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Orphan Works and Mass Digitization Report
united states copyright office Orphan Works and Mass Digitization a report of the register of copyrights june 2015 united states copyright office Orphan Works and Mass Digitization a report of the register of copyrights june 2015 U.S. Copyright Office Orphan Works and Mass Digitization ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This Report reflects the dedication and expertise of the Office of Policy and International Affairs at the U.S. Copyright Office. Karyn Temple Claggett, Associate Register of Copyrights and Director of Policy and International Affairs, managed the overall study process, including coordination of the public comments and roundtable hearings, analysis, drafting, and recommendations. I am also extremely grateful to Senior Counsel Kevin Amer and Attorney- Advisor Chris Weston (Office of the General Counsel), who served as the principal authors of the Report and made numerous important contributions throughout the study process. Senior Advisor to the Register Catie Rowland and Attorney-Advisor Frank Muller played a significant role during the early stages of the study, providing research, drafting, and coordination of the public roundtable discussions. In addition, Ms. Rowland and Maria Strong, Deputy Director of Policy and International Affairs, reviewed a draft of the Report and provided important insights. Barbara A. Ringer Fellows Michelle Choe and Donald Stevens provided helpful research and analysis for several sections of the Report. Senior Counsel Kimberley Isbell, Counsels Brad Greenberg and Aurelia Schultz, Attorney-Advisors Katie Alvarez and Aaron Watson, and Law Clerk Konstantia Katsouli contributed valuable research and citation assistance. Finally, I would like to thank the many interested parties who participated in the public roundtables and submitted written comments to the Office. -
01-618. Eldred V. Ashcroft
1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 3 ERIC ELDRED, ET AL., : 4 Petitioners : 5 v. : No. 01-618 6 JOHN D. ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY : 7 GENERAL : 8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 9 Washington, D.C. 10 Wednesday, October 9, 2002 11 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 12 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States at 13 10:03 a.m. 14 APPEARANCES: 15 LAWRENCE LESSIG, ESQ., Stanford, California; on behalf of 16 the Petitioners. 17 THEODORE B. OLSON, ESQ., Solicitor General, Department of 18 Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of the 19 Respondent. 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 Alderson Reporting Company 1111 14th Street, N.W. Suite 400 1-800-FOR-DEPO Washington, DC 20005 1 C O N T E N T S 2 ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAGE 3 LAWRENCE LESSIG, ESQ. 4 On behalf of the Petitioners 3 5 ORAL ARGUMENT OF 6 THEODORE B. OLSON, ESQ. 7 On behalf of the Respondent 25 8 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF 9 LAWRENCE LESSIG, ESQ. 10 On behalf of the Petitioners 48 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 2 Alderson Reporting Company 1111 14th Street, N.W. Suite 400 1-800-FOR-DEPO Washington, DC 20005 1 P R O C E E D I N G S 2 (10:03 a.m.) 3 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: We'll hear argument 4 now in Number 01-618, Eric Eldred v. John D. Ashcroft. 5 Mr. Lessig. 6 ORAL ARGUMENT OF LAWRENCE LESSIG 7 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS 8 MR. -
Focus Papers: Duke Conference on the Public Domain
Digital Information, Digital Networks, and The Public Domain Pamela Samuelson* I. Introduction Whether the public domain is a virtual wasteland of undeserving detritus or the font of all new creation is the subject of some debate.1 Those who adhere to the former perspective do not worry about “threats” to this domain any more than they would worry about scavengers who go to garbage dumps to look for abandoned property. Adherents of the latter view are, interestingly enough, not of one mind about “threats” to this domain. Some believe that propertizing value residing in the public domain will produce more social benefit than letting content languish there,2 while others regard propertization itself as the main threat to the public domain.3 At the risk of seeming a contrarian, I concur with all three views: some of what is in the public domain is detritus; some of what is valuable in the public domain might be better utilized if propertized to some degree; other parts of the public domain need to remain open and unownable as sources for future creations. In the course of explaining why I embrace this seemingly contradictory perspective, I will offer a map of the public domain.4 * Chancellor's Professor of Law and of Information Management, University of California at Berkeley. This draft has been prepared for a conference on the public domain at Duke University Law School on November 9-10, 2001. My thanks to James Boyle, David Lange, and J.H. Reichman for convening this event and inviting me to participate in it, as well as for the many works they have contributed to the literature on this subject. -
ELDRED V. ASHCROFT: the CONSTITUTIONALITY of the COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION ACT by Michaeljones
