The Great Powers in Peaceful Korean Reunification

The Great Powers in Peaceful Korean Reunification

Youngho Kim (Department of Political Science, Sungshin Women’s University)

Introduction There is an American proverb that “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” This status quo policy toward the Korean peninsula has dominated the post-Korean War strategic thinking of four great powers surrounding the peninsula, that is, the United States, Russia (the former Soviet Union), China, and Japan. North Korean-Chinese-Soviet coordinated attempt to reunify the country by force was met by direct American intervention in the war and ended in a stalemate on the current Demilitarized Zone with the signing of the Military Armistice Agreement in 1953. William Stueck called the Korean War “a surrogate for World War III” among great powers. The war gave them a sobering lesson that a local war on the peninsula has the potential to be expanded into a global war if great powers do not exercise their restraints and fail to rein in the irredentist tendency of the two Koreas. The status quo policy has contributed to peace and stability on the peninsula during the past fifty years. The great powers have considered it pointless to try and fix the post-Korean war arrangements on the Korean peninsula until North Korea appeared as a revisionist state with its nuclear weapons programs. North Korea’s revisionist policies are caused by the failure to reform the isolationist regime and its frustration with the status quo. North Korea’s objectives are to subvert the status quo and create an external milieu conducive to regime survival. The essence of North Korea’s policy can be summarized as the idea that “if it ain’t broke, break it.” The revisionist policy is novel in the long history of Korea’s relations with adjacent great powers in that immediate causes to instability can be found within the peninsula itself. The internal dynamic poses serious challenges to the national interests of great powers and has a potential for straining the relations between them. In the past conflicts of interests among great powers were reverberated into Korea and held sway over its future. Despite the striking reversal of the historical trend with the end of the Cold War, the importance of Korea’s geopolitical location remains unchanged and has direct impact on great powers’ involvement in the Korean affairs. In the face of the challenges emanating from the peninsula great powers cannot delay their attempt to find a solution for

 This paper is prepared for the Interreligious and International Federation for World Peace, Assembly 2003, Chonan, Korea, July 12, 2003. peaceful transition of the status quo on the peninsula. Durable peace and stability in East Asia will remain a remote possibility unless and until the question of peaceful Korean reunification is solved. Minimizing the negative impacts of the unification process, and devising a viable solution to peaceful Korean reunification are difficult tasks confronting four great powers as well as the two Koreas. This paper will begin by explaining what are the national interests of each of great powers in the process of the peaceful management of the status quo and the transition to peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. The clarification of their interests will enable us to see if there exist common grounds on which four great powers devise a viable solution to the future of Korea. The consensus-building process among great powers is necessary for peaceful Korean reunification if their national interests are so divergent that any common ground cannot be found. Thus the key question is whether it is possible to find a compromised solution for the future of reunified Korea among them. The compromised solution cannot be tenable if it does not result from realistic assessments of North-South Korean policies and their impact on the calculations of great powers. It is necessary to explain the structural constraints under which the two Koreas pursue security and economic prosperity and to analyze how the structural aspects influence their definition of national interests. The anarchical structure on the peninsula level stemming from the antagonistic interactions between the two Koreas contributes to the life-and-death struggle for domination of the whole country which underlies the fierce competition between them. Democratization and rapid economic growth of South Korea stand in sharp contrast with North Korea’s faltering economy and dynastic socialist dictatorship. Asymmetrical developments between them have put the unstable standoff under mounting pressure. Four contrasting scenarios can be put forward and evaluated for the future of North-South Korean relations: war, the status quo, North Korea’s collapse, and peaceful reunification. With these scenarios in mind this paper will explain which scenario will be in the national interests of each of great powers and what roles they can play in promoting the process of peaceful Korean reunification.

