Book Review: Rights: Sociological Perspectives

Book Review: Rights: Sociological Perspectives, Lydia Morris (Ed.) Routledge. 2006. 304 pages. ISBN: 9780415355214 (hbk). ISBN-10: 0415355222 (pbk).

Published inDSP (The Discourse of Sociological Practice) Vol 8, Issue 1, pp. 99-105. Spring 2007. Reviewed by Sue McPherson.

Chapter authors are Ted Benton, Robin Blackburn, Joan Busfield, Eamonn Carrabine, Diane Elson, Miriam Glucksmann, Paul Iganski, Lydia Morris, Ken Plummer, Carlo Ruzza, Colin Samson, Damien Short, and Rob Stones.

This book covers a broad spectrum of rights issues, both practical and theoretical. Divided into four parts, each part consists of three chapters which examine the topic of rights from a sociological perspective. Lydia Morris, editor of Rights, introduces readers to the book’s main themes, questioning whether there is or can be a foundation for either a theory of rights or the social processes that accruing rights involves, and whether the concept of ‘universal human rights’ can be actualised. Drawing on historical perspectives on the subjects of rights and difference, she leaves readers with the thought of considering future possibilities. Each in their own way, in the chapters that follow, scholars in key areas of sociology advance their own perspectives on rights. First, I shall briefly mention each, then focus on points of contention or particular interest.

In the first chapter, in Part I, Political economy and rights, Ted Benton considers the limitations of the liberal response in dealing with structural inequalities, in effect, the expectations and deliverance of rights, and the tensions of progression in society, including environmental concerns. Rather than having to have rights enforced, he concludes, working together respectfully towards alternative solutions might be a more just and compatible approach. Speaking of pensions and an ageing society, Robin Blackburn explores the history of pensions and class, viewing the continuity of generations as a resource as well as an inevitable shared liability, and seeing an imposed shared levy as a possible solution if co-operation and compromise fail. In the third chapter, Miriam Glucksmann explores rights within the context of the social organisation of care, looking at such concepts as ‘rights and duty,’ reciprocity, the idea of ‘women’s work,’ and the ethics of care. Recognising that rights are shaped according to socio-economic, political and cultural circumstances of the time, Glucksmann suggests redefining citizenship to include care, and directing greater scrutiny towards how systems of care are governed.

Part II of the book, Status, norms and institutions, begins with Chapter 4, by Lydia Morris, expressing concern over the lack of a framework with which to address contemporary issues of rights. She sees examining work and welfare rights as one possible means of providing a foundation for further analysis of the topic of social rights in general, commenting on how both formal and informal status differences influence entitlement. Diane Elson follows, focusing on women’s human rights, suggesting that a poststructuralist perspective would probably be best, with a commitment to “continual contestation and disruption” (p 109), increasing possibilities for some, though at the risk of intensifying insecurity for others. She also refers to the moral aspects of human rights as she sees them, noting that they address the limitations of sympathy with others as well as stemming from sympathy, and that they address our “moral frailty as well as our bodily frailty” (p. 96). Carlo Ruzza, in the final chapter of this section, focuses on anti-racism and ethnic discrimination within the European Union, a relatively new policy area for human rights issues. Along with a commitment to European integration 2 and racism advocacy, the endeavour is to have anti-racist EU human rights gain greater political legitimacy transnationally.

Starting off Part III, Meaning, interpretation and rights, in Chapter 7 Rob Stones reveals his framework consisting of social theory and political philosophy that he believes can address the socio- economic-political issues of rights together with the moral aspects. He uses examples of gay sexuality, sati (widow-burning) and Thai sex workers to illustrate dilemmas of individual autonomy, moral positions, and conflicting choices. Ken Plummer follows with a chapter on lesbian and gay sexual rights. Gay rights have come a long way, as he explains, involving many other aspects of rights, including women’s rights and the right for gay or lesbian couples to be a family. Now that gay culture is visible and acceptable in this part of the world, the emphasis, he says, needs to be in other countries throughout the world. Last in this section are Colin Samson and Damien Short, writing in Chapter 9 about indigenous peoples in Europe, Canada, and many other parts of the world. Rights, they say, are “products of social and political creation and manipulation” (p. 179). Indigenous rights are more than just being about citizenship and land, they argue. Indigenous struggles are often about maintaining traditional culture. Thus, an understanding of how their lives and land came to be subjected to the authority of the state is crucial, if a fair solution is to be found.

