May 17, 2005

May 17, 2005 29 Days of Strength, Resiliency By Captain Mark Bathurst Chairman, UAL-MEC Today marks the 20th anniversary of the pilots’ strike against United Airlines. It is difficult to put into context the issues this pilot group has faced over the last 20 years, but it is important nevertheless to stop for a moment, reflect on the strength and resiliency of this group, and look to the future. In the next several pages we’ll try to do just that. In his exceptional recounting of the events leading up to the 1985 strike, its aftermath and long-term effects, San Francisco Captain Pat Palazzolo writes in his article entitled “From Wooden Wings: United management had spec- tacularly underestimated the resolve of the pilot group and their loathing for the B-scale. As a result, Ferris was forced to AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland (walking to the left of unidentified settle on the economic issues woman with baby stroller) walked the picket line with United pilots during after only one week of the strike. the 1985 Strike. … (Ferris) dragged the strike on for another three weeks refusing to agree on any back- and its pilots worsened, and the recounting from Pat Palazzolo to-work agreement that did not include vindictive and George Hopkins of those events dramatically paints the provisions designed to punish pilots, the striking picture better than I can in this limited space. The point of management pilots, and, of course, the people for starting with Pat’s and George’s quotes is to highlight the fact whom he felt the most wrath—the 570. that the pilots’ strike proved beyond doubt that when faced with In his book “Flying the Line, Volume II,” Dr. George adversity, this pilot group addressed it in a manner such that it Hopkins writes: can successfully endure and emerge the stronger for it. Such is Confronted by a unified pilot group, with the strike the case yet today. costing United literally millions each day, Ferris Because of management’s continued hostilities as a result reluctantly, under shareholder and lender pressure, of the strike, and its forays into hotels and car rental companies, agreed to a five-year B-scale with negotiations and United’s pilots began looking for a means to wrest control from binding arbitration to follow. He could have had such the same ones who forced them to strike in 1985. Thus was an agreement earlier and with far less trouble and hatched the seed of the ESOP concept that, after several aborted expense. By the simple act of sustaining their picket attempts, was achieved in 1994 and forced Stephen Wolf to lines, United’s pilots had succeeded in calling his bluff. leave United (albeit a much wealthier man then when he arrived The B-scale game was no longer worth the candle, so at United). Again the pilots were at the forefront of these five days after the strike’s inception, Ferris settled. Subsequent to the strike’s end, relations between United Continued On Page 2 May 17, 2005

efforts. us and how many of the issues have decades of history behind The legacy of the ESOP is left to the individual judgment them. This industry is littered with “history” and I will NOT of each of us, as clearly events in retrospect put it in a much stand idly by and allow United to fall into that abyss. different light than many saw it as it unfolded. Notwithstanding The bankruptcy process has been enormously complex on the fact that the value of the ESOP stock was negated by the a number of different levels and I have kept your representa- bankruptcy filing, it remains a key part of our legacy and one tives fully apprised of our progress at each step along the way. which merits reflection on this anniversary of the seminal strike They, in turn, have kept you as informed as humanly possible 20 years ago. given the legal restraints we face on dissemination of informa- We find ourselves at a crossroad today, much as our tion. predecessors found themselves in the days and weeks leading There appears to be some progress in many arenas and I up to May 17, 1985. No one wants to see United do anything ask for your continued patience and perseverance as we work other then prosper, grow and remain the preeminent leader in our way through the final issues that will eventually take us out our industry. True in 1985, true today. Where we go from here of this morass we have endured for the past three years. What is clearly influenced by forces and players removed from our will be the structure and shape of United when we emerge from sphere of direct influence, but as repeatedly shown before, we Chapter 11? With all of the uncertainty of the 1110 process can shape the outcome of events so as to protect our investment (aircraft leases) and the pension issues to be sorted out in the in this company and continue to lead. coming weeks, it is still too early to predict the final outcome. So where do we go from here? I will say that we have the ability to emerge as one of the With a corporation in bankruptcy, there literally and survivors of this 10-year airline depression if we remain figuratively is no where to go but up. focused on the goal and avoid getting trapped by the negativity You have heard the rumblings and drum beats from those that seems to constantly surround us. Just as in 1985, we have a around us to “Shut it down,” and “it’s not worth it anymore,” set of common and identifiable threats. Cabotage, foreign “Full pay ‘til the last day,” and other such aggressive statements ownership (regardless of what Mr. Tilton espouses), the uncer- I would maintain that we have an overwhelming interest in tainty of the oil market, and the vagaries of federal transporta- keeping the company alive, and prosperous! What good is it to tion policy are ALL significant threats to our industry and you and your family if the company were to join the scrapheap profession. We have to remain focused on the targets over of failed airlines. Along with about 450 other United pilots, I which we can exert influence, and do the very best we can to am a refugee of Eastern Airlines. Eastern was once as proud influence those issues over which we have less control. and strong a company as United. A horrific combination of In the face of the worst three years of our proud airline’s greed and arrogance brought that great company down. I hear history, you have carried yourselves in credible professionalism from pilots almost daily about how we ought to “sound and act and with strong resilience. Working for more hours for far less like a real union.” I know how frustrated and angry you are at pay than we all signed up for is a hard pill to swallow, but you the performance of management, and in most cases, I heartily have done so and held your heads high. The losses we have agree that it seems that management never seems to miss an suffered will not be in vain. In the meantime, I urge you to opportunity to do exactly the wrong thing. We could pound our continue to stay informed, stay vigilant, stay healthy and stay fists on the table, issue hairy-chested press releases, and make focused on the job at hand. The United pilots have maintained far reaching and impossible demands. The reality we live with, their focus through 20 years of assault from one source or however, is that the company is largely being run by Judge another and, together, we will do so for the next 20 years as Wedoff and the Federal Bankruptcy Court. The reality is that well. anything we attempt to accomplish must meet the standards and In looking back at the heroism and strength demonstrated test of the Bankruptcy Court. Until we are able to wrest control by our fellow pilots in the Spring of 1985, we take stock in of our collective destiny from the clutches of the legal system, what makes United’s pilots unique. The generation before us we have limited ability to drive substantive change outside of laid a solid foundation in which to rebuild a stronger future for the legal process. all of us. These are the giants on whose shoulders we now We can however, continue to hold this management stand, and of whose legacy we will sustain. accountable and demand performance. I have been in close contact with many members of the UAL Board of Directors, upon which I serve, and have briefed them on the issues facing 2 May 17, 2005

Did We Win? By Captain Dave Landry (LAXFO) while somewhat in shock, politely declined his request. This There is little doubt our strike of “85” has now become folk- was a defining moment. It was the first time since deregulation lore. It’s 20 years later and we are still writing about those 29 that the UAL-MEC had simply said “no more” concessions to days. A great deal has happened since then, but in many ways, the boss. Negotiations continued through 1984, but were it was this seminal event that started us on the road to where we strained and finally stalled over the “B” scale. In July, Ferris are today. It permantly changed the United culture. Everyone attempted an old tactic: to negotiate directly with the MEC, involved remembers the occasion from his or her own unique bypassing the negotiators. perspective. In my case, I had a view of the event as a junior After vigorous debate, the MEC chose not to have him member of the UAL MEC. appear before them. Instead, we urged him When first elected to the MEC in It’s unclear what motivated Dick to properly bargain with our negotiators. It the summer of 1983, as the LAX may have been this seemly innocuous Council 57 Second Officer Represen- Ferris. Was it Lorenzo’s success action that set the stage for the confronta- tative, our relationship with manage- at crushing the CAL pilots? Did tion to follow. We later discovered Ferris ment was reasonably amicable. he not believe we would resist his viewed this slight as our disrespecting Granted, the economy was poor, we demands in such an anti-labor him. It was at this point that he began his had over 500 pilots on furlough and strike preparations in earnest. He hired a the airlines had not really recovered environment? Or did he harbor law firm that specialized in union busting from the 1981 controllers strike. The some malevolent resentment and named a notoriously unpopular MEC had just agreed to forgo two 6% towards pilots? We shall never manager, Jim Guyette, to lead his team. pay raises that had been negotiated in It’s unclear what motivated Dick the 1981 “Blue Skies” agreement and know the answer, but clearly, it Ferris. Was it Lorenzo’s success at crush- we were working a lot harder because had become a personal issue for ing the CAL pilots? Did he not believe we of work rule concessions. Yet, him to defeat our union. would resist his demands in such an anti- notwithstanding the frustration of labor environment? Or did he harbor some sitting in the same seat as a new hire malevolent resentment towards pilots? We after 15 years with the company, it shall never know the answer, but clearly, it seemed that we would survive deregulation and that the prom- had become a personal issue for him to defeat our union. No ises of the CEO to “grow the airline” at the expense of the longer was attaining a “B” pay scale his goal. He set his sights competition would finally be fulfilled. on the total destruction of our organization. Lorenzo had shown That summer, CEO Dick Ferris was touring the domiciles him the way. with an entourage of Senior VPs. The LAX road show was held As time passed, many have taken the view that the strike at the Queen Mary, where he paid for an open bar and rubbed MEC was a group of hard-nosed labor leaders, bent on taking shoulders with the pilots under the wings of the Spruce Goose. on the company at any cost. That myth is far from the truth. In All seemed to be on track except for one ominous omen: When comparison to other MEC’s that I have served on in later years, asked by someone how we can get the airline out of the dol- the strike MEC was very conservative and adverse to risk. They drums, he pointed his finger at the Captain Representative and were not looking for a fight. None of these men had ever led a myself and said “talk to those guys.” strike, or had to face the prospect of their careers ending by Three months later, Continental was bankrupt, their con- being permanently replaced. The realities of the industry and an tract abrogated by the courts and their pilots were on strike. anti-labor administration convinced many of them that we This was a personal matter for me, as my brother was one of could not possibly be successful. Nevertheless, they proceeded those striking pilots. Dick Ferris saw an opportunity: we were cautiously, and ultimately it would be the line pilots who would called to a special MEC meeting (my first as a representative) make the decision for them. where he told us that he needed a 24% pilot pay cut to stay As one of the early proponents of taking a stand against competitive with Frank Lorenzo, as well as the recently negoti- Ferris’s tyranny, it seemed like an insurmountable task to ated American Airlines “B” scale. At that meeting, the MEC, convince my fellow MEC members, let alone the entire pilot 3 May 17, 2005

group, that we were facing an unprecedented labor crisis. But as suiters” luck would have it, Dick Ferris helped us out. In the months returning to preceding the strike, management made a crucial mistake. They work. We unified the pilot group better than we could have ever accom- knew the plished by threatening not only the pilots but also their families battle would with a barrage of intimidating mail-grams, video tapes and be for the phone calls. Their final desperate attempt to sway pilot opinion hearts and was an infamous domicile road show. minds of While conducting an informational briefing in the LAX incumbent dispatch area, a local manager informed me that Ferris and his pilots. Ferris’ senior team were planning to visit the domiciles. He asked us to favorite threat get the word out to the pilots. This manager thought our ALPA was that we communication system could better inform the pilots, and he would never was absolutely right. Within minutes of hearing this, the MEC fly for any was on a conference call and decided that a boycott would airline again, demonstrate our solidarity, hopefully avoiding any miscalcula- and that he tions on management’s part. The road shows were a disaster for was also them. Only a few future scabs attended and the meetings were capable of quickly cancelled, but not before a noteworthy incident at the cutting off SEA meeting. Not only is this event part of the legend, but it medical became part of the record in a subsequent court case. It seems payments and The UAL-MEC Strike Center was a busy Dick Ferris was provoked enough that he yelled at an observer re-biding the location throughout the Strike of 1985. that “I will cut your nuts off.” Unfortunately for him, this airline to give Serving as “Ground Zero,” the Center remark was caught on tape and subsequently played before a super senior- served as a valuable communications Federal District Court Judge as to the intent of management in ity to his 1985. “loyal command post. Members of the UAL-MEC at that time had little or no employees.” We responded that the MEC was not crazy, that we personal strike experience. None of them participated in the would not walk off a cliff, and that no one would lose a job. In previous 1951 pilot strike. Fortunately, ALPA was well-versed the end, it was all about credibility and provided us with essential information and resources. Much Our communications were superb. While we only had 300- of this knowledge was hard-learned experience from the ill- band modems and the Internet did not exist, every pilot was conceived and continuing Continental episode. We knew from contacted personally, multiple times, by telephone. By May others’ misfortunes that preparation and organization is crucial 17th, little doubt remained as to the intentions of the line pilots. to success, particularly in a case where it is management’s Oddly, those that would go to work readily told us that they intention to continue to operate the airline with scabs. It was would cross. Other communication innovations which would obvious that if we were to have any chance of success, we later become standard practice were auditorium-sized telecon- would need an extremely high level of strike participation. To ferences and a program to involve the entire family in the achieve this, we needed concise and clear two-way communica- decision making process. Even picketing served the purpose of tions with the membership. The quip at the time was we did not bringing pilots together, thereby creating unity and calming the want to be generals leading a charge and when we looked fears that everyone endured during this time. Credit for much of behind us, no one was there. The need to be adequately pre- this organization should go to the strike committee chairman, pared and to know our strength required setting up a highly Captain Rick Dubinsky, although it was amazing to see how efficient strike organization months before the potential walkout much talent existed within the pilot group that stepped forward deadline. for this demanding task. At times, and by design, the “politi- We knew that the replacement of 4,500 pilots with outside cians” were separated from the strike committee and could only strikebreakers was not a valid threat, although Ferris implied admire their work. that he could wait as long as it would take to train these scaven- While the intent of the line pilots was known, little hard gers. The reality was that he would need United pilots crossing information was available as to the intent of the pre-hires, later the picket lines in hopes of creating a stampede of “brown to be called the (570). It was this group that was pivotal in the 4 May 17, 2005

dispute. If they did not support the effort to mitigate the damag- end. ing effect of a “B” scale, I knew it would be a very short strike. One consequence of the strike that I think we did not By the night the strike began, the negotiators had agreed to all consider beforehand was the depth of emotion that prevailed issues, except the pay scale for the new hires. The company was and was later manifested by the enduring resentment of those demanding a merge with the “A” scale upon reaching captain who crossed the picket line. The world certainly appeared (19 years seniority was then the junior captain.) The pilot different to us while walking the line and looking up to see a negotiators had agreed to a five-year merge in an effort to avoid United airplane flown by those who had virtually walked over the dispute. It was clear that the company saw that the divisive- our bodies to steal our career. It was hard to understand how ness this disparate pay scheme would eventually weaken the people we considered friends and who had eagerly accepted the unity from where a union gets its bargaining strength. In later benefits of years of previous labor struggles would now turn years, revisionists would say we struck for the new hires, which their backs on us at this critical juncture. They left a legacy of truly was not the case. We struck because the duration of the selfishness and deceit that still lives today. “B” scale, as proposed by the company, threatened to destroy So, back to the question. “Did we win?” Absolutely! the basic fabric of our union. We knew the incumbents’ pay While not readily apparent to us when the strike ended in scale would likely suffer in the long term when the “killer B’s” June, we had indeed set a new standard for the conduct of a attained political influence. In a last ditch attempt by the MEC high-tech, non-violent, albeit bitter strike. Other labor unions to avoid disaster, and only a few minutes before the strike would use the tactics that we developed for years to come and deadline, an offer was made to allow a seven-year merge of the labor in general would point to our strike as a watershed event. pay scales. Ferris responded to Roger Hall, “that’s not good Certainly other strikes would be longer and with vastly different enough, pal.” At that point the MEC voted 26 to 1 to authorize results. The United strike, in comparison to those at Continental the strike. Roger quickly left the room to appear on camera and Eastern, could be described as a walk in the park. But if we before the waiting teleconference. We were on strike. measure the 1985 strike by the intangible changes that occurred The morning of May 18, the MEC was back in session. to the United pilot mindset, it was a significant victory. We had Initially, the body was quite jubilant that the airline was nearly become a true “labor union,” a realization that had not existed 100% shut down. Reports were coming in that the group of 570 before this time. We came to understand where we stood in the was supporting the strike, including a story that some actually labor versus capital relationship. It was this new consciousness had to climb over a fence at the executive office hotel to escape that drove many of our decisions during the next 20 years. the compound. At this point, an obscure ALPA lawyer came The lessons that we learned in 1985 came at a high price into the meeting and within about 15 minutes, he quieted the and should never be forgotten. Strikes are very messy, chaotic room with a sobering briefing of what we could expect in the Continued On Page 11 coming weeks. We all returned to our homes, not to meet again until a tentative settlement agreement was at hand. I was fairly confident we would prevail in some fashion, but at times the thought crossed my mind that something could go wrong. It seemed we would get good news one day immedi- ately followed by bad news the next. Many described this period as an emotional roller coaster. For the first time in our careers, United pilots felt betrayed by their company. Some Published by the UAL-MEC Communications Committee. strikers truly believed we would never return to work and that they would lose their jobs. They were resigned to the worst. Copyright © 2005 Air Line Pilots Association—United Being in the leadership, I had some comfort in the knowledge Airlines Master Executive Council. that, if it became necessary, we had an exit strategy to end the strike. Fortunately, the line held and eventually pressure was MEC Communications Committee brought on Dick Ferris to settle. It was a legal compromise, not Chairman -- Captain Steve Derebey the clear win we would have liked. And, to no one’s surprise, Vice Chairman -- Captain Herb Hunter the battle would continue for another two years with retribution Committee Member -- Captain Garry Kravit from both sides. It was not until Dick Ferris and his minions Sr. Communications Specialist/ Editor -- C. David Kelly were forced from the company, by our first ESOP attempt, that we finally did experience some labor peace and see this affair 5 May 17, 2005

