2016-08-31
(September 30, 2016)
AND BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT immediately after the next election, an all-Party process be instituted, involving expert assistance and citizen participation, to report to Parliament within 12 18 months with recommendations for electoral reforms including, without limitation, a preferential ballot and/or a form of proportional representation, to represent Canadians more fairly and serve Canada better. PS: Both the NDP and the Green Party support electoral reform, thus 63% of the 68% of those who voted in the last election are supporting this initiative (maybe).
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Is the First-Past-the-Post the best electoral/voting system for Canada – i.e.: from a ‘voter representation’ and/or ‘increasing the voting participation rate’ points of view? Are there any other voting systems which might be better? What about Preferential (Ranked) or Proportional/Mixed Proportional Voting Systems? Should, for example, voting be made mandatory as it is in Australia?
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This Presentation: ◦ Does not cover all the types of voting systems out there ◦ Does not even delve into all the complexities of the systems examined ◦ Does not specifically deal with the Nomination Process , Governance, Political Stability, Party Funding and/or the ‘Diminishing of Democracy’ Issues – it….. ◦ only deals with Electoral Voting Systems
Voting Principles • Free, Open and Fair Vote • Administered by an Independent Electoral Entity (e.g.: Elections Canada) with powers to guard against infractions, compel witnesses, and enforce penalties • Easy to Understand • One person, One Vote
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Voting Principles • Results should Represent Voters’ Intentions • Voters should know the Person(s) who represents them directly • A certain Threshold of Votes should be needed to garner legislature recognition • Majority Rules – but, at the same time, Minorities should not abused
• Voting is only one demonstration of our hard-won Democratic Rights – but it is an important and visible part. Other democratic mainstays are: Strong Institutions, a Society of Law and Order; Respect for Electoral Results; Acceptance of Diversity; An Attitude of Tolerance and Compromise; etc.. • Voting and the results achieved through the electoral process should inspire thoughtful and informed voters to participate, not turn them off • A good Voting Model should also lead to good governance, to the capacity for efficient policy making, and to stability
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Definitions For the purposes of this presentation, the following definitions will be used: Minority – where a government won most of the seats but where the combined Opposition has more seats than the government False Majority – where a government has the majority of seats but achieved that without getting the overall majority of votes (e.g.: Our present Liberal Government) True Majority – where a government achieves both the majority of seats and the majority (over 50%) of the votes cast (e.g.: as were accomplished by PM Mackenzie King, PM Diefenbaker and PM Mulroney)
Voting Systems
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VOTING SYSTEMS EXAMINED
First-Past-the-Post Preferential (Ranked) Proportional
First-Past-the-Post Voting Systems
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VOTING SYSTEMS EXAMINED First-Past-the-Post – Westminster (Canada/UK) Model First-Past-the-Post – USA Model First-Past-the-Post – Run-off Election (French) Model First-Past-the-Post - No Party Voting Model (Northwest Territories) First-Past-the-Post – No Party Voting Model (Municipalities)
First-Past-the Post Westminister Model
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First-Past-the-Post (Westminster Model) Sample Ballot
First-Past-the-Post (Westminster Model) • Voting Process: – Voters select One Candidate from those listed on The Ballot – Candidate with the Most Votes Wins – The Party with the Most Candidates Elected Wins
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First-Past-the-Post (Westminster Model) Pros • Easy to Understand • There is a Direct ‘Elected Person to Voter’ Connection – i.e.: The Voter knows who represents her/him • It is a good voting model selecting between two alternatives but perhaps a poor model for selecting between multiple choices. (BTW: Canada only had two major Parties up until 1921).
First-Past-the-Post (Westminster Model) Cons • There may also be some Non- Representation Issues such as: – Winning Party may not reflect Public Sentiment /Values of a Voter or of a Significant Group of Voters – especially if there are a Number of Parties Running – An Elected Person may not be the Person for whom the Voter voted
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First-Past-the-Post (Westminster Model) Cons – Losing Parties may have no representation or an insufficient representation in the House of Commons (as indicated by the percentage of the votes received) – With multi-Party splits, a slight shift in Voter Intentions can greatly magnify the Voting Results in one direction or another – With multi-Party splits, a regional consolidation of votes (e.g.: Alberta/Quebec) can greatly magnify the Voting Results in one direction or another
First-Past-the-Post (Westminster Model) Cons
– When the Left or the Right of the political spectrum is split or divided, False Majorities occur more frequently (e.g.: Chretien and Harper)
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First-Past-the-Post (Westminster Model) Cons • 1993 – The PC Party, receiving 16% of the vote, got 2 seats whereas the Bloc Quebecois, receiving 13.5% of the vote, got 54 seats; • 1997 – Reform Party, receiving 18.7% of vote, got 60 seats whereas the PC Party, receiving 18.8% got 20 seats; and • Since 1960 there have been 10 majority governments (including the latest Liberal one) – 9 (false) without a 50% + 1 majority of votes and only 1 (true) with over 50% of the votes (1984 – the Mulroney Government).
