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“An Empirical Study of the Effectiveness of Irish Banks’ Lending Regulations”

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“An Empirical Study of the Effectiveness of Irish Banks’ Lending Regulations” “AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IRISH BANKS’ LENDING REGULATIONS” By Michael Doocey Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for achieving a Master of Business in Strategy and Innovation Management 1st September 2011 Acknowledgements I have been indebted in the preparation of this thesis to my supervisor, Mr. Shane Moran whose patience and guidance, as well as his academic experience, have been invaluable to me. I wish to express my gratitude to Mr Fearghal McHugh who was always available to guide me with his expertise in the area of research. His support was crucial in completing the thesis. I would also like to thank all of the academic staff within the G.M.I.T School of Business, especially Maureen Melvin, Kevin Heffernan & Marie Finnegan for their unwavering support throughout the academic year. Lastly, and most importantly, I wish to thank my parents, Anthony & Maureen Doocey who have been a pillar of support and encouragement throughout my entire Masters year. To them I dedicate this thesis. 2 Declaration of Authenticity I hereby declare that, except where daily acknowledged, this thesis is entirely my own work and has not been submitted for any degree in any other institute or university. Michael Doocey ______________________________ September 1st 2011 3 Table of Contents Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................... 2 Executive Summary ..................................................................................................... 7 Chapter 1: Introduction ......................................................................................... 10 1.1 Context of the Research .................................................................................. 10 1.2 Background to the Research ........................................................................... 10 1.3 Focus of the Research ..................................................................................... 10 1.4 Research Objectives ........................................................................................ 10 1.4.1 Research Question ....................................................................................... 10 1.4.2 Primary Objective: ...................................................................................... 10 1.4.3 Secondary Objectives: ................................................................................. 10 1.5 Perceived Difficulties ...................................................................................... 11 1.6 Target Population ............................................................................................ 11 Chapter 2: Literature Review ............................................................................... 12 2.1 Legislation & Regulation ................................................................................ 12 2.2 Governance ..................................................................................................... 19 2.3 Ethics .............................................................................................................. 25 2.4 Influences ........................................................................................................ 29 2.5 Stakeholders ................................................................................................... 34 2.6 History ............................................................................................................. 36 2.7 Current Market ................................................................................................ 37 Chapter 3: Research Methodology........................................................................ 41 3.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 41 3.2 Research Objectives ........................................................................................ 41 3.3 Research Design .............................................................................................. 41 3.4 Advantages of Questionnaire .......................................................................... 42 3.5 Disadvantages of Questionnaire ...................................................................... 42 4 3.5 Questionnaire Issues........................................................................................ 43 3.6 Types of Questions .......................................................................................... 44 3.7 Underlying Philosophical Assumptions .......................................................... 46 3.8 Idioms of Research .......................................................................................... 47 3.9 Selection of a Research Idiom ........................................................................ 47 3.10 Selection of Research Method ........................................................................ 48 3.11 Sample Size and Sample Selection ................................................................. 48 3.12 Questionnaire Sections .................................................................................... 49 3.13 Research Timeframe ....................................................................................... 50 Table 3.13.1 ....................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 3.14 Why the Research is Worthwhile .................................................................... 50 3.15 Data Collection................................................................................................ 51 3.16 Ethical Issues ................................................................................................... 51 3.17 Data Analysis Techniques ............................................................................... 51 3.18 Research Limitations ....................................................................................... 52 3.19 Pilot Questionnaire .......................................................................................... 52 Chapter 4: Research Findings & Analysis ............................................................ 54 4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 54 4.2 Target Population ............................................................................................ 54 4.3 Analysis of the Questionnaire ........................................................................ 54 `Question 2 ................................................................................................................. 55 Question 3 .................................................................................................................. 56 Question 4 .................................................................................................................. 57 Question 5 .................................................................................................................. 58 Question 6 .................................................................................................................. 59 Question 7 .................................................................................................................. 60 Question 8 .................................................................................................................. 61 5 Question 9 .................................................................................................................. 62 Question 10 ................................................................................................................ 64 Question 11 ................................................................................................................ 65 Question 12 ................................................................................................................ 66 Question 13 ................................................................................................................ 67 Question 14 ................................................................................................................ 68 Question 15 ................................................................................................................ 69 Question 16 ................................................................................................................ 70 Question 17 ................................................................................................................ 72 Question 18 ................................................................................................................ 73 Additional Comments ................................................................................................ 74 4.4 Summary ......................................................................................................... 75 4.5 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 75 Chapter 5: Conclusions ......................................................................................... 77 5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 77 5.2 Primary Objective ........................................................................................... 77 5.3 Secondary Objectives .....................................................................................
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