Pilots: The True Heroes of ‘85 By Captain Mark Seal (JFKFO) wrong. It was 20 years ago this morning when I stood looking out the During the next three months we had more than 56 days of windows of the meeting room on the top floor of the Ramada special MEC meetings as negotiations stagnated, mediation O’Hare Hotel. The rain from overnight had just about ended, slowed to a crawl and we were released into a 30 day “cooling but it was still a gray murky morning in Chicago. The weather off” period which would culminate, absent reaching an agree- certainly fit the mood that morning, as no one in that room slept ment, in a strike at midnight May 17, 1985. It was interesting at all since the vote to put almost 6,000 United Airline pilots on that in a number of closed meetings when we were discussing strike shortly after midnight. I was looking directly at the old E our negotiating strategy, positions and plans, we continuously and F concourses to see if there was any sign of the 6 a.m. bank got word that the subject matter of our closed discussions was getting ready to operate. After what seemed an eternity, noth- getting over to EXO (WHQ today) almost immediately. We ing was moving. The ALPA Pilots of didn’t know if our room was bugged or United Airlines were on strike and The ALPA pilots of United Airlines: what. We wouldn’t learn the source of would remain so for the next 29 days. These were the true heroes of this the leak until the night of the strike. I was the Second Officer represen- Once we were in the cooling off tative from Council 52 in New York and labor battle. 96% of them had voted period, things really seemed to stag- was the newest member of the United to go on strike, 96% walked the line nate. Our Mediator was quite ill and MEC, having been elected in a special for 29 days and 96% came back to had to return to his home in Boston mid-term council election as a result of work at the end of the strike. Their from Washington DC. The MEC our first officer representative (Beau remained at the call of the chair and Ferguson) suffering a non-fatal heart decision to fight to end American’s was generally off flying trips. Strike attack. Art Mount, who had been serving two-tier forever pay scale in a very preparation had been completed and as S/O Rep, had just checked out as a dangerous environment is one of the MEC Chairman Roger Hall and Strike Chairman Rick Dubinsky had sched- first officer and ran to complete Beau’s great labor successes in recent de- term, creating the vacancy that I filled. uled a teleconference for the night of In February 1985, attending the cades. It was truly an honor to be a May 16. This would ensure that first of what would be many special part of that effort. everyone who wasn’t flying could be MEC Meetings that year, I recall asking together when it was announced that JB Cockrell, the Second Officer repre- we either had an agreement or were on sentative from SFO who had served longer than any other MEC strike. member, (6 years), what he thought would be first on the Questions remained about whether John Peterpaul and the agenda that day. JB said “Your first vote will be to authorize IAM would strike in sympathy if indeed we did reach an United Airline pilots to strike in the event we couldn’t achieve impasse. Pat Friend, who was then MEC chairperson of the an agreement! Welcome to the MEC!” AFA at United, had already publicly stated that they would not We walked into the meeting room packed with rank and work if the pilots struck. file United pilots (they were fully engaged by this time) and the As always in high pressure situations, the rumor mill was first order of business was a unanimous vote to take the United in high gear and MEC Communications was working overtime pilots out on strike if we got released from mediation and didn’t to make sure that our information was accurate and timely, reach an agreement. The place erupted. It was full of media and something which served us very well during the course of the the Chicago Tribune reported the next day that it looked like a strike. strike was inevitable. Maybe I was naïve at the time, but what I I flew my last trip before the deadline with Captain Jack felt was that the entire MEC desired to achieve a fair and Hansen (30 years with United and a Korean War Veteran) and equitable agreement, especially when it came to eradicating the First Officer Red Aldrich (20 years with United and also an F- open-ended American Airlines style B-scale. We felt that if we 86 driver during Korea). It was a very poignant and telling demonstrated our preparedness to strike, CEO Dick Ferris moment when we blocked into LGA at the end of the trip. We would come to his senses and not take a strike. We were all shook hands and said if this had to be our last trip with 6 May 17, 2005

United Airlines, it couldn’t have been with a better group of not just show it by acclamation? We went down stairs and guys. Many similar conversations took place around the system Pierce said, “Okay, we have to get this right and recorded that week. correctly. Everyone in favor of going on strike say ‘aye. ‘” Bill Tyers, Art Mount and I left for Chicago to join the rest There was a loud “aye” from the MEC. “Those opposed?” of the MEC. We spent the day of May 16 getting updates on There was a very pregnant pause until the First Officer Repre- negotiations from Boston where our negotiating committee had sentative from Denver yelled out “NO” and ran out of the room. joined the national mediator along with the company negotia- We were in shock and we finally realized where our leak was. tors. Having the negotiating committee separated from the On the morning after, the MEC met briefly before going MEC was a bad idea, an idea which we vowed afterwards to home to be with our pilots (offline of course). We were all never repeat. handed telegrams from the company that said that our ALPA Finally, we were down to the final hour. We were in the drops were cancelled and if we did not report to our chief pilots old MEC Office on Higgins Road in Rosemont, Ill., waiting to within 24 hours for work, our employment with United Airlines hear if any movement had taken place in Boston. was terminated. That was kind of sobering. Doug Wilsman, The teleconference was being piped in downstairs and the the chairman from C57 in LAX stood up and said this was his ODEUM Theater was almost full. Roger Hall came in to the 60th Birthday and retirement date. He left the meeting to a nice MEC meeting and took the pulse of the group before asking the round of applause for his decades of ALPA service. Our rather astonishing question of whether we wanted to try to exhausted negotiating committee arrived from Boston to a arrange a conference call with Dick Ferris shortly before standing ovation. They looked pleased with us, until they midnight to see if there was something that we could do to avert found out what we had done with Ferris the night before. We a strike. Some of us were taken aback. For months, we had then listened to our attorneys, who were extremely nervous. remained with our negotiating position of a five-year phase in (The last ALPA pilot strike had been the Continental debacle for the first of five-step raises to merge in year six. (Yes, a B- and they were recommending we get this thing over with as scale, but not one forever.) Roger took a vote of the MEC and soon as possible.) We then recessed, proceeded to the picket the majority voted to move off of that position to an 8 year line at ORD and then tried to get home as best we could. merge. The MEC went upstairs with Roger, stood around the Seeing all of the United pilots on the line at ORD was one big conference table and heard Dick Ferris’ voice on the of the most memorable and uplifting experiences that I will ever speaker phone. Roger said “Dick, I am here with the entire have as a pilot representative. Senior pilots who were literally United MEC and we would like to propose something to you striking for the “unborn.” Pilots who had nothing to gain and that we hope will keep us from having to go on strike.” Ferris everything to lose. Pilots who had sat as 17 year flight engi- said “I am listening Roger.” Roger pitched the 8 year proposal. neers at a very stagnant United Airlines. Junior guys like me There was silence on the other end of the phone for a moment who had just gotten back from furlough. Former flight manag- and then Ferris stated, “Roger, I appreciate your and the MEC’s ers who a year earlier couldn’t have imagined doing such a efforts to find a solution but frankly, I don’t think what you thing. All these people walking the line together and literally have proposed is going to do it.” With that, the phone call was putting their jobs on the line. As we stood there, a lone United terminated. Airlines 747-100 made multiple approaches to ORD, not going In that conference room, 28 of us all looked at each other anywhere, just around and around! I thought to myself “what a in silence. We knew what we had just heard was final and what joke.” Ferris has to do touch and go’s at O’Hare in a big was in store for each of us, the pilots that we represented and airplane to demonstrate that he was still operating. He was their families. It was a very sobering moment. short about 5,800 pilots. Roger broke the silence by saying that he had to call Rick It is important to remember that this wasn’t a Nyrop – and get over to the teleconference. He left the room. As he was Northwest-style strike, where he shut the airline down during walking out, I noticed that he had a big orange IAM button on his many pilot strikes and everyone went home until people his lapel. I figured he had gotten the word that they were going came back to the bargaining table when they got hungry. This to support us. Wrong again. was mortal combat. If Ferris won, we would have been perma- Chuck Pierce, who was then the Secretary of ALPA nently replaced. There were some incredibly brave people on National, told us we had about 3 minutes to get down stairs and that picket line. take a formal recorded vote to go on strike. We all thought Bill, Art and I got home to New York on TWA. It was that’s pretty dumb, of course it is going to be unanimous. Why almost embarrassing when we walked into their ops in ORD. 7 May 17, 2005

They couldn’t do enough for us. In that conference room, 28 of us all some said that they were only here We finally made it home to to take up training slots during the JFK and went over to see our guys. looked at each other in silence. We strike but would never have flown a In true New York fashion we got knew what we had just heard was line trip. Many have become quite a going over from them final and what was in store for each excellent ALPA members over the when we walked up to the picket years. Only they know in their line at Hangar 8. Captain Jim of us, the pilots that we represented hearts what they would have done if Fenelley, a former Council 52 and their families. It was a very the strike had not ended when it did. Chairman, told me he was here sobering moment. Of all the pilots who received “extra picketing, but that strikes were the contractual pay,” only six gave it up result of failed negotiations and and worked under the ALPA agree- that he was “one pissed off ment. picket.” Guess who ended up on the front page of the New For the scab pilots, life was not very fun. They had to get York Times with his picket sign on? Jim was great. During the to their aircraft in blacked out busses with Andy Frain guards next 29 days, one of our more ingenious Captains, Gene constantly accompanying them. They had to work a schedule of Sengstacken, had fitted everyone out with extra wide “comfort 6 days on, 1 day off, 3 days on and 1 day off. They also were fit” shoulder straps for our strike signs. The Port Authority cops required to sit at a phone bank each evening and call striking had been complaining about pickets relieving themselves on the pilots’ families to advise them that management was rebidding grass, so Gene proceeded to construct the “Richard J Ferris the airline soon and if their spouses or fathers did not come Latrine” at the entrance to Hangar 8. back to work, they would lose their job forever. These calls Another image forever engraved in my mind is the sight of really endeared the scabs to the striking pilots and their fami- one of our pilots arriving for picket duty with his wife in a lies. wheelchair. She was stricken with MS. This after United The IAM decided not to honor our picket lines for what- management cancelled all of our medical insurance. The stories ever reason. are endless. The AFA went out in sympathy at great cost to their union, with many members signing up to go back to work when flights Points of interest became available. On the 29th day, when we reached an agree- On May 17, 1985, after more than two years of failed negotia- ment on the pilot contract and the flight attendants were being tions, federal mediation, declaration of impasse and a 30 day taken hostage on back to work issues, Pat Friend came to the “cooling off” period, the ALPA pilots of United went on strike. ALPA MEC and said that the most important thing for us to do The first pilot strike at United Airlines in 34 years. was to get this airline up and running again so her membership The strike lasted for 29 days. During that time, approxi- could get back to work. She released us from our pledge not to mately 288 of our former brothers decided to cross our picket go back to work without ALL the flight attendants immediately lines and scab the airline. returning with us. The “group of 570,” as they became known with about 13 That night, following an interesting exchange between exceptions, decided to support the strike and not help Richard Council 57 Rep David Landry and Council 12 Rep. Steve Smith Ferris replace his pilots. ALPA litigated and won their right to about how long we needed draft language in front of us before become United Airlines pilots, all the way to the United States we could vote, we ratified a new contract which included a 5 Supreme Court (the Judge Bua decision). During the years year merged pay rate. between 1986 and 1994, they achieved their seniority, had it To the dismay of the scabs who had crossed our picket reversed and finally negotiated back permanently. This was a line, all ALPA pilots came back to work together. landmark case which was pursued with the expert help and In less than six months after our strike ended, American counsel of Michael Abram, Esq. a partner in the law firm of Airlines management offered the APA a “merged” pay rate Cohen Weiss and Simon. ending once and for all an open ended B-scale. APA did send Another “group of 539” also were lined up as replacement us a check and a resolution of support. For the American pilots. Some were offered premium wages of $75,000 a year as Airlines pilots, the ALPA Strike at United was a wonderful replacement captains and $50,000 as replacement first officers. thing. As we found out later, some were really here to replace us and It took about six months for the United MEC to determine 8 May 17, 2005

what constitutes performance of struck work in the 1985 strike. the pilots at United the highest paid in the industry. Ferris told The definition we adopted remains to this day. In the 1991 his very loyal pilot group that “their golf handicaps were going ALPA CBA, the last vestiges of the B-scale were permanently to suffer as a result of the extra flying that they would have to removed. do” but that he would use the huge cost saving that he extracted Everyone found out one immutable fact. Airplanes don’t from the rest of the contract and the increased productivity to move without pilots in the seats. expand United Airlines exponentially. He did nothing of the sort. Dick Ferris and the Industry At the start of deregulation, Richard Ferris was CEO of the Since the 1970s, United CEO Richard Ferris had enjoyed a largest airline in the free world. While it may be hard for some loyal employee group that literally loved United Airlines. to believe today, United was almost twice the size of American When I came on the line in 1979, CLR had not arrived in the Airlines in 1978. Bob Crandall, then CEO of American, had a airline industry yet. The Captains were king and heaven help plan to do something about that. the poor First or Second Officer who wasted a drop of fuel or In 1982 Crandall offered the American pilots a deal that caused a trip to be delayed. These guys bled United blue and simply said, “If you are a pilot on this property at the time that showed it everyday. They were rather derisively called this agreement is signed, you will be grandfathered with your “Marvin Mainliners” by ALPA pilots throughout the industry. wages and working conditions. If you come to work after this Ferris’ relationship with United pilots was such that he was agreement is signed, you will work for 50% of what the other taught to fly by one of our own American Pilots receive FOR- and was given an honorary EVER!” seniority number by the UAL- Seeing all of the United pilots on the line at The B-scale was born. MEC. It was chaired at the ORD was one of the most memorable and Ferris was flabbergasted, as time by Captain John Ferg, a was every pilot in the United man who would later convince uplifting experiences that I will ever have as a States who flew commercial his son to cross our picket line pilot representative. Senior pilots who were airliners for a living. What the for a job. Dick Ferris con- literally striking for the “unborn.” Pilots who hell were the APA pilots think- vinced the pilots of United to had nothing to gain and everything to lose. ing? support airline deregulation Many American pilots were (the only group of pilots in the Pilots who had sat as 17 year flight engineers heard to say if anyone is dumb United States to do so). Ferris at a very stagnant United Airlines. Junior enough to come to work for those loved to state with his usual guys like me who had just gotten back from kinds of wages, they deserve bombast that United Airlines furlough, former flight managers who a year what they get. In an extremely was the 800 pound gorilla of shortsighted view, they felt that the airline industry and if we earlier couldn’t have imagined doing such a they would get to keep what they could get out from under the thing, all walking the line together and liter- had and, oh, by the way, Bobby Civil Aeronautics Board and ally putting their jobs on the line. Crandall had promised that with deregulate, United would take this new two-tier contract, he over the world. In 1981 he would make American Airlines convinced the pilots of United Airlines that if they signed an the world’s largest carrier. agreement which became known as “blue skies,” that he would Crandall eventually did exactly that. then take advantage of United’s huge size and bury the compe- Ferris was beside himself. He knew that he had squan- tition. dered his lead in the market place and had basically languished Blue skies was a hugely manpower-negative agreement in deregulation for almost four years doing nothing to increase implemented during a time when 760 United pilots (myself his market share. He knew that Crandall was coming after him included) were on furlough. The agreement basically threw out and that he had to move fast. The first thing he did was to 30 years of negotiated gains in duty rigs and working condi- convince the United pilots to defer the last contractual pay raise tions and put all pilots on salary regardless of how much or of the Blue Skies Agreement. He said he would pay that raise little they flew. While the contract probably kept the fur- on the completion of a new CBA. Of course, his failure to do loughed pilots on the street for another two years, it did make so exacerbated the erosion in the relationship between Ferris 9 May 17, 2005

