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6/9/03 EDGE Jeremy Marcus Julia Kung

The Arab League

Formation:

The Arab League, commonly known as the League of Arab States, was formed in

1945 for the purpose of giving political expression to the Arab nations. The original drive behind the league was given by the British in 1942 who hoped to rally the Arab nations against the Axis powers, however the league did not form until the final months of World War II. The original charter members were

Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan (now Jordan), Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and

Yemen. Although not an original signatory of the charter because he represented no official government, a representative of Palestinian Arabs was given full status and a vote in the Arab League.

Countries Joining in Subsequent Years:

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was granted full membership in

1976. Other current members include Algeria (1962), Bahrain (1971), Comoros

(1993), Djibouti (1977), Kuwait (1961), Libya (1953), Mauritania (1973), Morocco

(1958), Oman (1971), Qatar (1971), Somalia (1974), Southern Yemen (1967),

Sudan (1956), Tunisia (1958), and the United Arab Emirates (1971) (Full descriptions of member countries to follow).

Organization:

The league is organized into a council, special committees, and a permanent secretariat; the secretariat currently has its headquarters in Cairo. The league

1 votes with each member country having a single vote of equal weight, irrespective of its size. The constitution of the league provides for coordination among the signatory nations in the areas of education, finance, law, trade, and foreign policy, and it forbids the use of force to settle disputes among members. A joint defense treaty was signed in 1950.

Leadership

Secretary-General Amr Moussa

The secretary-general is nominated by at least two member states of the Arab

League and appointed by the council by a two-thirds majority for a five-year renewable term.

The present Secretary-General, Amr Moussa, was born in 1936 and studied law in

Cairo. He began a career in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry in 1958, where he held positions as ambassador to India and to the United Nations. From 1991 until his appointment as secretary-general in May 2001, he served as Egyptian foreign minister.

Economic Efforts

Historically, among the most important activities of the Arab League have been the coordination of Arab economic life; these efforts have included the Arab

Telecommunications Union (1953), the Arab Postal Union (1954), and the Arab

Development Bank (1959, later known as the Arab Financial Organization). The

Arab Common Market was established in 1965 and is open to all Arab League members. The common market agreement provides for the eventual abolition of customs duties on natural resources and agricultural products, free movement of

2 capital and labor among member countries, and coordination of economic development.

Historically Significant Positions:

During the inception year of the Arab league, it took a position supporting Syria and Lebanon in their disputes with France and also demanded an independent

Libya. Later, in 1961, it supported Tunisia in a conflict with France. From the beggining years the league made public its oppostion to Israel and offered its support towards the formation of a Palestinian States with a majority Arab population. Shortly after the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 the league countries jointly attacked it, but Israel resisted the multifaced attack successfully.

The league continued to maintain a boycott of Israel and of companies trading with Israel. The summit conferences of 1964–65 established a joint Arab military command, which has failed to provide a unified strategy towards the formation of a State of Palestine.

Egypt's membership in the League was suspended from 1979 to 1989 because of its treaty with Israel, and the league's headquarters were temporarily moved to Tunis. In 1988, the league endorsed the PLO's plan for a negotiated settlement with Israel, and therefore returned its headquarters to Cairo in 1991.

After much debate, the league ultimately supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq

War (1980-88). However the league remained divided over the Iraq’s invasion of

Kuwait in 1990 and the ensuing Persian Gulf War.

Arab League Response to American Threats

3 In assessing the future of the Arab League before the recent war, Arab analysts have freely acknowledged that the future of the Arab League “largely depends on the way it deals with the Iraqi crisis.” (Yunfei) As Sayed Eliwa, political science professor of the elite Egyptian Helwan University, explains,

“Undoubtedly, the Arab League is now standing at a crossing. It has to work on two fronts: healing rifts between member states internally while safeguarding the interests of the Arab nations externally.”

However, in considering the response of the Arab League to the Iraqi crises, the need for major reforms becomes apparent. The recent Iraqi crises demonstrated, on a world stage, the weaknesses and disunity of the Arab League.

As Qatar’s foreign minister Sheikh Hammad bin Jassem remarked, “our meetings

[the Arab League’s] are ceremonial and we don’t have a defined target.”

The Arab League originally reacted to the crisis in Iraq by attempting to persuade the Iraqis to comply with the UN resolutions. Arab League chief Amr

Moussa explained that an Iraqi acceptance of the UN resolutions “will bring us away from a war and near to a political solution that would represent a full compliance by Iraq with the UN Security Council resolution.” (Yunfei) The Arab

League held emergency meetings and had leading member states visit Iraq all in efforts to coordinate a common stance against the US led war in Iraq and promote a strategy to avoid such a war. The Arab leaders felt that any war in the area would further destabilize an already worsening situation in the Middle East.

In the weeks prior to the war the leaders of the Arab League “came out strongly against war in Iraq, asking Arab nations not to participate in such a war but also calling on Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to comply fully and completely with

4 all U.N. resolutions.” (CNN, 3/2/03) While the leaders of the Arab League came out with this position, there was little unity in reaching this decision, and support for the position was not complete.

In the months leading up to the eventual war there was a distinct lack of unity among the nations of the Arab League. One notable confrontation evolved between Iraq and Kuwait. On December 7th, 2002, Iraq issued an apology to

Kuwait for the events of a decade earlier, the invasion of Kuwait that precipitated the Gulf War. Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader, sent the following message to

Kuwait: “We apologize for what happened to you in the past,” while further proposing that the “devoted and holy warriors in Kuwait” join with the Iraqi forces and their “common creator” against the “infidel armies of London,

Washington and the Zionist entity.”

However Kuwait, instead of welcoming this apology and joining forces with Iraq as Saddam had hoped, instead labeled the apology as “efforts to create disorder amongst the leadership and people of Kuwait.” Arab League chief

Moussa declined any involvement in the Iraq Kuwait issue, responding to questions about the confrontation by stating: “It is not obliged for the Arab

League to make any statement on what Saddam is talking about. My stance is clear that it is imperative for Iraq to comply with the UN Security Council resolutions.” This example illustrates the hesitation that the Arab League had shown in attempting to resolve any conflict within its member nations. By completely avoiding the issue, the Arab League let the hostility between the nations grow which led to further complications as the war approached.

5 In the weeks prior to the war, Kuwaiti and Iraqi delegates were openly insulting one another at Arab League meetings. The Iraqi delegate at one point even went as far as publicly stating, “Shut up, you monkey. A curse upon your mustache [honor], you traitor.” Certainly when one is invoking primates and speaking of another delegate’s mustache, things have gotten far out of hand.

An additional factor creating tensions and mistrust within the Arab League in the months leading up to the war was the situation in the Middle East between the Israelis and the Palestinians. According to columnist Liu Yunfei, “The negative factors to the Mideast peace process [dealt] a heavy blow to confidence on the side of the Arabs, and consequently channels criticism to the Arab

League.” Sayed Eliwa, political science professor of the Egyptian Helwan

University, further explains that “Many Arabs are getting much more disappointed that a host of resolutions and statements could not be translated into actions.” This mounting disappointment could clearly be seen in the actions of the member countries in the months leading up to the war.

For example, on October 24th, 2003, Libya informed the Arab League of its intentions to quit the league because of the displayed inefficiency in dealing with

Arab issues, especially the Palesinian-Israeli conflict and the Iraqi Crisis. Libyan leader Omar Muammar Ghaddafi states, “Why should we remain as a member of an ineffective organization?” Reports later surfaced that Qatar intended to follow

Libya’s example and leave the league as well. However, in November Libya reversed its position and decided to remain a member of the league. The Libyans concluded that in the time of crisis leading up to the Iraqi war, that “despite some

6 limits, the Arab League is required to play an even more effective role at a time when the Arab nation is facing dangers.”

