HIGH, HOT and HEAVY

Working Paper

HIGH, HOT and HEAVY:

THE CH-47 CHINOOK IN COMBAT ASSAULT OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Peter W. Connors, PhD

8165906821

1 HIGH, HOT and HEAVY:

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction………

Chapter 2: A Brief History of US Army Air Assault Doctrine……..

Chapter 3: Operation ANACONDA Would Not Have Occurred Without the Chinook…….

Chapter 4: High/Hot/Heavy Combat Air Assaults in Afghanistan 2002-2006……..

Chapter 5: High/Hot/Heavy Combat Air Assaults in Afghanistan 2007-2011……..

Chapter 6: Conclusion……..

Bibliography……….

Suggested List of Photographs……….

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The Expanding Role of US Army CH-47 Chinook Helicopters

“There sits the workhorse of the United States Army,” said Major General William T.

Crosby, pointing to a CH-47F Chinook helicopter on the ramp at the Boeing Rotorcraft Systems facility in Ridley Park, Pennsylvania. “Everyone wants more,” Crosby – US Army Program

Executive Officer, Aviation – noted during ceremonies celebrating the 50th anniversary of the

Chinook’s first flight.1 Leanne Caret, Boeing Vice President of H-47 Programs, later remarked

“Chinooks plays a non-stop critical role in delivering people, equipment, and supplies to difficult areas.”2 Because of their ability to function effectively in high density altitude environments and to carry up to 50 fully-equipped Soldiers, CH-47s were increasingly utilized for combat air assaults in both Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). For their size,

Chinooks are fast and agile, have power to spare even when operating at maximum gross weight, and can “drop off a huge amount of fighting power in one swoop.”3

In Afghanistan, for example, inadequate roadways, mountainous terrain, and the threat of

IED attacks and ambushes, dictate that a significant percentage of personnel and equipment be transported by air. In such an environment, Chinooks have become a critical asset in both logistical and tactical operations. Because of the CH-47’s exceptional performance characteristics in high

3 altitude/high temperature conditions, its mission profile has expanded to include air assaults, troop insertions, medical evacuations, and search/rescue operations. As a result, the number of tactical missions undertaken by Chinook crews has increased steadily, since other helicopters are often unable to operate effectively in the high/hot conditions typically encountered in Afghanistan. “We have documented missions above 16,200 feet [and] any mission above 10,000 feet in Afghanistan is going to be operated almost exclusively by a Chinook because of the stability and the additional payload,” explained Mark Ballew, a 20-year veteran CH-47 pilot with combat experience in

Afghanistan and Iraq and Boeing’s current Director of Business Development for Chinook

Programs.4 Chinook pilots flew some of the first OEF combat assault missions during Operation

ANACONDA, as six CH-47s ferried 101st Airborne Division and 10th Mountain Division Soldiers to blocking positions in the Shahi Kowt Valley.5

Since the 1980s, the UH-60 “Blackhawk” has been the US Army’s designated combat assault mission helicopter. Chinooks were relegated to transporting supplies and equipment. In

Afghanistan’s high altitude operating environment however, the CH-47, with its superior useful load, greater service ceiling, and higher shaft horsepower engines, became the most reliable means of reaching locations in mountainous terrain. For these same reasons, plus the fact that Chinooks carry more troops and fly farther faster, Army commanders in Afghanistan soon realized that CH-

47s could also serve effectively as combat assault aircraft. Since a single CH-47 can carry 40-50 fully-equipped combat Soldiers, one Chinook can successfully perform air assault missions typically requiring four or five Blackhawks.6

This Long War Occasional Paper is a comprehensive review of the US Army’s use of CH-

47 Chinook helicopters in OEF combat assault operations. The study will cover the period 2002-

2011, focus on conventional forces only, and tell the story of how the CH-47 is tactically employed beyond the scope of its original role as a rear area transport aircraft. The rationale for this expanded role, the associated planning, and the preparations/training undertaken by US Army heavy

4 helicopter units will be described in detail. Successes, failures and other pertinent observations will also be addressed and analyzed. To the extent possible, this paper will rely in first hand data obtained through interviews with heavy combat aviation brigade, battalion, and company commanders, staff planners at the US Army Infantry School, representatives from the CH-47

Program Office at the US Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM), personnel from the

Army Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, and Boeing Rotorcraft Systems management team members; and from CH-47 unit After Action Reports available at AMCOM. As has been clearly demonstrated in Afghanistan, superior performance specifications make the CH-47 Chinook the aircraft of choice for combat assault operations in high altitude/high temperature environments.

CH-47 Chinook – History, Development, Specifications, and Performance Characteristics

Early Experimentation with Rotary Wing Concepts

Mankind’s fascination with rotary wing flight dates back more than two centuries to the

Chinese invention of light-weight flying devices that mimicked falling maple tree seeds.7 Not until

1483 did Leonardo da Vinci, inspired by Archimedes’ water-screw, design the first semblance of a helicopter-type flying device, referred to alternatively as a helical air screw, an aerial screw, or an air gyroscope.8 In the margin of da Vinci’s design drawing were instructions noting that the helical component of the craft be covered with linen “made air tight with starch [and] rotated with speed that said screw bores through the air and climbs high.”9 Due in all likelihood to the lack of an adequate contemporary power source, Da Vinci never built his flying machine.10

During the 18th and 19th centuries, scientists and inventors experimented with various methods for increasing the aerodynamic efficiency of rotor systems and with the development of light-weight, more powerful, engines. In the United Kingdom, for example, Sir George Cayley built flying models driven by rubber band-like devices and by clock-spring winding mechanisms.

Horace Phillips successfully flew small-scale steam powered machines that vented the steam from

5 the craft’s rotor blade tips. In 1861, Henry Bright patented a uniquely configured model that featured two contra-rotating, co-axial, rotors mounted on a single vertical drive shaft.11

In France, former secretary of the French Aeronautical Society, Emmanuel Dieuaide, built several steam-driven, twin rotor prototype systems; and Viscomte Gustave de Ponton d’Amecourt, who first coined the term ‘helicoptere,’ experimented with steam power engines and counter- rotating rotor blades. Meanwhile, German scientist Wilheim von Achenbach developed the tail rotor concept to counteract main rotor torque and Russian electrical engineer Alexander Lodygin conceived of the gyrocopter concept that utilized a rotating main rotor for lift and a standard airplane propeller for thrust. In 1878, Italian civil engineer Enrico Forlanini built a small steam- powered helicopter with dual counter-rotating rotors (similar to those of a CH-47) that flew to an altitude of 40 feet. Finally, Thomas Edison built model helicopters to test primitive internal combustion engines and electric motors as potential power sources in the United States.12

Twentieth Century Rotary Wing Developments

During the early 20th century, continuous improvements in the power-to-weight ratios of gasoline fueled, internal combustion, reciprocating, engines made the prospects of genuine rotary wing flight more practical and more promising. In 1921, the US Army awarded a classified contract to Dr. George de Bothezad to design and build an experimental helicopter. The ‘Flying

Octopus,’ with four rotors and a single 180 horsepower engine, was first flown in December 1922 by Army Colonel Thurman Bane.13 Companies with familiar names in helicopter aviation –

Sikorsky, Piasecki, Hiller, Kaman, and Bell – subsequently emerged and began developing a wide variety of rotary wing aircraft for testing and evaluation. Progress in helicopter design progressed in Europe as well. One notable example is the first effective twin tandem rotor machine built in

1933 by Nicolas Florine. Although both rotors on Florine’s helicopter turned counter-clockwise, they were tilted in opposite directions to help counteract torque effects.14 Success of the Florine tandem rotor concept eventually led to the Piasecki Helicopter Company’s design, development and 6 production of the tandem H-21 ‘Flying Banana’ helicopter and ultimately to the Boeing Rotorcraft

Systems’ CH-47 Chinook.

Piasecki and Tandem Rotor Systems

In 1940, Frank Nicholas Piasecki, an aeronautical engineering graduate of the

Guggenheim School of Aeronautics at New York University, formed the PV Engineering Forum with his partner Howard Venzie. The Forum concentrated initially on single rotor/tail rotor helicopters, but in 1945, the company built the first US overlapping twin tandem rotor helicopter, called the PV-3 ‘Dogship’ and designated the XHRP-1. PV Engineering became the Piasecki

Helicopter Company in 1946 and went on to build larger, more powerful, tandem rotor helicopters such as the H-21 and the HUP. Collectively by 1959, the US Air Force and US Army had purchased 535 H-21 A, B, and C models – the H-21Cs having been designated ‘Shawnee’ by the

Army. Piasecki also built 339 HUP helicopters for the US Navy, US Army (H-25 ‘Mule’), and the

French and Canadian navies. Success of the tandem rotor concept transformed the helicopter from a small aerial observation vehicle to an aircraft with a wide variety of military, commercial, and humanitarian applications. Piasecki Helicopter Company was renamed Vertol Aircraft Corporation in 1956, after Frank Piasecki resigned following a lengthy reorganization dispute.15

Emergence of Boeing-Vertol

Throughout the remainder of the 1950s, Vertol Aircraft continued developing tandem rotor helicopters. Following acquisition in 1960, Vertol became a division of the Boeing Company.

Subsequently, the Boeing-Vertol Model 107, with two powerful gas-turbine (turboshaft) engines, was purchased by the US Navy/Marine Corps and designated the CH-46 Sea Knight. By 1990, 601

Sea Knights had been produced and delivered to the Marines. In roughly the same timeframe, the

US Air Force, on behalf of the US Army, issued a contract to Boeing-Vertol for the development of a prototype medium lift transport helicopter, described interchangeably as Model 114 and/or the

7 YHC-1B. Before test and evaluation was completed, Boeing-Vertol began receiving orders for production versions of the Model 114, designated initially the HC-1B, and by 1962, the CH-47A

‘Chinook.’ The maximum gross weight of the new Chinook was an impressive 33,000 pounds, and later versions of the CH-47A were configured with dual Lycoming T55-L-7 turbine engines rated at

2,650 shaft horsepower (shp) each. The first CH-47A was delivered to Fort Rucker, Alabama in

1962, and by the following year, the Chinook was declared the Army’s official medium transport helicopter. A total of 354 CH-47A helicopters had been built by Boeing-Vertol as of May 1967, when the upgraded CH-47B model entered service.16

Chinook B and C Models

Boeing only produced 108 B model Chinooks before shifting production to the CH-

47C at the end of 1967. The CH-47B provided better performance, increased payload, and improved stability over and above the original A models. The more powerful 2,850 shp T55-L-7C turboshaft engines, for example, raised the aircraft’s maximum gross weight to 40,000 pounds and increased cruise speed from 110 to 140 knots. Deliveries of the CH-47C began in 1968 and once again this model offered improved performance characteristics beyond those of previous models.

Chinook C models were designed to meet a newly established Army requirement for transporting a

15,000 lb. payload, over a distance of 30 miles, in temperature conditions up to 95° F, and at an altitude of 4,000 feet. Upgraded Textron Lycoming T55-L-11C engines, rated at 3,750 shp, increased the C model’s maximum gross weight to 46,000 lbs. and extended the cruise speed to 150 knots. Eventually, Boeing-Vertol manufactured 270 CH-47Cs between 1968 and 1980. 17

Chinooks in the Vietnam War

All three versions of the Chinook – A, B, and C models – performed admirably during the Vietnam conflict. CH-47s participated in night combat assaults, conducted countless resupply missions, sling-loaded artillery pieces, and became indispensable in the establishment and

8 maintenance of dozens of fire support bases. Chinooks crews sprayed Agent Orange and dropped napalm and tear gas on enemy facilities and troop concentrations. During the course of the war,

Chinooks also recovered more 10,000 downed fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft. In 1966, four

Chinooks were converted to ACH-47As gunships that were configured with armor protection and a formidable assortment of weapons systems, including M-75 40mm grenade launchers, M-24 A1

20mm cannons, XM-159 2.75 in. forward firing rocket pods, M-18E1 7.62mm Miniguns, and M2

50 cal. or M-60D 7.62mm machine guns. In support of combat operations during 1967, ACH-47s delivered devastating fire power on enemy targets. However by 1968, three of the four gunships had been lost in accidents or to enemy action. With only one ACH-47 remaining, the large armed helicopter gunship program was discontinued in favor of the less expensive AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter initiative.18

Modernized D Model Chinooks

Following the Vietnam War, production of Chinooks decreased significantly. In 1976,

Boeing-Vertol began modifying and upgrading CH-47 A, B, and C models under an Army contract designed to increase the aircraft’s reliability and maintainability, while reducing overall operating and support costs. Modernized Chinooks, with 3,750 shp Textron Lycoming T55-L-712 engines and a maximum gross weight of 50,000 lbs., were designated CH-47Ds and began entering the

Army inventory in 1982. During Gulf War I, D model Chinooks participated in the largest aerial combat assault in history as US and Allied forces outflanked and cutoff Iraqi soldiers retreating from Kuwait. CH-47Ds were also utilized extensively in Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR,

PROVIDE COMFORT, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM. A total of 447 CH-

47D helicopters were produced by Boeing-Vertol between 1982 and 1995.19

Special Operations Chinook Configurations

9 Beginning in the 1980s, Boeing converted 12 A and C model Chinooks to MH-47Ds.

The MH series aircraft were designed for special operations missions conducted by the Army’s

160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) headquartered at Fort Campbell, KY.

Typical special operations missions often involve extended range, high-speed, night flights conducted in adverse meteorological conditions at both extremely high and/or low (nap-of-the- earth) altitudes. Boeing went on to produce 26 upgraded MH-47E and 62 MH-47G models. All of the G models were built from reconfigured CH-47D, MH-47D, and MH-47E aircraft and incorporated highly sophisticated satellite navigation/communications equipment, countermeasure systems, long-range fuel tanks, inflight refueling capability, terrain-following radar, Near Real

Time Intelligence Data (NRTID), and more efficient/more powerful T55-GA-714A engines.

Further discussions of MH series Chinooks and special operations will be limit since the focus of this Long War Occasional Paper is restricted to conventional US Army operations only.20

Introduction of the CH-47F Series

The most recent addition to the Chinook lineup is the CH-47F series. The US Army

Modernization Program specifies a total of 464 F model Chinooks – 220 newly built and 244 remanufactured from retired CH-47Ds. First delivery of the F model occurred in late 2006, and the aircraft was officially certified combat ready by July 2007. As of yearend 2011, Boeing had produced and delivered to the Army approximately 160 CH-47 F helicopters. These newest

Chinook models are configured with a variety of significant upgrades, such as all glass cockpits incorporating Common Avionics Architecture Systems (CAAS) and Digital Advanced Flight

Control Systems (DAFCS), along with two Honeywell T55-L-714A (4,733 shp – nearly double the rating of the original CH-47A) engines, vibration-dampening fuselages, and modernized cargo- handling equipment. The many impressive performance characteristics of the Chinook F model include a 170 knot cruise speed, a 200 nautical mile mission radius, a service ceiling of 20,000 feet, a useful load of 24,000 lbs., and a maximum gross weight of 50,000 lbs. As the Army’s only

10 heavy-lift transport helicopter, the advanced multi-mission CH-47F is scheduled to remain in inventory well into the 2030s. Several Boeing Rotorcraft Systems executives have speculated that the CH-47 Chinook may remain in the Army fleet for a century or more.21

Chapter 2

A BRIEF HISTORY OF US ARMY AIR ASSAULT DOCTRINE

Cavalry and I Don’t Mean Horses

Current US Army doctrine defines an air assault operation as a vertical envelopment in which “assault forces, using the mobility of rotary-wing assets and the total integration of available firepower, maneuver to engage enemy forces or to seize key terrain.22 During the mid-

1950s, the concept of combat assaults using helicopters increasingly intrigued senior level Army leadership. The US Marine Corps, using six-passenger H-19 Chickasaws, had experimented with the unique capabilities of helicopters in tactical situations and with vertical envelopment techniques during the Korean War.23 In 1954, the Army’s interest in heliborne operations mounted with the publication of “Cavalry – And I Don’t Mean Horses,” a journal article by

Major General James Gavin. Having personally witnessed the limitations of airborne and glider operations during World War II, Gavin believed that cavalry-type operations could be effectively implemented using helicopters to transport Soldiers into battle. To demonstrate the concept, he theoretically inserted helicopters into war-gaming studies at the Army Command and General

Staff College to show how the speed and maneuverability of the aircraft could significantly improve tactical results.24

12 Joint Exercise Sagebrush

As the Army’s G-3, Major General Gavin continued to pursue his vision of tactical helicopter operations, noting that “to win decisively and quickly in future limited wars, the Army needed substantial forces of sky cavalry.”25 During Joint Exercise Sagebrush in 1955 at Fort

Polk, Louisiana, much of Gavin’s sky cavalry concept was validated. Soldiers from the 82d

Airborne Division formed a provisional sky cavalry troop consisting of a reconnaissance element, a blocking force, an artillery/anti-tank group, and an aviation platoon. On several occasions, sky cavalry Soldiers using helicopters successfully infiltrated behind opposing force lines to gather valuable intelligence information unavailable by other means. The mobility and flexibility of Army helicopters was clearly evident during Sagebrush, as the aircraft routinely operated from improvised landing zones throughout the designated battle area.26

Air Assault Doctrine Initiatives

At the same time Exercise Sagebrush was evaluating helicopters as a means of transporting sky cavalry on the battlefield, Brigadier General Carl Hutton, commander of the US

Army Aviation Center (USAAVNC) at Fort Rucker, proposed the development of an Armed

Helicopter Mobile Task Force to fight along-side the sky cavalry. “In one case we would have an air transported Army, and in the other case we would have an air fighting Army…the time has come for the Army to consider its aviation needs with a fresh eye,” Hutton explained in Army

Aviation Digest.27 In 1957, Hutton’s replacement as USAAVNC commander, Major General

Bogardus Cairns, and his staff rewrote a 1936 horse cavalry field manual (FM 2-5) to create a training handbook entitled New Tactical Doctrine that reflected the sky cavalry advancements developing at Fort Rucker. Cairns also established a provisional Aerial Combat Reconnaissance

13 Platoon that, after several re-designations, eventually deployed to Vietnam as the 1st Squadron,

9th Cavalry. Finally in 1958, the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort

Leavenworth published FM 57-35, Army Transport Aviation Combat Operations, in which the phrase ‘air landed operations’ described the expanded sky cavalry concept.28 A subsequent version of FM 57-35 revised the nomenclature again to ‘airmobile operations’ – those in which

“combat forces and their equipment move about the battlefield in aerial vehicles under the control of a ground force commander to engage in ground combat.”29

Army Aviation Assessments and the First Deployments to Vietnam

In 1960, advancements in Army aviation continued with the establishment of an

Army Aircraft Requirements Review Board led by Lieutenant General Gordon Rogers, Deputy

Commanding General of the Continental Army Command. The Rogers Board Report – Army

Aircraft Development Plan – presented a series of recommendations regarding observation, surveillance, and transport aircraft. Included in the Board’s proposals were the purchase of UH-

1 Iroquois/Huey and CH-47 Chinook helicopters, and the continued feasibility testing and evaluation of the airmobile operations concept. This later recommendation was addressed in an addendum, entitled “Requirements for Air Fighting Units,” to the Rogers Board Report which was written by Lieutenant General Hamilton Howze, Commanding General of the Strategic

Army Corps and the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg.” Howze argued that air cavalry units, equipped with their own aircraft, could successfully fight both dispersed traditional enemy forces in conventional/European-type conflicts and less-formidable opponents in small brush fire actions, such as the one intensifying at the time in the Republic of Vietnam.30

14 Meanwhile, Major General William Westmoreland, commanding general 101st

Airborne Division, centralized control of the division’s disjointed aviation assets under the newly formed 101st Combat Aviation Battalion (Provisional), the first such unit authorized by the

Army.31 Then in the fall of 1961, General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, concluded that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) suffered from a serious lack of mobility in the growing Vietnam conflict. As a result of Maxwell’s assessment, the 8th and

57th Transportation Companies (Light Helicopter) deployed expeditiously to Vietnam. On 11

December, the USNS Card arrived at the port of Saigon with 400 Soldiers and 32 Piasecki H-21

Shawnee helicopters from the two transportation companies. Less than two weeks later, 30

Shawnees participated in the first airmobile combat operation in Vietnam – Joint Operation

CHOPPER, in which 1,000 Vietnamese paratroopers were airlifted into position for a surprise attack on a Viet Cong stronghold near the village of Duc Hoa. The 93d Transportation Company

(Light Helicopter) from Fort Devens, Massachusetts also deployed to Vietnam, arriving aboard the USS Princeton at Da Nang on 25 January 1962. Airmobile operations and combat air assault tactics soon became routine in the Vietnam War, with H-21 Shawnees initially, then H-34s and

UH-1s pioneering the effort.32

The Howze Board

Back in Washington, not completely satisfied with the Rogers Board results,

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara called upon the Army to “completely re-examine its requirements for aviation,” to evaluate “revolutionary new concepts of tactical mobility,” and to recommend actions required to “give the Army the maximum attainable mobility in the combat area.”33 In separate memoranda, McNamara directed Secretary of the Army, Elvis Stahr, to take a “bold new look,” and implement “fresh…unorthodox concepts” to “acquire quantum

15 increases” in land warfare mobility.34 McNamara suggested six specific areas of inquiry including the substitution of aviation assets for conventional military surface vehicles and the types of organizations and operational concepts required to exploit increases in mobility.

Finally, the Secretary of Defense strongly encouraged the use of field tests to evaluate new mobility concepts, and even went so far as to suggest potential members for the soon-to-be established US Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board.35

Lieutenant General Howze was appointed president of the Tactical Mobility Board – henceforth known as the Howze Board – which included 199 officers, 41 enlisted men, and 53 civilians. Also included were a governing board, a review committee, a steering committee, an advisory panel, a field test group, seven working committees, and eight working groups. One hundred twenty-five helicopters and 25 fixed-wing aircraft were allocated to the Board which established its headquarters in a grade school building at Fort Bragg. Eventually, more than

3,200 military personnel and 90 civilians took part in three major airmobile field exercises (in

Georgia, West Virginia, and North Carolina), sixteen small unit tests, and 30 additional tests and evaluations of new concepts and equipment.36

Within 90 days, the Howze Board completed its assignment and submitted a 3,500 page final report to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Howze summarized the findings in one overarching statement noting “the board has only a single, general conclusion – the adoption by the Army of the airmobile concept…is necessary and desirable [and] in some respects the transition is inevitable.”37 The Howze Board Report went on to describe five different approaches to increasing Army airmobility. The alternative deemed most responsive to

Secretary McNamara’s guidelines called for establishing five air assault divisions to replace five of the Army’s 16 existing divisions. According to Howze, 459 organic aircraft would be capable

16 of transporting an air assault division’s combat troops and equipment to a battle zone in three lifts. Also recommended as additions to the existing Army force structure were three, enhanced mobility, air cavalry combat brigades (316 aircraft each) capable of moving all combat elements in just one lift, and five air transport brigades, each with 142 aircraft, to perform logistics distribution operations.38

Evaluating the Air Assault Concept

Although the new Secretary of the Army, Cyrus Vance, and the Chief of Staff,

General Earl Wheeler, supported the Howze Board airmobility recommendations, the suggested changes to the Army’s force structure were considered excessively disruptive. Accordingly,

Secretary McNamara authorized the creation of only one provisional air assault division and a supporting air transport brigade for additional testing and evaluation. The air cavalry combat brigade concept was not immediately pursued.39 Subsequently, the 11th Air Assault Division

(formerly the 11th Airborne Division), plus the 10th Air Transport Brigade were activated at Fort

Benning, GA in February 1963. For the next eighteen months, with Lieutenant General Charles

Rich as overall project director, the new division conducted a series of exercises to assess and refine airmobile/air assault tactics, techniques, and procedures.40

Following Exercise AIR ASSAULT II in October 1964, in which the 82d Airborne

Division served as the opposing force, the 82d commander, Major General Robert York, praise air assault operations as having “dynamic potential,” adding “seldom do we see a new military concept which can contribute so decisively throughout the entire spectrum of warfare.”41 After completion of the additional extensive testing phase, McNamara approved the recommendation to establish an air assault division and add it to the Army force structure. In July 1965, new

17 Army Chief of Staff General Harold Johnson activated the US Army’s first air assault division – designated the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), comprised of Soldiers from the 11th Air

Assault Division (Test) and the 2d Infantry Division. The new unit was given 90 days to prepare for deployment to Vietnam.42

The 1st Cavalry Division Deploys to An Khe

In a nationally televised address on 28 July 1965, President Lyndon Johnson first laid out the United States’ goals and objectives in Vietnam, then went on to announce “I have today ordered to Vietnam the Airmobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately…additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested.”43 The deployment of the 1st Cavalry Division to Vietnam was designated Operation PAT and occurred in three increments – an advanced liaison detachment, and advanced party, and the main body. During August 1965, the 13,500

Soldiers and equipment (including 470 aircraft) of the main body sailed for Vietnam on troop ships, cargo ships, and aircraft carriers from the port cities of Charleston, Savannah,

Jacksonville, and Mobile. The USNS Boxer alone carried 239 aircraft, including fifty-seven CH-

47 Chinooks. The 1CD arrived piecemeal in Vietnam during September and by the end of the month was fully operational in its new base camp at An Khe – the world’s largest helipad – in the Central Highlands province of Bihn Dihn.44

1st Cavalry Combat Air Assaults

On 10 October 1965, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 7th Cavalry, 1st Squadron, 9th

Cavalry, and the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry conducted the first brigade-size airmobile/air assault against units of the North Vietnam Army (NVA) 325th Infantry Division and the Viet Cong 2d

18 Main Force Regiment in the Soui Ca River Valley during Operation SHINY BAYONET. The

1st Cavalry Soldiers met only light resistance as the enemy forces chose not the fight and retreated westward toward Cambodia. During a second air assault mission on 1 November, however, 8th, 9th, and 12th Cavalry Soldiers encountered intense resistance from the NVA 33d

Regiment in a series of engagements southwest of Plei Me. Although seven 1CD helicopters sustained hostile fire damage, the enemy regiment suffered considerable casualties, with ninety- nine killed and an estimated 183 wounded. On the night of 3 November, troopers form the 1st

Squadron, 9th Cavalry came under attack from the NVA 66th Regiment near the Chu Pong

Mountains. In what became the 1st Cavalry’s first night heliborne airmobile mission, ‘A’

Company, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, air assaulted into an unprepared landing zone (LZ) to reinforce the 9th Cavalry Soldiers. Airmobile operations were proving to be significantly innovative.45

Operation SHINY BAYONET was only the prelude to the more dramatic Operation

SILVER BAYONET involving the 1st and 2d Battalions, 7th Cavalry, LZ X-Ray, and the Ia

Drang Valley. On 14 November 1965, the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry conducted an air assault on the 66th NVA regimental base camp in the Ia Drang. The first three lifts were uncontested, however, on the fourth and fifth insertions, helicopters from the 229th Assault Helicopter

Battalion received intense enemy fire – four of the eight aircraft in the fifth lift were shot down.