and the pilots of United Airlines. He hired several union busting consultants (Hill and Ferris’ timing was bad. Crandall had been able to convince Knowlton included) and was advised that if he kept the pressure APA to institute the B-scale while the economy was still in the on, he would prevail and convince the majority of United pilots tank. By 1983, things were starting to turn around. All of the to come back to work, effectively killing ALPA on the property carriers were recalling their furloughees and traffic was picking at United. Those of us who did not return would “lose our jobs up. So much so, that by 1984, United Airlines enjoyed the most forever.” Richard Ferris, emboldened by his plans and the profitable year in its history. Unfortunately, Ferris was losing hostile labor atmosphere of the day, became intransigent in market share to American and he was in a box. He had re- negotiations and in less than a year managed to turn one of the called all of his pilots and he didn’t want to hire new ones on most company loyal pilot groups in the United States into union the United pilots’ contract. militants. The stage was set for a showdown. Richard Ferris then developed and executed his plan. He wanted to expand the airline, but he wanted the pilots to pay for ALPA and United Airlines it just as his major rival had done. He would propose a B-scale After the pilots of American Airlines left ALPA in the 1960s to or some sliding status pay scale scheme that would effectively form an in-house union, the United MEC representing the pilots mirror what American had. Most importantly, instead of hiring of United Airlines became the tip of the ALPA spear. United new pilots and bringing them immediately on the line, which he pilots carried the shield of the Association on a number of desperately needed to do to ward off American’s onslaught, he issues. Among the biggest to that point was the crew manning would attempt to pre-hire a group of pilots, train them almost to issue. Despite the B-737 being introduced and even flown by end level proficiency and then hold them in a pool until one of some of our ALPA brothers as a two-person cockpit, United two things happened. Either the Air Line Pilots Association pilots fought to maintain at a cost to the rest of their CBA to would sign up for a permanent two tier wage scale, in which maintain a third pilot in the cockpit, a provision that went away case he would bring the pooled pilots on at the reduced wages, with the signing of Blue Skies in 1981-82. or the pilots would balk at such an agreement and would strike. During 1983, as dissatisfaction was growing with the Either way, Ferris figured to achieve his goal. goings on at United, the UAL-MEC elected a new MEC The strike option offered Ferris a very interesting proposi- Chairman by a vote of 14-13. His name was Roger Hall. tion. In 1985 Ronald Reagan was just beginning his second Roger was the former negotiating chairman working for then term as President. His first four years had set new highs in anti- MEC Chairman John Ferg. The huge split in Roger’s election labor sentiment throughout the nation. Up to that point, the two was caused in part by his association with the Blue Skies major strikes in the aviation industry had been the PATCO agreement, despite the fact that negotiating committees serve at strike of 1981 after which Reagan fired all of the nation’s air the pleasure of their respective MECs. traffic controllers and the 1983 Continental Airlines strike. Roger ran on a very simple platform. If commercial airline Both of these job actions ended in disaster with virtually every pilots were going to be left with anything, sooner or later we striking controller and many CAL pilots losing their jobs were going to have to say no to Richard Ferris. He also knew permanently. Hardly an atmosphere which lent itself to good that when we did say no, it was going to get ugly around here faith bargaining and one that certainly didn’t bode well for a fast. Roger believed that the only way we were going to successful strike. achieve any level of success as a pilot group was to get edu- Ferris made the fateful decision that if ALPA was auda- cated on what was facing us and get unified behind what we cious enough not to give him what he wanted and struck the had to do. Job one was letting United pilots understand that airline, he would fly through it. He would use his cadre of what had happened at American Airlines (50% forever b-scale) TCA’s (training check airmen), quasi management pilots who would kill the careers of airline pilots in the United States. worked in the training center who could be used as immediate He also knew that if our CEO was going to declare war on scab captains and first officers. Most importantly, he would use the pilots, he needed a capable general to lead the fight. His his newly minted flight engineer “pre-hires” to fill out the choice to lead the strike preparedness committee was Captain crews he needed to accomplish his goal. Ferris figured that Rick Dubinsky. Any pilot still flying for United Airlines knows even if a large percentage of United pilots struck (he was being who Rick is so I don’t need go into great detail on his back- told that 20-25% would cross in the first week), they would ground. Suffice it to say that Roger hired a totally focused, come to their senses pretty fast once they saw United Airlines totally committed individual who would insure that if Ferris flying a good portion of their schedule and building back fast. tried to take us on in an all out replacement strike, we would be

10 May 17, 2005

in the best possible position to defend ourselves. with each of the pooled pilots, inform them as to what was Captain Dubinsky organized a strike preparedness commit- going on and if indeed the United pilots were forced to strike, to tee second to none. His attention to detail included what at the ensure that these young folks did not cross our picket line. time were state of the art communications, the first use of Rick even went out and hired a Northwest Airlines Captain satellite video transmissions for video conferencing, member- named Bob Keys. Bob had been on strike more than any ALPA ship tracking which made ALPA National envious, as well as pilot in history to that point in time and brought a unique having people traveling all over the world to lock up agree- insight into the process. Rick was bound and determined to ments that if Ferris did drive us to a strike, that no training make sure that the United pilots were prepared. The success of facilities outside of United Airlines would be used to train our the entire operation is a testament to Rick’s preparation. replacements. Family Awareness was organized throughout the Captain Bill Brashear was Chairman of the Negotiating airline, not only to educate spouses, (many strikes are won or Committee. Bill had the most frustrating task of trying to lost at the kitchen table) but also to know where every one of negotiate in good faith with a management hell bent on doing our pilots were in the event we had to strike. exactly the opposite. In that same vein, Rick knew that a big piece of Dick The ALPA pilots of United Airlines. These were the true Ferris’ replacement strategy were the 570 almost-trained-to- heroes of this labor battle. 96% of them had voted to go on proficiency pilots who were waiting in a pool to come to work. strike, 96% walked the line for 29 days and 96% came back to Capt. Dubinsky liaised with three pilots who were responsible work at the end of the strike. Their decision to fight to end for an organization which would become known as the American’s two-tier forever pay scale in a very dangerous “Dumpster.” Jamie Lindsay, Bruce Lasch and Steve Forte (yes, environment is one of the great labor successes in recent that Steve Forte) would be charged with establishing contact decades. It was truly an honor to be a part of that effort. Did We Win? Continued From Page 2 and costly. They should only be used in the most rare circum- one key element to our success, it would be trust. Trust in the stance as an option of last resort. Nevertheless, they should leadership and trust in each other. There were dark days in continue to be a tool in the union arsenal. Management must 1985, as there are today and will be in the future. We will recognize that attempting to break a strike with replacement continue to endure the vagaries of the airline industry and workers will likely result in their own or the company’s demise. ultimately it may be simple luck that determines our fate. The foes of labor relish the elimination of the workers’ ability Nevertheless, in 1985, we demonstrated that unity is a very to strike and have moved the battleground to the legislative powerful weapon to combat corporate greed and management arena. In the future, we must do all we can to protect the right hubris. For the participants of the strike, we will all agree, those to legally withdraw our services. 29 days in 1985 have become an indelible part of our memory. Looking back, there were many elements that influ- For myself, at no other time in my 37 years at United can I say I enced the outcome in 1985: an ego- driven CEO, broken was more proud to be associated with this pilot group. promises, courage and betrayal. However, if I were to pick the

11 May 17, 2005

There’s Something About May about 3,000 hours of flight time. After interviewing with “But that’s the wonderful thing about man; he never gets so United, I learned that the airline would pre-train pilots and discouraged or disgusted that he gives up doing it all over create a pool to be hired once the company completed negotia- again, because he knows very well it is important and worth the tions with ALPA on a new contract. To take United’s training, I doing.” resigned from Provincetown Boston Airlines. Most of us Ray Bradbury, Fahrenheit 451 resigned from other jobs to attend training. It was worth it for a shot at becoming a United Airlines Flight Officer. We all By Captain Garry Kravit (ORDFO) wanted to go to the show, to be the guys up front. The irony. Twenty years ago this week I was at United’s Flight Maybe somewhere deep down I knew it was too good to Training Center getting “refreshed” to be a new flight engineer, be true. They told us many times that once there was a con- hoping that United and ALPA would settle their differences, and tract, once they’d settled with the pilots, that we would have that there would be no strike. I was about to be immersed in jobs. They told us over and over that they were negotiating in what would turn out to be one of the most traumatic experi- good faith with the pilots and that they were confident that a ences of my life. What is it about May? strike would be averted. That sounded reasonable. Get your As I look back on the story of the 570, I realize that what foot in the door, get on the seniority list, and worry about the we did and how we came to an almost unparalleled unity is a pay later. United hadn’t hired since 1979, and the industry had drama about brotherhood and humanity. Anecdotes about the been through a sustained downturn. The sooner you could get a 570 have been printed, told in the cockpit, and laughed and seniority number, the better off you’d be. Who knew how long cried about in bars. We’ve shared our personal experiences, the hiring could possibly go on? United was finishing up we’ve joked about scab-clickers in Chicago flight ops, and we recalls of the last of the 1979 furloughees, and despite the fact retain images of striking pilots at teleconferences. We’ve been that American and United were declaring that they’d each disgusted by the notorious four 570 scabs who crossed the employ 10,000 pilots by the year 2000, most doubted that it picket line the first day, two of them from my own class. And could happen. we’ve been saddened by those few who, unable to control I checked in at the Ramada Inn Smith Road, a hotel where themselves, slithered across the lines just days before the strike many of the pre-hires stayed. We attended training at our own ended. And maybe what we’ve all been trying to achieve by expense and paid for our own accommodations. United gave us telling these stories is an understanding of what led us to make $30 a day in expense money. the decisions we made. For me, crossing the picket line or not After receiving my room key, I headed toward the pay crossing it wasn’t about money or a job flying airplanes. It was phones to call home and was approached by a guy about my about my fiancée and the children we would someday have, my age. “You here for United training?” he said. extended family, my old friends and the many new friends that “Yeah.” I’d made during the time leading up to the strike. It was also “I figured I’d ask if you want to get a room together.” about those of you who are reading this now, who were not I raised an eyebrow. “You a navy pilot?” involved in the strike, but who, in one way or another, would be “Okay, be an (censored),” he said. impacted by the decision made by the 570. Thus began my friendship with Phil Trosclair, roommate On January 3, 1985, I stared at the orange, red, and blue and stick partner. We are close friends to this day. Without carpeting lining the bulkhead in front of me. The 727 touched Phil, I probably wouldn’t have made it through training. down in a way that I knew that the guy at the controls wasn’t Phil was a difficult person to go through school with. He’s just flying it. He was wearing it, rolling it on, timing the extremely intelligent and has a photographic memory. He landing just perfectly so the wheels spun up with a sweet kiss, could read a 727 manual and regurgitate it on command. I, on creating a blue-smoke ghost that hovered just above the con- the other hand, wasn’t even sure how many engines the thing crete before drifting off on the light crosswind. The cockpit had after going through the 14-day Flight Engineer course. was where I wanted to be. I was 24 years old and couldn’t United was pumping the pre-hires through the program at believe how lucky I was. record rates, and for many of us who had no F/E or jet time, it I’d been out of college a little more than a year and had was a serious challenge. After ground school, we were given 12 May 17, 2005

four simulator periods and a check ride. that I was as good a pilot as any other. It was United’s irratio- Phil and I were teamed up with George Shavin and Sel nal training program that was hindering my performance. But Hewitt, two well-seasoned simulator instructors. I was having a rather than letting it get me down, I made the decision to let the difficult time in the simulator phase because I was under intense anger motivate me. pressure and had a minimal understanding of the airplane. That night, over a few beers, Phil gave me the advice that There is simply no rational way to teach and have pilots fully got me through my check ride. “Sit on your hands,” he said. learn the 727 in four simulator periods, especially those of us “What are you—some kind of pervert?” I said. who had no turbo-jet experience. “Okay, be an (censored),” he said. “I’ll just get another To make matters worse, Phil, George Rings (another pre- roommate when they send you home.” hire) and I were sent out to Los Angeles to use Western “No! I’m sorry. What?” Airline’s simulators due to a lack of facilities at United. The “You can do this. You just need to think before you touch day before our check ride, George and Sel decided that the anything. Just sit on your hands and verbalize whatever the fourth member of our group wasn’t going to make it through problem is. Remember this—don’t just do something! Sit and sent him home. There is a part of me that thinks that there!” because we were in Class Three of the pre-hires, the first class I finished my beer, thinking, Don’t just do something! Sit of “off the street” pilots (Classes One and Two were made up of there! consultant instructors and some pilots who had interviewed but The next day I watched as Phil went through all the drills: were not hired in 1979), management wanted to cull one from Fuel dumping, loss of essential power, rapid depressurization, the pack, to take him down, knowing full well that the story minor and major electrical, hydraulic, and pneumatic problems, would make the rounds to all who followed us. The message all the memory items. seemed to be: Let this be an example to all of you. Everyone Then it was my turn. George said, “You ready?” had better cooperate, graduate and do what we tell you, or you “Yeah,” I said. Don’t just do something! Sit there! won’t get out of here alive. I settled into the engineer’s seat, took a deep breath, and Management planted a negative seed, but due to the insane literally put my hands under my thighs. I chuckled, thinking it tempo of our training, we were too busy to dwell on its mean- was ridiculous, but everything was on the line and what did I ing. Nonetheless, it seriously raised the anxiety levels and my have to lose, especially with my check ride scheduled for the check ride was only one simulator period away—any one of us next day. George went right for the jugular: LOSS OF ALL could be voted off the island at any time. ELECTRICS. My arms twitched, wanting to fix the problem Adding to my problems, I had developed flying hands before I even knew what it was. Don’t just do something! Sit syndrome in the simulator. During any emergency or irregular there! I needed to flip a switch. Don’t just do something! Sit procedure, I was in a tremendous rush to fix something, often there! I wanted to make the lights come on. I wanted to fix it the wrong thing. George Shavin called me into his hotel room now! But I didn’t. to have a talk. He told me that if I didn’t get my act together, I I relaxed my shoulders and arms, taking another deep wouldn’t pass the check ride. I felt like I was sliding down a breath, leaving my hands planted firmly under my thighs and tunnel, unable to get control. “What am I doing wrong?” I said. said, “Okay … it looks like a loss of all generators ... I think I looked at my shoes and sighed. that’s what it is. I’m going to go to standby with essential George cocked his head. “Look, you’ve got to slow down power.” Then I raised my thighs and released my hands. and think. I’m sorry, I really am, but at this rate you’re not As I continued to evaluate the situation, my right hand, going to make it.” under strict orders, moved slowly up the panel and made George’s words only served to drag me deeper into the purchase on the Essential Power switch. I knew it was right, tunnel. I felt like I had been whacked over the head with a two- and with Phil’s words echoing in my head I had broken the by-four. I walked out of his room and stood in the hallway for code, I had the gouge, I would pass the check ride several minutes, trying to gain control of my emotions. How The next afternoon, with a fresh Flight Engineer’s rating in could I blow my first and best shot at what I’d been working my pocket and nothing to do but fly back home and wait for toward my entire life? I wasn’t a failure and I knew it, so why United and ALPA to settle the contract, Phil and I engaged in was I failing? As George’s words faded I thought about the the most important of aviator traditions: the consumption of a vortex of discord swirling around us. I became irritated and felt few cold beers. Raising our glasses and taking that first deli- like I was being used. I felt anger because I knew damn well cious sip, we drank to something that had bonded us, something 13 May 17, 2005

we’d need for what was coming. that. Management was exceptionally skilled at angering the ——— pilots and bringing them together. It has been said that Richard The pre-hires were trained and sent home to wait. Between Ferris and his management team were the best labor organizers December 1984 and May 1985, United trained a group of men money could buy. and women who would eventually come to be know as the Anticipation was building. For several days, signs had been group of 570. As the storm clouds of the strike gathered, ALPA posted around the training center and on a marquee at the hotel: sent us information on a regular basis. United filled in their end PREHIRE MEETING WITH SENIOR MANAGERS: 2:00 with propaganda. Tension rose as the two sides entered a 30- PM. day cooling off period, and speculation was abundant. Many About a hundred or so chairs had been set up in a large room at thought that the deadline was a good thing in that it would The Rodeway Inn, our refresher training hotel, with tables move the sides toward settlement. United maintained that they forming a makeshift stage toward the front. This placed the had bargained in good faith, meanwhile recalling the 570 back managers in a position where we had to look up at them. to Denver for a “Pre-hire Refresher Course.” Uncertainty filled Posted by the door were a couple of large, buff guys in dark the group, as it appeared that United might have other plans for suits, Ray-Bans, highly polished black shoes, and Secret us. We were in Denver about a week before May 17th, with Service-like coiled wires running from their ears and disappear- ALPA keeping us fed and watered, and United stroking us with ing into their suits. The 570 filed in, taking seats in anticipation one hand and slapping us with the other. of a good show. We’d finally have the chance to get some We later found out that Richard Ferris’ union-busting plan straight answers. relied heavily upon using the 570 as strikebreakers; he needed The cast was impressive: UAL President James Hartigan, the 570 to fill the F/E seats, but equally important was the Senior Vice President of Flight Operations Lloyd Barry, Direc- psychological blow that we could deliver the pilots if we tor of Training Bill Traub, a guy named Pat Nugent, and a crossed the picket line. If 570 young pilots who Ferris termed couple of others. The show got off to a predictable start: were, “The best available at the time,” would cross the picket “United needs the B-scale to be competitive with People lines and take the pilots’ jobs, it would deal a deathblow to Express and Frontier. The world is changing and pilots have to ALPA’s unity, opening up the flood gates, ending the strike and be realistic. If ALPA gives us the B-scale, we’ll give them busting the union. The pre-hires were a weapon pointed tremendous growth. This isn’t about union busting. We are directly at the pilots, or so Ferris thought. His large ego, lack of bargaining in good faith. We are hopeful that there won’t be a judgment and refusal to surround himself with anything but strike. We’re sorry to put you in this position. The company is “yes” men blinded him from seeing that when he pulled the doing everything it can to negotiate with ALPA. ALPA’s trigger, the gun would backfire. Meanwhile, the pilots weren’t demands are unreasonable. United has to have a 25-year “B” sure what the 570 would do and eyed us with both hope and scale. United can’t make money in the current environment, suspicion. etc., etc….” Ferris thought the best way to beat the pilots would be to We listened patiently and respectfully, some of us asking bully his way to victory by employing a 1920’s-style militaris- firm questions. The atmosphere was tense but cordial, and it tic union busting campaign. He surrounded the Cherry Creek seemed to me that not everybody had truly made up his mind as Inn (the training hotel) with fencing, barbed wire, and security to what he would do in the event of a strike. None of us wanted guards. Stories from Flying the Line were coming to life. to be put into such a situation. During this period, the 570 were threatened and coerced, For months we’d been told by United that it was highly generally on an individual basis, as various puppets of manage- unlikely that there would be a strike, that we’d be hired, and ment in the Training Center had told the 570s that they’d be that we’d all be flying for United Airlines. But at this meeting, black-balled, never to fly for any U.S. airline if they didn’t the tone changed. We realized that what were supposed to be cross the picket line. United’s contingency plans had become United definitive plans. While I personally hadn’t encountered any such threats, I We realized that a strike was imminent. We were advised that had more or less determined that I wouldn’t cross the picket when we came to work, we’d be protected from any and all line, the decision being more of an intellectual, or business retaliation by the union, that we’d be transported in busses with decision, than an emotional one. If the strike occurred, I’d blackened windows, that we shouldn’t use our real names when write off United and find another job somewhere. It wasn’t checking in or out of the hotels, and that we’d have police personal. Not yet. The Hartigan dog and pony show changed escorts. The managers spoke to us as if we’d already commit- 14 May 17, 2005

