Falling Support in Established Democracies?

CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 4 5/7/2018 2:07 a5/p5

Chapter 4

Falling support in established democracies?

Concern about trust and confidence in governing institutions has risen and fallen over time in periodic cyclical waves, with theories in social sciences reflecting global waves of democratization and the impact of historical events. It is important to build upon and update the main conclusions derived from this body of research. Part I summarizes the literature and then establishes the longitudinal trends in the United States and Western Europe, all countries with long experience of democracy, to see if support has eroded significantly and consistently across these states, as many commentators assume. Part II then focuses upon comparing public opinion towards democratic governance in a wider range of societies and regions around the globe, using the World Values Survey data for the broadest coverage. Democratic aspirations are contrasted with public evaluations of democratic practices. Part III explores evidence about the cognitive basis of knowledge about democracy, and how this varies by the length of experience of living within a democratic state. In particular, the study analyzes whether people in many countries are merely expressing lip-service to democratic notions, representing relatively superficial and uninformed expressions of opinion, or whether attitudes are more deeply grounded in an understanding which reflects the standard principles and processes embodied in liberal democratic theory.

I: Longitudinal trends in established democracies

The longest time-series survey data for analysis is available in established democracies and interpretations of developments in America and Western Europe have been the subject of the most extensive body of research. This work originated during the late-1950s and early-1960s, with Almond and Verba’s Civic Culture. The theoretical impetus for this study reflected contemporary concern to understand the underlying causes of regime instability during the second great reverse wave of democracy.1 The context included the historic rise of Nazi Germany and Italian fascism and the global disruption of the Second World War, as well as the collapse during the 1960s of fledgling parliamentary democracies in many newly independent African states emerging from colonial rule, and the checkered political experience of Latin America, due to a succession of military coups, populist dictators, and Communist revolution.2 The central message emerging from The Civic Culture emphasized that political stability required congruence between culture and structure. Almond and Vera argued that the democratic public needed to be finely balanced in equilibrium between the dangers of either an excessively deferential, apathetic and disengaged citizenry, on the one hand, or an overly-agitated, disenchanted, and heated engagement, on the other. An optimal level of political trust was posited in

1 CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 4 5/7/2018 2:07 a5/p5 stable democratic states, such as Britain and the U.S., where active and watchful citizens checked the powerful, without succumbing to the destabilizing forces of either excessive loyalty and deference, at one pole, or else excessive disaffection and alienation, at the other extreme.

The idea that societies differed in their political culture was hardly novel; indeed it had been the subject of philosophical speculation for centuries, in classic works from Montesquieu to de Tocqueville. But one of the more radical aspects of the civic culture study was the way that support for the theory was derived from a path-breaking cross-national opinion survey, demonstrating that citizen’s orientations could be examined empirically. The study analyzed the mass publics in Mexico, the United States, Italy, Britain, and Germany during the late-1950s. Almond and Verba concluded that the United States (and to a lesser extent, Britain) exemplified the civic culture: “Respondents in the United States, compared with those in the other four nations, are very frequently exposed to politics. They report political discussion and involvement in political affairs, a sense of obligation to take an active part in the community, and a sense of competence to influence the government. They are frequently active members of voluntary associations. Furthermore, they tend to be affectively involved in the political system: they report emotional involvement during election campaigns, and they have a high degree of pride in the political system. And their attachment to the political system includes both generalized system affect as well as satisfaction with specific government performance.” 3 By contrast, Italy (and to a lesser extent, Mexico) exemplified an alienated political culture: “The picture of Italian political culture that has emerged from our data is one of relatively unrelieved political alienation and distrust. The Italians are particularly low in national pride, in moderate and open partisanship, in the acknowledgment of the obligation to take an active part in local community affairs, in the sense of competence to join with others in situations of political stress, in their choice of social forms of leisure activity, and in their confidence in the social environment.”4 The question arising from contemporary developments is whether many political cultures have gradually edged closer to the Italian model during the half century since the original study was conducted, or whether civic orientations remain alive and well in many parts of the world.

