Smarter Money Fund Strategy: Cash Plus/Short-Term Fixed-Interest Return (Since Feb

Fund: Smarter Money Fund Strategy: Cash Plus/Short-Term Fixed-Interest Return (since Feb. 2012): 4.5% pa gross/3.6% pa net June 2020 Net return volatility (since Feb. 2012): 0.52% pa Click Here to Apply Online FE/Atchison/Australia Ratings: 4 FE Crowns/Highly Recommended/Superior

Net Period Gross Net Net Gross Objective: An independently-rated/recommended strategy RBA Cash Excess Ending Return Return Return Excess targeting low-risk cash and fixed-income returns that exceed Rate Return 30/06/2020 (Assist.)† (Insto.)† (Assist.)† Return‡ the RBA’s cash rate by 1%-2% pa after fees, over rolling 12 (Insto.)‡ month periods. 1 month 0.52% 0.44% 0.44% 0.01% 0.51% 0.43%

Strategy: We actively invest in a diversified portfolio of 3 months 2.09% 1.96% 1.90% 0.04% 2.06% 1.92% Australian deposits and investment grade floating-rate notes with a weighted-average “A” credit rating. We do not invest 6 months 0.69% 0.43% 0.33% 0.19% 0.50% 0.23% in fixed-rate bonds (unless interest rate risk is hedged), sub- 1 year 1.99% 1.36% 1.21% 0.64% 1.36% 0.72% investment grade bonds, direct loans, equities, capital notes, preference shares (eg, hybrids), use leverage, or take 2 years pa 2.92% 2.16% 2.05% 1.06% 1.86% 1.11% currency risk. We add value via active asset-selection using a range of valuation models with the aim of (1) delivering 3 years pa 2.87% 2.15% 2.05% 1.20% 1.67% 0.95% lower portfolio volatility than traditional bond funds and (2) providing superior risk-adjusted returns, or alpha, without 4 years pa 3.30% 2.52% 2.44% 1.28% 2.01% 1.24% explicitly seeking interest rate risk, credit risk or liquidity risk. The strategy is managed by Coolabah Capital Investments, 5 years pa 3.41% 2.62% 2.53% 1.42% 1.99% 1.20% which is a specialist active credit manager. Inception pa 4.47% 3.61% 3.55% 1.98% 2.49% 1.63% Feb. 2012 † The Assisted (Assist.) and Institutional (Inst.) columns represent different unit classes. Refer to the PDS for more information. ‡ The Excess Return columns represent the gross and net return above the RBA cash rate. Most recent month returns in this report are estimated

% Monthly Returns > RBA Cash Rate + 0.66% 83.2% Inception Av. Portfolio Weight to Cash 35.8%

Portfolio Weight to Cash Securities 15.6% Portfolio Weight to AT1 Hybrids 0.0%

Portfolio Weight to Floating-Rate Securities 83.6% Portfolio Weight to Sub-BBB- Securities 0.0%

Av. Portfolio Credit Rating A+ Cash-Flow Duration Across Portfolio 1,233 days

No. Cash Securities 6 Portfolio Weight to ABS/RMBS 19.6%

No. Floating-Rate Notes/Bonds 53 Credit Spread Duration 3.1

Total Number of Unique ADIs 15 Annual Volatility (since incep.) 0.52% p.a.

Av. Interest Rate (Gross Running Yield) 1.5% Gross/Net Sharpe Ratio (since incep.) 4.3x / 3.0x Awards: FE Alpha Manager 2019: Christopher Joye; Quant Ratings: 4 FE Modified Interest Rate Duration 0.07 years Crowns (FE); 4 Stars (Morningstar, January 2020). Qual Ratings: Lonsec available to advisers; Mercer available to clients; Highly Recommended (Atchison); “Superior” (Aust. Ratings)

Past performance does not assure future returns. Please read the PDS to understand risks and disclaimers on final page www.coolabahcapital.com Fund: Smarter Money Fund Return/Risk: 4.5% pa gross/3.6% pa net (0.52% pa volatility)

The since inception gross (net) return of 4.5% p.a. (3.6% p.a.) is the total annual return earned by the fund since February 2012, including interest income and movements in the price of the bond portfolio after all fund fees. The net return quoted applies to the Assisted Investor Unit Class, with quarterly distributions reinvested. Each investor’s return will vary depending upon their own investment date and any top-ups and withdrawals they make. The annualised volatility estimate of 0.52% p.a. is based on the standard deviation of net daily returns since inception, which are then annualised, attributable to the Assisted Unit Class.

