Republic of Azerbaijan

E1445 REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN

Avian Influenza (AI) Project

Environmental Management Plan

Baku, July 14, 2006

1 Table of Contents

Abbreviations

Introduction and Summary

I. Global, regional and national sector issues

(a) Introduction (b) Socioeconomic Context (c) Key Issues (d) The regional dimension (e) The national dimension

II. Project Development Objective and Project Components

III. Policy context

(a) IDA/IBRD Safeguards Policy (b) Azerbaijan Legislation (c) WHO and FAO/OIE Guidelines

IV. Project Region

V. Environmental Impacts and Mitigation Measures by Component

VI. Monitoring

VII. Institutional Arrangements and Budget

VIII. Public Consultation Arrangements

Annex 1: FAO/OIE AI Strategy Annex 2: WHO AI Strategy Annex 3: Project summary Annex 4: Wild birds in Azerbaijan and migration map Annex 5: Biocontainment Level Requirements Annex 6: International Best Practice in Safety of Research Laboratories Annex 7 - A: Mitigation Plan for Carcass and Waste Material Disposal by Burial Annex 7 – B: Mitigation Plan - Carcass Disposal by Incineration in Pits Annex 8 - A: Mitigation Plan for Laboratory Safety and Waste Management Annex 8 - B: Monitoring Plan for Carcass and Waste Material Disposal by Burial Annex 9 - A: Monitoring Plan- Disposal of Poultry by Incineration in Pits Annex 9 - B: Monitoring Plan for Laboratory Safety and Waste Management Monitoring Annex 10: Report on Dissemination and Public Consultation of EMP

2 ABBREVIATIONS

AI Avian Influenza

AI PIU Avian Influenza Project Implementation Unit

ADCP Agricultural Development and Credit Project

AZIVRS Azerbaijan Institute for Veterinary Research and Studies

BSL Bio-Safety Level

EA Environmental Assessment

EIA Environmental Impact Assessment

EMP Environmental Management Plan

FAO UN Food and Agricultural Organization

GPAI Global Program on Avian Influenza

HPAI Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IDA International Development Agency

MENR Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources

MOA Ministry of Agriculture

OIE UN World Organization for Animal Health

PCRs Polymerase Chain Reaction Devices

PPE Personal Protection Equipment

SAAC State Agency for Agricultural Credit

SVS State Veterinary Services

TF Trust Fund

WB World Bank

WHO World Health Organization

3 Introduction and Summary

The World Bank requires environmental assessment (EA) of projects proposed for Bank financing to help ensure that they are environmentally sound and sustainable, and thus improve decision making (OP 4.01, January 1999). The Bank favors preventive measures over mitigatory or compensatory measures, whenever feasible.

The Azerbaijan Avian Influenza (AI) Project has been assigned World Bank environmental category B, since it involves moderate environmental impacts that can be managed during implementation of the project. Although project activities supporting AI prevention, preparedness and planning, and response and containment are not expected to generate significant adverse environmental effects, they do present a moderate environmental risk from inadvertent spread of the AI virus and waste management. Overall the AI prevention and response-focused activities are expected to have a positive environmental impact, as the investments in facilities, equipment, and training for veterinary and public health service staff and laboratories will improve the effectiveness and safety over existing avian influenza handling and testing procedures by meeting international standards established by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). This would be reinforced by the mainstreaming of environmental safeguards into protocols and procedures for the culling and disposal of animals during AI outbreaks.

This environmental management plan addresses the moderate adverse environmental effects of the Veterinary and Human Health Components. For the Veterinary Services component, the EMP addresses zoonotic disease containment and waste management as pertain to special waste, emissions and materials at laboratories, and training for veterinary services workers, to include procedures for safe handling of AI materials; safe culling of infected and at-risk poultry and disposal of carcasses. For the Human Health component, the EMP focuses on equipment, refurbishing and training for reference and regional diagnostic laboratories to include key environmental issues in zoonotic disease containment and waste management. The EMP provides mitigation plans and monitoring plans to ensure appropriate attention to environmental issues, and tracking progress or problems in their management.

I. Global, regional and national sector issues

(a) Introduction

1. The continuing outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), which begun in late 2003 in several Southeast Asian countries and have occurred more recently in Europe, have been disastrous to the poultry industry in the two regions and have raised serious global public health concerns. As of March 2006, more than 140 million domestic poultry had either died or been destroyed and over 174 people had contracted the infection (of which 94 have died). Recent increases in the number of known cases of avian influenza (AI) transmission have raised concerns over the potential emergence of a pandemic, which could have devastating effects on human health and livelihoods.

2. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that there are many uncertainties about whether and when a pandemic might occur, as well as about its potential impact. Humans are not very susceptible to the disease, but if infected with the Asian H5N1 strain, they can exhibit a high

4 case fatality rate. The geographical spread of HPAI, the human dimension, and the potential enormous social and economic impact are unprecedented. Economic losses to the Asian poultry sector alone are estimated to date at around $10 billion. Despite control measures the disease continues to spread, causing further economic losses and threatening the livelihood of hundreds of millions of livestock farmers, jeopardizing smallholder entrepreneurship and commercial poultry production, and seriously impeding regional and international trade, and market opportunities. The rural poor, who rely for a larger share of their income on poultry, have been particularly hard hit with income losses.

3. It is impossible to anticipate when the next influenza pandemic may occur or how severe its consequences may be. On average, three pandemics per century have been documented since the 16th century, occurring at intervals of 10-50 years. In the 20th century, pandemics occurred in 1918, 1957 and 1968. The pandemic of 1918 is estimated to have killed almost 50 million people in eighteen months, with peak mortality rates occurring in people aged 20-45 years. The pandemics of 1957 and 1968 were milder, but many countries nevertheless experienced major strains on health care resources. If a major pandemic were to appear again, similar to the one in 1918, even with modern advances in medicine, an unparalleled toll of illness and death could result. Air travel might hasten the spread of a new virus, and decrease the time available for preparing interventions. Countries’ health care systems could be rapidly overwhelmed, economies strained, and social order disrupted. Through interventions as proposed in this Project, and in collaboration with other national and international partners, it should be possible to minimize a pandemic’s consequences in Azerbaijan through advance preparation to meet the challenge.

(b) Socioeconomic Context

4. The recent epidemics or outbreaks of animal origin (e.g. SARS, avian influenza, Lassa virus, Ebola virus, Marburg virus, Nipah virus, West Nile virus) have demonstrated the potential and real global impact of zoonotic diseases on the health and well-being of the public, as well as the enormous humanitarian, socio-economic, and trade damage that this group of diseases can cause to both developed and developing countries. They have also underscored the important role of official veterinary and public health services in disease prevention and control, as well as the importance of strengthening the capacity of these services in compliance with the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) international standards (e.g. the local, regional, and global quarantine powers under the International Health Regulations; and the international standards, guidelines and recommendations under the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code). The epidemics have also demonstrated that there is an urgent need for a global response to improve the local and regional preparedness and rapid response capacity to the threat from zoonotic disease.

5. Influenza is a zoonotic disease (animal to human transmission) of international importance because of the ability of the virus that causes the disease to mutate for a potential wide-scale human-to-human transmission. Outbreaks of influenza in humans occur annually, as a result of antigenic drift in the Influence A virus with a severity which varies from year to year, but is typically moderate to mild. Nonetheless, these outbreaks occur in all countries and exert an impact primarily through morbidity and reduced economic productivity because of illness. In contrast, severe influenza pandemics occur infrequently, as a result of antigenic shift, but have

5 been unprecedented in the number of infections and deaths caused over a short time-period. The worst such event in the 20th Century, the Spanish Flu pandemic of 1918-19, had the highest mortality rate among healthy young people. Less severe pandemics occurred in 1957-58 and 1968-69, but still had high attack rates, high case fatality, and major impact on economic activity. The severity of these influenza pandemics resulted from infection with a sub-type of influenza virus to which humans had not been previously exposed and so had no immunity. Such a new sub-type of influenza (known as H5N1) is currently causing large outbreaks in birds and domestic poultry in East and Central Asia and Europe, creating widespread concern that the risk of a new and potentially severe human pandemic is high1.

6. Addressing economic and social impacts must be an integral part of a comprehensive response. A pandemic would have devastating economic and social consequences, including large-scale loss of livelihoods as well as lives. The potential economic costs of avian influenza are apparent in countries such as Vietnam, where impacts are already evident on the poultry sector, associated input and distribution channels, and the rural poor who rely on poultry for a larger share of their income. Even if a pandemic does not occur, there could be important socioeconomic effects resulting from the response to the perceived risks. Countries confront choices in balancing preparation versus action since both imply economic costs. At least three types of economic costs or impacts should be considered under a human pandemic scenario: (i) effects of sickness and mortality on potential output; (ii) private preventive responses to an epidemic; and (iii) public sector responses.

(c) Key Issues

7. A coordinated global response should involve three types of strategic activities: (i) preventing the occurrence and spread of the disease in domesticated animals, thus lowering the virus load in the environment, (ii) preventing and/or mitigating the effects of an outbreak in humans, and (iii) in the event of a pandemic, helping affected populations cope with its effects. There is a need to formulate a global response based on a common vision for undertaking these three sets of activities. Such a vision should entail immediate measures while ensuring that these measures fit within a coherent longer-term strategy with respect to both animal and human health considerations. Key issues that have been identified include:

 Prevention and control of avian influenza is multi-sectoral in nature. It involves many players, including those in the areas of health, agriculture, environment, economics, finance, and planning among others. At the country level, in particular, an integrated, multi and inter- sectoral response is needed based on shared objectives. Responses must address both the animal health and human health dimensions and also appropriate social measures (quarantines, transport restrictions, mass communication strategies).

 The risk of a human pandemic is real. The H5N1 strain currently affecting several Asian countries has proven highly fatal to humans. The risk that a pandemic virus will emerge

1 Antigenic drift refers to a change in surface proteins of a given strain of influence virus in response to antibodies in human hosts who have been exposed to it. It occurs continually in both type A and B influenza strains, thus the reason to re-engineer the influenza vaccine on a regular basis to prevent seasonal outbreaks or epidemics. Antigenic shift refers to the reassortment of the animal influenza strain with the circulating human strain in the process of moving from an animal to humans. This antigenic shift is more of a concern since when it occurs, it results in pandemics due to generalized susceptibility to infection in humans.

6 depends on opportunities for human exposure and infection, which will persist as long as the H5N1 virus continues to circulate in animals. With the present situation, the potential of the HPAI virus to become transmissible among humans needs to be a serious concern. If the virus adapts itself to human-to-human transmission, lives may be threatened on a large scale.

 Avian Influenza virus is constantly evolving with unpredictable results. The HPAI viruses are of particular concern because they undergo constant genetic change that can have unpredictable results. The constant and rapid evolution of the virus necessitates a global approach to controlling the disease.

 Market conditions have caused HPAI to spread rapidly. The conditions for the emergence and local spread of HPAI have been exacerbated by the intensification and concentration of livestock production in areas of high-density human populations. The danger of international spread of HPAI has increased by the dynamics of regional and international trade and the movement of people. A global approach to avian influenza, therefore, will have relevance to strategic control of other livestock diseases, including zoonoses. Nevertheless, country strategies developed and owned by the governments facing the threat of avian influenza should be the foundation of a global response.

 The geographic coverage of a response should be determined by both immediate and anticipated needs. Asia is today the most affected region, but the disease is currently spreading to other areas of the world at an alarming rate and recent scientific evidence indicates that wild birds play a role in the spread of the virus from one country or region to another. The response should, therefore, combine control measures in countries where the virus has been already detected, with prevention measures in countries at risks (countries neighboring infected countries and/or in migratory bird fly way paths). A minimum level of preparedness is essential in all countries.