ted to scabbing for them. Jim Hartigan explained what would some fury. His eyes widened a few times and with no further happen on S-1, Strike Day 1. He said “S-1” as if it carried fanfare he walked out of the room. The Secret Service relaxed. military significance, like D-Day. It became obvious that all the Hartigan looked at the 570 who were sitting motionless. “Well niceties they’d been paying us were lies. then,” he said. But before he could utter another word, the They’d been planning for this strike all along. All the assembly of 570s stood up and followed the Marine out the words about good faith negotiations were big fat lies. I remem- door. This moment foreshadowed what was about to come only ber thinking how serious everything seemed, and that I was a couple of days later, yet I believe that the conversation that offended by the term S-1. How the hell did this 24 year old Hartigan had with Ferris later that afternoon went something college kid who just wanted to be an airline pilot find himself in like this: the middle of this mess? Who the hell were these guys to “How’d it go, Jim?” assume that I would bow to their threats and intimidation? I “Great, Dick, no problems. We got ‘em.” became angry. I wanted nothing to do with it. No, it went ————— beyond that. I wanted to fight them. This was America in the A couple of days later, Doug Hill and I, sitting in a 727 simula- year 1985 and these guys were acting like something out of a tor, were finishing our refresher check rides. We had a lousy John Steinbeck novel. Outrage built, seeming to float above the simulator schedule: May 16th, 1985 @ 2230 to May 17th, 2005 group like heat waves over a desert road. Yet nobody said @ 0030. We were on United’s property at midnight, the strike anything confrontational. Not until the Marine. deadline. I turned to the guy giving us our check ride and said, Hartigan was taking questions. He was a rotund man with “Well?” He picked up the phone and called scheduling. “Okay, a spider-webbed nose. He seemed like the kind of guy who thanks,” he said, hanging up the handset. “ALPA’s on strike.” could be your grandfather if he weren’t wearing the suit. He My heart sank. smiled, and, pointing over our heads, said, “Yes, son?” I had brought a pair of running shoes with me and quickly We turned. Standing against the wall in the back of the swapped them for the dress shoes I was wearing—back then room was a large Marine- looking guy who appeared not to be everyone wore suits during check rides. Doug and I finished up feeling a tremendous amount of kinship with Jim Hartigan. I the check ride, hustled our way through the training center and sensed that the word “son” pissed him off. The Marine out the door. I’ll never forget the feeling, as if escaping to searched the floor, the ceiling, and the walls, looking for his freedom, running with flight bag in hand, out the front gate of words. He was breathing hard and bit his lip as if trying to the Training Center, down the driveway, and onto the sidewalk. control the thing bubbling up from deep within. With trembling I was on strike, and it felt so good to send a message to Ferris, hands, and veins pulsing on his forehead, he came to focus Hartigan and all their cronies to shove it. directly at Hartigan. “Ya know!” he said in a loud, strong voice, They managed to make it personal, and there was no way I a little spit flying out of his mouth, “It sounds to me like you’re could sell out the people whom I’d come to know. People like pissing on us and telling us it’s raining.” Phil, who’d been there when I needed him. People like the 570, I smiled. A pregnant pause ensued … no movement in the who showed their integrity and honor by following their brother room. The Secret Service dudes puffed up in anticipation of out of the dog and pony show. People like the incumbent whatever was coming next. Every single person in the room, United pilots who had wives and children and mortgages and the 570, the Secret Service, Bill Traub, Lloyd Barry, Pat illnesses, who had worked and lived to make the piloting Nugent, the other managers, the hotel guy delivering soft profession something better. Who the hell was I to even think drinks, and I, must have been thinking the same thing: Oh that I could take someone’s job by stepping on their backs? (censored). Everybody just watched the stare down occurring How could I live with myself if I allowed myself to be manipu- between Hartigan and the Marine. What must have been lated, used, and prostituted? I would be digging my own seconds seemed like minutes. We were witnessing a mini- professional grave. What could I possibly tell my children in strike, a model of the picket lines about to come, a defining the future? moment to which Jim Hartigan rose by saying just about the That night at the Rodeway Inn, I again sat at the bar, stupidest thing he possibly could: “Son, if you don’t like it, lamenting with several of the 570. We thought that we’d never you can just leave right now.” see each other again at United, so we toasted our brief but rich In retrospect I wish that every United pilot -- and Ferris as sense of camaraderie. As the group filtered up to their rooms, well -- had been there to see what happened next. The Marine shook his head in indignation and disgust, maybe shaking off Continued On Page 30 15 May 17, 2005

From Wooden Wings ‘Wooden Wings” was first published in 1989 on the fourth it was in their best interest to make drastic concessions to then anniversary of the 1985 United Pilots’ strike. It chronicles the Chairman Richard Ferris. Ferg and Ferris had become good events leading up to the strike and the difficult years that friends and worked closely during that time in a joint communi- followed. It also illustrates the initial steps ALPA took toward cations campaign designed to win the pilots’ approval of a employee ownership which were motivated by the events highly concessionary contract dubbed “Blue Skies.” When the described herein. pilots agreed to the new contract, Ferris loudly proclaimed in the press how he had the contract he needed for United to compete, that there was now “a new partnership between By Captain Patrick Palazzolo (SFOFO) United and its pilots,” and that there would never again be an “Fifty years after its foundation in struggle, sacrifice and adversarial relationship. Some in management privately tragedy, the airline pilots of America, although not quite back expressed astonishment at the magnitude of the concessions the to square one, are still facing the fundamental questions their pilots had willingly given (almost 15% by the company’s own forebears faced in 1931. Can they stand up and fight the good estimate). In time, however, many pilots would begin to openly fight, always keeping in mind that justice and virtue do not question the relationship that existed between Ferg and Ferris. always prevail, and that ‘God,’ as Napoleon put it, ‘is on the Roger Hall, then Chairman of the Negotiating Committee side of the big battalions’? Are modern airline pilots made of under Ferg, certainly questioned it. Says Hall, “Not many the same stuff as the men who created ALPA during the era of people knew it, but Dick was doing a lot of very nice things for the wooden wings? History is waiting for its answer.” John. On a number of occasions Ferris would pick up Ferg in The final paragraphs of Flying the Line By George E. Hopkins front of the terminal at O’Hare and they’d drive off and spend Those words were written three years before the 1985 the evening together. I went along with John to some of the United pilots’ strike. United’s pilots, against substantial odds, dinners with Ferris, and let me tell you, they were some of the fought a fierce assault against their profession by a multi-billion most lavish things that I have ever seen in my life—twelve dollar corporation in a demonstration of professional pride and course dinners served by people in black ties with white gloves. solidarity that would surely have made the men with wooden It was really something. I was very uncomfortable at those wings proud. Perhaps history now has its answer. events and stopped going along because I felt it was inappropri- But as the events of four years ago are remembered, it is ate for Ferris to have that kind of a relationship with the repre- important to recognize how the strike came about, and that the sentatives of the pilots. But John loved it! He would always be strike was just one part of a much broader effort by United recognized in front of whatever group happened to be there and Airlines management to radically and permanently reduce the Ferris would often ask him to address the group. The relation- salaries and working conditions of all pilots—an objective ship obviously impressed John and it was serving Ferris’ apparently motivated simply by the desire for the financial purposes too. There was no doubt Ferris was trying to buy windfall it could bring the corporation. Ferg.” However, when the strike had thwarted their efforts, the It soon became clear, however, that Ferris saw the “Blue- corporation set out to accomplish the goal in another way. “We Skies” agreement as only the first step in a long-term well- thought the strike was the culmination of the struggle,” says planned assault on the salaries and working conditions of J.B. Cockrell, one of the longest serving former members of the United’s pilots. Jim Engleman, who was Vice Chairman of UAL-MEC. “But what we didn’t understand at the time was Washington’s Council 11 at the time and later was elected MEC that the strike wasn’t even the mid-point of the battle. The Vice Chairman under Roger Hall, said, “Shortly after the `Blue- corporation still hadn’t given up their ultimate goal of getting Skies’ agreement, Ferris went to the rest of the employees and our wallets away from us. Only their method had changed.” said, `The pilots have given, now it’s everybody else’s turn.’ He used the pilots’ contract as justification for extracting conces- I. IN THE BEGINNING GOD CREATED JOHN FERG. sions from the rest of the corporation. However, after Ferris got In order to fully understand the strike and the significance of the concessions from those people, he came back to the pilots in the four years since, we must return to August, 1982. UAL- early 1984 and said in his famous ‘24%’ roadshows, ‘Every- MEC Chairman John Ferg had persuaded the United pilots that body has given but the pilots. Now it’s your turn.’” 16 May 17, 2005

Ferris was clearly using each employee group to ratchet Engleman, “our A-plan was overfunded by 86%! This was very down the other. It was at this point, according to Cockrell, that effective in driving up our block-hour costs.” the MEC finally realized they and the pilots had been set up by In spite of record profits, management used the inflated Ferris. Where John Ferg had managed to get Ferris everything figures and a considerable amount of other misinformation to he wanted, the newly elected MEC Chairman, Capt. Roger wage a public relations war against the pilot group. Ferris had Hall, was of a different mind. From the beginning of his term in retained the public relations firm of Hill and Knowlton to assist late 1983, he repeatedly told him with his internal public Ferris the pilots would give him relations campaign. But while no more concessions. Hall was Roger Hall commented further, “The ALPA was successful in adamant. And Ferris was having a company expected that 30-40% of the maintaining an informed and difficult time accepting the fact pilots would cross the line within the first educated pilot group that was that Hall would dare say no to not swayed by management’s him. Ferris complained directly to few days of the strike. They didn’t think it arguments, Ferris was still able the pilots that he had developed a would take any time at all before the pilot to convince many of the rest of good relationship with John Ferg, group would, in Ferris’ words, `stampede the employees that the pilot but that Roger Hall was being across the line,’ go to work and effectively group was unwilling to give obstinate and not acting in the like their groups already had. pilots’ best interests. destroy ALPA on the property. Initially, I “There’s no doubt that “Interestingly, though”, said think Ferris’ goal was just to slash pilot Ferris conducted a campaign Cockrell, “at the 24% roadshows costs, but it became clear that he eventu- of character assassination and the pilots were still in the mood misinformation against the to give Ferris the 24% he was ally concluded that he could crush the pilot group,” said Engleman. asking for. We were getting lots entire union structure at United, with “He did it in the company of calls from pilots suggesting ALPA being the first to go. The thing he newspaper, in the Employee ways to give him the money. The hadn’t counted on was that ALPA had Newsline and in every other MEC was exasperated since we medium he could use.” A knew concessions were not learned from its mistakes in the Continen- United sales manager who required at all. We were con- tal strike.” commented for this article vinced Ferris was asking for them agreed. She said, “There were only because it was so easy for good managers at all levels of him the first time. He probably thought he could get even more the company who were surprised and dismayed at the style and the second time around. The MEC now found itself having to tone of the company’s communications about the pilots—in the stand between Ferris and the pilots.” Newsline, the newspaper and in the video tapes.” The reason for the pilots’ willingness to still give to Ferris was perplexing to many on the MEC. “I think that in 1983 the II. FERRIS THREW A STAMPEDE AND NOBODY pilots still saw themselves as `management.’ Ferris was very CAME charismatic and I think he represented what a lot of pilots By the fall of 1984 Ferris began plans for a pilots’ strike. He wanted to be,” Cockrell said. appointed Jim Guyette, then Vice President Central Division But that mood ended quickly. What was clear to the MEC and now Exec. V.P. of Operations, to prepare plans designed to soon became apparent to the pilot group. Ferris’ credibility keep United operating during a strike. This would be the first eroded rapidly through 1984 and 1985. Ferris repeatedly time United had ever planned to operate during a strike. If hammered on the need for the company to realize a net profit management was successful, ALPA would be broken. Union margin of 5%, yet through various financial manipulations, bashing was in vogue during this time. Former President Ferris made sure it was never achieved. Reagan had previously set the tone by firing several thousand For example, from 1983 through 1985 Ferris intentionally striking air traffic controllers. over-contributed to the pilots’ pension plans which resulted in Many felt that Ferris had become emboldened by Frank United’s pilot block-hour costs being much higher than they Lorenzo’s success in overpowering ALPA and slashing the should have been. “At one point in time,” according to pilots’ pay in half at Continental, and also, perhaps, envious of 17 May 17, 2005

the image Lorenzo had acquired with the rest of the business sions designed to punish the pilots, the striking management community at that time. By winter Jim Guyette, with the pilots and, of course, the people for whom he felt the most assistance of then Sr. V.P. of Flight Operations Lloyd Barry and wrath— the 570. others, had drafted a plan to replace United’s pilots and rebuild Said Hall, “Ferris was playing games with us. He finally the airline by using “fleet-qualified” replacement pilots and realized he couldn’t get us to cross without a contract, so he using what they expected to be a moderate-sized core of settled the contract and then tried to get the pilots to cross by strikebreaking pilots. But the big weapon they counted on was a refusing to agree to a back-to-work agreement. The pilots still scheme they devised that would, hopefully, stampede the pilots wouldn’t cross. We ultimately resolved the back-to-work issues, across the picket line. They planned to re-bid the seniority list but then Ferris wouldn’t sign a back-to-work agreement with in the order of those who crossed. the flight attendants unless they agreed to gut their contract as Also, unbeknown to anyone outside of management at the part of the deal. The AFA [Association of Flight Attendants] time, they now planned on using the 570 as strikebreakers. The refused. Knowing that we had promised the AFA we wouldn’t 570 were a group of pilots who had been previously trained and go back to work without them, he hoped he could get the pilots told United would hire them when a new agreement was to finally break ranks. But the pilots still wouldn’t cross. Ferris reached with ALPA. Although they were repeatedly assured continued to hold out, but AFA’s UAL-MEC Chairperson Pat over a period of months that they would not have to cross a Friend recognized that their contract picket line, in April 1985 they were suddenly ordered to report was still in force and she did not need a back-to-work agree- for work on May 17. ment for her people to return to the property. She asked us to go Dick Grant, one of the few striking management pilots, back to work so that the flight attendants would have jobs to and now ALPA’s Council Chairman in Denver, sat in on a report to. briefing by Guyette shortly before the strike. He said the By the time the strike was over, Ferris was really smarting. company established three contingency plans for operating: He could not break the pilots any way he tried.” The AFA’s last “One assumed more than half the pilots would cross the picket minute maneuver apparently blind-sided the company. “When I line. Another, 40%. And the minimum plan expected 25% of the went in and informed Dave Pringle and the company negotia- pilots to cross,” said Grant. All three plans assumed the 570 tors of our intentions,” said the AFA lawyer, “there was dead would cross. silence.” Examining how Ferris miscalculated is complex. Rick Roger Hall commented further, “The company expected Dubinsky, who served as Chairman of the MEC Strike Commit- that 30-40% of the pilots would cross the line within the first tee under Hall, says, “Ferris thought he could win because he few days of the strike. They didn’t think it would take any time had the recent experience over at Continental to look back at all before the pilot group would, in Ferris’ words, `stampede upon. He saw ALPA as disorganized, he saw the leadership as across the line,’ go to work and effectively destroy ALPA on the unprepared for a strike, and he had not seen ALPA take any property. Initially, I think Ferris’ goal was just to slash pilot affirmative steps subsequent to that situation to get itself costs, but it became clear that he eventually concluded that he prepared for any new strike. He had a billion dollars in the bank could crush the entire union structure at United, with ALPA and knew we had no money. He also had a belief that the pilots being the first to go. The thing he hadn’t counted on was that would never go against him. Somehow it was the leadership—it ALPA had learned from its mistakes in the Continental strike.” was Roger Hall or Rick Dubinsky or the MEC—but the pilots By the end of the strike, only 6% of the line pilots had would never turn on him. And, of course, he had John Ferg and crossed the picket line and almost all of the 570 had struck. others telling him that the pilots didn’t have guts, and that they United management had spectacularly underestimated the would never get themselves organized.” resolve of the pilot group and their loathing for the B-scale. As It was obvious to many that Ferris’ miscalculation of the a result, Ferris was forced to settle on the economic issues after pilots’ resolve resulted from bad information from his advisors. only one week of the strike. His dream of a low-paid pilot force Ferris has been described as “tough-minded,” and “strong- with a 20-year B-scale and a B-scale pension was reduced to a willed,” but some felt that his unwillingness to tolerate diver- five-year B-scale. But apparently out of revenge—a trait that gent opinion was a more accurate description. “He surrounded would later come to characterize him and many of his senior himself with a number of `yes-men,’” observed a retired managers—and his determination to break ALPA, he dragged management pilot. Added Hall, “Ferris systematically weeded the strike on for another three weeks refusing to agree on any out people who told him things he didn’t want to hear. There back-to-work agreement that did not include vindictive provi- were a few people who told him he couldn’t win and he 18 May 17, 2005