Part IV, The clash of rights, begins with Eamonn Carabine writing from the perspective of criminology. His purpose in Chapter 10 is to debunk the “pretensions of equality before the law,” through pointing out structural inequalities and social differences (pp. 191-92). He explains further, that “the assumption of sameness before the law masks the determining contexts of already existing social inequalities, social injustice and political marginalisation” (p. 204). As well as due process of the law, what is needed, he suggests, are mutual respect and an ethics of responsibility. In Chapter 11, Joan Busfield focuses on human rights in relation to those with severe mental disorder. Such individuals may first of all have suffered adverse circumstances in their lives, due to social or biological causes; following on from that, they may then have been further ill-treated, likely due to the stigma of their illness but also, inevitably, through the denial of their human rights. To some extent, however, Busfield acknowledges in her conclusion, the rights of those with severe disorders have improved. The final chapter, by Paul Iganski, addresses the right to freedom of expression and the conflict this can lead to. The right to speak, even to offend, is one of the freedoms of our society, but it is the repercussions of speaking out in such a manner that can cause damage, with the potential of influencing people’s perceptions of historical truths such as the Holocaust, or in other instances leading to physical and emotional harm. Through legislation and social interventions, however, the government is attempting to achieve a balance between preventing acts of racial and religious hatred and maintaining civil freedoms, while promoting norms about personal conduct in civil society.

In the conclusion to the book, Lydia Morris again expresses the appeal to her of acquiring some form of universal human rights, a basis for cohesion, she suggests, “in the face of fragmentation, diversity and loss of collective value frames” (p.240). Seeing a set of principles grounded in common humanity as a possible solution, the question then is the means by which a rights issue can gain support, become recognised as a rights issue, and be incorporated into the institutional structure. Mentioning contributions made in each chapter, Morris acknowledges what they have to offer. The nature of rights is multifaceted, she concludes, summarising her own perspective on rights and what she has attempted to convey. 3

This book offers a great deal to anyone interested in current approaches to human rights and related aspects. The collection covers a wide variety of perspectives, providing a tremendous amount of information on many topics, on the theoretical as well as experiential – both present-day and historical – in the quest for rights. I’m not sure, however, that attempting to reify a framework of rights in a universal model would be in the best interests of society.

I would have liked other kinds of rights included which may have been seen as important to a minority of readers, perhaps. As I read it I realised there was a gap in the content, and I see it as one that is entirely relevant in today’s world, even though others might not. The subject is heterosexuality, and while commenting on the book further, following, I have included aspects of this subject where relevant.

Paul Iganski addresses the conflict between the right to speak and freedom from racial discrimination and victimisation. I wonder about the dynamics between the ‘right to offend’ and the ‘right to be free from victimisation.’ Surely we can’t expect to go through life not being victimised at all. Is leading people to expect a life free from victimisation a reasonable course of action? There seems to be more of an expectation now that bad things shouldn’t happen and that life should be fair, and that if it isn’t, there is something wrong with this world that shouldn’t be happening. I am not attempting to diminish the fact that people may feel offended, or have been hurt in atrocious ways, just that an expectation of zero-tolerance or zero-expectation isn’t feasible. Iganski mentions that physical and emotional harm are possible consequences of victimisation, but neglected to add that economic forms of discrimination and victimisation can also happen. It is problematic that the people most likely to obtain their rights are those with access to resources. I would have liked to see an analysis that included the concept of power, and the importance of power in gaining one’s rights.

Seeing problems of consumer demand being an obstacle to social harmony, Ted Benton expresses the belief that the problems go deeper than economics. Nevertheless, he appears to lean towards maintaining existing cultural norms and current moral sentiments rather than investigate more deeply differences and inequalities in society. Continuing on, Robin Blackburn declares that age-related compulsory retirement should end, and in one sense the right to keep working is a human right. But the abolition of mandatory retirement policies would favour those already occupying the best careers, and at the expense of others lower down on the career ladder – an example of a ‘clash of rights,’ one could say, even if no overt objection is made in specific circumstances. The world seems to be operating under a misconception, that the supply of great jobs is endless, and that all who are worthy will have them. Another approach to ageing and retirement, from many years ago, was Erik Erikson’s (Erikson, Erikson, and Kivnick, 1986), whose life cycle approach had allowed for a stage of retirement and growing into old age, in some ways an old-fashioned idea as people nowadays can have many years ahead of them after age 65. Nevertheless, hanging on to well-paying careers does nothing to help either the economy or the next generation.