 An appropriate balance between short and long-term actions needs to be taken. Immediate action is needed in a number of areas. The immediate to short-term objective is to reduce the risk to humans by preventing further spread of HPAI in those countries that are currently infected. The long-term vision of the strategy is to minimize the global threat and risk of HPAI in domestic poultry and humans, through progressive control and eradication of HPAI. Achieving this goal will diminish the global threat of a human pandemic, stabilize poultry production, enhance a robust regional and international trade in poultry and poultry products, increase human and food safety, and improve the livelihoods of the rural poor.

 Global and regional aspects of the response need to be addressed and coordinated. Actions to secure borders and control international trade/travel in the event of a pandemic, as well as measures to limit the effects of disease transmission by migratory birds, are trans-boundary issues requiring regional and/or international coordination. Global and regional efforts should build on existing mechanisms such as the joint OIE/World Bank initiative for the Prevention and Control of Global Emerging and Re-emerging Diseases of Animal Origin, and the joint Global Framework for Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TADs), a joint FAO/OIE initiative and regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

7 8. The FAO/OIE’s Global Strategy. The long-term vision of the strategy prepared by FAO and OIE in collaboration with WHO is to minimize the global threat and risk of HPAI in humans and domestic poultry, through progressive control and eradication of HPAI, particularly that caused by H5N1 virus, from terrestrial domestic poultry. The global strategy will be implemented over three time frames: immediate to short (1-3 years), short to medium (4-6 years) and medium to long-term (7-10 years). During this period the spread of HPAI, mainly of the H5N1 strain, will have been progressively controlled in domestic poultry of all infected countries, and prevented from affecting those countries not currently infected, but at high risk. The strategy originally prepared to control HPAI in Asia is being revised by FAO and OIE to take into account the current spread on the disease outside Asia. The strategy will be complemented by more detailed country specific HPAI control plans. FAO/OIE have also issued specific recommendations for avian influenza and OIE has recently issued recommendations for each region, in addition to its standards and guidelines provided for the prevention and control of HPAI in animals.

9. The Recommended Strategic Action plan prepared by WHO for Responding to the Avian Influenza Pandemic Threat lays out activities for individual countries, the international community, and WHO to prepare for a pandemic and mitigate its impact. The objectives of the plan correspond to the opportunities and capacities to intervene and are structured in three phases: (i) pre-pandemic – supporting the FAO/OIE’s control strategy; increasing collaboration between animal and health services; strengthening EWS, (ii) emergence of a pandemic – containing or delaying spread at the source - and (iii) pandemic declared and spreading internationally – reducing morbidity, mortality and social disruption; conducting research to guide response measures. WHO has also prepared a global plan and guidelines for pandemic preparedness and is in the process of developing a model country plan that will allow countries to assess their state of preparedness and identify priority needs.

10. The Bank has developed a global facility through a multi-country adjustable program loan (MAP). In parallel, the Bank is discussing with the EU, WHO and FAO/OIE, and bilateral donors the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund (TF) that primarily supports country level activities in conjunction with a smaller and complementary role at the regional and global level.

(d) The regional dimension

11. Cases of the H5N1 strain of avian flu have already occurred in more than 30 countries in the Middle East, Asia, Europe and Africa, including most recently in Azerbaijan, Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Romania, and Turkey. There are also possible cases in Macedonia and Slovenia. The Russian outbreak of HPAI H5N1 has to date affected six administrative regions, beginning in the Ural Mountains and moving west to within 200 km of Moscow. With AI reported in one country in the Balkan Peninsula (Croatia), other countries in the Balkan peninsula and the Caucasus are at risk due to their proximity to two main flyways, the East Africa-West Asia Flyway and the Central Asia Flyway. Both flyways cross areas in North- eastern Europe, where avian influenza in wild and domestic fowl has been diagnosed. From a geographical point of view, the Caucuses and Central Asia represent a vast area in which introduction of AI is likely to occur, and where the sensitivity of the system for early detection of HPAI is low. All EU countries have plans to fight a possible avian flu pandemic. All countries in ECA have or are developing similar plans.

8 (e) The national dimension

12. There have been widespread reports of massive die off of wild birds along the Caspian Sea shore in Azerbaijan. On February 10, 2006, official tests carried out by the World Animal Health Organization (OIE) reference laboratory in Weybridge (UK) on some wild bird samples resulted positive for the H5N1 strain of avian flu. The veterinary department reported to the OIE that the disease has been confirmed in domestic poultry on February 24, 2006. In addition, several animal and human avian flu cases affected areas of eastern Turkey very close to the border with Azerbaijan and other countries in the Caucasus. Since the large majority of domestic birds (around 78 percent) in Azerbaijan are kept in household backyards in close contact with humans, the risk of spreading from domestic birds to humans is high, even though no human cases have officially been reported.

II. Project Development Objective and Project Components

13. The overall objective of the Project is to minimize the threat posed to humans by HPAI infection and other zoonoses in domestic poultry to prepare for the control and response to an influenza pandemic and other infectious diseases. To achieve this objective, the project will support (i) prevention, (ii) preparedness and planning, and (iii) response and containment. Achieving these goals will contribute to diminishing the burden of disease and loss of productivity, limiting the regional spread of HPAI, and enhancing economic and social prospects at the national, regional, and global levels.

14. The Project consists of the following four components:

(i) Veterinary Services (ii) Human Health (iii) Public Awareness (iv) Implementation Support and Monitoring and Evaluation

III. Policy context

(a) IDA/IBRD Safeguards Policy

15. The World Bank requires environmental assessment (EA) of projects proposed for Bank financing to help ensure that they are environmentally sound and sustainable, and thus improve decision making (OP 4.01, January 1999). EA is a process whose breadth, depth, and type of analysis depend on the nature, scale, and potential environmental impact of the proposed project. EA evaluates a project's potential environmental risks and impacts in its area of influence; examines project alternatives; identifies ways of improving project selection, siting, planning, design, and implementation by preventing, minimizing, mitigating, or compensating for adverse environmental impacts and enhancing positive impacts; and includes the process of

9 mitigating and managing adverse environmental impacts throughout project implementation. The Bank favors preventive measures over mitigatory or compensatory measures, whenever feasible.

16. EA takes into account the natural environment (air, water, and land); human health and safety; social aspects (involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples, and cultural property); and transboundary and global environmental aspects. It also takes into account the variations in project and country conditions; the findings of country environmental studies; national environmental action plans; the country's overall policy framework, national legislation, and institutional capabilities related to the environment and social aspects; and obligations of the country, pertaining to project activities, under relevant international environmental treaties and agreements. The Bank does not finance project activities that would contravene such country obligations, as identified during the EA.

17. The Azerbaijan Avian Influenza (AI) Project has been assigned World Bank environmental category B, since it involves moderate environmental impacts that can be managed during implementation of the project. The EA process for the AI project is addressed through this EMP. Key considerations to be taken into account during the EA process include:

 Generic initial screening to determine appropriate environmental assessment;  Compliance with existing environmental regulations in Azerbaijan;  Linkages with social assessment;  Analysis of alternatives;  Public participation and consultation with affected people and organizations; and  Disclosure of information.

(b) Azerbaijan Environmental Legislation and procedures

18. Environmental legislation. Activities carried out under the project will conform to current laws in Azerbaijan and sound environmental principles. Environmental protection in Azerbaijan is governed by the Law on Environment Protection (1999). The Law establishes the main environmental protection principles, and the rights and obligations of the State, public associations and citizens regarding environmental protection. It establishes the requirements for the preparation of environmental impact assessments, environmental quality standards, requirements for permitting the activities that affect the environment, prevention and reduction of environmental pollution, environmental monitoring and control, the role of the public and sanctions imposed on law violators. Other laws governing specific issues such as sanitary- epidemiological welfare, land reform, energy, health, water, forests, cadastre and land use, industrial and domestic wastes, fauna, fish breeding, ecological safety, water supply and wastewater, atmospheric protection and specially protected areas have been adopted since 1992. In addition, a large number (some 75+) of Decisions of the Cabinet of Ministers have been issued to help interpret the body of environmental legislation and related Presidential Degrees and Orders.

19. According to Article 42 of the Law on Environmental protection, the Ministry of Environment (MOE) is the competent authority for reviewing the EIA request and documentation

10 prepared by independent experts hired by the project developer prior to initiation of a new investment project. Other key laws forming the legal basis for EIA are the Law on Ecological Safety (1999) and the Provision on the Process of Environmental Impact Assessment in Azerbaijan (1996). This EMP will be submitted to the head office of the MOE in place of an EIA application for the AI project. In the process of reviewing the EIA application the MOE evaluates the following criteria:

 Whether the proposed project envisions new technologies;  The volumes and complexity of the proposed processes or technologies;  The expected environmental consequences;  Whether the proposed project would create significant changes for the local population; and  Public response to the proposal.

20. Veterinary and emergency regulations. The relevant legislative and policy documents governing veterinary services and AI response include:

 Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on Veterinary Service;  Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on Emergency Situations;  2006 Annual Work Plan of the State Veterinary Agency under the Ministry of Agriculture;  Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on Sanitary Epidemiological Health  Joint Action Plan of the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Internal Affairs to sustain epidemiological and epizootological stability in the Azerbaijan Republic for 2005-2008;  Joint Action Plan of the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources aimed at preventing of the highly pathogenic Avian Influenza in Azerbaijan Republic;  Minutes of the Cabinet of Ministers meeting regarding measures aimed at preventing the spread of the highly pathogenic Avian Influenza to the Azerbaijan Republic;  Action Plan for Prevention and Containment of HPAI adopted by the State Commission on March 04, 2006

21. In addition, the Cabinet of Ministers developed a draft resolution with respect to the “List of Especially Dangerous Animal Diseases Prevented, Diagnosed and Liquidated in the Veterinary Sector through the State Budget Funding” prepared by the State Veterinary Agency under the Ministry of Agriculture in accordance with the Law on Veterinary Service, Articles 14 and 21, which resolution also includes Avian Influenza.

22. The Law on Veterinary Service, Articles 14 and 24, provide for registration of Avian Influenza and veterinary and sanitary measures taken in areas of incidence, including quarantine, monitoring relocation of birds, vaccination, compulsory culling of birds and disposal of bodies, and sanitary works and disinfection.

23. Article 24 of the Law on Veterinary Service also provides for compensation for damages to owners of animals. A regulation and mechanism are to be designed for compensatory payments.

11 24. In emergencies and extraordinary situations, the special quarantine police force of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and resources of the Ministry of Emergency Situations will be used when implementing anti-epizootological measures in infection zones.

25. Construction standards and regulations. In Azerbaijan, engineering survey, design and construction standards and regulations are governed by the State Construction Committee. Rules for conducting supervision and control procedures by the State Construction Committee were approved by the Cabinet of Ministers in 2003. Subject to the State Construction Committee regulations, all construction operations are to be carried out with due regard to the environmental requirements. Following the existing construction rules, construction or renovation works are to be carried out on the basis of the approved project (design) documents only. State Construction Committee issue special licenses to conduct engineering survey and design operations (no license is required for construction operations).

(c) WHO and FAO/OIE Guidelines

26. The strategies for AI containment and response by the FAO/OIE and WHO are reviewed briefly in the section on global sectoral issues above. More information on these guidelines is presented in Annexes 1 and 2 below.