US National Interests and its Roles in the Unification Process The United States emerged victorious in the global Cold War struggle with the former Soviet Union. The regional security arrangements the United States had created and promoted during the Cold War contributed to maintaining regional stability and economic prosperity. South Korea and Japan are the two countries which have benefited from the “long peace” during the Cold War period. The US-ROK Defense Treaty and

2 the deployment of US forces in Korea provided an effective deterrent against North Korea. Under the US security umbrella, South Korea succeeded in achieving steady democratization and rapid economic growth. In contrast, North Korea lost its longtime allies with the collapse of the former Soviet Union and its empire. North Korea’s diplomatic isolation, famine, and economic collapse constitute a sharp contrast with political and economic developments of South Korea. This asymmetrical developments on the peninsula served as evidence for the effectiveness of the security arrangements the United States created and maintained during the Cold War. Thus the United States did not recognize an urgent need for revising the current security arrangements even after the end of the Cold War on the global level. The US policy toward the Korean peninsula can be construed as representing “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” attitude. The status quo-oriented policy continued during the Clinton administration when it singed the Framework Agreement of 1994 with the North to freeze North Korean nuclear weapons program in return for the supply of two light-water reactors and heavy fuel oils. The Agreed Framework epitomizes the status quo mentality of the US toward the Korean peninsula. Clinton administration officials also believed that the collapse of North Korea was imminent and the light-water reactor project will come to an abrupt end with its collapse. The strategic thinking that the continued pursuit of the status quo policy would result in the eventual demise of North Korea underlay the Clinton administration policy toward the Korean peninsula. Although its strategic reasoning is valid and prudent, Clinton administration policies were not realistic enough to achieve its intended policy objectives. The durability of the North Korean regime and the revelation of clandestine uranium- enriched nuclear weapons programs belied the expectations of the Clinton administration. North Korea considers itself a loser in the North-South Korean competition under the current security arrangements, thus making a proactive attempt to subvert the status quo. North Korea becomes a revisionist state against which status quo states like the US and South Korea defend existing security arrangements. Economic collapse left no choice for the North but to acquire nuclear weapons because its economy cannot afford to sustain and increase conventional military forces and armaments. Despite the fact that the Bush administration secured intelligence evidence for North Korea’s uranium nuclear program in 2001, it did not take measures to solve the problem until Assistant Secretary James Kelly visited Pyongyang in October 2002 in order to focus on Iraq. The reason for the belated response of the Bush administration to North Korea’s violation of a series of international agreements on nuclear non- proliferation can also be found in the divergent strategic perspectives between the Bush

3 and Kim Dae Jung administrations in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. During the first round of trilateral talks in Beijing in April 2003 North Korea announced that it already possessed nuclear weapons and was ready to carry out a nuclear test. North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons will make it very difficult to achieve peaceful Korean reunification by bringing about a radical change in the balance of power in the East Asian region as well as on the peninsula. The domino effect of North Korea’s nuclear weapons will be spread to Japan and Taiwan. Region-wide nuclear proliferation will lead to the reemergence of the diametrically opposed blocs in the region. The consolidation of North Korean-Chinese-Russian axis will perpetuate the division of Korea as was the case during the Cold War period. North Korea’s transfer of weapons of mass destruction to other nations or terrorist groups will be against the interests of the US whose main policies are to maintain the non-proliferation regime and to prevent terrorism after the 9.11 terrorist attack. In the face of North Korea’s revisionist policies neither benign neglect nor malign neglect policies of the Bush administration toward the North cannot be sustainable. The Bush administration’s policy to engage the North in a multilateral format is in the right direction to solve the North Korean nuclear issue and to set in motion the process of peaceful Korean reunification. North Korea’s nuclear ambition makes the United States start on the fix before the status quo on the peninsula is broken. The United States needs to approach the nuclear issue with a clear vision of Korean reunification and to capitalize on this multilateral format to deal with a variety of issues in the future unification process. Among four scenarios for Korean unification, war and North Korea’s collapse scenarios are not in the US national interests. It is evident that another war on the peninsula will totally destroy what South Korea has achieved with US security guarantee and economic assistance. North Korea’s sudden collapse and its absorption by South Korea also adversely affect US national interests because a rapid reunification of Korea will disrupt the regional balance of power. The multilateral security structure does not exist in the region to cushion the shock stemming from a precipitously unified Korea. The lack of a multilateral structure means that the US-ROK bilateral alliance system needs to play the role as a necessary transitional arrangement to promote regional stability. It remains unanswered whether other great powers in the region can accommodate the bilateral arrangement in the post-unification phase. The Unites States can use the Beijing multilateral conference as an opportunity to appraise the intentions of other great powers and to promote the institutionalization of a multilateral security forum for the future of reunified Korea.