However Libya was not done creating rifts within the Arab League. In an ironically named “Unity Summit” in the beginning of March, Libyan President

Muammar Ghaddafi blamed Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and others for involving the

US in the area twelve years prior in the Gulf War, which he claimed was the source of the current Iraqi conflict. Gadhafi had previously accused Saudi Arabia of entering into "a pact with the devil" by inviting US troops to defend its territory in 1990. Gadhafi’s comments at the summit prompted the Saudi, Iraqi, and

Syrian leaders to immediately leave the room and respond harshly to the comments, accusing the Libyan leader of ignorance. The Saudi representative further called Libya an “agent for colonizers.” This series of insults prevented anything constructive from happening for the day at the conference, as the major issues were forgotten in a series of insults. Furthermore, the conference was broadcast live on Arab satellite television, making the disunity and arguments within the Arab League public for the whole Arab world to witness. In Saudi

Arabia, Khaled al-Maeena, editor of the Arab News, said he was “shocked, appalled and saddened by the news.” "I felt embarrassed," he said. "In front of the world we've become a laughing stock. The Arab people are disappointed and confused…The spat took the steam off the main thrust, which was the Iraq issue."

Furthermore, The United Arab Emirates caused an additional stir at the same summit when it called for Saddam Hussein to surrender power and leave

Iraq. The proposal requested that “The Arab League, in cooperation with the

U.N. secretary-general, should supervise the situation in Iraq for an interim

7 period during which all necessary measures are taken in order to return the situation to its normal situation according to the will of the brotherly Iraqi people.” While many in the Arab world were calling for a unified front against the incursion by the Western powers, others were advocating surrender to the demands of the West. Moussa responded to this proposal by stating that it was not considered an official request and it “was excluded from the consideration of the council.” The proposal was generally publicly ignored at the conference, in spite of the fact that it was well known such ideas had been floated around several of the countries individually for several weeks. In response to this, the Emirati information minister grumbled that the Arab League "didn't have the courage" to respond to the proposal. However the Iraqis responded to this proposal angrily.

In New York, Mohammed Aldouri, Iraq’s Ambassador to the United nations, said

Saddam’s relinquishing power was “not at all” likely. He further called the proposal by the UAE “silly”. At the summit, an angry Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji

Sabri said that the proposal was not discussed because the “summit does not discuss silly, dirty, trivial ideas.” Without further elaboration, Sabri claimed that the United States and Israel were the real authors of the proposal.

While the above mentioned Unity Summit was intended to consolidate the

Arab voice in a position regarding the potential for a war in Iraq, due to the diversity of opinions, no strong statement was reached. Different countries came to the summit with very different positions. Some countries - particularly in the

Persian Gulf – argued at the summit that war was inevitable and said that the region should be planning for the aftermath. A second camp, including Egypt and

Saudi Arabia, insisted that war could be avoided if Iraq cooperated fully with

8 U.N. weapons inspectors. A third camp - led by Syria - wanted the summit to make an unequivocal anti-war declaration. The end result was simply a weak declaration against military action, a compromise not satisfying to any of the camps. Different camps also branded each other, with the Egyptians commenting on the UAE plan, “It is just like one of these Gulf states to criticize the rest of us and come up with this kind of a plan," referring to the plan encouraging Saddam to step down from power and go into exile.

These arguments and diversities of opinions prevented the Arab League from reaching a consensus in the months leading up to the eventual invasion by allied forces. Altercations such as the problems with Libya, Kuwait, the UAE, and others marred the attempts for the Arab League to act as a unified body in their response to the threat of the war.

This weakness and disunity currently exhibited by the Arab League is not a new phenomenon. Prior to the Gulf War in 1990 there was a meeting of the Arab

League in Cairo also intended to achieve a peaceful resolution to a conflict involving Iraq, that time because of their invasion of Kuwait. However, this summit nearly ended in a fistfight between the Iraqi and Kuwaiti foreign ministers, and did nothing to stave off the war.

One of the major dividing points for the Arab nation leading up to the recent war was the various levels and types of involvements different countries had with the United States. Many of the Arab nations were in one of two conditions: dependant on US aid, like Egypt, or dependant on American protection, like Saudi Arabia. Therefore these countries did not have the freedom to come out with a hard stance against the American action even if this is what

9 they believed. While certain states such as Syria tried to push a hard line against

America, they could not get the support behind this from the rest of the members of the Arab League. For example, Syria called for a hard line before the invasion, calling for a resolution for all member nations not to open their territory for U.S. military use. However the resolution adopted by the League called only for no direct participation in a military attack. Clearly the various degrees of involvement with the United States inhibited the unity and functioning of the

Arab League.

A final demonstration of the ineffectiveness of the Arab League was seen in the weeks leading up to the war. In a last attempt to prevent another war in the region, the Arab League organized a high level peace delegation to visit Baghdad.

The delegations were to consist of foreign ministers from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria,

Tunisia, and Baharain, in addition to the Arab League secretary General, Amr

Moussa. However Iraq first informed the delegation that it wished to delay its arrival, and finally cancelled the trip all together.

In Iraq’s memorandum to the Arab League on the reasons for the cancellation of the trip, Iraq cited developments pertaining to the growing threat of a United States led war on the country as the reason for Baghdad’s sudden decision not to host the Arab League delegation. The Arab League expressed

“deep regret” over Iraq’s decision. Iraq’s logic in canceling the trip serves as a signifier as to the weakness of the Arab League. In a time of crisis when the league was attempting to reach out and help one of its member delegations, it was refused on the basis of the crisis. It is clear that the Arab League is not the body

10 that Arab nations turn to in times of crisis for support, but rather an entity not to be trusted.

Furthermore, this problem spreads beyond Iraq’s attitude. Two other member countries, Lebanon and Syria, had raised serious questions about the purpose of the delegation’s visit, and had threatened to pull out of the committee.

Additionally, Syria is alleged to have advised Iraq to refuse the visit. The conflict over the delegation’s visit stemmed from the controversy over the message the

Arab League members wished the delegation to convey to Iraq. Several Gulf countries allegedly wished Saddam to abdicate power and go into exile to spare the region another war, while others disagreed with this request and refused to be associated with a delegation containing this message. The delegation representing the views of the Arab League insisted that persuading the Iraqi leader to abdicate was never part of the delegation’s mission, and said that the purpose of the trip to Baghdad was to relay to Iraqi leaders the Arab summit’s message. The main thrust of this message was the call for full Iraqi compliance with the United Nations Resolution 1441. The confusion over this visit and its eventual refusal exhibit the disorganization of the Arab League, the vast disagreement between its members, and the lack of power the league holds, as one of its members would refuse a peace delegation representing several of the other nations.

Reaction of the Arab League During the War

For the duration of the war the Arab League showed a marked increase in unity, however still exhibited many signs of dissent and anger. According to the

11 Associate Press, on March 24th after the beginning of the war, the Arab League

“after a meeting marred by deep divisions…called for the United States and

Britain to withdraw their troops from Iraq immediately and without conditions.”

(El-Magd) However this simple resolution still failed to win unanimous support, as Kuwait failed to sign based on the omission of any content surrounding ten missiles Iraq had fired onto its soil.

Additionally, the meeting did not proceed without other conflicts. Much of these conflicts arose due to the fact that while many Arab League nations condemned the attack by the United States, other member nations were supporting U.S. troops. For example, the Libyan representative, Ali al-Treiki warned that “if Iraq is to fall, many Arab countries will fall as well.” He further stressed that if the United States managed to oust Saddam Hussein it would set a negative precedent that might put the regions other undemocratic regimes at risk. Throughout this speech both the Kuwaiti and Qatari foreign ministers sat in silence, as both countries have aided and hosted U.S. troops. The Qatari minister’s only comment to reporters afterwards was “It would have been better concentrating on practical solutions to find a way out.” The Arab League found it difficult to agree on a simple condemnation of the war, even though widespread popular anger in the member countries is prevalent. This shared anger has “not managed to bring Arab states together over the Iraqi crisis.” (El-Magd) Much of the blame for this must fall on the inabilities of the Arab League to generate effective discourse. According to the Associate Press, “Attempts to discuss the

U.S. invasion at high-level meetings this month led to public exchanges of insults between Iraqi, Libyan, Saudi, and Kuwaiti delegates.”

