The Formula of the Universal Law

Kant’s Formula of the Universal Law: A Consideration of Its Capacity to Require the Moral Law

Kant, in the First Section of his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

(GMM), argues that a good-willed person must act from the motive of duty in order for her actions to have moral worth. The argument is summarized in his famous conclusion, the Categorical Imperative (CI): “[One] ought never to act except in such a way that [one] can also will that [one’s] maxim should become a universal law.”1 I will show in this paper, however, that Kant fails to reach his goal of establishing the CI (or one of its formulations) as the “supreme principle of morality” because, even if the argument is assumed to be sound in its essentials, it does not result necessarily in the moral law that Kant believed it did.

1. Introduction

Kant’s moral theory is widely commended as one of the boldest endeavors in modern philosophy. Unlike the ethical thinkers who had preceded him, he did not seek to establish what the Good was, and then give rules for applying it. Rather, he intended

“to seek out and establish the supreme principle of morality” (hereafter SPM), whereby

1 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and analyzed by H.J. Paton (New York: Harper, 1964), 70 [17, 402]. Throughout, I will list the page number for Paton’s version first, followed in brackets by the page number for Kant’s 2nd edition, then that for the edition published by the Royal Prussian Academy in Berlin (GMM appears in volume 4 of this latter work). 2

any rational being could determine what actions were moral through the application of this one rational principle.

Despite the boldness of Kant’s effort, it has been criticized for its perceived failings. My task will be to show that the argument for the CI—and specifically the

Formula of Universal Law (FUL)—as being the SPM Kant seeks to establish (call this argument “T”), does not necessarily result in a conception of the moral law (call it “ML”) as Kant held it to be, even if one largely abandons the traditional criticisms of T and instead assumes it to be an essentially valid argument. Drawing on the work of two recent commentators, I will show that it is possible to draw other conclusions from the beginning of Kant’s argument in the GMM.

I will assume that the essential statement of Kant’s conclusion can be found in the FUL, the first formulation of the CI: “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”2 Thus, I will use the FUL to stand for the conclusion of T.

2. The Possibility of Results Other Than Kant’s Moral Law

Does the CI—and Kant’s arguments in support of it—provide all that is necessary to produce the kind of ethical system that Kant seems to envision? Or is there some other principle that Kant assumes that allows for the CI to determine a moral framework of the sort he intends? If this assumed principle is supplanted with a different one, will not the CI produce a much different result? In this section, I will explore two variations on this theme of results other than Kant’s envisioned ML.

2 Ibid., 88 [52, 421]. KANT’S FUL: A CONSIDERATION OF ITS CAPACITY TO REQUIRE THE MORAL LAW 3

Let us entertain a provocative example in order to tease out whether or not the CI necessarily results in the ML. Kant makes it clear through the FUL that any maxim, in order to meet the requirements of a categorical imperative, must be able to be willed universally. One of Kant’s famous examples of this test is the false promise. He concludes that a moral agent cannot will the maxim, “a person who believes himself to be in need can make any kind of false promise he desires,” without self-contradiction.

Let us assume for the moment Kant’s principle of universalization and its illustration in the false promise example.

Let us expand on a provocative illustration from David Martyn by supposing that someone (call him “Jones”) proposes a maxim of an entirely different kind, one that appears initially to be absurd: one should murder anyone who gets in one’s way. 3

Jones argues that murder is not destruction, after all, but merely the altering of a natural form. Nothing is lost or annihilated, according to Jones; it merely metamorphoses into some other form of its constituent chemical components. Jones maintains that his maxim passes the universalization test and becomes the law of the universal metamorphosis of forms. When questioned on this, Jones replies that this law already exists in nature; indeed, Jones says, “Nature is the universal metamorphosis of forms.”4

Let us assess Jones’s argument. First, does it meet the requirement of FUL?

That is, can it be universalized? Initially, it appears to fail this test. How could anyone will that humans have a duty to kill one another for almost no reason at all? However, this is not the correct question to ask. Jones maintains that he does will his maxim to

3 See David Martyn, Sublime Failures: The Ethics of Kant and Sade, Kritik (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2003), 15-18. His overall thesis, that the ethics of Sade and Kant overlap to the extent that both conceive of universal standards for behavior in reductionistic and formalistic ways, is beyond the scope of this paper. 4 Ibid., 16-17. Emphasis in the original. 4

be universal law. In response, the correct question is: Does his law result in a contradiction? It appears that it does not. The principle of the metamorphosis of forms is consistent with Jones’s murder maxim and its elevation to universal status.