COPYRIGHT ELDRED V. ASHCROFT: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION ACT By MichaelJones On January 15, 2003, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA"), which extended the term of copyright protection by twenty years.2 The decision has been ap- plauded by copyright protectionists who regard the extension as an effec- tive incentive to creators. In their view, it is a perfectly rational piece of legislation that reflects Congress's judgment as to the proper copyright term, balances the interests of copyright holders and users, and brings the3 United States into line with the European Union's copyright regime. However, the CTEA has been deplored by champions of a robust public domain, who see the extension as a giveaway to powerful conglomerates, which runs contrary to the public interest.4 Such activists see the CTEA as, in the words of Justice Stevens, a "gratuitous transfer of wealth" that will impoverish the public domain. 5 Consequently, Eldred, for those in agree- ment with Justice Stevens, is nothing less than the "Dred Scott case for 6 culture." The Court in Eldred rejected the petitioners' claims that (1) the CTEA did not pass constitutional muster under the Copyright Clause's "limited © 2004 Berkeley Technology Law Journal & Berkeley Center for Law and Technology. 1. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203, 301-304 (2002). The Act's four provisions consider term extensions, transfer rights, a new in- fringement exception, and the division of fees, respectively; this Note deals only with the first provision, that of term extensions. -
Congress's Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred V. Ashcroft
Georgetown University Law Center Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 2002 Congress's Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft Lawrence B. Solum Georgetown University Law Center, [email protected] This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/879 http://ssrn.com/abstract=337182 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1-82 (2002) This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons CONGRESS'S POWER TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE: ELDRED V. ASHCROFT* Lawrence B. Solum** I. INTRODUCTION: ELDRED V. ASHCROFT ................................... 3 A. The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act ................. 4 B. ProceduralHistory ............................................................ 7 II. A TEXTUAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COPYRIGHT C LA U SE .......................................................................................... 10 A. The Structure of the Clause .................................................... 11 1. The parallel construction of the copyright and patent powers in the Intellectual Property Clause .................... 11 2. The structure of the Copyright Clause ........................... 12 * © 2002 by the Author. Permission is hereby granted to duplicate this Essay for classroom use and for the inclusion of excerpts of any length in edu- cational materials of any kind, so long as the author and original publication is clearly identified and this notice is included. Permission for other uses may be obtained from the Author. ** Visiting Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law and Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Loyola Marymount University. -
Harmonizing Copyright's Internationalization With
HARMONIZING COPYRIGHT’S INTERNATIONALIZATION WITH DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS A quick glance through recent copyright legislation suggests that we are in the midst of a “second enclosure movement,” this time fenc- ing off the “intangible commons of the mind” instead of the physical commons of the land.1 In 1992 the Copyright Renewal Act2 (CRA) abolished the longstanding renewal requirement for nearly all works; in 1998 the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act3 (CTEA) ex- tended the term of copyright protection by twenty years and the Digi- tal Millennium Copyright Act4 (DMCA) heightened penalties for copy- right infringement on the Internet and provided copyright owners with an increased ability to control access to their copyrighted digital me- dia. These are simply a few examples drawn from the larger set of copyright legislation enacted within the past two decades, a set that taken as a whole provides worrisome evidence of a one-way ratcheting up of copyright protection. No surprise, then, that there is widespread feeling among many copyright scholars that Congress has unabashedly ceded to the lobby- ing pressures of the copyright industries and steadily cut into the heart of the public domain.5 Scholars have unleashed a flurry of articles in the past decade warning about the public harms of copyright exten- sions and, cognizant of the skewed political economy, calling for meas- ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 1 James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33, 37 (internal quotation mark omitted). 2 Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (1992). -
Orphan Works, Mass Rights Clearance, and Online Libraries