Portfolio Managers Christopher Joye, Ashley Kabel, Stephen Parker, Darren Harvey (Coolabah Capital Investments)

APIR Code (Assisted) CRE0014AU Fund Inception 17-Feb-12 mFund Code SMF01 Distributions Quarterly

Morningstar Ticker 19382 Unit Pricing Daily (earnings accrue daily)

Asset-Class Short-Term Fixed-Interest Min. Investment $1,000

Target Return Net 1-2% over RBA cash rate Withdrawals Daily Requests (funds normally in 3 days)

Investment Manager Smarter Money Investments Buy/Sell Spread 0.00%/0.05%

Sub-Manager Coolabah Capital Investments Mgt. Fee (Assisted) 0.41% p.a.

Responsible Entity Equity Trustees Admin. Fee 0.25% p.a.

Custodian BNP Paribas Perf. Fee 20.5% of returns over RBA cash + 1.66% p.a.

Portfolio commentary: The zero-duration and daily liquidity Smarter Money Active Cash (SMAC) strategy returned 0.52% gross (0.44% net) in June. SMAC substantially outperformed the RBA Overnight Cash Rate (0.01%), the AusBond Bank Bill Index (0.01%), the BetaShares AAA ETF (0.06%), the FE fundinfo “Cash Enhanced” peer group (0.17%), and the AusBond Floating Rate Note (FRN) Index (0.23%). SMAC ended June with a weighted-average credit rating of A+ and a running yield of approximately 1.45%. Over the June quarter, SMAC returned 2.09% gross (1.90% to 1.96% net) compared to the RBA Overnight Cash Rate (0.04%), the AusBond Bank Bill Index (0.06%), the BetaShares AAA ETF (0.17%), and the AusBond FRN Index (1.39%). Since SMAC’s inception 8 years ago in February 2012, it has returned 4.47% pa gross (between 3.55% and 3.61% net), outperforming the RBA Overnight Cash Rate (1.98%), the AusBond Bank Bill Index (2.25%), the FE fundinfo “Cash Enhanced” peer group (2.43%), the BetaShares AAA ETF (2.62%), and the AusBond FRN Index (3.48%). SMAC’s since inception Sharpe Ratio, which measures risk-adjusted returns, has been 4.3 times (3.0 times) gross (net). While SMAC’s return volatility since inception has been low at around 0.5% pa (measured using daily returns), as a daily liquidity product with assets that are marked-to-market using executable prices, volatility does exist. This contrasts with illiquid credit (eg, loans and high yield bonds) wherein assets that have very high risk can appear to have remarkably low volatility, which is, in fact, just a mirage explained by the inability to properly value these assets using executable prices. Strategy commentary: June was yet another roller-coaster month in the remarkable year that has been 2020, which has subject all portfolios to the most extreme stress-tests wrought by the 1-in-100 year COVID-19 crisis. Coolabah Capital’s strategies had another strong month performance-wise with cash-plus products generally up between 0.44% and 0.52% net in the month (0.52% to 0.66% gross), the long/short credit strategies appreciating by between 1.38% and 1.63% net (1.76% gross) over the same period, and our Active Composite Bond Strategy returning 1.01% (before fees) compared to the AusBond Composite Bond Index’s 0.31% (this is an institutional product with confidential fee terms that is not available to retail investors). In fact, Coolabah had four wholesale strategies ranked in leading institutional researcher eVestment’s Top 15 fixed- income products globally in the period since March 2020, which spans over 25,000 funds in eVestment’s database (limited to strategies with less than US$2.5bn in FUM). In the June quarter Coolabah’s cash-plus strategies were up between 1.90% and 2.33% net (2.09% and 2.58% gross), the long/short strategies returned between 8.14% and 9.23% net over the same period, and the Active Composite Bond Strategy delivered a 4.13% return (gross) compared to the Composite Bond Index’s 0.53% (again, this is an insto-only product). As we had flagged in March and April, this performance was driven by aggressive mean-reversion in high-grade and liquid financial credit spreads on securities issued by systematically important banks. We had firmly asserted in March and April that the unprecedented moves in spreads presented a once-in-a-generation buying opportunity, and so it has proved with, for example, total non-annualised returns on hybrids bought in the darkest days of March north of 20%. There continue, however, to be conspicuous stresses in credits issued by lower-rated companies in both the BBB "investment-grade" band and the sub-BBB “high-yield” or “junk” categories, where both rating downgrades and defaults continue to climb. There have never been more fallen angels from the investment-grade to high-yield bands, and junk defaults are the highest they have been since the GFC. This has included a raft of high-profile defaults and corporate collapses, including Virgin Airlines, Hertz, JC Penney, J Crew and Wirecard, which have created mayhem for their creditors. The most striking example in Australia has been the default of Virgin Airlines on both its senior secured and senior unsecured junk bonds, which were quite popular with domestic investors that will now reportedly recover less than 10 cents in the dollar. For years we have argued against blind diversification in fixed-income and instead preferred to construct portfolios comprising systematically important issuers that are likely to be resilient and liquid in even the worst recessions. By way of contrast, the more common approach when building credit portfolios is to have a very large number of securities— ranging from circa 150 to over 1,000—in the name of reducing risk via "diversification".

