Alternative Assets and Cryptocurrencies
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AJAY K. AGRAWAL Geoffrey Taber Chair in Entrepreneurship and Innovation Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto
AJAY K. AGRAWAL Geoffrey Taber Chair in Entrepreneurship and Innovation Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto Education 1995 - 2000 University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC Ph.D. Strategy and Economics 1998 - 2000 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA Visiting Scholar 1993 - 1995 University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC M.Eng./MBA 1994 London Business School, London, UK Visiting Scholar (MBA program) 1988 - 1993 University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC B.A.Sc. Thesis Committee Professor Iain Cockburn, co-chair (Boston University) Professor Rebecca Henderson, co-chair (Harvard University) Professor James Brander (University of British Columbia) Research Refereed Publications (1) “Enabling Entrepreneurial Choice,” (with Joshua Gans and Scott Stern), Management Science, forthcoming 2021. (2) “Tax Credits and Small Firm R&D Spending,” (with Carlos Rosell and Timothy Simcoe), American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 12, Issue 2, May 2020. (3) “Artificial Intelligence: The Ambiguous Labor Market Impact of Automating Prediction,” (with Joshua Gans and Avi Goldfarb), Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 33, Number 2, Spring 2019, 31-50. (4) “Exploring the Impact of Artificial Intelligence: Prediction versus Judgment,” (with Joshua Gans and Avi Goldfarb), Information Economics and Policy, Volume 47, June 2019, 1-6. (5) “Slack Time and Innovation,” (with Christian Catalini, Avi Goldfarb, and Hung Luo), Organization Science, 29(6), 2018, 989-1236. (6) “Human Judgment and AI Pricing," (with Joshua Gans and Avi Goldfarb), American Economics Association: Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 108, 2018, 58-63. (7) "How Stars Matter: Recruiting and peer effects in evolutionary biology," (with John McHale and Alex Oettl), Research Policy, 2017. (8) “Does Standardized Information in Online Markets Disproportionately Benefit Job Applicants from Less Developed Countries?” (with Nicola Lacetera and Elizabeth Lyons); Journal of International Economics, 2016, 103, 1-12. -
Central Banks and Digital Currencies a Revolution in Money
Central banks and digital currencies A revolution in money omfif.org Wednesday 28 April 2021, 12:00 UK/07:00 ET All sessions will take place live unless stated otherwise. 12:00-12:05 Welcome address: OMFIF 12:05-12:30 Keynote in-conversation: The first retail CBDC John Rolle, Governor, Central Bank of the Bahamas 12:30-13:30 Panel I: Retail CBDCs: policy implications and rollout strategies • The need for retail CBDC from a policy perspective • Programmability and its potential impact on monetary and fiscal policy • Addressing disintermediation concerns • Implementation strategies: bringing in banks and fintechs • Legal implications and common standards Speakers: Hanna Armelius, Senior Adviser, Payments Department Analysis and Policy Division, Sveriges Riksbank Neha Narula, Director, Digital Currency Initiative, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Jose Fernandez da Ponte, Vice President, General Manager Blockchain, Crypto and Digital Currencies, PayPal Atul Bhuchar, Executive Director & Group Payments Head, DBS Bank 13:30-13:45 BREAK: On-demand presentation: CBDCs and digital identity 13:45-14:45 Private roundtable: Introducing a digital yuan (invite only) Mu Changchun, Director, Digital Currency Research Institute, People’s Bank of China 14:45-15:00 BREAK: On-demand presentation: Solving offline functionality omfif.org 15:00-16:00 Panel II: The payments revolution from the consumer’s perspective • PsPs and CBDC landscape: How best to combat financial exclusion • Addressing consumers, merchants and sectors that lack digital infrastructures -
YEUNG-DOCUMENT-2019.Pdf (478.1Kb)
Useful Computation on the Block Chain The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Yeung, Fuk. 2019. Useful Computation on the Block Chain. Master's thesis, Harvard Extension School. Citable link https://nrs.harvard.edu/URN-3:HUL.INSTREPOS:37364565 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA 111 Useful Computation on the Block Chain Fuk Yeung A Thesis in the Field of Information Technology for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies Harvard University November 2019 Copyright 2019 [Fuk Yeung] Abstract The recent growth of blockchain technology and its usage has increased the size of cryptocurrency networks. However, this increase has come at the cost of high energy consumption due to the processing power needed to maintain large cryptocurrency networks. In the largest networks, this processing power is attributed to wasted computations centered around solving a Proof of Work algorithm. There have been several attempts to address this problem and it is an area of continuing improvement. We will present a summary of proposed solutions as well as an in-depth look at a promising alternative algorithm known as Proof of Useful Work. This solution will redirect wasted computation towards useful work. We will show that this is a viable alternative to Proof of Work. Dedication Thank you to everyone who has supported me throughout the process of writing this piece. -