First-Past-the-Post (Westminster Model) Cons – Policies, enacted by an unpopular Government, tend to get reversed by the new incoming Government; possibly more so if it did not have a true majority mandate – a costly exercise
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First-Past-the-Post (Westminster Model) Note: • To Govern (in the UK), it is convention that the Winning Party achieve a True Majority of Seats either directly or by coalescing with Another Party – e.g.: The previous Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition • To Govern (in Canada), the Winning Party governs (No Majority (True or False) is Needed). Only the Confidence of the House is needed.
First-Past-the-Post (Westminster Model) Note: (cont’d) • And since No Majority (True or False) is Needed to Govern in Canada: – Assuming a Five-Party Race, a Winning Party can theoretically govern with only 21% of the vote. – And Assuming a 50% Voter Turnout, a Winning Party can similarly govern with only 10.5% of Total Eligible Voters’ Support
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First-Past-the-Post USA Model
At the State level: › Voters select One Candidate from those listed on The Ballot › Candidate with the Most Votes Wins › The Party with the Most Candidates Elected Wins
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At the Presidential level: › Voters select One Candidate from those listed on The Ballot › Candidate with the Most Votes in a State Wins that State’s Electoral College Votes, either Totally or Proportionally distributed (as determined by each State) › The Candidate with the Most Overall Electoral College Votes Wins
At the State level: › Easy to Understand
At the Presidential level: › Relatively Easy to Understand
At Either Level: › There is a Direct ‘Elected Person to Voter’ Connection – i.e.: The Voter knows who represents her/him
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Possibility of some of the same Voter Non- Representation Issues as with the Westminster Model
Candidate with the Most Popular Vote may not win the Presidency (Remember George W. Bush versus Al Gore – and Florida’s Hanging Chads)
The USA Model is basically a two-Party system as compared to many of the other democracies around the world
When the public or, more specifically, when the legislature is evenly split, governing in that multi-check and balance legislative system can become dysfunctional
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First-Past-the-Post French Model
•Voters select One Candidate from those listed on The Ballot •If no Party (or a Coalition of Parties) achieves 50% plus one of the Vote (a True Majority) in the First Election, the Top Two Parties then Compete in a Subsequent Run-off Election
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PROS •Easy to Understand •A True Majority Government is Always Achieved •There is a Direct ‘Elected Person to Voter’ Connection – i.e.: The Voter knows who represents her/him
CONS •Possibility of some of the same Voter Non-Representation Issues as with the Westminster Model •A two-step election process is more expensive to undertake
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First-Past-the-Post (No Party Voting) Northwest Territories Model
First-Past-the-Post No Party Voting Model (Northwest Territories)
Voters select One Candidate in their Riding from those listed on The Ballot Candidate with the Most Votes Wins All Elected Persons then Elect the Territorial Premier, who, in turn, selects the Cabinet
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First-Past-the-Post No Party Voting Model (Northwest Territories) PROS Easy to Understand There is a Direct ‘Elected Person to Voter’ Connection – i.e.: The Voter knows who represents her/him No Party Loyalty Required Greater Loyalty to Constituents and to the overall ‘Territorial’ Interest
First-Past-the-Post No Party Voting Model (Northwest Territories) CONS Winning Candidate might not be the Person for whom the Voter voted Winning Candidate might not garner a true majority of votes
This System might work well with a Limited Number (<50) of Elected Persons. Might be unmanageable with, say, 338 Elected Persons
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First-Past-the-Post (No Party Voting) Municipal Model
First-Past-the-Post No Party Voting System (Municipal Model) *Voters select One Riding/Ward Candidate from those listed on The Ballot *Riding/Ward Candidate with the Most Votes Wins *Voters select a Mayor separately across all Ridings/ Wards - again from those listed on The Ballot. The Candidate with the most votes, wins
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First-Past-the-Post No Party Voting System (Municipal Model) PROS *Easy to Understand *There is a Direct ‘Elected Person to Voter’ Connection – i.e.: The Voter knows who represents her/him *No Party Loyalty Required *Greater Loyalty to Ward Constituents and, at the Mayoralty level, to the overall ‘Municipality-wide’ Interest
First-Past-the-Post No Party Voting System (Municipal Model) CONS *Winning Candidate might not be the Person for whom the Voter voted *Winning Candidate might not garner a true majority of votes *This System might work well with a Limited Number (<50) of Elected Persons. Might be unmanageable with, say, 338 Elected Persons.