During the 1960s and early-1970s, many other American and European commentators also raised questions about the capacity of democratic institutions to serve as an outlet to contain public dissent. As shown in Figure 4.1, the standard indicators in the American National Election Study (ANES) suggested that U.S. trust in the federal government in Washington DC plummeted steadily every election year from the late-1950s to the late-1970s.5 These developments appeared to be linked to an

2 CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 4 5/7/2018 2:07 a5/p5 outbreak of tumultuous protest politics in the United States and Western Europe, with urban riots in major American cities symbolizing a breakdown of social control, and mass demonstrations over issues such as Viet Nam, welfare, race, and gender. These events triggered new scholarly research comparing the causes of protest activism.6

[Figure 4.1 about here]

Nevertheless interpretations of the meaning of the standard ANES political trust indicators have always differed among commentators, sparking a long-standing debate. As discussed earlier, the standard American National Election Study questions about political trust emphasize the ethical standards, efficiency, and integrity of elected officials. Russell Hardin points out that these items are often used uncritically, without reflecting upon whether they actually relate to the underlying notion of political trust.7 The items were originally designed to measure cynicism, and they mostly relate to the motivations, but not the competencies, of public officials. The items ask whether the ‘government in Washington’, or ‘people running the government’ can be trusted to ‘do what is right’, whether they ‘waste taxes’, whether government is run ‘for a few big interests’, or whether public officials are ‘crooked’. For Citrin, the erosion of American political trust during the 1960s shown in these figures can be understood to indicate an expression of public dissatisfaction with the performance of particular incumbent political leaders, representing part of the regular cycle of normal electoral politics. 8 In this perspective, public evaluations of the ethics, honesty and integrity of specific office-holders, including members of congress and specific presidents, can be expected to ebb and flow over time. For Miller, however, the ANES indicators suggest that the roots of public dissatisfaction extend more deeply to indicate a crisis of legitimacy in American democracy, representing a loss of faith that U.S. political institutions were the most appropriate ones for American society.9 The gloomier sentiments received strong endorsement in a major influential report written during the mid-1970s for the Trilateral Commission by Crosier, Huntington and Watakuki, which diagnosed a ‘crisis’ of democratic authority afflicting not just America but also many similar post-industrial societies.10

This wave of concern ebbed somewhat during the 1980s, reflecting the more quiescent mass politics of the conservative Thatcher-Reagan era. Indeed according to the standard National Election Study series, a sharp revival of American trust in the federal government occurred during the first Reagan administration from 1980-1984 (see Figure 4.1), despite the deep recession in the U.S. economy during the early-1980s. The gloomier prognostication about the legitimacy crisis of democracy in the United States and Western Europe started to appear overly-alarmist. This interpretation was typified by

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Lipset and Schneider, who conducted a detailed study of a wide range of American public opinion polls towards government, business, and labor. 11 The study noted that mass support for many types of political institutions in the United States had indeed eroded over time, but the authors concluded that most criticisms were leveled at the behavior and performance of specific power-holders, not doubts about the underlying structure and function of American institutions. The more positive interpretation was strongly reinforced by the Beliefs in Government project, a multivolume comparison examining broader trends in Western Europe from the early-1970s until the mid or late-1990s. A thorough and detailed collaborative study, the Beliefs in Government project dismissed talk of a ‘crisis of democracy’ as exaggerated. In particular, chapters in these volumes which examining institutional confidence and trust in politicians concluded that there was little evidence of a steady secular erosion of systems support in Europe during these three decades. Instead the authors arrived at relatively sanguine conclusions which emphasized the existence of persistent cross-national differences in systems support across different European member states, and a pattern of trendless fluctuations over the years.12

Yet the debate was far from settled. During the early to mid-1990s, American scholars continued to express concern about civic disengagement, exemplified by a catalogue of concern about eroding social capital (Putnam), low or falling voting turnout (Teixiera), declining support for political parties (Aldrich), lack of trust in government (Nye, Zelikow and King), and plummeting popular support for Congress (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse).13 The original Critical Citizens volume, published in 1999, extended the time-series analysis by another decade and widened the cross-national coverage by comparing many third wave democracies. In this study, Russell Dalton compared a range of established democracies and post-industrial societies during the period from the 1960s until the early-1990s, concluding that citizens had become more distant from political parties, more critical of political elites and institutions, and less positive towards government.14 Yet patterns display considerable volatility, rather than a simple linear fall; for example, the standard trends in trust in federal government in the American National Election surveys in Figure 4.1 spanning over fifty years show an overall decline. But there are clearly periods where American trust in the federal government revived, notably in the early-1980s, during the mid-to- late 1990s, as well as peaking around the dramatic events of 9/11.15

Comparisons of U.S. trends can also be made using the U.S General Social Survey, conducted by NORC, which has monitored confidence in institutional leaders since the early-1970s. The GSS asks: “I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any