Characterizing Ethereum's Mining Power Decentralization at a Deeper
Characterizing Ethereum’s Mining Power Decentralization at a Deeper Level Liyi Zeng∗§, Yang Chen†§, Shuo Chen†, Xian Zhang†, Zhongxin Guo†, Wei Xu∗, Thomas Moscibroda‡ ∗Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, Tsinghua University †Microsoft Research ‡Microsoft Azure §Contacts: [email protected], [email protected] Abstract—For proof-of-work blockchains such as Ethereum, than 50% of the total power has grown from several the mining power decentralization is an important discussion hundred to several thousand. Overall, the power is more point in the community. Previous studies mostly focus on the decentralized at the participant level than 4 years ago. aggregated power of the mining pools, neglecting the pool participants who are the source of the pools’ power. In this paper, However, we also find that this number varied signif- we present the first large-scale study of the pool participants icantly over time, which means it requires continuous in Ethereum’s mining pools. Pool participants are not directly tracking. Additionally, as our current data and method- observable because they communicate with their pools via private ology cannot de-anonymize the participants, it’s possible channels. However, they leave “footprints” on chain as they that some participants split themselves into many smaller use Ethereum accounts to anonymously receive rewards from mining pools. For this study, we combine several data sources ones for various reasons, which could make our estima- to identify 62,358,646 pool reward transactions sent by 47 tion inaccurate if not completely off the target. Further pools to their participants over Ethereum’s entire near 5-year study to improve the estimation accuracy is important. -
Crypto Research Report ‒ April 2019 Edition
April 2019 Edition VI. “When the Tide Goes Out…” Investments: Gold and Bitcoin, Stronger Together Technical Analysis: Spring Awakening? Cryptocurrency Mining in Theory and Practice Demelza Kelso Hays Mark J. Valek We would like to express our profound gratitude to our premium partners for supporting the Crypto Research Report: www.cryptofunds.li Contents Editorial ............................................................................................................................................... 4 In Case You Were Sleeping: When the Tide Goes Out…............................................................... 5 Back to the Roots ............................................................................................................................................. 6 How Long Will This Bear Market Last .............................................................................................................. 7 A Tragic Story Traverses the World ................................................................................................................. 9 When the tide goes out… ............................................................................................................................... 10 A State Cryptocurrency? ................................................................................................................................ 12 Support is Increasing ..................................................................................................................................... 14 -
Asymmetric Proof-Of-Work Based on the Generalized Birthday Problem
Equihash: Asymmetric Proof-of-Work Based on the Generalized Birthday Problem Alex Biryukov Dmitry Khovratovich University of Luxembourg University of Luxembourg [email protected] [email protected] Abstract—The proof-of-work is a central concept in modern Long before the rise of Bitcoin it was realized [20] that cryptocurrencies and denial-of-service protection tools, but the the dedicated hardware can produce a proof-of-work much requirement for fast verification so far made it an easy prey for faster and cheaper than a regular desktop or laptop. Thus the GPU-, ASIC-, and botnet-equipped users. The attempts to rely on users equipped with such hardware have an advantage over memory-intensive computations in order to remedy the disparity others, which eventually led the Bitcoin mining to concentrate between architectures have resulted in slow or broken schemes. in a few hardware farms of enormous size and high electricity In this paper we solve this open problem and show how to consumption. An advantage of the same order of magnitude construct an asymmetric proof-of-work (PoW) based on a compu- is given to “owners” of large botnets, which nowadays often tationally hard problem, which requires a lot of memory to gen- accommodate hundreds of thousands of machines. For prac- erate a proof (called ”memory-hardness” feature) but is instant tical DoS protection, this means that the early TLS puzzle to verify. Our primary proposal Equihash is a PoW based on the schemes [8], [17] are no longer effective against the most generalized birthday problem and enhanced Wagner’s algorithm powerful adversaries. -
Zcash Protocol Speci Cation