12 For obvious reasons, the Iraqi delegate was the most frustrated by the inability of the Arab League to come to a joint resolution backing Iraq. Iraqi foreign minister Naji Sabri accused those Arab countries that were hosting U.S. led forces of “stabbing the Iraqi people in the back.” Sabri went on to say that he wished for a “unified stance from Arabs…to condemn this occupation, to stop the war immediately and withdraw the invaders.”

However even as the Arab League finally reached near unanimity (all except Kuwait) condemning the attack, the resolution they agreed upon called for almost no action. The resolution stated that the Arab League would request an urgent session of the U.N. Security Council. It further stated that if the request was not granted, they would call for the U.N. General Assembly to hold an emergency session on the war.

While Iraq was pleased with the ideals of the statement, it did not get any action that it had hoped for. Iraqi foreign minister Sabri was pleased with the wording, saying that the resolution “represents the consensus of the Arab community – that no Arab country participates in the crime of imperialist aggression against Iraq.” However the Libyan President summed up the actions well when he stated that “our decisions in this summit, and other summits, are less than the ambitions of our people.” While the people in many of these countries wish for action, the Arab League commits itself to nothing besides an idealistic opposition to the war, a stance that is frustrating for member countries that would like a harder stance and a plan of action. Arab League Secretary

General Amr Moussa stated in conclusion that “Requesting an urgent meeting [of the U.N. Security Council] is our action.” In a time of war, for a group

13 representing the sum of the Arab powers when a member country is under attack from an outside force, this is a very weak action, further exhibiting the limits of power of the Arab League.

Economic Woes

Amid the international political turmoil, the world’s economic woes also raged. In the United States recession hit and unemployment rose. While the causes of the recession were probably numerous, a fairly obvious source arises from the world’s disapproval at the U.S’s aggression in Iraq. As Arab funded foreign investment in the U.S. withdrew post September 11th, the American economy faced its first slump. However, on the cusp of recovery, the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq created a full-fledged “double-dip” recession as foreign investment in the U.S. from all over the world continued to be withdrawn and caused a second plunge in the economy to occur. As the dollar continues to fall because of the U.S’s growing deficit on current account (the broadest measure of trade, including services, like tourism, and dividends), foreign investment will also continue to fall; the shrinking dollar would appear to be a foolhardy investment. (Campbell)

Outside of investment in the U.S’s market or currency, entities the world over seem to be eschewing American products and services as well. A case study that illustrates the situation is the ongoing battle between the U.S.’s Boeing and

France’s Airbus. Due to the wobbly travel and airline industry, Boeing and

Airbus’ battle has become more acute. For the third time in the past four years,

Airbus beat Boeing in terms of number of orders in 2002. (Wallace) Boeing

14 commercial executives have maintained that deliveries, not orders, are a better measure of how Boeing stacks up against Airbus, because orders can be canceled a year or more after they are placed. However, while both companies posted losses in the first quarter of 2003, Boeing’s losses, at $478 million, far exceeded the $105 million in losses posted by Airbus.

A theory to explain Boeing’s continued losses to its European rival in a market with an essentially undifferentiated product is a silent boycott on

American products. The order that pushed Airbus into the lead in fiscal year

2002 was made by EasyJet, for 120 planes. (Wallace) EasyJet, Europe’s premier discount airline, formerly operated Boeing 737s, but the deal with Airbus, signed on December 30 of 2002 and just making it into the annual report, was a clear slap in the face to Boeing and American industry, as tensions mounted over

America’s increasingly hostile stance.

As the American economic situation shows, the U.S. is not invulnerable.

The dollar’s continued loss to the European Union’s euro demonstrates clearly that the U.S. would not be able stand another powerful unified front. The Arab

League, although in no position to do so now, could become this threat.

After the War and the Future of the Arab League

As talk about the reconstruction of Iraq began following the war, debates raged over the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the role of all the parties involved, including the Iraqi people, the Arab League, the United Nations and the United

States. The previous U.N. “oil- for-food” program was awash in accusations of

Hussein’s corruption as well as corruption on the part of the U.N. The “oil-for-

15 food” program was designed to offset civilian suffering under the economic sanctions the U.N. imposed after the 1990 Iraq invasion of Kuwait. According to

Benon Sevan who runs the program, more than 90 percent of Iraqis survived on the U.N. food basket and medical supplies. Sixty percent used to sell part of their rations to pay for other essential needs, because it was their only source of income. the program was suspended March 17th and the U.S. led assault began on

March 20th. (Lederer) After the war, while some parties called for an expansion of the role of “oil-for-food” to achieve a reconstruction like that which followed the bloody East Timor revolutions, others (namely the U.S. administration) called for a lifting of U.N sanctions upon which “oil-for food” depended. In an effort to get aid to Iraq quickly , on April 24th, the Security Council voted unanimously to extend U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s authority to speed additional food and medicine to the Iraqi people till June 3rd. (Lederer) On May 22nd, after pressure from the U.S. and negotiations between the U.S. and opposing powers within the Security Council, such as Russia and Germany, the U.N. lifted 12 years of sanctions on Iraq.

Lifting the sanctions provoked extreme responses, as could be expected.

While Iraqis and most Arabs declare the institution of the sanctions after the Gulf

War unjust, their suspension gave cause for another outrage. U.S. Secretary of the

Treasury John Snow gave a press conference to announce the U.S.’s lifting of the sanctions declaring “Today marks a new beginning for a liberated Iraq. Saddam

Hussein’s regime and the command economy that he forced upon the Iraqi people is now merely a painful memory” (Federal News Service). One glaring discrepancy is evident in Secretary Snow’s statement. While a sanction-free Iraq

16 will create free-trade and support a “liberated Iraq,” the sanctions were imposed by the U.N. with the U.S.’s overwhelming support, and these sanctions were the foremost barrier to trade, not Hussein’s “command economy.” As a further example, Snow went on to say “As other nations follow the lead of the United

States, and implement, as we have today, the resolution passed by the U.N.

Security Council last Thursday, the people of Iraq can look forward to an end to the crippling economic deprivations they have suffered under the Saddam

Hussein regime.” In Secretary Snow’s statement, he attempts to conflate

Hussein’s regime and the sanctions themselves, in effect making them synonymous. That Snow even begins the first quote from above with “today,” that is, the day that the U.S. lifted sanctions, as opposed to the day that the U.N. approved sanctions, or the day when all sanctions on Iraq had been lifted the world over, is telling. It is a complicit allowance that the U.S. played a large role in keeping Iraq out of the world economy, and is now playing a large role in re- introducing Iraq, albeit on the U.S.’s terms.

Snow’s interpretation of the results from lifting of sanctions contrast strongly with opinions expressed by members of the Arab world. Snow declared:

“…Iraq will trade freely. Trade, and the opportunities and resources that come with it, will unleash the forces of the free market, bringing a better life to the Iraqi people, a richer life and a fuller life; a life full of many more opportunities for abundance.” (Federal News Service, 5/27/03) Compare Snow’s words with an excerpt from an article written by Abu

Nimma in the Amman daily, al-Ra’i, June 2nd 2003.:

“Except for lifting sanctions (which had been unjustly and unfairly imposed upon Iraq for more than 12 years, and which were not

17 lifted as a favor to the Iraqi people, but to facilitate the plunder of the country by its present occupiers), 1483 was an appalling example of submission [of the Security Council] to [America’s] brute force… Many had hoped the Security Council would maintain its courageous stance until the rule of law could be enforced in a country weakened by war and sanctions. But all hopes were dashed on May 22 with the approval of Resolution 1483, a document full of contradictions and violations. 1483 was an example of [the Security Council’s] weakness, opportunism and shameful submission to blackmail.” (al-Ra’i, 6/2/2003)

Nimma’s response certainly implies some bullying and underhanded negotiations on the part of the U.S. to reach U.N. approval of Resolution 1483. At the same time, the lack of U.S. press on the Security Council’s turnaround seems suspect. Both France and Germany, major opponents to the U.S.’s invasion of

Iraq supported the U.S.’s proposition to lift sanctions. While the U.S. press offered that Schroeder was “eager to heal the deep rift with Washington over his vocal opposition to the Iraq war,” (AFX News Limited) no explanation could be found for France’s turnaround. France had been an one of Iraq’s top trading partners under the “oil-for-food” program so a huge amount of incentive must have been given for them to sign. (Xinhua, 4/2/2003) Additionally, Bush has not been in contact with Schroeder since November and does not plan to do so.