IV. Project Region

27. The project will operate throughout Azerbaijan, as it is fully possible that AI will appear in wild birds and domestic poultry in all areas of the country. Initial areas of concern are regions that host large populations of migratory waterfowl. (Annex 4)

V. Environmental Impacts and Mitigation Measures by Component

28. Activities under AI projects are not expected to generate significant adverse environmental effects as they are focused largely on public sector capacity building and improved readiness for dealing with outbreaks of avian influenza in domestic poultry and a potential human pandemic. These prevention-focused activities are expected to have a positive environmental impact as the Project's investments in facilities, equipment, and training for veterinary and public health services and laboratories will improve the effectiveness and safety over existing avian influenza handling and testing procedures. This would be reinforced by the mainstreaming of environmental safeguards into protocols and procedures for the culling and disposal of animals during AI outbreaks. In addition, waste generated in upgraded laboratory facilities will be managed using existing national guidelines that are consistent with international good practice.

29. The main areas of environmental risk from project activities are the inadvertent spread of the AI virus during culling, transport and disposal of carcasses, animal waste, litter, and used protective gear; contamination of surface and groundwater from use of disinfectants; and laboratory biocontainment and waste management. In addition,

12 minor environmental disturbances may occur during renovation of laboratories and hospitals. The project environmental mitigation plan is attached as Annex 6.

(i) Veterinary Services: Equipment, refurbishing and training for diagnostic laboratories to include key environmental issues in zoonotic disease containment and waste management as pertain to special waste, emissions and materials; training for veterinary services and poultry sector workers to include procedures for safe handling of AI materials; safe culling of infected and at-risk poultry and disposal of carcasses. Formal compensation for culled animals should target owners/primary beneficiaries (e.g., specifically including women where they are the primary backyard producers).

(ii) Human Health: Equipment, refurbishing and training for diagnostic laboratories and hospitals to include key environmental issues in zoonotic disease containment and waste management

(iii) Public Awareness: No environmental issues, but an important component for design and delivery of communications tools for good hygiene, safe culling and disposal of animal carcasses, animal waste management.

(iv) Implementation Support and Monitoring and Evaluation: No environmental issues; implementation of the EMP will be monitored through this component.

A more detailed project description is available in Annex 3

30. Mitigation Measures for Veterinary Services Component. This component will support national prevention and control strategies in the short and medium term based on the assessments of the avian influenza preparedness status of the capacity of National Veterinary Services to cope with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) epidemic and the vulnerability of the livestock sector to new emerging infectious diseases. This component will support the following four areas of activity: (i) enhancing HPAI prevention and preparedness capability; (ii) strengthening of Veterinary Services, disease surveillance, diagnostic capacity and applied research for HPAI and other zoonoses; (iii) Strengthening HPAI control programs and outbreak containment plans as well as capacities to implement those plans; and (iv) improving bio-security in poultry production and trade.

31. Disposal of infected materials. In Azerbaijan, the existing animal carcass disposal method is digging of burial pits and use of quicklime to prevent earthworms bringing contaminated material to the surface after pit closure. This method is accepted in other countries (Australia, Canada) with due attention to factors such as the amount of material for disposal, location of the burial site, proximity to water catchment areas, soil characteristics, etc. Other options for disposal include cremation, incineration, pit burning, rendering and composting. Properly sited and constructed burial pits are the recommended disposal option in Azerbaijan as this is the locally

13 preferred method, incineration facilities are very limited in capacity, and due to the increased risk of spreading the virus by transporting carcasses and litter to remote disposal facilities. Of particular concern however is the risk to groundwater from poorly sited pits. The Project aims to address the risks of inadvertent spreading of the virus during disposal of carcasses through (i) training of veterinary services staff in proper handling of potentially infected materials; (ii) training for farmers and commercial poultry workers on proper burial pit construction and operation; (iii) provision of PPEs and other supplies; (iv) ensuring guidance is provided from the Ministry of Environment regarding siting of burial pits to avoid groundwater contamination.

32. Use of disinfectants. Contamination to surface and groundwater from use of disinfectants necessary for sanitization of infected premises will be mitigated by (i) promoting use of least toxic appropriate disinfectants (soaps and detergents), and (ii) providing training to veterinary services personnel and poultry growers on measures to limit use of toxic disinfectants and prevent untreated drainage or runoff into surface or groundwater systems.

Laboratories. Depending on the final allocation of funds by the Government and other donors, the project may finance purchase of one or more polymerase chain reaction devices (PCRs) for analysis of tissue samples to detect H5N1 virus. Operation of PCRs involves manipulation of the virus, and requires that the laboratory function at biocontainment level 3 (BSL-3), which is suitable for work with infectious agents that may cause serious or potentially lethal diseases as a result of exposure by the inhalation route. The two risk periods are handling and especially necropsy of dead birds and culture and multiplication of the virus in eggs. The risks are minimized by 1) handling carcasses and samples in Category 3 biosafety cabinets and 2) avoiding if possible culture of the virus. The Bank has recommended to minimize culture and will only support culture if the virus is handled in Cat 3 cabinets when there is a chance of aerolisation. A risk assessment should be carried out and this should be part of the Health and safety training package. Currently one PCR is in operation in Azerbaijan at the Republican Veterinary Laboratory in Baku under BSL-2 conditions, which is not recommended from a biocontainment hazard management perspective. Prior to purchase and delivery of the PCRs, the laboratory(ies) will be provided with BSL-3 cabinets to minimize the risks involved in handling live virus. These laboratories will also receive operational reviews and training for staff to ensure their ability to function at BSL-3. . Guidance on specific requirements for BSL-2, -3, and -4 is attached at Annex 5.

33. The project will address laboratory waste management by basing training and upgrades to laboratory infrastructure and equipment on guidelines such as “International Best Practice in Safety of Research Laboratories” developed by the US National Institutes of Health. The guidelines are attached below as Annex 5.

34. Minor construction associated with rehabilitation of laboratories will be carried out in accordance with Azeri regulations and practice regarding construction permitting, environmental, health and safety permits.

14 35. Mitigation Measures for Human Health Component. This component will address short and medium terms needs with respect to core public health functions. The Project will help to operationalize some elements that are contemplated as part of the GPAI, expanding and intensifying the responses rapidly. As it is unlikely that the global spread of a pandemic influenza virus could be prevented once it emerges, the emphasis is on reducing its impact. Several tools will help achieve this aim: (i) year- round surveillance; (ii) effective and accurate methods of diagnosis; (iii) planning for social distancing interventions; and (vi) strengthened medical services. The interventions supported under the Project will be based on Azerbaijan’s epidemiological and programmatic needs, and well-assessed options for meeting them. The interventions will be grouped in two sub-components: (a) Enhancing Public Health Program Planning and Coordination, and (b) Strengthening of National Public Health Surveillance Systems. The component will provide equipment upgrades to medical laboratories.. Laboratory improvements financed under the project will include training on safety and waste management in accordance with the guidelines at Annex 5.

36. The project would finance also creation of low pressure units in hospitals. This would be carried out in accordance with Azeri regulation and practice regarding construction permitting, environmental, health and safety permits.

VI. Monitoring

37. The environmental monitoring and evaluation guidelines for project were developed to monitor environmental performance and identify any implementation problems so that these can be addressed promptly. These guidelines provide clear and functional roles and responsibilities, and provide monitoring indicators in order to measure the success of the mitigation measures. The monitoring plan is attached at Annex 8 A.

38. The PIU within the SAAC under the Ministry of Agriculture will be responsible for overall project implementation. The PIU and the project will be supervised by the World Bank task team. The PIU will hire a consultant with an environmental background who will be responsible for overall monitoring of the implementation of mitigation measures for the AI project. The incumbent will also serve as the environmental specialist for the ADCP-2, which is also managed by SAAC. S/he will provide periodic environmental monitoring reports to the PIU director and MENR and will notify (through the PIU management) the relevant authorities in the event of problems or issues connected with the mitigation measures. Monitoring of the EMP implementation will form a part of the overall project monitoring and evaluation system.

VII. Institutional Arrangements and Budget

39. The AI PIU is responsible for ensuring adequate budget and procurement of goods, works and services for implementation of the EMP mitigation and monitoring measures, and for supervision. The AI PIU is also responsible for full coordination with the

15 Veterinary Service, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Emergency Situations, and Cabinet of Ministers on matters connected with implementation of the EMP.

40. Budget for implementation and monitoring of the EMP is provided under Component 4, Implementation Support and Monitoring and Evaluation.

VIII. Public Consultation Arrangements

41. The environmental aspects of the project were discussed with the officials of the State Veterinary Service, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources. The draft EMP has been publicly disseminated in Azeri by the SAAC through the MENR and MOA announcing availability of the document in local press and on the SAAC an websites, and by making paper copies available in the MENR’s Public Information Center (Aarhus Center). 42. A public consultation on the draft EMP was held on May 31, 2006. A summary of discussion at this round table is provided in Annex 10. The draft EMP has been revised after the meeting to take into account inputs from the consultation, as appropriate. The final version of the EMP will be made publicly available in Azerbaijan, provided to the World Bank, and used by the AI PIU in the implementation of the project.

Annex 1: FAO/OIE AI Strategy Annex 2: WHO AI Strategy Annex 3: Project description Annex 4: Wild birds migration map Annex 5: Biocontainment Level Requirements Annex 6: International Best Practice in Safety of Research Laboratories Annex 7 - A: Mitigation Plan for Carcass and Waste Material Disposal by Burial Annex 7 – B: Mitigation Plan - Carcass Disposal by Incineration in Pits Annex 8 - A: Mitigation Plan for Laboratory Safety and Waste Management Annex 8 - B: Monitoring Plan for Carcass and Waste Material Disposal by Burial Annex 9 - A: Monitoring Plan- Disposal of Poultry by Incineration in Pits Annex 9 - B: Monitoring Plan for Laboratory Safety and Waste Management Monitoring Annex 10: Report on Dissemination and Public Consultation of EMP

16 Annex 1

Summary of the FAO and the OIE Global Strategy for the Progressive Control of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)

1. Vision and goal. The long-term vision of the strategy is to minimize the global threat and risk of HPAI in humans and domestic poultry, through progressive control and eradication of HPAI, particularly that caused by H5N1 virus strain, from terrestrial domestic poultry in Asia. Achieving this goal will diminish the global threat of a pandemic, stabilize poultry production, enhance a robust regional and international trade in poultry and poultry products, increase human and food safety, and improve the livelihoods of the rural poor.

2. A phased approach. The global strategy will be implemented over three time frames: immediate to short (1-3 years), short to medium (4-6 years) and medium to long term (7-10 years). During this period the spread of HPAI, mainly of the H5N1 strain, will have been progressively controlled in domestic poultry of all infected countries of Asia, and prevented from affecting those Asian countries not currently infected, but at high risk.

3. The immediate to short-term objective is to reduce the risk to humans by preventing further spread of HPAI in those countries that are currently infected by H5N1.

4. Over the medium to long-term (7-10 years), a more focused approach to HPAI will be mounted to progressively eradicate the disease from the remaining compartments of infected domestic terrestrial poultry in the region. The medium-to-long term strategy will consider all control measures, including vaccination, zoning and compartmentalization as defined in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code. For the long-term success of this strategy, restructuring of the poultry sectors in the region will need to be seriously considered.

5. To prevent the threat of HPAI from spreading to avian influenza-free countries, the long-term strategy supports the development of active surveillance programs and emergency preparedness plans for non-infected, at risk countries. The application of OIE standards relating to the international trade of poultry and poultry products will further assist in preventing the spread of HPAI virus across continents.