4 CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 4 5/7/2018 2:07 a5/p5 confidence at all in them?” The top graph in Figure 4.2 shows the trends in American confidence in the executive branch, Congress, and the Supreme Court. The trend line summarizes the overall strength and direction of the linear trend. The results for both the executive branch and the Supreme Court clearly demonstrate a pattern of trendless fluctuation around the mean; there is no significant overall fall in institutional confidence for these institutions. The executive branch, in particular, displays considerable volatility over time, for example the sharp peaks registered temporarily in 1977, 1990-91, and again in 2001. The comparison with confidence in the US Congress shows that some parallel surges occur in public confidence, but there is less pronounced volatility, and the overall trend line shows falling support during these decades. But is this a crisis of legitimacy for government? For comparison, the bottom graph shows similar trends in the private sector for banks and financial institutions as well as major companies. Here both banks and companies show overall trends of declining confidence from the start to the end of this era, which are similar in strength to that experienced towards Congress. It is also notable that banks and financial institutions show sharper peaks and troughs than confidence in major companies.

Part II: Global comparisons

Cross-national evidence for longitudinal trends over several decades is lacking outside of established democracies, although contemporary evidence for mass support for democratic principles from the early-to-mid 1990s has now accumulated in a broad swath of countries, as well as among different types of cultural areas, notably from the World Values Survey and from the regional Barometers conducted in post-Communist Europe, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Arab states. A global comparison of public opinion by Klingemann, based on analyzing data in the early to mid-1990s from the World Values Survey, demonstrated substantial cross-national variations, and relatively low evaluations of the performance of representative institutions, in many third-wave democracies. Confidence in government was especially low in many post-Communist European states and in parts of Latin America.16 More recent studies based on a broader comparison across global regions have commonly echoed Klingemann’s conclusions.17 For example, Catterberg and Moreno compared trends in confidence towards parliaments and the civil service in three dozen nations where comparisons were available over at least two points of time from 1981 to 2001, using the World Values Survey. The study concluded that confidence in these institutions declined in most of the established

5 CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 4 5/7/2018 2:07 a5/p5 and third wave democracies under comparison, with some of the sharpest falls registered in Latin America and post-Communist Europe.18 Nevertheless the exact timing of these shifts is often country- specific and many indicators display considerable volatility over time, like a jagged fall, rather than steady secular erosion. Inglehart and Welzel

At the same time, however, building on Easton’s original insights, Critical Citizens emphasized that the concept of systems support was not all of one piece, so that considerable care is needed in disentangling the most appropriate components and measures.19 In contrast to the survey data showing rising skepticism about democratic institutions, little systematic evidence suggested a long-term ‘crisis’ in support for democratic principles over these decades, indeed rather the reverse; at the end of the twentieth century, these values commanded almost universal acceptance as an ideal; as Klingemann concluded, “I can find no evidence of growing dissatisfaction with democracy as a form of government.”20 Nor was this pattern confined to Western societies; according to the burgeoning range of cross-national surveys, widespread public support for democratic ideals was apparent in many parts of the world, even in many states governed by autocratic regimes.21 Surveys, including the series of global-barometers covering major world regions, suggest that many citizens around the globe have come to adhere to democratic principles and aspirations as the best system of government.22

The consensus which has emerged in the previous research literature, on the basis of survey evidence until the late-1990s, suggests that support for democratic ideals, at least in the abstract, has become pervasive among the majorities of publics around the world. Support for democracy is far from simply a Western cultural artifact, as the ‘Asian values’ debate once claimed. 23 Even in the Middle East, which lags behind the globe in democratic reforms, 2006 Arab Barometer surveys in Jordan, Algeria, Morocco and Kuwait report that eight or nine out of ten respondents believe that ‘democracy is the best form of government’ and that ‘having a democratic system of government would be good for our country’.24 As Diamond summarizes a recent review of the survey evidence: “Strikingly, the belief that democracy is (in principle at least) the best system is overwhelming and universal. While there is a slightly higher preference for the Western industrialized countries, in every region – even the former Soviet Union and the Muslim Middle East – an average of at least 80 percent of people polled say that democracy is best.”25

In the light of the debates in the literature, we need to reexamine the cross-national evidence for democratic aspirations, understood throughout this study as expressions of support for the principles, normative ideals, and values underpinning democratic regimes. This concept can be

6 CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 4 5/7/2018 2:07 a5/p5 measured through surveys by gauging agreement with the idea of democracy, including citizen’s approval of democracy as the 'best form of government' and as 'a good way of governing' for their own country, as well as by monitoring the value and importance of democracy, and also comparing preferences for democratic governance over types of regimes. Cross-national surveys have accumulated considerable evidence concerning mass support for democratic principles in a wide range of nations, as well as among the mass public living under different types of regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 26 The previous literature which has examined public opinion concludes that, at least by the mid-1990s or early 2000, support for democratic ideals had become widespread around the world. Even in countries with little or no experience of this form of government, such as Azerbaijan, Iran and Vietnam, the majority of the public say that they support democracy as the best form of government. 27