However, Bush did have time to meet with Roland Koch, Germany’s prominent conservative opposition leader the day before Powell met with Schroeder. Such a move on Bush’s part could certainly seem threatening to Schroeder and the future of his party in Germany.

Meanwhile the Arab League has failed to take a realistic position on the reconstruction of Iraq. It has not discussed any humanitarian aid plan and has not discussed what role the Arabs would play in reconstruction. Furthermore, no

18 member-state has dared discuss democracy in debating the new Iraqi government’s future. It has even become a taboo for Middle Eastern journalists to propose that their may be beneficial outcomes to the war. Hala Mustafa, an analyst at the Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo said she was struck by the Arabs’ unwillingness to debate “What next?” and their failure to offer creative responses to the opportunities and dangers presented by

Hussein’s overthrow. Emad Shahin, an Arab specialist at the American University in Cairo said the current crisis offers the 22-member Arab League an opportunity to regain relevancy by formulating a common strategy on Iraq. (Lamb)

Unfortunately, the Arab League has failed to take advantage of this bid for legitimacy by failing to address the pertinent issues.

While the world fights over Iraq’s future, the future of the Arab League and Arab relations with the rest of the world are, as could be predicted, in a state of flux stemming from mistrust on all sides and disagreement from within the

Arab League as well as the Western powers. In an interview from April 1, 2003,

Arab League Secretary- General, Amr Moussa questioned the League’s future after divisions over Iraq. The interview took place with a London-based Arabic paper, Al Sharq al-Awsat. During the interview Moussa expressed the belief that war would not have broken out had the Arabs adopted a unified position. The war had brought out such deep divisions that Moussa himself expressed apathy over whether or not the Arab League would survive. He stated, “Arab states wanted the war and I do not care if the Arab League remains or goes.” Moussa went further to make a distinction between the administration’s positions and the desires of the people. As he said “The Arab [nations] are not united, the people

19 are. All Arab people reject the war.” Responding to queries on the Arab league’s future, Moussa declared that the Arab League could be reorganized in another form. He made a comparison with the League of Nations’ dissolution with World

War II that led to the formation of the United Nations. According to Moussa, the current goal of the Arab League should be to protect the regional and strategic interests of the Arab states which could potentially be more effectively achieved under the auspices of a different organization. He pointed to the “two big shakes” that have jolted the Arab system, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and “the failure” there, and the Iraqi events.

Now that simultaneous seeming solutions, or at least respites from the

“two big shakes” have occurred-- reconstruction of Iraq has begun and Sharon has approved the formation of a new Palestinian state-- initiation of the reform process for the Arab League has also been declared. On May 29th, Agence France

Presse reported a meeting to take place in Cairo on June 15-16 to begin a six month study of reforms aimed at saving the Arab League. The committee’s task is to draft a consensus formula on the development of the organization using proposals floated from Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia among others. The article noted that several of the proposals posited the European Union’s structure as a model.

Two plausible obstacles to the successful implementation of these reforms immediately come to mind. Firstly, within the charter of the Arab League, Article

VII states that “Unanimous decisions of the Council shall be binding upon all member-states of the League; majority decisions shall be binding only upon those states which have accepted them” [see appendix]. Thus, to accept the reforms, the

20 Arab League must be unanimously in favor of them, which given the disunity within the League, seems unlikely. Second, and a less direct impediment, but as confounding, is the discrepancy between proposed models based on the

European Union and the preexisting Arab League and member states’ governments. European governments, after much experimentation, have by in large settled on some form of socialist-democracy which enables more equality for the citizens as well as transparency between the administrations and the citizens. Although this may be a generalization, it can be stated that Arab nations in general have not enjoyed as many rights in alignment with democracy as those of European nations.

Another unique and integral aspect to the unity of the European Union outside of the common market, which probably could be achieved by the Arab states since tariffs between member states are already quite low for the most part, is the Euro. A single currency between the member states of the Arab League could not be achieved unless all the members were at approximately the same level of economic security, had the same amount of debt, inflation, etc. A quick look at the appendix’s Arab League’s member states’ vital statistics makes it quite obvious that the members are not at any sort of consistent level of economic stability. A transition into a European Union style form of umbrella governance will have to take time and must go adjustments to suit the Arab world. An estimation of the functional end- result would predict little actual resemblance to the Union.

A possible alternative to solely reforming the Arab League is the possibility of a collaboration with the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Iranian

21 president, Mohammad Khatami said that “the two international organizations should lobby for putting aside the minor differences among Muslim nations and mobilize their efforts to deal with common threats” (World News, 5/29/03). His further hope for such a collaboration is that Islamic nations could foster democracy without the influence of Western powers.

While America has proven their military dominance in the Gulf war and recent conflict, and also shown economic and political dominance through obtaining an economic stronghold in the Middle East, with the recent struggles in the U.S. economy, we’ve seen how dependent America has become on the global market. Therefore with the large numbers of Arabs and sympathizers’ abilities to influence world wide opinion, the Arabs if unified, would have the power to severely affect the U.S.’s position in the global hierarchy, and become a body which demands the respect of both its own people and the rest of the world.

22 APPENDIX: A- Member Country Information:

Algeria – Joined 1962

Area: total: 2,381,740 sq km Population: 30,480,793 (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: Arab-Berber 99%, European less than 1% Religions: Sunni Muslim (state religion) 99%, Christian and Jewish 1% Languages: Arabic (official), French, Berber dialects Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 61.6% male: 73.9% female: 49% (1995 est.) Government type: republic Independence: 5 July 1962 (from France) Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal Executive branch: chief of state: President Liamine ZEROUAL (appointed president 31 January 1994, elected president 16 November 1995) head of government: Prime Minister Ahmed OUYAHIA (since 31 December 1995) GDP: purchasing power parity—$120.4 billion (1997 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$4,000 (1997 est.) Debt—external: $33 billion (1997 est.) Economic aid: recipient: ODA, $420 million (1996) Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 4,871,931 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $1.3 billion (1994) Military expenditures—percent of GDP: 2.7% (1994) Disputes—international: part of southeastern region claimed by Libya

Bahrain joined 1971

Area: total: 620 sq km Population: 616,342 (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: Bahraini 63%, Asian 13%, other Arab 10%, Iranian 8%, other 6% Religions: Shi'a Muslim 75%, Sunni Muslim 25% Languages: Arabic, English, Farsi, Urdu Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 85.2% male: 89.1% female: 79.4% (1995 est.) Government type: traditional monarchy Independence: 15 August 1971 (from UK) Constitution: 26 May 1973, effective 6 December 1973

23 Suffrage: none Executive branch: chief of state: Amir ISA bin Salman Al Khalifa (since 2 November 1961); Heir Apparent HAMAD bin Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa (son of the Amir, born 28 January 1949) head of government: Prime Minister KHALIFA bin Salman Al Khalifa (since 19 January 1970) GDP: purchasing power parity—$8.2 billion (1997 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$13,700 (1997 est.) Debt—external: $3.2 billion (1995) Economic aid: $NA Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 120,753 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $256 million (1994) Military expenditures—percent of GDP: 5.4% (1995) Disputes—international: territorial dispute with Qatar over the Hawar Islands and maritime boundary dispute with Qatar currently before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)