Kant, of course, would object. It is interesting to ask: “On what grounds?” Most apparently, his objection would be based on his formulation of the CI as the Formula of

Humanity as End in Itself (FH): “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.”5 Clearly, one cannot murder someone and still treat him as an end in himself. It is evident that Jones’s proposed universal law does not obtain once a full Kantian approach is considered.6

However, it must be noted that neither the CI nor its formulation in the FUL, by themselves, necessarily precludes this intuitively reprehensible “law.” It is only when the FH is applied that the murder maxim clearly fails.

This prompts us to consider whether or not the FH is entirely consistent with the bare CI. Though a full evaluation is beyond the scope of this paper, an initial assessment is possible. First, it must be remembered that Kant, in the preface of

GMM, places high demands on his own reasoning as he goes about developing his ethical theory. One of the premises of his quest for the SPM was that his argument must be accomplished with pure rational thought: the metaphysic must precede the empirical, “each metaphysic having to be scrupulously cleansed of everything empirical

5 GMM, 96 [66-67, 429]. 6 Martyn, too, acknowledges the “incompleteness” of the example (see 18, 222n7). He offers it only as an introductory illustration. KANT’S FUL: A CONSIDERATION OF ITS CAPACITY TO REQUIRE THE MORAL LAW 5

if we are to know how much pure reason can accomplish . . . and from what sources it can by itself draw its own a priori teaching.”7

Second, any observation from nature would clearly be empirical. That is, if one makes a claim based on observations of facts external to oneself, such a claim is said to be empirical.

Third, Kant’s argument for FH hinges on an observation from nature. In his reasoning which leads to the FH, Kant states:

Rational beings . . . are called persons because their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves—that is, as something which ought not to be used merely as a means—and consequently imposes to that extent a limit on all arbitrary treatment of them (and is an object of reverence).8

As much as one might desire to agree with Kant about persons being ends in themselves, it is not at all intuitively clear that his judgment could be determined a priori.

It appears implausible that one could assess a being’s nature without using empirical evidence. At the very least, it seems that Kant did not provide a sound argument to establish that he could completely determine a priori what marks persons as ends in themselves.

Therefore, Kant’s argument for the FH is unsound because it is based, at least partly, on apparently empirical grounds, a form of reasoning he had previously prohibited himself from using. Therefore, Kant does not reason from the bare CI (or its relative, the FUL) to the FH using only pure rational thought. Therefore, the FUL does not seem—either in itself or via pure rational extension—to necessarily preclude a potential universal law based on an intuitively amoral, and distinctly non-Kantian,

7 GMM, 56 [v, 388-389]. 8 Ibid., 96 [65, 428]. Emphasis in original. 6

maxim. Thus, it appears to be somewhat plausible that the ML does not necessarily follow from the CI/FUL.

It is also possible to expose a breach between the CI/FUL and the ML by means of a second argument. Here, I will explore the idea that Kant’s ethical theory represents a ‘dualism of practical reason.’ This argument, recently made by Hills, draws on the dualism argument of Sidgwick, who argued that “utilitarianism was not rationally required because it could not be shown that a utilitarian theory of practical reason was better justified than a rival egoist theory of practical reason.”9

In short, the dualism argument also can be applied to Kant’s moral theory. A self-regarding imperative can be formulated that is as justified by Kant’s rules of practical reasoning as is his own other-regarding imperative. We can label these parallel positions as the K-prudential law (hereafter, KPL) and the moral law (our

“ML”).10

I will begin my explanation of the dualism argument by describing Sidgwick’s original usage. Next, I will show (at some length) how it might be applied to Kant’s practical reasoning. I will conclude this section by evaluating the dualism argument and showing whether it—similar to the fanciful murder maxim that I previously described— plausibly exposes certain weaknesses that exist in Kant’s argument for the CI/FUL on the path to his intended ML.

9 See Alison Hills, “Is Ethics Rationally Required?” Inquiry 47 (March 2004): 1-19. The quotation is from page 1. Sidgwick’s dualism argument was originally proposed in H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1907). 10 It is important to note here only that Hills’s use of the term ‘prudence’ differs markedly from Kant’s usage. More will be said about this difference in terminology below. KANT’S FUL: A CONSIDERATION OF ITS CAPACITY TO REQUIRE THE MORAL LAW 7

Sidgwick’s argument is remarkably powerful because it “assumes that the theory of practical reason endorsed by the candidate ethical theory is almost entirely correct.”11

In its original formulation, Sidgwick conceded much of the theory of practical reasoning that supports utilitarianism, while showing that utilitarianism itself is not rationally required. He argued that just as utilitarianism maintains that one ought to maximize everyone’s happiness, a parallel claim can be made for egoism—which holds that one ought to maximize only one’s own happiness—based on the same reasoning. Thus, unless someone can show either that there is no actual conflict between the two theories or that one is better justified than the other, it is not possible to argue that either candidate theory is rationally required. In addition, he argues that any justification offered must be “strong” enough so as to convince a moral skeptic. This strong- justification requirement, coupled with the close parallelism of the competing theories makes it difficult to justify either one without justifying the other at the same time and to the same extent.

