Carnell, Polanyi, Kuhn, Sorokin

Sorokin’s Contribution to Critical Realism

Polanyi, Sorokin, Carnell: Part II

Steve Clinton

Spring, 2009

EPS – Southeastern Region

Introduction

Empiricism took over from Realism in the philosophy of the sciences in the early 1930s, and it largely took over the social sciences since 1940s. The humanities, on the other hand, have always kept some appreciation for integration, speculation, creativity and philosophical thought, and hold an open position on which of the many philosophies is worthy of discussion. In the universities empiricism ‘won’ the battle for methodological control of the word “scientific” and nearly co-opted the word “scholarly.” This philosophical movement ranged from phenomenology to pure materialism. But it excluded realism.

By the 1950s there was a group of scholars across various disciplines in the sciences and social sciences who saw the need for integrating paradigms, that is, the value of central ideas in systems of thought and professional constructions of reality. In science this was led primarily by Kuhn (1962), although a number of physicists also saw the need, such as Polanyi (1958) and Popper (1957). In sociology many people saw the need but only a few tried, almost as counter-culture agents, to propose a new integrating paradigm. The primary systems thinker was

Sorokin (1950). The shared philosophy of most of these thinkers was a new form of realism, now called critical realism.

1 In religion the denominations and Christian Universitites had consolidated positions on doctrinal grounds. But there was wide-spread methodological disunity and misunderstanding. Carnell (1957) tried to create a new methodology which came to be called systematic consistency. It follows the understanding of Kant identifying that human capabilities allow us to pursue three epistemological methodologies: reason, experience, intuition. When we ask the appropriate questions, using the appropriate methods then we gain true knowledge. Thus the

1950s were a time of creativity in epistemology and theory formation. But the metaphysical implications of the new epistemology were not worked out yet.

By the mid-1960s skeptics derived deconstructionism as a response to the idea of creating any new integrative system. In any deconstructionist approach to truth the assumption is that there cannot be objective truth, therefore any “system” is temporary and context dependent (Plumb, 2008). This conceptual dependence which leads to relativism is especially true of naturalism itself (Kwan, 2008). This move to situated interpretation continued to grow through the 1970s and culminated intellectually in Rorty (1975) for whom philosophy became an interesting discussion, not a search for anything foundational. Eventually another, more neutral, stance was taken under the label post-modernism. This position rejects the ‘answers’ of all systems, from the Enlightenment to the present. We can ask interesting questions and derive thoughtful answers. But we will never have final answers or total systems of truth. These related approaches are the newest form of relativism.

This project will review a few of the main ideas of Polanyi, Sorokin and

Carnell with a view to seeing if there is any common direction toward critical

2 realism in these diverse efforts and whether contemporary scholars are following these directions. Today we will focus on Sorokin’s integralism and the conceptual foundations of sociological theory (Turner, 1991), particularly epistemological and metaphysical issues.

I. Sorokin Contribution

Sorokin worked on analyzing the past cultures of Western society and identified three types: ideational, idealistic, and sensate. He maintained that an integral system of truth entails a synthesis of these three types of cultures, thus approximating the true threefold nature of reality (spirit, soul, body). “Hence integralism is the most adequate system of truth and knowledge.” (Sorokin, 1962,

226-237; 1957a, 679-697). This primarily applies to how we live life together and the culture we mutually develop. Sorokin begins with a simple naïve realism.

If holding a culture in balance is the key to success for a people, then we can evaluate both how such a culture comes about and how it maintains an equilibrium.

With the dominance of materialism in the 1920-1940s Sorokin knew that change would be a necessity for the future. “Change to an integral ontology and epistemology was viewed by Sorokin as a necessary condition for realizing the creative potential of the social sciences (Sorokin, 1962, 226-237; 1961; 1963, 372-

408).” (Jefferies, 1999).

One key in integralism is to keep all three approaches more or less balanced for the culture to grow and thrive. Conceptual and cultural balance can be hard to achieve and difficult to maintain. There will always be variant ideas, they keep us fresh. But there must be conscious attempts at theoretical and applied balance. T.

S. Eliot wrote in the late ‘40s on Christianity and Culture and talked about the same

3 kind of cultural balance needed for Western Civilization. Eliot said that the future of the West was to create a new culture, either a pagan one or a new Christian one

(1948, 10). Eliot also recognized that a new challenge faced humanity: to relate national and regional cultures and values to the growing world culture. This new world culture is what is today called globalism. Any new cultural synthesis will be based on a metaphysical and epistemological foundation. Eliot said, “Without a common faith, all efforts toward drawing nations closer together in culture can produce only an illusion of unity” (1948, 157). In the 60 years since Eliot wrote it is clear that there are three dominant ideas vying for control of the new world culture: materialism (and its epistemological and ethical method relativism),

Christianity, Islam.