Zcash Protocol Specication Version 2018.0-beta-14 Daira Hopwood† Sean Bowe† — Taylor Hornby† — Nathan Wilcox† March 11, 2018 Abstract. Zcash is an implementation of the Decentralized Anonymous Payment scheme Zerocash, with security xes and adjustments to terminology, functionality and performance. It bridges the exist- ing transparent payment scheme used by Bitcoin with a shielded payment scheme secured by zero- knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (zk-SNARKs). It attempts to address the problem of mining centralization by use of the Equihash memory-hard proof-of-work algorithm. This specication denes the Zcash consensus protocol and explains its differences from Zerocash and Bitcoin. Keywords: anonymity, applications, cryptographic protocols, electronic commerce and payment, nancial privacy, proof of work, zero knowledge. Contents 1 1 Introduction 5 1.1 Caution . .5 1.2 High-level Overview . .5 2 Notation 7 3 Concepts 8 3.1 Payment Addresses and Keys . .8 3.2 Notes...........................................................9 3.2.1 Note Plaintexts and Memo Fields . .9 3.3 The Block Chain . 10 3.4 Transactions and Treestates . 10 3.5 JoinSplit Transfers and Descriptions . 11 3.6 Note Commitment Trees . 11 3.7 Nullier Sets . 12 3.8 Block Subsidy and Founders’ Reward . 12 3.9 Coinbase Transactions . 12 † Zerocoin Electric Coin Company 1 4 Abstract Protocol 12 4.1 Abstract Cryptographic Schemes . 12 4.1.1 Hash Functions . 12 4.1.2 Pseudo Random Functions . 13 4.1.3 Authenticated One-Time Symmetric Encryption . 13 4.1.4 Key Agreement . 13 4.1.5 Key Derivation . 14 4.1.6 Signature . 15 4.1.6.1 Signature with Re-Randomizable Keys . -
Piecework: Generalized Outsourcing Control for Proofs of Work
(Short Paper): PieceWork: Generalized Outsourcing Control for Proofs of Work Philip Daian1, Ittay Eyal1, Ari Juels2, and Emin G¨unSirer1 1 Department of Computer Science, Cornell University, [email protected],[email protected],[email protected] 2 Jacobs Technion-Cornell Institute, Cornell Tech [email protected] Abstract. Most prominent cryptocurrencies utilize proof of work (PoW) to secure their operation, yet PoW suffers from two key undesirable prop- erties. First, the work done is generally wasted, not useful for anything but the gleaned security of the cryptocurrency. Second, PoW is natu- rally outsourceable, leading to inegalitarian concentration of power in the hands of few so-called pools that command large portions of the system's computation power. We introduce a general approach to constructing PoW called PieceWork that tackles both issues. In essence, PieceWork allows for a configurable fraction of PoW computation to be outsourced to workers. Its controlled outsourcing allows for reusing the work towards additional goals such as spam prevention and DoS mitigation, thereby reducing PoW waste. Meanwhile, PieceWork can be tuned to prevent excessive outsourcing. Doing so causes pool operation to be significantly more costly than today. This disincentivizes aggregation of work in mining pools. 1 Introduction Distributed cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin [18] rely on the equivalence \com- putation = money." To generate a batch of coins, clients in a distributed cryp- tocurrency system perform an operation called mining. Mining requires solving a computationally intensive problem involving repeated cryptographic hashing. Such problem and its solution is called a Proof of Work (PoW) [11]. As currently designed, nearly all PoWs suffer from one of two drawbacks (or both, as in Bitcoin). -
Julia Chatterley
JULIA CHATTERLEY Anchor and Correspondent for CNN International Julia Chatterley is an anchor and correspondent for CNN International based in New York. She anchors First Move with Julia Chatterley live from the floor of the New York Stock Exchange weekdays at 9am ET on CNN International. Chatterley has been instrumental in CNN’s coverage of many major global business stories including the coronavirus outbreak, US-China trade relations, Brexit and the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. She also covers transformative technologies within the financial sector including global payments, the use of blockchain technology and digital assets like cryptocurrencies. She has interviewed key players like Ripple CEO Brad Garlinghouse, Calibra’s chief economist Christian Catalini and Mu Changchun, the Topics head of the digital currency research institute at the People’s Bank of China, to discuss the impact of new technology and the need for better regulation. Economics Emcee Chatterley has also interviewed key current and former members of the Federal Global Reserve including former Chairman Alan Greenspan and St. Louis Fed President Globalisation James Bullard in addition to many prominent CEOs and economists including Moderators Huawei’s Chief Security Officer Andy Purdy, Emirates Airlines president Tim Clark, Women LinkedIn co-founder Reid Hoffman, Cisco’s chairman and CEO Chuck Robbins. Chatterley joined CNN from Bloomberg, where she hosted the dailyBloomberg Markets and What’d You Miss? shows, covering global politics, business and breaking news, as well as hosting discussion panels and live events. A first-class honors graduate in Economics from the London School of Economics, Chatterley began her career in finance, working for Morgan Stanley in London. -
Alternative Mining Puzzles