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First-Past-the-Post No Party Voting System (Municipal Model) Note: Vancouver and some BC Municipalities use a voter-at-large electoral system (much like the Northwest Territories) in which all candidates run on a City-wide platform, with only the top (and required number of) candidates being elected. Elected Councillors then have a City-wide mandate and vision rather than a narrower Ward preoccupation.
First-Past-the-Post (Democratic) Countries
OCanada OIndia OUK OUSA OZimbabwe
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Preferential Voting Systems
VOTING SYSTEMS EXAMINED
Preferential (Ranked) Ballot Single Transferable Ballot - BC Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform
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Preferential Voting Ranked Ballot
PREFERENTIAL BALLOT SAMPLE BALLOT
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PREFERENTIAL BALLOT
Voters rank Candidates listed on a Ballot in a Preferred Order
If no Candidate achieves a 50% plus one True Majority, the Candidate with the Least Number of Votes is dropped and his/her 2nd, 3rd, etc. preferences are then redistributed amongst the remaining persons
PREFERENTIAL BALLOT
This process is repeated until one Candidate achieves a True Majority
The Party with the overall majority of such True Majority Candidates wins
Note: Australia uses this Preferential System to elect Members to its House of Representatives
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PREFERENTIAL BALLOT PROS
A True Majority will always be achieved
Relatively easy to understand
PREFERENTIAL BALLOT CONS
Not as easy to understand as the First- Past-the-Post System
Voters must now make a more difficult Voting Preference Decision on all (or more than one) Candidates – not just one
Difficult to surmise who will win
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PREFERENTIAL BALLOT CONS Possibility of some of the same Voter Non- Representation Issues both at the Individual and Party level as with the Westminster Model Note: Voters are not mandated to state their 2nd, 3rd, 4th, etc. Theoretically, if all voters only stated their 1st choice, all Parties receiving less votes (other than the top one) would be dropped and the winner could govern with less than 50% of the votes cast (just like FPTP System).
PREFERENTIAL BALLOT CONS
Persons who voted for the dropped Parties would not be represented in the House of Commons by someone with their value choice
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Preferential Voting Single Transferable Ballot Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform BRITISH COLUMBIA (2004/2005)
Preferential Voting Single Transferable Ballot (BC Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) Sample Ballot
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Preferential Voting Single Transferable Ballot (BC Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) • Electoral Voting District Boundaries would be first adjusted to be larger and more equal in voter numbers BUT with a number of candidates to be elected in each Riding (instead of just a single Elected Person per Riding) • Voters Rank Candidates listed on The Ballot – same as a Preferential Ballot
Preferential Voting Single Transferable Ballot (BC Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) • However instead of simply dropping off the lowest Vote-getter and redistributing those votes to 2nd, 3rd, etc. choices, a formula calculation is first undertaken to determine when a Candidate achieves a majority (Hare Quota* or Droop Quota)** *Thomas Hare (1809 – 1891) **Henry Richmond Droop (1831 - 1884)
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Preferential Voting Single Transferable Ballot (BC Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) • Using the Hare or Droop Quota Formula allows for the Determination of Surplus Votes from the Winner(s)
Hare Quota Formula Droop Quota Formula*
# of Votes ( # of Votes ) +1 # of Seats ( # of Seats +1 )
*The Droop Quota Formula produces a larger surplus number, thus reducing the number of ballot count iterations needed to achieve quota
Preferential Voting Single Transferable Ballot (BC Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) • If any candidate exceeds the Hare/Droop Quota, those Surplus Votes are then redistributed to 2nd, 3rd, etc. choices as indicated on those Surplus Ballots. However if no Candidate exceeds the Quota on the first and/or subsequent Ballot Counts, then the lowest vote-getter is dropped off and her/his votes are redistributed until the Quota is achieved or exceeded (just like the Preferential Ballot Voting System).