6. Capacity building. Inadequate capacity in many countries is the principal limiting factor for effectively and quickly stamping out and controlling infectious diseases. Thus, the strategy suggests building a strong and sustainable human and physical resource capacity in the countries, to respond in a more effective and timely manner in detecting and stamping out not only HPAI outbreaks, but also other newly-emerging infectious zoonotic and trans-boundary animal diseases. Capacity building will be wide ranging and include all aspects of disease control as well as policy development and socioeconomic impact analysis.

7. Strategic research. The global strategy recognizes that the dynamics of the current rapid spread and persistence of HPAI remain unclear. Therefore, the strategy will facilitate strategic research to investigate the epidemiology of avian influenza, evaluate the efficacy of vaccines in domestic poultry

17 to reduce the virus shedding in domestic fowl including duck reservoirs, and work in close collaboration with regional and international advanced research institutions to promote the development of improved vaccines and rapid diagnostic tests. Risk analysis of various poultry production systems and along marketing chains will be carried out to better target effective disease control.

8. Implementation. Implementation will be at the national, regional and international levels. At the national level, well-defined country specific projects will be formulated, which will be underpinned by the formation of sub-regional HPAI support units. Through these units, sub-regional disease diagnosis and surveillance and socio-economic and policy analysis networks will be established. These sub-regional networks will provide the lead in the development of harmonized technical standards and regional policies related to the management of live animal movement, compensation plans, capacity building, disease reporting requirements and long term planning to restructure poultry sectors.

9. At the international level, coordination of the national programs and sub-regional networks will be under the umbrella of GF-TADs (global framework for the control of trans-boundary animal diseases), a joint FAO/OIE initiative. The international coordination will provide technical backstopping to the sub-regional networks and national programs, promote international cooperation, and mobilize and coordinate resources for HPAI control.

10. Partners. The main partners in implementation of the strategy will be infected and non- infected at-risk countries, and regional organizations, all of which are committed to controlling trans- boundary animal and zoonotic diseases. Given the zoonotic nature of the HPAI, and the complex interface between farming systems, livestock trade, food safety and public health, a strong international partnership among FAO, OIE and WHO will be continued. A number of other partners will be involved, important among these would be the private sector, NGOs, and regional national agriculture extensions systems (NARES).

11. Resources. The implementation of the strategy will require funding to support the national, regional and international HPAI control programs as outlined above.

Framework for Implementation

12. A Framework for Implementation has been developed by FAO/OIE, promoting national, regional, and international initiatives. It includes the following:

National initiatives:

 Development of a National Strategy for each country specific to its own conditions. It would address farming systems, presence/absence of water fowl, presence of human cases or not, trade orientation, implementation capacity, and wildlife migration patterns;  Preparation of contingency and emergency preparedness plans;  Development of economic impact and policy frameworks;  Prevention of avian influenza to non-infected at-risk countries through awareness, reporting, and early detection; and effective control regimes  Improvement in epidemiological information on source of infection and transmission dynamics in farming system and marketplaces.

18 Regional initiatives:

 Standardization of diagnosis and reporting techniques among countries;  Sharing of disease information between countries;  Development of a regulatory framework for management of animal movements; and  Promotion of adherence to OIE guidelines to facilitate regional trade.

Global initiatives:

 Strengthening of partnerships (FAO, OIE, WHO, UNDP, donors);  Support for global networks (OIE Global Service Center supported by WB/DGF and donors);  Support for sub-regional networks -- OIE/FAO epidemiology collaborating centers and Avian Influenza Network (OFFLU);  Further development of control strategies for trans-boundary animal diseases (utilizing the GF- TADs mechanism);  Development of a Global Early Warning System (FOA/OIE/WHO);  Coordination of research on improved tools for avian influenza control;  Provision of global vision for avian influenza control; and  Mobilization of resources through donor liaison and advocacy.

19 Annex 2 Summary of the World Health Organization (WHO) Strategy

1. The strategic plan lays out activities for individual countries, the international community and WHO to prepare for a pandemic and mitigate its impact. The objectives of the plan correspond to the opportunities to intervene and are structure in the following three phases:

Phase - Pre-Pandemic:

(i) Reduce opportunities for human infection. An immediate priority is to halt spread in poultry to reduce human exposure to the virus. More intensive collaboration is needed between the animal and health sectors. Communication activities targeting stakeholders, particularly rural poultry holders, should be strengthened. Workers carrying out the culling of poultry must be protected against infection by clothing and equipment.

(ii) Strengthen the early warning system. To assess risks to public health and guide protective measures, information is needed on the extent of influenza infection in animals and humans and on circulating viruses. National surveillance systems must be improved urgently in potentially affected countries. When outbreaks in animals occur, active human case detection should be pursued by a coordinated animal-human health team.

Phase - Emergence of a Pandemic:

(iii) Contain or delay spread at the source. Aggressive containment measures such as isolation and prophylactic use of antiviral drugs may slow pandemic spread and allow time for response measures. An international stockpile of antiviral drugs for an emergency response should be established, starting with a stockpile for targeted early use.

Phase – Pandemic Declared and Spreading Internationally:

(iv) Reduce morbidity, mortality, and social disruption. Although mass vaccination is the preferred intervention, serious issues related to the time lag between emergence of the virus and vaccine production as well as production capacity constraints must be addressed. Anti-viral supply and production capacity are also limited. Therefore, the main responses in the immediate term should be classic “social distancing measures” such as quarantine, bans on mass gatherings, and travel restrictions, backed up by a well-designed communication strategy. For the longer term, options with industry to improve antiviral and vaccine capacity need to be explored.

(v) Conduct research during pandemic. Research is needed for policy development and adjustments for current and future epidemics. The main elements include: assessing the epidemiologic characteristics; monitoring the effectiveness of the interventions; and evaluating the medical and economic consequences.

Recommended Strategic Actions

20 2. In view of the immediacy of the avian influenza threat, WHO recommends that all countries undertake urgent action to prepare for a pandemic. Advice on doing so is contained in the recently revised WHO global influenza preparedness plan (2005) and a new WHO checklist for influenza pandemic preparedness planning (2005). Table 1 describes the phases of increasing public health risk associated with the emergence of a new influenza virus subtype that may pose a pandemic threat, and the overarching public health goals under each phase.

Table 1: Phases of Increasing Public Health Risk Associated with the Emergency of a New Influenza Virus Subtype that May Pose a Pandemic Threat

PHASES OVERARCHING PUBLIC HEALTH GOALS

Interpandemic period Phase 1. No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected Strengthen influenza pandemic preparedness in humans. An influenza virus subtype that has caused human at the global, regional, national and infection may be present in animals. If present in animals, the sub-national levels. risk of human infection or disease is considered to be low. Phase 2. No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected Minimize the risk of transmission to humans; in humans. However, a circulating animal influenza virus detect and report such transmission rapidly subtype poses a substantial risk of human disease. if it occurs.

Pandemic alert period Phase 3. Human infection(s) with a new subtype, but no Ensure rapid characterization of the new virus human-to-human spread, or at most rare instances of spread subtype and early detection, notification to a close contact. and response to additional cases.

Phase 4. Small cluster(s) with limited human-to-human Contain the new virus within limited foci or transmission but spread is highly localized, suggesting that delay spread to gain time to implement the virus is not well adapted to humans. preparedness measures, including vaccine development.

Phase 5. Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human spread still Maximize efforts to contain or delay spread, localized, suggesting that the virus is becoming increasingly to possibly avert a pandemic, and to gain better adapted to humans, but may not yet be fully time to implement pandemic response transmissible (substantial pandemic risk). measures.

Pandemic period

Phase 6. Pandemic: increased and sustained transmission in Minimize the impact of the pandemic. general population. a The distinction between phase 1 and phase 2 is based on the risk of human infection or disease resulting from circulating strains in animals. The distinction is based on various factors and their relative importance according to current scientific knowledge. Factors may include pathogenicity in animals and humans, occurrence in domesticated animals and livestock or only in wildlife, whether the virus is enzootic or epizootic, geographically localized or widespread, and/or other scientific parameters. b The distinction between phase 3, phase 4 and phase 5 is based on an assessment of the risk of a pandemic. Various factors and their relative importance according to current scientific knowledge may be

21 considered. Factors may include rate of transmission, geo-graphical location and spread, severity of illness, presence of genes from human strain (if derived from an animal strain), and/or other scientific parameters.

Source: WHO 2005 In order to accomplish the public health goals described for each phase, WHO recommends strategic actions that can be undertaken to capitalize on each opportunity to intervene. Given the many uncertainties about the evolution of the pandemic threat, including the amount of time left to prepare, a wise approach involves a mix of measures that immediately address critical problems with longer-term measures that sustainably improve the world’s capacity to protect itself against the recurring pandemic threat.

3. The strategic actions are:

Reduce opportunities for human infection, including:

 Support to the FAO/OIE control strategy;  Intensify collaboration between the animal and public health sectors;  Strengthen risk communication to rural residents; and  Improve approaches to environmental detection of the virus

Strengthen the early warning systems, including:

 Improve the detection of human cases;  Combine detection of new outbreaks in animals with active searches for human cases;  Support epidemiological investigation;  Coordinate clinical research;  Strengthen risk assessment;  Strengthen existing national influenza centers throughout the risk-prone regions; and  Give risk-prone countries an incentive to collaborate internationally.

Contain or delay spread at the source, including:

 Establish an international stockpile of anti-viral drugs;  Develop mass delivery mechanisms for anti-viral drugs; and  Conduct surveillance of antiviral susceptibility.

Reduce morbidity, mortality and social disruption, including:

 Monitor the pandemic in real time;  Introduce non-pharmaceutical interventions;  Use of antiviral drugs to protect priority groups;  Augment vaccine supplies;  Ensure equitable access to vaccines; and  Communicate risks to the public.

Conduct research to guide response measures, including:

22  Assess the epidemiological characteristics of an emerging pandemic;  Monitor the effectiveness of human interventions; and  Evaluate the medical and economic consequences.

23 Annex 3 Restructuring of the Second Institution Building Technical Assistance Project to Address the Avian Influenza Emergency

The Government of Azerbaijan and the World Bank have agreed to restructure the Second Institution Building Technical Assistance Project (IBTA-2) to address the avian flue emergency. The ongoing components of IBTA-2 are expected to be implemented by June 30, 2006, leaving an estimated US$5,145,000 of credit funds available for the restructured project.

A. Development Objectives of the Restructured Project

The restructured project will reduce the threat posed to humans by HPAI infection and other zoonoses in domestic poultry and prepare for the control and response to an influenza pandemic and other infectious diseases. To achieve the additional project objectives, the project will support: (i) prevention; (ii) preparedness and planning; and (iii) response and containment. Achieving these goals will contribute to diminishing the burden of disease and loss of productivity, limiting the regional spread of HPAI, and enhancing economic and social safety at the national, regional, and global levels.

B. Project Restructuring

The restructured project will finance the following four new components (see page 4 for the approximate budget):

 Component I - Veterinary Services. This component will support national prevention and control strategies proposed by the Republic of Azerbaijan to cover its needs in the short and medium term based on the assessments of the AI preparedness of the National Veterinary Services and the vulnerability of the livestock sector to new emerging infectious diseases. This component will support the following five areas of activity: (i) enhancing HPAI prevention and preparedness capability; (ii) strengthening of veterinary services, disease surveillance, diagnostic capacity and applied research for HPAI and other zoonoses; (iii) strengthening of HPAI control programs and outbreak containment plans, including poultry vaccination, as well as capacities to implement those plans; (iv) improving bio-security in poultry production and trade, isolating its potentially adverse effects on other aspects of people's lives, and (v) assistance in the design of a compensation fund for both commercial and small backyard poultry growers, which will help to mitigate economic losses.