shouldn’t even try. He eventually got rid of them. Two were Jim Hannah, the Chief Pilot in San Francisco, and Pat Nugent, the Vice President of Flying and Training in Denver. The only people Ferris tolerated in management were those who were willing to tell him what they thought he wanted to hear.” Jim Engleman pointed out another source of bad input Ferris received. After the “Blue-Skies” agreement, John Ferg predictably made his way into management and, as a friend of Ferris, had his ear. “We know he was getting it from John Ferg, and if you understand Ferg’s history and his attitude toward the pilots, you will understand that he thought the pilots were just a bunch of jellyfish, that they didn’t have any spine and that they would roll over. He even said that about the MEC and The UAL-MEC Strike Preparedness Committee convenes for told us so on a number of occasions when he was MEC Chairman. I think he really believed it and I one of its many meetings in the weeks leading up to the Strike of believe he had Ferris convinced.” Roger Hall 1985. agreed. He said, “I put a large part of the blame for the 1985 strike right at the feet of John Ferg.” back to these events in his career. The pilots who he felt had Dubinsky saw Ferg’s turn against the pilots evolve over a betrayed him were enough reason, in his mind, to side with long period of time. “You have to go back into Ferg’s history,” Ferris.” said Dubinsky. “Ferg was the Master Chairman in the early Ferris also misjudged the 570. “He thought the 570 1960’s. However, he was recalled by the MEC which embit- were going to cross the line and scare the hell out of the tered him. Then sometime in the early 1970’s he testified pilots,” said Hall, “but they misjudged the integrity and against a captain who had a landing accident in Denver. It was sophistication of the 570 and Jamie Lindsay’s activities.” one of the first times a non-management pilot had testified Jamie Lindsay, a Denver-based pilot, headed an ad-hoc against a fellow pilot. The MEC censured Ferg without a ALPA committee of United pilots who set out to educate and hearing and Ferg filed a lawsuit against the Association. ALPA organize the 570 from make-shift offices in some hotel ultimately settled and paid his legal fees. I don’t think Ferg ever rooms near United’s Denver training center. By April 1985 liked ALPA after that. When he got elected Master Chairman they had established regular and frequent contact with the second time around he became great friends with Ferris. He virtually all the 570. The new pilots became determined not saw Ferris as a visionary. to aid the company in destroying their own careers, and the John’s view of what the future would hold for us was quite careers of every United pilot who would follow them, by accurate relative to deregulation. He saw the danger of a helping Ferris establish his 20-year B-scale. ratcheting down of wages and working conditions. I firmly United didn’t help its own cause either. As the strike believe that when he started down the road with Ferris, he drew closer, the 570 were increasingly subjected to arro- probably thought he was doing the right thing for the pilots. But gance, threats and intimidation by management personnel at by 1983, when the pilots chose to separate from him, to resist DENTK. In court testimony after the strike, one 570 testified the ratcheting, to stiffen their back and to take on Ferris, John’s that her class was told by Rick Brown, then one of the loyalty toward Ferris won out. management pilots in charge of the new-hire section, that if His animosity toward ALPA overcame him . When he they didn’t cross the picket line and somehow were still able could not get re-elected by changing the MEC policy and run to get their jobs back, he “would personally see to it that we for a third term, I think he chose sides and decided to show would never make it through our probationary year.” these people who he felt had, once again, screwed him over— After the strike more than 100 of the 570 chose not to namely ALPA. He had this burning hate for ALPA that went return to United. Michael Didero, a 570 and now a senior 19 May 17, 2005

MD-80 first officer at USAir said, “They treated us pretty badly diately after the strike, Ferris and Barry directed that the before the strike. Washington and Miami domiciles would be closed. Ferris had Coming back and flying at United just wasn’t worth the made it clear that if the pilots went on strike, he would close the abuse.” two small bases and force the pilots to commute to work in In order to protect them from retribution by the company Chicago. ALPA filed an expedited grievance and the neutral, during the period leading up to the strike, Lindsay’s committee Richard Bloch, ruled that the company could not retaliate. But instructed the group to tell the company “whatever they want to Ferris did anyway—sort of—he fired Bloch. Bloch and a hear.” Consequently the company had no accurate knowledge number of other arbitrators had recently ruled against the of their intentions until the strike company in some rather important commenced. On the morning of decisions. By invoking a little-used May 17, to management’s utter provision of the contract, the astonishment, only four of the 570 It was obvious to many that Ferris’ mis- company summarily fired them the pilots—including John Ferg’s son— calculation of the pilots’ resolve resulted Sunday before Christmas. crossed the line. When Ferris from bad information from his advisors. “That move certainly didn’t encountered Lindsay in the Denver Ferris has been described as “tough- help the company’s cause in the terminal a few days later, his anger long run,” said Noble, referring to was uncontained, according to minded,” and “strong-willed,” but some what some called the “Sunday witnesses. “Ferris told him he was felt that his unwillingness to tolerate Night Massacre.” “The arbitrators `lower than whale shit, and to crawl divergent opinion was a more accurate are a distinguished, well-respected back into the dumpster where he description. “He surrounded himself lot who are not easily intimidated. came from,’” said one. He added, We’re talking about people like “Lindsay replied rather propheti- with a number of `yes-men,’” observed a Archibald Cox and others, and I cally, `Let’s see who’s still here a retired management pilot. Added Hall, suspect that the company’s arro- year from now, Dick.’” “Ferris systematically weeded out people gance did not go over well within From that day on, Lindsay’s their group.” operation became known as “The who told him things he didn’t want to Cockrell saw the firings and Dumpster-Works.” hear. There were a few people who told intentional backlogging of the him he couldn’t win and he shouldn’t grievance machinery as part of a III. “IF YOU DON’T LIKE IT, even try. He eventually got rid of them.” larger picture. “What they were THEN GRIEVE IT” trying to do,” he said, “was to try When the strike failed to break and make our union weak and ALPA, the company began a powerless like Lorenzo had done different tact to accomplish their goal. Many pilots saw the with some success on his properties. Clearly this appeared to be company embarking on an effort to weaken the union in order the company’s objective for us after 1985. There’s no doubt in to reduce its effectiveness. The company began routinely my mind about that.” violating the contract and “established past practice” whenever Rick Dubinsky agrees, but said, “I would even take it a they could. Knowing that it took a year or two for an arbitrator step further. I think all along Ferris intended to not only crush to hear a grievance, the company’s attitude seemed to become, ALPA, but to get it off the property. It was clear that he in- “If you don’t like it, then grieve it.” Management routinely tended to replace ALPA with the `United Pilots Association,’ denied grievances without apparent regard for merit. According which was being organized by John Ferg, Denver Capt. Bill to Capt. Jim Noble, MEC Grievance Chairman, the backlog of Palmer (both of whom subsequently appeared on CBS’ West grievances awaiting hearings from arbitrators had increased 57th Street) and others. His goal, I think, was decertification of from about 50 to 250. Even though the number of neutral ALPA and the emergence of this company-controlled union. System Boards were increased from about 4 per year to 24, the One way you might accomplish this is by showing the member- company seemed to feel they had carte blanche in violating the ship that their union is ineffective and that it can’t protect either pilots’ contract since it would take years for an arbitrator to them or their contract. When this continues to occur, the order the company to cease and desist. membership may eventually start to ask themselves why they The company’s brazenness didn’t stop there either. Imme- even need a union or, perhaps, whether they need a different

20 May 17, 2005

union.” were systematically being given type ratings and permitted to Consequently, the message the company was communicat- fly as Captain even though they did not have Captain seniority. ing to the pilots after the strike was: “From now on anything The pilots and their leadership could only conclude that the you get is because we choose to give it to you, not because company was preparing a scab force for the next round of ALPA was able to get it for you.” conflict. After 1985 the company operated around ALPA wherever possible. Interaction with ALPA was avoided unless it could be IV. VINDICTIVENESS 101 used as a way to discredit the union or perhaps enhance the If one word characterized this period, it was vindictiveness. image of management. What became known as the “Frontier Ferris and his supporters were clearly humiliated by the defeat Fiasco” clearly showed the extent to which the company would of 1985. The humiliation and anger were magnified by the fact go to try and discredit ALPA. that Ferris had predicted with such certainty to the rest of the In the summer of 1986 United announced it wanted to company and the industry that ALPA would be crushed. purchase Frontier Airlines. United said it required ALPA to Dick had a vindictive streak in him unlike anything I’ve waive the scope protections in the pilots’ contract as a condition ever seen,” said Hall. “I think he was smarting something fierce of the purchase. that we had cost him all that money, that he had taken us on and This would permit United to bring the Frontier pilots over had not been successful in accomplishing what he’d wanted. He at wages well below “A” scale industry standard and in effect, also felt he had been misled by his own people which I’m sure accomplish what they couldn’t achieve in the strike—and just infuriated him to no end. There is no doubt his objective something the company knew the pilots would never agree to. was to try to wreak as much revenge on the pilot group as he In essence, United had cleverly engineered an abortive attempt could for what they’d done to him. I think that’s why he took to purchase Frontier Airlines and leave the appearance that such a vindictive stand on the 570.” ALPA was the cause of the failure. It was an effort many The vindictiveness took the form not only of punitive believed was designed instead only to strip Frontier of certain action, but of a double standard toward striking and non- valuable assets desired by United. striking pilots. No less than ten “570” pilots were terminated— Consequently, when United pulled out of the purchase, almost all of them under highly questionable circumstances. they conveniently blamed it on ALPA and moved instead only The pilot group became subject to standards of discipline that to acquire the Denver hangars, certain slots and aircraft. In the apparently were not applicable to end, after a court battle, United ended non-striking pilots. An onerous and up without even the assets. They had demeaning code-of-conduct was forfeited Frontier’s market share, Dick had a vindictive streak in him unilaterally imposed on the pilot aircraft and employees to Frank unlike anything I’ve ever seen,” said group that was so vague that a pilot Lorenzo, and now face serious litiga- Hall. “I think he was smarting some- could be charged with an offense for tion with Frontier’s pilots. thing fierce that we had cost him all doing just about anything manage- One major shareholder in Crain’s ment didn’t like. In one of the more Chicago Business would later call it that money, that he had taken us on and obvious attempts to weaken ALPA’s “the worst mistake Ferris made.” He had not been successful in accomplish- effectiveness, David Pringle, then made many others as well! In the ing what he’d wanted. He also felt he United’s Sr. V.P. of Human Re- months following the strike it became sources, declared that ALPA would clear to the pilots that management was had been misled by his own people no longer be permitted to represent girding for another strike. Striking which I’m sure just infuriated him to no pilots during investigative hearings, pilots were excluded from all manage- end. There is no doubt his objective even though discipline was likely to ment positions, the training center was was to try to wreak as much revenge on result. filled exclusively with scabs, fleet- Lloyd Barry was, like John qual’s and many who had adequately the pilot group as he could for what Ferg, a close ally of Ferris and demonstrated little qualification other they’d done to him. I think that’s why seemed to share Ferris’ vindictive- than loyalty to Ferris and his hench- he took such a vindictive stand on the ness toward the pilots. Barry was men. The overall quality of training 570. not viewed as a particularly able took a noticeable downturn. Scabs manager—even before the strike.

21 May 17, 2005

His management style seemed awkward and mediocre. Prior to occasions as one who was not very bright. Joe just did whatever the strike, Barry had joined Ferris in many of the threatening he was told to do. He never asked any questions. Ferris, Jim communications directed at the pilots. After the strike, the Guyette, Barry and people of that ilk and mentality loved it, and antipathy between Barry and the pilots seemed mutual. In fact, that’s exactly why they put him where they did.” But the the pilots’ contempt for Barry seemed to feed on his disdain for biggest change was the addition of Flight Operations Managers them. who the pilots came to call “Hall Monitors.” These non-pilots Perhaps what most clearly characterized the ill-will were selected from the supervisory ranks of other departments between Barry and the pilots were the “yellow-ribbons.” After and began to manage the pilots in a style that was viewed by the the strike the company had refused to rehire many of the pilots as demeaning. Some had a penchant for patrolling the striking flight attendants whose union had supported ALPA’s halls ordering pilots to remove ALPA stickers from their flight strike. The pilots were angered by this and appalled by a bags, or give other petty directives. “The hall monitors just fell number of other vindictive actions taken toward the flight in with a lot of other things they started doing after the strike,” attendants. Some pilots began wearing small yellow ribbons observed Hall, “like sick leave counseling and the fact that just under their ALPA pins as a demonstration of their gratitude and anybody could give orders to pilots. It was an effort to demean support. Barry responded by ordering all pilots to remove the and downgrade the position of pilot as much as they could. ribbons. Soon most pilots were sporting the yellow ribbons. They were obviously structuring their management in such a Said one insightful pilot at the time, “If Barry wanted the way so as to be in a position to take us on again in another ribbons off, he should have ordered the pilots to wear them.” strike.” Barry seemed threatened and frustrated by his lack of Pathetic relations between United and its pilots continued control over the pilots. He apparently didn’t realize that it was through 1986. But the issue which best exemplified the con- not control he had lost—but credibility. So Barry sent a letter to tempt between the two parties was the company’s treatment of all management employees instructing them that they were now the 570. Ferris’ anger at the 570 was no secret. During the strike authorized to give orders to any United pilot and the pilots were he repeatedly promised that these pilots would “never ever obligated to comply with their directives. However, most work again at United.” supervisory personnel had enough common sense to ignore After the economic issues of the strike were resolved, Barry’s letter. One Los Angeles-based captain took great Ferris refused to negotiate a back-to-work agreement that pleasure in demonstrating the illogic of Barry’s new policy. He included the 570. He also insisted that his re-bid seniority list requested that a ramp supervisor present him with his 25-year be allowed to stand. ALPA insisted that both demands—aside wings. from their vindictiveness—were illegal. Finally, the federal mediator proposed that the legalities be decided by the courts, V. “ONE-FINGER JOE” and the parties agreed. In late 1985 and early 1986 Flight Operations was reorganized. In October 1985, U.S. District Court Judge Nicholas Bua The changes appeared to reflect Barry’s fear that he couldn’t ruled that the re-bid was illegal and that United must return the control the pilots, his dislike for ALPA, and his insistence on 570 to the property. He disagreed with United’s argument that blind loyalty. In the appointment of new chief pilots and since the 570 had never crossed the line, they were never domicile flight managers, all selected were scabs. And some, employees and, therefore, were not protected by the Railway like Denver’s Paul Burnham, made no secret of their feelings Labor Act (RLA). The RLA gives employees a right to strike about ALPA. Pat Nugent, Vice President of Flying and Train- and protects them from retribution for doing so. Bua reasoned ing, was sent packing. He had made the mistake of privately that requiring the 570 to cross the line, report to work and then questioning the direction management was going prior to the cross back over was an “empty gesture.” The 570 were re- strike. He was replaced by two people who apparently were less turned, but Ferris, as one would expect, was determined to win apt to ask questions. Bill Traub was named Vice President of and appealed the decision. In the fall of 1986 the U.S. Court of Training and Joe Hertrich became Vice President of Flying. Appeals overturned part of the Bua decision stating that the 570 Joe had become well-known to the pilots for greeting were not employees because they had not physically crossed strikers with his middle finger. So his selection seemed incred- the line and reported for work. This meant simply that these ible to many, but not to Roger Hall, who felt Hertrich, more pilots were not protected by the RLA and United could—if it than most others, epitomized United management’s ideal “yes- chose to -take punitive action against this group of pilots. The man.” Said Hall, “I’ve characterized Joe on a number of ruling angered the pilot group. United management said they 22 May 17, 2005

