Change Request to Clean up Security Section 10.6

IEEE C802.16m-09/0399

1 IEEE C802.16m-09/0399 Project IEEE 802.16 Broadband Wireless Access Working Group

Title Change Request to clean up Security section 10.6

Date 2009-02-26 Submitted

Source(s) Youngkyo Baek E-mail: [email protected] Jungje Son Rakesh Taori Samsung Electronics

Anil Agiwal [email protected] Samsung India Software Operations Re: “IEEE 802.16m Internal Documents Configuration Control Procedure (CCP)”, IEEE 802.16m- 09/0008

Abstract This contribution provides modifications for the security section 10.6 of SDD

Purpose Discussion, review, and inclusion into IEEE 802.16m SDD This document does not represent the agreed views of the IEEE 802.16 Working Group or any of its subgroups. It Notice represents only the views of the participants listed in the “Source(s)” field above. It is offered as a basis for discussion. It is not binding on the contributor(s), who reserve(s) the right to add, amend or withdraw material contained herein. The contributor grants a free, irrevocable license to the IEEE to incorporate material contained in this contribution, Release and any modifications thereof, in the creation of an IEEE Standards publication; to copyright in the IEEE’s name any IEEE Standards publication even though it may include portions of this contribution; and at the IEEE’s sole discretion to permit others to reproduce in whole or in part the resulting IEEE Standards publication. The contributor also acknowledges and accepts that this contribution may be made public by IEEE 802.16. The contributor is familiar with the IEEE-SA Patent Policy and Procedures: Patent and Policy . Further information is located at and .

2 IEEE C802.16m-09/0399 Change Request to clean up Security section 10.6 Youngkyo Baek, Jungje Son and Rakesh Taori Samsung Electronics Anil Agiwal Samsung India Software Operations

1. Introduction

This contribution proposes changes for the section “10.6 Security” in IEEE 802.16m System Description Document in order to clean up SDD text and keep consistency throughout security section. This contribution proposes the following changes to chapter 10.6:

1.1Location of EKS in MAC PDU Encryption key sequence (EKS) is used to identify the key used for encrypting the payload in the MAC PDU. In 16e EKS is carried in the Generic Mac header (GMH). In order to optimize the header overheads EKS has been removed from GMH in 16m. This contribution proposes to place all the security related information at one place in the MAC PDU. So we propose to co-locate the EKS with PN before the encrypted payload.

1.2 Standalone signaling header authentication The function of ‘standalone signaling header authentication’ was removed from the section 10.6.1 security architecture at the last session # 59. In order to keep consistency in security section, we suggest deleting the subsection '10.6.5.2.2 standalone signaling header authentication'.

1.3 ECC based Authorization The section 10.6.2.2 on ECC based authorization was decided to be removed as a resolution to comment# 197 at the last session # 59. The resolution of comment# 197 is not correctly implemented in the latest release of SDD. The section 10.6.2.2 should be removed from SDD.

2. Text Proposal

[Change 1, for 1.1 above] 10.6.5.1.1 AES in CCM mode The PN size is reduced in IEEE 802.16m from 4 bytes to 3 bytes. Encryption Key Sequence (EKS) is co-located with PN. The most significant 2 bits of PN is set to EKS. Further reduction in PN and sup- porting methods are FFS. The nonce construction for the AES-CCM algorithm defined in the reference system is used also for 802.16m.

[Change 2, for 1.2 above] Remove the subsection '10.6.5.2.2 standalone signaling header authentication'.

[Change 3, for 1.3 above] Remove the subsection '10.6.2.2 Elliptic Cryptography-based Authorization.