24  Component II – Human Health. This component will address short and medium term needs with respect to core public health functions. Building an effective national public health response requires an enabling environment and the necessary resources to quickly scale up proven interventions nationwide. Thus, the restructured project will help to operationalize elements of the Government’s Joint Plan of Action, thereby expanding and intensifying the responses rapidly. The emphasis will be on reducing the risks of animal to human transmission and on reducing the impact of a global pandemic, if one were to develop.. Several tools will help achieve these aims: (i) year-round surveillance; (ii) effective and accurate methods of diagnosis; (iii) planning for social distancing interventions; and (vi) strengthened medical services. The interventions supported under the restructured project will be based on Azerbaijan’s epidemiological and programmatic needs, and well-assessed options for meeting them. The interventions will be grouped in two sub-components: (i) enhancing Public Health Program planning and coordination; and (ii) strengthening of National Public Health Surveillance Systems.

 Component III - Public Awareness. This component is designed to promote awareness and coordination for the execution of the contingency plans and the national AI strategy. It is designed to safeguard human health, in particular for animal health workers, poultry backyard producers and their families, and consumers, by improving knowledge and consequently behaviors. It is also designed to contain the damage to large scale poultry production. A comprehensive communication strategy has been partially elaborated, in cooperation with the international community and national authorities. Support will be provided to the relevant government agencies and NGOs for communication activities, in order to increase the commitment of government, private sector, and civil society organizations, and raise awareness, knowledge and understanding among the different groups of stakeholders about the risk and potential impact of AI. Activities will include: (i) development and dissemination of communication materials for poultry producers and processors, consumers, technicians, medical personnel, children and teenagers, etc.; (ii) design and realization of training courses, seminars, workshops and other events for extension and veterinary staff, health workers at the regional and district levels, teachers and media people; and (iii) strengthening effective coordination and collaboration among national agencies, NGOs and the international community.

 Component IV - Implementation Support and Monitoring and Evaluation. The component would support costs associated with: (i) project management and coordination, including the provision of technical assistance for procurement, financial management and training; and (ii) project monitoring and impact evaluation assessments.

25 Annex 4

Wild Birds in Azerbaijan and migration map

Wild Birds in Azerbaijan. Some 360 species of birds have been recorded in Azerbaijan. These range from the large - such as flamingos and eagles - to many kinds of waterfowl, colorful bee-eaters and rollers, the amusing, improbable Hoopoe, and numerous small brown warblers that even strain the identification skills of experts. The avian show keeps changing throughout the year.

Winter. Azerbaijan's relatively mild winters attract many birds from farther north in Russia to winter. Millions of birds pass over or stop in Azerbaijan, especially during winter. Thousands of waterbirds - both large and small - concentrate in Azerbaijan's many wetlands and are located along the coast and inland. Wetland birds include swans, geese, ducks, flamingos and shorebirds (known as "waders" to the British) like Black-tailed Godwits, curlews and snipe. Along the coast, Common and Great Black-headed Gulls can be seen. Hen Harriers and a few Peregrine Falcons and Saker Falcons hunt over land; the latter two, may be illegally captured for lucrative sale to Arab falconers. Some species of small birds that nest farther north also come to Azerbaijan for the winter. Large flocks of Meadow Pipits and Bramblings, for instance, roam the open areas, feeding on seeds. In the mountains, most birds of the alpine zone, like Guldenstadt's Redstart and the Great Rosefinch, are forced lower in winter by snow; some even migrate down into the river valleys.

Spring migration peaks in April and May. All sorts of small birds, such as shrikes, warblers and flycatchers, stay to nest or pass on through. Early arrivals from the south include Hoopoes, Barn Swallows and wheatears, all easily seen along roadsides. This type of bird tent to live closer to humans, a factor which may facilitate transmission. However their smaller size makes them less visible and therefore they may cause less concern. This would increase risk. Common Cranes or Steppe Eagle pass on their way to Russia or Kazakhstan. Yellow and blue bee-eaters and electric blue rollers. Along the coast, cormorants, terns and shorebirds stream by. Wild bird presence in wetlands is reduced because most of the waterfowl and shorebirds depart for northerly climes, beginning in late February.

Summer. This is the time most birds reproduce. In the marshes, herons, Pigmy Cormorants and the ducks that have remained behind are quite conspicuous, while Purple Swamphens, Moorhens and Water Rails skulk in the reeds. The forest birds, such as tits and woodpeckers, in the mountain forests and remnant lowland patches, break away from the winter flocks to set up paired housekeeping. Alpine birds move upslope to the meadows below snowline.

26 Autumn. Bird migrations in fall are not as concentrated as they are in spring. There is no reproductive command pushing them, just the need to find a food supply for winter. Certain shorebirds start to arrive by late summer, followed by small land birds in September. Migration begins to be quite obvious in October with a variety of land and waterbirds and ends with the great influx of waterfowl (ducks, geese and swans) between October and December. Throughout the fall, raptors such as eagles and hawks pass through, especially along the coast. Waterbirds, too, have preferred flyways. The majority of them follow the coast, some cutting across the Absheron Peninsula, some going around it. While many birds fly further south along the coast beyond Azerbaijan to Iran, others turn westward and head into the Kur River lowlands toward interior wetlands or on to the Black Sea.

The areas in Azerbaijan in which migrating birds travel and rest are indicated in Figure 1. Migrating birds fly this route twice each year, in autumn and spring. The spring migration starts in the middle of February, and finishes at the end of May. These birds travel from the African continent, up through Iran, over Azerbaijan then onwards to Russia and Siberia. The birds fly return on this path during the autumn migration, which begins at the end of August and continues until mid December, heading south to warmer climes. Some migrating birds only travel as far as Azerbaijan during the migration. This happens in both directions with different species of bird.

The number of migrating birds was estimated to have doubled in 2005, and due to the very cold winter in Russia, the migration started earlier: in the last week of January. Seventy two species of seabirds were witnessed on the migration, from a total of 224 species of migrating birds on this flyway.

The birds on the spring migration often come in close contact with people, poultry and wild birds in settlements. Birds on the autumn migration tend to remain closer to the sea coast, thus impacting minimally on the local bird population of Azerbaijan.

There are also internal migrations within Azerbaijan. Most specifically, these occur from the mountains to the plains (and back) and between national parks in the southern half of the country. Sample collectors, in the field of ornithology, wear gloves and special (but not disposable) coats to collect parasitology specimens (blood and faeces).

27 Map of Azerbaijan displaying bidirectional migration routes of migratory (i.e. not national wild birds) wild birds with areas of maximum risk of transmission between migratory birds, national wild birds, poultry and humans.

28 Annex 5

Guidance on the Biocontainment Levels for Laboratories

Biocontainment Level REQUIREMENTS OF THE 2 3 4 LABORATORY A) Laboratory siting and structure 1. Not next to known fire hazard Yes Yes Yes 2. Workplace separated from other Yes Yes Yes activities 3. Personnel access limited Yes Yes Yes 4. Protected against entry/exit of Yes Yes Yes rodents and insects Yes and Yes and 5. Liquid effluent must be sterilized monitored monitored 6. Isolated by airlock. Continuous Yes Yes internal airflow Single for input, 7. Input and extract air to be filtered Single on extract double for using HEPA or equivalent extract 8. Mechanical air supply system with Yes Yes fail-safe system 9. Laboratory sealable to permit Yes Yes fumigation 10. Incinerator for disposal of carcasses Available Yes Yes on site and waste B) Laboratory facilities 11. Class 1/2/3 exhaust protective Yes Yes Yes cabinet available Yes with Yes with 12. Direct access to autoclave Yes double doors double doors 13. Specified pathogens stored in Yes Yes Yes laboratory

14. Double ended dunk tank required Preferable Yes

15. Protective clothing not worn outside Yes Yes Yes laboratory 16. Showering required before exiting Yes laboratory

29 17. Safety Officer responsible for Yes Yes Yes containment 18. Staff receive special training in the Yes Yes Yes requirements needed C) Laboratory discipline 19. Warning notices for containment Yes Yes Yes area 20. Laboratory must be lockable Yes Yes Yes 21. Authorized entry of personnel Yes Yes Yes 22. On entering all clothing removed Yes Yes and clean clothes put on 23. On exiting all laboratory clothes Yes removed, individual must wash and

transfer to clean side 24. Individual must shower prior to Yes transfer to clean side 25. All accidents reported Yes Yes Yes D) Handling of specimens 26. Packaging requirements to be Yes Yes Yes advised prior to submission 27. Incoming packages opened by Yes Yes Yes trained staff 28. Movement of pathogens from an Yes Yes Yes approved laboratory to another

requires a license 29. Standard Operating Procedures Yes Yes Yes covering all areas must be available (Source: OIE)

30 Annex 6

International Best Practice in Safety of Research Laboratories2

Procurement / Transport  Minimize acquisition / quantity of hazardous materials, minimize storage time needed  Identify mechanism of waste disposal before acquisition  For chemicals, have Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) accessible/confine deliveries to areas that are equipped to handle them (and train relevant personnel)  Ensure container is intact and appropriately labeled (US regulations detail how hazardous materials have to be identified, packaged, marked, labeled, documented and placarded)  Transport in appropriate (secondary) containers  Use triple packaging system for infectious and potentially infectious substances  Adhere to international air transport regulations Storage / Management  Inventory should have name as printed on the container  For chemicals: include molecular formula for further identification and to provide a simple means of searching chemicals; include CAS (Chemical Abstract Service) registry number for unambiguous identification of chemicals despite the use of different naming conventions  Source  Size of container  Hazard classification, as a guide to safe storage, handling, and disposal  Date of acquisition, to ensure that unstable chemicals are not stored beyond their useful life, and Storage location

Procedures  Dispose of materials anticipated to not be needed within a reasonable time frame  Use approved containers; make sure storage containers remain intact and sealed  Dispose of chemicals prior to expiration date, monitor reactive chemicals  Replace deteriorating labels before information is obscured or lost  Follow regulations for safe storage in stockroom or lab  Avoid storing chemicals on bench tops or lab hoods  Store volatile chemicals in ventilated cabinet (near hood)  If ventilation is not required, store in closable cabinet or on shelf with lip to prevent sliding  Do not expose stored chemicals to heat or direct sunlight  Observe all precautions regarding the storage of incompatible chemicals  Provide vented cabinets beneath hoods for storing hazardous materials  Use chemical storage refrigerators for storing chemicals  Have fire protection system (sprinklers)  Follow storage limits for flammable and combustible liquids  Restrict access to storage facility Protocols / Facilities for Use in Research  Wear and use appropriate personal protection materials to minimize exposure  Wash hands  Reduce the possibility of creating splashes or aerosols

2 US National Institutes of Health

31  Contain in biological safety cabinets operations that generate aerosols  Use good housekeeping  Use mechanical pipetting devices  Promptly decontaminate work surfaces  Never eat, ring, smoke, handle contact lenses, apply cosmetics, or take medicine in the lab  Take special care when using sharps  Keep lab doors closed when experiments are in progress  Use secondary leak-proof containers to move or transfer cultures  Decontaminate infectious waste before disposal  Post appropriate warning signs  Mark emergency equipment, maintain it, inspect it; list telephone numbers to call in case of accident  Control access

For Radioisotopes  Use only in designated areas  Allow the presence of essential staff only  Use personal protective equipment  Monitor personal radiation exposures  Use spill trays lined with disposable absorbent materials  Limit radionuclide quantities  Shield radiation sources  Mark radiation containers with the radiation symbol, including radionuclide identity, activity, and assay date  Use radiation meters to monitor working areas, protective clothing, and hands after completion of work  Use appropriately shielded transport containers  Remove radioactive waste frequently from the working area  Maintain accurate records of use and disposal of radioactive materials  Screen dosimetry records for materials exceeding the dose limits  Establish and regularly exercise emergency response plans  In emergencies, assist injured persons first  Clean contaminated areas thoroughly  Write and keep incident reports

