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2016-08-31 (September 30, 2016) AND BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT immediately after the next election, an all-Party process be instituted, involving expert assistance and citizen participation, to report to Parliament within 12 18 months with recommendations for electoral reforms including, without limitation, a preferential ballot and/or a form of proportional representation, to represent Canadians more fairly and serve Canada better. PS: Both the NDP and the Green Party support electoral reform, thus 63% of the 68% of those who voted in the last election are supporting this initiative (maybe). 1 2016-08-31 Is the First-Past-the-Post the best electoral/voting system for Canada – i.e.: from a ‘voter representation’ and/or ‘increasing the voting participation rate’ points of view? Are there any other voting systems which might be better? What about Preferential (Ranked) or Proportional/Mixed Proportional Voting Systems? Should, for example, voting be made mandatory as it is in Australia? 2 2016-08-31 This Presentation: ◦ Does not cover all the types of voting systems out there ◦ Does not even delve into all the complexities of the systems examined ◦ Does not specifically deal with the Nomination Process , Governance, Political Stability, Party Funding and/or the ‘Diminishing of Democracy’ Issues – it….. ◦ only deals with Electoral Voting Systems Voting Principles • Free, Open and Fair Vote • Administered by an Independent Electoral Entity (e.g.: Elections Canada) with powers to guard against infractions, compel witnesses, and enforce penalties • Easy to Understand • One person, One Vote 3 2016-08-31 Voting Principles • Results should Represent Voters’ Intentions • Voters should know the Person(s) who represents them directly • A certain Threshold of Votes should be needed to garner legislature recognition • Majority Rules – but, at the same time, Minorities should not abused • Voting is only one demonstration of our hard-won Democratic Rights – but it is an important and visible part. Other democratic mainstays are: Strong Institutions, a Society of Law and Order; Respect for Electoral Results; Acceptance of Diversity; An Attitude of Tolerance and Compromise; etc.. • Voting and the results achieved through the electoral process should inspire thoughtful and informed voters to participate, not turn them off • A good Voting Model should also lead to good governance, to the capacity for efficient policy making, and to stability 4 2016-08-31 Definitions For the purposes of this presentation, the following definitions will be used: Minority – where a government won most of the seats but where the combined Opposition has more seats than the government False Majority – where a government has the majority of seats but achieved that without getting the overall majority of votes (e.g.: Our present Liberal Government) True Majority – where a government achieves both the majority of seats and the majority (over 50%) of the votes cast (e.g.: as were accomplished by PM Mackenzie King, PM Diefenbaker and PM Mulroney) Voting Systems 5 2016-08-31 VOTING SYSTEMS EXAMINED First-Past-the-Post Preferential (Ranked) Proportional First-Past-the-Post Voting Systems 6 2016-08-31 VOTING SYSTEMS EXAMINED First-Past-the-Post – Westminster (Canada/UK) Model First-Past-the-Post – USA Model First-Past-the-Post – Run-off Election (French) Model First-Past-the-Post - No Party Voting Model (Northwest Territories) First-Past-the-Post – No Party Voting Model (Municipalities) First-Past-the Post Westminister Model 7 2016-08-31 First-Past-the-Post (Westminster Model) Sample Ballot First-Past-the-Post (Westminster Model) • Voting Process: – Voters select One Candidate from those listed on The Ballot – Candidate with the Most Votes Wins – The Party with the Most Candidates Elected Wins 8 2016-08-31 First-Past-the-Post (Westminster Model) Pros • Easy to Understand • There is a Direct ‘Elected Person to Voter’ Connection – i.e.: The Voter knows who represents her/him • It is a good voting model selecting between two alternatives but perhaps a poor model for selecting between multiple choices. (BTW: Canada only had two major Parties up until 1921). First-Past-the-Post (Westminster Model) Cons • There may also be some Non- Representation Issues such as: – Winning Party may not reflect Public Sentiment /Values of a Voter or of a Significant Group of Voters – especially if there are a Number of Parties Running – An Elected Person may not be the Person for whom the Voter voted 9 2016-08-31 First-Past-the-Post (Westminster Model) Cons – Losing Parties may have no representation or an insufficient representation in the House of Commons (as indicated by the percentage of the votes received) – With multi-Party splits, a slight shift in Voter Intentions can greatly magnify the Voting Results in one direction or another – With multi-Party splits, a regional consolidation of votes (e.g.: Alberta/Quebec) can greatly magnify the Voting