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Preferential Voting Single Transferable Ballot (BC Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform)
• This ‘Surplus-then-Preferential-redistribution- sequence-order-of-priority’ process continues until the required number of Candidates achieve the Quota
Preferential Voting Single Transferable Ballot (BC Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform)
• The redistribution of Surplus Votes is to ensure that no Voter’s Vote is ‘wasted’ on Candidates who have already achieve Quota • Note: Australia uses this (Hare-Clark and Droop Quota) Single Transferable Ballot System for some of its State (Provincial) and Senate elections. • Presently, there is no requirement in BC to have a True Majority to govern
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Preferential Voting Single Transferable Ballot (BC Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) • Here is how the Hare-Droop Quota formula (used to calculate Surplus Votes) work: Assuming 2 seats vying for 100 votes and assuming 4 Candidates getting 60/15/15/10 votes respectively, the Surplus Votes (xx) would be: Hare Quota Formula Droop Quota Formula*
# of Votes ( # of Votes ) +1 # of Seats ( # of Seats +1 )
100 = 50 (10) ( 100 ) = 33.3 + 1 = 34 (26) 2 (2 + 1 = 3)
*The Droop Quota Formula produces a smaller quota/larger surplus, thus possibly reducing the number of ballot count iterations needed to achieve quota
Preferential Voting Single Transferable Ballot (BC Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) PROS
• Having two or more Candidates per Ridings allows for more representation of any Riding in the legislature; allows for a backup Candidate should one become indisposed; and allows for a diversity of views
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Preferential Voting Single Transferable Ballot (BC Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) CONS • Voters must now make a more difficult Voting Preference Decision on all (or more than one) Candidates – not just one • The calculated Quota/Surplus redistribution is difficult to understand. For example, who determines which Ballots are surplus? The 2nd and 3rd Preferences may differ from one Ballot to another, such as ……
Preferential Voting Single Transferable Ballot (BC Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) • Here is how the Hare-Droop Quota formulae (used to calculate Surplus Votes) work: Assuming 2 seats vying for 100 votes and assuming 4 Candidates getting 60/15/15/10 votes respectively, the Surplus Votes (xx) would be: Hare Quota Formula Droop Quota Formula*
# of Votes ( # of Votes ) +1 # of Seats ( # of Seats +1 )
100 = 50 (10) ( 100 ) = 33.3 + 1 = 34 (26) 2 (2 + 1 = 3)
Question: From what part of the Voting Parcel does the 10 or 26 Surplus Votes come and might the 2nd or 3rd preferences differ depending on whether those 10 or 26 Surplus Votes came from that Voting Parcel’s front, middle, end or being randomly picked?
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Preferential Voting Single Transferable Ballot (BC Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) CONS • Difficult to surmise who will win • Possibility of some of the same Voter Non- Representation Issues both at the Individual and Party level as with the Westminster Mode
BTW: A principle source of educational material for the BC Citizens’ Assembly was: Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction by Professor of Politics David M. Farrell
Preferential Voting Single Transferable Ballot (BC Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform)
BC Voters Failed to Achieve the Super Majority of 60% for this Electoral Reform Proposal by only Voting 57.7% For the Proposal
(Anecdotally Media Reports/Surveys indicated that British Columbians felt, in part, that the Quota Calculation System was too hard to Understand)
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Proportional Voting Systems
Definitions For the purposes of this presentation, the following definitions will be used: A definitive characteristic of Proportional Systems is that to achieve proportionality a certain number of MPs will (in addition to those directly- elected) be selected from Lists. There are two types of Lists: Closed PR Lists – where the List has been put together in the Party backroom and where the voter has no say whatsoever in its makeup or its use. These are simply better known as Party Lists. (BTW: Closed Lists are used by the majority of PR countries in the world.) Open PR Lists – where the List has been together by the Party backroom but where the voter can preferentially-select (or –deselect) persons on that List – OR – where the List has been put together through some other open and transparent process.
(Note: An advantage of Closed Party Lists is that Parties can, if they wish, proactively use them to overcome gender, ethnic, indigenous, and minority inequalities – as is done extensively in the Scandinavian Countries.)