To examine the survey data, the proportion of ordinary people who express support for democracy as the best of government for their own country can be compared in 95 societies contained in the World Values Survey from 1995 to 2005. The survey asked the following “I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system.” Figure 4.1 shows the proportion who responded in each society with the strongest approval (‘very good’). The graph illustrates the wide range of replies, with the strongest support expressed in Ghana, Greece and Morocco, where eight out of ten people thought that a democratic system was a very good form of government. Far from being a Western phenomenon, a glance down the ranking suggests no particular obvious pattern; approval was widespread among the majorities of the populations in more than fifty societies. Approval was expressed in a wide range of democratic and autocratic states, and among all cultural regions, as well as among developing countries, emerging economies, and post-industrial economies from around the world. Popular support was weaker in the remaining 48 societies, with the lowest levels of popular support expressed in Ukraine, Latvia, Russia and Hong Kong, but again there is no obvious single factor which these countries share.

This pattern confirms previous studies based on the World Values Survey and the regional Barometer surveys which also found that by the end of the twentieth century, support for democracy as a form of government had become widespread among the publics in many societies worldwide. The analysis needs updating, however, to see whether democratic aspirations have further strengthened during the last decade, or whether public opinion has become increasingly skeptical, reflecting the

7 CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 4 5/7/2018 2:07 a5/p5 general slowdown in further democratization which has occurred around the world. 28 The association of democracy promotion under the Bush administration with unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may also have depressed support for this type of regime, especially in the Middle East and in Muslim- majority states. Table 4.1 shows approval of democracy in the twenty-one countries which carried this item in both the 1995 and 2005 World Values Surveys.

Understanding the meaning of democracy

Therefore democratic aspirations appear to be widespread, according to this evidence, even in unlikely cases. It remains unclear, however, what ordinary people understand by the idea of democracy. The skeptical view suggests that attitudes towards democracy are relatively shallow, superficial and malleable. Democracy is a complex idea open to alternative meanings, including variants such as ‘liberal’, ‘participatory’, and ‘deliberative’, debated in political philosophy.29 Not surprisingly, there is considerable lassitude for different understandings of the term in ordinary language. Moreover cross- national surveys may capture responses towards democracy which are culturally-specific in their meanings. Schaffer conducted in-depth interviews in Senegal, for example, a mostly Islamic and agrarian country with a long history of electoral politics. He discovered that ideas of “demokaraasi” held by Wolof-speakers often reflect concerns about collective security, rather than the standard liberal concepts of free and fair elections, accountable executives, and respect for human rights. 30

In a broader comparison, Welzel and Inglehart found that most people around the world pay lip service to the idea of democracy, but they argue that this does not necessarily indicate strong motivations or deep-rooted coherent orientations.31 They reason that a marked disjuncture is evident in many societies between overt public support for democracy and the actual type of regime in power. By contrast, they argue, the presence of more deeply-rooted ‘emancipative’ values in society, exemplified by feelings of social trust, tolerance, and participation, proves a more accurate predictor of ‘effective’ democratic regimes. Yet debate continues and other scholars have challenged the evidence for the Welzel and Inglehart argument, and dismissed the more general claim that democratic development is affected either by emancipative values or by overt expressions of approval for democratic values. 32 It may be naïve to assume, however, that democratic aspirations, by themselves, have the power to overthrow repressive regimes and long-established autocracies, where states are willing to use techniques of imprisoning opponents and suppressing opposition reform movements. Even in more liberal regimes, institutional structures and levels of socioeconomic development may prove more powerful drivers of democratization than cultural values alone. 33 In this context, the expression of

8 CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 4 5/7/2018 2:07 a5/p5 cultural values in each society, while genuine, would probably prove a poor predictor of contemporary patterns of democratic governance.

Democracy is a complex idea open to multiple interpretations – along with the related concepts of self-government, human rights, freedom, equality, participation, rule of law, accountability, and representation. The cultural meaning of support for democracy deserves closer scrutiny, in particular, among publics in long-standing autocracies, such as in China, Vietnam and Saudi Arabia, where the free flow of political information is restricted and ordinary people have never had any direct experience of living under this form of governance. We need to establish whether ordinary people are merely expressing lip-service to the abstract notion of democracy, representing relatively superficial and uninformed expressions of opinion, or whether attitudes are more deeply grounded in a coherent cognitive understanding which reflects the standard principles, structures and values embedded in democratic theory.