At present, cultural norms suggest that work can and perhaps should continue longer, providing further gains for those already advantaged. Ignoring others’ circumstances under the guise of claiming one’s right, in any particular instance, shouldn’t be thought of as simply one’s right. The terms poverty and idleness are often equated with one another, even though the connection is spurious. The poor may be idle due to lack of resources. The ‘idle,’ often meant to refer to the unemployed, I think, stand a good chance of becoming poor, and thus, idle. Seeing these terms – poverty and idleness – as a pair is demeaning towards many people, though it might be simply a turn of phrase, no harm intended. Again, 4 focusing on the economics of rights, this time related to the idea of ‘care,’ and in particular, care of the elderly, an issue of increasing concern in society, Glucksmann suggests a framework which would include both formal aspects of care and those rooted in family and social relations, raising difficult questions about entitlement and the right to care, which might best be situated within a framework of ‘power.’

While Lydia Morris argues in Chapter 4 that citizens, immigrants and asylum seekers may encounter difficulties in their struggle for rights, she acknowledges that in general, the terrain of rights is a shifting one, whereby different factions attempt to negotiate the “profile of rights.” For D. Flynn, as stated in the conclusion to that chapter, rights are reserved mainly for the privileged, those who had already received greater opportunities for achievement in their lives (p. 93). I don’t believe the dynamic nature of rights should be reined in any more than necessary. However, career advancement, and welfare, when seen as rights, need to be associated with a profile that can be accepted not only by the privileged but also by those who are underprivileged.

The liberal view of choice seems to take priority in Rob Stones’s chapter, especially in his example of Thai sex workers. Like the widows who endured immolation on their husbands’ funeral pyres, these sex workers are women without husbands, who have to find some way to survive. Stones’s interpretation neglects other more negative aspects of such sexual cultures such as class differences among women, social class mobility, and lastly, men’s right of access to women, sexually. If there is any right that is a given, it would have to be this one. These are other aspects of the experience of sex work in general that need to be examined. Making this a matter of morality regarding duty to family and elders versus autonomy and independence of mind and body is misleading. What of women who are lured away from home by the promise of a fulfilling and respectful future? Is there then really a choice?

It would be impossible to address all of the main human rights concerns, though I wonder about this gap in this collection, on the topic of sex and sexuality. Although the matter of gay rights were raised more than once in the book, and in fact were the main topic in one chapter, the subject of heterosexuality, in terms of rights and human rights, received scarcely a mention. In one chapter compulsory heterosexuality was briefly referred to, in the sense that women not permitted to be lesbians was a form of abuse, but this was seen as a gender problem, of the domination of women by men (Elson: 105). This topic relates in some ways to the chapter using the example of Thai sex workers and the question of choice, but it was not dealt with adequately. A liberal approach simply cannot get at all the issues.

These matters of sex and sexuality and of compulsory heterosexuality certainly need to be addressed, especially since the numbers of single, divorced and widowed women all seem to be increasing. This is not to imply that couples and sexuality is not an important research topic but that has received more attention, until now, at least. And sexual rights, within marriage, would be different than among those without a partner. There is little information, for instance, for women who become single again after many years of marriage. Whether such women have sexual rights, and what these rights might be, is a topic that has not been thoroughly investigated. In this book this has scarcely been mentioned at all. Although Rob Stones speaks of choice, his interpretation of the lives of Thai sex workers is one-sided, and Ken Plummer’s chapter is limited to the rights gained by gays and lesbians. Diane Elson refers to ‘compulsory heterosexuality,’ a term originally used by feminist Adrienne Rich, also the beginning part of the title of her essay, to which I turn now. 5

In the essay’s foreword, written later, in 1983, Rich explained her reason for writing it – in part because she believed the experience of heterosexual women was distorted, as well as because she believed that lesbian existence at that time was excluded from feminist literature. (Rich, 1908: 203). Writing on heterosexual matters, she made the following claim:

But whatever its origins, when we look hard and clearly at the extent and elaboration of measures designed to keep women within a male sexual purlieu, it becomes an inescapable question whether the issues feminists have to address is not simple “gender inequality” nor the domination of culture by males nor mere “taboos against homosexuality,” but the enforcement of heterosexuality for women as a means of assuring male right of physical, economic, and emotional access (Rich, 1980: 216).

That this is a problem of male power exclusively, however, may be an outdated perception, based on the economic and gendered relations of that time, when many women were lacking in power in their marriages and in the workplace. It has been noted that women themselves will align themselves with men, in fact, collude with them in order to achieve their goals. But to what extent, and at whose expense. Now that many women are in positions of power, there is still pressure to conform to the requirements of heterosexual relations.

The fact is that the workplace, among other social institutions, is a place where women have learned to accept male violation of their psychic and physical boundaries as the price of survival (Rich, 1980: 211).