It is possible to expand Sidgwick’s argument by applying it to Kant’s ethical theory. Before I show how the dualism can be constructed, the argument requires that I reject the traditional criticisms of Kant’s ethics and concede many elements of his reasoning, including:

that ‘duty’ is a fundamental ethical concept; that ‘humanity’ (the capacity to act rationally) is the source of value; that duties can be derived from the FUL without invoking desires; that the different formulations of the ML (particularly the FH and the FUL) are equivalent; that, if we have duties, we must be able to decide independently from our desires;

11 Hills, 1. 8

that humans can be autonomous; that an autonomous will must act on a law; and that no desire-based law of practical reason could be a law of autonomy, and consequently, the correct theory of practical reason must depend on something other than desire.12

It will seem as if the dualism argument has conceded the entire argument, but it has not.

Now, let us review Kant’s distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives. Prudential reasons, based on the agent’s desires, are hypothetical: they apply only to those agents who have certain desires. Moral imperatives are categorical, in the sense that their normative force is not dependent on the agent’s desires and that they obtain for every rational agent, no matter what he desires. Most importantly for

Kant’s argument, categorical imperatives always take precedence over hypothetical imperatives. Thus, from Kant’s perspective—in terms of Sidgwick’s argument—there is no dualism between categorical moral imperatives and prudential hypothetical imperatives because: (1) they are grounded differently, with moral imperatives based on duty to universal laws and prudential imperatives based on desires; and (2) moral imperatives always supersede prudential imperatives.

At this point, the dualism argument has seemingly conceded Kant’s entire argument except the formulations of the ML itself. The break comes in considering the

FH formulation. It demands that an agent treat humanity, whether himself or someone else, always as an end and never simply as a means. This results in duties to others, such as the duty not to make false promises, and duties to oneself, including the duty not to commit suicide.

12 Ibid., 5. KANT’S FUL: A CONSIDERATION OF ITS CAPACITY TO REQUIRE THE MORAL LAW 9

It is possible, however, to replace the FH with a theory of practical reason (the

KPL) which consists in this formulation:

Always treat humanity in your own person as an end, never as a mere means.13

Unlike the FH, this theory produces self-regarding imperatives only, but does not generate other-regarding duties. It is said that self-regarding imperatives (generated by the KPL) are based on “agent-relative” reasons, while other-regarding imperatives

(generated by the ML) are based on “agent-neutral” reasons.

Owing to the fact that the KPL is self-regarding, Hills finds it more plausible to classify the imperatives which result from this formula as prudential than as moral (the latter better describing imperatives which contain duties toward others). It is a prudential principle in the sense that it produces reasons for action based on an agent’s interests; however, “these reasons are not concerned with [one’s] interest in [one’s] desires, but with [one’s] interests as a rational agent, for instance, [one’s] interest in having well-developed talents.”14 Thus, for Kant, prudence is a hedonistic concept, but the KPL usage embodies duties arising from a law of self-regard.

With the construction of KPL, it is possible to assess whether or not a dualism of practical reason exists between the KPL and the ML. As noted above, according to

Sidgwick, there is a dualism unless it can be shown that either there is no actual conflict between the two theories, or that one is better justified than the other. At a minimum, the two theories are quite apparently in theoretical conflict,15 having different bases for

13 Ibid., 7. 14 Ibid. 15 Hills, 9, argues that the two theories are also in practical conflict; however, her example is open to question. 10

the duties they produce: the KPL is based on respect for the agent’s own humanity only, whereas the ML is based on respect for everyone’s humanity.

There are at least two ways the ML could be shown to be better justified than the

KPL. First, it might be shown that only agent-neutral reasons are valid. But:

No such argument is available, because a theory of agent-relative reasons like the [KPL] can satisfy all the plausible demands we might make on a theory of practical reason. [KPL] imperatives are universal (every agent has a reason to respect her own rational agency) and can be acknowledged as real reasons by other rational agents.16

Thus, through their ability to be universalized and to be recognized by others, KPL imperatives are said to be equally justified by the validity of reasons test.