Strategy commentary cont’d: The problem with this logic is that diversification is only valuable if the correlations between securities are less than one when crises arrive. Yet in the corporate credit market, defaults are highly cyclical, as we saw in 2008 and 2009, 2015 and 2016, and again in 2020. This means defaults are correlated, which in turn means that if you diversify a corporate credit portfolio across a large number of issuers with BBB and/or high-yield (ie, sub BBB) ratings you will inevitably suffer from a large number of defaults and/or stress events during a recession. Many investors would not know one-quarter to one-half of the names in a superficially well-diversified corporate bond portfolio precisely because it includes many medium-sized businesses with much higher risks of going sour. When recessions materialise, as one did in March, investors discover that the liquidity of these bonds disappears because nobody wants to buy them as a result of their soaring credit risks. Our contention is that the real hazard is in these so-called “bar-belled” portfolios where you have, say, half the capital in bonds with unquestionably strong credit quality and the other half in much racier exposures. In any serious economic retrenchment, some component of the high-risk half of the portfolio blows-up (or suffers stress), cruelling the overall portfolio’s performance and liquidity. In the Australian bond market we have seen evidence of extreme credit stress and illiquidity in many sectors, including airlines, airports, commercial property (especially office and retail), hospitality, retail, and amongst lenders to small to medium sized enterprises. There are also historically high rates of defaults (or borrower non-payment) in riskier non- bank lending portfolios, including, amongst others, sub-prime home loans and SMEs. During more benign times, all these sectors were sources of yield and comforting diversification. But it turns out that during the tough times this diversification has heightened rather than reduced credit and liquidity risk. The alternative approach that Coolabah prefers is to focus on credits issued by systematically important institutions that benefit from implicit or explicit government guarantees, such as banks, and extremely durable monopolies and oligopolies, like Woolworths and Coles. June was yet another month replete with exogenous shocks and seemingly never-ending tape bombs that Coolabah’s 23 person team, including five portfolio managers and 11 analysts, was committed to analysing around the clock. One area of focus has been understanding the consequences of new COVID-19 outbreaks in the US and Victoria. In the US there are certain states like California, Florida and Texas where there have been long and strong first waves (see screenshots from our live COVID-19 tracking system below). Officials are clearly struggling with containment, and the cumulative infection curves have yet to flatten or stabilise. This contrasts with most developed countries and states like New York where initial outbreaks have increased more quickly, but have then been comprehensively crushed through effective lockdown and containment measures.

Strategy commentary cont’d: In Australia our data scientists’ analysis of Victoria's COVID-19 infection trajectory has unearthed a disturbing finding: it would appear that since April our southern neighbour has systematically underperformed the rest of Australia's key conurbations in terms of its ability to contain this wicked virus and flatten their curve. The first chart below is a screenshot from our internal, real-time system that tracks the cumulative number of daily infections. This highlights that Victoria has been struggling to contain COVID-19 since the start of April in striking contrast to the rest of Australia, which has done a brilliant job of flattening their curves.

The second screen-shot from our systems presents the growth in cumulative infections on a state-by-state basis in logarithmic terms, and it shows a similar story: there is something in the Victorian experience---either its policy reaction function or perhaps the composition of its population---that has prevented it from flattening the COVID-19 curve like all other states. Put differently, Victoria's curve has been increasing, not flat-lining, for a number of months now in contrast to the other major metro markets.

Strategy commentary cont’d: If we then look at the daily change in the number of new infections, one can see that Victoria (blue line) has reported persistently higher cases than NSW (brown line), which is the comparison in the first screen-shot below, and all other states, which are included in the second screen-shot. While we might want to beat-up on our Victorian brethren, when we turn to consider our real-time Google mobility data, on almost every score Premier Andrews has been a lot tougher than the other states. Victoria is the purple line and has experienced, for example, lower retail/recreation activity, public transport usage, workplace attendance, participation in parks, and longer stays at home. (The residential screen tracks the duration of time that people spend in their homes.)

Credible explanations have been posited, including fundamental vulnerabilities in the security arrangements around Victoria's quarantine hotels, growing community indifference to the mixed messages from the premier regarding lockdowns and protests, and the lack of translated COVID-19 communications that meant ethnic minorities might not have fully understood the gravity of the crisis. Another explanation relates to deficiencies in Victoria's COVID-19 testing intensity. Our systems track a rich range of real-time data on testing from around the world on a state (or provincial) level through to national statistics, which are updated automatically. When we evaluated the testing data from Victoria, there did indeed appear to be some shortcomings. In particular, cumulative tests per capita materially lagged New South Wales, Queensland and South Australia, and the national Australian and New Zealand averages, between the onset of the crisis in March through to early May. It seemed the Victorians new something was awry by that time, because there was a noticeable acceleration in testing per capita thereafter to such an extent that by mid May Victoria was outperforming most states (and the Australian and New Zealand averages). You can see our system screenshots enclosed below.