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VOTING SYSTEMS EXAMINED
Proportional – Pure (Israeli) Model Proportional – Mixed Member Proportional (German) Model Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform (2006) - Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) Stéphane Dion’s Proposed P3 Voting System
Proportional Voting Israeli Model
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Proportional Voting - Pure (Israeli Model) • Voters only vote for Parties listed on The Ballot – there are no individual Candidates • The number of elected persons per Party is determined by the percentage of the popular vote each Party achieved
• Individual Elected Persons are selected by the Parties from their own (closed) Party lists
Proportional Voting - Pure (Israeli Model)
• A True Majority of Elected Persons (either directly achieved or through a coalition) is required to govern • With usually more than two Parties running and since a True Majority is require to govern, Coalitions are nearly always the norm
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Proportional Voting - Pure (Israeli Model) PROS • Easy to understand • All Parties (above a certain threshold of votes) will be present in the Legislature, thus all above-threshold Voters have their views and values represented in the Knesset • Such a legislative representation might encourage a greater voter turnout
Proportional Voting - Pure (Israeli Model) CONS • Individual Member selection from closed Party Lists for Proportionally-allocated Seats is seemingly undemocratic and is prone to Political Backroom Manipulations • No direct ‘Voter-to-Elected Person’ Connection • Note: Australia elect her Senators using a true Proportional (Parties only) Vote (above the line) and a Single Transferable, Multi-member, Vote System (below the line). Voters can decide which side of the line they would like to use.
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Proportional Voting German Model
Proportional Voting - Mixed (German Model) • All Voters are given a single Two-Vote Ballot – One Vote to choose an Individual Candidate and One Vote to choose a Party • Elections for individual candidates follow the First-Past-the-Post Rules. • Elections for Parties follow the Proportional Allocation Rules
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German Sample Ballot
Proportional Voting - Mixed (German Model) • 1/2 (or 310) of all Legislative Seats are allocated for Individually-elected Candidates • 1/2 (or 310) of all Legislative Seats are allocated for the Proportional Distribution of Party Seats • Persons sitting in Proportionally-allocated Seats come from closed Party Lists
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Proportional Voting - Mixed (German Model) • Requires a True Majority to govern • Since a True Majority is required to govern, Coalitions, in a Multi-Party system, are nearly always the norm • Providing a Two-Vote Ballot allows the Voter to choose the ‘best’ Candidate AND the ‘best’ Party – which may differ
Proportional Voting - Mixed (German Model) PROS • Relatively Easy to Understand • Voters get a Directly-elected Person responsive to them • Voters also get their Party Views and Values represented in the Legislature through Proportional Allocation • Such a legislative representation might encourage a greater voter turnout
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Proportional Voting - Mixed (German Model) CONS • Possibility of some of the same Voter Non- Representation Issues as with the Westminster Model • Individual Member selection from closed Party Lists for Proportionally-allocated Seats is seemingly undemocratic and is prone to Political Backroom Manipulations
Proportional Voting - Mixed (German Model) CONS • Given that one MP is directly-elected and one MP (maybe from the same Riding) is selected from Party Lists, which MP (if any) has a more enhanced status in the eyes of the voter – OR – indeed amongst MP colleagues as well?
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Proportional Voting - Mixed (German Model) • Note: New Zealand uses a One Ballot/Two Vote system (like the German Ballot) for its Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) System to elect its unicameral House of Representatives – one for electing the individual and one for selecting the Party. It does not have a Senate. • Note: Australia provides two Ballots to each Voter – one to Preferentially-elect individual Members to its House of Representatives and one, using a Pure Proportional (above the line) and a Multi-member, Single Transferable Vote (below the line) system to elect its Senators.
Proportional Voting - Mixed (German Model) • Note: While Germany directly-elects her MPs using the First-Past-the-Post method, this selection could be modified to use the Preferential (Ranked) voting method thus ensuring a True Majority support for that directly- elected person.
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Proportional Voting Mixed Member Proportional Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform ONTARIO (2006/2007)
Proportional Voting - Mixed (Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform)
Very similar to the German One Ballot, Two Vote, Mixed Member, Proportional (MMP) Model
Ontario’s 129 Legislative Seats would be divided between Directly-elected and Proportionally-allocated Seats as follows………
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Proportional Voting - Mixed (Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform)
Ninety (90) of the Legislative Seats would be for First-Past-the-Post, Directly-Elected MPPs and the other 39 Seats would be for the Proportional Allocation of Party Seats according the percentage of votes each Party received
Note: New Zealand has a 70/50 ratio – 70 Directly-elected and 50 Proportionally-allocated Seats whereas Germany has a 1/2 Directly-elected and 1/2 Proportionally-allocated ratio.