For Animal laboratories  Require good microbiological techniques  Establish policies and protocols for all operations and for access to vivarium  Establish appropriate medical surveillance program and supervision for staff  Prepare and adopt safety or operations manual  Post warning signs  Decontaminate work surfaces after use  Use appropriate biological safety cabinets or isolator cages; handle and decontaminate animal bedding and waste materials appropriately  Transport material for autoclaving or incineration safely, in closed containers  Treat, report, and record injuries Training of Personnel Employer develops Chemical Hygiene Plan containing (models available from U.S. government and from some

32 professional societies)  Employee information and training about the hazards of chemicals in the work area: o How to detect their presence or release o Work practices and how to use protective equipment o Emergency response procedures  Circumstances under which a lab operation requires prior approval from the institution  Standard operating procedures for work with hazardous chemicals  Criteria for use of control measures  Measures to ensure proper operation of fume hoods and other protective equipment  Provisions for additional employee protection for work with select carcinogens and toxins  Provisions for medical consultations and examinations for employees  Labs should establish their own safety groups at the department level (include students and support staff)  Labs should provide training in safety and waste management for all lab workers, including students in laboratory classes  Labs should incorporate institutionally supported lab and equipment inspection programs into their overall health and safety programs  Review exit / evacuation routes  Know how to report fire, injury, chemical spill, or summon emergency response  Know first aid  Know location and use of emergency equipment such as safety showers and eyewashes  Know location and use of fire extinguishers and spill control equipment (have appropriate kits readily available)  Lab personnel should establish ongoing relationships and clear lines of communication with emergency response teams  Include information on safe methods for highly hazardous procedures commonly encountered by lab personnel that involve: o Inhalation risks o Ingestion risks o Risks of percutaneous exposures o Bites and scratches when handling animals o Handling of blood and other potentially hazardous pathological materials o Decontamination and disposal of infectious material Segregation / Triage of Waste Multihazardous waste – goal is reduction of waste to a waste that presents a single hazard.  Consider frequency and amount of waste generated; assess risk  Identify / characterize waste: o Physical description o Water reactivity o Water solubility o pH and possibly neutralization information o ignitability / flammability o presence of oxidizer o presence of sulfides / cyanides o presence of halogens o presence of radioactive materials o presence of biohazardous materials

33 o presence of toxic constituents  Minimize waste’s hazards  Determine options for management of hazards  If appropriate, take steps to neutralize waste or render it non-hazardous  When possible, select a single management option  Establish procedures for dealing with unstable waste, or waste that requires special storage or handling  Store safely: o Designated room or facility modified to contain the waste (with ventilation and effluent trapping) o Protect workers o Minimize risk of fire or spill o Minimize radiation levels outside of area o Consider compatibility of materials being accumulated (e.g., aqueous and non-aqueous waste should be separated)  Give particular attention to the handling or cleaning of radioactive laboratory ware, and to the proper disposal of sharps. o Non-contaminated (non-infectious) waste can be reused or recycled or disposed of as general waste o Contaminated (infectious) sharps – collect in puncture-proof containers fitted with covers and treated as infectious; autoclave if appropriate o Contaminated material for decontamination by autoclaving and thereafter washing and reuse or recycling o Contaminated material for direct incineration Disposal No activity should begin unless a plan for the disposal of hazardous waste has been formulated  Use appropriate disposal method for each category of waste  Use appropriate containers  Label and securely close waste containers  Separate wastes as appropriate

For low level radioactive waste, options include  Storage time for decay and indefinite on site storage,  Burial at a low-level radioactive waste site,  Incineration, or  Sanitary sewer disposal

For biological waste, options include  Disinfection  Autoclaving  For liquids, disposal in sanitary sewer; putrescible waste disposed of by incineration; needles and sharps require destruction, typically by incineration or grinding

Collection and storage of waste  At satellite area near lab: o should be clearly identified, ventilated if necessary

34 o determine whether to recycle, reuse, or dispose o hold here for less than one year; when containment volume limits reached, move to central accumulation area – package appropriately  At central accumulation area: o separate according to compatibility, commingle solvents when appropriate o label clearly, store in appropriate containers o limit storage time to 90 days o (ensure that employees are trained to handle waste materials as well as contingency planning for emergencies) o When transporting, make provisions for spill control in case of accident; have internal tracking system to follow movement of waste o Ensure that all necessary records have been generated (Quantities and identification of waste generated and shipped; Documentation and analyses of unknown materials; Manifests for waste shipping as well as verification of waste disposal; Any other information required to ensure compliance and safety from long-term liability)  Disposal options: o Incineration – is method of choice for most wastes, but is most expensive o Normal trash – only where appropriate, must be clearly identified and appropriately labeled o Sanitary sewer – not commonly used; solutions must be aqueous and biodegradable, or low toxicity inorganics – make sure sewer doesn’t drain into water supply inappropriate for waste disposal, and make sure waste is highly diluted o Release to the atmosphere – not acceptable; fume hoods must have trapping devices to prevent discharge to atmosphere  If hazardous and non-hazardous wastes are mixed, entire waste volume must be treated as hazardous  Preparation for transport to a treatment, storage, and disposal facility (TSDF)  Waste generator must obtain assurance (in terms of documentation, permits, records) that provider is reliable

For infectious material  Decontaminate, autoclave, or incinerate in lab  Package appropriately (for incineration or for transfer to another facility for incineration)  Protect against hazards to others to those who might come in contact with discarded items

35 Annex 7 - A

MITIGATION PLAN - Carcass and Waste Material Disposal by Burial

Phase Hazard Mitigation Costs per location Institutional Measure Responsibility Install Operate Supervise

1) Set up of the site Location of site Indirect and direct Base of pit minimum 1 m Local Poultry pollution of water above the water-table and Veterinary farmers 100 m from water supply or Service; MoE; well; MoE certifies soil local characteristics suitable for administartion burial

Excavation Direct pollution of Not into water table $50 per Local Contractors water Minor works pit (2 m3 Veterinary or farmers Dust Suppression with water pit) Service

Disposal of soil Loss of soil quality Use as overfill Included Local Contractors in costs Veterinary or farmers above Service Secure site Transfer of virus to Fencing and implementation $50 Local Contractors humans or animals of a comprehensive bio Veterinary or farmers security strategy to address Service contamination in both directions (in and out, out and in) 2) On site operations Transport of dead and Emission of virus Sealed covered container $50 Local Contractors slaughtered birds and to air Short transport distances; transportat Veterinary waste materials dispose on site if feasible ion costs Service Operator training and (1000 supervision dead birds); Training is included in project training budget Emission of virus Sealed covered container Local Contractors via aerosols or Veterinary

36 Phase Hazard Mitigation Costs per location Institutional Measure Responsibility Install Operate Supervise

body fluids from Service dead stock Virus Disinfectant used at Part of Local Contractors contamination of recommended rates project Veterinary transport vehicles Use of appropriate sprays for training Service wash down package/b Operator training and udget supervision

Contamination of Mechanical handling Part of Local Contractors personnel Operator training and project Veterinary or farmers supervision training Service, MOH Disinfecting procedures package/b udget

Unloading of dead Leaching of fluids Operator training and Part of Local Contractors poultry Release of virus to supervision project Veterinary or farmers air Use of mechanical loader training Service Carcasses in bags package/b udget Burial of dead poultry Release of virus to Operator training and Part of Local Contractors air via aerosols supervision project Veterinary or farmers during or after Cover carcasses with 400mm training Service burial soil first, then apply lime, then package/b Contamination of complete filling udget; $25 personnel Cover with minimum 2 m soil for 32 kg to ground level, plus overfill of Disinfecting procedures quicklime for 2 m3 pit Temporary storage for Leaching of fluids Enclosed building Part of Local Contractors culled birds Groundwater Shelter from weather project Veterinary or farmers accumulated between pollution Operator training and training Service transport runs Release of virus to supervision. package/b air via aerosols Minimal storage times. udget Rupture of storage Impermeable surfaces. units Rodent contact and assess by scavengeners Birds may not be Serious animal Supervision and monitoring Part of Local Contractors effectively killed welfare issues. Slaughter Operator Training proejct Veterinary or farmers Virus spread form training Service escaped poultry package

3) Clean up of

37 Phase Hazard Mitigation Costs per location Institutional Measure Responsibility Install Operate Supervise infected premises Disposal of waste from Disinfectants Minimal transport distances. Part of Local Contractors infected premises contaminate Covered loads project Veterinary or farmers surface and Use appropriate disinfectants training Service groundwater Avoid drainage to watershed budget Influenza virus Operator training and release supervision Odour Hold solid waste for the Transmission of Marked and fenced dedicated S20 Local Site owner sanitary period of 42 Influenza virus by area Veterinary days. air, water, vermin Covered heaps Service Impermeable surfaces Hold for sanitary period Use of disinfectants on Biocides toxic to Block or intercept the flows in Local Contractors the surfaces of the aquatic fauna from drains to surface or Environmental or farmers infected premises drainage and groundwater. Authority surface run off Collect and store the diluted disinfectant and organic material for the sanitary period of 42 days Operator training and supervision

38 Annex 7 - B

MITIGATION PLAN - Carcass Disposal by Incineration in Pits

39 Phase Mitigation Cost Institutional Comments HAZARD Measure Responsibility (e.g. Costs per village except Secondary impacts) Install Operate Supervise Operate

1 Set up of the facility Location of pit Indirect and direct SVS, Local SVC pollution of water administratio 50 – 100 m from water n supply or well

Excavations Direct pollution of Not into water table $50 per pit SVS Contractors water Minor works (0.6x0.5x2. Dust Suppression with water 6) Disposal of Loss of soil quality Spread top soil on land Included in SVS Contractors soil costs above Supply of Environmental burden Local supply where possible $40 diesel SVS Contractors Costs will be materials of extraction and cost per covered by transport incineration SVS or ; farmers’/com $70 cost of mercial woods poultry 2. On site operations Transport of Road traffic emissions Short travel for slaughtered $50 SVS SVS slaughtered from livestock transportati birds Fuel use on costs (1000 dead birds) Emission of virus to Sealed covered container Part of SVS SVS air Short transport distances project Operator training and training supervision budget Emission of virus & Sealed covered container $200 SVS SVS body fluids from dead stock Emission of virus on Disinfectant used at Part of SVS SVS transport vehicles recommended rates project Use of appropriate sprays training for wash down package/bu Operator training and dget supervision

Contamination of Mechanical handling Part of SVS SVS personnel Operator training and project supervision training Disinfecting procedures package/bu dget Unloading of Leaching of nutrients Operator training and Part of SVS SVS dead poultry Groundwater supervision project pollution Impermeable hardstanding training Release of virus to air Use of mechanical loader package/bu Close transfer dget Carcasses in bags Temporary Leaching of nutrients SVS SVS storage for Groundwater Enclosed building culled birds pollution Shelter from weather Accumulated Release of virus to air Operator training and between Rupture of vessel or supervision. burning runs bags Minimal storage times. Rodent contact Impermeable surfaces.