Although heavy fighting continued for the remainder of the day and night, the arrival of 5th

Cavalry reinforcements on 15 November turned the tide in the American’s favor. On the following day, the majority of NVA forces broke contact and withdrew toward Cambodia. The

8th Battalion, 66th NVA Regiment remained behind, however, and inflicted heavy casualties in an ambushed of the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, as the Soldiers were preparing for extraction from the

19 battle zone. Although SILVER BAYONET and the air assault into the Ia Drang Valley was considered a tactical success – two NVA regiments destroyed and 3,500 enemy combatants killed – the campaign also exacted a heavy toll on the 1st Cavalry Division with 300 Cavalrymen killed and hundreds more wounded.46

The 1CD also fought on a secondary front in heavily populated Binh Dinh Province.

Once again the division conducted a series of air assaults, this time to mass its troops and to repeatedly strike enemy forces at great distances. US and ARVN Soldiers remained in continuous contact with enemy units for nearly two months, knocking out three NVA regular regiments. The 1st Cavalry’s success in the Central Highlands validated the airmobile concept, demonstrated the flexibility of air assault tactics, and led senior military leaders to believe that expanded employment of airmobile TTP could be beneficial in achieving US strategic objectives in Vietnam.47

In the fall of 1965, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) commander,

General William Westmoreland reported that double the number of US battalions would be required to win the war in Vietnam. By the end of the following year, battalion levels had increased more than two-fold from thirty-four to seventy-four. US troop strength escalated accordingly to nearly 400,000. Following a series of briefings with Westmoreland in Saigon and

1st Cavalry Soldiers at An Khe, Secretary of Defense McNamara told reporters “it will be a long war.”48

US Divisions Employing Air Assault Tactics

In addition to 1CD, the 173d Airborne Brigade and elements of the 101st Airborne and 1st Infantry Divisions were also conducting combat operations in Vietnam during 1965.

20 Each of these units was utilizing their own versions of air assault tactics. In March 1966, the

Army formed the 1st Aviation Brigade, with 11,000 soldiers, 850 aircraft, two combat aviation groups, eight combat aviation battalions, and forty-three companies stretching from Soc Trang in the south to Hue in the north. Over the next four years, the 1AB more than double in size to four groups, sixteen battalions, eighty-three companies, 4,000 aircraft, and 25,000 men. In a further testament to the success of air assault concepts, the Army converted the 101st Airborne Division to an airmobile configuration, re-designating it the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). At the height of the Vietnam War build-up, twenty-five US Army brigades were deployed to the country.49

The tempo of US Army air assault operations remained high for the duration of the war. During the Communists’ Tet Offensive – January through March, 1968 – NVA and Viet

Cong forces attacked major cities throughout Vietnam. Dozens of US airmobile combat assaults on enemy strongholds and concentrations drove the Communists from the urban areas and delivered a crushing blow to their offensive aspirations. Airmobility provided US forces with the tactical flexibility to quickly deploy and re-deploy to areas under attack.50 During Operation

PEGASUS in April 1968, two 1st Cavalry brigades air assaulted into northwestern Quang Tri

Province to assist besieged US Marines at the Khe Sanh Combat Base. After a week of fighting,

North Vietnamese forces withdrew west toward Laos and north toward the Demilitarized Zone.51

Later in April, the 1st Cavalry, 101st Airborne, and the 1st Army of the Republic of Vietnam divisions conducted a combined airmobile and ground attack – Operation DELAWARE/LAM

SON 216 – into the A Shau Valley, a major NVA supply base along the Ho Chi Minh trail.

Although tons of enemy equipment and supplies were captured/destroyed, dozens of American

21 helicopters either crashed or were damaged by intense NVA anti-aircraft fire before the operation ended on 17 May 1968.52

US airmobile operations had become commonplace by the time the Cambodian

Campaign began in 1970. Army aviation was crucial to the success of the US and ARVN incursion into NVA sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia. From April through July, thirteen separate ground and air assault operations were conducted involving units from the 1st Cavalry Division,

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the 4th, 9th, and 25th Infantry Divisions. By mid-May, thirty-three US maneuver battalions were fighting in Cambodia. By the completion of the campaign, allied force had captured or destroyed 22,500 weapons, 431 vehicles, and more than

9,800 tons of rice, ammunition, communications equipment, and medical supplies.53

Success in Cambodia led US officials to develop a similar plan for interdicting NVA supply routes further north in Laos. By 1971, US ground troops were prohibited by law from entering Laotian territory. As such, Operation LAM SON 719 involved an all-ARVN armor/infantry task force that proceeded west into Laos along Route 9 from the former US

Marine base at Khe Sanh. ARVN Airborne, Ranger, and 1st Infantry Division forces were then airlifted by US Army helicopters across the border to flanking positions north and south of the main advance. When the main column bogged down, additional ARVN 1st Division soldiers air assaulted aboard Army helicopters into LZ Hope near Tchepone village, the operation’s primary objective. The LZ Hope air assault was the largest of the Vietnam War, involving 276 US helicopters.54

On 9 March 1971, ARVN forces began their withdrawal east along Route 9. A continuous series of NVA ambushes soon turned the ARVN withdrawal into a chaotic retreat.

22 Enemy anti-aircraft fire devastated American helicopters that attempted to assist the besieged

ARVN soldiers. By 6 April, when LAM SON 719 officially ended, military commanders were dismayed by the excessive helicopter losses sustained during the operation – 108 totally destroyed and 618 damaged. Although officials subsequently concluded that airmobile/air assault operations could in fact be conducted successfully in mid-intensity type conflicts, the significant LAM SON helicopter losses soon led to unique aviation innovations, such as nap-of- the-earth flight techniques, an increase in night operations with pilots and crews using night vision devices, and improvements in aircraft survivability.55

Following the 1973 armistice agreement signed by the United States, North and

South Vietnam, and the Viet Cong, MACV disbanded, US troops returned home, and American military involvement in South Vietnam officially ended. In testimony before the US Senate

Armed Services Committee, Director of Army Aviation, Brigadier General William Maddox, explained that “the helicopter made a difference the French lacked earlier,” during the First

Indochina War (1946-1954).56 Former MACV commander, General William Westmoreland, later proclaimed helicopter air assault warfare “the most innovative tactical development to emerge from the Vietnam War.”57 Noting the unwelcomed effectiveness of US airmobile operations, one Viet Cong commander recalled “the days of power and comfort were fine, but ever since those accursed helicopter soldiers have been encountered our troubles had multiplied.”58 By adding the dimensions of flexibility and mobility to warfare, tactical helicopter operations came of age during the Vietnam War. Helicopters touched the lives of every US

Soldier who fought in Vietnam, taking them into battle and returning them to safety. 2,700 US

Army helicopter pilots and crewmen were killed in Vietnam, flying missions in support of their infantry comrades.59

23 Air Assault Developments 1970s – 1980s

Although air assault operations had proven successful during the Vietnam Conflict, the higher intensity threats observed in the 1973 Middle East Yom Kippur War led US military officials to question the survivability of helicopters in more hazardous combat environments – those that included armor, radar-controlled anti-aircrafts systems, and shoulder-fired, heat- seeking missiles. Meanwhile, the Army surprisingly converted the 1st Cavalry Division from airmobile to a TRICAP division, and then to an armored division, thereby leaving the 101st

Airborne as the sole remaining US airmobile division.60 And in 1979, the Army began replacing the venerable UH-1 Huey with faster, larger, UH-60 Black Hawk utility tactical transport helicopters. The UH-60 soon became the Army’s primary air assault aircraft, as a single Black

Hawk could carry a completely-equipped eleven-Soldier infantry squad over greater distance on the battlefield, even in adverse weather conditions.61

Further reorganization and expansion in the 1980s under the Army of Excellence

(AOE) initiative led to the establishment of sixteen combat aviation brigades, six corps aviation brigades, three regimental aviation brigades, and a more robust aviation brigade for the 101st that included four attack helicopter battalions, two combat support aviation battalions, a general support aviation battalion, and a reconnaissance squadron. Army leaders calculated that a total of 5,900 combat and transport helicopters would be needed to support the AOE configuration requirements. In 1988, the Army briefly considered establishing a corps-level air cavalry division reminiscent of the 1960s’ sky cavalry concept. Finally, under the Aviation Restructure

24 Initiative (ARI) of the mid-1990s, the Army adopted a more streamlined force structure and reduced its total helicopter requirement to 4,400.62

Additional US Combat Operations and the Employment of Air Assault Tactics

Also during the 1980s-90s, US military forces participated in three conflicts that that required combat air assaults. In the first, four-hundred Marines conducted an air assaulted in

Grenada during Operation URGENT FURY in October 1983. The following day, US Army

Rangers, flying aboard CH-46 Marine Corps Sea Knight helicopters, conducted a second air assault to rescued endangered American medical students who had been studying on the island.

Unfortunately on the third day, three Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters crashed during an air assault on a Grenadian military barracks. URGENT FURY clearly demonstrated, however, the growing value of US military aircraft and air assaults tactics in support of political-military operations. A lesson learned originally in Vietnam, then relearned in Grenada, was the requirement for helicopter gunship escort and coverage during air assault operations.63

Six years later, nearly 26,000 US military personnel took part in Operation JUST

CAUSE, conducted to protect American citizens living in Panama, to promote democracy and human rights in the country, and to uphold the Torrijos-Carter Treaties that transferred control of the Panama Canal to Panamanians. US Army Soldiers and Paratroopers conducted five air assaults during the operation, one of which was carried out at night by the 1st Battalion, 508th

Parachute Infantry Regiment.64

Finally, during Gulf War I – the liberation of Kuwait from occupying Iraqi forces – nearly 700,000 US troops and more than and 1,900 Army aircraft participated in Operations

DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. CH-47 Chinook helicopters, often the most effective

25 means of transporting personnel and equipment over extended distances, conducted numerous

Special Operations insertion and extraction missions inside Iraq. On 24 February 1991, in the largest and longest combat air assault ever conducted, 300 Black Hawks and Chinooks from the

18th Aviation Brigade flew the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) 110 miles into

Iraq to secure Forward Operating Base (FOB) COBRA in the Euphrates River Valley. Using their helicopter assets, 101st AB Soldiers then leapfrogged from FOB COBRA sixty miles further to Highway 8, thereby blocking the escape route for Iraqi forces retreating from Kuwait.

In the main attack, VII Corps Soldiers from the 1st Infantry, 1st Armored, and 3d Armored

Divisions and the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment attacked and destroyed Iraq’s Republican

Guard Armored Divisions. The 11th Aviation Brigade conducted numerous air assaults of infantry units into trouble spots during this phase of the operation. After four days of fighting,

Kuwait had been successfully liberated and an official ceasefire was declared. The series of successful air assaults conducted during Gulf War I extended reach and flexibility of the ground force and validated the US Army’s increasing reliance on helicopters and airmobile operations.65

Combat Air Assaults – Twenty-First Century Considerations

Air assault tactics were particularly suited to the counterinsurgency operations conducted by US and allied forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. During Operations ENDURING

FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), enemy combatants lacked air superiority and sophisticated air defense systems, transportation networks were typically poor, and useable roadways were often mined with improvised explosive devices (IED). The role of aviation as a critical facilitator of ground force movement increased dramatically grew in the counterinsurgency operational environment. As a result, the Army continued to revise, restructure, and fine tune aviation assets, capabilities, and force structure during the early twenty-

26 first century. Additional plans and programs were developed and updated descriptive terminology, such as, modular, self-contained, multi-functional, and unit of action, was introduced. Army aviation units were expected to be flexible, lethal, tailorable, sustainable, and easily deployable. Finally, under the terms and conditions of the 2004 Aviation Transformation

Plan, the Army settled on a force structure consisting of twenty-one standardized combat aviation brigades (CAB), thirteen active component and eight reserve.66

Currently, combat aviation brigades are task-organized based upon mission requirements and typically support Army divisions and/or multiple brigade combat teams (BCT).

CABs can be configured as either “heavy,” or “full-spectrum,” with varying combinations of attack, assault, and general support aviation battalions, medevac and command aviation companies, and reconnaissance squadrons. As of 2012, CAB helicopter assets included only

UH-60 Black Hawks, CH-47 Chinooks, AH-64 Apaches, and OH-58 Kiowa Warriors. CABs and BCTs can be easily integrated into Air Assault Task Forces (AATF) when conducting combat assault missions. CABs are capable of performing a comprehensive range of independent missions, including aerial attack, reconnaissance, security, movement to contact, air assault, casualty evacuation, crew recovery, and command and control.67

The Army issued the first Air Assault Operations Field Manual (FM 90-4) in 1987.

An upgraded version – ATTP 3-18.12 – was released by TRADOC and the US Army Maneuver

Center of Excellence in March 2011. An air assault is currently defined as a vertical envelopment, under the control of a ground or air maneuver commander and using the mobility of rotary-wing aircraft, to seize terrain, destroy an enemy force, or interdict enemy withdrawal routes. The new manual describes the coordinated effort necessary for brigade combat teams and combat aviation brigades to properly plan, prepare for, and vigorously conduct combat air

27 assault missions. Commanders are advised to attempt to surprise the enemy, and whenever possible strive for unopposed landings. Also addressed are the establishment and effective use of integrated, task-oriented, mission-specific, AATFs to execute offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support air assault operations. Inherent speed and agility make it possible for an AATF to extend the battlefield and rapidly concentrate decisive combat power above and beyond the capabilities of most other US forces.68

Apropos to this Long War Occasional Paper, Chinooks conducted the first US military infiltration missions of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. On 19 October 2001, two separate teams of Special Forces Soldiers from Task Force DAGGER were successfully inserted into Afghanistan’s Panjshir and Darya Suf Valleys aboard specially equipped MH-47 Chinook helicopters.69

Chapter 3

OPERATION ANACONDA WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED WITHOUT THE CH-47

“US Army-style air assaults were key…the helicopter landings by hundreds of US troops at strategic locations in the Shahi Kowt Mountains were pulled off almost flawlessly on D

Day,” Colonel Frank Wiercinski explained.70 Wiercinski was commander of the 101st Airborne

Division’s Task Force Rakkasan, the air assault force for Operation ANACONDA which took place during March 2002 south of Gardez in Paktia Province. “We used Chinooks because of the altitude…the lowest HLZ was 8,500 feet…we needed to get to the HLZs fast with a lot of troops,” he later recounted, adding “the CH-47 was the helicopter of choice…we had just put in new 714 engines, incredibly powerful…we had up to 35 troops with full combat loading [per aircraft].”71

TF Rakkasan went on to conduct fourteen combat air assaults in support of

ANACONDA. Lieutenant Colonel James Marye, commander of Task Force Talon, the US

Army composite aviation unit in Afghanistan that actually flew the air assault missions, was equally complimentary of the Chinook, noting “no other airframe was capable of providing lift for that large a force at that altitude to achieve mass on each HLZ. “The Chinook was the assault platform of choice for that type of operation where massing large numbers of troops on a specific target is required to achieve overwhelming firepower…Operation ANACONDA would not have succeeded or even occurred without the CH-47,” Marye subsequently wrote.72

Prelude to Operation ANACONDA

Following the terrorist attack of September 2001, the United States launched a military campaign – Operation ENDURING FREEDOM – against the Taliban regime and its militant al-Qaeda allies in Afghanistan. An ingenious combination of US Special Forces, friendly indigenous Afghan militias, and devastatingly effective American airpower quickly overwhelmed Taliban resistance. By December, Taliban rule in Afghanistan was officially over,

Hamid Karzai had been appointed leader of the new interim government, twenty-five million

Afghan citizens had been liberated, and US and coalition military forces remaining in

Afghanistan began the transition to stability and humanitarian aid operations.

In January 2002, plans were being formulated to redeploy US troops back to the

United States. Major General Franklin Hagenbeck, commanding general of the 10th Mountain

Division, who also led the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC, Forward) which was responsible for nearly all ground forces in the theater, described the mindset at the time, noting “it was the general consensus from everyone that the war, the fight, in Afghanistan was done.”73 Meanwhile, Special Operations Forces intelligence reports indicated the presence of up to 800 Taliban and al-Qaeda combatants remaining in the Shahi Kowt Valley, near Shir

Khan Kheyl village.74 Since a key aspect of the potential assault on the Shahi Kowt involved establishing blocking positions to prevent the enemy from escaping, CENTCOM directed that a combination of Afghan militiamen, US Special Forces, and US conventional forces be organized to conduct the operation.75 The conventional force chosen for Operation ANACONDA was the 3d Brigade,

101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) which had arrived in mid-January to replace elements of

US Marine Corps Task Force 58 at Kandahar. In compliance with the DoD light American footprint directive and consistent with the prevailing notion that the war in Afghanistan was basically over, the Rakkasans deployed with only 2,200 Soldiers, just 30% of its standard equipment load plan, and no organic artillery – hardly the makings for a full-spectrum brigade combat team (BCT).76 Colonel Wiercinski, his downsized brigade staff, and the 2d Battalion,

187th Infantry took control of operations at Kandahar, while 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry deployed initially to Shahbaz Air Base in Jacobabad, Pakistan to provide airfield security. 1st

Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, which was providing security at Karshi-

Khanabad (K2) airfield in Uzbekistan, would eventually be attached to TF Rakkasan, thereby providing Wiercinski with three highly trained light infantry battalions for Operation

ANACONDA.

Task Force Talon served as the composite aviation component for the Rakkasan package. Aviation assets from the 3d and 7th Battalions, 101st Aviation regiment were assigned to TF Talon which was led by 7-101st commander, Lieutenant Colonel James Marye. The task force consisted of a grand total of twenty-four helicopters – eight CH-47 Chinooks from A

Company, 7-101st (Major John Davidson), eight AH-64 Apache gunships from A Company, 3-

101st (Captain Bill Ryan), and a detachment of eight UH-60 Black Hawks for command and control and medical evacuation. At the time of deployment in early January, Talon’s mission primarily involved transporting Soldiers in support of CFLCC stability operations. Bravo

Company, 159th Aviation Regiment, XVIII Airborne Corps (Major Terry Jamison) joined the task force in February, adding seven more CH-47 Chinooks to the aircraft mix.77 CFLCC (Forward) was redesignated Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain in mid-February 2002. Major General Hagenbeck moved his headquarters from K2 to Bagram and took over responsibility for the planning and execution of Operation ANACONDA. His planning staff began a thorough analysis of the 60-square mile Shahi Kowt Valley that was bordered by a steep mountain ridge on the east and the smaller Tergul Ghar hill mass to the west.

The valley was oriented northeast to southwest with entrances at both the north and south ends.

Intelligence reports indicated that Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters were concentrated in the south- central portion of the valley near the villages of Shir Khan Kheyl, Babol Kheyl, and Marzak.

CJTF Mountain planners anticipated that the enemy would be armed with AK-47s, RPG-7s, 82- mm mortars, and DShK 12.7-mm machine guns. Concerns were raised regarding the availability of suitable HLZs along the eastern ridge as well as the possibility that enemy combatants might have established defensive positions in the eastern high ground. The final analysis concluded, however, that the enemy would fight briefly, allow their leaders to escape, and then withdraw eastward toward Pakistan. Planners discounted the possibility of the Taliban and al-Qaeda vigorously defending the valley and fighting to the death.78

Hagenbeck’s final operations plan for ANACONDA called for TF Anvil, two

Afghan militia groups each accompanied by US Special Forces advisors, to establish outer-ring blocking positions east and south of the Shahi Kowt. A third Afghan militia – the operation’s main effort, designated TF Hammer, and also advised by US Special Forces Soldiers – was to split into two assault elements, enter the valley from the north and south, and hold in place along a line three kilometers west of Tergul Ghar. Following a series of preplanned US air strikes, TF

Hammer would then proceed eastward to clear Shir Khan Kheyl, Babol Kheyl, and Marzak.79 While the Afghan militias were moving into position, TF Rakkasan would air assault into seven blocking positions below the eastern ridge to prevent Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters from escaping along exfiltration routes into Pakistan. Sealing the escape routes on the eastern side meant a two-battalion operation with each of the seven passes closed off by an individual infantry company. “This mission had 101st written all over it…an air assault…the

101st’s raison d’etre,” Lieutenant Colonel Jim Larsen, TF Rakkasan executive officer, recalled thinking during a February 2002 receipt of mission briefing at Bagram.80

Finally, Major General Hagenbeck’s commander’s intent for Operation

ANACONDA was unmistakable – he would consider the operation successful when all the al-

Qaeda combatants in the Gardez-Khost region were either killed or captured. On 26 February

2002, the CJTF Mountain commander issued the following mission statement to Coalition forces:

On order, CJTF Mountain attacks to destroy (capture or kill) AQ (al-Qaeda) vicinity OBJ Remington (Shir Khan Kheyl), and to identify or disrupt AQ insurgency support mechanisms and exfiltration routes into Pakistan. BPT (be prepared to) conduct follow-on operations to clear selected objectives and interdict AQ movements in AO Lincoln.81

The planning for ANACONDA was painstakingly meticulous at CJTF Mountain command level.