would reduce their seniority below the replacement pilots with management complaining that it’s the employees who are and those hired immediately after the strike. This only infuri- wrecking the company. That was the plan—and it was happen- ated the pilots more. ing.” In December, 1986 MEC Chairman Roger Hall was To add insult to injury, then United President Jim Hartigan elected First Vice President of the Air Line Pilots Association began telling the pilots that “unprofitable” United Airlines and the UAL-MEC elected Capt. Rick Dubinsky as its new would now have to compete with the profitable subsidiaries for Chairman. The election wasn’t viewed with enthusiasm at UAL Inc.’s capital. The pilots were hearing the same tired EXO. Management seemed afraid of Dubinsky. Some there had message: “Unless you give us more concessions, United will nick-named him “The Bomb Thrower,” and “Mad Dog not grow.” Just like Eastern, the pilots saw United being set up Dubinsky.” While Hall’s gentle but firm diplomacy certainly for failure. Dubinsky and his two other MEC officers, Vice contrasted with Dubinsky’s confidence and assertiveness, Hall’s Chairman Jamie Lindsay and Secretary/Treasurer Felix performance against Ferris, nonetheless, had given him a Isherwood, worked throughout the winter and early spring of reputation as one who carried a loaded gun—and used it. After 1987 with a diverse group of advisors on preparations for an returning with Hall from an evening of celebrating his election, employee buy out of United Airlines. They were convinced it Dubinsky started to call it a night, but Hall interrupted, “Oh, was the employees’ only hope for saving their airline—and there’s one thing I forgot to tell you, Rick,” he said as he pulled their careers. a thick stack of papers out of his briefcase. “Here’s how the During this period the atmosphere became more oppres- employees are going to buy the company.” Dubinsky was sive for the pilot group. The corporation’s management struc- speechless. ture seemed to have taken on a personality that internalized Ferris’ anti-union sentiments. VI. THE DISMANTLING OF UNITED AIRLINES Jim Guyette, the architect of Ferris’ strike effort, was It was apparent to almost everyone that Ferris couldn’t wait to promoted to Executive Vice President of Operations. Kurt take on the pilots again. More significantly, though, Ferris had Stocker was appointed Vice President of Corporate Communi- steered the corporation on a course that was bleeding the airline cations. He had been a Vice President at Hill and Knowlton, the of money and upstreaming it to the holding company through firm used by Ferris before and during the strike in his public its other subsidiaries. Rapidly losing market share to aggressive relations campaign against the pilots. competitors, United was becoming a dying airline as its assets David Pringle, United’s chief negotiator during the 1985 and cash were being siphoned off by UAL Inc. to purchase strike, traveled to California and appeared before a professional hotels and rent-a-cars. group telling them that one lesson United learned from the Said Hall, “I saw a scenario very similar to what Lorenzo strike was that “We obviously weren’t prepared. We should later did at Eastern.” Just like Eastern, UAL had spun-off have started replacing the pilots a lot quicker.” United’s Apollo reservation system into a subsidiary called Frank Jarc was appointed United’s new Chief Financial Covia. Instead of keeping the Apollo profits, United was now Officer replacing John Cowan who was promoted to the same required to pay Covia for every reservation it made —just like position at UAL Inc. According to a copy of a memo circulated the other airlines that used its services. UAL Inc. also formed within United, Jarc had helped Lorenzo develop his bankruptcy UAL Leasing to which it sold a number of United aircraft. plan that “broke the unions at Continental”. And John Cowan, United then had to lease back its own airplanes. The pattern was in a speech before financial analysts in Boston during January becoming very disturbing. Many feared it wouldn’t be long 1987, probably best typified the mentality United’s pilots saw before the airline was being charged for its own maintenance, in their management when he said, “The best part about our food service and every other function that it currently per- new flight attendant agreement is that we can hire foreign formed for itself. nationals (in the Pacific) and get people to work for rice- Said Dubinsky, “The airline was being put at a competitive bowls.” The utter contradiction in Cowan’s statement to the disadvantage because the profits that were normally being made analysts that United intended to be the nation’s premier airline by the airline were being upstreamed to UAL Inc. through the and at the same time treat employees with such disrespect was subsidiaries. As a result, UAL Inc. shows a profit, the other not lost on those in attendance. subsidiaries show a profit, but lo and behold, the poor airline is Finally, in a meeting with more than 200 pilots in San destitute. It can’t borrow money, it can’t buy airplanes and it Francisco the same month, Hartigan made his feelings about the can’t afford to pay its employees decent wages. You end up pilots very clear. In response to a question about why the 23 May 17, 2005

United pilots couldn’t get captain’s jumpseat authority, Hartigan the company had what they called “Operation Flight Plan” in shot back, “No.There will be no perks for pilots.” place—a plan they claimed would terminate and replace all the At similar meetings in the other domiciles in January, 570 by May 1. Dubinsky privately reassured the MEC by Hartigan and Barry met with the pilots to “exchange ideas.” saying, “Things will become much clearer tomorrow.” Most, however, felt the real purpose was to test the waters about Early the next morning the MEC was rousted out of bed their intention to reduce the seniority of the 570. The pilots left and secretly bussed to a hotel several miles away. By the end of no doubt in their minds about how they felt. As one pilot said to the next day the MEC had been briefed by the officers, ALPA Hartigan, “It used to be legal to refuse to hire blacks and President Hank Duffy, Vice President Roger Hall, F. Lee Bailey women as pilots. It used to be legal to fire flight attendants for and almost two dozen other lawyers. The plan to buy the getting married. But just because it was legal didn’t mean it was company was ready—but it required MEC approval. By right. And just because it’s now legal for you to punish the 570 agreeing to wage investments and certain concessions, the doesn’t make that right, either.” employees could afford to purchase United from Allegis—but When it became obvious that Hartigan and Barry had their the pilots would have to raise millions of dollars in seed money minds set, the exchanges became loud, pointed and taunting. “I from among themselves to get the ball rolling. It was not an knew the pilots were angry,” said one ALPA council officer, easy decision. One MEC member confided to another that it “but I never thought I’d see both Hartigan and Barry roughed- was the hardest decision he would have to make—thoughts of up like they were tonight.” After the two returned to Chicago, the effect of this on his friends and their families kept occupy- Dubinsky asked Barry if the meetings had changed his mind. ing his mind. He replied, “Of course not.” That same month, Joe Hertrich There was strong debate on both sides, but the MEC voted resigned. He had distinguished himself in office by getting unanimously to go for it. They felt the risks of inaction were caught in the O’Hare pilots’ bag room peeling ALPA-PAC greater than the risks in going ahead. The corporation initially stickers from pilots’ flight bags. In a brilliant move Barry dismissed news of the effort as a publicity stunt by the dis- appointed John Ferg to replace Hertrich as Director of Domicile gruntled pilots. But by the next day it was clear that Wall Street Management. had taken it seriously. UAL stock was soaring, and Ferris would have a difficult time stopping it. The next month Coniston VII. ALLEGIS... (GESUNDHEIT!) Partners acquired a large block of stock and announced they In February, 1987 Ferris announced that UAL Inc. would now would attempt a consent solicitation to remove the board of be called Allegis Corp., and would become a worldwide travel directors and sell off the various companies. services company with United Airlines as only one part. UAL The board and Ferris frantically searched for a way out. said it paid $7.3 million for the name that would soon become Every attempt to establish a poison pill defense infuriated the the butt of Wall Street jokes. Real estate tycoon Donald Trump shareholders. Then Ferris and the board decided to recapitalize said it sounded like a “world-class disease.” Wall Street was the corporation and pay the shareholders $3 billion. But to do it skeptical of Ferris’ plan. The pilots saw it as the death knell for they would not sell off non-airline assets. Instead they would the once greatest airline in the country. borrow it. The plan would result in a negative net worth for During the next few months Dubinsky began assuring the Allegis and would place the company under a staggering debt pilots —and putting the company on notice—that if they load. Curiously, the board’s argument against selling United to reduced the seniority of the 570, he would take whatever legal the employees was that it would have placed the company course he could to eventually restore their rightful seniority. under too great a debt. The brazenly self- serving nature of their Ferg advised Ferris, Hartigan and Barry that unless they wanted plan to place an even greater debt on the airline simply to years of labor strife over this issue the only recourse was to fire preserve their own positions on the board was not lost on the them all. The company took the position that they would indeed public, the shareholders, the press or the employees. fire the 570—unless the MEC agreed to their seniority being In early June, Dubinsky called the MEC into session again reduced and promised never to raise the subject in negotiations in Chicago. The financial advisors presented a revised plan that again. The company had a loaded gun pointed to the heads of would top Ferris’ and, hopefully, thwart the recapitalization. the MEC. The MEC approved it and after its announcement on Thursday, Dubinsky called a special MEC meeting for Friday, April June 4, UAL stock reacted favorably. Ferris was in trouble. 3, 1987 in Chicago. By that evening the MEC had no choice but The next evening Ferris called Dubinsky at his home. to agree to the company’s demand. Dubinsky told the MEC that Ferris needed to talk to him right away. Dubinsky agreed to 24 May 17, 2005

meet him at a remote airport near Dubinsky’s home in northern Plan (ESOP), but he also knew that he had to have labor peace, Ohio later that night. ESOP or not. Unfortunately, Flight Operations wasn’t touched. Shortly after 9 p.m. Ferris climbed out of his Lear jet, Lloyd Barry said the next day in a recorded telephone message greeted Dubinsky and they walked over to the pilots’ lounge. to all pilots, “You may know of my personal admiration and Ferris told Dubinsky that because of the pilots’ latest offer, the respect for Dick...we have lost a very talented visionary as our banks were squeezing him and he was having difficulty getting leader.” financing for his recapitalization. Dubinsky commented later about the conversation, “He VIII. THE BRIGHT SHINING LIGHT won the Oscar, the Emmy, the Tony and every other acting Almost immediately upon Tallent’s arrival, significant changes award. Ferris said he was our friend and he couldn’t understand started occurring in the company’s behavior toward its pilots. why our relationship had deteriorated. He blamed a great deal Tallent realized that quite a number of the management prac- of that on Roger Hall. He also said he didn’t understand the tices he observed ran contrary to accepted tenets of manage- strike, he didn’t understand the ment-labor relations. Said Dubinsky, “All you have to do is emotions during or after the strike, and if we’d just give him a read some of the text books on the subject to know that what we chance and trust him, he would make everything right.” witnessed here at United was a very individualized reaction to Ferris insisted that an employee- owned airline could be the strike. It was not a common method of dealing with labor, worked out under terms that would be satisfactory to both the especially a highly professional labor group like airline pilots. pilots and himself. They agreed to meet at that airport the next Tallent recognized that immediately and started to correct as day, Saturday, and fly to New York. much of it as quickly as he could.” For the next two days Ferris, Dubinsky, Isherwood and During Tallent’s short tenure at United, all but two of the their financial advisors negotiated inside Morgan Stanley’s New terminated 570 pilots were reinstated. Pilots were again allowed York offices. However, by Sunday afternoon it became clear to to exercise their right to ALPA representation in initial hearings, Dubinsky and his advisors that, notwithstanding his promises, and the oppressive sick-leave counselling was discontinued. Ferris would not agree to anything that required him to give up Most significantly, a tremendous backlog of pilot grievances control of the airline. That evening Dubinsky and Isherwood were favorably resolved across the table between Tallent and returned to Chicago. Ferris’ frantic search for an agreement Dubinsky that would have otherwise taken years to resolve apparently indicated that he knew what was about to happen. through the already overloaded neutral System Board. On Tuesday evening, June 9 the Allegis board asked Ferris to These changes weren’t easy for Tallent. At times he found resign. himself up against the wall from internal company politics. As a The Allegis board recognized, that in order to avoid a take- result, virtually all of the changes that Tallent brought about over and the loss of their positions on the board, they had to pay were done without Barry’s cooperation or, in many cases, over a large amount of money to the shareholders by recapitalizing. his objections. At one point Tallent told the MEC officers, “If They also realized that the only way they could get the money you think ALPA politics are bad, you should see the politics was by selling assets. Their decision was to sell all the non- inside EXO.” Dubinsky and the other officers had a high regard airline assets, give the money to the shareholders and return to for Tallent even though, in the end, he worked against ALPA by their core business as only an airline. Allegis was dead, and the helping the International Association of Machinists (IAM) corporation would soon be renamed, of all things, UAL Corp. develop the Protective Covenants for their new contract. The board appointed Frank Olson as interim Chairman. Dubinsky commented, “Was Tallent sent here to try and kill the Olson was the CEO of Hertz, an Allegis subsidiary, and also an ESOP? I think you’d have to say yes, given his track record Allegis director. Olson made some initial moves to stop the with the IAM. But from a labor relations standpoint, he was growing labor unrest that was clearly responsible for the current clearly a bright shining light. He was honest and he accom- corporate upheaval. President Jim Hartigan was named to the plished a lot of things, even over the strong objections of largely ceremonial position of United Airlines Chairman. Olson Barry—and perhaps even Jim Guyette, although we have no removed Sr. V. P. of Human Resources Dave Pringle from all direct evidence of that.” duties involving collective bargaining and he retained the The IAM leadership was strongly opposed to the ESOP. services of Steven Tallent, a noted labor lawyer, to start mend- Some in ALPA suspected their concern centered around how ing fences with the unions and employees. Olson clearly such a concept would affect their authority. The IAM leadership wanted to diffuse the need for an Employee Stock Ownership also claimed the ESOP was nothing more than an attempt by the

25 May 17, 2005

pilots to keep their salaries up at the expense of everybody else. IX. A WOLF AT THE DOOR In the fall of 1987 the IAM and the company approached Finally the board announced in late November 1987 that the end of a federally mandated 30-day cooling off period. Stephen Wolf, the Chairman and CEO of Tiger International, United pilots set up strike support offices around the system in would become Allegis Corp.’s new Chairman. Wolf had ac- preparation for a possible IAM strike. Unknown to the pilots at quired a reputation for slashing the salaries and pay of his the time, one of the unresolved issues was the mutual desire by employees at near-bankrupt carriers. In fact at Tigers, Wolf the IAM and the company for a contractual “poison pill” to threatened to liquidate the carrier unless the pilots agreed to stave off employee ownership. slash their pay. United was not financially troubled, but many The IAM was playing its cards right and wanted big bucks expected he would try and wring concessions from the employ- from the company in return for the agreement. They got it and ees anyway. the United’s pilots felt betrayed. Not only did the IAM try and Mr. Wolf was invited to speak to the MEC at their January scuttle the ESOP, but they didn’t even bother removing their 1988 meeting in Kona, Hawaii. The day before Wolf spoke, the no-sympathy-strike clause from their contract. That clause had MEC invited Flying Tiger MEC Chairman Frank Maguire to conveniently kept the IAM at work during the pilots’ 1985 share with the MEC his impressions of Wolf. strike. The IAM hid behind that clause and crossed ALPA Maguire said that, in his view, Frank Olson probably picket lines. stayed on as long as he did in order to set up conditions dictated ALPA sued United and the IAM claiming that the Protec- by Stephen Wolf prior to Wolf’s accepting the new CEO tive Covenants were designed to unlawfully deprive ALPA and position. Maguire believed that the Allegis board was told by the company’s shareholders of their rights. The U.S. District Wolf in mid-1987 exactly what culture should exist prior to his Court threw out one provision and claimed it didn’t have accepting the CEO duties. Maguire said his belief was based on jurisdiction to rule on the other. Both ALPA and the company methods Wolf used at Tigers. appealed. In May of 1989 the Appellate Court agreed with “His scheme is to convince United employees that since ALPA on both counts and ordered the second provision sent United is shrinking in market share, you must accept his plan of back to the District Court for hearing. The court noted that initially small, but cumulatively large, concessions or face financing for the ESOP could not proceed until the two cov- retrenchment. Your failure to go along will be blamed as the enants were removed. sole cause for all subsequent problems,” Maguire said. “With By the end of 1987 the grievance machinery was grinding Wolf, nothing happens by accident. He will try to do what out a number of very significant victories for ALPA and the Ferris failed to do—by the numbers,” Maguire added. “You will pilots. Arbitrators had ruled against the company in at least nine want to believe his projection of humility and confidence. But major cases. Pilots could not fly as captain unless they held in the end he will laugh in your face and hand you your head. captain seniority. That eliminated one of the perks granted to Wolf is a thinker who has a good grasp of subtleties. He knows the scabs by Barry. The company was also forced to release your frustrations, fears and insecurities and will try to turn them dozens of scab and fleet-qual pilots from the TCA positions all against you at the right time.” Maguire predicted that Wolf because they had been awarded the jobs improperly and at the will repeat at UAL his practices at Tigers by running off some expense of qualified striking pilots. The Board further ruled that management and making him a hero to some workers, and will the company’s refusal to grant ALPA pilots trip drops to con- offer a profit-sharing program that leaves a carrot dangling but duct ALPA business was improper. The Board also ruled for keeps employees without any power on the board. ALPA on a number of contract violations as well as a number of “He will use `Chairman’s Conferences’ and letters to imply improper terminations—including one pilot fired for wearing a a need for concessions without actually ever saying it,” pre- yellow ribbon. dicted Maguire. “He will isolate employee groups by playing For nearly six months the corporation had been a rudder- on the emotions of envy. Any union response short of his less ship, unable to find a permanent CEO. A number of posi- unspoken demands to give the company concessions will be tive personnel changes did occur, however, under Olson’s characterized as a `rejection of the company offer.’” interim tenure; John Cowan, Frank Jarc, Kurt Stocker and Dave Maguire said he believed that UAL agreed to the IAM Pringle all resigned or were asked to leave. poison pills at Wolf’s direction to weaken the ESOP, and that he will try to take on the AFA as an object lesson to the pilots, while telling the rest of the employees and the press how unnecessary this all is. Maguire said he believes Wolf will seek 26 May 17, 2005