Birds may not Serious animal Supervision and monitoring Part of SVS SVS 40 be effectively welfare issues. Slaughter Operator Training proejct killed Virus spread form training escaped poultry package/bu 41 Phase 3 clean up of infected premises Hardstanding Contaminated water if SVS Municipality remains after used to store organic Maintain as a clean area. incineration materials Contain contaminated water in tank Handling of Disinfectants Impermeable surfaces $10 SVS SVS waste from Leaching of nutrients Drainage to impermeable vessel. infected premises surface and groundwater Treatment on site pollution Operator training and Influenza virus release supervision Odour Disposal of Pollution of groundwater Disinfectant used at SVS SVS stored wash water Toxicity to soil organisms recommended dilution. with disinfectant Pollution of surface water Further dilution by clean water mixed in Degradation of biocide in storage 10 m wide no spread zone near drains and watercourses. Avoid slopes and spread according to a waste management plan Operator training and supervision Removal of Transfer of virus in faeces Minimal transport distances. $100*holding SVS SVS faeces from mixed in the soils. Covered loads backyards and Disinfectants Operator training and poultry housing surface and groundwater supervision interior pollution loss of soil

Hold solid waste Transmission of Influenza Marked dedicated area $20 *holding SVS Holding for the sanitary virus by air ,water, Covered heaps owner period. vermin Impermeable surfaces Removal of soil with waste. Use of Biocides are list 2 Block or intercept the flows in $500*holding SVS SVS disinfectants on substances in the drains to surface or groundwater. for temporary the surfaces of Groundwater Directive Collect and store the diluted tank the infected toxic to aquatic fauna disinfectant and organic material premises from drainage and surface for the sanitary period of 42 run off days Operator training and supervision

42 Annex 8 A

MITIGATION PLAN – Laboratory Safety and Waste Management

Phase Hazard Mitigation Costs per location Institutional Measure Responsibility

Install Operate Supervise 1) Assess None MoH/Vet AI PIU, labs/hospitals Services/PIU Consultants needs for training, equipment and physical infrastructure

2) Conduct Operation of PCR Training in biosafety Included in MoH/Vet Consultants, training and below BSL-3 risks procedures; handling project Services contractors provide release of virus carcasses and samples in Cat training Category 3 3 biosafety cabinets; avoiding budget cabinets if possible culture of live virus

3) Procure Release of virus Training on new equipment Included in MoH/Vet AI PIU, equipment and project Services/PIU contractors, provide staff training consultants training budget

4) Ongoing Inappropriate waste Training and upgrades to Included in MoH/Vet AI PIU, laboratory management laboratory infrastructure and project Services contractors, operations equipment based on training consultants International Best Practice in budget Safety of Research Laboratories

43 Annex 8 - B

MONITORING PLAN - Disposal of Poultry in Burial Pits

Phase What Where How When Why Responsibility parameter is is to be is it to be is it to be is the to be monitore monitored/ monitored parameter to monitored? d? type of -frequency be monitoring or monitored equipment? continuous? (optional)? Baseline Burial in pits Burial Observation During Veterinary or sites burial Services, local unregulated government disposal Construct Site selection Burial Observation; During To ensure Veterinary and pit sites Design and construction appropriate Services, construction construction After size and Ministry of to completion design Ecology, local appropriate of government standard construction

Operate Safe handling Burial Observation During To avoid Veterinary of carcasses sites and records. burial spreading the Services and materials virus; for disposal; Hourly to avoid Disinfection when water of workers operating pollution and from equipment During disinfectants disinfection before breaks and at end of day Closing Burial pit Burial Observation After pit it To ensure Veterinary sites and records. closed correct Services, local closure to government prevent spread of virus

44 Annex 9 – A

MONITORING PLAN- Disposal of Poultry by Incineration in Pits

Phase What Where How When Why Responsibility parameter is to is to be is it to be monitored/ is it to be is the be monitored? monitored? type of monitoring monitored parameter to be equipment? -frequency or monitored continuous? (optional)? Baseline Burial in pits Burial sites Observation During burial SVS

Construct Site selection Incineration sites Designs and During To avoid water SVS, MENR and construction to avoid construction pollution impermeable escape of liquid to After completion hard standing water of construction Operate Incinerator Incinerator flue Integral During To avoid air emissions stack instrumentation and incineration pollution Incinerator operator Effluent tank records. Smoke odour Visual and Hourly when CO, O2 olfactory operating assessments of MENR Temperature emissions Continuous Extractive Annual Particulate

HCl, CO, SO Drains near the 2 site Visual presence in At washdown To avoid water open channels pollution Washdown water emmision

45 Annex 9 - B

MONITORING PLAN – Laboratory Safety and Waste Management

Phase What Where How When Why Responsibility parameter is to be is it to be is it to be is the is to be monitored? monitored/ monitored paramet monitored? type of -frequency or er to be monitoring continuous? monitore equipment? d (optiona l)? Baseline Republican Baku and Observation Once prior to Establish M&E specialist Veterinaria regional project baseline and n Lab and labs/hospitals effectiveness environmental two zonal consultant of AI labs PIU

Training Staff Baku and Observation; After To M&E specialist and training; regional records of completion of ensure and Renovation lab/hospital labs/hospital training; training and satisfact environmental renovations s Design and construction ory consultant of AI construction completi PIU to on of appropriate training standard and lab/hospi tal renovati ons Procure Installation Baku and Observation After To avoid M&E specialist and install and safe regional and records installation, spreading and equipment operation labs/hospital of training . before the virus Environmental of s operations consultant hired equipment by the AI PIU Quarterly thereafter

46 Annex 10

Report on Dissemination and Public Consultation on the Draft Environmental Management Plan for the Azerbaijan Avian Influenza (AI) Project

Prepared by Ayten Shirinova Local Environmental Consultant

Draft Environmental Management Plan (EMP) of the AI Project was prepared in English and Azerbaijan languages.

The cover letter was prepared and sent to the certain Ministries together with the draft EMP and summary for review, comments and confirmation of data, roles and responsibilities. The official letters with the comments and suggestions were received from the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, State Veterinary Committee and the Ministry of Health. On April 10th, 2006 the draft EMP was posted on SAAC website. The Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources was also contacted with the request to post draft EMP on its website. However, it turned out impossible at this moment as the Ministry’s web site is under the restoration. It is expected to post EMP on MOE website after restoration. Paper copies of the document were disseminated to public through the Aarhus Public Information Center of the Ministry of Environment.

Consultations with poultry growers (commercial and backyard) SAAC, Vet Services representatives regarding EMP, costs of mitigation measures were conducted and mitigation plan was completed by filling in data missed. On May 31, 2006 a public briefing and consultation on the draft EMP was held at the Caspian Environment Program office in Baku. It was attended by the representatives from the Ministries of MOE, MOH, SAAC, Veterinary Service, NGOs, local representatives of international agencies, poultry farm, poultry trader and press. The list of participants is attached. All invited people were provided with the briefing materials prior the meeting so they can actively participate.

The meeting was mediated by AI PIU Director Mr. Huseyn Huseynov, who briefly introduced goal and the agenda of the meeting, the subject of AI Project and the Environmental Management Plan prepared for it. All participants were given a chance to introduce themselves and their employer organizations.

Ms. Ayten Shirinova has made EMP power point presentation and brief main points of the document.

Then meeting was opened for Q&A and comments.

Main points outlined were:

 All actions against the virus should be taken respecting international standards.  Health legislation needs to be included in EMP

47  Mobilization and cooperation of all relevant Ministries and organizations in order to coordinate activities against the spread of the disease throughout the country.  More public awareness about issue and strengthening public involvement into the process  To consider different carcass disposal options  To develop more detailed mechanism of the monitoring and results to be reported to the public

In a conclusion all participants expressed their willingness to cooperate, to get themselves closer acquainted with the proposed AI Project and its Environmental Management Plan and to send in their comments and suggestions within a week should such comments arise.

Attached are:

 List of participants of the public briefing of the draft EMP

 Comparison Of Disposal Methods

48 Annex 1

List of Participants

Annex 2 № Name of the Participant Organization/Title Contact Phone E-mail 1 Tamilla Musayeva USAID 99412-498 18 35 ext 216 [email protected] Development Assistance Assistant Mobile: 050-204 09 34 2 Gunay Rzayeva Progma Azerbaijan Agro business Center Mobile: 050-549 02 40 [email protected] Quality Administrative 3 Eyyub Huseynov The Union of Free Consumers 99412 441 28 33 [email protected] Chairman Mobile: 050- 341 62 25 http://icu.iatp.az

4 Aydin Veliyev Poultry Association 99412 – 459 95 75 5 Agayev Sabir ANB 6 Azer Melikov IMC Mobile: 050- 375 48 91 7 Kliment Asadov State Veterinary Committee 99412- 462-64-09 Epidemiological Department Director 050-374- 56-21 8 Zakir Azimov Devechi Broler –Poultry farm – executive Director 99412-449-81-36 9 Irada Yagubova “EL” NGO, FMESA 99412- 449 81 30 10 Hashimov Hashim Ministry of Health-sector of Sanitary Epidemiological 99412-493 10 33 [email protected] Surveillance/Leading Adviser Mobile:050- 320 36 18 [email protected]

11 Anakhanum Mammadova TETA “HAZRI” NGO 99412- 462-87-89 [email protected]

12 Hasanov Tofik CA Project ADB Mobile: 050-329-29 71 [email protected]

13 Elchin Sardarov “SANIYA” - Information Agency / NGO Mobile: 050- 317 38 25 [email protected] Chairman [email protected] 14 Amy Evans World Bank 1-202-473-8018 [email protected] 15 Ayten Shirinova WB Environmental Consultant 99412-497 17 85 [email protected] 16 Husey Huseynov SAAC PIU-Director of Agricultural Department 99412-493 46 93 [email protected] 17 Masud Khatibi Agency for support to the Development of Agricultural 99412-462-77 95 [email protected] PIU – Veterinarian Specialist Mobile: 050-345 60 86 18 Ayan Mollazade UNICEF –APO, Communication 99412-492-30-13 [email protected] 99412-492-17-82 www.unicef.org/azerbaijan 19 Firuza Amirova “Our Home” NGO 99412-440 63 30 20 Sevil Yuzbashova “For Clean Caspian” -NGO 99412- 430-51 73

COMPARISON OF DISPOSAL METHODS FOR ANIMAL WASTES GENERATED FROM AVIAN INFLUENZA OUTBREAKS

ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY ADVANTAGES/ DESCRIPTION CONSIDERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS DISADVANTAGES OPTION 1: BURIAL IN A PIT Decomposition of dead birds/ carcasses Site Selection Considerations:  Use of personal protection equipment (PPE) Advantages: and other wastes through biological  Distance to watercourses, bores, and to ensure personnel hygiene and safety of  Safe disposal if environmental degradation in a pit and involves: dug wells personnel working at the site conditions are met  Excavation of a burial pit  Height of watertable (the base of the  Availability of emergency response  Risk of disseminating the virus to  Placing carcasses in a deep burial pit pit must be at least 1 m above the measures and equipment for safety breaches other sites can be avoided if  Covering carcasses and other wastes watertable) (e.g. availability of first aid and rescue burial can be done on site with soil (about 40 cm) to: (i)  Slope of the land at the burial site to equipment if the personnel falls into the pit)  Low cost prevent carcasses from rising out of the nearest watercourse (drainage to  Established and documented the pit, (ii) prevent scavengers and from the pit) cleaning/disinfection procedures Disadvantages: digging up carcasses, (iii) help filter  Soil permeability  Availability of cleaning/ disinfection  Likely to be affected by surface out odors, and (iv)absorb the fluids  Distance to human settlements and supplies/equipment water, groundwater, soil or of decomposition. public lands (including roads)  Personnel training on personnel hygiene topographical conditions  Adding an unbroken layer of slaked  Prevailing wind direction (for odor and safety measures  If transportation to an Transportation of Carcasses/Wastes to an environmentally suitable site is lime [Ca(OH)2] to protect carcasses emission) from being uncovered by carnivores  Availability of space for temporary Environmentally Suitable Site: required, then: (i) increased the and earthworms after pit closure storage of excavated soil If carcasses and other contaminated materials risk of disseminating the virus to (lime should not be placed directly  Accessibility of the burial site by need to be transported to an off-site for disposal, other sites, (ii) higher costs for on carcasses because in wet digging equipment (e.g. excavator) then: transportation and associated conditions it slows, and may prevent,  The vehicles must be leak-proof and mitigation measures decomposition) Burial Site Inspection: covered  Risk of groundwater  Closing the pit to ground level with Three (3) months after closure, inspection  The vehicles and external surfaces of contamination if site selection is soil (at least 2 meters of soil is of the burial site to identify any potential containers should not leave the culling area not appropriate required in total) problems (e.g. seepage) and take corrective without first being thoroughly cleaned/ measures. disinfected  The vehicles and internal, external Transportation-Related Waste/Wastewater surfaces of containers should be cleaned/ Treatment: disinfected after unloading carcasses and  Any wastewater generated from other wastes at the environmentally suitable cleaning/disinfection of vehicles/ site containers should be disinfected before discharge.  Any waste generated during loading

ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY ADVANTAGES/ DESCRIPTION CONSIDERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS DISADVANTAGES and unloading of vehicles as well as cleaning/disinfection of vehicles/containers should be safely disposed OPTION 2: OPEN AIR BURNING (CREMATION) This method is based on destruction of Site Selection Considerations:  Maintaining adequate fire break around the Advantages: infective pathogens, animal carcasses and  Potential adverse impacts of heat, pyre (consult local fire brigades or residents  Cremation is not affected by other wastes through thermal destruction smoke or odor on nearby people, for advice) surface water, groundwater, soil, in open air. It involves: infrastructure (structures,  Use of PPE to ensure personnel hygiene of and topographical conditions  Digging trenches, which act as air underground and aerial utilities, personnel working at the site  Low cost, compared to vents roads, etc.) and environment (e.g.  Availability of emergency response incinerator option  Placing pyre (wood) on top of trees) measures and equipment for safety breaches trenches (upwind, at right angle to  Accessibility of equipment to (e.g. availability of first aid equipment and Disadvantages: the prevailing wind direction) construct and maintain the fire and availability of fire fighting equipment and  Infective pathogens may not be  Placing carcasses and other wastes at for delivery of fuel and carcasses personnel and if fire spreads around) effectively destroyed if the opposite side  The ashes should be buried and the  Established and documented combustion of carcasses and Pouring fuel (e.g. kerosene) onto site should be restored cleaning/disinfection procedures wastes is incomplete, especially carcasses, other wastes and pyre and  Availability of cleaning/ disinfection under adverse atmospheric starting fire (adequate supply of fuel Waste Pretreatment/Containment: supplies/equipment conditions (wind, precipitation) must be at the site to ensure complete  To avoid emission of dioxins or  Personnel training on personnel hygiene  It is not possible to easily verify cremation). furans during cremation, carcasses and safety measures that all infective pathogens are should not be pretreated with a destroyed in the incomplete chlorine-bearing disinfectant or combustion process should not be contained in PVC  Air emissions from open air

bags. For the same reason, no other burning (PM, CO2) material destined for cremation  Disposal of ash from cremation should contain chlorine-bearing requires consideration for surface chemicals water, groundwater, soil and topographical conditions  Expensive than option 1 (burial) OPTION 3: COMPOSTING This method is based on thermal Site Selection Considerations:  Use of PPE to ensure personnel hygiene of Advantages: deactivation of the virus and  Must be done at the affected farm in a personnel working at the site  Effective for manure and litter decomposition of carcasses, litter and secure area not accessible by other  Availability of emergency response waste other contaminated organic wastes animals (such as birds, rodents, cats, measures and equipment for safety breaches  Can be undertaken within sheds through aerobic biological degradation. or dogs)  Established and documented or otherwise on site to avoid the Success of composting depends on: (i)  Proximity to residential areas and cleaning/disinfection procedures risks of disseminating the virus proper nutrient mix [carbon-to- nitrogen water sources (must be away)  Availability of cleaning/ disinfection through transport

ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY ADVANTAGES/ DESCRIPTION CONSIDERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS DISADVANTAGES (C:N) ratio of 20:1 to 35:1; carbon-to- supplies/equipment  No transportation cost phosphorus (C:P) ratio of 100:1 to 150:1 Personnel training on personnel hygiene and is desirable); (ii) moisture (40-60%); (iii) safety measures Disadvantages: temperature (55-60oC), and (iv) pH (6.5-  Maintaining optimum 7.2). Composting involves: temperatures for many days in  Piling carcasses with other bulky cold climate areas/seasons may contaminated or non-contaminated not be possible (or may be costly) material, such as wood chips, saw  Infective pathogens may not be dust, straw bedding, to allow for effectively destroyed if ideal proper aeration and covered with a conditions are not achieved biological filter (not whole plastic)  Risk of disseminating the virus if without pressing or compacting. the composting area is not Piling should not exceed about 3.5 m effectively secured/isolated in width and 2 m in height.  It may not be possible to easily  Collecting and treating any runoff verify that all infective pathogens water from the decomposing are destroyed material  Keeping the wastes in place for several weeks (while a temperature of 55-60oC is attained within 10 days)  After several weeks as temperatures decrease to about 45-50oC, mixing the material within the pile without pressing (Properly decomposing material should be dark in color with minimal foul odor.) Using the compost solely soil amendment only on the land of animal production unit. OPTION 5: INCINERATION (FIXED) This method is based on thermal Site Selection Considerations:  Use of PPE to ensure personnel hygiene of Advantages: destruction of infective pathogens,  Should not be in a floodplain personnel working at the site (incinerator  Complete destruction of infective carcasses and other wastes in an  Distance to human settlements operators must change their PPE before pathogens incinerator. It involves:  Human settlements upwind of the handling animal carcasses and other wastes)  Over 95% waste reduction  Transporting carcasses and other prevailing wind direction (for odors  Established and documented wastes to the incineration site before incineration and emissions cleaning/disinfection procedures Disadvantages:  Cleaning containers and vehicles from incineration)  Established and documented emergency  Complex technology which may be

ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY ADVANTAGES/ DESCRIPTION CONSIDERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS DISADVANTAGES transporting carcasses and wastes, response procedures imported to the country with treatment of the resulting Technology Requirements:  Availability of cleaning/ disinfection  High investment cost wastewaters  Incinerator at a minimum supplies/equipment  High operating cost (especially fuel  Incinerating carcasses and other temperature of 850oC and with a  Availability of emergency response cost) wastes (using fuel and air) at a high minimum residence time of 2 equipment (e.g. first aid, fire fighting)  Some spare parts may need to be temperature seconds. Temperature must be  Personnel training on personnel imported (cost and downtime of Transporting incineration residues measured and recorded. hygiene/cleaning, safety and emergency incinerator in case of AI outbreak) (bottom ash/slag and flyash) to the  Incinerator equipped with an response measures  High level of operator training disposal site and disposal at the sanitary auxiliary burner that can be switched  Regular inspections of the environment and  Scrutinized administrative landfill on when the temperature falls below equipment, with documented inspection requirements (recordkeeping, etc.) o 850 C schedules and results  The incineration facility may be too  Incinerator automatic feed system far from the location with the AI connected to temperature Transportation of Carcasses/Wastes to the outbreak, requiring extensive measurement Incineration Site: transportation of carcasses and  Site security and inaccessibility by When carcasses and other contaminated materials other wastes with infective animals (such as birds, rodents, are transported to the fixed incineration site, then: pathogens, resulting in: (i) insects and other vermin)  The vehicles must be leak-proof and increased risks of disseminating the  Storage areas for animal carcasses covered virus to other sites, and (ii) higher and other wastes as well as  The vehicles and the external surfaces of costs for transportation and incineration residues must be containers should not leave the culling area associated mitigation measures. covered. These areas must be without first being thoroughly Air emissions from the incinerator labeled and designed and operated to cleaned/disinfected (PM, SO2, CO2) prevent accidental releases of  The vehicles and internal/external surfaces polluting substances to the of containers should be cleaned/ disinfected environment. Storage capacity after unloading carcasses and other wastes provided to collect contaminated at the incineration site. stormmwater and wastewater from spillage or firefighting Transportation of Incineration Residues to the  Transportation of bottom ash/slag Disposal Site: and flyash in closed containers to  The vehicles must be covered prevent environmental releases  The vehicles and containers should not  Disposal of bottom ash/slag and leave the incineration area without first flyash in a sanitary landfill being thoroughly disinfected

Waste Pretreatment/Containment: To avoid emission of dioxins or furans during incineration, carcasses should not be pretreated with a chlorine-bearing

ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY ADVANTAGES/ DESCRIPTION CONSIDERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS DISADVANTAGES disinfectant or should not be contained in PVC bags. For the same reason, no other material destined for incineration should contain chlorine-bearing chemicals OPTION 6: INCINERATION (MOBILE) This method is based on thermal Technology Requirements:  Use of PPE to ensure personnel hygiene of Advantages: destruction of infective pathogens, animal  Incinerator at a minimum personnel working at the site (incinerator  Complete destruction of infective carcasses and other wastes in an temperature of 850oC and with a operators must change their PPE before pathogens incinerator. It involves: minimum residence time of 2 handling animal carcasses and other wastes)  Over 95% waste reduction  Transporting the mobile incinerator seconds. Temperature must be  Established and documented  Avoids the need to transport the to the culling site measured and recorded cleaning/disinfection procedures infective pathogens, carcasses, and  Incinerating carcasses and other  Incinerator equipped with an  Established and documented emergency other wastes to the incinerator (i.e. wastes (using fuel and air) at a high auxiliary burner that can be switched response procedures reduced risk of disseminating the temperature on when the temperature falls below  Availability of cleaning/ disinfection virus to other sites compared to the Transporting incineration residues 850oC supplies/equipment fixed incineration case) (bottom ash/slag and flyash) to the  Incinerator automatic feed system  Availability of emergency response disposal site and disposal at the sanitary connected to temperature equipment (e.g. first aid, fire fighting) Disadvantages: landfill measurement  Personnel training on personnel  Complex technology which may be  Storage areas for animal carcasses hygiene/cleaning, safety and emergency imported to the country and other wastes as well as response measures  High investment cost incineration residues must be  High operating cost covered. These areas must be  Some spare parts may need to be ventilated, labeled, and designed and imported (cost and downtime of operated to prevent accidental incinerator in case of AI outbreak) releases of polluting substances to  High level of operator training the environment.  Scrutinized administrative  Transportation of bottom ash/slag requirements (recordkeeping, etc.) and flyash in closed containers to  Transportation of the mobile prevent environmental releases incinerator to the culling site is  Disposal of bottom ash/slag and associated with: (i) the risk of flyash in a sanitary landfill exposing the incinerator (i.e. the investment) to damage/total loss in Waste Pretreatment/Containment: case of an accident (contributed by To avoid emission of dioxins or furans poor road conditions, severe during incineration, carcasses should not weather, etc.), and (ii) high be pretreated with a chlorine-bearing transportation cost of the incinerator disinfectant or should not be contained in to the culling site PVC bags. For the same reason, no other  Accessibility of the culling site by

ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY ADVANTAGES/ DESCRIPTION CONSIDERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS DISADVANTAGES material destined for incineration should the mobile incinerator contain chlorine-bearing chemicals Air emissions from the incinerator

(PM, SO2, CO2)