For the aviators who would eventually fly the mission, the goal was simply to get the infantry on the ground, on time, where they wanted to be. “For us, the objective was always get them in on target, plus or minus 50 meters, plus or minus 30 seconds,” explained Chief Warrant Officer 3

Jeffrey Simon, a TF Talon Chinook pilot.82

During the last two weeks of February, TF Rakkasan Soldiers, pilots, and aircrew members conducted a series of drills and rehearsals designed to replicate the ANACONDA mission requirements. Troops carrying nearly 100 pounds of combat equipment practiced loading and unloading the TF Talon Chinook helicopters. On the last day of the month, the six

CH-47s scheduled for the first lift into Shahi Kowt conducted a fully loaded fly away exercise in the mountainous region north of Bagram to reevaluate and reaffirm the Chinook’s high altitude flight and performance characteristics. ANACONDA would be the highest altitude combat assault ever undertaken by US Soldiers. Additionally, Rakkasan combat engineers made preparations for establishing a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) at an abandoned airstrip north of the valley. The FARP TEXACO was intended primarily to give AH-64 Apache pilots a close-in facility to quickly rearm, refuel, and return to the fight. Fuel at the FARP would be provided by two Chinooks, specially equipped with 3,600-gallon internal fuel tanks, and referred to fondly as “fat cows.”83

Due to inclement weather conditions in eastern Afghanistan, D-Day for Operation

ANACONDA was postponed until 2 March. The delay gave Colonel Wiercinski all the more time to worry about problematic issues, such as the distinct possibility of enemy heavy weapons covering the flight approaches to the Shahi Kowt, the prospects of a Chinook being shot-down, assaulting into the low ground (not the high ground) below the eastern ridge, losing the element of surprise with a day vs. a night assault, going into battle with no supporting artillery, and recent intelligence reports that enemy fighters were not holed up in the villages, but instead were manning defensive positions in the ridgelines.84 Wiercinski no doubt recalled the briefing he attended at the Special Forces’ advanced operating base the day he arrived in Bagram.

Lieutenant Colonel Pete Blaber, commander of Advance Force Operations, had stated the obvious, “Remember, every enemy on the planet expects the US military to attack using helicopters, this enemy will be no different.”85 The final plan for ANACONDA remained essentially unchanged. Beginning on D-

1, TFs Hammer and Anvil would begin movements to reach the western and southern portions of the Shahi Kowt, respectively, by daybreak on D-Day. At dawn on D-Day, the first air assault wave of Rakkasans would land along the eastern ridgeline. The northeastern escape route out of the valley would be purposely left open to entice enemy fighters to withdraw in that direction.

At dusk on D-Day, a second Rakkasan air assault would land in the northern portion of the valley to close the northeastern exfiltration route. On D-1, Colonel Wiercinski spoke with the Chinook crews that would ferry the Rakkasan Soldiers into combat and to the Apache pilots who would provide the protective firepower for the air assault. He told the airmen that in an earlier briefing he had told the infantrymen that they would be “flying into battle with the best crews and the best helicopters in the world.” “Not every helicopter and not every crew could do this,” he said.

“You’ve got the equipment, you’ve got the people…this is going to be a great mission.” In concluding his remarks, the Rakkasan commander reflected on the broader meaning of the

ANACONDA mission. “When they wrote the book on air assault, this is what they were talking about,” Wiercinski said. “No other unit in the world could do this…you will make history.”86

Combat Air Assault into the Shahi Kowt Valley

After midnight on D-Day, Rakkasan troops began boarding the six CH-47 Chinooks that would take them into the Shahi Kowt. For security purposes, the loading operation – forty to forty-five Soldiers per helicopter – was conducted under blackout conditions. As only five

AH-64 Apaches were available for the mission, TF Talon commander Lieutenant Colonel Jim

Marye revised the air movement plan such that two lead Apaches (Team 1) would clear the valley and cover the three Chinooks (Section 1) inserting 2d Battalion, 187th Infantry into the northern HLZs, while the remaining three Apaches (Team 2) would escort the three Chinooks (Section 2) landing in the southern HLZs with the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry. At 0430, 2 March

2002, Apache Team 1 departed Bagram for the valley. The three Chinooks in Section 1 lifted off at 0500, followed shortly thereafter by Section 2. Although inclement weather played havoc with the enroute flight, the pilots successfully navigated the intense fog and cloud cover and all the aircraft had arrived without incident in the objective area by approximately 0615.87 In describing the intensity of the mission, Chinook pilot Chief Warrant Officer 2 Kenneth Gunter reported that “ten minutes out the entire helicopter was just silent…everybody was just doing their jobs and getting ready for those last few minutes inbound.”88

Apache Team 1’s sweep of the designated landing areas along the eastern ridge was uneventful with no enemy activity detected. Once cleared to proceed, the Chinooks then entered the valley from the south, with each aircraft proceeding to a different HLZ close to the blocking position assigned to the ground maneuver element onboard. The three Chinooks inserting 2-187

Infantry landed safely at HLZs 1, 3, and 4, while the three CH-47s with 1-87 Soldiers landed at

HLZs 5, 12, and 13. “I was most worried about the terrain in the landing area…we had imagery

[but] those pictures didn’t do us a lot of good,” recalled Chief Warrant Officer 2 John Quinlan.

“We knew we were going to be in jagged areas…so basically getting that helicopter in there safely and getting those guys off, that’s what everyone was focused on,” Quinlan added.89

At the same time, Colonel Wiercinski and a tactical command post staff were inserted by UH-60 Black Hawks on a high ridge – Rak TAC ridge – south of the valley. In addition, Lieutenant Colonel Marye as the Air Mission Commander remained airborne over the

Shahi Kowt in a command and control UH-60 for the duration of the air assault. As the Section 1 Chinook pilots began their return trip to Bagram, they were ordered to TF Hammer’s location west of the valley to pick up wounded US Special Forces Soldiers and Afghan militiamen.90

Soon after landing, 2-187 began taking enemy fire at HLZ 3. A short time later,

Soldiers remaining on HLZ 1 also came under small arms and RPG fire. However, with assistance from the Apaches, the 2-187 troops completed their movement and established three blocking positions by 1500 D-Day.91 “I don’t think they anticipated the type of resistance they encountered when they got on the ground…a lot of us anticipated it going smoother than it did,”

Chief Warrant Officer 3 Scott Breslin thought as he climbed out of the Shahi Kowt and headed back to Bagram.92

To the south along the eastern ridge, 1-87 also received enemy fire from Takur Ghar after landing. The Soldiers began to consolidate in a bowl-like depression between two of their assigned blocking positions – BPs Heather and Ginger – as enemy small arms, machinegun,

RPG, and 82-mm mortar fire intensified. CW3 Simon recalled thinking that enemy fighters “are actually attacking our guys as opposed to trying to flee…it wasn’t what we expected.”93

Although fixed wing and Apache close air support knock out numerous enemy fighting positions, by noon on D-Day 1-87 had more than 20 wounded Soldiers, was running short of ammunition, and was pinned-down in the bowl.

After sunset, an AC-130 gunship arrived to provide suppressive fire while two US

Air Force HH-60 Pave Hawk helicopters evacuated the wounded. At midnight, two Chinooks landed and extracted the 1-87 Soldiers from the bowl area.94 Chief Warrant Officer 2 John

Ketchum, one of the Chinook pilots on the extraction mission, recalled being nervous going in –

“we weren’t sure how the infantry guys were going to signal us…we came around and I saw them waving a stick in the air and that was really a sigh of relief.” “My aircraft had five wounded that had taken shrapnel to different parts of their bodies,” Ketchum continued, “fellow

Soldiers carryied them onto the aircraft and they were bleeding.”95

By the end of D-Day, TF Hammer’s advance east of the Shahi Kowt had bogged down, two of the five TF Talon Apaches were un-flyable due to battle damage, a second lift by

Chinooks with reinforcements from Bagram had been cancelled because of the intense action in the valley,96 twenty-six Americans had been wounded, most of 1-87 had been extracted, and the enemy was fighting back, not attempting to escape. CJTF Mountain needed a new plan.

On 3 March (D+1), TF Rakkasan ordered all of the 1-87 and 2-187 units remaining along the eastern ridge to link up, move north, and consolidate at HLZ 15. At approximately

1100, six Chinooks departed Bagram headed for HLZ 15 with 1-187, the brigade reserve, onboard. Due to enemy mortar fire at the HLZ, the ground commander recommended that this air assault mission be aborted. However, one section of Chinooks landed anyway, while the other section returned to Bagram. At 1800, additional 2-187 Soldiers arrived by Chinook at HLZ

15, and at 2000 the Chinooks that had earlier aborted brought in the remaining 1-187 troops. By the end of the day, all of the Rakkasan troops had assemble at HLZ 15 in the north end of the valley.97

After arriving at the HLZ, 1-187 was ordered to move south to BP AMY. Upon reaching AMY early the next morning, the battalion was further ordered to clear the entire eastern ridge all the way south to blocking point GINGER. That afternoon (4 March), however,

1-187 was instructed to hold at BP DIANE. TF Rakkassan then assigned the mission of securing blocking point GINGER to the reconstituted 1-87th, designated at this point TF Summit. With a well-trained and capable, yet makeshift, complement of three full companies, Summit air assaulted into HLZ 3 west of BP DIANE aboard CH-47 Chinooks on 5 March. A brief change of mission involving the seizure of Takur Ghar was quickly reversed and 1-87 proceeded south toward PB Ginger as originally planned. By 12 March, TF Rakkasan had withdrawn all of its battalions from the Shahi Kowt. The entire extraction operation was conducted by Chinook pilots and crews.98

By 10 March, Afghan militia forces had reorganized west of the valley. Under the code name Operation GLOCK, a newly arrived Northern Alliance Tajik unit assaulted and cleared Tergul Ghar, then attacked the villages to the east in the Shahi Kowt. The original TF

Hammer Pashtun force also attacked villages in the southern portion of the valley before linking up with the Tajiks. CJTF Mountain leaders then established Task Force Commando, comprised of the 3d Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry; 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry, and elements of 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division to conduct additional ANACONDA missions.

During Operation HARPOON on 13 March, the Canadian Light Infantry, along with A/4-31, air assaulted onto the north end of Tergul Ghar to conduct a more thorough sweep of the four mile long hill mass. Chinooks from the 159th Aviation Regiment conducted the air assault. After completing the mission and reaching the south end of Tergul, the Canadians and A Company were extracted by CH-47s from the 159th.99

The final ANACONDA operation was designated POLAR HARPOON. The mission was assigned to 4-31 Infantry and entailed clearing Takur Ghar and the upper Shahi

Kowt Valley. On 18 March, Chinooks inserted the battalion TAC and C Company on a precariously steep ridgeline north of, and 1500 feet below, Takur Ghar’s peak. Additional CH-

47s landed in the valley with A Company. Charlie Company and the TAC climbed to the top of the mountain and conducted a thorough search, while A Company swept the valley below. After completing the mission, 4-31 was extracted the next day, again by Chinooks.100 Operation

ANACONDA was finally over. Although some would disagree, General Tommy Franks, commander in chief, US Central Command, declared ANACONA “an unqualified and absolute success.”101

Assessment of the ANACONDA Combat Air Assaults

Task Force Talon conducted fourteen separate CH-47 Chinook combat air assaults in support of TF Rakkasan during Operation ANACONDA. “I use[d] Chinooks to bring the troops in rather than Black Hawks…because of the altitude…the constraints on the lift capability of helicopters at that altitude,” Major General Hagenbeck explained in a post-operation interview.102 More than 1,400 Soldiers had been safely inserted and extracted in ANACONDA – the highest altitude combat operation in American history.103 Although none of the air assault

Chinooks sustained battle damage from enemy fire, the outcome could have been devastatingly different.

On D-1, a five-man Special Operations reconnaissance team that had earlier infiltrated the upper Shahi Kowt spotted an enemy DShK 12.7-mm machine gun position perfectly situated to interdict the CH-47s as they entered the valley and began their landing approaches. With assistance from US Air Force AC-130 gunships, this Special Operations team and others located throughout the Shahi Kowt attacked and successfully destroyed five DShK antiaircraft positions prior to the Rakkasan air assault the next morning.104 Although this Long

War Occasional Paper focuses on CH-47 Chinook combat air assaults by conventional forces, it is worthy of note that during the Special Operations phase of ANACONDA, two MH-47E Chinooks from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment were shot down by enemy

RPGs and small arms fire.105 “When we found out that two MH-47 crews had gone down in the exact area where we were putting in the 10th Mountain, it hit close to home,” CW2 Quinlan recalled. The notion that the Taliban “could be that effective with their rocket-propelled grenades to take down an aircraft…I think that hit the special operations community pretty hard,” Quinlan said in an after action interview.106

Operation ANACONDA was the US military’s first conventional combat operation of the OEF campaign. It was the first time Chinooks and Apaches had ever operated together as a team in combat. Unfortunately, TF Talon may not have had a sufficient of number of

Chinooks available to transport the entire Rakkasan force and its equipment to the valley all at the same time in one lift. “The whole mission economy of force due to the restricted footprint allowed in Afghanistan by direction of the Secretary of Defense,” explained Colonel Scott

Kubica, Talon executive officer during ANACONDA.107 Ground commanders were forced to pick and choose which units and what supplies to take in first or leave behind. These decisions were difficult to make since intelligence estimates of the enemy situation in the Shahi Kowt were updated continually as new data came in prior to D-Day. In hindsight, for example, more mortars should perhaps have been included in the first lift.

After inserting the first lift troops in the valley, the original six Chinooks returned to

Bagram to pick up the remaining Soldiers and equipment. Inclement weather and enemy activity in and around the HLZs, delayed/prevented the second lift of Rakkasans from reaching the valley in a timely manner. More Chinooks, enough to move everyone and everything in one lift, may have been more effective. “Our deployment to OEF was done by USAF Strategic Airlift vice

Sea Lift…that kept us from taking more Chinooks,” Colonel James Marye, TF Talon Commander emphasized. “Our full up sixteen ship Chinook company would have been able to accomplish the task” of transporting all of the Rakkasans and their equipment to the Shahi Kowt in just one lift. Marye conceded, however, that FARP TEXACO may not have been able to support more aircraft. “We had a pretty fair FARP capability, but it would have been a serious stretch with additional Chinooks, since they had to also fuel and rearm Apaches and Black

Hawks, he later wrote. 108

Because of the CH-47’s exceptional allowable combat load and its ability to operate in high altitude environments, the six Chinooks that did participate in the D-Day air assault mission enabled TF Rakkasan to surprise the enemy, take the initiative, and choke off escape routes by rapidly massing combat power on key terrain features in the Shahi Kowt. No other aircraft was capable of supporting Operation ANACONDA to the same extent. Two months after ANACONDA ended, Royal Marines went back into the valley. They discovered some caves, defensive positions, and piles of American MREs and bottled water, but no al-Qaeda or

Taliban fighters – “it’s pretty quiet,” Sergeant Darren Hughes admitted, acknowledging that

ANACONDA may have been more successful than previously believed.109 “It was clear that

Operation ANACONDA had dealt the enemy a heavy blow…al Qaeda and Taliban forces have been devastated,” Brigadier Roger Lane, commander of British forces in Afghanistan said in

May 2002. “I don’t think we fully appreciate how devastating ANACONDA was,” he told a

Times reporter as he climbed down from an RAF Chinook at Bagram.110 HIGH, HOT and HEAVY:

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The CH-47 Chinook proved its mettle in high elevation combat air assault operations during Operation ANACONDA. The ability of the aircraft to insert large numbers of troops and equipment into mountainous Afghan terrain proved invaluable to Task Force

Rakkasan’s success in the Shahi Kowt Valley. Combined Forces Land Component Command

(CFLCC), Rakkasan, and Task Force Talon commanders realized and understood early-on that

Chinooks would in all likelihood be the aircraft of choice for OEF missions into high altitude

HLZs.111

Operation MOUNTAIN LION I

“It’s important for Americans to know this war will not be quick and will not be easy…the battles in Afghanistan are not over,” President George W. Bush told the crowd gathered for the George C. Marshall ROTC Award Seminar on National Security at Virginia

Military Institute in April 2002. President Bush announced a new offensive campaign, code named Operation MOUNTAIN LION, designed to “hunt down [remaining] al Qaeda and

Taliban forces and keep them on the run.”112 At the time of the President’s address, the 90-day operation to clear enemy sanctuaries in Paktia, Paktika, and Oruzgan provinces was already underway. The CJTF Mountain plan called for battalion or company sized units to conduct a series of air assault/full spectrum operations in and around the key cities of Gardez, Khost, and

Orgun-e, to kill/capture Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, and to set the stage for the upcoming loya jirga that would elect a transitional Afghan government.113

In the opening action of Operation MOUNTAIN LION, the 1st Battalion, 187th

Infantry air assaulted from Kandahar onboard CH-47 Chinooks to seize and clear a suspected enemy cave and tunnel facility near the Zhawar Kili mountain range in Paktia province. The air assault was unopposed, and the 1-187 IN Soldiers systematically cleared the complex then flew back to Kandahar. During the spring of 2002, British and Canadian forces conducted a series of sub-operations – PTARMIGAN, SNIPE, HARPOON, TORII, CONDOR, BUZZARD, and

CHEROKEE SKY – in support of the overall MOUNTAIN LION effort. Although three Royal

Air Force HC Mark II Chinooks from the 27th Squadron at RAF Odiham deployed to

Afghanistan, many of these allied operations were supported by CH-47 crews and aircraft from the 7th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment and 1st Battalion, 159th Aviation Regiment, 18th

Aviation Brigade.

Chinooks, for example, flew soldiers from the 3d Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Light

Infantry Regiment on a sensitive site exploitation mission to the Tora Bora area during TORII in

May. More than 400 US, Canadian, and Afghan Soldiers were involved in TORII, which also included a team of American forensic experts which collected DNA samples from deceased/buried Taliban and al-Qaeda suspects. Also in May, four companies of Royal Marines from the 45th Commando Regiment, TF Jacana, air assaulted into the mountains of Paktia province during Operation CONDOR in search of Taliban fighters who had ambushed an

Australian Special Forces team. British Marines participating in Operation SNIPE conducted air assaults into a region southeast of Khost, and in Operation BUZZARD at the end of the month,

TF Jacana returned by Chinook to Paktia to deny the Taliban freedom of movement between

Khost and the Pakistan border. Finally, in June 2002, military vehicles and US Black Hawk and

Chinook helicopters transported Canadian troops on a sweep of Zabol province designated

Operation CHEROKEE SKY to establish a coalition presence, gather intelligence, and foster positive relations with local Afghan citizens. CHEROKEE SKY was the last of the Operation

MOUNTAIN LION missions.114

Air Assaults under Combined Joint Task Force-180

Lieutenant General Dan McNeill and Combined Joint Task Force-180 (CJTF-180) –

XVIII Airborne Corps – assumed responsibility for OEF Coalition operations in June 2002.

Later that summer, Combined Task Force (CTF) 82 – 82d Airborne Division – deployed to

Afghanistan and replaced the re-designated CTF Mountain, and the infantry units of the 10th

Mountain and 101st Airborne Divisions returned home. Bravo Company, 159th Aviation

Regiment and A Company, 7th Battalion, 101st Airborne Division, the CH-47 Chinook units that had flown in Operation ANACONDA and during the ensuing months, remained in Afghanistan to support CTF 82 which established its headquarters at Bagram. Task Force Panther, CTF-82’s tactical forces based at Kandahar, was comprised of two battalions from the 3d Brigade and one battalion from the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division.115

During the remainder of the summer 2002, TF Panther began establishing forward operating bases (FOB) Salerno, Shkin, and Orgun-e in southeastern Afghanistan and soon began an ongoing series of raids and cordon/search operations, nearly all of which were supported by

Chinooks. 82d Airborne Soldiers continuously air assaulted into small villages, such as Qiqay south of Khost, in search of weapons and equipment left behind by enemy forces. On 10 August, hundreds of paratroopers flew to the village of Malakay on the Pakistan border to search buildings and confiscate weapons.116 In a June 2008 interview, Lieutenant General McNeill described the TF Panther tactical campaign as a “rolling series of operations going on all the time” to prevent the Taliban from reconstituting.117

CTF 82 and TF Panther next launched Operation MOUNTAIN SWEEP, the largest

OEF air assault mission since ANACONDA. Soldiers from the 1st and 3d Battalions, 505th

Parachute Infantry Regiment (505 PIR) launched onboard 7-101st Chinooks from Kandahar to

HLZs southwest of Gardez, near the villages of Dormat and Narizah, in search of Taliban fighters in and around the Shahi Kowt Valley. Over the next six days, the Paratroopers air assaulted from village to village in Paktia province’s Zormat district capturing Taliban sympathizers and confiscating caches of enemy weapons, ammunition, and documents. More than 2,000 US and Coalition forces participated in MOUNTAIN SWEEP, which once again made evident the Chinook’s ability to quickly deliver overwhelming combat power into Taliban sanctuaries in even the remotest regions of Afghanistan. During the five combat air assault missions, the CH-47 helicopters were escorted by AH-64 Apache gunships. “The air assaults were complex, with some requiring two lifts to get all the forces into the objective area,” CJTF-

180 spokesman Major Gary Tallman explained the day after MOUNTAIN SWEEP ended.118

During the fall of 2002, TF Panther Soldiers began moving out from Kandahar to the newly established FOBs in Khost and Paktika provinces. The troops also continued their progressive series of offensive sweeps supported in part by Chinooks for air assaults.119 During

Operation VILLAGE SEARCH in October, 3-505 PIR launched from FOB Salerno and searched four high-desert villages along the Pakistan border for enemy fighter and weapons caches. In

November, CH-47s air assaulted Soldiers from 1-505 PIR into several villages surrounding

Bagram Air Base. Operation KOFI SOFI, which also included Chinook insertions and extractions of troops in the nearby Kohe Safi Mountain range, was designed to eliminate weapons and ammunition caches that were in close proximity to the base. Finally, in December,

CTF 82 conducted an air assault into the village of Shumace in Parwan province just twenty miles northeast of Kabul. This mission was flown by pilots and crews from Charlie Company,

159th Aviation Regiment. The landing was unopposed, and once on the ground, the Soldiers offered medical assistance and humanitarian aid to the local Afghan villagers.120

First Brigade, 82d Airborne – TF Devil – replaced TF Panther in January 2003.

Soon after arriving, TF Devil initiated Operation MONGOOSE, a Chinook air assault to search for Taliban and to exploit cave facilities southeast of Kandahar in the Adi Ghar Mountains, near

Spin Boldak. Nearly 350 Coalition troops, including Soldiers from 2-504 PIR, cleared 75 caves in the honeycombed complex before being extracted by CH-47s in early February.121 Less than two weeks later 2-504 PIR air assaulted into the Baghran River Valley in search of Taliban leaders. The intense village-by-village cordon and search conducted during Operation VIPER result in the discovery of several weapons caches and the capture of eight suspected Taliban operatives.122

On 20 March, several CH-47s from C Company, 7th Battalion, 101st Airborne

Division participated in a night air assault into several HLZ in the Sami Ghar Mountains.

Operation VALIANT STRIKE was a two-battalion insertion into eastern Kandahar province involving Soldiers from both the 2d and 3d Battalions, 504 PIR, along with Romanian and

Afghan Army forces. More than five-hundred 504 PIR and Special Operations Soldiers air assaulted into Sangin, Helmand province, during Operation RESOLUTE STRIKE the following month. During the remainder of spring 2003, Chinook pilots and crews took part in a number of additional air assault missions in support of Operation UNIFIED VENTURE – US, Italian, and

Afghan troops inserted along the Pakistan border, Operation DELIBERATE STRIKE 37 miles north of Kandahar, and Operation DRAGON FURY, in which US and Italian troops were inserted back into the Shahi Kowt Valley.123

Task Force Warrior, comprised primarily of the 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain

Division, replaced TF Devil as CJTF-180’s principle tactical combat force in southern and southeastern Afghanistan during the summer of 2003. TF Warrior included four light infantry battalions, a typical assortment of supporting elements, and Coalition forces from Romania,

France, and Italy. CH-47 Chinook aviation support for Warrior air assault operations remained the responsibility of C Company, 159th Aviation Regiment and newly arrived Detachment 1, B

Company, 2d Battalion, 104th Aviation Regiment, a Connecticut Army National Guard unit from Windsor Locks.124 Although routine combat and stability operations were normally conducted within ten to fifteen miles of the Forward Operating Bases at Salerno, Shkin, and

Orgun-e, TF Warrior did launch several large-scale, battalion-sized, combat insertions into remote regions significantly distant from its FOBs.

