Jones V. State (Miss., 2013)

Jones v. State (Miss., 2013)

BRETT JONES v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2009-CT-02033-SCT SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI Dated: July 18, 2013

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/19/2009 ¶1. Brett Jones was convicted of murder for TRIAL JUDGE: HON. THOMAS J. stabbing his grandfather to death. In accordance GARDNER, III with Mississippi Code Section 97-3-21, the trial judge sentenced Jones to life imprisonment. COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LEE Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-21 (Rev. 2006) ("Every COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT person who shall be

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: Page 2

SYLVIA S. OWEN convicted of murder shall be sentenced by the THOMAS HENRY FREELAND, IV court to imprisonment for life in the State 1 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: Penitentiary."). Jones's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Jones v. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY State ("Jones I"), 938 So. 2d 312 (Miss. Ct. GENERAL App. 2006). BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS ¶2. This Court granted Jones leave to seek post- NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST- conviction relief in the Circuit Court of Lee CONVICTION RELIEF County. In his petition for post-conviction relief before the circuit court, Jones argued, inter alia, DISPOSITION: that, because he was fifteen years old at the time of the murder, his life sentence violated the THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel APPEALS IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND and unusual punishment. The circuit court REVERSED IN PART. THE JUDGMENT denied Jones's motion for post-conviction relief, OF and the Court of Appeals affirmed that THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LEE judgment. Jones v. State ("Jones II"), 2011 WL COUNTY IS 3671890 (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2011), reh'g AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED denied (Apr. 3, 2012). IN PART. THE SENTENCE IS VACATED, ¶3. Jones then petitioned this Court for writ of AND certiorari, noting that two cases were pending THIS CASE IS REMANDED TO THE before the United States Supreme Court which CIRCUIT COURT OF LEE COUNTY raised the issue of whether the Eighth FOR Amendment forbids a sentence of life without RESENTENCING - 07/18/2013 parole for juveniles convicted of homicide. On June 25, 2012, the Supreme Court decided MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: Miller v. Alabama (and the companion case Jackson v. Hobbs), __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, MANDATE ISSUED: 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012). This Court granted EN BANC. Jones's petition for writ of certiorari and ordered

- 1 - Jones v. State (Miss., 2013) supplemental briefing regarding the application adults also put them at a significant of Miller. We have limited our review to that disadvantage in criminal proceedings"); J.D.B. issue. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. __, __, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2400-2401, 180 L. Ed. 2d 310 (2011) ANALYSIS (discussing children's responses to interrogation). And finally, this mandatory Page 3 punishment disregards the possibility of ¶4. Where an appeal raises a question of law, the rehabilitation even when the circumstances most applicable standard of review is de novo. suggest it. Lambert v. State, 941 So. 2d 804, 807 (Miss. Page 4 2006) (citing Brown v. State, 731 So. 2d 595, 598 (Miss. 1999)). Id. at 2468.

¶5. In Miller, the United States Supreme Court ¶6. We recently addressed Miller in Parker v. held "that the Eighth Amendment forbids a State, 2013 WL 2436630 (Miss. June 6, 2013) sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison (mandate not issued). Like Jones, fifteen-year- without the possibility of parole for juvenile old Parker was convicted for the murder of his offenders." Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (emphasis grandfather and sentenced to life imprisonment. added). The Court declined to impose a Id. at *1. Preliminarily, we found that "[p]rior to categorical bar on sentences of life without Miller, our trial courts were not required to hold parole for juveniles, but "require[d] [the an individualized sentencing hearing for sentencing authority] to take into account how juveniles before imposing a life sentence." Id. at children are different, and how those differences *7. Thus, Miller imposed a new obligation with counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a which this State must comport.2 Id. We held lifetime in prison." Id. The Miller Court that, although "murder does not carry a specific identified multiple juvenile characteristics and sentence of life without parole," the State's circumstances which may exist that are parole statute, Section 47-7-3(1)(h),3 rendered precluded from consideration by a mandatory Parker's life sentence "tantamount to life without sentencing scheme: parole." Id. Therefore, our sentencing and parole scheme "contravene[d] the dictates of Miller," Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile as it made Parker ineligible for parole absent precludes consideration of his chronological age consideration of his youth by the sentencing and its hallmark features—among them, authority. Id. We vacated Parker's sentence and immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to remanded his case to the circuit court for a new appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents sentencing hearing.4 Id. at *10. taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him—and from Page 5 which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects ¶7. Parker was pending before this Court on the circumstances of the homicide offense, direct appeal when Miller was announced. The including the extent of his participation in the United States Supreme Court has stated, "[w]hen conduct and the way familial and peer pressures a decision of this Court results in a 'new rule,' may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he that rule applies to all criminal cases still might have been charged and convicted of a pending on direct review." Schriro v. lesser offense if not for incompetencies Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351, 124 S. Ct. 2519, associated with youth—for example, his 159 L. Ed. 2d 442 (2004) (quoting Griffith v. inability to deal with police officers or Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S. Ct. 708, prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or 93 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1987)). After determining that his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. See, Miller imposed a new obligation, there was little e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2032 question as to whether that obligation should ("[T]he features that distinguish juveniles from apply if this Court found that Parker had