4 The North Korea’s collapse scenario is not in the economic interests of the United States. The German unification model cannot be applied to the case of Korea because the South Korean economy is not as robust as that of West Germany as demonstrated by the financial crisis of 1997. A rapid Korean reunification will become a great financial burden for both South Korea and the United States. In terms of democratic institutionalization and consolidation, South Korea is still fragile and vulnerable. Internal political stability can be wrecked by nationalistic sentiments which strengthen the sense of uncertainty on the part of great powers toward a unified Korea. For the reasons listed above, a rapid Korean unification with sudden North Korea’s collapse is not in the US national interests. The only remaining option for the United States is to promote gradual Korean unification by peaceful and democratic means between the two Koreas. The two Korean can consider and accommodate the interests of each of great powers in the gradual and moderated process of reunification, thus greatly reducing the possibility of great powers’ exercising veto power against reunification. Following the German model, the United States may suggest the “one- plus-four” formula to guarantee Korea’s territorial integrity and economic viability. The American unipolar structure of the international system will give credence to the US initiative on Korean reunification. The United States can incorporate both security and economic dimensions into the multilateral formula. The United States can take the initiative to form a regional or global economic consortium to assist reunified Korea’s economic reconstruction. Despite the fact that gradual and peaceful Korean reunification is the most preferred option for the United States, other scenarios cannot be excluded. Negative impacts of unexpected contingencies can be alleviated and overcome only by the continuation of US-ROK alliance and US military presence in South Korea. The tumultuous reunification process makes it necessary to preserve the US-ROK alliance. Continued presence of US forces on the peninsula will contribute to the peace and stability in a rapid unification process by reducing uncertainties of the process and anxieties of other great powers. The North Korean nuclear issue prevents the United States and South Korea from starting a genuine dialogue for the future role of US-ROK alliance and the redefinition of the role of US forces for reunified Korea. It is necessary for the United States to take advantage of the Beijing multilateral forum to identify a variety of issues arising from the Korean reunification process and to devise specific policies for the realization of peaceful Korean reunification.

China’s National Interests and its Role in the Unification Process

5 The United States and China have the more important roles to play in the Korean unification process than Japan and Russia because they intervened in the Korean War and became the signatories of the 1953 Armistice Agreement. One of the most important reasons for Chinese intervention in the war was that China cannot tolerate sharing its border with US forces stationed in Korea. The intervention can be construed as Chinese attempt to save a buffer state to counterbalance American influence in East Asia. Despite the withdrawal of Chinese forces from North Korea in 1958 and the tumultuous relations between the two countries during the Cultural Revolution, China came to the aid of North Korea to buttress the buffer state whenever China considered it in its national interests. The occurrence of another Korean War would disrupt China’s four modernization programs. China needs a peaceful international environment for economic developmental programs. The experiences of the Korean War make China very sensitive to the affairs on the Korean peninsula. China purses what Arnold Wolfers calls a “milieu goal” to create and maintain the peaceful regional security environment around the Korean peninsula. Thus the possibility that China may support the North Korean attempt to attack South Korea in the near future is very low. This means that the war scenario is not in the China’s national interests. With the demise of the former Soviet Union, North Korea lost its traditional allies which provided security guarantee and economic assistance. China has become the greatest donor country for North Korea in terms of food and oil. Continued Chinese economic assistance to North Korea signifies its determination to save the North Korean buffer state in the post-Cold War period. China is prepared to do what is required to prevent a sudden North Korean collapse because the North Korea’s collapse scenario is not in its national interests. A huge flow of refugees into China will occur with the collapse of North Korea. It is less costly for China to feed North Koreans through food aid than to give humanitarian aid to those in refugee camps in Manchuria. North Korea’s collapse will pose a dilemma to China’s internal politics. China will be faced with the question of whether China should militarily intervene to rescue the North Korean state. China may recognize the collapse of the Kim Jong Il regime. Yet it cannot permit the North Korean state to be absorbed into the South. China’s military intervention intends to anoint “the Great Leader III” with Chinese blessings who will not pursue foreign policies against China’s national interests. Chinese intervention is more likely when a specific security arrangement for the post-unification Korea is not made in advance. China cannot allow US forces to deploy along the long Manchurian borders. The decision to intervene may spark an internal political debate among Chinese