On 30 August 2003 for example, to kick off Operation MOUNTAIN VIPER,

Chinooks inserted a company-sized unit from 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry into the mountainous region near the village of Deh Chopan in Zabol province. The purpose of this air assault was to clear a twenty square mile area east of the landing zone of Taliban fighters. The following day additional 2-22 IN Soldiers air assaulted into HLZs north of the original site in pursuit of fleeing

Taliban elements. CH-47s flew the Quick Reaction Force from Kandahar to join the fighting on 1 September. Afghan National Army forces were then inserted by Chinook into the operation to conduct patrols and establish checkpoints. Over the next few days, 2-22 IN conducted several additional Chinook air assaults in the region while pursuing Taliban leaders and exploiting cave complexes. By the end of the week, operations around Deh Chopan ended and CH-47s picked up the 2-22 IN Soldiers and flew them back to Kandahar.125

During a night air assault on 6 November, Chinooks inserted A Company, B

Company, and 2d Platoon, C Company, 2-22 IN into the Hindu Kush Mountains near the village of Namgalam, Nuristan Province. Operation MOUNTAIN RESOLVE was a hammer and anvil mission with 2-22 IN sweeping north through the Waygal River Valley, thereby forcing al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters into blocking positions established by Combined Joint Special Operations

Task Force (CJSOTF) elements. After six days, the 2-22 IN Soldiers were extracted by

Chinooks and returned to Bagram, only to be re-inserted into the same area of the Waygal for a follow-up operation a week later.126 In December, Chinooks conducted dozens of air assaults in support of four week long Operation MOUNTAIN AVALANCHE to “deny sanctuary and disrupt the activities of terrorist forces simultaneously throughout the eastern, southeastern, and southern regions of Afghanistan.”127 With four battalions and 2,000 Soldiers participating, “this one is the largest [assaults] we have ever designed…the enemy isn’t going to know when we hit and he isn’t going to know what we’re doing,” explained Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Hilferty, spokesman for US military headquarters at Bagram Air Base.128

In Helmand province, Paratroopers from the 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry Regiment used CH-47s for company-sized air assaults in Operation MOUNTAIN BLIZZARD during the winter of 2004. Thousands of US, Coalition, and Afghan Army troops conducted patrols, raids, and cordon-and-searches, discovered dozens of weapons and ammunition caches, and killed 22 enemy combatants in the operation which ended in March.129 “In Operation MOUNTAIN

BLIZZARD…Coalition forces have succeeded in finding and destroying scores of weapons caches, placing numerous terrorists and other enemies of Afghanistan under control, and establishing the conditions for security and stability,” Lieutenant Colonel Hilferty told Voice of

America News in mid-February.”130 In TF Warrior’s last major operation before redeploying code-named MOUNTAIN STORM, 2-22 IN conduct five Chinook air assaults in conjunction with several cordon and search missions in the vicinity of Kandahar.131 The overall operation was conceived by Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) the new senior military theater strategic headquarters for OEF established at Kabul in October 2003. In addition to 2-22

IN’s insertions at Kandahar, US Marines from the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit and two battalions of Afghan soldiers conducted a series of simultaneous assaults into the southern and southeastern provinces “to crush anti-coalition forces along Afghanistan’s border with

Pakistan.”132

New Tactical Headquarters – Combined Joint Task Force-76

CJTF-76 from the 25th Infantry Division replaced CJTF-180 as the Coalition’s operational and tactical headquarters in May 2004. CH-47 Chinook air assault support for CJTF-

76 was provided at the time by B Company, 214th Aviation Regiment at Bagram and F

Company, 131st Aviation Regiment from the Alabama and Georgia Army National Guard at

Kandahar. Company F conducted missions throughout southern and southeastern Afghanistan in conjunction with the 25th ID’s CTF Bronco, which included 2d Battalion, 5th Infantry (TF

Bobcat), 2d Battalion 35th Infantry (TF Cacti), the Romanian 281th Infantry Regiment, plus additional supporting units. F Company had 14 CH-47s and was a component of TF Diamondhead (2-25 AVN), which was subordinate to TF Wings – one of six CJTF-76 task forces

– that was responsible for all Army aviation coverage in Afghanistan.

During their deployment F Company Soldiers conducted approximately 200 air assault missions, the largest of which required was the attack of a suspected Taliban training facility that involved twelve Chinooks, six Apaches, and four Black Hawks. Coalition and

Afghan Soldiers were picked up at both Kandahar and FOB Gereshk and flown north to a suspected Taliban training facility along the Helmand River. The Chinooks then landed the troops in ten separate HLZs on both sides and in the middle of the valley. The training site was cleared without resistance and the Soldiers were extracted the following day. Chinook crews and aircraft stood continuous Quick Reaction Force (QRF) duty at Kandahar. The same day and night crews served in this capacity 24/7 for a week at a time. Numerous air assault, insertion, and extraction missions were conducted by the Chinook crews in the QRF role. The Company also flew general support missions for the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit at FOB Ripley in

Oruzgan Province. Chinooks from F Company inserted TF Cacti Soldiers into the Arghandab

Valley on a cordon and search operation north of Kandahar in July.133

Later, in October 2004, A Company, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry was ambushed and pinned down at Baylough Daychopan in Zabol Province. Taliban controlled the mountains surrounding the town and attacked A Company with heavy machine gun fire, rocket propelled grenades, and mortars during five straight days of fighting. If the Soldiers tried to escape in their own vehicles, they would have been destroyed. Chinook crews from F Company volunteered to conduct the emergency rescue mission. In adverse weather conditions and under enemy fire, a flight of Chinooks landed in hot HLZs and extracted the A Company Soldiers and their equipment in less than 15 seconds. Following the successful extraction, the appreciative A Company commander, Captain Peter Farrell, explained, “There were no go-arounds, no missed hook ups, and despite all that was going on around them, they managed to get our people off the ground and back home safely.”134 During the winter 2005, F Company Chinooks and TF Bobcat

Soldiers conducted additional air assaults into Sha Wali Kot District of Kandahar Province,

Mirabad in Helmand, and the Bahguchar Valley in Oruzgan Province.135 Pilots, crew members, and support teams from F Company returned to Georgia and Alabama in March 2005.

Also in March 2005, the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) replaced the 25th

Infantry Division as the CJTF-76 headquarters element. Although several operations were initiated, such as DETERMINED RESOLVE, LIGHTNING FREEDOM, VIGILANT

SENTINEL, COUNTERSTRIKE, and SECURE PROSPERITY, to disrupt any potential Taliban resurgence and set conditions for the September Afghan parliamentary and provincial elections, none required Chinook combat air assault support. SETAF controlled all US tactical ground forces in Regional Commands South and East. The 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team, CTF

Bayonet, at Kandahar was responsible for RC-South, while 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division,

CTF Devil, directed operations in RC-East from Bagram Air Base.

The principal focus at this time was the less kinetic pillars of counterinsurgency operations rather than fighting Taliban. As described by CTF Bayonet commander Colonel

Kevin Owen, the emphasis was on providing “a secure environment for the Afghan people…to allow governance to develop and economic initiatives to take hold.”136 Soldiers moved off of the

FOBs into the villages, took responsibility for specific AOs, and lived among the Afghans. For the paratroopers of 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry in RC-East this experience was significantly different from that of their first OEF deployment. Previously 2-504 Infantry was more mobile – a small unit would air assault into an objective area, fight for several days, fly back to the FOB, and do the same thing over again in a different location a week or so later.137 For 1st Battalion,

325th Infantry, responsible for Wardak, Lowgar, and portions of Ghazni and Paktika Provinces, all movements were on foot or by HMMWV – the battalion never conducted a single air assault mission.138

Taliban Resurgence

By the time the 10th Mountain Division assumed command of CJTF-76 in February

2006, the Taliban had begun a surprisingly resilient resurgence. To thwart the Taliban buildup, the Caolition undertook a second Operation MOUNTAIN LION designed to clear, hold, build and engage in the Pech River Valley, Marawara district, Kunar Province. Nearly 2,500 US

Soldiers, Marines, and Afghans from the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain (TF

Spartan), the 1st Battalion, 3d Marine Regiment (TF Lava), and the ANA 203d Corps, participated in the operation. CH-47 Chinook air assault support in Afghanistan at this time was provided by 3d Battalion, 10th General Support Aviation Brigade and B Company, 7th Battalion,

158th Aviation Regiment, an Army Reserve heavy lift company from Kansas.

Prior to the official launch of MOUNTAIN LION, Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 32d

Infantry, TF Chosin, infiltrated to blocking positions in the valley. Then at H-hour, 11 April,

Coalition forces conducted a pre-dawn air-ground assault into the Korengal and Shuryak Valleys in search of Taliban sanctuaries. At the same time, Marines and B Company, 1st Battalion, 32d

Infantry air assaulted into an area 20 miles west of Kunar’s provincial capital of Asadabad near

Sawtalo Sar Mountain to seal off potential Korengal escape routes. By the end of June 2006, having successfully cleared the valleys of Taliban fighters, Coalition forces began establishing a permanent presence in the formerly disputed region. The CH-47 combat air assaults during operation MOUNTAIN LION were conducted by pilots and crews from B Company, 3-10

AVN.139

To set the stage for the takeover of RC-South by NATO-International Security

Assistance Forces, CJTF-76 initiated Operation MOUNTAIN THRUST in May 2006 to drive

Taliban insurgents from sanctuaries in Kandahar, Helmand, Zabol, and Oruzgan Provinces. Ten thousand Coalition and Afghan forces participated in the operation, in which movement was conducted primarily by ground vehicles or on foot. As a precaution, however, several CH-47

Chinooks from 3-10 AVN were re-positioned from Bagram to augment those of B Company, 7-

158 AVN already at Kandahar. As MOUNTAIN THRUST unfolded, the Chinooks were utilized increasingly for a wide variety of re-supply and air assault missions. In late May, for example,

2d Battalion, 4th Brigade Combat Team (TF Warrior) conducted a Chinook air assault into the

Chalekor Valley, Deh Chopan district, in northern Zabol Province in support of the arrival of a

Romanian battalion.140

Next in June, CH-47s inserted a Quick Reaction Force from A Company, British 3d

Parachute Battalion to help rescue a logistics convoy that had been ambushed near Sangin in the

Helmand River Valley. The next day, C Company, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, led by Captain

Jared Wilson, drove out to the ambush site and led the stricken convoy back to Musa Qal’eh.

Chinooks extracted the 3d Para QRF and returned them to FOB Robinson. On 17 June,

Chinooks inserted 170 Soldiers from Wilson’s company onto Hill 1999, which offered a commanding view of the Baghran Valley. Two days later, C/2-87 successfully fought off an attack by 60 Taliban fighters. The company was subsequently extracted by Chinooks on 5 July and flown to Musa Qal’eh.141 Finally, in a follow-on operation designated MOUNTAIN FURY, two TF Warrior companies conducted Chinook air assaults into eastern Ghazni Province to establish blocking positions in Andar district.142 “We did all of our air assaults with Chinooks,”

Lieutenant Colonel Frank Sturek, TF Warrior commander said. “We put sniper teams on M-

Gator utility vehicles, loaded them last, so they could be first off the ramp…after landing they would race to the high ground…set up an overwatch…while the rest of the platoon established a perimeter,” Sturek explained.143

From March to October 2006, Bravo Company, 7th Battalion, 158th Aviation

Regiment conducted 1,000 missions, logged more than 7,700 flight hours, and carried 25 million tons of men and equipment in support of the 10th Mountain Division in RC-South. Shortly after mobilizing, B Company was diverted to Pakistan to provide several months of humanitarian assistance following the October 2005 earthquake. Once in Afghanistan, the 230 member company became the heavy lift component of Task Force Knighthawk at Kandahar. Pilots and crews began flying day and night missions immediately in support of US and Coalition forces –

British, Canadian, French, and Afghan – along the ring route, which included FOBs, COPs, and other outposts, such as Cobra, Anaconda, Tarin Kowt, Deh Chopan, Robinson, Gereshk, Qalat, and Spin Boldak.144

Two or three Bravo Company Chinooks stood QRF duty each day and night.

During one high priority QRF mission, US Special Forces and Afghan military personnel were inserted into an area near the Kajaki Dam about 100 miles northwest of Kandahar City. The landings created an enormous brownout, but the Chinooks were in and out in 30 seconds. With the Chinooks capacity to haul large numbers of Soldiers, “you could surround a village in no time…it was going to be a bad day for somebody,” Bravo Company commander, Lieutenant

Colonel Walter Bradley explained in a post-deployment interview. “We’d move quickly, often conduct our briefings on a dirt patch, and give the ground commander whatever he wanted,” Bradley continued.145 Three and often four Bravo Company Chinooks flew the air assault missions during Operations MOUNTAIN LION, MOUNTAIN THRUST, and MOUNTAIN

FURY, described above. The company returned to Kansas in October 2006. HIGH, HOT and HEAVY:

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Operation Enduring Freedom organizational and command level changes in 2006 and 2007 affected the number of combat operations and air assaults conducted by Coalition forces. In October 2006, NATO/ISAF assumed responsibility for RC-East, after taking control of RC-South the previous July as described in Chapter 4. By the end of 2006, ISAF was responsible for all five contiguous commands in Afghanistan.146 As a consequence, CFC-A was deactivated in February 2007, and CJTF-76 (10th Mountain Division) became the ISAF headquarters for RC-East. At the same time, 4th BCT, 82d Airborne (TF Fury) at FOB Salerno assumed responsibility for the RC-East southern provinces, leaving 3d BCT, 10th Mountain (TF

Spartan) at Jalalabad to cover the northern provinces. CJTF-76 was then re-designated CJTF-82, with arrival of the 82d Airborne Division headquarters element in March. Finally in June, the

173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team (TF Bayonet) relieved TF Spartan. TF Bayonet units were split up, with Soldiers eventually operating from eighteen satellite bases in Kunar and

Nuristan Provinces.147

ISAF launched a number of Coalition operations, such as HOOVER, HAMMER,

ACHILLES, SILVER, SILICON, HARAKATE YOLO, COMMANDO FURY, and

SNAKEBITE in 2007. The Battle of Musa Qala, the largest engagement of the year, involved primarily US, Afghan and British troops. A Chinook detachment from B Company, 3d General

Support Aviation Battalion, 82d Combat Aviation Brigade with four Chinooks at Kandahar provided critical support to the numerous FOBs and COPs throughout RC-South. During

Operation FURIOUS PURSUIT, Bravo Company, 3d GSAB inserted 400 Soldiers from 1st

Battalion, 508th PIR into an area in the Helmand River Valley known as the ‘heart of darkness’ in a four-Chinook air assault in April 2007. This operation, which cleared enemy fighters from the village of Sangin and liberated two British forward operating bases that were under siege, also included Afghan, Estonian, Dutch, Canadian, British and US Special Operations Forces.148

Sadly, two pilots and three crew members from B Company, along with two passengers, were killed during a night air assault when their CH-47 was shot down in the Upper Sangin Valley,

Helmand Province, on 30 May 2007. The aircraft was second in a flight of three. Landing and unloading troops at the HLZ was uneventful, however upon lift-off, the CH-47 was hit below the cockpit and between the right main and rear auxiliary fuel tanks with rocket propelled grenades.

The aircraft nosed over immediately and crashed.149

Regional Command – East Air Assaults

In RC-East, a second B Company detachment flew dozens of air assault missions in support of TF Fury and TF Bayonet Soldiers in the Waygal and Pitigal Valleys, Nuristan

Province, and the Korengal and Chowkay Valleys in Kunar Province.150 In July 2007 for example, 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment Soldiers air assaulted onboard Chinooks into

HLZ Shetland, located at the 10,000 foot level in the mountains of Nuristan Province. The purpose of the mission, called Operation SARAY HAS, was to search for Taliban who had been firing missiles at FOB Naray from the mountain-top villages of Badermashal and Cherigal.

Although the Taliban shooters were not discovered, the mission was considered a success. “We came up here to…deny the enemy use of the hilltop,” Headquarters and Headquarters Troop executive officer, First Lieutenant Christopher Richelderfer said before the Soldiers were extracted from the mountain.151

Next in August, 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry Regiment and Afghan National Army elements conducted a night Chinook air assault onto a 7,000 foot mountain overlooking the

Chowkay Valley. The TF Bayonet mission, designated “Destined Strike,” used CH-47s to ensure that the Soldiers could quickly seize the high ground above the valley. At daybreak, the troops moved down the mountain and began sweeping villages in the valley. After five days, the operation was completed and the Soldiers were extracted by Chinooks.152 Afghan and TF

Bayonet Soldiers air assaulted into three remote villages in the Pitigal Valley along the Pakistan border in search of Taliban leaders in September. Twenty Taliban fighters were killed and 11 captured during this operation, in which a bombmaking factory was also discovered. 153

A second CH-47 Chinook detachment deployed to Afghanistan in September 2007.

Detachment 1, B Company, 3d Battalion, 126th Aviation Regiment, comprised of pilots, crews, and support personnel from the New York and Maryland Army National Guard, split their assets sending two aircraft to Kandahar, two to FOB Salerno, and four to Bagram.154 The Guardsmen arrived just in time to participate in TF Bayonet’s Operation ROCK AVALANCHE, a series of multiple-company night sequenced air assaults into the Chapa Dara, Shuryak, Pech, Watapor, and Korengal River Valleys, all of which were Taliban strongholds in Kunar Province.

Paratroopers from all four 2-503 IN companies were positioned, then, re-positioned, at different times and into different locations throughout Kunar in an effort to drive Taliban fighters from safe haven and into the open. A total of eight Chinooks flew dozens of day and night air assault lifts over the course of the seven-day operation.155

Beginning in mid-October Soldiers from Bravo Company, 2-503 IN, conducted a coordinated air assault of the Abas Ghar ridgeline that dominated the Korengal Valley. This was the same area, known as the Valley of Death, where in 2005 a Chinook had been shot down killing all 16 passengers onboard. Alpha Company air assaulted onto Phase Line Ridgeway,

7,500 feet above the Shuryak and Pech Valleys near the village of Aybot. The heavy-weapons platoon from D Company also air assaulted onto a nearby ridgeline with its 40 mm MK19 grenade launcher, M2 machine guns, and 81 mm mortar tubes. “I’ve never air assaulted with a

MK19 before,” said grenadier Specialist David Hooker after setting up his firing position near the HLZ.156 Operation ROCK AVALANCHE ended successfully on 25 October 2007 with scores of Taliban insurgents killed during numerous firefights and other sustained contacts.

In December 2007, two additional Chinooks from B Company 3-126th were repositioned to FOB Salerno to participate in operation DEADWOOD, designed to capture

Taliban leaders and disrupt enemy in the Khost Bowl. This was a complicated night air assault mission involving US Special Forces, Afghan commandos, Chinooks, Black Hawks, and

Apaches. The assault teams struck three different locations on the same night. The air assault plan was unusual in that, depending upon the objective, different aircraft would take the flight lead as the entire packaged moved from one HLZ to the next. “We did this to support the ground commander’s intent,” explained Captain Eric Fritz, OIC of the Chinook contingent at Salerno.

In one insertion, Chinooks landed within feet of a targeted house – 60 troops instantly surrounded the building. “This is the advantage of using Chinooks for assaults,” Fritz said, “you can use surprise and mass against the insurgents giving them little time to react.”157 Prior to conducting the operation, the assault team practiced the mission during a flying rehearsal on

Christmas Day.

Chinook pilots and crews from B Company, 3-126th, at FOB Salerno took part in an additional large air assault mission, designated COMMANDO RECON, in April 2008. Four

CH-47s inserted 100 US Special Forces Soldiers and Afghan commandos into 10,000 foot-high

HLZs in the Afghanistan elephant trunk area, eastern Ghazni Province. One Chinook landed an team on the highest mountain top in the objective area to provide overwatch for the operation.

“This was a pure CH-47D air assault with four Chinooks, 2 AH-64 Ds and a C-130 gunship for cover,” Captain Fritz later wrote.158

Back in RC-South Chinook crews from both B Company, 3d GSAB, 82d CAB and

Detachment 1, B Company, 3d Battalion, 126th Aviation Regiment flew missions in support of the aviation task force at Kandahar, TF Corsair, 2d Battalion, 82d CAB. These missions typically involved routine re-supply, but also included 2-3 aircraft air assaults with ISAF forces – either, US, British, Australian, Dutch, Canadian, or Afghan – in search of high value Taliban targets or enemy weapons caches.159 After weeks of high-level planning, however, ISAF launched Operation SNAKEPIT in December 2007 to retake the Taliban-occupied town of Musa

Qala in Helmand Province. Thousands of NATO and Afghan forces massed south of the town, while 600 Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment conducted a late- afternoon air assault to seize Roshan Hill on the north side. Chinooks, Black Hawks, and

Apaches – nineteen helicopters in all – participated in SNAKEPIT air assault, which was one of the largest in Afghanistan since Operation ANACONDA. Although some fierce fighting occurred at Musa Qala, the Taliban slipped away and ISAF troops gained control of the town within three days.160 Anatomy of the Chinook Air Assault during the Battle of Musa Qala161

On 2 December, two Chinooks from B Company, 3-82d AVN flew from Bagram to

Kandahar to temporarily join TF Corsair for the air assault on Musa Qala, referred to alternatively as Operation SNAKEPIT and/or Operation MAR KARARDAD. At a preliminary briefing the following day, critical aspects of the operation involving objectives, intentions, responsibilities, scheduling, sequencing, forces available, and the enemy situation were presented and discussed. The initial plan stipulated the insertion of three companies from 1st Battalion,

508th PIR into an area north of Musa Qala. Three separate helicopter lift serials, each accompanied by AH-64 Apaches, were called for in the plan. Serial one consisted of four US

Chinooks; four British Chinooks made up serial two; and two Dutch Chinooks, along with four

US Black Hawks, comprised serial three. Additional Black Hawks were slated to provide overhead command and control.

An additional planning session took place on the morning of 4 December, followed by a final synchronization meeting involving dozens of US, British, and Dutch representatives in the afternoon. That evening, the entire plan for SNAKEPIT, including a minute-by-minute overview, was briefed to the CJTF-82 command and staff. Additional critical details, such as

ISR data, fire support, radio call signs/frequencies, and the final timeline, had been fleshed out and were presented during the command briefing. The original plan for a night insertion was revised such that all landings would now occur during daylight. This change was made to accommodate British concerns regarding low illumination cycles and night vision systems issues.162 On 5 December (D-2), TF Corsair conducted the Air Mission Briefing in which the operational plan was first presented to the pilots and crews who would actually fly the air assault mission. Photos of the HLZ, a large open wadi north of town, were presented and reviewed.

The enemy situation was described in more detail – Musa Qala was a center of insurgent activity, numerous foreign fighters were in the area, and the Taliban were heavily armed and willing to fight. Additional important information regarding weather conditions, flight sequencing, air routes, abort/down aircraft/go around procedures, rules of engagement, and the ground force

(approximately 375 Soldiers from 1-508th) scheme of maneuver was also formally presented.

Later in the day, the same briefing was presented to all of the flight crews from all three nations, more than 100 attendees, during the official Air Crew Mission Brief held in the TF Corsair motor pool building. Following this briefing, the motor pool floor was used for a ‘rock drill,’ in which the pilots and crews walked through the air assault, studied the timelines, reviewed their roles and responsibilities, and considered several contingency scenarios.

During update briefings the evening of 5 December and next morning, SNAKEPIT participants were kept up to date on progress of the British and Afghan ground operation south of

Musa Qala. They were also informed that the entire mission had been compromised by an

Afghan informant working at Kandahar Air Field and that the Taliban would be waiting with heavy weapons to attack the air assault helicopters. It was anticipated that the Taliban would remain undercover to avoid the Apaches and any preparatory fires, then pop up and begin firing as the aircraft were on final approach. During a loading rehearsal later in the day, 1-508th

Soldiers practiced getting on and off the helicopters. It was determined during this routine exercise that the original load plan, 40 troops per Chinook or 35 troops plus an M-Gator, was impractical. With the approval of the 1-508th battalion commander, the load factor was subsequently reduced to 30 Soldiers per Chinook. That evening, all of the air and ground forces slated to conduct the air assault gathered in a large hangar for the final Combined Arms

Rehearsal which gave everyone involved the opportunity to review the plan for the last time.