- 2 - Jones v. State (Miss., 2013) received a mandatory sentence of life without defendant stands convicted of an act that the law parole. In contrast, Jones's conviction and does not make criminal or faces a punishment sentence became final in 2006, more than five that the law cannot impose upon him." Id. at years before Miller. Jones is before this Court 351-52 (internal citations omitted). Miller solely on collateral review. Thus, the issue presented addressed the latter. today is whether Miller applies to cases which already have become final. Stated differently, ¶10. Although Miller did not impose a we must determine if Miller applies categorical ban on the punishment that the retroactively to cases on collateral review. substantive law could impose, it explicitly foreclosed imposition of a mandatory sentence I. of life without parole on juvenile offenders. By prohibiting the imposition of a mandatory ¶8. In Teague, a plurality decision, the United sentence, the new obligation prevents "a States Supreme Court held that, "[u]nless they significant risk that a [juvenile] . . . faces a fall within an exception to the general rule, new punishment that the law cannot impose on him." constitutional rules of criminal procedure will Id. not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are Page 7 announced." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 ¶11. "[S]ubstantive rules . . . include[] decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by Page 6 interpreting its terms." Id. at 351-52 (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620- (1989). The Teague Court identified two 621, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1998)). exceptions to the general bar against Prior to Miller, everyone convicted of murder in retroactivity. The Court stated, Mississippi was sentenced to life imprisonment and was ineligible for parole. Following Miller, First, a new rule should be applied retroactively Mississippi's current sentencing and parole if it places certain kinds of primary, private statutes could not be followed in homicide cases individual conduct beyond the power of the involving juvenile defendants. Our sentencing criminal law-making authority to proscribe. scheme may be applied to juveniles only after Second, a new rule should be applied applicable Miller characteristics and retroactively if it requires the observance of circumstances have been considered by the those procedures that . . . are implicit in the sentencing authority. As such, Miller modified concept of ordered liberty. our substantive law by narrowing its application Id. at 307 (internal citations omitted). This for juveniles. Court expressly has adopted Teague's "very ¶12. The Legislature is the branch of limited retroactive application standard." government responsible for enactment of Manning v. State, 929 So. 2d 885, 900 (Miss. substantive law, which includes both crime and 2006). punishment. As we noted in Parker, "[t]he ¶9. In ensuing cases, the United States Supreme authority to say what constitutes a crime, and Court has expounded upon the exceptions what punishment shall be inflicted is in its articulated in Teague. In Summerlin, the Court entirety a legislative question." Parker, 2013 determined that Teague's first exception WL 2436630, at *9 (quoting Williams v. State, encompassed rules "more accurately 708 So. 2d 1358, 1361 (Miss. 1998)). However, characterized as substantive rules not subject to its enactments must comport with both the the bar." Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 351-352 n.4. United States and Mississippi Constitutions. The Court stated, "[n]ew substantive rules Miller explicitly prohibits states from imposing generally apply retroactively . . . because they a mandatory sentence of life without parole on necessarily carry a significant risk that a juveniles. Thus, Miller rendered our present sentencing scheme unconstitutional if, and only

