on the basis still no legal advice had been received. The case officer indicated that he was chasing the Council’s legal team at this time.

5.32 Later on the 13th November an application to discharge a number of pre-commencement conditions in relation to the 2016 consent, as discussed with the case officer on the 3rd November, was submitted to the LPA via the Planning Portal.

5.33 On the 14th November an e-mail was sent to the case officer advising him that an application to discharge conditions in relation to the 2016 consent had been submitted and sought to confirm that the same information could be considered, where relevant, to the current s73 application to avoid the need to submit the same information twice. The case officer replied asking for confirmation of the submitted items so that he could incorporate these into his committee report which was due that Friday (17th November). This information was duly sent, albeit at the time of writing this had also not appeared on the B&DBC website.

5.34 Also on the 14th November the case officer advised that there appeared to be some words missing from the legal advice sent on the 4th October and asking if this could be provided. An email was sent by return advising that the missing text had already been sent on the 10th October and forwarding that e-mail again.

5.35 On the 28th November a further e-mail was sent to the case officer seeking an update, later the same day, following a meeting between the appellant and her agent, a second more detailed e- mail was sent, expressing frustration as to lack of progress, in particular with regards to the legal advice which the Council still had apparently not received. This e-mail indicated that if no decision had been made by Friday (1st December) the appeal for non-determination would be submitted the following Monday (4th December).

5.36 A response from the case officer was received by return, apologising for the delay but indicating that the Council still did not have any legal advice and that this was expected within another week to 10 days, or around early to mid-December. The case officer again confirmed that it was still the intention to recommend the application for approval but this would still have to go to the Development Control Committee. However, although the appellant was originally to understand that the proposal was to be discussed at the December panel, it was now stated that it would not be heard until the Committee meeting scheduled for January 10th 2018. The case officer also indicated that if an appeal was submitted for non-determination, then the application would not go forwards to the January date, but instead the LPA would wait on a decision by the Planning Inspector.

5.37 Later on the 28th November the appellant was informed by a third party, who had contacted the LPA, without the appellant’s knowledge, with reference to the property, that the case officer had indicated that the planning application permitted allowing the alterations to the bungalow had

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expired and the application in relation to the dwelling permitted in 2016 had a condition to demolish the existing bungalow. An e-mail questioning this was sent to the case officer.

5.38 The case officer responded by return setting out his explanation of the conversation, which indicated that at the time, he indicated that the 2013 permission would have needed to have been implemented by 9th September 2016 to remain extant, he did confirm that after reviewing the documentation that the Council are satisfied that the permission is extant. It was also explained that he did not indicate that there was a condition to demolish the building, but had said that the council had not agreed that there was permission for two dwellings on site.

5.39 On the 30th November the appellant was made aware by the same third party that in a subsequent conversation with the case officer, again without her prior knowledge, it had been stated that legal advice had still not been received by the Council, but that this was now expected in 2 – 3 weeks’ time, or around mid to late December. It was also confirmed by the case officer that there was planning for the new dwelling where the bungalow stands today but not for it to be built 12 metres away, meaning the bungalow must be demolished and replaced with the new dwelling if actioned today. But due to the missing condition to demolish in their grant they were awaiting legal opinion and would be able to issue confirmation in January / February 2018 post committee decision.

5.40 An e-mail to the case officer seeking a further explanation of his comments was sent on the 30th November. This e-mail also pointed out that the 2016 permitted dwelling is located on a different part of the plot and that the bungalow would not have to be demolished if the new dwelling is ultimately built. The e-mail also expressed concern about ambiguous information coming from the council in relation to the property. To date no response to this e-mail has been received. Indeed, given previous instances of third parties being given allegedly misinformation by the LPA with regard to the planning status at the appellant’s property, it is envisaged at least one such third party may litigate on the issue of that alleged misinformation and the subsequent LPA denial regarding same.

5.41 Copies of e-mail correspondence in relation to the above is included in Appendix 2 of this appeal.

5.42 Given the ever increasing delays as to when/if the Council will receive their legal advice and ultimately, which date committee the proposal will be considered by, the appellant believes that she has no choice but to finally submit the appeal herewith for non-determination. It is believed that the appellant has been more than reasonable in her approach with the LPA, firstly seeking pre-application advice, and submitting an application in light of the advice given, she has also delayed submitting the appeal to allow more time for the LPA to obtain their own legal advice. Whilst it is appreciated that there may be a legal question to be determined, the appellant provided the LPA with a legal opinion from a recognised expert in the field and it was not unrealistic for her to expect that the LPA would be able to source their own advice within a reasonable time frame. The appellant’s legal opinion is also seconded by Counsel from another chambers.

5.43 Once the appeal is submitted the appellant would still be more than happy to continue communications with the LPA until such time a decision is issued. It may be seen as unhelpful that the case officer has formally ruled out this possibility. Of course if the appellant is unhappy with that eventual decision, she would continue with this current appeal.

6 Legal Matters

6.1 In terms of the delay in determining the application there are a number of legal issues which have to be considered.

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6.2 Whilst it is clear that the application was never going to be determined by the 31st August, simply on the basis that the first request for a site visit was made for this day. There are a number of other elements in which the LPA have delayed the progress of the application.

6.3 The primary issue relates to the retention of the bungalow alongside the newly permitted dwelling if relocated 12m further south. Whilst it may be considered in the 2016 planning application that the intention of the appellant had been to remove the existing bungalow, the assertion of the case officer at that time that the site could easily accommodate two dwellings, caused the appellant to seriously consider the possibility of two dwellings on the site and how this could be achieved, including further informal discussions with the LPA at that time.