On D-Day morning, 7 December 2007, a Predator drone feed spotted Taliban vehicles in the proposed HLZ. Further observation indicated that the enemy fighters were planting IEDs along the primitive roadway that ran through the wadi. Although it was obvious at this point that the Taliban new exactly where the air assault aircraft would be landing, the mission was not cancelled or changed. At mid-day, the Paratroopers assembled on the tarmac for a final briefing before boarding the helicopters. The aircrews conduct one last briefing as well.

At 1520, the Apaches and C2 Black Hawks in serial one lift off. Next, five US

Chinooks carrying the main effort 1-508th ground force launched, followed thereafter by two US

Black Hawks and four British Chinooks, and lastly by four more US Black Hawks and two

Dutch Chinooks. When the aircraft were 20 minutes out from landing, preparatory fires, including a salvo of guided multiple rocket launched missiles, hit suspected Taliban target in and around the HLZ. Unfortunately, due to the convoluted USAF approval process, anticipated preparatory air strikes never materialized. As a result, Taliban firing positions threatening the air assault egress route were not attacked and destroyed as planned. With just a few minutes remaining before the lead Chinooks were scheduled to land, the Air Assault Mission

Commander, Colonel Kelly Thomas flying overhead in the C2 Black Hawk, ordered the entire flight to divert to an alternative HLZ over two miles away. All of the landings and departures at the alternate HLZ were uneventful and uncontested. The paratroopers then conducted a night movement to their originally assigned initial objectives. By the next day, all three 1-508th companies were in contact with Taliban resistors.

Apaches provided overhead fire support, while Chinooks began a seemingly endless series of day and night resupply missions. Nearly all the aircraft were fired upon, and three Apaches were hit, but not seriously damaged. By 10 December, the US ground forces had reached their primary objectives outside of Musa Qala and began preparations for the planned battle handoff to

Afghan troops. Over the next four weeks, the transition of responsibility to the Afghans was postponed several times. Finally, during the second week of January 2008, the 1-508th Soldiers were extracted by Chinooks and returned to Kandahar.

Changes in Regional Command - East

An additional series of troop rotations took place in 2008. In mid-January, the 101st

Combat Aviation Brigade – TF Destiny – replaced the 82d CAB at Bagram. The headquarters of the 82d Airborne division was relieved in April by the 101st Airborne Division. The new headquarters became CJTF 101 and assumed command of operations in RC-East. At the same time, the 4th BCT, 101st ABN replaced the 4th BCT, 82d ABN; and in July, the 3d BCT, 1st

Infantry Division relieved the 173d Airborne Brigade, thereby retaining the two brigade force structure arrangement in RC-East. CH-47 combat air assault support during this period was provided by B Company, 6th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment and B Company, 7th Battalion,

101st Aviation Regiment, 159th Combat Aviation Brigade, which had recently begun flying the upgraded ‘F’ model Chinook.

ISAF and CJTF 101 operations in RC-East during 2008 focused primarily on clear, hold, and build activities. As a result, the number of RC-East platoon and company FOBs and

COBs had grown to 35 by 2008.163 Many of these facilities were in remote locations often inaccessible by road, thus increasing the ground troops’ dependence on helicopters – principally

Chinooks – for resupply and general support. Combat air assaults during this timeframe were typically company-sized or smaller and often included Afghan forces. After Taliban overran the

Bari Alai Afghan outpost in Kunar province on 1 May, for example, an ANA commando company, along with US Special Forces advisers, conducted a Chinook air assault into the nearby Helgal Valley in an effort to block the escaping insurgents.164

In July 2008, B Company, 1-506 IN and a company of Afghan soldiers air assaulted into the Tangi Valley, Wardak Province, to block a Taliban force that had ambushed a 203d

Afghan Corps jingle truck convoy.165 Later, during Operation MANE – a major offensive in the

Jalrez and Nerkh Valleys in October – the 1-506 IN battalion TAC, the Scout and Mortar

Platoons, and an Afghan platoon air assaulted by Chinook onto an over-watch position near the

Jalrez district center. A platoon from C Company then conducted a night air assault to reinforce blocking positions in the Nerkh near FOB Airborne. An estimated 180 Taliban were killed or wounded in firefights and air strikes during the two-day operation.166 After replacing 1-506 IN in

Wardak in February 2009, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry continued conducting air assault operation in and around the worrisome Tangi Valley. During a two battalion operation in March, 2-87 IN began sweeping the valley from the north end, while 3-71 Cav entered from the south. At the same time Afghan commandos with Special Forces advisers air assaulted onboard Chinooks deep into the valley in search of Taliban leaders. Enemy resistance was light and the two-day

Tangi sweep concluded after the two battalions met near the Lowgar-Wardak provincial border.167 “We did dozens of air assaults with Chinooks in my year over there 2008-2009… there were a whole series of DEVIL, VIPER, SPADER, ROCK, and other operations, including about a dozen more CJSOTF missions we resourced,” 3d BCT, 1st ID commander Colonel John

Spiszer explained.168 The brigade conducted at least four Chinook air assaults per month for the first six months, then up to seven or eight a month during the latter half of the deployment.169

Once Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division, arrived in

Kunar Province in February 2009, they also conducted several Chinook insertions in conjunction with Operation LIONHEART along the rugged Pakistan border. LIONHEART was a complementary operation, involving US, Afghan, Pakistani military, and Pakistani Frontier

Corps forces, designed to prevent Taliban insurgents from crossing the border into Afghanistan.

“What we have done is refocus our…intelligence, surveillance [and] reconnaissance assets to identify who is transiting the border and launch attacks on those deemed a threat,” Spiszer told the American Forces Press Service when the operation began in November 2008.170

During Operation VIPER SHAKE in the spring 2009, troops from 1st Battalion,

26th Infantry Regiment, 1st ID (TF Spader) used Chinooks for air assaults into the mountains surrounding the Korengal Valley. 1-26 IN was almost entirely dependent on helicopter support since its platoons were scattered throughout the dangerous and volatile Kunar, Pech, Watapor,

Chapadara, and Korengal Valleys in Kunar Province.171 The 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry

Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team that replaced 1-26 IN in Kunar experienced numerous firefights and skirmishes in these same valleys. “We used a lot of Chinooks up there…in the

Hindu Kush region…usually at least one Chinook on all of our air assaults,” 2-12 IN commander, Colonel Brian Pearl, recalled.172 Meanwhile in Zabul Province, the Taliban had successfully closed down portions of

Highway 1, the main roadway connecting Kabul to Kandahar. Intelligence reports indicated that the Taliban were launching their attacks on the highway from sanctuaries in the Lurah River

Valley. During the spring 2008, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry initiated a series of Chinook air assaults from FOB Qalat into HLZs near villages in the valley. The villages were systematically searched for weapons and cleared of insurgents. “Company-size air assaults were most effective…and with not enough aviation support to go around, Chinooks were most efficient… you could get a larger number of guys in with fewer lifts,” Colonel John Allred, 2-506 IN battalion commander at the time later explained.173 Allred described how occasionally a company would air assault into a village, stay for several days and then extract out. Thinking that the Americans were gone for good, Taliban would move back into the village. The 2-506 IN company would then air assault right back into the same village, catching the Taliban off guard and putting them on the defensive in villages throughout the valley. With their support network in the Lurah seriously disrupted, the Taliban were unable to continue attacking Highway 1.

Second Battalion went on to conduct a series of additional Chinook air assaults in Paktika

Province, after deploying there later in the year.174

In Paktia Province, 1st Squadron, 61st Cavalry faced a similar problem. The

Haqqani Network, an insurgent group allied with the Taliban, had closed down the Khost to

Gardez road and set up an illegal toll-collecting operation near the Seti-Kandow Pass. 1-61 Cav and Afghan soldiers from 1st Brigade, 203d ANA Corps initiated a series of Chinook air assaults, designated Operation RADWA U BARQ, to clear the pass area of Haqqani fighters.

The squadron conducted one assault per month beginning in April 2008; then during RADWA U

BARQ IV in July, two companies air assaulted directly into the Haqqani sanctuary high in the mountains north of the pass. The surprised insurgents fled the area, leaving behind weapons, ammunition, and explosives. Shortly thereafter, the Khost-Gardez road reopened.175

Finally, in June 2008, 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment, 1st ID deployed to RC-

South to support and augment Canadian (TF Kandahar) and British (TF Helmand) forces. 2-2

IN assumed responsibility for the Maiwand, Ghurak, and Shah Wali Kowt districts in western

Kandahar Province. The battalion went on to conduct a series of ground and air assaults operation with Canadian, British, and Australian forces to interdict Taliban infiltration routes, attack insurgent sanctuaries, and search for high value targets/IED cells in the more troublesome

Zhari, Panjway’i, and Arghendab districts.176

Combat Air Assaults in 2009 and 2010

As with previous years, significant command changes occurred in Afghanistan during

2009. CJTF 82 replaced CJTF 101 in RC-East. The 4th BCT, 4th Infantry Division took over from the 3d BCT, 1st ID at Jalalabad Airfield and assumed responsibility for Nangarhar,

Nuristan, Kunar, and Laghman Provinces. Out of FOB Shank, 3d BCT, 10th Mountain Division began conducting operations in Logar and Wardak Provinces, while 4th BCT, 25th ID at FOB

Salerno took command in Khost, Paktia, and Paktika. By mid-year CH-47 Chinook heavy lift support was provided by the 159th CAB in RC-East and the 82d CAB in RC-South. General

Stanley McChrystal became commander of ISAF and USFOR-A in June, and earlier in the year,

President Obama had announced a significant OEF US troop increase, with “a clear and focused goal…to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan.”177

Soldiers from the 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment, along with an Afghan platoon, air assaulted onboard Chinooks into the Zormat district, Paktia Province, to establish COP Kalagu during Operation KALAGU THUNDER in April.178 In Operation HIWAD

PARAST, the 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry Regiment conducted two air assaults into the Minzi

Mountains, Paktika Province, to assist Special Forces Soldiers in attacking and exploiting a large

Taliban camp/IED factory.179 In June, 1-501 IN began Operation YUKON RECOVERY in which dozens of Chinook air assaults were conducted in the futile search for a captured 1st

Squadron Soldier.180

General McChrystal arrived in Afghanistan just in time to oversee Operation

KHANJAR, an unusually large brigade-sized offensive push into the Taliban infested Helmand

River Valley in southern Helmand Province that began in July. The KHANJAR plan called for

4,000 Marines from the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and 650 Afghan soldiers to simultaneously night air assault into the towns of Nawa-l-Barakzayi, Sorkh-Duz, and Kanashin – all Taliban strongholds in the valley. Since the Marines had insufficient helicopter assets to conduct the mission on their own, both the 82d CAB (B Company, 3d Battalion) and the 159th

CAB (B Company, 2d Battalion, were called upon to provide Chinook and Black Hawk support for the operation, which envisioned upwards of 50 aircraft.181 Chinooks – 15 in all – were provided by B Company, 3d Battalion, 82d Aviation Regiment and B Company, 2d Battalion,

238th Aviation Regiment (Army National Guardsmen from Illinois and South Carolina). “What makes Operation KHANJAR different from those that have occurred before, said 2d MEB commander, Brigadier General Lawrence Nicholson, is the massive size of the force introduced, the speed at which it will be inserted, and the fact that where we go, we will stay, and where we stay, we will hold, build, and work toward transition of all security responsibilities to Afghan forces.”182 On the night before the air assault, the Chinooks flew from Kandahar to FOB

Bastion to rehearse loading and pick-up zone (PZ) procedures with the Marines.183 During the actual assault the following night, PZ execution was flawless. With 31-33 Marines per aircraft, three lifts of four Chinooks each flew under night vision goggle conditions into pre-determined

HLZs in the Helmand Valley. Black Hawks and escort Apaches accompanied each lift. The first four Chinooks then returned to Bastion, refueled at the Marine FARP, picked up the remaining

2d MEB Marines, and flew them to the objective area. Some aircraft took enemy fire while approaching and departing the HLZs, however none were damaged.184

KHANJAR was a complex, complicated, air assault operation involving dozens of

US Army, US Marine Corps, US Air Force, and British fixed and rotary wing aircraft. The airspace de-confliction process – vertical and horizontal separation – required intricate planning and extensive coordination. “We had lots of liaison officers, established excellent communications, worked through contingencies, minimized risks, rehearsed, and developed lengthy execution checklists,” explained Colonel Paul Bricker, 82d CAB commander and air mission commander for the northern Helmand air assault. Because of the significant number of aircraft involved, “we tried to keep the execution simple,” Bricker added, “with timed releases, specific distances between serials, Apaches over the HLZs before H-hour, and minimal time on the ground for the Chinooks and Black Hawks.”185 “The new ‘F’ model Chinooks were the best helicopters in Afghanistan, capable of bring in so much combat power in a short period of time…and our combat-tested veteran Warrant Officer pilots were at the top of their game during

KHANJAR,” Colonel Bricker continued.186 Brigadier General Nicholson, the 2d MEB commander, was duly appreciative of Army aviation’s contribution, later noting, “I was very, very pleased with Marine aviation and frankly with Army aviation…[on] a couple of our principal lifts we used Paul Bricker and the Combat Aviation Brigade…they did a tremendous job in support of the Marines.”187 Chinook crews from the 82d CAB continued to support ISAF operations in the Helmand Valley and throughout RC-South during the summer 2009.

In July and August, for example, Chinooks flew air assault missions into the Zhari and Panjway’i districts, Kandahar Province, with Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry

Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, during a series of operations designated TORA AWAR I-V.188

Subsequently, 1-12 IN air assaults back into the Zhari district in November to capture a prominent IED maker.189 Back in Paktika in September 2009, 1-501 IN initiated Operation

GERONIMO DARAU to clear the districts of Sar Hawza, Mata Khan, and Yahya Khel, and to reopen a key roadway between the provincial capital Sharana and the commercial city of Orgun.

Following a daylight air assault – flown by Chinook crews from the 159th CAB – into Sar

Hawza, the 1st Battalion Scout Platoon located and killed seven insurgents and a Taliban commander.190 “One of the biggest impacts achieved during Operation GERONIMO DARAU was defeating the insurgent command and control…this was critical because this district connects two of our largest population centers…I believe GERONOMO DARAU was an overwhelming success,” said 1-501 IN executive officer, Major Jeffrey Crapo.191

After Taliban overran Barg-e Matal, Nuristan Province, in July 2009, Soldiers from

1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division air assaulted into the area to recapture the village during an operation designated MOUNTAIN FIRE. Following a Taliban counterattack, troops from 2-12 IN at Camp Blessing conducted an additional air assault into

Barg-e Matal to provide reinforcement. By the end of July, the Taliban withdrew after having lost 170 KIA.192 “This operation [MOUNTAIN FIRE] shows that Afghan and Coalition forces can go anywhere, anytime, and successfully conduct any operation we choose to defeat the enemies of Afghanistan,” Colonel Randy George, commander 4th BCT, 4th ID, told ISAF Public

Affairs representatives following the re-taking of Barg-e Matal.193

In February 2010, the 82d CAB participated in two additional combined, joint, ISAF air assaults operations. During Operations MOSHTARAK and HELMAND SPIDER, some

15,000 US Army, US Marine Corps, British, Canadian, Danish, Estonian, and Afghan forces attacked the villages of Marjah and Nad-e Ali in Helmand Province. The objective of the operations was to protect and secure the Afghan citizens living in the region, and not necessarily to kill Taliban. US, British, and Afghan troops had been conducting shaping operations in preparation for the mission for several weeks. “We’re going to take Marjah away from the

Taliban,” Brigadier General Lawrence Nicholson, commander, 2d Marine Expeditionary

Brigade, said before the operations began. Chinooks, Black Hawks, Apaches, and CH-53 Sea

Stallions from Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadrons 463 and 466 inserted the 1st Battalion, 6th

Marine Regiment, plus additional ANA soldiers, into Marjah during a night air assault on 13

February. Prior to the insertions, Predator drones and Apaches took out Taliban IED teams and anti-aircraft weapons positions near several intended HLZs. Other Landing zones were secured by US and British Special Forces and Afghan commandos. As the first Chinooks approached the objective area, Marine AV-8B Harriers illuminated the landing zones with infra-red flares visible only by the pilots and crews flying with night vision equipment. The approaches, landings, and departures were executed without incident and all eleven objectives in and around Marjah were secured within minutes.194

82d CAB Chinook pilots and crews also took part in the Coalition air assault on objectives surrounding Nad-e Ali. This second air assault “was even more complex as it included over 20 rotary-wing aircraft from the US, Britain, and Canada,” explained 82d CAB commander Colonel Paul Bricker after the assaults had been completed.195 There actually may have been as many as 40 helicopters involved in the Nad-e Ali assault, including three Canadian

Chinooks, four Canadian Griffon gunships, several British Chinooks, plus additional US

Chinooks, Black Hawks, and Apaches. Eleven hundred British and Afghan soldiers were inserted into objective area HLZs by eleven separate lifts in little over and hour. The individual lifts were spaced just minutes apart and each country was assigned its own airspace and approach/departure routes, with flights inbound to the HLZs flying at lower altitudes than returning flights.196

In Zabol Province, 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry Regiment, 4th BCT, 82d Airborne

Division conducted a series of air assaults and sweeps of Taliban safe havens in the Shamulzai district along the Pakistan border.197 Chinooks from the 3d Combat Aviation Brigade provided support for many of these missions.198 As with previous OEF air assaults, when significant numbers of troops were need for deliberate or hasty missions, Chinooks often delivered enough force to surround and capture an entire village. “This war would grind to a screeching halt without Chinook heavy lift assets,” Sergeant First Class Jeremy Whittaker said.199 Although not considered a true combat air assault, Chinooks from F Troop, 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry participated extensively in Operation MOUNTAIN DESCENT II, the evacuation of 4th Brigade

Combat Team Soldiers from multiple COPs scattered throughout the Korengal Valley. “We

[were] the main transportation element moving equipment and personnel out of the various

COPs swiftly and safely from the so-called valley-of-death,” said 3d CAB plans officer, Major

Michael Reyburn.200 Due to the rugged terrain, many locations in the valley were accessible only by air. And since previous retrograde operations at COPs Bella and Keating had been contested by the Taliban, MOUNTAIN DESCENT II was conducted entirely during hours of darkness, with 500 Soldiers and five-hundred thousand pounds of equipment extracted in 76 flights over the course on four nights. A lone Chinook lifted off with last contingent of Soldiers at 0300, 14

April 2010.201

In September 2010, Chinooks from 4th Battalion, 3d Aviation Regiment conducted an air assault mission with the 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Wardak Province during

Operation TALON PURGE. Nearly 350 Afghan commandos and Paratroopers from 1st

Battalion, 503d Infantry Regiment were inserted at night by four Chinooks and two Black Hawk helicopters from 3d CAB into five HLZs in Chak district. Two Army National Guard Chinooks from the 168th Aviation Regiment (Oregon and Washington) flew five round trips each, with 30 passengers per aircraft, from COP Sayed Abad west of FOB Shank to the objective area. Two additional CH-47s from 2d Battalion, 3d Aviation Regiment based at Bagram conducted three round-trip flights in support of the complex mission. The air assault into the Chak Valley was the largest undertaken by 173d Soldiers during their 2009-2010 OEF deployment.202 Once on the ground, the Paratroopers quickly located and killed a Taliban commander and several subordinates. “We came in, secured key locations, and fought it out with the insurgents…they have to realize that we can and will go into any area in this country…,” Sergeant Bradley Mora, a squad leader with A Company, 1-503 IN, said following the operation.203

Flight operations tempo for Chinook crews in 2010 at FOB Shank was intense. To begin with, the FOB was a 6,600 feet and “we still had to climb out over the mountains,” said

Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jeffrey Hutchinson, D Company, 1st Battalion, 169th Aviation

Regiment. “Ninety percent of the HLZs we went into were also at 6,000 feet or higher.” “We ran dozens of missions…do the infil at night, then do a resupply, and finally do the exfil,” Hutchinson continued.204 With only two Chinooks at Shank, D Company pilots flew missions day and night for 30 days straight during one stretch in 2010.205 Chief Warrant Officer 4 Gary

Ossinger, who arrived with B Company, 3-10 General Support Aviation Battalion later in the year, agreed with the OPTEMPO assessment. Bravo Company’s Chinooks were split, with several at Jalalabad in direct support of 1st BCT, 101st Airborne and others at Bagram in general support of the entire RC-East AO. “We did at least 200 air assaults…seemed like every night,”

Ossinger explained. “F model Chinooks were the main air assault platform…and a typical mission involved two CH-47s, escorted by two Apaches, inserting a relatively small force into a strategic location at night.”206

In October 2010, 1st Squadron, 33d Cavalry conducted a joint air assault with

Afghan troops into a mountainous region of Khost Province. The objective of Operation WAR

OLD COFFEE (translated from Pashto) was to disrupt Taliban supply routes and destroy enemy weapons caches. Chinooks making the insertions were required to execute pinnacle landings on the mountain tops so that the off-loaded Soldiers could quickly capture the high ground. Two substantial caches were discovered and destroyed by an attached explosive ordnance team.

Chinooks were well suited for this high altitude operation – “you can get the most guys and equipment in in one shot,” said 1st Squadron commander, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Lutsky.207

By December 2010, Chinooks from 6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry Aviation Regiment,

10th Mountain Division had replaced those of 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry Aviation Regiment at

Jalalabad and FOB Sharana. Chinook crews from 6-6 Cav and 3-10 GSAB subsequently conducted an air assault with 2d BCT, 34 ID Soldiers and Afghan troops into the Galuch Valley, near the town of Hind Dor, Laghman Province, in March 2011. Operation BULLWHIP, which cleared the valley of Taliban, was the largest air assault by 101st Airborne Soldiers during their OEF X-XI deployment. The air assault crews encountered very little enemy resistance when landing in the valley.208 “We were going…out there with overwhelming combat power…the large mass of folks we brought and the fact that we air assaulted in…the enemy probably made the decision that it was best not to fight,” Lieutenant Colonel Steven Kremer, commander 133d

Infantry Regiment, 2d BCT, surmised following the successful insertion.209

In RC-South, 2d BCT, 101st Airborne Division and Afghan forces from the 205th

Corps kicked off Operation DRAGON STRIKE, a large-scale ground and air assault into the

Zhari, Arghandab, Maiwand, and Panjwai districts surrounding Kandahar City, in September

2010. The objective of the operation was to regain control of Highway One and to “disrupt enemy sanctuaries and staging areas [used] for attacks into Kandahar City,” said Colonel Rafael

Torres, director of the ISAF Joint Operations Center.210 Chinook support – 21 aircraft total – for

DRAGON STRIKE came from B Company, 6th Battalion, 101st Combat Aviation Brigade, B

Company, 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment, and an Australian rotary wing detachment.

Since ground movement in many areas of Kandahar Province was often restricted by extensive vegetation, numerous rat lines, and dozens of Taliban-placed IEDs, aviation support was essential to freedom of movement and the ability jump over the IED belts. “The enemy knew we would have to come from north to south, and they had prepared some pretty nasty defensive belts

[trenches, bunkers, IEDs, minefields] to keep us from doing that,” explained Lieutenant Colonel

Peter Benchoff, commander 2d battalion, 502 IN at the time. “So the air assaults were a way of jumping behind those defensive belts…we coined the term ‘back clears’…you air assault to the south of these defensive belts and then back clear up to them… you’re coming from an area that is likely to be less of a threat,” Benchoff continued.211 During the initial month of DRAGON STRIKE, Chinooks conducted 24 air assaults, placing a large number of troops – but broken down into small elements – into strategic locations spread throughout the AO. The extensive number of insertions frustrated the Taliban’s situational awareness, and prevented the insurgents from reinforcing. In the first week, eight

Chinooks were hit by enemy fire. Prior to the operation, portions of the objective area had been declared ‘no-fly’ zones due to the heavy concentration of Taliban anti-aircraft fires. Since the plan called for the inserted forces to remain in-place for months rather than being quickly extracted, resupply requirements were unceasing. Each night four Chinooks were assigned to fly the seemingly endless resupply missions.212

Early in the operation, B Company and the Scouts from 2-502 IN air assaulted at night onboard Chinooks into the town of Baluchan south of the battalion FOB at Howz-e Madad.