Comoros joined 1993

Area: total: 2,170 sq km Population: 545,528 (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: Antalote, Cafre, Makoa, Oimatsaha, Sakalava Religions: Sunni Muslim 86%, Roman Catholic 14% Languages: Arabic (official), French (official), Comoran (a blend of Swahili and Arabic) Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 57.3% male: 64.2% female: 50.4% (1995 est.) Government type: independent republic Independence: 6 July 1975 (from France) Constitution: 20 October 1996 Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal Executive branch: chief of state: President Mohamed TAKI Abdulkarim (since 16 March 1996) head of government: Prime Minister Nourdine BOURHANE (since 6 December 1997) GDP: purchasing power parity—$400 million (1997 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$685 (1997 est.) Debt—external: $219 million (1996 est.) Economic aid: recipient: ODA, $NA Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 76,991 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $3 million (1994 est.) Military expenditures—percent of GDP: NA% Disputes—international: claims French-administered Mayotte

Djibouti joined 1977

Area: total: 22,000 sq km Population: 440,727 (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: Somali 60%, Afar 35%, French, Arab, Ethiopian, and Italian 5% Religions: Muslim 94%, Christian 6% Languages: French (official), Arabic (official), Somali, Afar Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write

24 total population: 46.2% male: 60.3% female: 32.7% (1995 est.) Government type: republic Independence: 27 June 1977 (from France) Constitution: multiparty constitution approved in referendum 4 September 1992 Executive branch: chief of state: President HASSAN GOULED Aptidon (since 24 June 1977) head of government: Prime Minister BARKAT Gourad Hamadou (since 30 September 1978) GDP: purchasing power parity—$520 million (1997 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$1,200 (1997 est.) Debt—external: $276 million (1996 est.) Economic aid: recipient: ODA, $NA Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 61,319 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $26 million (1989) Military expenditures—percent of GDP: NA% Disputes—international: none

Egypt joined 1945

Area: total: 1,001,450 sq km Population: 66,050,004 (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: Eastern Hamitic stock (Egyptians, Bedouins, and Berbers) 99%, Greek, Nubian, Armenian, other European (primarily Italian and French) 1% Religions: Muslim (mostly Sunni) 94% (official estimate), Coptic Christian and other 6% (official estimate) Languages: Arabic (official), English and French widely understood by educated classes Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 51.4% male: 63.6% female: 38.8% (1995 est.) Government type: republic Independence: 28 February 1922 (from UK) Constitution: 11 September 1971 Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal and compulsory Executive branch: chief of state: President Mohammed Hosni MUBARAK (since 14 October 1981) head of government: Prime Minister Kamal Ahmed El-GANZOURI (since 4 January 1996) GDP: purchasing power parity—$267.1 billion (1997 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$4,400 (1997 est.) Debt—external: $30.5 billion (1996/97 est.) Economic aid: recipient: ODA, $1.713 billion (1993) Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 11,247,896 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $3.28 billion (FY95/96) Military expenditures—percent of GDP: 8.2% (FY95/96) Disputes—international: administrative boundary with Sudan does not coincide with international boundary creating the "Hala'ib Triangle," a barren area of 20,580 sq km

Iraq joined 1945

25 Area: total: 437,072 sq km Population: 21,722,287 (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkoman, Assyrian or other 5% Religions: Muslim 97% (Shi'a 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), Christian or other 3% Languages: Arabic, Kurdish (official in Kurdish regions), Assyrian, Armenian Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 58% male: 70.7% female: 45% (1995 est.) Government type: republic Independence: 3 October 1932 (from League of Nations mandate under British administration) Constitution: 22 September 1968, effective 16 July 1970 (provisional Constitution); new constitution drafted in 1990 but not adopted Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal Executive branch: N/A GDP: purchasing power parity—$42.8 billion (1997 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$2,000 (1997 est.) Debt—external: very heavy relative to GDP but amount unknown (1996) Economic aid: recipient: ODA, $NA Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 2,941,014 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $NA Military expenditures—percent of GDP: NA% Disputes—international: N/A

Jordan joined 1945

Area: total: 89,213 sq km Population: 4,434,978 (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: Arab 98%, Circassian 1%, Armenian 1% Religions: Sunni Muslim 96%, Christian 4% (1997 est.) Languages: Arabic (official), English widely understood among upper and middle classes Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 86.6% male: 93.4% female: 79.4% (1995 est.) Government type: constitutional monarchy Independence: 25 May 1946 (from League of Nations mandate under British administration) Constitution: 8 January 1952 Suffrage: 20 years of age; universal Executive branch: chief of state: King Abdullah bin Hussein bin Talal Al-Hashimi (since 11 February 1999) head of government: Prime Minister Abd al-Salam al-MAJALI (since 19 March 1997) GDP: purchasing power parity—$20.7 billion (1997 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$4,800 (1997 est.) Debt—external: $7.3 billion (1997 est.) Economic aid: recipient: ODA, $424 million (1996) Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 766,973 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $627 million (1997 est.)

26 Military expenditures—percent of GDP: 7.8% (1997) Disputes—international: none

Kuwait joined 1961

Area: total: 17,820 sq km Population: 1,913,285 (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: Kuwaiti 45%, other Arab 35%, South Asian 9%, Iranian 4%, other 7% Religions: Muslim 85% (Sunni 45%, Shi'a 40%), Christian, Hindu, Parsi, and other 15% Languages: Arabic (official), English widely spoken Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 78.6% male: 82.2% female: 74.9% (1995 est.) Government type: nominal constitutional monarchy Independence: 19 June 1961 (from UK) Constitution: approved and promulgated 11 November 1962 Suffrage: adult males who have been naturalized for 30 years or more or have resided in Kuwait since before 1920 and their male descendants at age 21 note: only 10% of all citizens are eligible to vote; in 1996, naturalized citizens who do not meet the pre-1920 qualification but have been naturalized for 30 years were eligible to vote for the first time Executive branch: chief of state: Amir JABIR al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah (since 31 December 1977) head of government: Prime Minister and Crown Prince SAAD al-Abdallah al-Salim Al Sabah (since 8 February 1978); GDP: purchasing power parity—$46.3 billion (1997 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$22,300 (1997 est.) Debt—external: $8 billion (1995 est.) Economic aid: $NA Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 409,563 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $3.5 billion (FY95/96) Military expenditures—percent of GDP: 12.8% (FY95/96) Disputes—international: in November 1994, Iraq formally accepted the UN-demarcated border with Kuwait which had been spelled out in Security Council Resolutions 687 (1991), 773 (1993), and 883 (1993); this formally ends earlier claims to Kuwait and to Bubiyan and Warbah islands; ownership of Qaruh and Umm al Maradim islands disputed by Saudi Arabia

Lebanon joined 1945

Area: total: 10,452 sq km Population: 3,806,795 (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: Arab 98%, Armenian 1%, other 1% Religions: Islam 71% (5 legally recognized Islamic groups - Shi'a, Sunni, Alawite or Nusayri, Druze, Isma'ilite), Christian 29% (11 legally recognized Christian groups—4 Orthodox Christian, 6 Catholic, 1 Protestant), Judaism NEGL% Languages: Arabic (official), French, English, Armenian spoken by Armenian minority. Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 88.4% male: 90.8%

27 female: 82.2% (1997 est.) Government type: republic Independence: 22 November 1943 (from League of Nations mandate under French administration) Constitution: 23 May 1926, amended a number of times Suffrage: 21 years of age; compulsory for all males; authorized for women at age 21 with elementary education Executive branch: chief of state: President Emile Lahoud (since 24 November 1998) head of government: Prime Minister Salim Al-Hoss (since 22 January1998) GDP: purchasing power parity—$15.2 billion (1997 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$4,400 (1997 est.) Debt—external: $2.3 billion (1997 est.) Economic aid: recipient: aid pledges of $3.5 billion for 1997-2001 Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 558,774 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $445 million (1997) Military expenditures—percent of GDP: 5% (1997) Disputes—international: Israeli troops in part of southern Lebanon (Shebaa Farms) since June 1967, recently withdrawn.

