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CCR 60055.2. Definitions
Board Administration and Regulatory Coordination Unit Division 3. Air Resources Board Chapter 1. Air Resources Board Subchapter 1.25. Administrative Procedures–Hearings Article 2. Administrative Hearing Procedures for Petitions for Review of Executive Officer Decisions Subarticle 1. General Provisions § 60055.2. Definitions. (a) The definitions applicable to these rules include those set out in the Health and Safety Code (commencing with section 39010) and in Title 13, California Code of Regulations, Chapter 5, Standards for Motor Vehicle Fuels, sections 2250, et seq., and Chapter 8, Clean Fuels Program, sections 2300, et seq. (b) The following definitions also apply: (1) “Administrative record” means all documents and records timely filed with the hearing office, pursuant to section 60055.4 and the time deadlines of these rules, including pleadings, petitions, motions, and legal arguments in support thereof; all documents or records admitted into evidence or administratively noticed by the hearing officer; all official recordings or written transcripts of hearings conducted; and all orders or decisions issued by the hearing officer or the state board regarding the petition for review of an executive officer decision; administrative record does not include any prohibited communications as defined in section 60055.13, and any settlement discussions or offers of settlement pursuant to section 60055.24. (2) “Days” means calendar days. (3) “Default” means the failure of any party to take the steps necessary and required by these regulations to further the hearing towards resolution, resulting in a finding by the hearing officer of forfeiture of the cause of action against that party. (4) “Discovery” refers to the process set forth in section 60055.25 allowing one party to request and obtain information relevant to the proceedings. -
Tol, Xeer, and Somalinimo: Recognizing Somali And
Tol , Xeer , and Somalinimo : Recognizing Somali and Mushunguli Refugees as Agents in the Integration Process A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA BY Vinodh Kutty IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY David M. Lipset July 2010 © Vinodh Kutty 2010 Acknowledgements A doctoral dissertation is never completed without the help of many individuals. And to all of them, I owe a deep debt of gratitude. Funding for this project was provided by two block grants from the Department of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota and by two Children and Families Fellowship grants from the Annie E. Casey Foundation. These grants allowed me to travel to the United Kingdom and Kenya to conduct research and observe the trajectory of the refugee resettlement process from refugee camp to processing for immigration and then to resettlement to host country. The members of my dissertation committee, David Lipset, my advisor, Timothy Dunnigan, Frank Miller, and Bruce Downing all provided invaluable support and assistance. Indeed, I sometimes felt that my advisor, David Lipset, would not have been able to write this dissertation without my assistance! Timothy Dunnigan challenged me to honor the Somali community I worked with and for that I am grateful because that made the dissertation so much better. Frank Miller asked very thoughtful questions and always encouraged me and Bruce Downing provided me with detailed feedback to ensure that my writing was clear, succinct and organized. I also have others to thank. To my colleagues at the Office of Multicultural Services at Hennepin County, I want to say “Thank You Very Much!” They all provided me with the inspiration to look at the refugee resettlement process more critically and dared me to suggest ways to improve it. -
Regulating In-House Counsel: a Catholicon Or a Nostrum Daniel A
CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by Marquette University Law School Marquette Law Review Volume 77 | Issue 2 Article 4 Regulating In-House Counsel: A Catholicon or a Nostrum Daniel A. Vigil Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr Part of the Law Commons Repository Citation Daniel A. Vigil, Regulating In-House Counsel: A Catholicon or a Nostrum, 77 Marq. L. Rev. 307 (2009). Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol77/iss2/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. REGULATING IN-HOUSE COUNSEL: A CATHOLICON OR A NOSTRUM? DANIEL A. VIGIL* I. INTRODUCTION What is and what is not the unauthorized practice of law has long been difficult, if not impossible, to define.' Unauthorized practice of law committees and courts have frequently grappled with the issue. Specifi- cally, are corporate in-house counsel participating in the unauthorized practice of law when they are assigned to work in a jurisdiction where they are not licensed? This issue has never been fully resolved. The American Bar Association has sidestepped the issue, although it has had a number of opportunities to address it. The ABA Code of Pro- fessional Responsibility and the ABA Model Rules of Professional Con- duct provide little guidance. They simply state that "[a] lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that juisdiction."2 In the absence of guidance from the ABA, states confronting the question have reached very differ- ent conclusions. -