Secondly, the dualism might be solved by showing that the KPL is somehow inadequate when compared to the ML. Kant’s concepts of freedom and autonomy seem to be the best candidates for exposing such an inadequacy. For example, if it could be shown that the notion of freedom requires an agent to accept the ML, then the

KPL would be rendered inadequate in a clear way. Kant’s conception of freedom says that a positively free will cannot be determined by the agent’s desires, but rather must be determined by a law.17 The argument for the KPL notes that an agent whose will is determined by the KPL is operating from a basis of law and not desire.18 Therefore,

Hills argues that there is no valid reason on the basis of freedom (or the related argument from autonomy) to prefer the ML to the KPL.

Before evaluating this argument from Hills, I will briefly review its logical flow:

16 Ibid., 10. 17 See GMM, 114-115 [97-99, 446-447]. 18 Hills continues with considerable detail here (see 10-14), including significant dialogue with the positions of H. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: CUP, 1990) and ‘On a presumed gap in the derivation of the categorical imperative’ in his Idealism and Freedom (Cambridge: CUP, 1996). KANT’S FUL: A CONSIDERATION OF ITS CAPACITY TO REQUIRE THE MORAL LAW 11

(1) Kant’s approach to ethics is correct (including ‘duty’ as a fundamental ethical concept, placing humanity as the source of value, the need for freedom, etc.).

(2) Kant’s FH is a possible theory which can be constructed according to his rules of practical reason. Namely, it is other-regarding, and as such, can be rightly called a ML (for Kant, the ML).

(3) Per Sidgwick’s argument, a dualism of practical reason exists when two theories are in conflict—either theoretically or practically—and neither is better justified than the other.

(4) It is possible to construct a self-regarding imperative, i.e., KPL, which is an equally plausible Kantian theory of practical reason and is in conflict with the ML, both theoretically and practically.

 (5) Kant’s identification of the ML as the only valid theory of practical reason is in error.

 (C) No agent is rationally required to accept the ML (or the KPL).

To evaluate this argument, I will first consider the dualism tests of Sidgwick, that is, those of conflict and justification, then proceed to explore one other potential criticism.

First, there seems to be no question that the KPL conflicts with the ML. It remains then to assess whether or not the ML can be better justified than the KPL. It seems that the reasoning from Hills in this section lacks a consistent logical force and it is not clear that she has established an adequate level of plausibility for the KPL in order to claim equal status with the ML in terms of justification. Despite the fact that she seeks to place the onus for justification on the side of Kant and his sympathizers, it must be acknowledged that Kant’s theory has pride of place (and time-length of dominance); therefore, an objection such as the KPL theory will require a very strong case in order to proceed in challenging Kant’s ML.

Finally, I find that Hills fails to address one central question regarding the KPL and its self-regarding imperatives. The theory can appear on the surface to be only a 12

word game hiding a “morality” based strictly on inclination and desire. Thus, it would strengthen the argument considerably to reveal explicitly the ways in which an agent who wills to follow the self-regarding imperatives generated by the KPL might differ in actuality from one who is motivated only by selfish desire.

Nonetheless, I believe her theory shows at least some promise in questioning how strong the logical link is between Kant’s ethical theory (as shown in the CI/FUL) and his intended result, the ML.

3. Conclusion

I have attempted to show in this paper that Kant fails to reach his goal of establishing the CI (or one of its formulations) as the “supreme principle of morality” because his argument, even if it is assumed to be sound in its essentials, does not result necessarily in the ML that Kant believed it did.

I have explored two lines of argument—one seemingly amoral and the other

“prudential”—that do not reject Kant’s argument, per se, but only deviate from his conclusion, the Moral Law (ML). I found that the case of the murder maxim, while certainly objectionable to the overwhelming majority of rational agents, did generate some implausibility around Kant’s line of argument from the CI/FUL to the ML. In the second argument, that of Hills’s K-prudential Law (KPL), I showed that her argument presumed too great of a burden to be placed on Kant’s argument for the ML.

Nevertheless, I believe that her theory of practical reasoning shows some level of implausibility in Kant’s strict equation of the CI/FUL and its presumed result in the ML. KANT’S FUL: A CONSIDERATION OF ITS CAPACITY TO REQUIRE THE MORAL LAW 13

On the basis of these objections to Kant’s reasoning, I conclude that he has failed to fully establish his sought-for supreme principle of morality (SPM) through his argument for the CI/FUL. 14

Bibliography

Hills, Alison. “Is Ethics Rationally Required?” Inquiry 47 (March 2004): 1-19.

Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and analyzed by H.J. Paton. New York: Harper, 1964.

Martyn, David. Sublime Failures: The Ethics of Kant and Sade, Kritik. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2003.