Libya joined 1953 Area: total: 1,759,540 sq km Population: 5,690,727 (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: Berber and Arab 97%, Greeks, Maltese, Italians, Egyptians, Pakistanis, Turks, Indians, Tunisians Religions: Sunni Muslim 97% Languages: Arabic, Italian, English, all are widely understood in the major cities Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 76.2% male: 87.9% female: 63% (1995 est.) Government type: Jamahiriya (a state of the masses) in theory, governed by the populace through local councils; in fact, a military dictatorship Independence: 24 December 1951 (from Italy) Constitution: 11 December 1969, amended 2 March 1977 Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal and compulsory Executive branch: chief of state: Revolutionary Leader Col. Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI (since 1 September 1969); note—holds no official title, but is de facto chief of state head of government: Secretary of the General People's Committee (Premier) Muhammad Ahmad al-MANQUSH (since NA January 1998) GDP: purchasing power parity—$38 billion (1997 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$6,700 (1997 est.) Debt—external: $2.6 billion excluding military debt (1995 est.) Economic aid: $NA Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 731,963 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $1.4 billion (1994 est.) Military expenditures—percent of GDP: 6.1% (1994 est.) Disputes—international: maritime boundary dispute with Tunisia; Libya claims about 19,400 sq km in northern Niger and part of southeastern Algeria

28 Mauritania joined 1973 Area: total: 1,030,700 sq km Population: 2,511,473 (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: mixed Maur/black 40%, Maur 30%, black 30% Religions: Muslim 100% Languages: Hasaniya Arabic (official), Pular, Soninke, Wolof (official), French Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 37.7% male: 49.6% female: 26.3% (1995 est.) Government type: republic Independence: 28 November 1960 (from France) Constitution: 12 July 1991 Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal Executive branch: chief of state: President Col. Maaouya Ould Sid Ahmed TAYA (since 12 December 1984) head of government: Prime Minister Mohamed Lamine Ould GUIG (since 7 December 1997) GDP: purchasing power parity—$4.1 billion (1996 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$1,750 (1996 est.) Debt—external: $2.5 billion (1995) Economic aid: recipient: ODA, $NA Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 269,884 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $33 million (1995) Disputes—international: none

Morocco joined 1958

Area: total: 446,550 sq km Population: 30,645,305 (July 2001 est.) Ethnic groups: Arab-Berber 99.1%, other 0.7%, Jewish 0.2% Religions: Muslim 98.7%, Christian 1.1%, Jewish 0.2% Languages: Arabic (official), Berber dialects, French often the language of business, government, and diplomacy Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 43.7% male: 56.6% female: 31% (1995 est.) Government type: constitutional monarchy Independence: 2 March 1956 (from France) Constitution: 10 March 1972, revised 4 September 1992, amended (to create bicameral legislature) September 1996 Suffrage: 21 years of age; universal Executive branch: chief of state: King MOHAMED VI (since 23 July 1999) head of government: Prime Minister Abderrahmane YOUSSOUFI (since 14 March 1998) GDP: purchasing power parity—$107 billion (1997 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$3,500 (1997 est.) Debt—external: $23.4 billion (1996 est.) Economic aid:

29 recipient: ODA, $297 million (1993) note: $2.8 billion debt canceled by Saudi Arabia (1991) Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 4,748,018 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $1.313 billion (1996) Military expenditures—percent of GDP: 3.7% (1996) Disputes—international: claims and administers Western Sahara, but sovereignty is unresolved and the UN is attempting to hold a referendum on the issue; the UN-administered cease-fire has been in effect since September 1991; Spain controls five places of sovereignty (plazas de soberania) on and off the coast of Morocco—the coastal enclaves of Ceuta and Melillawhich Morocco contests, as well as the islands of Penon de Alhucemas, Penon de Velez de la Gomera, and Islas Chafarinas

Oman joined 1971

Area: total: 212,460 sq km Population: 2,363,591 (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: Arab, Baluchi, South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, Bangladeshi), African Religions: Ibadhi Muslim 75%, Sunni Muslim, Shi'a Muslim, Hindu Languages: Arabic (official), English, Baluchi, Urdu, Indian dialects Government type: monarchy Independence: 1650 (expulsion of the Portuguese) Constitution: none; note—on 6 November 1996, Sultan QABOOS issued a royal decree promulgating a new basic law which, among other things, clarifies the royal succession, provides for a prime minister, bars ministers from holding interests in companies doing business with the government, establishes a bicameral Omani council, and guarantees basic civil liberties for Omani citizens Suffrage: limited to approximately 50,000 Omanis chosen by the government to vote in elections for the Majlis ash-Shura Executive branch: chief of state: Sultan and Prime Minister QABOOS bin Said Al Said (since 23 July 1970); note— the sultan is both the chief of state and head of government GDP: purchasing power parity—$17.2 billion (1997 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$8,000 (1997 est.) Debt—external: $3 billion (1997 est.) Economic aid: recipient: ODA, $82 million (1993) Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 414,528 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $1.82 billion (1996) Military expenditures—percent of GDP: 13.7% (1996) Disputes—international: no defined boundary with most of UAE, but Administrative Line in far north

Palestine joined 1945 Area: total: 21,130 sq km Population: 2,485,652 (Live in occupied Palestine) Ethnic groups before occupation: Arab Muslim 94%, Arab Christian 4%, Arab Jewish 2% Ethnic groups after 50 years of occupation: Jewish 79% (Israel-born 43%, Europe/Americas/Oceania-born 24%, Africa-born 7%, Asia-born 5%), non-Jewish 21% (mostly Arab) (1998 est.) Religions before occupation: Muslim 94%, Christian 4%, Jewish 2%

30 Religions after 50 years of occupation: Jewish 79%, Muslim 18%, Christian 2% others 1%. Languages before occupation: Arabic, "official" (Hebrew spoken by Arab Jewish minority) Languages after 50 years of occupation: Hebrew "official" (Arabic spoken by Arab minority) English most commonly used foreign language Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 95% male: 97% female: 92% (1998 est.) GDP: purchasing power parity—$1 billion (1996 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$1,100 (1996 est.) Debt—external: $NA (Mostly donations from the Internatinal Community received by the newly established Palestinian Authority headed by Mr. Yasser Arafat). Economic aid: recipient: ODA, $NA Military branches: NA "paralyzed by the Israeli occupation" Military expenditures—dollar figure: $NA Military expenditures—percent of GDP: NA% Disputes—international: Palestine is Israeli-occupied with current status subject to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement.