- 3 - Jones v. State (Miss., 2013) if, the sentencing authority fails to take into murder is tantamount to life without parole, we account characteristics and circumstances expressly rejected that a juvenile unique to juveniles. When the Miller Court announced a new obligation prohibiting the Page 9 application of our existing substantive law, it modified Mississippi substantive law. could be sentenced to life without parole in Parker. See Parker, 2013 WL 2436630, at n.21 II. ("[T]oday's decision only grants the trial court the authority to sentence a juvenile to 'life Page 8 imprisonment' - the maximum sentence allowed by statute."). ¶13. The dissent posits that this Court should declare Section 47-7-3(1)(h) unconstitutional as ¶16. The dissent further posits that declaring applied to every juvenile. This position was Section 47-7-3(1)(h) unconstitutional as applied rejected by the Parker Court after full and to all juveniles "minimizes our intrusion into any careful deliberation. See Parker, 2013 WL legislative function." Diss. Op. ¶ 24. Yet, while 2436630, n.14 ("Miller does not require this seeking not to appropriate this legislative Court to declare Section 47-7-3(1)(h) per se function, the dissent would declare a valid unconstitutional as applied to juveniles.") legislative enactment unconstitutional, even Declaring Section 47-7-3(1)(h) unconstitutional though it already has been shown that Section as applied to all juveniles would be an inordinate 47-7-3(1)(h) can be applied constitutionally to expansion of Miller's holding. Application of certain juveniles. Section 47-7-3(1)(h) to a juvenile is unconstitutional only absent consideration of the ¶17. Finally, the dissent misconstrues the actual characteristics and circumstances unique to effect of the holding in Parker, and suggests juvenile defendants by the sentencing authority. that "the revised sentence will have no effect." Diss. Op. ¶ 27. I doubt Mr. Jones would agree, ¶14. To be clear, neither the sentencing statute, given that today's decision grants him an Section 97-3-21, nor the applicable parole opportunity to be relieved of a mandatory life provision, Section 47-7-3(1)(h), has been sentence. If the sentencing authority concludes, abrogated, as posited by the dissent. Section 97- after Miller consideration, that Jones's eligibility 3-21 does not violate the Miller mandate. for parole should not be foreclosed by the parole Section 47-7-3(1)(h) cannot be applied in all statute, he is to be sentenced to "life cases, but can be applied constitutionally to imprisonment with eligibility for parole juveniles who fail to convince the sentencing notwithstanding the present provisions of authority that Miller considerations are Mississippi Code Section 47-7-3(1)(h)." See sufficient to prohibit its application. Therefore, supra n.4. In that event, subsection (h) will have in order to comply with the United States been annulled by the sentencing authority, and Constitution and to make Miller considerations Jones will be eligible for parole subject to the more than perfunctory, we put in place a "stop- general provisions of Section 47-7-3(1). gap mechanism" which allows the sentencing authority "to annul application of Section 47-7- CONCLUSION 3(1)(h)." Parker, 2013 WL 2436630, at *9. This mechanism enables the trial judge to nullify ¶18. We are of the opinion that Miller created a application of subsection (h) to ensure protection new, substantive rule which should be applied of a juvenile's Eighth Amendment rights. retroactively to cases on collateral review. We affirm in part and reverse in part the Court of ¶15. This mechanism does not, as the dissent Appeals' judgment and the trial court's denial of suggests, allow a juvenile defendant convicted post-conviction relief. We vacate of murder to be sentenced to life without parole. While we all recognize that a life sentence for Page 10

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Jones's sentence and remand this case to the Miller's declaration that "mandatory life without Circuit Court of Lee County for a new parole for those under the age of 18 at the time sentencing hearing to be conducted consistently of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's with this Court's opinion in Parker.5 See supra prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishment'." n.4. Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012); U.S. Const. ¶19. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF amend. VIII. Accordingly, I would adopt the APPEALS IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND approach taken by the Wyoming Supreme Court REVERSED IN PART. THE JUDGMENT when addressing their statutes and hold OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LEE COUNTY IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND Page 12 REVERSED IN PART. THE SENTENCE IS VACATED, AND THIS CASE IS Section 47-7-3(1)(h) unconstitutional as applied REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT to juveniles convicted of murder, in light of OF LEE COUNTY FOR RESENTENCING. Miller. See Bear Cloud v. Wyoming, 294 P. 3d 36 (Wyo. 2013) (construed in Parker, 2011- WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON, P.J., KA-01158-SCT). Therefore, rather than LAMAR, PIERCE AND COLEMAN, JJ., remanding the case for resentencing, I would CONCUR. KITCHENS, J., DISSENTS grant Jones's petition for post-conviction relief WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION as it relates to his sentence, and I would declare JOINED BY CHANDLER AND KING, JJ. that, for juvenile offenders convicted of murder, the parole authorities shall apply only the KITCHENS, JUSTICE, DISSENTING: general parole provision of Section 47-7-3(1).8