Client Choice, Contractual Restraints, and the Market for Legal Services*
CLIENT CHOICE, CONTRACTUAL RESTRAINTS, AND THE MARKET FOR LEGAL SERVICES* Robert W. Hillman** I. INTRODUCTION The freedom of clients to discharge their lawyers at any time, with or without cause, greatly facilitates competition among lawyers. 1 An era of lawyer mobility that has destabilized law firms and rewarded lawyers able to command the loyalty of their clients rests on the simple and largely unquestioned premise that clients should be free to discharge their lawyers, with or without cause and even, under most circumstances, in contravention of contract. 2 This Article explores the norm of client choice and its impact on the market for legal services. It discusses the historical foundations of the norm, the policy reasons for and against the freedom accorded to clients to change their lawyers at any time, and ways in which the exercise of client choice is limited by application of other principles of law and ethics. For a comparative perspective, it also looks to standards of medical ethics to see the relative roles of consumer choice over service providers in the two professions. II. LEGAL SERVICES AND CLIENT CHOICE A. The Foundations of Client Choice At the core of client choice is the premise that an individual has a right to legal counsel and that “choice” necessarily suggests alternatives from which to choose. From a constitutional perspective, however, an express right to legal representation is limited, with some exceptions, to criminal proceedings 3 and is implemented through a standard of * Copyright 2007 by Robert W. Hillman ** Fair Business Practices Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. -
Contract and Agreement for Appointed Counsel Services Between the Board of Pardons and Paroles And
CONTRACT AND AGREEMENT FOR APPOINTED COUNSEL SERVICES BETWEEN THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES AND ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW STATE OF TEXAS § § COUNTY OF TRAVIS § SECTION 1 PARTIES This contract and agreement is made and entered into by and between the Board of Pardons and Paroles, hereinafter referred to as "BPP," and , hereinafter referred to as "Counsel." The parties hereto severally and collectively have agreed and by the execution hereof are bound to the mutual obligations and performance of the tasks hereinafter described. SECTION 2 CONTRACT PERIOD This contract shall commence on September 1, 2011 or if the contract is signed, by any party, after September 1, 2011, on the date last appearing in this contract and agreement shall terminate on August 31, 2012 or when a final order is entered in the any pending parole revocation hearing referenced in Section 4, herein, whichever occurs later, or unless terminated earlier in accordance with the provisions of Section 13, herein. SECTION 3 AUTHORITY AND REPRESENTATIONS The BPP enters into this contract under the authority granted to that Agency by the Constitution and laws of Texas. This contract is not within the purview of, nor is it controlled either by the Consulting Services Act, Section 2254.021 et seq. of the Government Code or the Professional Services Act, Section 2253.042 et seq. of the Government Code. Page 1 of 6 FY12 0701 SECTION 4 OBLIGATION OF COUNSEL Counsel shall provide competent legal representation and advice to certain offenders scheduled to appear at a preliminary and/or revocation hearings, including a continuance and reopening, to consider revocation of their administrative release or other sanctions; or scheduled to appear at an erroneous release hearing to consider their return to prison or other parole vote; and/or to pursue an appeal of the revocation hearing by filing a Motion to Reopen Hearing with the BPP. -
Rule 1A:4. Out-Of-State Lawyers – When Allowed to Participate in a Case Pro Hac Vice
Rule 1A:4. Out-of-State Lawyers – When Allowed to Participate in a Case Pro Hac Vice. 1. Introduction. A lawyer who is not a member of the Virginia State Bar, but is currently licensed and authorized to practice law in another state, territory, or possession of the United States of America (hereinafter called an “out-of-state lawyer”) may apply to appear as counsel pro hac vice in a particular case before any court, board or administrative agency (hereinafter called “tribunal”) in the Commonwealth of Virginia upon compliance with this rule. 2. Association of Local Counsel. No out-of-state lawyer may appear pro hac vice before any tribunal in Virginia unless the out- of-state lawyer has first associated in that case with a lawyer who is an active member in good standing of the Virginia State Bar (hereinafter called “local counsel”). The name of local counsel shall appear on all notices, orders, pleadings, and other documents filed in the case. Local counsel shall personally appear and participate in pretrial conferences, hearings, trials, or other proceedings actually conducted before the tribunal. Local counsel associating with an out-of-state lawyer in a particular case shall accept joint responsibility with the out-of-state lawyer to the client, other parties, witnesses, other counsel and to the tribunal in that particular case. Any pleading or other paper required to be served (whether relating to discovery or otherwise) shall be invalid unless it is signed by local counsel. The tribunal in which such case is pending shall have full authority to deal with local counsel exclusively in all matters connected with the pending case. -