Ringnalda.qxd 1 Orphan Works, Mass Rights Clearance, and Allard Ringnalda Online Libraries: The Flaws of the Draft Orphan Works Directive and Extended Collective Licensing as a Solution 1. Introduction European lawmakers have recently shown a profound interest in copyright law as an obstacle to the creation of Allard Ringnalda, Project researcher, Centre for online digital libraries. Unfortunately, a new directive that is Intellectual Property Law, Molengraaff Institute soon to be proposed to remove these obstacles suggests for Private Law, Utrecht University; PhD resear- that they have focused on the wrong problem. It provides a cher, Willem Pompe Institute for Criminal Law solution for the problem of orphan works: the many copy- and Criminology and the Department of legal righted works whose rightsholders are unknown or unloca- theory, Utrecht University. table. These orphan works cannot be used in a manner that The author would like to thank Rebecka Zinser and requires the rightsholder’s consent.1) With a new Orphan Willem Grosheide for their comments on earlier drafts. Works Directive, the Commission aims to facilitate the ex- The usual disclaimer applies. pansion of Europeana, the non-profit online library that should disseminate the digitised collections of all European national libraries. The problem of orphan works obviously stands in the way of a successful online library: if copyrights cannot be cleared, copyrighted works cannot be digitised and made available online. However, in this article, I shall propose and defend two claims. First, that the issue of orphan works is not the main hurdle on the way to a successful Europeana. Instead, the orphan works problem is only a symptom of a much larger issue: the inability to clear copyrights for the mass digitization and online dissemination of entire library collections. -
The Origins and Meaning of the Intellectual Property Clause
THE ORIGINS AND MEANING OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE Dotan Oliar* ABSTRACT In Eldred v. Ashcroft (2003) the Supreme Court reaffirmed the primacy of historical and textual considerations in delineating Congress’ power and limitations under the Intellectual Property Clause. Nevertheless, the Court overlooked what is perhaps the most important source of information regarding these considerations: The debates in the federal Constitutional Convention that led to the adoption of the Clause. To date, several unsettled questions stood in the way of identifying fully the legislative history behind the Clause. Thus, the Article goes through a combined historical and quantitative fact-finding process that culminates in identifying eight proposals for legislative power from which the Clause originated. Having clarified the legislative history, the Article proceeds to examine the process by which various elements of these proposals were combined to produce the Clause. This process of textual putting together reveals, among other things, that the text “promote the progress of science and useful arts” serves as a limitation on Congress’ power to grant intellectual property rights. The Article offers various implications for intellectual property doctrine and policy. It offers a model to describe the power and limitations set in the Clause. It examines the way in which Courts have enforced the limitations in the Clause. It reveals a common thread of non-deferential review running through Court decisions to date, for which it supplies normative justifications. It thus concludes that courts should examine in future and pending cases whether the Progress Clause’s limitation has been overreached. Since Eldred and other cases have not developed a concept of progress for the Clause yet, the Article explores several ways in which courts could do so. -
Computer Software Derivative Works: the Calm Before the Storm
COMPUTER SOFTWARE DERIVATIVE WORKS: THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM Natalie Heineman* Cite as 8 J. HIGH TECH. L. 235 (2008) I. Introduction Every generation believes they live in the most exciting times of continued social and technological advancement. Since the advent of computers and the internet, however, the present is a time in which progress seems unrivaled. While the law races to catch up with technology, the area of law requiring the fastest runners may be that of computer software derivative works under current copyright law. An author’s exclusive right to prepare derivative works is particularly challenged in the software environment where innovation often involves references to and incorporation of other preexisting works. Without definitive cases on point or specifically tailored legislation to guide the analysis, however, the scope of this note is simply to help define the issues presented, thereby drawing attention to what looks to be the calm before the impending storm. This note considers the challenge posed by computer software derivative works. The note first discusses the definition of derivative works under the current Copyright Act, and analyzes how the courts have interpreted derivative works in analogous contexts. Because defining a derivative work necessarily considers whether it has infringed the underlying work, the note then discusses how the courts make infringement analyses. The infringement analysis focuses primarily on the abstraction-filtration method as it has developed in computer software cases. Finally, the note considers trends in cases and legislation that suggest an increasingly broad interpretation of derivative rights. This section emphasizes the Open Source movement which will no doubt have a significant impact on the future of computer software derivative works. -