¶20. For the reasons stated in my separate ¶21. I agree that Jones's life sentence for murder opinion in Parker, I disagree with the Court's is tantamount to a sentence of life without remanding the present case to the circuit court parole. But, under Section 97-3-21, life without for resentencing. Parker v. State, 2011-KA- parole is a sentencing option for capital murder, 01158-SCT (¶¶ 31-38) (Miss. June 6, 2013) but not for murder. Indeed, the State recently (Kitchens, J., concurring in part and dissenting argued that the imposition of a sentence of life in part, joined by Dickinson, P.J., Chandler and without parole for murder was legally King, JJ.).6 While capital murder may be permissible because Section 47-7-3(1)(h) punished by a sentence of life without parole, foreclosed eligibility for parole. Fernando Jones received a life sentence for murder, the Martinez Parker v. State, 30 So. 3d 1222, only punishment that our courts (i.e., the 1227-28 (Miss. 2010). In rejecting that "sentencing authority") may impose for that argument, we held that Section 47-7-3 "does not crime. affect a judge's sentencing prerogative under the criminal statutes." Id. at 1228. Because Page 11 Page 13 See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-21 (2012).7 Yet, our probation and parole statutes automatically a sentence of life without parole "exceeded the foreclose the possibility of parole for those statutory maximum," we vacated the sentence convicted of a violent crime. Miss. Code Ann. § and remanded "for resentencing within the 47-7-3(1)(h) (Rev. 2011). Our trial courts can statutory guidelines." Id. at 1228, 1235.9 impose only those sentences allowed by statute, whereas authority over parole eligibility is ¶22. The Court's having explicitly rejected the vested in the executive branch, specifically, the notion that, in Mississippi, a sentencing court State Parole Board. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 47- has the authority to determine parole eligibility 7-1 to 47-7-55 (the Parole and Probation Law). for those convicted of murder, mandatory life Thus, it is the parole statute, Mississippi Code without parole is a product of Mississippi's Section 47-7-3(1)(h) (Rev. 2011), that violates parole and probation statutes, specifically

