Zero Option Arms in Europe
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Reagan 1981
“Zero Option” Arms in Europe
President Reagan’s early record on nuclear arms control appeared weak. From 1979 to 1987, NATO deployed ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) in Europe. The low flight missile relied on revolutionary technology to propel it over a 2,500-kilometer range that avoided radar detection. Deployment of the missiles was mobile on hard to detect carriers. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations’ conventional military forces far outnumbered NATO’s conventional forces, so the use of GLCMs to protect Europe from Soviet attack made deployment attractive. However, the Soviet Union countered with deployment of their modern SS-20s, which were also mobile, accurate, capable of concealment, and rapid redeployment. Before 1981, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) had focused on limiting the growth of nuclear weapons deployment. On November 18, 1981, President Reagan outlined a framework for negotiations with the Soviet Union on strategic weapons, called Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) for the first time, with emphasis on reductions, as opposed to limitations on new deployments. Reagan’s “zero-option” proposed that no US tactical nuclear missiles would be deployed in Europe in exchange for the Soviet Union’s eliminating its deployed Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) missiles, including the modern SS-20s, and the older SS-4s and SS-5s. The Soviets, recognizing that the proposal did not take into account nuclear deployments of France and Great Britain, balked. NATO, fearful of the Soviet’s conventional force superiority, insisted on the reduction of nuclear weaponry in Europe. This led to an impasse in negotiations until 1982. Cruise missile deployment in Europe in 1983, the start of NATO’s INF deployment, caused the Soviet Union to walk out of the INF, and then the START talks in December 1983. The zero-sum option established the principle of reduction of nuclear weaponry, but created many obstacles relating to the counting and verification of newly deployed mobile missiles on both sides. Reagan's innovative negotiating tactic established the principle of reduction of nuclear arms, but caused delays in START and consternation among proponents of arms limitation treaties. http://www.nato.int/doc (NATO history) http://www.clw.org (Times Article on Reagan strategy) http://www.fas.org (INF terms)