Proportional Voting - Mixed (Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform)
Voters would only get One Ballot BUT Two Votes – one for the Candidate and one for the Party (which again could differ from the Party of the Candidate selected). Voting for the Candidate would be as in a First-Past-the- Post election – i.e.: Voters select One Candidate from those listed on The Ballot Candidate with the Most Votes Wins
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Proportional Voting - Mixed (Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform)
The Number of Candidates then required to bring each Party proportionally up to the overall percentage of the votes each Party received in the Election would be taken from Closed Lists submitted by each Party
Proportional Voting - Mixed (Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform)
In a Multi-Party system, Minority Governments or Coalitions would nearly always be the norm
Presently, there is no requirement in Ontario to have a True Majority to govern
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Proportional Voting - Mixed (Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) PROS
Relatively Easy to Understand
Voters get a Directly-elected Person responsive to them
Voters also get their Party Views and Values represented in the Legislature through Proportional Allocation
Proportional Voting - Mixed (Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) PROS
Such a legislative representation might encourage a greater voter turnout
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Proportional Voting - Mixed (Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) CONS Possibility of some of the same Voter Non- Representation Issues as with the Westminster Model
The same MPP Status issues between those MPPs directly-elected and those proportionally-allocated as with the German MMP Voting Model
Individual Member selection from Closed Party Lists for Proportionally-allocated Seats is seemingly undemocratic and is prone to Political Backroom Manipulations
Proportional Voting - Mixed (Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform)
Ontario Voters Rejected this Electoral Reform Proposal by a 63.1% Vote Against
(Anecdotally Media Reports/Surveys indicated that Ontarians felt, in part, that the Proportionally-allocated MPPs from Closed Party Backroom Lists was too politically manipulative)
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Proportional Voting - Mixed (Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) Suggested Reforms to Party Lists • Instead of having the Proportionally-allocated MPPs coming from submitted (closed) Party Lists, have them come from Lists compiled from all those persons who were unsuccessful from both the Election and the Candidate Nomination Processes – in that Priority Order • Note: While the title MPP is used here (because it refers to Ontario only), it could also apply to proportionally- selecting MPs.
Proportional Voting - Mixed (Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) Suggested Reforms to Party Lists • Here is how it would work: – Voters would vote for their directly-elected (First- Past-the-Post or Preferentially-selected) Candidate. – The winner would become the directly-elected MPP for that Riding
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Proportional Voting - Mixed (Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) Suggested Reforms to Party Lists – All the other unsuccessful persons would then be placed on their respective Party’s List in the order of the number of votes that each received – the higher the number of votes received, the higher up the Party List each would be placed In the case of ties, selecting a candidate alphabetically or by a toss of a coin, etc., could be applied
Proportional Voting - Mixed (Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) Suggested Reforms to Party Lists – Once the Party Lists have been completely filled with unsuccessful Candidates from the election, those Lists would then be supplemented by the unsuccessful persons from the Nomination Process – again, in order of the number of votes received during the Nomination Election (See further explanation later) Again, in the case of ties, selecting a candidate alphabetically or by a toss of a coin, etc., could be applied
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Proportional Voting - Mixed (Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) Suggested Reforms to Party Lists – All Proportionally-allocated MPPs would come from these ‘Unsuccessful Candidates’ Party Lists
Proportional Voting - Mixed (Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) Suggested Reforms to Party Lists Explanation for the Inclusion of Unsuccessful Candidates from the Nomination Process The reason for including the unsuccessful persons from the Candidate Nomination Process would be to cover off the unlikely situation of One Party winning ALL of the directly-elected seats but was still requiring more Candidates to fill any Proportionally-allocated seats – (Remember Premier Frank McKenna winning all the seats in the New Brunswick Legislature in 1987.)