Section 47-7-3(1)(h). When recently interpreting law," making them truly discrete, individual Miller under a similar statutory scheme, the punishments when applied to juveniles. Wyoming Supreme Court held that the least intrusive approach would be to leave the Id. at 46. sentencing statute undisturbed and hold the statutes which barred parole for offenders ¶24. In contrast, the majority rejects this view serving life sentences "unconstitutional as and holds that juveniles convicted of murder applied to juvenile offenders." Bear Cloud, 294 should be resentenced, following a circuit court P. 3d 36. This solution is simple, preserves hearing, to either life or "life imprisonment judicial resources, respects the legislative Page 15 authority to prescribe the bounds of sentences, and does not encroach on the executive branch's notwithstanding the provisions of Mississippi statutory authority over parole matters. Code Section 47-7-3(1)(h), as it presently provides." Despite its insistence to the contrary, ¶23. Although the Parker majority reasoned the majority holds that a juvenile convicted of that its was "chart[ing] the same course" as Bear murder may now be sentenced to life or life Cloud, 294 P. 3d 36, it clearly did not. Parker, without parole.12 This decision ignores the clear 2011-KA-01158-SCT at ¶ 24. Unlike distinctions between capital murder and murder. Page 14 By explicitly providing harsher sentencing options for capital murder (one of which is death Parker, (and Brett Jones), the Bear Cloud case, if the offender is an adult), it cannot be doubted 294 P. 3d 36, involved a juvenile convicted of that the Mississippi legislature views capital "murder in the first degree," i.e., the equivalent murder as a more heinous crime than murder. of capital murder in Mississippi. 10 The Thus, rather than our disturbing "the existing Wyoming Supreme Court explained that, under possible statutory sentence" for murder under the "clear and unambiguous" language of the Mississippi Code Section 97-3-21, finding the sentencing statute, the permissible sentences for parole statute unconstitutional as applied to first-degree murder in Wyoming are "life juveniles convicted of murder "minimizes our imprisonment without parole or life intrusion into any legislative function," while imprisonment according to law." Id. at 44 preserving distinct sentences for murder and (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(b) (2009)).11 capital murder. Bear Cloud, 294 P. 3d at 46. Although the defendant was sentenced to "life Under this approach, subsection (1)(h) is imprisonment according to law," two other inapplicable, and the juvenile would be subject statutes prohibited Wyoming's parole board to the general provisions, i.e., subsection (1) from granting him parole. The Bear Cloud only, of the parole statute, which permits release opinion held that the least intrusive approach on parole after the serving of ten years of a life under Miller was to leave the sentencing statute sentence. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-3(1). undisturbed and hold the statutes which barred parole for offenders serving life sentences ¶25. Notably, this approach was advocated by "unconstitutional as applied to juvenile the State in Parker, 2011-KA-01158-SCT at ¶ offenders." Bear Cloud, 294 P. 3d at 45-46. The 27. The Parker majority rejected this view. Id. Wyoming Supreme Court explained that: The majority decision in the present case renders the same result, finding that Miller requires our We find this statutory interpretation most trial courts "to hold an appropriate for two reasons. First, it minimizes our intrusion into any legislative function while Page 16 allowing trial courts to impose the existing individualized sentencing hearing" which may possible statutory sentences for first-degree result in a sentence of life with eligibility for murder in a constitutionally permissible way. parole or life without parole. Maj. Op. ¶ 6. Second, it separates "life imprisonment without parole" from "life imprisonment according to

¶26. Yet, the main holding of Miller is that Court should declare Mississippi Code Section "mandatory life without parole for those under 47-7-3(1)(h) unconstitutional as applied to the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates juveniles and leave the sentencing statute the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel undisturbed. Accordingly, I dissent and would and unusual punishment'." Miller, 132 S. Ct. at grant and render post-conviction relief to Jones 2460; U.S. Const. amend. VIII. This requires our regarding his Miller claim. Court to apply Miller to Mississippi's relevant statutes in light of our own precedent. A CHANDLER AND KING, JJ., JOIN sentencing hearing might be warranted if life THIS OPINION. without parole were a permissible sentence; but, based on our case law and the interplay between --- Mississippi's sentencing statute and its parole statute, it is clear that Miller requires this Court Notes: to find Section 47-7-3(1)(h) unconstitutional as applied to juveniles convicted of murder. The 1. Mississippi Code Sections 97-3-19 and majority, however, abrogates both the parole 97-3-21 have recently been amended by the statute and the applicable sentencing statute. Legislature to provide for three classifications of Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-21; Miss. Code Ann. § murder: capital, first-degree, and second-degree. 47-7-3(1)(h). See 2013 Miss. Laws Ch. 555 (S.B. 2377).

¶27. Finally, I find the majority's holding to be a 2. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301, purely procedural pronouncement that fails to 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989) ("In provide any meaningful solution. If, on remand, general . . . a case announces a new rule when it the trial court imposes "life imprisonment breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation notwithstanding the provisions of Mississippi on the States or the Federal Government."). Code Section 47-7-3(1)(h)," the revised sentence will have no effect. 3. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-3(1)(h) (Rev. 2011) ("No person shall be eligible for parole ¶28. Our circuit courts (i.e., the "sentencing who is convicted except that an offender authority") have no authority to impose anything convicted of only nonviolent crimes . . . other than a life sentence upon a conviction of 'nonviolent crimes' means a felony other than murder. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-21 (Rev. 2006). homicide . . . ."). Yet, the majority adds an additional sentencing option of life without parole. This holding is in 4. In instructing the trial court on remand, clear conflict with the legislature's clear and this Court stated: unambiguous declaration that the Parole Board "shall have exclusive responsibility for the After consideration of all circumstances required granting of parole as provided by Miller, the trial court may sentence Parker, despite his age, to "life imprisonment." See Page 17 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 ("[W]e do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that by Section[] 47-7-3 . . . ." Miss. Code Ann. § 47- judgment in homicide cases . . . ."). However, if 7-5(3) (Rev. 2011) (emphasis added). Because the trial court should determine, after the executive branch, not the judiciary, has consideration of all circumstances set forth in jurisdiction over parole matters, any language Miller, that Parker should be eligible for parole, regarding parole in a sentencing order for the court shall enter a sentence of "life murder constitutes "surplusage and in no way imprisonment with binds the parole board . . . ." Brown v. State, eligibility for parole notwithstanding the present 731 So. 2d 595, 599 (Miss. 1999). Therefore, to provisions of Mississippi Code Section 47-7- give any effect to Miller's prohibition on 3(1)(h)." mandatory sentences of life without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide offenses, this