Sorokin likewise saw the need for religion to be deeply involved in a world discussion. A fundamental assumption of Sorokin’s integral perspective is that religious and theological ideas contain valid insights and truths regarding various aspects of human behavior and social life. The ideas of the major world religions can be divided into two basic categories in terms of their relation to an integral social science. The first category is composed of those ideas pertaining directly or primarily to the nature of the spiritual, superrational, supersensory world. Ideas such as those pertaining to the nature of God, the relation between God and human beings, and the afterlife fall into this category. So far, this fits Kant’s Critique of

Judgment. “These ideas can be related to the purposes of integral social science, provide justifications for some of its concepts, and influence the structure of its priorities” (Jefferies, 1999). One difference between Sorokin and Kant is that

4 Sorokin says that he is talking about a real world and real values which is known to us through intellect, experience and intuition.

A second category of ideas are the moral and ethical precepts of the major world religions. Also important in this regard are ideas about the causes and effects of such morality with respect to both individuals and the sociocultural values of human cultures. Since these ideas pertain directly to universal variations in human behavior, they are the focal point of an integral social science. Krishna (1960) notes that the ideational system of knowledge also contains some ideas pertaining to empirical and rational aspects of the world. These ideas are suitable for verification through the methods of empirical science or logical philosophy. “An example of such ideas at an abstract level is the positive and negative precepts of the Golden Rule: to do good to others and to avoid doing harm to them” (Jefferies,

1999). These are principles (abstract) which lead to moral behaviors (experiential).

The incorporation of religious ideas within the frame of reference of the social sciences is consistent with Popper's (1957,38-39) view that metaphysical ideas have furthered scientific advancement throughout history. Sorokin believed that society and culture are ultimately created by the aggregate effect of individual choices. Most social theorists up to Sorokin had assumed that key individuals in dominant nations almost singlehandedly created and promoted dominant cultures.

In this context of mass human relations, the choice of altruistic love is a key determinant of both personal and social reconstruction in new directions (Sorokin,

1950, 287, 355; Johnston, 1995). This will form a basis for creating a new world culture in the future.

5 Sorokin applies this practical demonstration of composite individual choices and the need for conceptual balance directly to theological issues: “The truth of faith, or ideational truth, is ‘…disclosed in a supersensory way through mystic experience, direct revelation, Divine intuition, and inspiration.’” (Sorokin,

1948,607). There is a common source of supersensory truth, and such revelatory information is a legitimate part of human knowledge and experience and can be used to build a system of thought and culture. This is a form of metaphysical realism.

In his description of integralism, judgment or intuition is identified by Sorokin as the third method of cognition, in addition to sense and reason, following Kant.

Sorokin views intuition as a source of cognition, irrespective of content, of anything which is not accessible through sensory and rational methods alone. In this sense, it may in some instances include supersensory-superrational aspects of the total reality (Sorokin, 1962, 227-229; 1961; 1963, 372-408). This integrative methodology is a philosophical direct descendent of Kant’s three critiques: one world, three approaches to knowledge.

II. Sorokin and Critical Realism

Sorokin’s philosophy relates to the more modern movement called critical realism. The positivism of integralism is based on the principles of critical realism

(Musgrave, 1993). In sociology “Critical realism incorporates recent valid criticisms of positivism, while advocating a theory of knowledge based on a strong realist epistemology.” (Jefferies, 1999). Other philosophers of sociology reject positivism in favor of a more pragmatic approach and still call the position realism (Tuner,

1991). Currently this realist epistemology is being explored by BonJour (1999) and

6 Porter (2006). A recent book "Critical Realism and the Social Sciences: Heterodox

Elaborations" edited by Jon Frauley and Frank Pearce gives away too much of realism (Manicas, 2008).

Ritzers’ (1975, 7) concept of paradigm applies Sorokin's and Kuhn’s ideas: “A paradigm is a fundamental image of the subject matter within a science. It serves to define what should be studied, what questions should be asked, and what rules should be followed in interpreting the answers obtained. The paradigm is the broadest unit of consensus within a science and serves to differentiate one scientific community (or sub-community) from another. It subsumes, defines, and interrelates the exemplars, theories, and methods and instruments that exist within it.” Kuhn (2000) used a similar definition of paradigms.

Sorokin’s three types of culture would have three different sets of values which would show up intermingled in the dominant cultural paradigm. This complex cultural paradigm is recognized in research today. For example, contemporary educational thought asserts that there is both a set of overt values in the curriculum taught to pupils and another set of values in the hidden curriculum, made up of the teacher-student relations and the administration-student relations.

What we teach, such as democracy in eleventh grade, is not what we apply to the adult-student relationships, which are based on authority and bureaucracy (Apple,

1979; Clinton, 1997). Students have no say in the curriculum, budget, personnel or administrative policy which governs them. Sorokin would point to these as ideational and idealistic social forces conflicting at a local level as creating the culture of the school.