The heart of this debate concerns the need to interpret what ordinary people understand when they express support for democratic values. Poor people living in Accra, Cairo and Sichuan may regard the image of democracy favorably today, as the political system associated historically with rich and powerful nations and with modern post-industrial societies. But positive approval does not imply that they know much in any detail about the complex principles, practices, and abstract ideas underlying this form of governance. Alternatively, when they express approval of democracy, Nigerians, Egyptians and the Chinese may be expressing more deep-seated aspirations for self-governance, and they may share an understanding of basic democratic values, structures, and processes which is similar to citizens living in long-established democracies. After the fall of the Berlin wall, Hofferbert and Klingemann found that Western and Eastern Germans shared common notions of what defines democracy in terms of values and processes, such as the association of this form of governance with freedom of speech and competitive elections, although citizens differed in their understanding of the social and economic features of democracy.34 Similarly Dalton, Shin and Jou analyzed open ended responses when ordinary people were asked about the meaning of democracy in surveys conducted in roughly fifty countries. 35 They found that in most places, democracy is broadly identified with freedom and civil liberties. This response was far more common that understanding the meaning of democracy in terms of institutions and procedures, such as elections or rule of law, or in terms of social benefits, such as peace and equality. At the same time, roughly one fifth of the public could not offer any substantive definition, even in long established democracies.

To consider the meaning of democracy, the WVS asked

Comparing evaluations of state institutions

If there is any ‘crisis’ of democracy, many commentators argue that the heart of the problem lies in an erosion of trust and confidence in the core institutions of state, including the legislature, executive and judicial branches of government, as well as other public sector agencies, such as the police, military and civil service. Nevertheless previous research examining institutional confidence in America and Western Europe has emphasized the need to distinguish among both public and private sector agencies, as well as among different branches of government. 36

The distribution of critical citizens

To build upon the conceptual foundation, the heart of this study seeks to focus upon the contrast and tensions between positive approval of democratic values, on the one hand, and negative evaluations of the performance of democratic institutions, on the other. The aim is not to look at all types of support for the nation state but rather to understand the syndrome of ‘ critical citizens’ in more depth. 37 The matrix in Figure 4.X illustrates the framework and how this is measured. Any selection of suitable variables for indicators needs to balance the desirability of using composite measures derived from the factor analysis, with the potential advantage of the greater reliability derived from multi-item scales, against the problems arising from missing data and more limited cross-national and time-series coverage which arise from this process.

The horizontal dimension concerns democratic values. This reflects the aspirations which citizens express towards the ideal type of principles for governing their state, irrespective of the type of democratic or autocratic regime actually in power. Democratic values involve the normative underpinnings which are involved in approval or disapproval of this type of state. This concept is gauged using a single item from the pooled World Values Survey 1995-2005 in terms of strong agreement ( ‘very good’) with the statement ‘I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system?’ It should be noted that this item does not seek to define any particular type of democracy in terms of principles or structural institutions, so it open to multiple meanings within each culture.

The vertical dimension concerns citizen’s confidence in state agencies in their own country, understood to reflect approval of their performance in practice. This is also measured using four items selected from the pooled WVS from 1981-2005 by the question: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? Parliament, the civil service, the police, and the armed forces.” Each of these are an integral part of any effective nation- state, whether democratic or not, and as the factor analysis demonstrated, attitudes towards these agencies are also strongly correlated with confidence in the national government, the courts, and political parties, where the pooled WVS contained a more abbreviated time series (1990-2005). The confidence in state institutions scale is constructed by summing the four components as a standardized 100 point scale and then the scale is dichotomized around the mean into high and low categories.

[Figure 4.X about here]

Combining these components in the matrix generates four ideal types. The critical democrats, representing those located in the lower right quadrant, referring to citizens who simultaneously aspire to democracy as the ideal form of government yet who remain skeptical about the way that state institutions work in practice. The top right quadrant contains the satisfied democrats, where there is congruence between support for democratic values and confidence in state agencies. Alternatively, the matrix also identifies the critical non-democrats, a group which does not adhere to democratic values and which is also skeptical about state institutions. Lastly, the satisfied non-democrats do not subscribe to democratic values and they are satisfied with institutional performance. When operationalized using the measures in the pooled World Values Survey 1995-2005 the distribution in Figure 4.X shows that critical democrats proved to be the largest category, with 43% of respondents. The next largest category contained the satisfied democrats, representing roughly one third (35.1%) of all respondents. Critical non-democrats represented 13.6% of respondents, while the satisfied non-democrats were the smallest group (8.4%).