Qatar joined 1971

Area: total: 11,437 sq km Population: 697,126 (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: Arab 40%, Pakistani 18%, Indian 18%, Iranian 10%, other 14% Religions: Muslim 95% Languages: Arabic (official), English commonly used as a second language Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 79.4% male: 79.2% female: 79.9% (1995 est.) Government type: traditional monarchy Independence: 3 September 1971 (from UK) Constitution: provisional constitution enacted 19 April 1972 Suffrage: none Executive branch: chief of state: Amir HAMAD bin Khalifa Al Thani (since 27 June 1995 head of government: Prime Minister ABDALLAH bin Khalifa Al Thani, brother of the amir (since 30 October 1996 GDP: purchasing power parity—$11.2 billion (1997 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$16,700 (1997 est.) Debt—external: $11 billion (1997 est.) Economic aid: $NA Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 154,436 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $400 million (1996 est.) Military expenditures—percent of GDP: 3.5% (1996 est.) Disputes—international: territorial dispute with Bahrain over the Hawar Islands and maritime boundary dispute with Bahrain currently before the International Court of Justice (ICJ); in 1996, agreed with Saudi Arabia to demarcate border per 1992 accord; that process is ongoing

31 Saudi Arabia

Area: total: 1,960,582 sq km Population: 20,785,955 (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: Arab 90%, Afro-Asian 10% Religions: Muslim 100% Languages: Arabic Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 62.8% male: 71.5% female: 50.2% (1995 est.) Government type: monarchy Independence: 23 September 1932 (unification) Constitution: governed according to Shari'a (Islamic law); the Basic Law that articulates the government's rights and responsibilities was introduced in 1993 Executive branch: chief of state: King and Prime Minister FAHD bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud (since 13 June 1982) note—the king is both the chief of state and head of government GDP: purchasing power parity—$206.5 billion (1997 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$10,300 (1997 est.) Debt—external: $NA Economic aid: donor: pledged $100 million in 1993 to fund reconstruction of Lebanon Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 3,112,733 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $18.1 billion (1997 est.) Military expenditures—percent of GDP: 12% (1997 est.) Disputes—international: large section of boundary with Yemen not defined; location and status of boundary with UAE is not final, de facto boundary reflects 1974 agreement; Kuwaiti ownership of Qaruh and Umm al Maradim islands is disputed by Saudi Arabia; in 1996, agreed with Qatar to demarcate border per 1992 accord; that process is ongoing

Somalia joined 1974

Area: total: 637,660 sq km Population: 6,841,695 (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: Somali 85%, Bantu, Arabs 30,000 Religions: Sunni Muslim Languages: Somali (official), Arabic, Italian, English Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 24% male: 36% female: 14% (1990 est.) Government type: transitional, parliamentary national government Independence: 1 July 1960 Constitution: 25 August 1979 Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal Executive branch: chief of state: ABDIKASSIM Salad Hassan (since 26 August 2000) GDP: purchasing power parity—$8 billion (1996 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$600 (1996 est.) Debt—external: $2.6 billion (1994 est.) Economic aid: recipient: ODA, $NA

32 Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 930,405 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $NA Military expenditures—percent of GDP: NA% Disputes—international: most of the southern half of the boundary with Ethiopia is a Provisional Administrative Line; territorial dispute with Ethiopia over the Ogaden

Sudan joined 1956

Area: total: 2,505,810 sq km Population: 33,550,552 (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: black 52%, Arab 39%, Beja 6%, foreigners 2%, other 1% Religions: Sunni Muslim 70% (in north), indigenous beliefs 25%, Christian 5% (mostly in south and Khartoum) Languages: Arabic (official), Nubian, Ta Bedawie, diverse dialects of Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic, Sudanic languages, English note: program of Arabization in process Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 46.1% male: 57.7% female: 34.6% (1995 est.) Government type: authoritarian regime - ruling military junta took power in 1989 Independence: 1 January 1956 (from Egypt and UK) Constitution: 12 April 1973, suspended following coup of 6 April 1985; interim constitution of 10 October 1985 suspended following coup of 30 June 1989; new constitution implemented on 30 June 1998 partially suspended 12 December 1999 by President BASHIR Executive branch: chief of state: President Lt. General Umar Hasan Ahmad al-BASHIR (since 16 October 1993) note—the president is both the chiefof state and head of government GDP: purchasing power parity—$26.6 billion (1997 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$875 (1997 est.) Debt—external: $20.3 billion (1996 est.) Economic aid: recipient: ODA, $387 million (1993) Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 4,733,457 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $581 million (2001 est.) Military expenditures—percent of GDP: 2.5% (1999) Disputes—international: administrative boundary with Kenya does not coincide with international boundary; administrative boundary with Egypt does not coincide with international boundary creating the "Hala'ib Triangle," a barren area of 20,580 sq km

Syria joined 1945

Area: total: 185,180 sq km Population: 16,673,282 (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: Arab 90.3%, Kurds, Armenians, and other 9.7% Religions: Sunni Muslim 74%, Alawite, Druze, and other Muslim sects 16%, Christian (various sects) 10%, Jewish (tiny communities in Damascus, Al Qamishli, and Aleppo) Languages: Arabic (official); Kurdish, Armenian, Aramaic, Circassian widely understood; French, English somewhat understood Literacy:

33 definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 70.8% male: 85.7% female: 55.8% (1997 est.) Government type: republic Independence: 17 April 1946 (from League of Nations mandate under French administration) Constitution: 13 March 1973 Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal Executive branch: chief of state: President Bashar Hafiz al-ASAD (since 22 August 2000) head of government: Prime Minister Mahmud ZUBI (since 1 November 1987) GDP: purchasing power parity—$106.1 billion (1997 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$6,600 (1997 est.) Debt—external: $20 billion (1997 est.) Economic aid: recipient: $4.2 billion (1990-92) Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 2,182,608 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $800 million-$1 billion (1997 est.); note—based on official budget data that understate actual spending Military expenditures—percent of GDP: 8% (1995 est.) Disputes—international: Golan Heights is Israeli occupied; Hatay question with Turkey; dispute with upstream riparian Turkey over Turkish water development plans for the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers; Syrian troops in northern, central, and eastern Lebanon since October 1976

Tunisia joined 1958

Area: total: 163,610 sq km Population: 9,380,404 (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: Arab 98%, European 1%, Jewish and other 1% Religions: Muslim 98%, Christian 1%, Jewish and other 1% Languages: Arabic (official and one of the languages of commerce), French (commerce) Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 66.7% male: 78.6% female: 54.6% (1995 est.) Government type: republic Independence: 20 March 1956 (from France) Constitution: 1 June 1959; amended 12 July 1988 Suffrage: 20 years of age; universal Executive branch: chief of state: President Zine El Abidine BEN ALI (since 7 November 1987) head of government: Prime Minister Hamed KAROUI (since 26 September 1989) GDP: purchasing power parity—$56.5 billion (1997 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$6,100 (1997 est.) Debt—external: $10.6 billion (1997 est.) Economic aid: recipient: ODA, $221 million (1993) Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 1,450,442 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $535 million (1995) Military expenditures—percent of GDP: 2.8% (1995)

34 Disputes—international: maritime boundary dispute with Libya; Malta and Tunisia are discussing the commercial exploitation of the continental shelf between their countries, particularly for oil exploration

United Arab Emirates joined 1945

Area: total: 82,880 sq km Population: 2,303,088 (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: Emiri 19%, other Arab and Iranian 23%, South Asian 50%, other expatriates (includes Westerners and East Asians) 8% (1982) note: less than 20% are UAE citizens (1982) Religions: Muslim 96% (Shi'a 16%), Christian, Hindu, and other 4% Languages: Arabic (official), Persian, English, Hindi, Urdu Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write but definition of literacy not available total population: 79.2% male: 78.9% Government type: federation with specified powers delegated to the UAE federal government and other powers reserved to member emirates Independence: 2 December 1971 (from UK) Constitution: 2 December 1971 (made permanent in 1996) Suffrage: none Executive branch: chief of state: President ZAYID bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan (since 2 December 1971) head of government: Prime Minister MAKTUM bin Rashid al-Maktum (since 8 October 1990) GDP: purchasing power parity—$54.2 billion (1997 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$24,000 (1997 est.) Debt—external: $14 billion (1996 est.) Economic aid: $NA Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 425,373 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $1.59 billion (1994) Military expenditures—percent of GDP: 4.3% (1994) Disputes—international: location and status of boundary with Saudi Arabia is not final, de facto boundary reflects 1974 agreement; no defined boundary with most of Oman, but Administrative Line in far north; claims two islands in the Persian Gulf occupied by Iran: Lesser Tunb (called Tunb as Sughra in Arabic by UAE and Jazireh-ye Tonb-e Kuchek in Persian by Iran) and Greater Tunb (called Tunb al Kubra in Arabic by UAE and Jazireh-ye Tonb-e Bozorg in Persian by Iran); claims island in the Persian Gulf jointly administered with Iran (called Abu Musa in Arabic by UAE and Jazireh-ye Abu Musa in Persian by Iran)—over which Iran has taken steps to exert unilateral control since 1992, including access restrictions and a military build-up on the island; the UAE has garnered significant diplomatic support in theregion in protesting these Iranian actions