199 3. Sixth Amendment — Effective Assistance of Counsel
2010] THE SUPREME COURT — LEADING CASES 199 3. Sixth Amendment — Effective Assistance of Counsel. — The Sixth Amendment right to counsel has long been recognized as the right to be represented by “effective” counsel.1 In Strickland v. Wash- ington,2 the Supreme Court clarified that counsel is ineffective if two requirements — constitutional deficiency and prejudice — are met.3 Federal and state courts have held, in near unanimity, that the right to effective assistance of counsel extends only to direct consequences of a conviction, not to so-called collateral consequences,4 even though “the imposition of collateral consequences has become an increasingly cen- tral purpose of the modern criminal process.”5 Last Term, in Padilla v. Kentucky,6 the Supreme Court held that criminal defense counsel have an affirmative duty to provide accurate information regarding the de- portation consequences of a guilty plea when those consequences are “clear.”7 In extending Strickland to ineffective assistance claims re- garding deportation, the Court stated that deportation is unique and difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence of conviction.8 The Court implicitly rejected the current approaches to determining Strickland’s reach and created a new category of covered topics that cannot reasonably be restricted to the deportation conse- quence alone. Lower courts will likely struggle over which other con- sequences — previously excluded from Strickland’s coverage — are similarly “unique.” Jose Padilla has resided in the United States as a lawful permanent resident for over forty years.9 Padilla pleaded guilty to three drug- related charges after he was indicted in Hardin County, Kentucky.10 Padilla claimed that he entered his guilty plea in reliance upon his at- torney’s advice that he “did not have to worry about immigration sta- tus since he had been in the country so long.”11 In fact, however, his conviction resulted in nearly automatic deportation.12 Padilla filed for ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 1 See McMann v. -
RESOLUTION Recognizing Kenneth C. Frazier Upon the Occasion of His Retirement As Chief Executive Officer of Merck & Co
RESOLUTION Recognizing Kenneth C. Frazier upon the occasion of his retirement as Chief Executive Officer of Merck & Co., Inc. WHEREAS, Kenneth C. Frazier will be retiring as chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) of the multinational pharmaceutical company Merck & Co., Inc. effective June 30, 2021; and WHEREAS, Mr. Frazier joined Merck in 1992 as vice president, general counsel and secretary of the Astra Merck group. He was appointed as vice president of public affairs in 1994, and then in 1997 he assumed the additional responsibilities of assistant general counsel for corporate staff. Mr. Frazier was promoted to vice president and deputy general counsel in January 1999. In December 1999, he became senior vice president and general counsel. In November 2006, he was promoted to executive vice president and general counsel. Mr. Frazier served as executive vice president and president, Global Human Health, from 2007 to 2010. He was named president of Merck in May 2010. Mr. Frazier became Merck’s chief executive officer and a member of its board in January 2011. He became chairman of the board on December 1, 2011; and WHEREAS, Under Ken’s strong and highly principled leadership, Merck strengthened its commitment to the company’s core values: scientific excellence, business integrity, patient focus, and respect for all people; and WHEREAS, Ken’s vision and courage to make difficult decisions within Merck, while steadfastly investing in research and development, have positioned Merck well for sustainable future growth, as they continue -
DESCRIPTION the Chief Executive Officer, Under the Direction of The
Metro Gold Line Foothill Extension Construction Authority Job Description – Chief Executive Officer CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER DESCRIPTION The Chief Executive Officer, under the direction of the Board of Directors, provides overall leadership and direction to ensure the Construction Authority achieves its vision, mission, goals and objectives. Organizes and manages Construction Authority staff and contractors to provide effective and efficient transportation planning, and construction. TYPICAL TASKS, KNOWLEDGE AND DUTIES Examples of Duties • Approves and adopts Construction Authority’s policies, procedures; and maintains accountability for the performance of the entire agency • Provides overall leadership and staff direction in formulating and achieving Construction Authority’s objectives • Makes recommendations to the Board of Directors on significant matters affecting Construction Authority operations and policies • Oversees the development and implementation of short-range and long-range goals and business plans • Directs and manages staff to efficiently and effectively implement the policies and direction of the Board of Directors • Provides leadership for the region’s mobility agenda and coordinates regionally significant projects and programs by working collaboratively with regional partners • Oversees Construction Authority’s planning efforts, including identifying major priorities, establishing goals and strategies that ensure the success of the project • Works closely with the Municipal Operators to ensure coordination • Aggressively -