Strategy commentary cont’d:

While the recent outbreak in Victoria has been disappointing, it is encouraging that the premier has now moved to lockdown the 10 affected regions, because one thing we know with conviction is that high-integrity lockdowns do work.

Don’t forget to listen to Coolabah Capital’s popular Complexity Premia podcast. You can listen on your favourite podcast app, or you can find it on Apple Podcasts or Podbean here.

Performance Disclaimer: Disclaimer: Past performance does not assure future returns. All investments carry risks, including that the value of investments may vary, future returns may differ from past returns, and that your capital is not guaranteed. This information has been prepared by Smarter Money Investments Pty Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of Coolabah Capital Investments Pty Ltd. It is general information only and is not intended to provide you with financial advice. You should not rely on any information herein in making any investment decisions. To the extent permitted by law, no liability is accepted for any loss or damage as a result of any reliance on this information. The Product Disclosure Statement (PDS) for the funds should be considered before deciding whether to acquire or hold units in it. A PDS for these products can be obtained by visiting www.coolabahcapital.com. Neither Coolabah Capital Investments Pty Ltd, Smarter Money Investments Pty Ltd, Equity Trustees Limited (EQT) nor its respective shareholders, directors and associated businesses assume any liability to investors in connection with any investment in the funds, or guarantees the performance of any obligations to investors, the performance of the funds or any particular rate of return. The repayment of capital is not guaranteed. Investments in the funds are not deposits or liabilities of any of the above-mentioned parties, nor of any Authorised Deposit-taking Institution. The funds are subject to investment risks, which could include delays in repayment and/or loss of income and capital invested. Past performance is not an indicator of nor assures any future returns or risks. Smarter Money Investments Pty Limited (ACN 153 555 867) is an authorised representative (#000414337) of Coolabah Capital Institutional Investments Pty Ltd (AFSL 482238). Equity Trustees Ltd (AFSL 240975) is the Responsible Entity for these funds. Equity Trustees Ltd is a subsidiary of EQT Holdings Limited (ACN 607 797 615), a publicly listed company on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX: EQT).

Ratings Disclaimers: Financial Express Crown Rating Disclaimer: © 2018 FE. All Rights Reserved. The information, data, analyses, and opinions contained herein (1) include the proprietary information of FE, (2) may not be copied or redistributed, (3) do not constitute investment advice offered by FE, (4) are provided solely for informational purposes and therefore are not an offer to buy or sell a security, and (5) are not warranted to be correct, complete, or accurate. FE shall not be responsible for any trading decisions, damages, or other losses resulting from, or related to, this information, data, analyses, or opinions or their use. FE does not guarantee that a fund will perform in line with its FE Crown Fund Rating as it is a reflection of past performance only. Likewise, the FE Crown Fund Rating should not be seen as any sort of guarantee or assessment of the creditworthiness of a fund or of its underlying securities and should not be used as the sole basis for making any investment decision.

Australia Ratings Analytics Disclaimer: The information contained in the Australia Ratings Analytics report (assigned January 2019) and encapsulated in the investment rating is of a general nature only. The report and rating reflect the opinion of Australia Ratings Analytics Pty Limited (AFSL 494552). It does not take into account an individual’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Professional advice should be sought before making an investment decision. A fee has ben paid by the fund manager for the production of the report and investment rating.

Atchison Disclaimer: The Atchison Rating (assigned June 2019) presented in this document is published by Atchison Consultants Pty Ltd ABN 58 097 703 047 AFSL 230 846. The report contains recommendations and advice of a general nature and does not have regard to the particular circumstances or needs of any specific person who may read it. Investors should assess either personally or with the assistance of a licensed financial adviser whether the Atchison Consultants recommendation or advice is appropriate to their situation before making an investment decision. The information contained in the report is believed to be reliable, but its completeness and accuracy is not guaranteed. Opinions expressed may change without notice. Atchison Consultants does not accept any liability, whether direct or indirect arising from the use of information contained in this report. No part of this report is to be construed as a solicitation to buy or sell any investment. Atchison Consultants does not accept any responsibility to inform you of any matter that subsequently comes to its notice, which may affect any of the information contained in this report. The performance of the investment in this report is not a representation as to future performance or likely return.

Past performance does not assure future returns. Please read the PDS to understand risks and disclaimers on final page www.coolabahcapital.com