Therefore the growing tensions between support for democratic values and practices have been observed in many previous studies in the literature, but nevertheless these components are most commonly analyzed separately, rather than being integrated.38 Systematic research has not clearly established the social background and political characteristics of critical citizens, and the distribution of these groups across different types of societies, cultural regions, and regimes. We also need to describe trends over time within the same set of countries to establish whether and where there has been any

11 CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 4 5/7/2018 2:07 a5/p5 significant growth in the proportion of critical democrats. Lastly, we also need to examine the behavioral consequences of these particular attitudinal profiles for civic engagement, governance, and regime stability. Subsequent chapters explore all these issues in greater depth to understand how we can best explain the phenomenon of critical citizens in any society, and also why this matters.

Figure 4.1: American trust in federal government, 1958-2008

Note: The standard ANES question is: “How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right -- just about always, most of the time or only some of the time?”

Source: The American National Election Surveys, 1958-2008

Figure 4.2: American trust in public and private sector institutions, 1972-2006

Note: “I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?” The proportion reporting ‘a great deal’ of confidence in each institution. The linear trends summarize each series. Source: U.S. General Social Survey cumulative file 1972-2006 http://publicdata.norc.org/webview/

Figure 4.1: Trends in nationalism

Note: The nationalism scale is constructed from two items: (V75) Willingness to fight for one’s country in a war and (V209) Feelings of national pride. These items are summed and standardized to a 100- point scale.

Figure 4.2: Approval of democracy as best form of government for own country (% ‘Very good’) 2005

Figure 4.2: Institutional confidence

Note: Institutional confidence scale (8) 1981-2005

Source: Pooled WVS 1981-2005

Figure 4.3: Confidence in parliament

Note: Confidence in parliament, 1981-2005

Figure 4.5: The dimensions and distribution of critical citizens

Non-democratic values Pro-democratic values

High confidence in state Satisfied non-democrats Satisfied democrats agencies (8.4%) (35.1%)

Low confidence in state Critical non-democrats Critical democrats agencies (13.6%) (42.9%)

Notes:

Democratic values are measured in the WVS from 1995-2005 by the question (V151) “‘I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system?’” Pro-democratic values are classified from those who responded ‘very good’ or fairly good’, with the remainder classified as holding non- democratic values.

Confidence in state agencies is measured in the WVS from 1981-2005 by the question: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? Parliament, the civil service, the courts, the police, and the armed forces.” The scale is constructed by summing these five components as a standardized 100 point scale and then the scale is dichotomized around the mean into high and low categories.

Source: World Values Survey 1995-2005

Figure 4.6

Figure 4.X Perceived characteristics of democracy by length of experience of living in a democratic state

Table 4.1: Approval of democracy as the best form of government for own country (% very good)

Nation 1995 2005 Change 1995-2005 Russian Federation 6 24 18 Ukraine 20 36 16 Moldova, 26 41 15 Sweden 63 76 13 Chile 30 42 12 Uruguay 45 55 10 Finland 31 39 8 Taiwan 25 33 8 Australia 52 59 7 Germany 58 65 7 Slovenia 41 47 5 Brazil 27 30 3 India 49 52 3 Argentina 51 52 2 Mexico 28 28 -1 United States 55 52 -3 Bulgaria 37 33 -5 Colombia 35 27 -8 Japan 43 35 -8 Romania 66 54 -13 Serbia 50 35 -15 Republic of Korea (South) 45 24 -21 Total 40 43 2 Note: Question “I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system.” Percentage ‘very good’.

Source: World Values Survey 1995-2005

Table 4:2 Perceived characteristics of democracy.

Survey items Political rights Strong government V157. Civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression. .706 V154. People choose their leaders in free elections. .699 V161. Women have the same rights as men. .682 V160. People can change the laws in referendums. .660 V158. The economy is prospering. .630 V159. Criminals are severely punished. .541 V155. People receive state aid for unemployment. .519 V153. Religious authorities interpret the laws. .787 V156. The army takes over when government is incompetent. .723 V152. Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. .491 % of variance 29.8 16.9 Note: Q “Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy” and 10 means it definitely is “an essential characteristic of democracy”” The table presents the results of Principle Components factor analysis using Varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization.