The Scouts were extracted and flown to a different location within a few days, while B Company remained to hold the ground around Baluchan for several months.213 Second BCT was the main effort during DRAGON STRIKE. “We had four Chinooks for six weeks…and used [them] for multiple air assaults…normally run at battalion level…a two ship air assault with multiple turns,” Colonel Arthur Kandarian, 2d BCT commander, said in describing the CH-47’s contribution to the operation. “The Chinooks and Black Hawks…were from 101st CAB and their support and bravery were the finest I have observed,” Kandarian continued. “We trained with the CAB before we deployed and fought with them in Kandahar so we enjoyed a phenomenal relationship.”214

Although DRAGON STRIKE continued into 2011, by late October 2010 Highway 1 was Taliban-free. Kandahar Governor Tooryali Weesa drove without military escort from Kandahar City to Howz-e Madad for a shura with village elders. “This has not been possible since 2004 and would have led to a catastrophe even three weeks ago, British Major General

Nicholas Carter, RC-South commander, said referring to Governor Weesa’s hour-long trip, then adding that “Operation DRAGON STRIKE made this possible.”215 During the fall of 2010 and winter 2011, 2-502 IN conducted several additional Chinook air assaults into the Zhari and

Maiwand districts during a successive series of DRAGON STRIKE sub-operations code-named

Nashville, Clarksville, Franklin, and Nolensville. Numerous Chinook and Black Hawk air assaults were subsequently completed by the 2d BCT in the brigade-sized Operations DRAGON

DESCENT and DRAGON WRATH in January/February 2011. Finally, during Operation

MOUNTAIN JAGUAR in Maiwand district, 2-502 IN executed nine Chinook air assaults in 30 days to disrupt the Taliban spring offensive. On the final mission, “we air assaulted all four maneuver companies,” Lieutenant Colonel Benchoff recounted.216

Chinook Air Assaults Continue in 2011

In addition to providing support to 2d BCT, 101st CAB Chinook pilots and crews also flew air assaults in October 2010 with 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 3d BCT,

101st Airborne Division into the villages of Mushan, Zangabad, and Taluqan in the Horn of

Panjway’i, 30 miles southwest of Kandahar City.217 Chinooks also conducted deliberate and hasty air assault missions in support of Special Operations Forces in RC-South. During one 30 day period, seven Chinooks were allocated every night for Special Operations missions. The new

F model Chinooks, with moving map displays, digital advanced flight control system hover modes, common avionics architecture systems, and hovering symbology to see through dust, were nearly comparable, performance-wise, to the MH-47G models flown by the 160th Special

Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR). “In the end, we were providing multiple aircraft and aircrews for multiple missions every night,” Captain Christopher Getter, B Company, 6-101

CAB, commander, later wrote. 218

Captain Getter also estimated that the 21-aircraft Chinook team at Kandahar conducted at least 250 air assaults during its deployment in RC-South. Colonel William Gayler, commander of the 101st CAB, calculated that overall the brigade flew a combined total of 363 air assaults while deployed in Afghanistan. In a 2012 interview, Gayler described how his pilots often flew what he called 3D maneuvering flight patterns, constantly changing heading, altitude, and air speed, thereby causing Taliban gunners to continually adjust for height estimates, lead angles, and range rates. “One of my tenets was never pattern set,” Colonel Gayler said, “Never do it the same way every time.”219

In February 2011, the 159th CAB replaced the 101st CAB in RC-South. Bravo

Company, 7th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment deployed with new ‘F’ model Chinooks, while two attached companies – B Company, 1st Battalion, 171st Aviation Regiment (HIARNG) and B Company, 1st Battalion, 52d Aviation Regiment from Alaska – were equipped with older

‘D’ models.220 The majority of the aircraft were at Kandahar, with a platoon each at FOBs Tarin

Kowt and Wolverine. Chinook pilots and crews flew air assault missions in support of all the ground units in the region, including US conventional and Special Operations forces, Afghan counterparts, and Romanian and Latvian troops.221 The general trend for CH-47 air assaults in

RC-South continued, often with two conventional and two Special Operations insertions per night. “Typically two [conventional] companies would air assault into an objective area, stay for a couple of days, and then extract out,” said 7th Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Darren Gerblick. “Special Operations night assaults, on the other hand, were targeted raids…in and out in a couple of hours.”222

Bravo Company, 1-52 was advised prior to deployment to expect a preponderance of general support missions – battlefield circulation in support of multiple units in the AOR.

Instead, the company was divided upon arriving in Afghanistan, with half the aircraft remaining at Kandahar and the other half split between Wolverine and Tarin Kowt. Due to the priorities in the AOR, “we were immediately assigned direct support missions at all three locations,” Captain

Robert Bender, commander, B/1-52 explained after redeploying to Alaska.223 The most common air assaults were night cordon and search operations, involving two Chinooks and approximately

70 Soldiers/passengers, and requiring extraction within two to five days. Speed and surprise were critical factors for success. Finally, normal air assault planning cycles were often cut short, since B/1-52 routinely supported ground units located at different FOBs/COBs and mission briefings were conducted via teleconference or secure email.224

Throughout the course of 159th CAB’s deployment, ground and air unit commanders most often chose to insert as many troops as possible with a single lift – one turn with four aircraft, for example, versus two turns with two aircraft. Generally, Chinooks, particularly ‘F’ models because of their enhanced ability to land safely in dusty environments, were the platform of choice for the 700 hundred air assault missions conducted by the 159th

CAB during its tour in Afghanistan.225

Bravo Company, 7th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment (KS USAR) returned to

OEF Afghanistan in April 2011. The company had 19 organic Chinooks, was augmented with six additional CH-47s and crews from B Company, 2d Battalion, 135th General Support Aviation Brigade, Nebraska and Colorado ARNG, and reported initially to the 10th CAB and later the 82d CAB. Three separate company detachments were established in RC-East with the aircraft and crews parceled out to Bagram Air field and FOBs Salerno and Shank. The headquarters detachment at Salerno supported 3d BCT, 1st ID and then 4th BCT, 25th ID operations, while the BAF contingent conducted ISAF-level general support missions. The crews at Shank supported 1st BCT, 10th Mountain and Soldiers from the 16th Infantry Regiment,

1st Infantry Division who were under the tactical control of the Combined Joint Special

Operations Task Force – Afghanistan for village stability operations.226 Both detachments at

Salerno and Shank also flew numerous deliberate and hasty air assault missions in support of

Special Operations Task Force 310 in search of Taliban and Haqqani network leaders.

The Operational Tempo for B/7-158 AVN jumped dramatically compared to the company’s previous deployment. “In 2005-6, we flew the ring route and conducted approximately 30 air assaults in RC-South,” said Captain Christopher Ruff, B Company commander. “This time in RC-East, we were an air assault platform…flew 12,300 hours and completed 478 deliberate and hasty combat assaults.”227 At FOB Salerno, at least two Chinooks were allocated for general support and deliberated air assaults for the BCT. During the last few months of B Company’s deployment, Chinooks flew air assaults with 4th BCT, 25th ID Soldiers nearly every night. In September 2011, during Operation NIKE 4, four Chinooks, each making three round trips, inserted Soldiers into objectives on the north and south sides of the Mangal

Valley and onto the mountain-top OP Buttercup in the Lazha Mangal district, Paktia Province.

Two additional Salerno CH-47s were allotted to Special Operations Task Force 310 for nightly hasty air assaults missions. The B Company crews often worked alongside Chinook pilots and crew members from Task Force Brown, 160th SAOR. “We would do a ‘one over the world briefing’ and just go,” Captain Ruff explained.228 On one such B Company Chinook raid into the

Khost-Gardez Pass region, TF 310 captured Haji Mali Khan, a high-ranking member of the

Haqqani network.229

On 6 August 2011, a Chinook from B Company, 7-158 AVN was shot down by a

Taliban RPG in the Tangi Valley, Wardak Province. All 38 persons on board – 17 US Navy

SEALs, five Naval Special Operations support staff, three US Air Force Special Tactics Airmen, seven Afghan soldiers, plus the five Chinook crew members – were all killed.230 Late in the evening of the previous day, 5 August, two Chinooks had air assaulted from FOB Shank with US

Army Rangers and their Afghan partners into a different Tangi location in search of a suspected

Taliban leader. Overhead ISR aircraft observed Taliban fighters leaving the objective area as the ranger-led assault force arrived. Shortly thereafter, 10 Taliban, possibly including their leader, were spotted congregating approximately a mile away from the original target site. The special operations task force commander subsequently decided to launch the Immediate Reaction Force

(IRF), built around a troop of Navy SEALs, to kill or capture the group of Taliban.231

A suitable HLZ was chosen, and the 33 member IRF was loaded onto a single

Chinook – callsign Extortion 17 – in order to quickly mass troops on the ground and to mitigate risk to a second aircraft. Two Chinooks, however – one with passengers, one without – launched on the mission at 0222, the morning of 6 August. The empty trail CH-47 broke off short of the

HLZ and began orbiting a pre-determined holding point while awaiting the return of the lead aircraft. On final approached to the HLZ, however, one of the aft rotor blades on the lead

Chinook – the one carrying the IRF – was struck by a Taliban RPG. The aircraft began spinning uncontrollably, the fore and aft rotor blade assemblies separated, and the fuselage crashed in a ball of flames into a dry creek bed. Two hours later, the original Ranger-led assault force arrived at the crash site. They were soon joined by a 20-member Pathfinder downed aircraft rescue and recovery unit. By 1030, 6 August, the remains of all 38 passengers and crew members had been successfully accounted for. The complete aircraft wreckage was removed by 9 August 2011.232

The next day, ISAF Commander and Commander of US Forces in Afghanistan, US Marine

Corps General John Allen reported that the Taliban who fired the deadly RPG shot had been killed in a USAF F-16 airstrike.233

Back in RC-South, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment, 1st Heavy Brigade Combat

Team, 1st Infantry Division, a combined arms battalion from Fort Riley, KS, conducted 33 air assaults behind Taliban defensive positions in the Band-e/Timor region of Maiwand district,

Kandahar Province. “Tankers learned the skills of infantrymen…served in every maneuver company…and conducted the majority of the air assaults,” said Lieutenant Colonel Christopher

Kidd, 2-34 AR commander.234 Colonel Patrick Frank, commander of the 10th Mountain

Division’s 3d Brigade Combat Team, wanted 2-34 AR off the beaten path and out in the Taliban controlled areas along the Arghandab River and in the Sur Reg Desert west of Kandahar City.

Since, the battlespace had no road network, the “terrain and the enemy situation drove us to air assaults” as the primary means of maneuvering, Colonel Kidd explained.235

Nearly all 2-34 AR air assaults were search operations executed at night by company-sized elements and their Afghan counterparts, 200-250 Soldiers per assault. Typically, two or three Chinooks would fly the missions, making multiple turns with approximately 30

Soldiers per aircraft per lift. Rather than designating a single landing site, several HLZ were utilized in order to surround a village or a particular tactical objective. After 48-72 hours on the ground, the assault force was extracted, again from multiple PZs. AH-64 Apaches escorted the air assault Chinooks during infiltration and exfiltration, while F-16s or A-10s flew overwatch coverage.236

Major Nicholas Ayers, and Armor officer and battalion S-3, did nearly all of the air assault planning for 2-34 AR. After receiving mission orders from higher headquarters, Ayers prepared ground tactical plans and a preliminary infiltration plans, with proposed air corridors and HLZs. He initiated Air Mission, HLZ ISR, Apache escort, and fixed wing aircraft requests, and then developed pre-assault fire support plans and electronic warfare objectives, if required.

Throughout the process, Ayers coordinated with planners and flight crews from the 159th CAB regarding mission specifics, such as rehearsals, the number of passengers per aircraft, number of turns, time requirements, resupply, and exfiltration plans. Occasionally, false insertions were executed during the insertion and/or extraction phases of 2-34 AR air assaults to deceive and confuse the Taliban.237

Army Aviation OPTEMPO remained high in Afghanistan well into 2012. All of the aircraft were being flown at three-to-four times the rate for which they were originally designed to fly. Chinooks were showing the most wear.238

HIGH, HOT and HEAVY:

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

The CH-47 Chinook is a “prime example of the adaptability of Army Aviation,” explained Major General William Crosby, Program Executive Officer, Aviation, US Army

Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Redstone Arsenal,

Huntsville AL.239 Designed originally to carry the MGR-1 Honest John Missile, its launcher, and support vehicles, Chinooks soon became all-purpose, heavy-lift, cargo aircraft, and eventually assumed a significant portion of the combat air assault role during Operation ENDURING

FREEDOM. The evolution of CH-47 tactics, techniques, procedures, roles, and missions is a

“credit to the innovation, vision, and imagination of modern day aviators…bread into them is a focus and mindset to support the Soldiers on the ground, enabling the Soldiers to be inserted at the critical time and place on the battlefield,” Major General Crosby, one of the few Army

Aviators to have flown all models of the Chinook, continued. “The CH-47 is a critical enabler today and will be for the foreseeable future,” he added.240 Colonel Robert Marion, Program

Manager for Cargo Helicopters at AMCOM agreed, noting that he anticipates “the Army will keep the Chinook in its inventory for another generation of aircrew members,” and that he expects “more of the same from the venerable Chinook and the community that loves it so much, affectionately called the Hookers.”241

September 21, 2011 marked the 50th anniversary of the CH-47 Chinook’s first flight in Ridley Township, Pennsylvania. The US Army accepted delivery of the initial CH-47 A model in August 1962, and by 1965, Chinook crews from the 1st Cavalry Division were flying combat missions – typically troop movement, artillery emplacement, and battlefield resupply – in

Vietnam. The Army has steadily modernized and improved the Chinook fleet ever since. As of

April 2012, approximately 1,175 CH-47s have been built by Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, the latest version being the highly sophisticated F model – either remanufactured from older D models or newly built.242 “We have a great history and a great legacy…we also have a great responsibility…to keep this aircraft flying for the next two generations of aviators.” “When you talk about our system, it’s about relevance and the benefit that we bring…as an enabler for the ground forces,” Colonel Marion told Kari Hawkins in a 2012 Redstone Rocket interview.243

Major General Anthony Crutchfield, Commanding General, Army Aviation Center of Excellence agreed, noting in his Army Aviation 2030 Vision statement that “our relationship with the ground force is the best that it has ever been in our history.”244

To meet current and future full-spectrum requirements, the US Army has developed an Aviation Transformation Plan to decisively upgrade aviation capabilities based on doctrine and lessons learned from flying more than 4.2 million combat hours during OEF, OIF, and

Operation NEW DAWN. Active and reserve component aviation warfighting units have been reorganized into Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB) to enhance modularity and tailorability, while providing more lethal and sustainable support to ground force Brigade Combat Teams.245 Transformation efforts were hastened by the Global War on Terrorism (Overseas Contingency

Operations) which effectively reduced the emphasis on large-scale conventional campaigns and focused more on balanced, multi-functional, CABs. The Army also weaned some legacy aircraft from its fleet, thereby reducing logistical and training requirements and concentrating aviation resources on the four primary helicopters remaining – UH-60, AH-64, OH-58, and CH-47. Army

Aviation is continuously adding incremental upgrades and improvements to these aircraft, thereby lengthening their respective service lives, enhancing full-spectrum mission capabilities, reducing logistical footprints, and increasing speed, range, payload, reliability, and survivability.246 Currently, there are more than 3,500 helicopters in the Army Aviation inventory, approximately 500 of which are CH-47 Chinooks. The overall Army Acquisition Objective is

533 F model Chinooks by 2020.247

Army modernization upgrades planned specifically for the CH-47 include an improved Cargo On/Off Load System (COOLS) that replaces the F model’s cargo bay floor with a roller system, significantly improves loading and off-loading cargo through the ramp, reduces crew member workloads, and facilitates in-flight reconfiguration to accommodate a variety of mission requirements.248 The Cargo Platform Health Environment (CPHE) modification is an electronic diagnostic and prognostication system that monitors all aircraft vibrations, thus assisting maintenance personnel in predicting/identifying potential component failures. The

Advanced Chinook Rotor Blade (ACRB), which will increase the CH-47’s lift capacity by 2,000 lbs, is expected to be operational by 2015. Also, the cockpit armor panels in D and F models are scheduled to be replaced by a Multi-Impact Transparent Armor System (MITAS) which is 30% lighter and affords comparable ballistic protection. Additional modifications include a cargo ramp gunner seat for the crewman operating the ramp-mounted M240H machine gun and an improved engine control unit that increases reliability, maintainability, and troubleshooting capabilities.249

As a result of the early effectiveness of CH-47s in OEF, the Army expanded the role of Chinooks beyond the division asset level and began assigning Chinook companies (12 CH-

47s) as organic units of General Support Aviation Battalions within each CAB. As the numbers of FOBs/COBs rose in Afghanistan and as the BCT assigned areas of responsibility grew in size, the Chinook’s superior range capability and high/hot operational proficiency became all the more beneficial in support of both combat air assault and resupply missions.250 Operational demands for Chinook support continued to mount as payload weights – vehicles, mission equipment packages, Soldiers’ combat loads – increased over time. Technologies built into the CH-47F models improved situational awareness and allowed pilots to land more safely at night and in degraded visual environments (dust and brown-out landings), thereby lowering risks for passengers and crews.251

In the February 2012 Army Aviation Vision 2030 statement, Major General

Crutchfield warned, however, that “incremental improvements or upgrades to the current DoD rotorcraft fleet, which is nearing the limits for decades-old technology, will not fully meet future joint service operational requirements…we will seek to execute change that is beyond the capabilities of today’s aircraft.”252 Vision 2030 calls for a re-examination of Army Aviation’s roles, missions, and organization in order to redesign, equip, and staff an aviation force that is effective, adaptive, flexible, lethal, and efficient in the face of potentially uncertain, complex, and rapidly changing future operational environments. When confronted with a broad spectrum of possible threats, Army Aviation must be capable of providing ground commanders with sufficient multi-dimensional mobility to outmaneuver any enemy on any battlefield. Vertical lift, like that provided by the CH-47, is unrestrained by troublesome terrain and will remain a critical combat multiplier well into the 2030 timeframe. Current Army Aviation core competencies – reconnaissance/security, attack, air assault/air movement, and aeromedical evacuation – will likewise remain unchanged, as will the requirement to fly faster, further, day or night, in unfavorable visual environments, and in adverse weather conditions. As for the air assault core competency component, future vertical maneuver missions will require sufficient lift capacity to transport complete ground teams to designated objectives and adequate speed/range to rapidly close with enemy forces at extended distances.253

In May 2011, a specially equipped US Army MH-60K helicopter crash-landed at a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan during Operation NEPTUNE SPEAR. Abbottabad is situated at the 4,000 ft. level in the foothills the Pir Panjal Mountain range. Air temperature there on the night of the accident was above normal for that time of year. The Black Hawk experienced an aerodynamic condition known as “settling with power,” the ship’s tail rotor struck the 10-foot high compound wall, and the aircraft crashed into the courtyard. No one on board was seriously injured, however the helicopter could not be flown and was subsequently destroyed in-place by a demolition team following completion of the mission. The downed MH-

60K carried a crew of three plus 13 passengers, and was retrofitted with heat signature reduction components, a radar-evading paint scheme, and a noise-reducing tail rotor assembly system. The added stealth technology modifications made the aircraft heavier than a standard MH-60.254

Settling with power typically occurs on landing approaches involving slow forward airspeeds, flight path angles greater than 30 degrees, and with vertical or near-vertical rates of descent higher than 300 feet per minute. Despite applying full power, the excessive sink rate cannot be reversed, rotor efficiency is lost, and the helicopter settles into its own downwash as engine power is insufficient to stop the descent. The high, hot, and heavy flight conditions encountered at Abbottabad were precisely those that had prompted Army commanders to favor

CH-47 Chinooks for air assault operations which involve elevated HLZs, high temperature days, and excessive payload weights. Following the successful mission in Abbottabad, the crew and passengers from the downed helicopter were extracted by Chinooks.

Since a significant proportion of Afghan terrain is above 6,000 ft. mean sea level, thousands of OEF combat assault missions were conducted in high, hot, and heavy conditions, in which Chinooks outperform all other Army Aviation assets. By utilizing CH-47s, ground force commanders can bring along more of their critical assets, such as mortars, motorcycles, and

ATVs, thereby enhancing speed, mobility, and firepower after reaching the HLZ. The Chinook’s large payload capacity also allows ground commanders to land their entire force in a single lift, thus getting the force into action faster, while minimizing the risk of a small initial force being attacked or a helicopter being shot down during multiple lifts and consecutive landings at the same HLZ. These same benefits apply during the extraction phase of an operation as well.

Ground commanders can get their troops out more quickly and avoid leaving behind smaller groups awaiting additional lifts/aircraft. Completing an air assault mission in a single lift also simplifies route planning. The number of HLZs is reduced and the possibility of having to land in the same zone twice is eliminated. “It’s much easier to plan a route for two CH-47s than for six UH-60s,” Captain Robert Bender, commander, B/1-52 explained after returning to Alaska from Kandahar.255

Based upon the CH-47’s unqualified success in the combat air assault role in

Afghanistan, ground unit commanders are likely to request continued Chinook support in future operations/conflicts. Putting more forces on an objective in a shorter period of time in a high, hot, and heavy environment is an obviously desirable capability. Anticipated improvements to the Chinook, such as increased payload, range, speed, survivability, and digital interoperability, will doubtlessly enable the aircraft to continue as the workhorse of Army Aviation well into the

21st century. HIGH, HOT and HEAVY:

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http://xaxor.com/other/22566-ch-47-chinook-photos.html http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47-Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#! i=675978239&k=ti2m4&lb=1&s=A http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47-Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#! i=385654526&k=9wySt&lb=1&s=A http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47-Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#! i=493083574&k=RsE6D&lb=1&s=A http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47-Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#! i=410405577&k=jviQF&lb=1&s=A http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47-Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#! i=408664412&k=wpQTy&lb=1&s=A http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47-Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#! i=491568495&k=Jg7HR&lb=1&s=A http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47-Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#! i=493083919&k=X38v3&lb=1&s=A http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47-Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#! i=491563889&k=HXGPU&lb=1&s=A http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47-Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#! i=491564118&k=ZvVxL&lb=1&s=A http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47-Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#! i=493081462&k=mdzu2&lb=1&s=A http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47-Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#! i=491564083&k=2T2VU&lb=1&s=A http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47-Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#! i=491560718&k=zFxD9&lb=1&s=A http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47-Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#! i=491563010&k=UQbAy&lb=1&s=A http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47-Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#! i=491560736&k=Vrbhw&lb=1&s=A http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47-Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#! i=410415554&k=bcMyD&lb=1&s=A http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47-Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#! i=406460681&k=nXTYm&lb=1&s=A http://www.visualintel.net/Army/Systems/CH-47-Chinook/7601910_kGMRZc#! i=663100214&k=ma2WV&lb=1&s=A 1 Major General William Crosby quoted in Ann Roosevelt, “New Boeing Production Line Expects More, Less Expensive, and high Quality CH-47Fs,” Defense Daily, Vol. 251, 21 September 2011, 3-4.

2 Leanne Caret quoted in Ann Roosevelt, “New Boeing Production Line Expects More, Less Expensive and high Quality CH-47Fs,” Defense Daily, Vol. 251, 21 September 2011, 3-4.

3 James Warden, “Chinooks Take On More Air Assaults,” Stars and Stripes, 29 February 2008, 1-2.

4 Mark Ballew quoted in Eric Tegler, “High Ground: Boeing’s CH-47F Delivers Where Others Can’t,” Defense Media Network Newsletter, 22 July 2011, 1-2.

5 Aircraft and crews were from (1) A Company, 7th Battalion, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and (2) B Company, 159th Aviation Regiment (Hunter Army Airfield), 18th Aviation Brigade, 18th Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The principal ground units were (1) 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and (2) 1st Battalion, 87th Regiment, 10th Mountain Division. See Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), Ch. 6.

6 James Dunnigan, “Chinook Replaces Blackhawk in Combat,” StrategyWorld.com, 25 March 2008, 1, http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/200832521247.asp (accessed 12 December 2011).

7 J. Gordon Leishman, Principles of Helicopter Aerodynamics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5-6; David Lentink et al., “Leading-Edge Vortices Elevate Lift of Autorotating Plant Seeds,” Science, 12 June 2009, 1438-1440; Nick Van Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011), 5.