6 leaders as was the case with the decision to intervene in the Korean War. To prevent the internal debate from erupting into a power struggle in the Chinese Communist Party, Chinese leaders prefer a gradual unification process by peaceful and democratic means between the two Koreas. China’s pursuit of the milieu goal is not limited to the security realm. A rapid collapse of North Korea would be economically costly for South Korea and other great powers to assist the reconstruction process of reunified Korea. The concentration of capital investments on reunified Korea will adversely affect the Chinese economic developmental plans. For these security and economic reasons, China makes great efforts to avoid the collapse scenario. What China expects from North Korea is that reformist leaders pursue economic reforms and open diplomacy to escape diplomatic isolation and economic stagnation. It will be desirable for Chairman Kim Jong Il to take the lead in reform and openness of North Korea. Yet Chairman Kim’s maneuvering room is greatly limited because opening North Korean society will threaten the regime based on the Juche ideology. Rather than pursuing reformist policies, Chairman Kim seeks to develop and possess nuclear weapons to secure regime survival. The nuclear program accelerates North Korea’s international diplomatic isolation and makes it difficult to receive foreign aids and investments from international financial institutions which is necessary to rebuild defunct economy. North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons poses a dilemma to China. A nuclear North Korea will be helpful for regime survival by giving North Korea nuclear deterrent against the US and South Korea. Yet North Korea’s policy is in violation of international non-proliferation norms and treaties. Mounting international pressure will destabilize the security environment on the Korean peninsula. The heightened tensions will adversely affect China’s pursuit of a milieu goal necessary for economic development. If the situations further aggravate, China may be faced with the least desirable choice on the peninsula. The unexpected development arising from the escalation of nuclear confrontation between North Korea and the United States will be in opposite directions of Chinese expectations. In the past nuclear crisis of 1993-94 China did not veto the UN resolution urging North Korea to abide by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Yet China made clear its policy to oppose the sanctions against North Korea. At the same time China warned North Korea that despite its opposition to sanctions China might not be able to exercise a veto power against a UN sanction resolution if international opinion on sanctions is prevailing. China’s diplomatic moves were catalytic in defusing the first nuclear crisis.

7 China assumes the same intermediary role in the second nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. North Korea’s acquiescence to the multilateral format was due to China’s prodding. North Korea was persistent in demanding the bilateral talks with the United States. In the face of strong US opposition to North Korea’s demand, China weighed in to persuade North Korea to join the trilateral talks in Beijing. It is reported that China cut an oil supply to North Korea for three days on the pretext of technical reasons. This means that China has the clout to influence North Korean behavior despite China’s official statement that its influence on the North is very limited. China needs to capitalize on the multilateral conference to go far beyond the forum for the resolution of the nuclear issue. South Korea and Japan should be allowed to participate in the conference. Russia is also permitted to join the conference if she wants to participate. The emergence of a genuine multilateral forum in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue will contribute to the eventual institutionalization of a regional security arrangement to deal with the peaceful Korean reunification process. The multilateral format in which four powers participate will give them a sense of responsibility in guaranteeing unified Korea’s security and in promoting regular consultations and policy coordination among them. The multilateral conference on the North Korean nuclear issue in Beijing provides China with an excellent opportunity to play a constructive role in the process of Korean reunification.