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Proportional Voting - Mixed (Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) Suggested Reforms to Party Lists PROS • Proportionally-allocated MPPs coming from ‘Unsuccessful Persons Lists’ would completely eliminate any political backroom manipulation as there would be no way for any Party to know in advance who would make that List in the first place and/or in what order • Unsuccessful Candidates would still have a ‘second chance’ hope of being elected through the Proportionally-allocated Process
Proportional Voting - Mixed (Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) Suggested Reforms to Party Lists PROS • Unsuccessful persons (making it to the Party Lists) would have been vetted by the Nomination/ Election/ Media/ Public Scrutiny Processes ahead of making it to the ‘List’ – thus presumably making them more acceptable to the public by removing the taint of political backroom manipulation • Removing the backroom political taint might encourage a greater voter turnout
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Proportional Voting - Mixed (Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) Suggested Reforms to Party Lists CONS • It might be difficult to explain to the General Public how these Proportionally-allocated, ‘Unsuccessful Candidate’, Party Lists are compiled • Riding boundaries may have to be redrawn to remove any bias and to ensure as much equality as possible between the eligible voters within Urban and Rural Ridings • The Directly-elected/Proportionally-selected legitimacy Status Issue remains - both in the eyes of the voter and amongst MPPs/MPs themselves
Proportional Voting - Mixed (Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform) Suggested Reforms to Party Lists CONS • Selecting Proportionally-allocated MPs from Lists made of Unsuccessful Candidates reduces the opportunity to elect women, ethnic, indigenous, and minority persons as would be the case if such Lists were constructed by Parties wanting to proactively promote these groups i.e.: through the use of Closed Lists.
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Another Voting System Proposal STÉPHANE DION’S P3
P3 means Preferential, Proportional and Personalized
A Two-Ballot, Mixed Preferential – Proportional Voting System
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The Preferential Voting part being similar to the Single Transferable BC Citizens Assembly’s Vote Proposal (with a Reduced Number of Ridings; with up to five Elected Persons per Riding; but with the Same Number of Existing Seats in the House of Commons) but without the Hare/Droop Quota Surplus Vote Calculation
His proposed Proportional part gets somewhat more complicated in that it really is NOT a Proportional Vote per se (as understood in other jurisdictions around the world) but rather it is a Preferential Vote strictly on the Party Choice as opposed to a Preferential Vote on just individual Candidates but where all Parties, over a given threshold, would always get at least one seat.
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This is how the Party ballots would be counted:
First, the Voters’ 1st Party preferences would be counted. If one or more Parties failed to get above a certain threshold, then starting with the Party that got the smallest number of sub-threshold votes, such sub-threshold Parties would be (just like in Preferential Voting) eliminated and its Voters’ 2nd choices would be transferred to the remaining Parties. The 2nd and subsequent choices of all the sub- threshold Parties would then be allocated until all of those sub-threshold Parties were eliminated and all the over- threshold Parties had obtained a least one seat.
Voting System Considerations
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• Any voting system selecting between two or more candidates/Parties has, as a given, that a candidate and/or a Party may be elected for whom a voter did not vote
• Is having representation of all above-Threshold voters in the legislature important? If so, then how high should that threshold be? And if so, only Proportional Voting Systems achieve that representation. (BTW: 82% of Canadians support Proportional Representation (Environics Poll – April 2013).)
• First-Past-the-Post, Preferential and Single Transferable Voting Systems do not produce full, above-Threshold voter representation in the legislature
• Is always having a True Majority to govern in a multi-Party System important? If so then Preferential and First-Past- the-Post Run-Off (French Model) Systems achieve that along with formalized Coalition Governments (if needed) for all the other voting systems where a True Majority is required to govern. BTW: In 1985, France, in a referendum, chose majority governments over proportional (representative) governments.
• Other First-Past-the-Post and Proportional Systems do have the capability of producing a True Majority Government – more so in two-Party races but less so in multi-Party electoral contests.
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• The Preferential Voting System used by Australia produces a True Majority in its House of Representatives whereas its Pure Proportional/Single Transferable (Preferential but also quasi-Proportional) Voting System produces a better spread of voter representation in its elected Senate.
• However such a Proportionally-elected Senate does not necessarily represent the State (Provincial/Territorial), regional, ethnic, gender, age and linguistic characteristics of the country that is capable of being achieved by an appointed Senate. (Note: Canada also has constitutional ‘number of seat’ requirement for some Provinces – e.g.: PEI and Quebec.)
• Is getting rid of Proportionally-allocated elected persons selected from Closed Party Lists important? If so, then selecting them from Open PR Lists such as the ‘List of Unsuccessful Candidates’ might solve that.
• Is a Direct Connection between Voter and Elected Candidate (i.e.: The Voter knows who represents her or him) important? If so, all voting systems achieve that except for the Pure Proportional Voting System (e.g.: Israeli Model).
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• Should the Proportionally-selected MPs be selected based on the National percentages achieved by each Party – OR – should Mixed Member Proportionally-selected MPs come from percentages achieved by each Party on a closer-to- home Regional basis, as proposed by the Law Commission of Canada?