Women of today are not as likely to see sex as a violation – or does Rich have a point? Are women in denial about the psychic and physical aspects of their sexuality? Is there a women’s sexuality, complementary to men’s but not the same as theirs, and not based on men’s social, psychological, and physical needs? Do women have a right to consider for themselves what their sexuality means to them, or are they only permitted to do so as long as it doesn’t interfere with men’s rights? There are many ways that people have of working out their relations – sexual and marital and so on – but to impose on any person a sexual cultural norm that goes against their values would seem to be a violation of their rights as sexual human beings, or simply as human beings. In Chapter 4, Lydia Morris referred to the plight of single mothers, and while it should be obvious that sex or sexuality has something to do with their situation, she focuses mainly on their class position (p. 84). There seems to be a reluctance in this country to do anything about this situation, other than ensure young women have access to contraception, abortion, and the morning-after pill. If such women are being pressured into ‘giving something back,’ especially when their chances for having a career could be non-existent, then surely this is an issue that needs to be addressed.

In her chapter, Joan Busfield has dealt with the rights of those with severe mental disorder, such as the right to treatment and proper care and, especially for women, protection from sexual violence and rape. Since women who are suffering from severe mental disorder are unable to give consent appropriately, we can ask whether there are circumstances in which mutual sexual relations would be permissible and acceptable – or would it always be thought of as sexual exploitation. Married women with Alzheimer’s disease could well have times when their cognitive impairment is not a great problem, but for men and women without a partner, the idea of consenting to sexual relations might be a thorny issue. In these circumstances, an individual approach to the problem might lead to the best solution. 6

Eamonn Carrabine’s chapter raises important questions about the prison system and who has endured more suffering, the victims of crime or the criminals, and which of these, if either side at all, deserves to suffer. Anyone who has been victimised unlawfully is going to feel unhappy about that, and perhaps angry, and dismissing their feelings and refusing to acknowledge their losses, thinking instead only about those who have been caught by the law, isn’t going to be seen as fair by most people. Many prisoners must indeed live grim lives, but I think that it would help in any such writing on the subject if harms they have done are acknowledged, or at least some recognition shown that there is another side to it.

But of course there are always more changes that could be made. This is one reason why it makes more sense not to attempt to develop a framework of rights based on universal values – better to leave the matter open, making changes as society changes, or as new considerations arise. For sociologists, sociology itself, both traditional and feminist, can provide the basis for what is needed, with other input as needed.

I have a few final thoughts on the book itself. I believe that the language of terms and conditions of rights needs to be managed carefully in order to minimise misunderstandings. I question the value of having each section introduced by the book’s editor, Lydia Morris, as well as having a fairly lengthy introduction at the start of the book by the same person. The chapters with their individual authors are for readers to interpret and reflect upon, the additional element of a lead-in to each section being unnecessary and a drawback, if that is the purpose. If it is meant to provide direction to students then it might be appropriate, though it could undermine the purpose of academic thought, to explain how chapters should be read. People have the right to form their own opinions and beliefs without being pressured unnecessarily by others. Other than that (and the gap in the subject matter), clearly there is much useful and fascinating information in this book, far more than I could mention here.

References

Erikson, Erik H., Erikson, Joan M., and Helen Q. Kivnick (1986). Vital Involvement in Old Age. NY; London: W. W. Norton & Co. Rich, Adrienne (1980). Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, pp. 203-224, Adrienne Rich’s Poetry and Prose. Barbara Charlesworth Gelpi and Albert Gelph (Eds.) London, NY: W. W. Norton. 1975 and 1993.

About the authors: the contributors to Rights are, or have been, members of the faculty in the Department of Sociology, University of Essex, UK.

Table of Contents: Introduction Section 1. Political Economy and Rights 1. Do We Need Rights? If So, What Sort? 2. Return of the Proletariat? Pension Rights and Pension Finance in the Ageing Society 3. Developing an Economic Sociology of Care and Rights Section 2. Status, Norms and Institutions 4. Social Rights, trans- national Rights and Civic Stratification 5. ‘Women’s Rights are Human Rights’: Campaigns and Concepts 6. Human Rights, Anti-Racism and EU Advocacy Coalitions Section 3. Meaning, Interpretation and Rights 7. Rights, Social Theory and Political Philosophy: A Framework for Case Study Research 8. Rights Work: Constructing Lesbian, Gay and Sexual Rights in Late Modern Times 9. The Sociology of Indigenous Peoples' Rights Section 4. The Clash of Rights 10. Punishment, Rights and Justice 11. Mental Disorder and Human Rights 12. Free to Speak, Free to Hate? Conclusion 7

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