6.4 At the time the application was submitted, it had never been hidden that the appellant was seeking consent for two dwellings. Initially this had been to seek consent for a new “second dwelling” to be located in the north eastern corner of the site, which was clearly set out in the second pre-application submission.

6.5 It is noted that the case officer dealing with the s73 application was different to the case officer who dealt with the pre-application. It is understood that this was due to workloads in the planning department, however, it is disappointing that communication between the officers appears to have been so poor, especially given one of the purposes of the pre-application process, as set out in Paragraph 190 of the NPPF, is to “assist local planning authorities in issuing timely decisions, helping to ensure that applicants do not experience unnecessary delays and costs.”

6.6 The main legal issue was however focused on whether the original 2016 application contained a provision to allow the LPA to seek demolition of the existing bungalow. This is particularly important as the dwelling permitted in the 2016 application was located on a separate part of the site, meaning that both dwellings could co-exist at the same time. It was noted that there was no specific condition to enforce the demolition of the existing bungalow on the decision notice, and as such the appellant sought legal advice.

6.7 Advice was provided by Martin Edwards of Cornerstone Barristers. The advice received is included at appendix 3 of this statement and which was also provided to the LPA on the 4th October. For the avoidance of doubt, the advice in appendix 4 is exactly as provided to the LPA including the reprographic error recorded in the e-mail correspondence above.

6.8 As can be seen, the legal advice obtained was detailed and, as it can be read in full in the appendix, it is not proposed to set it out in body of this statement. The advice however unequivocally stated that without a specific condition, there was no legal mechanism in regards to the 2016 application which the Council could rely on to seek the demolition of the bungalow.

6.9 It is not known whether the omission of a specific condition was on purpose or a mistake on behalf of the LPA, however, this is not relevant, the fact remains that the existing bungalow can remain on site alongside the 2016 permitted development.

6.10 The appellant also sought a second opinion of this advice from Jonathan Wills of Landmark Chambers, who concurred with the advice given by Cornerstone Barristers.

6.11 Interpretation of this advice means that there is already the ability for the appellant to have two dwellings on the site. One, is the existing bungalow, along with the extensions permitted in 2013 and for which works have been implemented. Two, is the dwelling permitted in 2016, for which it is acknowledged that there are a number of pre-commencement conditions, but importantly is still extant.

6.12 This therefore represents the appellant’s fall-back position, if the current s73 consent is permitted with any new condition added, particularly including the removal of the existing

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bungalow, the appellant would of course first seek to have such conditions removed through the appeal process, but failing this would simply continue the 2013 permission as well as implementing the 2016 permission.

6.13 It is however clear that the site would work much better if there was a larger degree of separation between the existing dwelling and the new dwelling. Therefore, whilst it may be considered that the appellant has only managed to obtain two dwellings by capitalising on a mistake made by the LPA, it does not seem to be unreasonable to at least provide both dwellings with a decent level of amenity and to maximise the space available on the site. Again it should be noted, originally the suggestion of allowing greater amenity space between the two permitted dwellings came from the case officer in 2016. Therefore, the appellant does not believe her planning permissions result from any mistake.

6.14 On receiving the appellant’s legal advice, it was reasonable that the LPA wished to seek their own legal opinion on the matters raised. However, instead of seeking advice in a timely manner this appears to have been a further excuse by the LPA to delay making a decision. At the time of writing it has been nearly nine weeks since the LPA indicated that they were seeking advice and beyond any indication of when that advice would be received.

6.15 The second issue relating to the delay in determining the application was the LPA’s response to the third party objections received. It is understood that the LPA would supply these representations to the Planning Inspectorate for consideration as such it is not proposed to relay the contents of these in detail here.

6.16 It is however clear that the majority of these objections do not raise any material planning issues. Most indicate other matters, which maybe causing the writers some concerns, but are themselves either outside the scope of development control, or could otherwise be considered to be permitted development.

6.17 Analysis of the objections, taken from a generous point of view, really only indicates that at the very most four could be considered to raise material planning matters. This being the case it is questioned as to why it was considered necessary for the application to be further delayed by seeking determination by DC committee. The Council’s Constitution clearly states that if there are less than five letters which raise valid planning objections that it should be dealt with by delegated powers.

6.18 The principle of the new dwelling had already been decided and as such the only question related to its siting. The case officer was clearly satisfied that the siting was acceptable and had recommended approval. The only other reason the application could have gone to Committee was if a member had called it in. Whilst it is understood that Councillor Leeks had indicated he may wish to do this, it is written by the case officer that this request was allegedly withdrawn.

7 Conclusion

7.1 It can therefore be concluded that the appellant already benefits from planning permission granted in 2016 to build a new dwelling on the site.

7.2 It is also understood that if the new dwelling is built in accordance with the 2016 application then the existing dwelling located on the site may remain in situ.

7.3 The existing dwelling benefits from planning permission granted in 2013 to substantially enlarge including installation of a first floor level. This consent has been implemented and is recognised by the LPA as such.

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7.4 The appellant therefore has a valid fall-back position to allow two dwellings onsite.

7.5 The LPA have failed to issue a decision with regards to the relocation of the new dwelling permitted in 2016, although a case officer’s report to DC Committee confirms that in principle the development is acceptable and has been recommended for approval.

7.6 In recommending for approval, new conditions were to be imposed, which were not considered to be lawful and in any case disregarded the appellants fall-back position.

7.7 It is therefore requested that a decision is made and the s73 application is permitted with no new conditions imposed or delay.

8 Costs

8.1 Given the delays caused by the unreasonable behaviour of the LPA, failure to seek legal advice within a reasonable timeframe, and ambiguous statements made by the LPA to third parties, the appellant has incurred costs. A separate application against B&DBC for costs is therefore made in respect of this appeal.

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