5. Our disposition in this case comports with department, and who has served not less than the disposition of Miller's companion case, one-fourth (1/4) of the total of such term or Jackson. Jackson was before the United States terms for which such prisoner was sentenced, or, Supreme Court on collateral review. Upon if sentenced to serve a term or terms of thirty remand, the Supreme Court of Arkansas (30) years or more, or, if sentenced for the term remanded Jackson's case to the trial court for of the natural life of such prisoner, has served resentencing. Jackson, 2013 WL 1773087, at *2 not less than ten (10) years of such life sentence, (Ark. Apr. 25, 2013) may be released on parole as hereinafter provided . . . . 6. On July 8, 2013, Parker filed a motion for rehearing now pending before the Court. Mot. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-3(1) (Rev. 2011) for Reh'g, Parker, 2011-KA-01158-SCT (Mot. (emphasis added). No. 2013-2030). 9. Likewise, in Brown v. State, 731 So. 2d 7. The sentencing statute in effect at the time 595 (Miss. 1999), this Court rejected the provided: defendant's argument that his sentencing order amounted to a mandatory minimum sentence Every person who shall be convicted of murder without parole. The Court explained that shall be sentenced by the court to imprisonment "[e]xclusive power over the granting and for life in the State Penitentiary. revoking of parole is vested in this State's parole Every person who shall be convicted of capital board." Id. at 598 (citing Miss.Code Ann. § 47- murder shall be sentenced (a) to death; (b) to 7-5 (Supp.1998)). The opinion noted that, while imprisonment for life in the State Penitentiary "certain statutes specify that a trial court may or without parole; or (c) to imprisonment for life in must impose a sentence 'without the possibility the State Penitentiary with eligibility for parole of parole' . . . this sentencing authority is as provided in Section 47-7-3(1)(f). separate and distinct from the parole board's authority to grant or revoke parole." Id. (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-21 (Rev. 2006). As Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-21 (1994) (capital noted by the majority, this statute has been murder conviction permitting sentence of life amended, and, effective July 1, 2013, there will without parole); Mitchell v. State, 561 So. 2d be three types of murder under Mississippi law: 1037, 1039 (Miss. 1990)). Citing Mitchell, 561 first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and So. 2d at 1039, the Court reiterated that "where capital murder. 2013 Miss. Laws WL No. 269 the trial court has no statutory authority to limit (S.B. 2377). Under these 2013 revisions, Jones's parole, language purporting to do so is without crime would be designated as "first-degree legal effect." Mitchell, 561 So. 2d at 599. murder." The only sentence for "first-degree murder" - imprisonment for life - will be the 10. The defendants in Miller, 132 S. Ct. same as the sentence currently provided for 2455, also were convicted of capital murder. murder. The corresponding parole statute was not amended. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-3 (Rev. 11. For adult offenders, the death penalty is a 2011). third option, but the statute specifically prohibits a death sentence "for any murder committed 8. Section 47-7-3(1) provides: before the defendant attained the age of eighteen (18) years." Id. Every prisoner who has been convicted of any offense against the State of Mississippi, and is 12. Otherwise, there is no distinction confined in the execution of a judgment of such between a sentence of life and "life conviction in the Mississippi Department of imprisonment notwithstanding the provisions of Corrections for a definite term or terms of one Mississippi Code Section 47-7-3(1)(h), as it (1) year or over, or for the term of his or her presently provides." natural life, whose record of conduct shows that such prisoner has observed the rules of the

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