8 Ivor Hart, The World of Leonardo da Vinci: Man of Science, Engineer, and Dreamer of Flight (London: Macdonald Publishing Company, 1961), 356; “The Inventions of Leonardo da Vinci,” Linda Hall Library of Science, Engineering, and Technology Exhibition, 27 October to 3 December 1994; Nick Van Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011), 5.

9 Leonardo da Vinci quoted in J. Gordon Leishman, “A History of Helicopter Flight,” extracts from the author’s book, Principles of Helicopter Aerodynamics (First Edition, 2000), 3, http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~leishman/Aero/history.html (accessed 17 January 2012).

10 Da Vinci may have intended to power his aerial screw machine by using four men to operate cranks that rotated the central shaft and helical wing surfaces. See “Leonardo da Vinci Inventions: Helicopter (Aerial Screw),” provided by InventHelp, 2008, 1, http://www.da-vinci-inventions.com/about.aspx (accessed 17 January 2012).

11 Douglas Jackson, Early Helicopter History, The Aircraft Museum, 1997, 1-3, http://www.aerospaceweb.org? design?helicopter/history.shtml (accessed 17 January 2012).

12 Judy Rumerman, Early Helicopter Technology, US Centennial of Flight Commission, 2003, 1-5; Nick Van Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011), 5; J. Gordon Leishman, “A History of Helicopter Flight,” extracts from the author’s book, Principles of Helicopter Aerodynamics (First Edition, 2000), 3, http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~leishman/Aero/history.html (accessed 17 January 2012).

13 C.V. Glines, “The Flying Octopus,” Air Force Magazine, October 1990, 8-11.

14 Nick Van Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011), 8.

15 “Pioneers in Vertical Flight: Frank N. Piasecki,” Piesecki Aircraft Corporation Fact Sheet, 2009, 1-5; David Anderton and Jay Miller, Boeing Helicopters CH-47 Chinook (Arlington, TX: Aerofax, Inc., 1989), 1-2; Nick Van Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011), 12-13.

16 K. I. Grina, “Helicopter Development at Boeing-Vertol Company,” The Aeronautical Journal, March 1975, 401- 416; Helicopter History Site, “Boeing-Vertol 107M, H-46 Sea Knight: Helicopter Database,” Helis.com, 1997, 1-2; Nick Van Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011), 30-41; David Anderton and Jay Miller, Boeing Helicopters CH-47 Chinook (Arlington, TX: Aerofax, Inc., 1989), 4-7.

17 Tom Marinucci, “CH-47D Chinook,” Boeing Defense, Space & Security Backgrounder, June 2010, 1-2; Nick Van Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011), 45-47, 70-71; David Anderton and Jay Miller, Boeing Helicopters CH-47 Chinook (Arlington, TX: Aerofax, Inc., 1989), 7, 21-22.

18 Leo Burnett, “The Chinook Story,” US Army Aviation Digest, August 1972, 9-14; James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 118; Nick Van Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011), 42-44, 49-50; David Anderton and Jay Miller, Boeing Helicopters CH-47 Chinook (Arlington, TX: Aerofax, Inc., 1989), 7-11.

19 Boeing Defense, Space & Security, CH-47D/F Technical Specifications Fact Sheet, 2012, 1; Nick Van Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011), 51-53; David Anderton and Jay Miller, Boeing Helicopters CH-47 Chinook (Arlington, TX: Aerofax, Inc., 1989), 8-9.

20 “Boeing MH-47D Model Helicopters,” Boeing Defense, Space & Security Factsheet, January 2012, 1-2; “MH- 47E/G Special Operations Chinook,” Boeing Defense, Space & Security Factsheet, January 2012, 1-2; Jack Satterfield, “US Army Special Operations Command MH-47G Special operations Chinook,” Boeing Defense, Space & Security Backgrounder, March 2005, 1-2; Nick Van Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011), 59-60.

21 Department of the Army, 2010 Army Modernization Strategy, Report to Congress, 23 April 2010, 58-60; James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 351-353, 386; Tom Marinucci, “CH-47F Chinook,” Boeing Defense, Space & Security Backgrounder, January 2012, 1-2; Nick Van Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011), 56-58.

22 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual ATTP 3-18.12 (FM 90-4), Air Assault Operations (Washington, DC, 1 March 2011), 1-1; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations (Washington, DC, 16 June 2008), GL-4.

23 Lieutenant Colonel Ronald Brown, “Whirlybirds: US Marine Helicopters in Korea,” in US Marines in the Korean War, ed. Charles Smith (Washington, DC: History Division United States Marine Corps, 2007), 710; Kevin Dougherty, “The Evolution of Air Assault,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1999, 52.

24 James Gavin, “Cavalry – And I Don’t Mean Horses,” Harper’s Magazine, April 1954, 54-60; James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 69.

25 Major General Gavin quoted in Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), 423; the term “Sky Cavalry” attributed to Major General Gavin in Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 1-100, Aviation Operations (Washington, DC, 21 February 1997), G-3.

26 Colonel Stewart McKenney, “SKYCAV Operations during Exercise Sagebrush,” Military Review, June 1956, 11- 18.

27 Brigadier General Carl Hutton, “The Commandant’s Column: An Air Fighting Army,” Army Aviation Digest, July 1955, 2-3; See also Richard Weinert, History of Army Aviation 1950-1962: Phase II 1955-1962 (Fort Monroe, VA: US Army Training and Doctrine Command Historical Office, 1976), 90. 28 James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 76; Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 57-35, Army Transport Aviation Combat Operations (Washington, DC, June 1958), 4.

29 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 57-35, Airmobile Operations (Washington, DC, 2 November 1960), 3.

30 Lieutenant General John Tolson, Vietnam Studies: Airmobility 1961-1971 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1973), 8-9; James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 90-91, 98-99; Lieutenant General Hamilton Howze, “The Howze Board I,” Army, February 1974, 14; Lieutenant General Hamilton Howze, A Cavalryman’s Story: Memoirs of a Twentieth-Century Army General (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996), 235-236.

31 Lieutenant General John Tolson, Vietnam Studies: Airmobility 1961-1971 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1973), 10.

32 145th Combat Aviation Battalion, “Battalion History: 11 December 1961 to 2 April 1972,” 1-3, http://www.145thcab.com/History/BattalionHistory.htm (accessed 31 January 2012); Lieutenant General John Tolson, Vietnam Studies: Airmobility 1961-1971 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1973), 3; Nick Van Valkenburgh, Chinook – The Legacy of Tandem Rotor Helicopter (Huntsville, AL: US Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM), Cargo Helicopters Project Management Office, 2011), 18.

33 Robert McNamara, Memorandum to the Secretary of The Army, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 19 April 1962, 1.

34 Robert McNamara, Memorandum to the Secretary of The Army, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 19 April 1962, 1; Robert McNamara, Memorandum to Mr. Stahr, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 19 April 1962, 1-2.

35 Robert McNamara, Memorandum to the Secretary of The Army, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 19 April 1962, 2; Robert McNamara, Memorandum to Mr. Stahr, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 19 April 1962, 1.

36 J. Stockfisch, The1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 15-16; Lieutenant General John Tolson, Vietnam Studies: Airmobility 1961-1971 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1973), 20-21.

37 Lieutenant General Hamilton Howze quoted in Lieutenant General John Tolson, Vietnam Studies: Airmobility 1961-1971 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1973), 24.

38 John Carland, How We Got There: Air Assault and the Emergence of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) 1950- 1965 (Arlington, VA: The Institute for Land Warfare, 2003), 10-11; J. Stockfisch, The1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 18-24.

39 General Hamilton Howze, “Winding Up a Great Show: Howze Board III,” Army, April 1974, 18-23.

40 At the time of the Howze Board, the terms airmobile and air assault were often used interchangeably. Following the air assault concept evaluation at Fort Benning, airmobility began to refer generally to the use of Army airlift assets to simply move troops and equipment. Air assault operations, however, were seen as deliberate combat operations using aviation assets to engage and destroy enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain.

41 Major General Robert York quoted in Lieutenant General John Tolson, Vietnam Studies: Airmobility 1961-1971 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1973), 55.

42 J. Stockfisch, The1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 25-28; John Carland, How We Got There: Air Assault and the Emergence of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) 1950-1965 (Arlington, VA: The Institute for Land Warfare, 2003), 11-14.

43 President Lyndon Johnson, “The President’s News Conference,” 28 July 1965, 1-2.

44 “The Scout’s Prologue: Organizational Legacy of the 1st Cavalry Division and its Subordinate Commands,” Cavalry Outpost Publications, 1996, Chapters 7 and 8, http://www.first-team.us/tableaux/ (accessed 3 February 2012). 45 “The Scout’s Prologue: Organizational Legacy of the 1st Cavalry Division and its Subordinate Commands,” Cavalry Outpost Publications, 1996, Chapter 8, 4-5, http://www.first-team.us/tableaux/chapt_08/ (accessed 3 February 2012).

46 James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 126-128; “The Scout’s Prologue: Organizational Legacy of the 1st Cavalry Division and its Subordinate Commands,” Cavalry Outpost Publications, 1996, Chapter 8, 5-6, http://www.first-team.us/tableaux/chapt_08/ (accessed 3 February 2012).

47 James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 130.

48 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara quoted in Lieutenant General Harold Moore and Joseph Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once and Young (New York: Random House, 1992), 368.

49 John McGrath, The Brigade: A History: Its Organization and Employment in the US Army (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 65; Kevin Dougherty, “The Evolution of Air Assault,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1999, 56; Walter Boyne, How The Helicopter Changed Modern Warfare (Gretna, LA: Pelican Publishing Company, Inc., 2011), 132-136; James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 136, 159.

50 James Willbanks, The Tet Offensive: A Concise History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 79-86.

51 Jack Shulimson et al., US Marines in Vietnam: 1968 The Defining Year (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1997), 255-290.

52 227th Assault Helicopter Battalion, “After Action Report: A Shau Valley, 227th AHB,” May 1968, 1-5, Appendix I, http://vhfcn.org/ashau.html#bn (accessed 6 February 2010).

53 Shelby Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army: US Ground Forces in Vietnam 1965-1973 (New York: Random House Publishing Group, 1985), 333-339; John Shaw, The Cambodian Campaign: The 1970 Offensive and America’s Vietnam War ( Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2005), 158-162; Major Donald Phillips, Across the Border: Success and Failures of Operation Rockcrusher (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 4 June 1999), 68-87.

54 Nguyen Duy Hinh, Indochina Monographs: LAM SON 719 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1979), 58-88; Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harvest Books, 1999), 253.

55 Earl Tilford, Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1991), 201; James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 166.

56 Brigadier General William Maddox quoted in James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 171.

57 General William Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1976), 348.

58 Unidentified Viet Cong commander quoted in Captain William Griffin, “Army Aviation in Support of Counterguerrilla Operations,” US Army Aviation Digest, September 1962, 9.

59 Herbert LaPore, “The Role of the Helicopter in the Vietnam War,” US Army Aviation Digest, July/August 1994, 33- 39.

60 Captain Daniel Henk, “The Threat to Air Assault Operations,” US Army Aviation Digest, February 1976, 6-7, 16- 18; 1st Cavalry Division, “America’s First Team: TRICAP Conversion,” 2010, 1 http://pao.hood.army.mil/1stcavdiv/about/history/tricapconversion.htm (accessed 8 February 2012).

61 US Army FACTFILES, “Black Hawk,” 1, http://www.army.mil/factfiles/equipment/aircraft/blackhawk.html (accessed 9 February 2012). 62 John Romjue, The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army (Fort Monroe, VA: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1993), 48, 78, 93-94; Kevin Stubbs, “Beyond the AOE,” Military Review, August 1988, 35-41; Congressional Budget Office, A CBO Study: An Analysis of US Army Helicopter Programs, Report to Congress, December 1995, 11, 20, 64-65.

63 Ronald Cole, Operation URGENT FURY: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada 12 October – 2 November 1983 (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), 41-58; James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 223.

64 Cody Phillips, Operation JUST CAUSE: The Incursion into Panama (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2004), 26-28, 34-35.

65 James Williams, A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War on Terror (Lincoln, NE: US Army Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc. and iUniverse, 2005), 236-258; VII Corps, “VII Corps in Desert Storm,” http://www.vii-corps.org/DesertStorm/DesertStorm.htm (accessed 9 February 2010).

66 John McGrath, The Brigade: A History: Its Organization and Employment in the US Army (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 86-90, 131-138; Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010 Army Modernization Strategy, 23 April 2010, 58.

67 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: 2008), C-10; Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual ATTP 3-18.12 (FM 90-4), Air Assault Operations (Washington, DC: 2011), 1-3, 1-4.

68 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual ATTP 3-18.12 (FM 90-4), Air Assault Operations (Washington, DC: 2011), vi, 1-1, 1-2, 1-5.

69 Brigadier General John Mulholland, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 May 2007, 6.

70 Colonel Franklin Wiercinski quoted in “Colonel Sets Positions From Ridge,” Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, 16 March 2002, 1-2, http://lubbockonline.com/stories/031602/wor_0316020122.shtml (accessed 16 February 2012).

71 Colonel Frank Wiercinski, interview by Austin Bay, Creators Syndicate, 29 June 2002, 1-5, http://www.strategypage.com/on_point/20020627.aspx (accessed 14 February 2012).

72 Colonel James Marye, email correspondence with author, 17 February 2012, 1.

73 Lieutenant General Franklin Hagenbeck, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 30 March 2007, 6.

74 Lester Grau and Dodge Billingsley, Operation Anaconda : America’s First Major Battle in Afghanistan (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 107-111.

75 In hindsight, some military commanders believed that failure to establish blocking positions during the Battle of Tora Bora (12-17 December 2001 in the Spin Ghar region of Nangarhar Province) allowed high-level Taliban and al- Qaeda leaders to escape.

76 A fully equipped brigade combat team would typically have 5,000 Soldiers, see Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2005), 53.

77 Lester Grau and Dodge Billingsley, Operation Anaconda : America’s First Major Battle in Afghanistan (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 96-98. The exact number of aircraft in TF Talon at the time is unclear. TF Commander Colonel James Marye later recalled 8 Chinooks initially, 4 more Chinooks arrived some time later, 8 Apaches, 8 Black Hawks, and 4 MEDEVAC helicopters. TF Talon Executive Officer, Colonel (as of 2012) Scott Kubica recalled 8 Chinooks initially, 8 more arriving from the 159th Aviation Regiment, 8 Apaches, 4 Black Hawks, and 3 MEDEVAC helicopters. On 28 January 2002, a Chinook from A Company, 7th Battalion, 101st Airborne crashed in Khost province while executing a night, brown-out conditions, landing. This aircraft was damaged beyond repair. See Colonel James Marye, email correspondence with author, 26 February 2012, 1-3; Colonel Scott Kubica, email correspondence with author, 27 February 2012, 1. 78 Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 132- 135; Richard Stewart, The United States Army in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-March 2002, CMH Publication 70-83-1 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2006), 31.

79 Richard Stewart, The United States Army in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-March 2002, CMH Publication 70-83-1 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2006), 33.

80 Lieutenant Colonel Jim Larsen quoted in Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2005), 62.

81 CJTF Mountain, Operation Anaconda, Combat Operations Brief, 26 February 2002, slide 2.

82 Chief Warrant Officer 3 Jeffrey Simon quoted in Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Pilot Reports from Afghanistan,” Press Release, updated 21 January 2012, 1.

83 Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 141; Lester Grau and Dodge Billingsley, Operation Anaconda : America’s First Major Battle in Afghanistan (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 130.

84 Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2005), 68, 119, 122, 125, 126, 131, 139, 149.

85 Pete Blaber, The Men, The Mission, and Me: Lessons from a Former Delta Force Commander (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2008), 241.

86 Colonel Franklin Wiercinski quoted in Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2005), 179-180.

87 Kevin Kennedy, “Operation ANACONDA Virtual Staff Ride,” US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, July 2010, 37-43.

88 Chief Warrant Officer 2 Kenneth Gunter quoted in Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Pilot Reports from Afghanistan,” Press Release, updated 21 January 2012, 2.

89 Chief Warrant Officer 2 John Quinlan quoted in Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Pilot Reports from Afghanistan,” Press Release, updated 21 January 2012, 2.

90 Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 142- 146.

91 Major Franklin Baltazar, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 May 2007, 8-12.

92 Chief Warrant Officer Scott Breslin quoted in Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Pilot Reports from Afghanistan,” Press Release, updated 21 January 2012, 3.

93 Chief Warrant Officer 3 Jeffrey Simon quoted in Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Pilot Reports from Afghanistan,” Press Release, updated 21 January 2012, 3.

94 Kevin Kennedy, “Operation ANACONDA Virtual Staff Ride,” US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, July 2010, 44-63; Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 149-154; Note - A/1-87 and the battalion scouts purposely remained in the valley covering blocking point EVE.

95 Chief Warrant Officer 2 John Ketchum quoted in Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Pilot Reports from Afghanistan,” Press Release, updated 21 January 2012, 4-5.

96 After the initial air assault early on D-Day, the six Chinooks (including those that extracted casualties from TF Hammer) returned to Bagram to refuel and load the remaining 1-87 and 2-187 Soldiers for the second air assault lift to the Shahi Kowt. The second lift was postponed, however, due to the extensive enemy activity in the valley. The CH- 47s with 2-187 Soldiers never left Bagram. The CH-47s with 1-87 troops flew to the AO at sunset on D-Day, but could not land because of enemy fire. The flight then waited at FARP TEXACO for a short period before attempting a second landing in the zone. Again the Chinooks were unable to land safely and subsequently returned to Bagram, see Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2005), 269-270.

97 Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 154- 157; Kevin Kennedy, “Operation ANACONDA Virtual Staff Ride,” US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, July 2010, 64-69.

98 Richard Stewart, The United States Army in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-March 2002, CMH Publication 70-83-1 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2006), 43; Kevin Kennedy, “Operation ANACONDA Virtual Staff Ride,” US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, July 2010, 93-100, 103.

99 Charles Briscoe et al., Weapon of Choice: US Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combat Studies institute Press, 2003), 322-324; Colonel Stephen Townsend, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 May 2007, 3; Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Stogran, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5-15.

100 Colonel Stephen Townsend, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 May 2007, 6-11.

101 General Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York: Harper-Collins Publishers Inc., 2004), 381.

102 Major General Franklin Hagenbeck quoted in Robert McElroy, “Afghanistan: Fire support for Operation Anaconda,” Field Artillery, September/October 2002, 6.

103 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), “TF Rakkasan Operation ANACONDA: The Battle of Shah-i- Kot Valley, 2-13 March 2002,” Briefing, Slide 57.

104 Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2005), 173-176; Lester Grau and Dodge Billingsley, Operation Anaconda : America’s First Major Battle in Afghanistan (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 149.

105 Kevin Kennedy, “Operation ANACONDA Virtual Staff Ride,” US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, July 2010, 70-92.

106 Chief Warrant Officer 2 John Quinlan quoted in Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Pilot Reports from Afghanistan,” Press Release, updated 21 January 2012, 5.

107 Colonel Scott Kubica, email correspondence with author, 27 February 2012, 1.

108 Colonel James Marye, email correspondence with author, 26 February 2012, 1-3.

109 Royal Marines Sergeant Darren Hughes quoted in Carlotta Gall, “Marines Say al-Qaeda Unable to Fight On,” The Times, 6 May 2002, 15.

110 Brigadier Roger Lane quoted in Carlotta Gall, “Marines Say al-Qaeda Unable to Fight On,” The Times, 6 May 2002, 15.

111 Lieutenant Colonel John O’Brien, Post Historian, Fort Campbell, KY, interview by the author, 14 March 2012, 1; Colonel Wiercinski, TF Rakkasan commander, realized the critical importance of CH-47s during pre-deployment mission analysis planning at Fort Campbell in the fall of 2001.

112 President George W. Bush, “President Outlines War Effort,” Remarks at the George C. Marshall ROTC Award Seminar on National Security at Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA, 17 April 2002, 3.

113 CJTF Mountain, Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division, Afghanistan and Operation ANACONDA Brief, undated, Slides 41 and 42; Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 184-185.

114 Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Waging the War Against Terrorism: A Fight in Afghanistan,” Press Release, 18 February 2012, 4-1, 4-5, 6-1, 6-2; Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Stogran, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 May 2007; Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 185-187.

115 Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 209- 211.

116 Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Waging the War Against Terrorism: A Fight in Afghanistan,” Press Release, 18 February 2012, 10-2; Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 211.

117 General Dan McNeill, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 June 2008, 10.

118 Jim Garamone, “Coalition Forces Complete Operation MOUNTAIN SWEEP,” American Forces Press Service, 26 August 2002, 1; Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Waging the War Against Terrorism: A Fight in Afghanistan,” Press Release, 18 February 2012, 10-4 to 10-6.

119 Although Chinooks participated in these air assaults, the majority were conducted by Black Hawks - Brigadier General Martin Schweitzer, email correspondence with author, 17 March 2012, 1; see also David Zucchino, “The Changing Face of Battle,” Los Angeles Times, 13 October 2002, 1-7, http://articles.latimes.com/2002/oct/13/world/fg- 82nd13 (accessed 16 March 2012).

120 Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 215- 216; Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Waging the War Against Terrorism: A Fight in Afghanistan,” Press Release, 18 February 2012, 12-2, 13-1.

121 HK94 Team Administration, “Operation MONGOOSE: Cave Clearing Taliban Strongholds,” 26 February 2003, 1-2, http://www.hk94.com/weblog/archives/75 (accessed 17 March 2012); Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Waging the War Against Terrorism: A Fight in Afghanistan,” Press Release, 18 February 2012, 14-1.

122 Heike Hasenauer, “The War on Terror,” Soldiers, September 2003, 27.

123 Specialist Marie Schult, “Operation VALIANT STRIKE,” ARMY, May 2003, 59-60; Jim Garamone, “Errant Bomb Kills 11 Afghan Civilians,” American Forces Press Service, 9 April 2003, 1; StrategyPage, “Operation UNIFIED VENTURE,” 6 May 2003, 1, http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/afghan/articles/20030506.aspx (accessed 17 March 2012; Jim Garamone, “US, Italian Forces Launch Strike in Afghanistan,” American Forces Press Service, 4 June 2003, 1; Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Waging the War Against Terrorism: A Fight in Afghanistan,” Press Release, 18 February 2012, 14-6.

124 According to Colonel (Ret) John Whitford, PAO, Connecticut National Guard, B Company, 2d Battalion, 104th Aviation Regiment did not participate in air assault operations during its 2003 deployment to Afghanistan – interview by the author, 26 March 2012, 1.

125 Department of Defense, “DEFEND AMERICA: Afghanistan Update,” 19 August – 17 September, 2003, 1-6, http://www.defendamerica.mil/afghanistan/update/sep2003/au091703.html (accessed 18 March 2010); Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Waging the War Against Terrorism: A Fight in Afghanistan,” Press Release, 18 February 2012, 14-8; Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 252-253.

126 Sergeant Greg Heath, “10th Division Shows Its Mettle in Operation MOUNTAIN RESOLVE,” The Mountaineer Online, 26 November 2003, 1-2, http://www.drum.army.mil/mountaineer/Article.aspx?ID=3423 (accessed 19 March 2012); Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Waging the War Against Terrorism: A Fight in Afghanistan,” Press Release, 18 February 2012, 15-1.

127 CJTF-180 statement quoted in Liz Sly, US Launches New Afghan Ground Offensive,” Chicago Tribune, 9 December 2003, 4. 128 Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Hilferty quoted in “US Launches Largest Offensive to Date against Taliban, al-Qaeda,” ArmyTimes.com, 8 December 2003, 1, http://www.armytimes.com/legacy/new/1-292925-2460750.php (accessed 19 March 2012); Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Waging the War Against Terrorism: A Fight in Afghanistan,” Press Release, 18 February 2012, 15-2.

129 Colonel Harry C. Glenn III, interview by the author, 19 March 2012, 1; Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A), “Operation MOUNTAIN BLIZZARD has successfully ended here and Operation MOUNTAIN STORM has Begun,” News Release, 13 March 2004, 1.

130 Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Hilferty quoted in Ayaz Gul, “US Troops Arrest Dozens of Suspected Insurgents in Afghanistan,” VOANews.com, 16 February 2004, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-a-2004-02-16-11-US- 66340037.html (accessed 19 March 2012).