The Interests of Japan and Russia and their Roles The status quo on the Korean peninsula with continued division of the country is the scenario Japan considers in its best national interests. North Korea’s developments of nuclear weapons and Nodong medium-range missiles constitute a direct threat to Japan’s security. The test-firing of Nodong and Taepodong missiles aroused Japanese concerns about its security which led to the passage of a series of war preparation laws in June 2003. This means that the status quo with North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons and missiles does not serve Japan’s national interests as it has done since the end of the Korean War. A sudden collapse of North Korea is not in Japan’s national interests. A huge flow of refugees on boat from North Korea would be a humanitarian disaster to Japan as it experienced at the end of the Vietnam War. And Japan’s financial burdens for reunified Korea’s economic reconstruction would be much greater than those during the financial crisis of South Korea in 1997. Despite the fact that the result of Korean reunification is critical to the future of Japan, Japan is unlikely to take the initiative in the process of peaceful Korean unification. The

8 reactive and adaptive patterns of Japan’s Korea policy are in the historical tradition of Japanese foreign policy after World War II. Japan will bandwagon with US policies toward Korea and seek to realize its national interests under close cooperation with the United States and South Korea. Since the creation of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group(TCOG) as part of the Perry process in 1999 Japan pursues and coordinates its Korea policies through this trilateral forum. The forum will be a conduit through which Japan contributes to peaceful Korean reunification. When the trilateral conference in Beijing on the North Korean nuclear issue is expanded to allow Japanese participation, Japan may play a constructive role for Korean reunification through the multilateral forum. Japan has both positive and negative means in hand for promoting the peaceful Korean unification process. Japan may provide reparations for colonial rule to North Korea to boost its defunct economy. North Korea can escape isolation by the diplomatic normalization with Japan. These measures will contribute to the stabilization of the peninsula, thus paving the way for a gradual and peaceful Korean unification. Japan also has negative means such as the curtailment of money transfer from Koreans in Japan and the refusal of North Korean ships to visit Japanese ports. These pressures from Japan will aggravate their relations. Japan is not expected to take the lead in promoting or delaying peaceful Korean reunification. Japan will be reactive and circumspect by carefully observing strategic circumstances and pursuing its interests through opportunistic policies. The process of peaceful Korean unification will have direct impact on the future configurations of the international structure in the East Asian region which will constrain Japan’s relations with other great powers. Continued US-ROK alliance and US military presence in the post-unification phase will give Japan reassurance that the post-unification regional structure will not adversely affect Japan’s national interests. The departure of American forces from Japan will produce undesirable pressure for the withdrawal of US forces from Japan as well. To avoid this ripple effects Japan needs to actively participate in the policy coordination process on the status of US forces in the region with the United States and South Korea. The multilateral conference in Beijing will be a test case to see if Japan is ready to play a constructive role in the process of peaceful Korean reunification. The former Soviet Union’s influence on North Korea began to decrease at the end of the Gorbachev era when Soviet diplomatic relations with South Korea was normalized. The loss of a longtime ally prompted North Korea to embark on nuclear weapons programs. After the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia cannot play an independent role

9 in the management of the affairs on the Korean peninsula. President Vladimir Putin seeks to reestablish constructive relations with North Korea and to regain its influence on North Korea through the summit meetings in 2000 and 2001. Putin’s energetic and pragmatic leadership will have a positive impact on the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. Russia has been promoting the “two plus four” formula since the era of the former Soviet Union. Russian participation in the Beijing multilateral conference will help other great powers to hear specific ideas on a new multilateral security arrangement to deal with the peaceful Korean unification process.

Conclusions With the revelation of North Korean nuclear weapons programs continuation of the status quo on the Korean peninsula as it existed since the end of the Korean War is no longer feasible. Yet the rapid dismantlement of the current structure could entail terrible upheavals whose impacts would be a world-wide as was the case with the Korean War. Thus four great powers prefer a gradual and peaceful Korean unification. Despite its announced commitment to peaceful unification they are hesitant to take a bold initiative in rapidly changing the status quo or to replace it with a new security arrangement when they are not confident that the new formula can guarantee peace on the peninsula and stability in the region. Hostilities among great powers in the region greatly subsided with the end of the Cold War. The security environment constitutes a sharp contrast to that just before the outbreak of the Korean War when there existed antagonistic interactions between two diametrically opposed blocs. The strengthening of harmonious relationships among four great powers would greatly contribute to devising a creative formula for peaceful Korean reunification. The North Korean nuclear crisis and the multilateral conference in Beijing become a critical moment to see if four great powers play a constructive role in the unification process.