7 Sorokin’s point is that a realistic set of values is needed to form a new world culture. Will this needed set of values likely come from modern American culture?

Our public schools are dominated by social utilitarianism. But utilitarianism is not committed to any underlying metaphysical program. Shepperson seeks to lay such a basis and goes back to C. S. Peirce for a realist foundation (2008). There does not appear to be a viable set of values in American culture (but see Clinton, 1997).

We have seen eight contributions Sorokin makes to understanding life in a complex but interactive way:

1. Analyzing cultures and finding three dominant trends which can achieve balance.

2. The necessity of continual adjustment and change in cultures.

3. Religion gives knowledge, in keeping with Kant’s view of judgment.

4. Incorporating religious ideas as a major component in understanding culture.

5. Recognizing the religious basis of many personal moral choices.

6. Recognizing intuition has cognitive content.

7. Relating integralism to critical realism, and thus into mainstream philosophy.

8. Relating integralism to the use of paradigms at a cultural level.

He bases all eight of these in a philosophical position commensurate with modern critical realism. In doing this he helps create the philosophical foundation for a new faith based culture. The alternatives are continued cultural decay or a sensate materialistic culture.

II. Modern Social Theory and Critical Realism

Turner's (1991) suggestion is that there are common topics among various value perspectives in sociology and that a matrix can be developed using these common elements. He lays the groundwork for such a theory but does not develop one.

8 Turner's (1991) suggestion is that there are common topics among various sociological perspectives and that a matrix can be developed using these common elements

(chapter one of Turner, 1991).

Chart 1: Turner's Analysis of Theories

Meta-theoretical schemes

Analytical schemes

Definitions Concepts Statements Formats

Propositional schemes

Modeling schemes

Statements are the way that concepts take specific shape in the language. It is at the level of statements that empirical data influence the way that concepts are formed in language. After showing the role of the various terms of this chart and how the statements take the format of one of the schemes, Turner shows how these theoretical elements are related by level of abstraction (Turner, 1991, p. 21).

Chart 2: Turner's Levels of Theory

Axiomatic/ Analytical Meta- formal schemes theory High schemes

Analytic models

Level of Middle-range Abstraction Propositions

Empirical Causal generalization model Low

Low High

Scope of substantive phenomena

9 What distinguishes between various elements of schemes (theory statements) is their scope; the range of phenomena covered by the statement (Turner, 1991, p. 21). Useful theories must be abstract to apply to many cases of particulars. But such theories must also be testable in some means in order to be affirmed or rejected. Turner (1991, p. 24) thinks that all three forms of high levels of abstraction are too general to generate good, testable theories. He also thinks that mid-range propositions are possibly too narrow in scope to serve as good theories. Some form of axiomatic propositions or analytic models are the place to build testable theories (1991, pp. 25-26). This blend of speculative theory formation and empirical testing occurs within a realist conception of the world. But Turner does not argue for such a concept, rather, he assumes it.

This discussion of the appropriate level of abstraction in theory construction is ongoing. Taylor (1993) and Weiler (1996) both raise the question of whether the politico-educational theories of Paulo Freire are presented in so abstract a form as to be not useful in describing any concrete situations. If a theory is presented in an overly abstract way, it is neither predictive nor testable. If a theory is too narrow, that is based on specific empirical results without sufficient generalization, it does not generate a system of understanding which is inclusive and comprehensive.

Turner's solution is to use axiomatic propositions or analytic models. The danger, which he does not discuss, is that one may loose touch with the facticity of the mid-range propositions. The building blocks of a theory must originate in the empirical level of investigation, be linked together in an explanatory system or causal model, be generalized in the form of middle-range propositions and be theoretically linked together

10 to form analytic models. Only when the links of such a scheme (system) are seen does the model retain the connection to empirical data and thus preserve empirical integrity.

However, it is possible to go beyond Turner and use even less advanced levels of abstraction to form a theoretical means for analysis and integration of a system. This can be accomplished by relating middle-range propositions to one another in a hypothetical analytic model, and then testing the relationships of the theory to discern if the analytic model is faithful to the propositions; a test of coherence. Some form of analytic model, made up of middle range propositions, based on empirical generalizations is necessary to be sufficiently broad in scope and yet testable in practice. This new formal understanding of statements and the levels of abstraction and scope of phenomena can be applied to the theoretical matrix of relational elements of values. This formulation is compatible with a realist understanding of the world, but not with a materialist one or an idealist one.

Conclusion

Sorokin’s beginning using culture, values, and philosophy has been followed by

Turner, who adds more formal work on theory formation. Both of them use a formula based on coherence and yet open to empirical testing. However, the conclusion in such a system can only work in realism. Neither of them interacts with modern philosophical literature in critical realism.

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