131 Colonel Joseph Dichairo, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 27 August 2007, 11.

132 Terry Boyd, “Troops in Afghanistan Preparing Spring Offensive in Pursuit on Insurgents,” Stars and Stripes, 10 March 2004, http://www.stripes.com/news/troops-in-afghanistan-preparing-spring-offensive-in-pursuit-of-insurgents- 1.17447 (accessed 19 March 2012); Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 253.

133 Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jeffrey Hutchinson, Chief Warrant Officer 3 William Johnson, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Timothy Lidson, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Mark Morris, and Chief Warrant Officer 3 Duane Sandbothe, group interview by the author, 14 March 2012, 1-3; Boeing Rotorcraft Systems, “Waging the War Against Terrorism: A Fight in Afghanistan,” Press Release, 18 February 2012, 16-1.

134 Captain Peter Farrell quoted in Georgia Department of Defense, “Aviators Rescue Soldiers from Besieged Afghan Town,” First Friday Briefing, 3 December 2004, 1-2, http://www.dod.state.ga.us/firstfridayonline/dec04/pages/ch47.htm (accessed 20 March 2012).

135 Task Force 2-5 Bobcat’s Newsletter, March 2005, 1, 5, http://www.bobcat.ws/Task%20Force%202- 5%20NewsletterMar.pdf (accessed 20 March 2012).

136 Colonel Kevin Owens, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 9 and 10 December 2008, 9.

137 Colonel George T. Donovan, Jr., interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 January 2009, 27.

138 Colonel David P. Anders, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 January 2009, 6, 11-12.

139 “Coalition Launches Operation MOUNTAIN LION in Afghanistan,” Armed Forces Press Service, 12 April 2006, 1; Sergeant Joseph Lindsay, USMC, “Operation MOUNTAIN LION Roars into Korengal Valley,” Armed Forces Press Service, 8 May 2006, 1; Colonel Michael A. Coss, “Operation Mountain Lion: CJTF-76 in Afghanistan, Spring 2006,” Military Review (January-February 2008), 22-29; Chief Warrant Officer 4 Gary Ossinger, interview by the author, 10 March 2012, 2.

140 Lieutenant Colonel Frank Sturek, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 October 2008, 15-17.

141 Major Jared Wilson, interview by the author, 23 March 2012, 1.

142 Lieutenant Colonel Frank Sturek, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 October 2008, 3-4.

143 Lieutenant Colonel Frank Sturek, interview by the author, 23 March 2012, 1.

144 Corporation for Public Broadcasting, “America at a Crossroads: Kansas to Kandahar,” Press Release, July 2006, 1- 2; Lieutenant Colonel Walter Bradley, interview by the author, 9 March 2012, 1-5. 145 Lieutenant Colonel Walter Bradley, interview by the author, 9 March 2012, 2.

146 The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) initially provided security for Kabul. NATO subsequently assumed command of ISAF in 2003. ISAF expanded and took control of RC-North and RC-West in 2004 and 2005, respectively.

147 173d Airborne Brigade, “2d Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry History,” 4, http://www.173airborne.army.mil/173rd%20Template/website%20template/2nd%20BN/unitHistory4.html (accessed 27 March 2012).

148 Captain Christopher Getter, “The Progression of the Deployment of the CH-47 Aircraft during the Global War on Terrorism,” unpublished manuscript, 28 March 2012, 2-3; “Awards and Citations: Silver Star,” awarded to Sergeant First Class William Tomlin, Military Times, 6 August 2009, 1-2, http://militarytimes.com/citations-medals- awards/recipient.php?recipientid=3835 (accessed 30 March 2012).

149 “Boeing CH-47D Chinook helicopter 86-01644,” 25 March 2012, 1-2, http://www.chinook- helicopter.com/history/aircraft/D_Models/86-01644/86-01644.html (accessed 26 March 2012).

150 Chief Warrant Officer 3 Jimmy Valencia, interview by the author, 26 March 2012, 1.

151 First Lieutenant Christopher Richelderfer quoted in Brandon Aird, “Sky Soldiers Air Assault into Clouds of Nuristan,” Tien Bien Times, 1 September 2007, 15.

152 Chief Warrant Officer 3 Jimmy Valencia, interview by the author, 26 March 2012, 1; Brandon Aird, “Paratroopers Take Fight to Taliban during Operation Destined Strike,” Armed Forces Press Service, 5 September 2007, 1-2.

153 Chris Brummitt, “US, Afghan Troops Kill Scores of Insurgents,” St. Petersburg Times, 2 September 2007, 1-2; Sebastian Junger, “Into the Valley of Death,” Vanity Fair, January 2008, 84-93.

154 During their deployment, the Chinook crews at Bagram conducted several joint, multi-aircraft, operations with Afghan National Air Force crews who were flying Mi-17 Russian-built, twin turbine, transport helicopters, see Major William Hummer, interview by the author, 27 March 2012, 1.

155 Major William Hummer, interview by the author, 27 March 2012, 1; Jacob Caldwell, “Company Works to Flush Out Taliban During Rock Avalanche,” American Forces Press Service, 31 October 2007, 1-2.

156 Specialist David Hooker quoted in Jacob Caldwell, “Company Works to Flush Out Taliban During Rock Avalanche,” American Forces Press Service, 31 October 2007, 1.

157 Captain Eric Fritz, email correspondence (both quotations), 4 April 2012, 2.

158 Captain Eric Fritz, email correspondence, 4 April 2012, 2.

159 Major William Hummer, interview by the author, 27 March 2012, 1

160 Matthew Sanchez, “Kicking Out the Taliban,” WND.com, 10 December 2010, 1-2, http://www.wnd.com/2007/12/44982/ (accessed 28 March 2012); “The Taking of Musa Qala,” Scotsman.com, 16 December 2007, 1-2, http://www.scotsman.com/news/the_taking_of_musa_qala_1_704162 (accessed 28 March 2012); Mark Townsend, “Fierce Battle Rages for Taliban Stronghold,” The Observer, 8 December 2007, 1-4, 33.

161 This Section of Chapter 5 is based on original source data from Major David Henselman, Detachment Commander for the 305th Military History Detachment that deployed to Afghanistan in 2007 – Major David Hanselman, “Operation MAR KARARDAD,” unpublished manuscript, January 2008, 1-16.

162 Some aviator night vision equipment required certain lunar elevation angles and percentages of lunar illumination. Most US Chinook pilots by this time were utilizing AN/AVS-6(V)3 Aviator Night Vision Imaging Systems (ANVIS) that enabled the pilots to conduct and complete night operations during the darkest of nights, see John McGrath, email correspondence, 12 August 2010, 1; Harry Buchanan, ITT Night Vision, interview by the author, 18 May 2012, 1.

163 Headquarters, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Spartan Review, Draft After-Action Report, May 2007, 5-13. 164 Lieutenant Colonel Brett Jenkinson, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 9 and 11 February 2011, 14.

165 Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, “1-506 IN REGT: Red Currahee Operations in Afghanistan,” After- Action Report, 9; Note – also in July 2008, the Battle of Wanat, involving Soldiers from 2-503 IN, occurred in Nuristan Province.

166 Lieutenant Colonel Anthony DeMartino, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 5 April 2011, 19-20; Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, “1-506 IN REGT: Red Currahee Operations in Afghanistan,” After-Action Report, 18-20; Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, “Optimized Battle for Jalrez, Nerkh,” PowerPoint briefing, slides 1-3.

167 Fred Baker, “Clearing the Tangi: Task Force in Afghanistan Takes Troubled Valley,” American Forces Press Service, 9 March 2009, 1-6.

168 Colonel John Spiszer, email correspondence, 1 April 2012, 1.

169 Lieutenant Colonel Jose Galvan, email correspondence, 2 April 2012, 1.

170 Colonel John Spiszer quoted in Jim Garamone, “Terror Groups along Afghan-Pakistan Border Feel Pressure,” American Forces Press Service, 18 November 2008, 1.

171 Sergeant Matthew Moeller, “Operation VIPER SHAKE Clears Korengal Valley,” Regional Command-East Press Release, 25 April 2009, 1.

172 Colonel Brian Pearl, email correspondence, 2 April 2012, 1.

173 Colonel John Allred, interview by the author, 5 April 2012, 1-2.

174 Colonel John Allred, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Part 2, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 10 December 2010, 19-23; Colonel John Allred, interview by the author, 5 April 2012, 1-2.

175 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas W. O’Steen, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 9 February 2011, 8-10; Headquarters, 1st Squadron, 61st Cavalry, “Operation RADWA U BARQ,” Power Point Brief, undated, slide 2.

176 Colonel Daniel Hurlbut, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 7 February 2011, 3-12; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Troops Face New Tests in Afghanistan: Battalion's Experience Outlines Issues in South,” Washington Post, 15 March 2009, A1.

177 President Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 27 march 2009, 2.

178 Lieutenant Colonel Robert Campbell, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2 May 2011, 8; “Cav Air Assault,” 5th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment, video account, April 2009, http://www.dvidshub.net/video/59707/cav-air-assault (accessed 7 April 2012).

179 Lieutenant Colonel Clint Baker, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 9 May 2011, 11; Valorous Unit Citation Narrative, 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry, undated.

180 Laura King, “World: New Taliban Video Shows US Soldier; Pfc Bergdahl of Idaho, Missing since June,” Los Angeles Times, 26 December 2009, A32; “June 30 Marks Two-Year Point for U.S. Soldier in Captivity,” ISAF Headquarters Public Affairs Office-Afghanistan, 30 June 2011, 1; Lieutenant Colonel Clint Baker, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 9 May 2011, 10.

181 Department of Defense, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress, October 2009, 17; Ben Sheppard, “US Marines Storm south in Major Afghan Offense,” Agnece France-Presse, 1 July 2009, 3, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-marines-launch-major-operation-in-afghanistan-largest-since-vietnam (accessed 3 April 2010); “Marines Launch Operation KHANJAR in Southern Afghanistan,” Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan Public Affairs Office, 2 July 2009, 1. 182 Brigadier General Lawrence Nicholson quoted in Robert Haddick, “This Week at War, No. 24: Is Obama Channeling Bush in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, 10 July 2009, 1, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/07/10/this_week_at_war_no_24?page=full (accessed 4 April 2012).

183 According to Colonel Paul Bricker, 82d CAB commander in 2009, the Army and the Marines both used the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) “Gold Book” to plan the complex Khanjar mission. The Gold Book focuses on TTP unique to brigade-size air assaults.

184 Major John Gunter, interview by the author, 16 March 2012, 1-2.

185 Colonel Paul Bricker, interview by the author, 10 March 2012, 1-5.

186 Colonel Paul Bricker, interview by the author, 10 March 2012, 4-5.

187 Brigadier General Lawrence Nicholson, interview by the United States Marine Corps History Division, 9 June and 17 August, 2010, 30.

188 Lieutenant Colonel Reik Andersen, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 11 February 2011, 5-6.

189 Lieutenant Colonel Reik Andersen, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 11 February 2011, 12.

190 Marcus Butler, “Operation GERONIMO DARAU: ANSF, Paratroopers Target Militants,” CJTF-82 Afghanistan, Bagram Media Center, 10-18 September 2009, 1, http://www.troopscoop.typepad.com/updates/page/27/ (accessed 8 April 2012); Marcus Butler, “Operation GERONIMO DARAU: Paratroopers, Afghan Forces Target Militants,” Alaska Post, 2 October 2009, Vol. 16, No. 39, http://www.usarak.army.mil/alaskapost/Archives2009/091002/Oct02Story14.asp (accessed 8 April 2012); Lieutenant Colonel Clint Baker, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 9 May 2011, 14; Department of the Army, “Valorous Unit Award: 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry Regiment,” Permanent Orders 174-09, 23 June 2010, 1-2, http://www.history.army.mil/html/forcestruc/HRC/2010/174-09_20100623_HRCMD.pdf (accessed 8 April 2012).

191 Major Jeffrey Crapo quoted in Marcus Butler, “Operation GERONIMO DARAU: ANSF, Paratroopers Target Militants,” CJTF-82 Afghanistan, Bagram Media Center, 10-18 September 2009, 1, http://www.troopscoop.typepad.com/updates/page/27/ (accessed 8 April 2012).

192 Colonel Randy George, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 27 January 2011, 6-12; Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Brown, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 16 February 2011, 19; Lieutenant Colonel Brian Pearl, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 13 May 2011, 9; Mathew Moeller, “Dawn Patrol during Operation MOUNTAIN FIRE,” 5th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment, RC-East, 15 July 2009, 1, http://www.rc-east.com/regional-command-east-news-mainmenu- 401/1848-dawn-patrol-during-operation-mountain-fire.html (accessed 9 April 2012); “ANSF, ISAF Completing Operation MOUNTAIN FIRE,” ISAF Public Affairs Office, 16 July 2009, 1, http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2009/07/pr090716-500.html (Accessed 9 April 2012).

193 Colonel Randy George quoted in “ANSF, ISAF Completing Operation MOUNTAIN FIRE,” ISAF Public Affairs Office, 16 July 2009, 1, http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2009/07/pr090716-500.html (accessed 9 April 2012).

194 Sean Rayment, Patrick Sawer, and Benjamin Farmer, “Afghanistan: First Stage of Operation MOSHTARAK Declared a Success,” The Telegraph, 13 February 2010, 1-3, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7230940/Afghanistan-first-stage-of-operation-Moshtarak- declared-a-success.html (accessed 9 April 2012); Lieutenant Colonel Carl Slaughenhaupt, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 3 May 2011, 14; Lieutenant Colonel Burton Shields, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2 February 2011, 11. 195 Colonel Paul Bricker quoted in Aubree Clute, “Army Aviation Plays Key MOSHTARAK Role,” American Forces Press Service, 17 February 2010, 1.

196 Josh Wingrove, “Canadians Play Key Role in NATO Offensive,” Globe and Mail, 12 February 2010, A23.

197 Lieutenant Colonel David Oclander, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 16 February 2011, 5, 15-16.

198 In 2010, Chinooks in the 3d CAB were flown by B Company , 2d Battalion, 3d Aviation Regiment; F Troop, 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, and; B Company, 1st Battalion, 169th General Support Aviation Brigade, assigned to 4th Battalion, 3d Aviation Regiment.

199 Sergeant First Class Jeremy Whittaker quoted in Kaden Koba, “Heavy Lifting: National Guard Chinook Unit Moves Thousands of Passengers and Tons of Cargo for TF Viper,” FALCON FLYER, April 2010, 10-11.

200 Major Michael Reyburn quoted in Monica Smith, “Flying in the Shadow of the Valley of Death,” FALCON FLYER, May 2010, 16.

201 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas von Eschenbach, “Halfway There,” Lighthorse Times, 25 April 2010, 2, http://www.stewart.army.mil/units/AB/unit317CAV/docs/TFLH-FRG_4.pdf (accessed 22 February 2012).

202 Chief Warrant Officer 4 Kyle Evarts, interview by the author, 13 March 2012, 1-2.

203 Sergeant Bradley Mora quoted in Bruce Cobbledick, “Soldiers, Afghan Forces Conduct Air Assault,” Task Force Bayonet Public Affairs, Army News Service, 30 September 2010, 2, http://www.army.mil/article/45944/Soldiers__Afghan_forces_conduct_air_assault/ (accessed 11 April 2012).

204 Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jeffrey Hutchinson, Chief Warrant Officer 3 William Johnson, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Timothy Lidson, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Mark Morris, and Chief Warrant Officer 3 Duane Sandbothe, group interview by the author, 14 March 2012, 4-5.

205 Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jeffrey Hutchinson, Chief Warrant Officer 3 William Johnson, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Timothy Lidson, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Mark Morris, and Chief Warrant Officer 3 Duane Sandbothe, group interview by the author, 14 March 2012, 5.

206 Chief Warrant Officer 4 Gary Ossinger, interview by the author, 10 March 2012, 1-2.

207 Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Lutsky, interview by the author, 11 April 2012, 1; Staff Sergeant Brent Powell, “Afghan Air Assault Nets Weapons, Ammo, Intel,” WWW.ARMY.MIL, 12 October 2010, 1-2, http://www.army.mil/article/46467/afghan-air-assault-nets-weapons-ammo-intel (accessed 11 April 2012).

208 Amanda Brown, “TF Phoenix Supports Largest Air Assault in RC-East,” Task Force Phoenix Public Affairs, RC- East.com, 3 April 2011, 1-2; Ryan Matson, “Red Bulls, ANA Sweep Galuch Valley, Establish Joint Security Center,” Task Force Red Bulls Public Affairs, RC-East.com, 7 April 2011, 1-3.

209 Lieutenant Colonel Steven Kremer quoted in Ryan Matson, “Red Bulls, ANA Sweep Galuch Valley, Establish Joint Security Center,” Task Force Red Bulls Public Affairs, RC-East.com, 7 April 2011, 2.

210 Colonel Rafael Torres quoted in “UPDATE Afghanistan, Coalition Forces Destroy IEDs in Kandahar,” ISAF Joint Command-Afghanistan, IJC News Release #2010-09-CA-218, 21 September 2010, 1.

211 Lieutenant Colonel Peter Benchoff, interview by Afghan Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 June 2011, 28.

212 Captain Christopher Getter, “The Progression of the Deployment of the CH-47 Aircraft during the Global War on Terrorism,” unpublished manuscript, 28 March 2012, 5-6; Lieutenant Colonel Peter Benchoff, interview by Afghan Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 June 2011, 3, 30.

213 Lieutenant Colonel Peter Benchoff, interview by Afghan Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 June 2011, 42-47. 214 Colonel Arthur Kandarian, email correspondence, 11 April 2012, 1.

215 Major General Nicholas Carter quoted in “Provincial Governor Proves Kandahar Highway Safe,” ISAF Joint Command-Afghanistan, IJC News Release #2010-10-CA-228, 22 October 2010, 1.

216 Lieutenant Colonel Peter Benchoff, interview by Afghan Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 June 2011, 9, 13, 34, 36-39.

217 Julius Cavendish, “Afghanistan’s Linchpin: Kandahar,” The Christian Science Monitor, 16 November 2010, 14; Edward Garibay, “Soldiers and ANA Fight to Drive Out Last Taliban Stronghold,” 16th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment, 3 December 2010, 1, http://www.army.mil/article/48987/Soldiers_and_ANA_fight_to_drive_out_last_Taliban_stronghold/ (accessed 21 April 2012).

218 Captain Christopher Getter, “The Progression of the Deployment of the CH-47 Aircraft during the Global War on Terrorism,” unpublished manuscript, 28 March 2012, 5.

219 Colonel William Gayler, interview by Afghan Study Team, US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 April 2012, 19, 21, 25.

220 B/1-171AVN Chinooks were split-based in Bagram, Kandahar, and FOBs Salerno and Shank. B/2-135 AVN (Colorado and Nebraska ARNG) replaced B/1-171 AVN in August 2011.

221 Colonel Kenneth Royar, interview by the author, 7 May 2012, 1.

222 Lieutenant Colonel Darren Gerblick, interview by the author, 26 April 2012, 1; Note: the Special Operations air assault raids flown by 159th CAB pilots and crews resulted in the capture of approximately 180 Taliban leaders, see Bill Larson, “The 159th Combat Aviation Brigade Uncased their Colors in a Ceremony at Fort Campbell Yesterday,” Clarksville Online, 23 March 2012, 6, http://www.clarksvilleonline.com/2012/03/23/the-159th-combat-aviation- brigade-uncased-their-colors-in-a-ceremony-at-fort-campbell-yesterday/ (accessed 23 April 2012).

223 Captain Robert Bender, email correspondence, 22 May 2012, 1.

224 Captain Robert Bender, interview by the author, 17 May 2012, 1; Captain Robert Bender, email correspondence, 22 May 2012, 1.

225 Colonel Kenneth Royar, interview by the author, 7 May 2012, 2.

226 Colonel Donald Bolduc, “Forecasting the Future of Afghanistan,” Special Warfare, October-December 2011, 27.

227 Captain Christopher Ruff, interview by the author, 25 April 2012, 2-3.

228 Captain Christopher Ruff, interview by the author, 25 April 2012, 2.

229 “Afghan, Coalition Forces Capture Senior Haqqani Leader in Afghanistan,” ISAF Joint Command – Afghanistan, ISAF Releases, 1 October 2011, 1-3; Captain Christopher Ruff, interview by the author, 25 April 2012, 3.

230 Two of the ill-fated Chinook crew members were from B Company, 2d Battalion, 135th GSAB.

231 Brigadier General Jeffrey Colt, Executive Summary: Crash of CH-47D Aircraft in Wardak Province, Afghanistan on 6 August 2011, Memorandum for Commander, United States Central Command, 9 September 2011, 1-3; Captain Christopher Ruff, interview by the author, 25 April 2012, 1-4.

232 Brigadier General Jeffrey Colt, Executive Summary: Crash of CH-47D Aircraft in Wardak Province, Afghanistan on 6 August 2011, Memorandum for Commander, United States Central Command, 9 September 2011, 3-5; Captain Christopher Ruff, interview by the author, 25 April 2012, 1-4.

233 General John Allen, “DoD News Briefing with General Allen via Teleconference from Afghanistan,” Office of the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 10 August 2011, 1-2, 5. 234 Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Kidd quoted in Summer Woode, “Dreadnaughts Mark Return with Uncasing of Colors,” 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team Public Affairs, 14 February 2012, 1, http://www.1id.army.mil/NewsViewer.aspx?id=6061 (accessed 1 May 2012).

235 Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Kidd, interview by the author, 8 May 2012, 1.

236 Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Kidd, interview by the author, 8 May 2012, 2.

237 Major Nicholas Ayers, interview by the author, 8 May 2012, 1.

238 Major General Anthony Crutchfield, interview by Vago Muradian, “US Army Aviation Part I,” This Week in Defense News, 22 May 2011, http://www.rucker.army.mil/biographies/bio_cg.html (accessed 14 May 2012).

239 Major General William Crosby, email correspondence with the author, 30 April 2012, 1.

240 Major General William Crosby, email correspondence with the author, 30 April 2012, 1.

241 Colonel Robert Marion, email correspondence with the author, 29 April 2012, 1.

242 As of 2012, Chinooks were the rotary wing aircraft of choice in the OEF theatre, where Army Aviation OPTEMPO was at its highest point ever. The new F model CH-47s incorporate machined airframes, common avionics architecture system cockpits that meet digitized interoperability requirements, full authority digital automatic flight control systems, and additional integrated improvements, see Major General William Crosby, “Department of Defense Rotorcraft Modernization Programs,” Statement before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, Second Session, 112th Congress, 27 March 2012, 5-6.

243 Colonel Robert Marion quoted in Kari Hawkins, “Forget the Museum, First Chinook Still Flying,” Redstone Rocket, 11 April 2012, 2.

244 Major General Anthony Crutchfield, Army Aviation 2030 Vision, 16 February 2012, 2.

245 Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008 US Army Posture Statement, “Information Papers: Restructuring Army Aviation,” 26 February 2008, 1-2; Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011 US Army Posture Statement, “Information Papers: Restructuring Army Aviation,” 2 March 2011, 1-2.

246 Major General Anthony Crutchfield, Army Aviation 2030 Vision, 16 February 2012, 6.

247 Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, A CBO Paper: Modernizing the Army’s Rotary-Wing Aviation Fleet, November 2007, 24; Colonel Robert Marion, “The Amazing Cargo Helicopter: Celebrating 50+ Years, 1961-2012,” Army Aviation Association of America, AAAA Cargo Update, 4 April 2012, 4.

248 Major General William Crosby, “Department of Defense Rotorcraft Modernization Programs,” Statement before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, Second Session, 112th Congress, 27 March 2012, 6.

249 Colonel Robert Marion, “The Amazing Cargo Helicopter: Celebrating 50+ Years, 1961-2012,” Army Aviation Association of America, AAAA Cargo Update, 4 April 2012, 6.

250 The nonlinear battlefield and lack of infrastructure/road networks in Afghanistan increased dependence on aviation support in general.

251 Captain Jared Koelling, email correspondence with the author, 7 May 2012, 1.

252 Major General Anthony Crutchfield, Army Aviation 2030 Vision, 16 February 2012, 6, 9.

253 Major General Anthony Crutchfield, Army Aviation 2030 Vision, 16 February 2012, 2-8.

254 Peter Bergen, “The Last Days of Osama Bin Laden,” Time, 7 May 2012, 24-33. 255 Captain Robert Bender, email correspondence, 22 May 2012, 2.