Source: World Values Survey 2005

Table 4.2: Perceived essential characteristics of democracy

Region W Free elections Civil Referenda Economy Punish State aid for Tax rich Army Religious om liberties prospers crime unemploymen takes leaders en t over in define eq need law ual Africa 8.2 8.36 7.34 8.03 7.71 7.81 6.86 6.03 4.87 4.84 2 Asia-Pacific 8.4 8.51 8.11 7.72 8.24 8.13 7.00 7.40 4.62 4.59 9 Central & Eastern 8.9 8.67 8.39 8.14 8.53 8.07 7.84 6.53 4.43 3.86 Europe 2 North America 8.6 8.41 7.69 6.91 6.92 6.51 6.53 5.59 4.28 3.49 8 South America 8.7 8.63 7.77 7.98 7.49 6.82 7.19 5.69 4.03 4.03 6 Scandinavia 9.5 9.20 8.72 7.94 6.17 6.15 7.35 6.71 2.81 2.16 0 Western Europe 8.9 8.62 8.25 7.90 7.46 7.58 7.43 6.43 3.00 2.82 8 Total 8.6 8.56 8.00 7.82 7.80 7.60 7.19 6.46 4.21 3.95 9

Note: For the exact questions, see Table 3.X

Table 4.3

Region Importance of living in Evaluation of Respect for human a democracy democracy in own rights in own country country Scandinavia 9.13 7.45 1.83 Western Europe 8.86 6.28 2.20 North America 8.81 6.62 2.17 Africa 8.64 6.45 2.37 Asia-Pacific 8.46 6.89 2.09 South America 8.35 6.57 2.60 Central &Eastern Europe 8.05 5.13 2.82 Total 8.51 6.34 2.46

Notes:

V162.”How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?”

V163: “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would you choose?”

V164” “How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays in this country? Do you feel there is 1 A great deal of respect for individual human right, 2 ‘Some respect”, 3 Not much respect, 4 No respect at all.”

28 1 Samuel P. Huntington. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press.

2 For the intellectual history of the origins of the civic culture study, see Gabriel Almond’s (1996) ‘The civic culture: Prehistory, retrospect, and prospect’ (http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/96-01) and Gerardo L. Munck and Richard Snyder. 2007. Passion, Craft, and Method in Comparative Politics.

3 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 314.

4 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p.308.

5 See the ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior. http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/graphs/g5a_1_2.htm

6 Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase. 1979. Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage.

7 Russell Hardin. 2006. Trust. Cambridge: Polity Press.

8 Jack Citrin. 1974. ‘Comment: The political relevance of trust in government.’ American Political Science Review 68:973-88; Jack Citrin and Donald Philip Green. 1986. ‘Presidential leadership and the resurgence of trust in government.’ British Journal of Political Science 16: 431-53.

9 Arthur H. Miller. 1974. ‘Political issues and trust in government, 1964-1970.’ American Political Science Review 68: 951-72; Arthur H. Miller. 1974. ‘Rejoinder to 'Comment' by Jack Citrin: Political discontent or ritualism?’ American Political Science Review 68:989-1001; Arthur H. Miller and Stephen A. Borrelli. 1991. ‘Confidence in government during the 1980s.’ American Politics Quarterly 19: 147-73.

10 Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki. 1975. The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission. New York: New York University Press. See also Samuel P. Huntington. 1981. American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 11 Seymour Martin Lipset and William C. Schneider. 1983. The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind. New York: Free Press. P.6. See also Joseph S. Nye, Philip D. Zelikow, and David C. King. Eds. 1997. Why People Don't Trust Government. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

12 See, in particular, Ola Listhaug and Matti Wiberg. 1995. ‘Confidence in political and private institutions.’ In Citizens and the State, eds. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Ola Listhaug. 1995. ‘The dynamics of trust in politicians.’ In Citizens and the State, eds. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

13 This concern generated an extensive American literature during the early to mid-1990s. See, for example, Ruy A. Teixeira. 1992. The Disappearing American Voter. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution; John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 1995. Congress as Public Enemy. New York: Cambridge University Press; John H. Aldrich. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Susan J. Tolchin. 1996. The Angry American: How Voter Rage Is Changing the Nation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; Joseph S. Nye, Philip D. Zelikow, and David C. King. Eds. 1997. Why People Don't Trust Government. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Robert D. Putnam. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. NY: Simon and Schuster; John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 2001. What Is It About Government That Americans Dislike? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

14 Russell J. Dalton. 1999. ‘Political support in advanced industrialized democracies.’ In Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. Ed. Pippa Norris. New York: Oxford University Press. See also Russell J. Dalton. 2004. Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies. New York: Oxford University Press.

15 It should be noted that the New York Times surveys have carried the same ANES item from 1976 to June 2009, and this series registers a modest (3 percentage point) uptick in trust in government following the election of President Obama in November 2008.

16 Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1999. ‘Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis.’ In Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. Ed. Pippa Norris. New York: Oxford University Press.