• Proportional Systems (other than the Israeli Model) will always result in two types of MPs – one directly-elected and one proportionally-selected. Can you live with that?
• What is more important to you – A True Majority (Stable) Government (Preferential Voting) – OR - a Government that fairly represents all the different voices and values in the country but which, with a number of Parties running, usually results in Minority or Coalition Governments (Proportional Voting)? True Majorities (possibly through Coalitions) can always be mandated in either option. Are Minority Governments that bad? And lastly…..
• Which is preferable: A One Ballot/One-Vote (Individual and Party combined) or a One (or Two) Ballot/Two-Vote (Individual and Party selected separately) System?
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Other Voting System Considerations
How to Increase Voter participation? Some additional thoughts: .Increase Voter Education .Instill a greater Civic Pride .Start Voting Models early in School – i.e.: Students would debate and then ‘Vote in Class’ during an election and have their Teacher take their ‘Vote’ to the Voting Booth (in addition to his/her own). This might require a legislative change to allow teachers to cast two votes.
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.Implement electronic voting using secure and reliable technology
.Revert to non-fixed election dates. Fixed election dates (to say nothing of lengthening out the unofficial election campaign) might produce voter apathy, complacency and non-involvement between elections whereas non-fixed elections dates (coupled with the inherent instability of Minority Governments – see next slide) might keep the voters alert, aware and on their toes – thus hopefully keeping them more involved. (BTW: Fixed Election legislation in Canada is an illusion because that legislation explicitly does not diminish the Governor General’s ability to call elections or the Prime Minister’s ability to advise him/her to call one. Confidence Votes, which could trigger an election, are also retained.)
.Minority Governments (as opposed to formalized Coalitions to achieve True Majority Governments) tend to force more cross-Party(ies) compromise and tend to make politics more interesting and ‘exciting’ – thus attracting public attention
.Implement a Voting System which assures voters that their votes do indeed count – e.g.: A Mixed Member Proportional, Single Ballot, Two-Vote, Voting System – with the directly- elected person being chosen by either a FPTP or Preferential (Ranked) voting method.
.Make Voting Mandatory (as is done in Australia, Brazil, etc.). (BTW: 56% of Canadians favour Mandatory Voting, with 31% against and 13% undecided (Canada 2020/EKOS Poll - Oct 2014).)
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The next six slides were developed from information provided by Fair Vote Canada (http://www.fairvote.ca/)
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Countries with Proportional Representation: 67.3% Countries with Winner-Take-All Voting: 59.5%
Maybe the last 10 Canadian Commissions to recommend Making Votes Count were on to something
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CANADA VOTES 2015 – SEATS (In 2015, a Majority is 170 Seats.)
CANADA VOTES 2015 – SEATS (In 2015, a Majority is 170 Seats.)
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Do Coalition Governments Work?
26 of the OECD Countries (with Parliamentary Governments) are or have been governed by Coalitions: 88% being True Majority Coalitions, with 12%* being Minority Coalitions
Germany Switzerland Czech Republic Hungary Australia Ireland Portugal France Greece Estonia Finland Belgium Luxembourg Italy Norway* Austria Iceland Slovenia Israel Sweden* Netherlands Poland Japan UK Denmark* New Zealand* Among OECD Countries, to better represent Voters, Cooperation and Compromise are the Norm
Countries with Parliamentary Governments but without Mandated Coalitions (* Constitutional Monarchy) OCanada* OChile OKorea OMexico OSlovak OSpain* OTurkey OUSA
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.Finally, which Voting Model increases Voter Participation while, at the same time, results in good governance, in the capacity for efficient policy making, and in providing stability? .Are these aspects connected or are they mutually exclusive – in whole or in part? What are the trade- offs? .Remember: All Voting Systems have Pros and Cons. No Voting System is perfect. It should nevertheless reflect your value system as best as possible.
Electoral Reform Video
This video unfortunately is not available in this uploaded version. The video segment caused it to be too large a file for this website’s capability.
It can be viewed by going to the CBC Video Player at: http://www.cbc.ca/player/play/738444355627
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Electoral Reform Referendum
…..and then, in the case of Referendums (Referenda), there is the New Zealand example - i.e.: Referendums held in 1992/1993/2011 accompanied by a huge public education exercise
Electoral Reform Committee
To follow and/or to send submissions/comments to the Federal Special Committee on Electoral Reform Hearings, go to: www.parl.gc.ca/Committees/en/ERRE
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