Canadian Lawyer Article EN
CREATED WITH PERMISSION FROM THE REPRINT CL45.01 ISSUE. © KEY MEDIA FEATURE CROSS EXAMINED THE MEANDERING PATH FROM LEGAL TO CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER Yves Desjardins-Siciliano always knew he wanted to head a company, but it took the new CEO at Siemens Mobility Canada years of persistence MAKING THE LEAP from general counsel to It involved uncertainty, short-term failures what a lawyer practising at a law firm would CEO is the stuff of dreams for many in-house and an openness to varied experiences. have received, including in marketing, sales, lawyers. While in-house roles are extremely Desjardins-Siciliano’s first taste of what felt finance and even installing computers. varied and often highly influential, many ambi- like professional failure was when he articled “I displayed the ambition to be a business tious GCs will ask themselves “what’s next?” at Stikeman Elliott LLP in Montreal but was executive at IBM, [and] the way to become an after leading the legal department. not asked back to the firm. executive at the time required that you carry For Yves Desjardins-Siciliano, the answer “On a personal level, it taught me to deal the bag, as they say.” to that question had been clear from the with failure, because I failed in staying at While Desjardins-Siciliano was settled outset of his career. He wanted to be a busi- Stikemans, [but I found] within me the confi- at IBM, one day he received a call from ness leader. In law school in the late 1970s, Desjardins- Siciliano attended a conference where Ian “I displayed the ambition to be a business Sinclair, chairman and CEO of Canadian executive at IBM, [and] the way to become Pacific, spoke. -
Christopher L. Slaughter | Chief Executive Officer PHONE (304) 526-8140 EMAIL [email protected] LICENSURE KY | OH | WV EDUCATION J.D
Christopher L. Slaughter | Chief Executive Officer PHONE (304) 526-8140 EMAIL [email protected] LICENSURE KY | OH | WV EDUCATION J.D. University of Kentucky Chris Slaughter is the CEO of Steptoe & Johnson. He was elected to the position in 2020, the culmination of a career with the firm spanning more than twenty years. His legal practice is focused on counseling and litigation. He advises clients on labor negotiations, contract administration, and structural changes that impact employment. He represents employers when they are faced with litigation before the National Labor Relations Board, arbitrators, state and federal courts, and agencies. His clients range from Fortune 500 companies to mid-sized businesses in the construction, energy, health care, hospitality, and manufacturing industries. Throughout his career, Chris has honed his proactive, consensus-based leadership style while holding a number of leadership positions. He is a past managing member of the firm’s Huntington, West Virginia office and was elected to multiple terms on the firm’s executive committee. He serves his community through leadership positions in his church and with organizations dedicated to the arts and economic development. Chris is named among The Best Lawyers in America® and Chambers USA America’s Leading Lawyers for Business. He is also a fellow of both the West Virginia Bar Foundation and the American College of Labor and Employment Lawyers. REPRESENTATIVE EXPERIENCE Successfully prosecuted civil fraud action against former corporate -
In Law Or in Equity?
In law or in equity? By Eric Lindquist, Of Counsel to Fox Horan & Camerini LLP © Eric Lindquist 2020 St. Thomas More, English Chancellor 1529-1532 Lawyers and businesspersons around the world read contracts every day that provide for indemnity against, or the release of, claims “in law or in equity.” Based on my conversations with civil lawyers and with business executives in the US and abroad, it seems that many of them haven’t really thought about what “equity” means in this context. Here are the basics. Equity jurisdiction arose in England during the Middle Ages to balance the excessive rigidity of the common law courts by allowing a royal official, the Lord Chancellor, to decide disputes based on broad concepts of fairness and good conscience. The distinction between law and equity is important because: (a) equitable claims are decided by a judge, not by a jury, (b) claims in equity are subject to different defenses from legal claims (the defenses of “unclean hands,” “laches,” or “undue hardship,” e.g.), (c) equitable relief being viewed as an “extraordinary remedy,” the standards of pleading and proof are generally stricter than for legal claims, requiring greater specificity and clearer evidence, (d) courts can retain jurisdiction over equitable matters long after judgment is entered, allowing them to modify or dissolve injunctions, or to appoint receivers to manage property or special masters to monitor compliance, (e) equitable judgments are enforceable by sanctions for contempt of court, and (f) equitable judgments are discretionary and therefore especially difficult to overturn on appeal. Most claims arising “in equity” ask the court for an injunction, that is, an order that the respondent do something or refrain from doing something.