progressive pay and pension cuts to reduce cash outflow. “If the Damron and Jim Leroy were able to have Wes commit his pilots give in, Wolf will up the ante and demand more,” accord- opinion to paper. ing to Maguire. He predicted, “Wolf will respond to union Dubinsky was then able to get a high level meeting with proposals by announcing that he is ‘personally saddened the Mr. Wolf, Guyette, and Barry. Wes Bartlett attended the meet- union rejected the company offer.’” ing and stated the reasons why the 737 fleet should be split. Finally, he reminded the MEC, “The louder Wolf screams, Considering the antipathy between Barry and ALPA, Bartlett’s the better the job ALPA is doing.” willingness to speak out was courageous. According to “It was uncanny,” said Jock Savage, Editor of San Dubinsky, Bartlett’s advocacy was probably the straw that Francisco’s ALPA publication The Bayliner. Maguire predicted broke the camel’s back. “Wolf announced, right there on the fairly accurately what Wolf would say to the MEC the next day. spot, to make the decision that the fleet would be split. He had Using Maguire’s script, Wolf said the pilots would “have to been “convinced.” Did we have a loaded gun? Absolutely! take the leadership role” in turning around the company by Would I have gone public if the company hadn’t been reason- giving concessions. Again, following Maguire’s exact words, able? Absolutely! Did I threaten Wolf with going public? No, I Wolf said that he wouldn’t be able to grow the company unless did not. I think he understood the damage that could have been his labor costs were lower. wrought had he chosen to fight us given all the evidence we After returning to the mainland, Wolf started his first round had.” of “Chairman’s Conferences.” As predicted by Maguire, The event was significant in the industry. USAir soon split Without actually ever saying it, Wolf made sure everyone their 737 fleet as have others since the change at United. Once clearly understood that he wanted concessions from them. again it was the United pilots who were out on the point making In 1988 United and ALPA agreed to permanently split the major course corrections in the way this industry operates. 737-200 and -300 fleets. It was a significant event, as the United pilot group was the first in the industry to achieve this X. THE PIANO PLAYER success. Many pilots are under the impression that this agree- Within a short time at United, Wolf started using a new twist in ment was an example of management and ALPA starting to his ability to demand concessions without ever actually saying finally work together. It was, sort of. it— he had the press say it for him. Ever since the Company had ordered the airplane, the “Wolf played the press like a piano,” observed one ALPA MEC had been trying to get the company to split the 737 fleet official. United’s labor costs had been average for the indus- because of the safety risk in requiring pilots to fly two so vastly try—and pilot costs ranked in the lower half, while United’s B- different aircraft as a common fleet. Lloyd Barry did not agree. scale pilots earned some of the lowest salaries in the industry. The MEC suspected that, as in some other questions of this Nonetheless, Wolf began personally briefing the business press kind, Barry did not see a safety problem if the solution cost to the contrary. He told them how he had to lower his labor money. It quickly became apparent, however, that the pilots did costs—how they were way too high. The press bit. Within the not feel it was a safe operation. In late 1987 the MEC and the next few weeks a number of publications began reporting that company conducted a joint safety survey of ORD-based pilots Wolf had to have concessions because his labor costs were just which showed that the pilots felt unqualified and unsafe flying too high. After a closed-door meeting in New York with secu- the 737’s in a mixed fleet. The company was surprised by the rity analysts in June 1988, a number of brokerage firms quickly results, but didn’t budge on their position. Finally, ALPA told reported that UAL’s labor costs were too high. Morgan management that if the company wasn’t willing to seriously Stanley’s Kevin Murphy went so far as to say that “United’s address these safety complaints, the MEC officers were pre- pilot costs are the highest in the industry.” (Remember, Morgan pared to go public with the survey results. Stanley was UAL’s banker under Ferris.) The July 25, 1988 About this time 737 Capt. Jim Damron happened to make issue of Barrons reported that “the United pilots are the highest contact with Capt. Wes Bartlett in Denver. Bartlett, who had paid in the industry.” Wolf was clearly letting the press create previously headed the 737 program during the -300 develop- the illusion for the public—and the employees—that conces- ment phase, had been relieved as Fleet Captain and was now sions were needed. working in the 747 program. In their conversation Bartlett On July 6, 1988, Wolf presented to ALPA his “growth confided that he no longer believed the -300 was a safe opera- plan” for rebuilding the airline from years of stagnation. As tion. He strongly believed that it should be split and that he and predicted, the pilots would help pay for it. He sought a highly the company had erred when they put the program together. concessionary contract with a five-year pay freeze, a continua- 27 May 17, 2005

tion of the B-Scale, a C-scale and reduction in pension contri- managers.” butions. The United strike effort clearly established a blueprint for The following months saw a curious parade of events as successful labor battles in the deregulated airline industry. The Wolf’s manipulation of the press went nowhere, and then technological and organizational capabilities developed in the backfired. In what the pilots and the press widely viewed as a 1985 strike represented the leading edge in labor’s ability to botched attempt to entice the pilots into a concessionary positively influence the balance of power between management contract, the company asked the MEC negotiating committee to and labor. That advantage continues to improve. The Northwest consider accepting the company’s July proposal in return for and Eastern pilots have used our procedures and improved on taking Pan Am’s delivery positions on a number of Airbus A- them tremendously. “If and when it becomes our turn at bat 320’s. The negotiating committee responded that they’d be again, we will improve upon it as well,” says Dubinsky. happy to consider any proposal as long as it was within the The United pilots were the first to realize that conducting a guidelines of ALPA’s opening letter. The response apparently strike was basically a communications effort. Family Aware- infuriated Wolf. The company’s negotiating team was a no- ness, computerized communications between strike centers and show at the next scheduled session. pilots homes, computerized telephone-tree data bases, elec- Within several weeks of the “scam A-320 proposal,” the tronic voice messaging, and satellite teleconferences were the Wall Street Journal nailed the coffin on Wolf’s strategy of hallmark of the United strike. Coupled with the vast resources getting pilot concessions before he would buy new aircraft. To of ALPA’s Major Contingency Fund, they continue as the the company’s certain embarrassment, the Journal reported in a benchmark for organized labor’s last line of defense in the front-page article that Wolf intended to purchase a large number airline industry. Hopefully, it will serve as a major deterrent of Boeing aircraft. The paper reported that Wolf didn’t want to against those who see airline pilots and their contracts as easy announce his intentions until he could get concessions from the targets. pilots, and it added that United “apparently doesn’t want the Did management learn any lessons? Engleman is cautious. pilots to know they are going to buy them anyway.” United said He says, “Except for a change in a couple of players, you still the story wasn’t true. Six months later Wolf bought the air- have much of the same board of directors, and virtually the planes. In December 1988 both Ferg and Barry retired. Ferg’s same incestuous management structure. You’ve got Guyette at apparent hatred for ALPA didn’t seem to stop at retirement. the top and largely the same group of flight managers. I don’t Within a few months Ferg took one last blast at ALPA on CBS’ know if those people have learned anything or not. But whether West 57th Street. Barry’s retirement was five years early. they have or not, you have to look at our current Sr. V.P. of According to those who knew him, Barry had a very deep Flight Operations Hart Langer, and to a lesser extent, Wolf. seated resentment for the loss of the strike and the pilots Their public utterances have questioned the integrity and disrespect for him that left him a very bitter and unhappy man. certainly the business judgments of their predecessors. Hart, John Zeeman, Ferris’ Executive Vice President of Market- certainly, has been holding up a mirror to the corporation. He is ing resigned in May 1989. Of Ferris’ group of senior executives beginning to show them how far they had gone from what was who had taken part in the 1985 assault on the pilot group, only right and reasonable, and how far they had departed from sound one still remains. Ironically, it is Jim Guyette, the man who management procedures and from the ethos and value system organized and led the strike effort for Ferris. But the other irony that you must have when you’re running a corporation in a is that the United pilots, after the ESOP Initiative, eventually service industry.” watched the departure of almost all of the senior executives Dubinsky looks at the question from a tactical view. He who had tried to replace them in the 1985 strike. says, “Yes, I think they’ve learned some lessons. First of all, Wolf has learned that he should not make himself the point-man XI. LESSONS the way Ferris did, but instead hold back and reserve himself On this, the fourth anniversary of the end of the 1985 pilots for the ‘white-knight’ role toward the very end or else he’ll strike, one wonders if any lessons have been learned at United. come out as a specter. At least for the time being, it appears he Roger Hall thinks the pilots have learned one very important is being very careful to stay out of the front lines and is using lesson. He says, “The 1985 strike showed the airline pilots of other people. this country that they could successfully take a stand against “Another thing they’ve learned is not to try and do things powerful management, that they could take action, influence that are irritating to the pilots. They’ve learned their lesson in their futures, and not be helpless victims of the whims of airline that regard. However, you’re going to see repeatedly—month in 28 May 17, 2005

and month out—`good deals’ for years when only those who had us, neat little things for us such as “I think all along Ferris intended to not only demonstrated blind obedience to jumpseats and the ALPA pin on crush ALPA, but to get it off the property,” a now-disgraced management managers. One must be careful said Rick Dubinsky. “It was clear that he were allowed to participate. that this doesn’t lull the pilots into But United’s pilots have a false sense of well-being. And, I intended to replace ALPA with the `United reason to be optimistic. ALPA in don’t think you’ll see them Pilots Association,’ which was being orga- general and the United and attempt to threaten us again, or do nized by John Ferg, Denver Capt. Bill Eastern pilots in particular have sent a message to managements some of the other things Ferris did Palmer and others. His goal, I think, was that were quite stupid. in this industry. “The strength of “Most importantly,” says decertification of ALPA and the emergence our Association has really been Dubinsky, “they have learned of this company-controlled union. One way revitalized,” says Hall, “with our that, if left no other choices, we you might accomplish this is by showing the `war chest,’ sophisticated will strike. But they’ve also communications techniques and learned some of our weaknesses membership that their union is ineffective ability to unite cohesively. I and how to deal with us on and that it can’t protect either them or their believe we’re going to make emotional, strategic and tactical contract. ...Consequently, the message the some good things happen in the levels. In that regard, Wolf should company was communicating to the pilots future and I think airline man- never be underestimated.” agements are going to think Would Wolf be inclined to after the strike was: “From now on anything twice before they take on a pilot take the pilots on again? Cockrell you get is because we choose to give it to group again.” says, “Not—unless they perceive you, not because ALPA was able to get it for But the hated B-scale, although only a fraction of the weakness on our side. And that’s you.” what happened in 1985. Even scope Ferris and the board though the pilots were solid as a envisioned, still plagues this rock, the company obviously didn’t see that until it was too late. company. As Warren Villareal, UAL-MEC No B-Scale Com- So it’s crucial that the pilots ensure that management never mittee Chairman recently said, “The B-scale salary structure again acquires an incorrect perception of our strength.” was not just an assault on the new hire pilots, it was an assault Roger Hall says he believes management didn’t learn on the A-scale pilots.” As long as the cancer is allowed on this nearly as much as they should have. But he adds, “The one property, all United pilots are threatened. thing they should have learned out of all of this is how unpro- A few years ago no one envisioned the challenges the ductive bad labor-management relations are, that it creates such United pilots would have to confront in order to protect their a large liability for the corporation and that there’s no future in careers and profession. The inner strength and courage the it. It would be great to think what United could be producing group displayed has left little doubt that United’s pilots are right now if we hadn’t even had the strike.” indeed made of the same stuff as the men who created ALPA during the era of the wooden wings. XII. CONCLUSION While positive changes have occurred—largely as a result of arbitration victories and actions taken by the pilots, many changes remain to be made at United. Management’s vindic- tiveness after the strike institutionalized labor strife at United that continues to eat away at the fabric of the company and its employees. The punitive reduction of the 570’s seniority and the continuation of fleet-qual compensation only serve as a continuous reminder of the hatred and anger. The degrading B- scale must end. The incestuous Flight Operations management structure must be drastically changed. It exists today because of a number of 29 May 17, 2005

A ‘570’ Perspective Continued From Page 15 Mike Sanders and I did what we did best—we continued to what we thought they could have done to us. The busses were drink beer, and by the time we left the bar, at two a.m.., we empty and we didn’t want to help them fill their quota of scabs. were three sheets to the wind. We had been told to be in the We were hung-over and feared that they might kidnap us. I lobby at 6:30 a.m. as ALPA had arranged for transportation to said, “Run!” pick us up and bring us to the picket lines at the Training Center “Hey!” the suits yelled. “We’ll give you a ride.” This only for strike duty. The United busses would arrive at 7:30 a.m.. made us run faster. It was awkward with the suitcases. As we I jumped up and looked at the clock. Oh, God! Eight- stumbled to the edge of Quebec Street we started laughing, thirty. I called Mike. I woke him up. “Yeah?” uncontrollably. “Why are we running?” I said. “Dude, it’s eight-thirty!” “I don’t know,” Mike said. “No!” We flagged down a hotel van and gave him five dollars to “Yeah!” I said. take us down the street to the Training Center where we spent “See you down there in ten.” the next few hours picketing. The lobby was empty. Mike and I staggered out the front That was May 17th, 1985, 20 years ago this week. And door with our suitcases. There were three United busses sitting now, just like then, we face what seem like immense challenges, in the parking lot, the windows covered with butcher paper. wonder how we will measure up to them, and imagine how we Four or five guys in suits, holding clipboards, looked at us as might conquer them. But we will because today, just as it was we approached. They were smiling and eager, like used car yesterday, our unity is our strength. It is what sets us apart from salesmen. They wore United lapel pins. “Are you guys pre- the corporation and management, it is our brother and sister- hires?” hood, and no matter how difficult a path we find ourselves on, “No!” Mike yelled. we are, as Ernie Gann has called us, A Band of Brothers. The United officials continued their assault. I don’t know