Results in one direction or another First-Past-the-Post (Westminster Model) Cons – When the Left or the Right of the political spectrum is split or divided, False Majorities occur more frequently (e.g.: Chretien and Harper) 10 2016-08-31 First-Past-the-Post (Westminster Model) Cons • 1993 – The PC Party, receiving 16% of the vote, got 2 seats whereas the Bloc Quebecois, receiving 13.5% of the vote, got 54 seats; • 1997 – Reform Party, receiving 18.7% of vote, got 60 seats whereas the PC Party, receiving 18.8% got 20 seats; and • Since 1960 there have been 10 majority governments (including the latest Liberal one) – 9 (false) without a 50% + 1 majority of votes and only 1 (true) with over 50% of the votes (1984 – the Mulroney Government). First-Past-the-Post (Westminster Model) Cons – Policies, enacted by an unpopular Government, tend to get reversed by the new incoming Government; possibly more so if it did not have a true majority mandate – a costly exercise 11 2016-08-31 First-Past-the-Post (Westminster Model) Note: • To Govern (in the UK), it is convention that the Winning Party achieve a True Majority of Seats either directly or by coalescing with Another Party – e.g.: The previous Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition • To Govern (in Canada), the Winning Party governs (No Majority (True or False) is Needed). Only the Confidence of the House is needed. First-Past-the-Post (Westminster Model) Note: (cont’d) • And since No Majority (True or False) is Needed to Govern in Canada: – Assuming a Five-Party Race, a Winning Party can theoretically govern with only 21% of the vote. – And Assuming a 50% Voter Turnout, a Winning Party can similarly govern with only 10.5% of Total Eligible Voters’ Support 12 2016-08-31 First-Past-the-Post USA Model At the State level: › Voters select One Candidate from those listed on The Ballot › Candidate with the Most Votes Wins › The Party with the Most Candidates Elected Wins 13 2016-08-31 At the Presidential level: › Voters select One Candidate from those listed on The Ballot › Candidate with the Most Votes in a State Wins that State’s Electoral College Votes, either Totally or Proportionally distributed (as determined by each State) › The Candidate with the Most Overall Electoral College Votes Wins At the State level: › Easy to Understand At the Presidential level: › Relatively Easy to Understand At Either Level: › There is a Direct ‘Elected Person to Voter’ Connection – i.e.: The Voter knows who represents her/him 14 2016-08-31 Possibility of some of the same Voter Non- Representation Issues as with the Westminster Model Candidate with the Most Popular Vote may not win the Presidency (Remember George W. Bush versus Al Gore – and Florida’s Hanging Chads) The USA Model is basically a two-Party system as compared to many of the other democracies around the world When the public or, more specifically, when the legislature is evenly split, governing in that multi-check and balance legislative system can become dysfunctional 15 2016-08-31 First-Past-the-Post French Model •Voters select One Candidate from those listed on The Ballot •If no Party (or a Coalition of Parties) achieves 50% plus one of the Vote (a True Majority) in the First Election, the Top Two Parties then Compete in a Subsequent Run-off Election 16 2016-08-31 PROS •Easy to Understand •A True Majority Government is Always Achieved •There is a Direct ‘Elected Person to Voter’ Connection – i.e.: The Voter knows who represents her/him CONS •Possibility of some of the same Voter Non-Representation Issues as with the Westminster Model •A two-step election process is more expensive to undertake 17 2016-08-31 First-Past-the-Post (No Party Voting) Northwest Territories Model First-Past-the-Post No Party Voting Model (Northwest Territories) Voters select One Candidate in their Riding from those listed on The Ballot Candidate with the Most Votes Wins All Elected Persons then Elect the Territorial Premier, who, in turn, selects the Cabinet 18 2016-08-31 First-Past-the-Post No Party Voting Model (Northwest Territories) PROS Easy to Understand There is a Direct ‘Elected Person to Voter’ Connection – i.e.: The Voter knows who represents her/him No Party Loyalty Required Greater Loyalty to Constituents and to the overall ‘Territorial’ Interest First-Past-the-Post No Party Voting Model (Northwest Territories) CONS Winning Candidate might not be the Person for whom the Voter voted Winning Candidate might not garner a true majority of votes This System might work well with a Limited Number (<50) of Elected Persons. Might be unmanageable with, say, 338 Elected Persons 19 2016-08-31 First-Past-the-Post (No Party Voting) Municipal Model First-Past-the-Post No Party Voting System (Municipal Model) *Voters select One Riding/Ward Candidate from those listed on The Ballot *Riding/Ward Candidate with the Most Votes Wins *Voters select a Mayor separately across all Ridings/ Wards - again from those listed on The Ballot.
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