Cryptocurrency Technologies Alternative Mining Puzzles Alternative Mining Puzzles • Essential Puzzle Requirements • ASIC-Resistant Puzzles • Proof-of-Useful-Work • Non-outsourceable Puzzles • Proof-of-Stake “Virtual Mining” Puzzles (recap) Incentive system steers participants Basic features of Bitcoin’s puzzle The puzzle is difficult to solve, so attacks are costly … but not too hard, so honest miners are compensated Q: What other features could a puzzle have? 1 Cryptocurrency Technologies Alternative Mining Puzzles On today’s menu . Alternative puzzle designs Used in practice, and speculative Variety of possible goals ASIC resistance, pool resistance, intrinsic benefits, etc. Essential security requirements Alternative Mining Puzzles • Essential Puzzle Requirements • ASIC-Resistant Puzzles • Proof-of-Useful-Work • Non-outsourceable Puzzles • Proof-of-Stake “Virtual Mining” 2 Cryptocurrency Technologies Alternative Mining Puzzles Puzzle Requirements A puzzle should ... – be cheap to verify – have adjustable difficulty – <other requirements> – have a chance of winning that is proportional to hashpower • Large player get only proportional advantage • Even small players get proportional compensation Bad Puzzle: a sequential Puzzle Consider a puzzle that takes N steps to solve a “Sequential” Proof of Work N Solution Found! 3 Cryptocurrency Technologies Alternative Mining Puzzles Bad Puzzle: a sequential Puzzle Problem: fastest miner always wins the race! Solution Found! Good Puzzle => Weighted Sample This property is sometimes called progress free. 4 Cryptocurrency Technologies Alternative Mining Puzzles Alternative Mining Puzzles • Essential Puzzle Requirements • ASIC-Resistant Puzzles • Proof-of-Useful-Work • Non-outsourceable Puzzles • Proof-of-Stake “Virtual Mining” ASIC Resistance – Why?! Goal: Ordinary people with idle laptops, PCs, or even mobile phones can mine! Lower barrier to entry! Approach: Reduce the gap between custom hardware and general purpose equipment. -
Understanding the Motivations, Challenges and Needs of Blockchain Software Developers: a Survey
Empirical Software Engineering manuscript No. (will be inserted by the editor) Understanding the Motivations, Challenges and Needs of Blockchain Software Developers: A Survey Amiangshu Bosu · Anindya Iqbal · Rifat Shahriyar · Partha Chakroborty Received: November 6, 2018 / Accepted: March 19, 2019 Abstract The blockchain technology has potential applications in various areas such as smart-contracts, Internet of Things (IoT), land registry, supply chain man- agement, storing medical data, and identity management. Although the Github currently hosts more than six thousand active Blockchain software (BCS) projects, few software engineering research has investigated these projects and its' contrib- utors. Although the number of BCS projects is growing rapidly, the motivations, challenges, and needs of BCS developers remain a puzzle. Therefore, the primary objective of this study is to understand the motivations, challenges, and needs of BCS developers and analyze the differences between BCS and non-BCS development. On this goal, we sent an online survey to 1,604 active BCS developers identified via mining the Github repositories of 145 popular BCS projects. The survey received 156 responses that met our criteria for analysis. The results suggest that the majority of the BCS developers are experienced in non-BCS development and are primarily motivated by the ideology of creating a decentralized financial system. Although most of the BCS projects are Open Source Software (OSS) projects by nature, more than 93% of our respondents found BCS development somewhat different from a non-BCS development as BCS projects have higher emphasis on security and reliability than most of the non- BCS projects. Other differences include: higher costs of defects, decentralized and hostile environment, technological complexity, and difficulty in upgrading the soft- ware after release. -
Workshop Report – “Cbdcs – Do We Need Them?” – Online Video Conference, 29 October 2020
EU BLOCKCHAIN OBSERVATORY & FORUM Workshop Report – “CBDCs – Do we need them?” – Online Video Conference, 29 October 2020 EU Blockchain Observatory & Forum – “CBDCs – Do we need them?” – Videoconference, 29 October, 2020 The report is published by the European Commission, Directorate-General of Communications Networks, Content & Technology. The information and views set out in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Commission. The Commission does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this study. Neither the Commission nor any person acting on the Commission’s behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained therein. Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. Author: Tonia Damvakeraki Published: December 2020 Comments and inquiries may be addressed to the following email: [email protected] 2 EU Blockchain Observatory & Forum – “CBDCs – Do we need them?” – Videoconference, 29 October, 2020 Table of Contents Workshop Report – “CBDCs – Do we need them?” – ................................................................... 1 WELCOME .................................................................................................................................... 4 SESSION 1 - USE CASES FOR PROGRAMMABLE MONEY IN THE ECONOMY .................................... 4 SESSION 2 - STABLE COINS: READY FOR PRIMETIME? ................................................................. 6 SESSION 3 – CENTRAL