Go to Page 31 for a Timeline of the Strike of 1985

30 May 17, 2005

“It is with deep regret that your Negotiating Committee reports March 25, 1985 to you that we were unsuccessful in reaching an agreement with The United Pilots’ Strike Preparedness Committee announces the Company. We can assure you that we exhausted every that Family Strike Awareness Training Seminars were held in available opportunity in order to conclude these negotiations in Chicago on March 21 and 22nd. The United pilots and their a manner that you have told us you would find acceptable…You wives who attended the seminar learned the techniques of will hear rumors about last minute offers, parties almost helping pilots and their families prepare for the financial and reaching agreement until last minute confusion halted progress, professional issues that accompany a strike. etc., but do not be confused by all these rumors. There was not going to be a tentative agreement unless the pilots accepted a March 29, 1985 two-tier pay scale that merged ‘somewhere within the Captain In a letter to United pilots, MEC Chairman Captain Roger Hall rates.’ “ writes: “I hope you are aware that United negotiators broke off With those words began the Strike of 1985. Members of the contract talks in Boston last Sunday, March 24, without re- United MEC Negotiating Committee — Chairman W.C. sponding to an ALPA proposal on the bargaining table. As he Brashear, Vice Chairman J.R. Brace and members D.A. Clark left, the Company’s Chief Negotiator David Pringle stated that and W.H. Nelson — told their fellow pilots in a May 17, 1985 he would be asking the National Mediation Board for a release letter that months of negotiations with the company had reached from mediation. … Immediately following the breakdown of an impasse. The Strike of 1985 was underway. negotiations in Boston, Company representatives began lobby- For 29 days, United’s pilots stood their ground and fought ing for the Company’s latest proposal again using false and the Company’s attempt to install a two-tier wage structure. It misleading statements.” Included with Chairman Hall’s letter was a 29-day period that marked the character and will of what was an MEC Negotiating Committee analysis of the latest constitutes a United pilot. It also is a period of our airline’s proposals of both ALPA and the Company. history that put on clear display a management team hell-bent on destroying the resolve and soul of a pilot group. To March 29, 1985 management’s chagrin, they far underestimated the will and Stressing the need for unity in the pilot profession, ALPA sends fortitude of the pilots of United Airlines. a letter to non-members: “This is more than a formal invitation. The Strike of 1985 contained many subplots. What follows It is a vigorous enlistment of your active support in these is just one snapshot of how the Strike of 1985 unfolded. In critical times and an introduction for future contact and coordi- order to provide the tone and “feel” of that time, we are includ- nation as the present situation becomes ominous. Furthermore, ing passages from communiqués and letters from the United you can be sure that this is not a campaign for membership MEC, the MEC Negotiating Committee and the MEC Strike recruitment. Indeed, this is a recognition that ‘non-members’ Committee. are a visible force which may swing the balance of power to the ultimate benefit of all of us in the present struggle. This is an January 10, 1985 endeavor to unify.” In a letter to all pilots, the United Pilots’ Strike Preparedness Committee writes the following: “Given the current state of April 17, 1985 negotiations, there is a distinct possibility that a pilot strike The National Mediation Board declares an impasse in talks may occur in the near future at United Airlines. In order for the between ALPA and United Airlines, and institutes a 30-day strike to be successful, each of us must take action now to cooling off period. With no talks scheduled, the Company prepare for the financial security during the strike. Being remains hopeful that a settlement will be reached during the 30- financially prepared will not only assist in providing peace of day period. If no settlement is reached, pilots are free to strike mind, but will also add to our bargaining leverage if the at 12:01 a.m., May 17. Company knows in advance that we are individually able to withstand a strike.” April 18, 1985 MEC Chairman Captain Roger Hall writes a letter to United March 24, 1985 pilots clarifying a misleading “Special Newsline” put out by the Negotiations between ALPA and United Airlines break off. Company the day before. The Company claimed in its Newsline that “ALPA had refused to agree to competitive new-hire rates for pilots.” Captain Hall wrote in response: “We take strong 31 May 17, 2005

exception to three statements in that Newsline article. While we ing compensation, hours of service, vacation and pension and would agree that ONE of the outstanding major issues is the insurance), and farthest from agreement on rates of pay for two-tier pay scheme, it is by no means the ONLY issue. We are new-hire pilots. After the Negotiating Committee returned to still far apart on wages, work rules, pension and vacation. Chicago and reported to me what had occurred in Boston, I “United’s disclaimer that they are ‘not proposing a concluded that we were, in fact, very close to an impasse with two-tier wage structure’ begs the Company. the question most deceitfully. Saying that he “did not When they have added pay want us to stumble into a rates for Captains on B-747 costly strike count-down and DC-10 equipment, and because of a misunderstanding have modified the minimum by anyone of the issues in- pay raise for move-up in pay volved, the bargaining position categories, the fact remains of either side or the pilot that a new-hire pilot will spend consensus as revealed in the more than twenty years in his roadshow,” Captain Hall career before reaching parity requested a meeting with with today’s pilots. And until he Ferris. approaches that parity, he will The two met the afternoon be receiving up to 55% less for of Thursday, March 28 and his service than an incumbent.” into the morning of Friday, March 29. Shortly after the April 19, 1985 start of the March 29 meeting, The United Pilots’ Strike Ferris insisted the two sides Committee sends out a notice agree to two conditions before to all pilots with information on continuing: One condition was “Communication Facilities” at that if the conversations did Local Strike Centers. not produce a tentative Reporters and television cameras were common in the agreement or at least move the April 24, 1985 UAL-MEC Strike Center throughout the Strike of two sides significantly closer, The United Pilots’ Strike 1985. Pilot volunteers also manned the phone banks to the parties would revert to Committee sends a letter to all keep a constant flow of information to the striking their last proposals of record, which were made on March non-member pilots advising pilots. them that a “Non-Member 23 and 24. The second condi- Coordinating Committee” has tion was that Ferris would not been established to provide information to pilots who are not allow the talks to continue unless the two sides agreed to make members of ALPA. no public reference to Ferris being involved in negotiations. Captain Hall reluctantly agreed to Ferris’ conditions, April 26, 1985 and the talks resumed. “During my time in office as your MEC MEC Chairman Captain Roger Hall writes a letter to pilots to Chairman, I have attempted to conduct your affairs openly,” clarify misstatements made by UAL Chairman Richard Ferris. Captain Hall wrote to the pilots. “However, after considering Captain Hall writes: “In his April 17 letter to you, Mr. Ferris my responsibility to take every opportunity to achieve a con- said that ALPA rejected the company’s March 23 proposal. His tract, I reluctantly agreed to Mr. Ferris’ conditions and we statement is only partially accurate. In fact, on March 24, the proceeded to talk.” ALPA Negotiating Committee made a counterproposal to which After a long discussion with Ferris, Captain Hall meets with the Company’s response was to break off negotiations and say his fellow MEC Officers and the MEC Negotiating Committee. that it would be requesting a release from mediation. Despite agreeing that Ferris had “made movement, in some “When the Company broke off negotiations March 24, areas, toward an acceptable meeting ground,” the group is the parties were still apart on most of the major issues (includ- unanimous in deciding that a “new-hire pay scale which does 32 May 17, 2005

not merge with incumbent pay for 25 years would not be ability to financially weather a strike. acceptable to the United pilots.” The Committee enclosed a checklist and sample letter Captain Hall then advises Ferris that ALPA cannot to creditors to help pilots. accept the Company’s two-tier proposal and the failure of the Company to address any of the Blue Skies problems that ALPA May 6, 1985 had brought to the bargaining table. Ferris’ response to Captain The United Pilots’ Strike Committee issues the following Hall: “That’s too bad — that means war.” Ferris proceeded to bulletin to pilots: “Some recent incidents involving pilots, flight ask Captain Hall whether his fellow officers and members of management and facilities have prompted us to remind all the Negotiating Committee agreed with the decision to reject pilots that, despite the current dispute with the Company, we the Company proposal, Captain Hall told Ferris “we were must all comport ourselves as true professionals. unanimous in our decision.” “Confrontational incidents and misuse of Company As Captain Hall explains to the pilots in his letter: “He property are more harmful than productive and can lead to (Ferris) then wanted to know if we knew what our decision disciplinary action which would seriously damage our collec- meant. I told him that we had discussed the implications or our tive cause. decision at length, and that everyone knew that our decision “We urge you to continue your high standards of flying could ultimately result in a strike. in accordance with the requirements of the FARs, FOM con- “Again, Mr. Ferris said, ‘That’s too bad — that means tract, and Company SOPs. The maintaining of a solid and war.’ professional pilot attitude is the best guarantee of reaching an “We spent some of the remaining time discussing what acceptable resolution of our dispute. would be the ramifications of a strike. During this conversation, “If irresponsible and unsafe activities are to be carried Mr. Ferris displayed no agitation. He did not mention a tenta- out, let them be carried out by the Company’s management and tive agreement. He did not accuse me of reneging on any not by the United pilots. Be careful and be safe.” commitment. He made no comment alleging my failure to sell his proposal. In summary, nothing in either his bearing or his May 17, 1985 spoken words suggested to me that I was talking with a man At 12:01 a.m., during a boisterous rally in Chicago that was who felt that he had been either deceived or let down in any teleconferenced to all domiciles around the United system, way. MEC Chairman Roger Hall announces an impasse in negotia- “Can you imagine my surprise when, in his April 17 tions between ALPA and the Company, and officially declares letter, Mr. Ferris states that he and his associates ‘reached a that United’s pilots were on strike. Captain Rick Dubinsky, tentative agreement’ with me ‘on the packaged proposal’ and Chairman of the MEC Strike Committee, calls each pilot that I ‘was unable to sell the agreement’ which I had addressed domicile and orders each council chairman to “shut down the earlier. airline.” “I realize that a disparity exists between the statements in Mr. Ferris’ letter and what I have just related to you. I will May 17, 1985 say only that my recollection of what took place does not The United MEC Negotiating Committee advises the pilot support several statements which Mr. Ferris made in his letter.” group that ALPA and the Company failed to reach an agree- Captain Hall requests the MEC Negotiating Committee to ment. send to all pilots a detailed response to Mr. Ferris’ letter to “It is with deep regret that your Negotiating Committee pilots. This response was sent to the pilots the same day as reports to you that we were unsuccessful in reaching an agree- Captain Hall’s letter. ment with the Company. We can assure you that we exhausted every available opportunity in order to conclude these negotia- April 26, 1985 tions in a manner that you have told us you would find accept- The United Pilots’ Strike Committee advises all pilots to make able. financial preparations for a strike. The Committee advises pilots “You will hear rumors about last minute offers, parties to secure lines of credit (generally not available after a strike almost reaching agreement until last minute confusion halted begins), make signature loans from the Credit Unions (UAL progress, etc., but do not be confused by all these rumors. There and ALPA) or banks, obtain the ALPA medical insurance where was not going to be a tentative agreement unless the pilots desirable, and to do everything necessary to enhance a pilot’s accepted a two-tier pay scale that merged, ‘somewhere within 33 May 17, 2005

the Captain rates.’ “At this point, all we can ask of you is that we are May 27, 1985 family. More importantly, we are a UNITED family.” Contract talks with the company over back-to-work issues break off over the weekend. ALPA refused to accept the follow- May 24, 1985 ing demands: In an issue of “The United Family News,” the United MEC 1. The UAL pilots who crossed the line and were Negotiating Committee warns striking United pilots of “Psy- awarded new vacancies will stay in place until November 19, chological Warfare” being applied by management. “Dick 1985, where-upon they will exercise “super seniority” and be Ferris and his ego have been backed into a corner,” said able to leapfrog over thousands of more senior striking pilots. Captain W.C. Brashear, chairman of the MEC Negotiating 2. The approximately 500 new hires would receive no Committee. “According to Douglas Feaver, a writer for the assurance of employment. Washington Post, it has become ‘apparent that United’s attempt 3. The replacement captains and first officers would to keep flying has not been as successful as management had continue to receive their $75,000/50,000 respective salaries but hoped.’ This masterpiece of understatement, incidentally, comes would be put at the bottom of the UAL pilot seniority list and from a writer who has consistently favored the company line. ahead of the new hires. Ferris is like a cornered tiger. He has no place to go but to lash 4. All TCAs who honored the picket line would return out in the pilots’ faces. Look for some dirty tricks in the near to line flying. future, such as: The Company said the tentative agreement reached on “1. A letter from Ferris stating that an agreement was May 25 was tied to ALPA’s acceptance of these back-to-work reached prior to strike date, but ALPA reneged. This is NOT demands. ALPA rejected this notion out of hand. true. The “United Family News” reports that the number of “2. The company may walk out of the Chicago negotia- revenue trips flown since the beginning of the strike has tions after a few days. They are already in phase I of this classic dropped. On May 20, three day after the start of the strike, 219 negotiating 1-2 punch, that is, releasing statements that revenue flights took off. On May 26, that number dropped to progress is being made and them walking out. This to get 205. everyone’s hopes up then comes the walkout, dashing everyone to a new psychological low. BE PREPARED! The MEC reports May 28, 1985 little progress so far, contrary to company reports. It does not MEC Chairman Captain Roger Hall says he is prepared to call yet appear that UAL is ready for serious negotiations. They are the MEC Negotiating Committee back to Chicago to resume still waging war. talks with the Company. “We are ready, willing and able to “3. Look for a program of SCABs’ wives trying to meet with United, with or without a mediator, to try to end this convince strikers’ wives to influence their husbands to ‘save strike,” said Captain Hall. “With the reaching of a tentative their careers’ and ‘save the airline.’ “ agreement Friday on the economic issues, the company already has demonstrated that they have gotten what they said they May 25, 1985 needed — a new contract that would keep them competitive. A “United Family News” bulletin advises United pilots that a The back-to-work agreement, which normally is a routine tentative agreement has been reached on the basic agreement, matter to negotiate, is the only thing holding us apart now. however, “there are numerous major unresolved issues on the “If need be, we are well-prepared for a long-term back to work agreement.” strike,” Captain Hall continued. “However, there are no win- “A back-to-work agreement may well be more difficult ners in a strike because in the long run, everyone loses. There- to achieve than the basic agreement,” said the United Family fore, we are ready to meet and resume negotiations whenever News. “We will not go back to work without an acceptable and wherever necessary. The sooner these problems are re- back-to-work agreement. It is this agreement which will assure solved, the sooner all employees can return to normalcy and protection of such items as seniority, sick leave, vacations and help rebuild United.” numerous other issues including commitments we have made to other employee groups. May 29, 1985 “Do not allow your resolve to weaken in this critical In a message to all pilots walking the picket line, the United stage of negotiations.”

34 May 17, 2005

MEC issued the following notice: “We congratulate all of you “turned into a nightmare” by management’s lack of honesty. on your determination and dedication to this front line of One pilot quoted in the Post article said his experience at activity. The comments made by people passing your positions DENTK reminded him of a “concentration camp.” have been varied and not all have been kind. Your professional- ism has once again been proven by not reverting to retaliatory June 3, 1985 measures. More of the public is now aware of why we are on United Family News issues the following “Alert” to all pilots: strike. Educating them on this issue is taking place. We sin- “The company has been operating only 14% of its flights since cerely thank the Flight Attendants, as well as other unions, who the strike began two weeks ago. It has recently announced that are walking the line with us. Keep up the good work and hold it will attempt to raise its level of operations to approximately your heads high.” 25%. To do so will require an increase in the number of pilots available to fly the line. May 30, 1985 “The number of pilots reported by the company and A teleconference is attended by more than 14,000 United identified by our observer group has leveled off at approxi- employees to listen to strike updates and other information from mately 500. MEC Chairman Captain Roger Hall, ALPA International “However, for the last couple of weeks, we have been President Captain Hank Duffy, attorney F. Lee Bailey and receiving reports of ‘replacement’ pilots trickling into training. national and local representatives from the Association of Flight It is possible that the company has ‘stock piled’ 50-100 or so Attendants. replacement scabs as well as 100 or so United scab pilots not yet assigned back to the line. May 30, 1985 “Don’t be alarmed if within the next 14 days as many The United pilots’ strike against United Airlines and the as 200 scabs suddenly descend on the airline. We fully expect company’s attempt to hire replacement pilots were “discussed” this to happen. It is a standard strikebreaking technique de- on The Tonight Show. During host Johnny Carson’s mono- signed to convince you that there is an ‘army’ of pilots out there logue, the following exchange occurred: all primed to take your jobs.” Ed McMahon: “Where do you find flying squirrels?” Johnny Carson: “In United Airlines cockpits. They’ll June 5, 1985 hire anyone.” The National Mediation Board announces its availability to mediate discussions between ALPA and United Airlines regard- June 1, 1985 ing back-to-work issues. ALPA accepts the Board’s offer, Reports of increased violence is being reported by MEC Strike saying, “We have always said that we would meet with the Control Central. “It has come to our attention that there are other side any time and any place to seriously negotiate the increasing reports of violence in terminals and other loca- issues in this dispute. We look forward to a round of serious, tions,” according to a report in today’s United Family News. good-faith bargaining that will result in a fair and equitable “To our knowledge, at least four incidents have recently taken settlement on behalf of the more than 5,000 United pilots now place, all involving aggressive action by non-striking employees walking the picket line.” against striking employees. The strike breaking employees so The Company rejects the National Mediation Board’s involved will be dealt with by the authorities. offer. “We will not condone violence in any form, including threatening or abusive phone calls to non-striking employees or June 6, 1985 their families. “The company’s rejection of (the National Mediation Board’s) “Our sincere appreciation to all walking the line. appeal to resume negotiations aimed at ending the strike Organized labor is anxiously watching our struggle. Let us demonstrates clearly that management has been bargaining in write a new chapter in the history books for them to read.” bad faith.” — The United MEC.

The Denver Post runs an article profiling four pilots who An article in this morning’s Chicago Tribune addresses United defected from DENTK. The defections occurred because of Airlines’ refusal of the Mediation Board’s offer settle the back- “intolerable conditions,” according to the pilots. They told the to-work differences between ALPA and UAL. An attorney close Post that it was their dream to fly for UAL, but that dream was to the airline, according to the article written by James Warren,

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said, “Legally, United is undoubtedly correct. But practically to failure by virtue of United’s rejection of the proffer.” speaking, this is no way to solve the problem. It’s pretty sim- Judge Bua said “ALPA had satisfied the reasonable plistic, almost 8th-grade stuff.” efforts requirement by its negotiations prior to and during the Another attorney is quoted as saying United’s motive is strike.” to break ALPA’s back. “It seems as if (UAL) is going for the last ounce of blood,” said the unnamed attorney. “The message June 12, 1985 to the union is, ‘You better settle or you’re dead.’ “ United pilots and management reach a tentative agreement aimed at ending the strike. The United MEC announces it is June 8, 1985 convening a special meeting in Chicago to discuss the agree- U.S. District Court Judge Nicholas Bua denies United Airlines’ ment. United Family News reports that the company is “push- motion to reject an ALPA claim for injunctive relief to prevent ing for immediate ratification. However, the MEC will take United from hiring replacement pilots. United argues that ALPA whatever time is necessary to ensure that a return to work is in forfeited its claim when it did not accept a National Mediation everyone’s best interest.” Board offer of arbitration in mid-April, an offer that already had been rejected by the company. United also alleges ALPA failed June 14, 1985 to make reasonable efforts to settle the dispute. The United MEC ratifies the tentative agreement and back-to- Judge Bua said that “it would be an empty gesture and work agreement between ALPA and United Airlines. The picket not commensurate with common sense to require (ALPA) to lines are ordered down and the strike ends. accept the proffer of arbitration … When the effort is doomed

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