17 See, for example, Neil Nevitte and M. Kanji. 2002. ‘Authority orientations and citizen support: A cross- national analysis of satisfaction with governments and democracy.’ Comparative Sociology 3-4: 387-412; Mattei Dogan. Ed. 2005. Political Mistrust and the Discrediting of Politicians. The Netherlands: Brill; Colin Hay. 2007. Why We Hate Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. 18 Gabriela Catterberg and Alejandro Moreno. 2006. ‘The individual bases of political trust: Trends in new and established democracies.’ International Journal of Public Opinion Research 18(1): 31-48.

19 David Easton. 1965. A framework for political analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall; David Easton. 1975. ‘Reassessment of the concept of political support.’ British Journal of Political Science 5(OCT): 435-457.

20 Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1999. ‘Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis.’ In Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. Ed. Pippa Norris. New York: Oxford University Press.

22 Larry Diamond. 2008. ‘Introduction’. In How People View Democracy. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. P.xi.

23 Russell Dalton and Doh Chull Shin, eds. 2006. Citizens, Democracy and Markets around the Pacific Rim Oxford: Oxford University Press.

24 Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler. 2008. ‘The Arab Aspiration for Democracy.’ Table 1. In Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). How People View Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

25 Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). 2008. ‘Introduction’. In How People View Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

26 Michael Bratton, Michael, Robert Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi. 2004. Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Roderic Camp. ed. 2001. Citizen Views of Democracy in Latin America Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press; Russell J. Dalton and Doh Chull Shin, eds., 2006. Citizens, Democracy and Markets around the Pacific Rim Oxford: Oxford University Press.

27 Ronald Inglehart. 2003. ‘How solid is mass support for democracy: and how do we measure it?’ PS: Political Science and Politics 36:51-57; Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. 2003. ‘Political culture and democracy: Analyzing cross-level linkages’. Comparative Politics. 36(1): p. 61-+; Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). 2008. ‘Introduction’. In How People View Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 28 Larry Diamond. 2008. The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World. New York: Times Books; Arch Puddington. 2009. ‘Freedom in the world 2009: setbacks and resilience.’ Freedom in the World, 2009. Washington, DC: Freedom House. http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/FIW09_OverviewEssay_Final.pdf

29 David Held. 2006. Models of Democracy. 3rd ed. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

30 Frederic G. Schaffer. 1998. Democracy in Translation: understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press

31 Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. 2003. ‘Political culture and democracy: Analyzing cross-level linkages’. Comparative Politics. 36(1): p. 61-+; Christian Welzel. 2007. ‘Are levels of democracy affected by mass attitudes? Testing attainment and sustainment effects on democracy.’ International Political Science Review 28(4): 397-424; Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart. 2008. ‘The role of ordinary people in democratization.’ In Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). In How People View Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

32 See Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell. 2005. ‘Cultural and economic prerequisites of democracy: Reassessing recent evidence.’ Studies In Comparative International Development 39 (4): 87-106; Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart. 2006. ‘Emancipative values and democracy: Response to Hadenius and Teorell.’ Studies In Comparative International Development 41 ( 3): 74-94; Jan Teorell and Axel Hadenius. 2006. ‘Democracy without democratic values: A rejoinder to Welzel and Inglehart.’ Studies In Comparative International Development 41(3): 95-111.

33 Pippa Norris. 2008. Driving Democracy: Do Power-sharing Institutions Work? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

34 Richard I. Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 2001. ‘Democracy and Its Discontents in Post-Wall Germany.’ International Political Science Review 22(4): 363-378. See also Dieter Fuchs. 1999. ‘The Democratic Culture of Unified Germany.’ In Pippa Norris. Ed. Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

35 Russell J. Dalton, Doh C. Shin and Willy Jou. 2008. ‘How people understand democracy.’ In Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds). 2008. How People View Democracy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 36 See Seymour Martin Lipset, and William C. Schneider. 1983. The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind. New York: Free Press; Ola Listhaug and Matti Wiberg. 1995. ‘Confidence in political and private institutions.’ In Citizens and the State, eds. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press

37 For alternative conceptualizations and studies about this phenomenon, see also Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam. (Eds.) 2000. Disaffected Democracies: what's troubling the trilateral countries? Princeton: Princeton University Press; Mariano Torcal and José R. Montero . 2006. Political Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies: Social Capital, Institutions, and Politics. London: Routledge; Richard I. Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 2001. ‘Democracy and Its Discontents in Post-Wall Germany.’ International Political Science Review 22(4): 363-378.

38 The main exception is the study presented by Richard I. Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 2001. ‘Democracy and Its Discontents in Post-Wall Germany.’ International Political Science Review 22(4): 363- 378.