'Orphan Works'? Law360, New York (September 29, 2015, 8:06 PM ET) -- on Sept
Portfolio Media. Inc. | 860 Broadway, 6th Floor | New York, NY 10003 | www.law360.com Phone: +1 646 783 7100 | Fax: +1 646 783 7161 | [email protected] What Shall We Do About 'Orphan Works'? Law360, New York (September 29, 2015, 8:06 PM ET) -- On Sept. 22, a California federal judge ruled that Warner/Chappell Music Inc. does not own a valid copyright on "Happy Birthday To You," thereby adding one of the most recognizable English language songs to the millions of "orphan works." What should be done to more fairly enable the use of orphan works? Naomi Jane Gray, Harvey Siskind LLP The orphan works problem plagues many would-be users of works who cannot identify or locate the owners of works they may wish to license. This introduces uncertainty and risk into the creative process and can chill expression. There have been many calls for a legislative fix of this problem, including creation of a small-claims-type tribunal, excepting orphan works from liability for infringement if the user has conducted a diligent search, government-based licensing and collective licensing. Others argue that the existing fair use defense should be sufficient to protect users’ interests. The Copyright Office has endorsed a “notice and use” proposal, whereby users would be eligible for limitations on remedies for infringement if they file a notice with the Copyright Office of their intent to use works and conduct a “good faith diligent search” for the owner. Remedies for infringement would then be limited to “reasonable compensation,” envisioned to be comparable to a reasonable license fee. -
Orphan Works in the United States and Copyright Issues
1 Orphan Works In The United States And Copyright Issues Dear Karyn Temple Claggett/Catherine Rowland This is the research work of Perry4Law1 in which we are sharing our views about the orphan work related problems in US. The crux of our discussion is that there should be a balance between copyright protection of orphan works and their suitable publications. For any further informatin or clarification, kindly contact us at [email protected]. I. The Background-Orphan Works Copyright protection is made available the moment a copyrightable work is brought into force. There is no statutory requirement to get a copyrighted work registered at the copyright office of the respective Nation, including United States. This is also the main reason that copyright protection shares an invese relationship with copyright infringement. Despite much copyright awareness campaigns, many copyright infringers still believe that copyright protection is available only if the work is registerd with the copyright office. This is definitely a misconception and a sure receipe for facing a copyright infringement suit. However, many times a copyrighted work is published and is made available to public without it being registered. In some exceptional cases the authors of such copyrighted work do not provide relevant details about themselves. In such a situation it becomes very difficult to contact such author to do commercial negotiations about such copyrighted work. Such work becomes an orphan work in which though copyright subsists yet it becomes very difficult to contact the author to seek his/her/its permission to reproduce the work. Nevertheless, using such copyrighted work amounts to copyright violation and in many cases results in a legal suit. -
ELDRED V. ASHCROFT: the CONSTITUTIONALITY of the COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION ACT by Michaeljones
COPYRIGHT ELDRED V. ASHCROFT: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION ACT By MichaelJones On January 15, 2003, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA"), which extended the term of copyright protection by twenty years.2 The decision has been ap- plauded by copyright protectionists who regard the extension as an effec- tive incentive to creators. In their view, it is a perfectly rational piece of legislation that reflects Congress's judgment as to the proper copyright term, balances the interests of copyright holders and users, and brings the3 United States into line with the European Union's copyright regime. However, the CTEA has been deplored by champions of a robust public domain, who see the extension as a giveaway to powerful conglomerates, which runs contrary to the public interest.4 Such activists see the CTEA as, in the words of Justice Stevens, a "gratuitous transfer of wealth" that will impoverish the public domain. 5 Consequently, Eldred, for those in agree- ment with Justice Stevens, is nothing less than the "Dred Scott case for 6 culture." The Court in Eldred rejected the petitioners' claims that (1) the CTEA did not pass constitutional muster under the Copyright Clause's "limited © 2004 Berkeley Technology Law Journal & Berkeley Center for Law and Technology. 1. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203, 301-304 (2002). The Act's four provisions consider term extensions, transfer rights, a new in- fringement exception, and the division of fees, respectively; this Note deals only with the first provision, that of term extensions.