Yemen joined 1945

Area: total: 527,970 sq km Population: 16,387,963 (July 1998 est.) Ethnic groups: predominantly Arab; Afro-Arab concentrations in western coastal locations; South Asians in southern regions; small European communities in major metropolitan areas Religions: Muslim including Shaf'i (Sunni) and Zaydi (Shi'a), small numbers of Jewish, Christian, and Hindu Languages: Arabic

35 Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 38% male: 53% female: 26% (1990 est.) Government type: republic Independence: 22 May 1990 Republic of Yemen was established on 22 May 1990 with the merger of the Yemen Arab Republic {Yemen (Sanaa) or North Yemen} and the Marxist- dominated People's Democratic Republic of Yemen {Yemen (Aden) or South Yemen}; previously North Yemen had become independent on NA November 1918 (from the Ottoman Empire) and South Yemen had become independent on 30 November 1967 (from the UK) Constitution: 16 May 1991; amended 29 September 1994 Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal Executive branch: chief of state: President Lt. Gen. Ali Abdallah SALIH (since 22 May 1990) head of government: Acting Prime Minister Dr. Abd al-Karim Ali al-IRYANI (since NA April 1998) GDP: purchasing power parity—$31.8 billion (1997 est.) GDP—per capita: purchasing power parity—$2,300 (1997 est.) Debt—external: $8 billion (1996) Economic aid: recipient: ODA, $148 million (1993) Military manpower—fit for military service: males: 2,026,175 (1998 est.) Military expenditures—dollar figure: $407 million (1998 est.) Military expenditures—percent of GDP: 5% (1998 est.) Disputes—international: a large section of boundary with Saudi Arabia is not defined; a dispute with Eritrea over sovereignty of the Hanish Islands in the southern Red Sea has been submitted to arbitration under the auspices of the International Court of Justice; a decision on the Islands is expected in mid-1998

B- Pact of the Arab League of States (1)

His Excellency the President of the Syrian Republic, His Royal Highness the Emir of Transjordan, His Majesty the King of Iraq, His Majesty the King of Saudi-Arabia, His Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic, His Majesty the King of Egypt, the King of Yemen,

With a view to strengthen[ing] the close relations and numerous ties which bind the Arab States,

And out of concern for the cementing and reinforcing of these bonds on the basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of theme Stated,

And in order to direct their efforts toward[s] the goal of the welfare of all the Arab States, their common weal, the guarantee of their future and the realization of their aspirations

And in response to Arab public opinion in all the Arab countries,

Have agreed to conclude a pact to this effect and have delegated as their plenipotentiaries those whose names are given below:

36 Who, after the exchange of the credentials granting them full authority, which were found valid and in proper form, have agreed upon the following:

Article 1.

The League of Arab States shall be composed of the: independent Arab States that have signed this Pact.

Every independent Arab State shall have the right to adhere to the League. Should it desire to adhere, it shall present an application to this effect which shall be filed with the permanent General Secretariat and submitted to the Council at its first meeting following the presentation of the application.

Article 2.

The purpose of the League is to draw closer the relations between member States and co-ordinate their political activities with the aim of realizing a close collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.

It also has among its purposes a close co-operation of the member States with due regard to the structure of each of these States and the conditions prevailing therein, in the following matters:

(a) Economic and financial matters, including trade, customs, currency, agriculture and industry;

(b) (communications, including railways, roads, aviation, navigation, and posts and telegraphs;

(c) Cultural matters;

(d) Matters connected with nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgments and extradition;

(e) Social welfare matters;

(f) Health matters.

Article 3.

The League shall have a Council composed of the representatives of the member States. Each State shall have one vote, regardless of the number of its representatives.

The Council shall be entrusted with the function of realizing the purpose of the League and of supervising the execution of the agreements concluded between the member States on matters referred to in the preceding article or on other matters.

It shall also have the function of determining the means whereby the League will collaborate with the international organizations which may be created in the future to guarantee peace and security and organize economic and social relations.

Article 4.

A special Committee shall be formed for each of the categories enumerated in article 2, on which the member States shall be represented. These Committees shall be entrusted with establishing the basis and scope of co-operation in the form of draft agreements which shall be submitted to the Council for its consideration preparatory to their being submitted to the States referred to.

37 Delegates representing the other Arab countries may participate in these Committees as members. The Council shall determine the circumstances in which the participation of these representatives shall be allowed as well as the basis of the representation.

Article 5.

The recourse to force for the settlement of disputes between two or more member States shall not be allowed. Should there arise among them a dispute that does not involve the independence of a State, its sovereignty or its territorial integrity, and should the two contending parties apply to the Council for the settlement of this dispute, the decision of the Council shall then be effective and obligatory.

In this case, the States among whom the dispute has arisen shall not participate in the deliberations and decisions of the Council.

The Council shall mediate in a dispute which may lead to war between two member States or between a member State and another State in order to conciliate them

The decisions relating to arbitration and mediation shall be taken by a majority vote.

Article 6.

In case of aggression or threat of aggression by a State against a member State, the State attacked or threatened with attack may request an immediate meeting of the Council.

The Council shall determine the necessary measures to repel this aggression. Its decision shall be taken unanimously. If the aggression is committed by a member State the vote of that State will not be counted in determining unanimity.

If the aggression is committed in such a way as to render the Government of the State attacked unable to communicate with the Council, the representative of that State in the Council may request the Council to convene for the purpose set forth in the preceding paragraph. If the representative is unable to communicate with the Council, it shall be the right of any member State to request a meeting of the Council.

Article 7.

The decisions of the Council taken by a unanimous vote shall be binding on all the member States of the League; those that are reached by a majority vote shall bind only those that accept them.

In both cases the decisions of the Council shall be executed in each State in accordance with the fundamental structure of that State.

Article 8.

Every member State of the League shall respect the form of government obtaining in the other States of the League, and shall recognize the form of government obtaining as one of the rights of those States, and shall pledge itself not to take any action tending to change that form.

Article 9.

The States of the Arab League that are desirous of establishing among themselves closer collaboration and stronger bonds than those provided for in the present Pact, may conclude among themselves whatever agreements they wish for this purpose.

The treaties and agreements already concluded or that may be concluded in the future between a member State and any other State shall not be binding on the other members.

38 Article 10.

The permanent seat of the League of Arab States shall be Cairo. The Council of the League may meet at any other place it designates.

Article 11.

The Council of the League shall meet in ordinary session twice a year, during the months of March and October. It shall meet in extraordinary session at the request of two member States whenever the need arises.

Article 12.

The League shall have a permanent General Secretariat, composed of a Secretary-General, Assistant Secretaries and an adequate number of officials.

The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the Council upon the vote of two-thirds of the States of the League. The Assistant Secretaries and the principal officials shall be appointed by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Council.

The Council shall establish an internal organization for the General Secretariat as well as the conditions of service of the officials.

The Secretary-General shall have the rank of Ambassador; and the Assistant Secretaries the rank of Ministers Plenipotentiary.

The first Secretary-General of the League is designated in an annex to the present Pact.

Article 13.

The Secretary-General shall prepare the draft of the budget of the League and submit it for approval to the Council before the beginning of each fiscal year.

The Council shall determine the share of each of the States of the League in the expenses. It shall be allowed to revise the share if necessary.

Article 14.

The members of the Council of the League, the members of its Committees and such of its officials as shall be designated in the internal organization, shall enjoy, in the exercise of their duties, diplomatic privileges and immunities.

The premises occupied by the institutions of the League shall be inviolable.

Article 15.

The council shall meet the first time at the invitation of the Head of the Egyptian Government. Later meetings shall be convoked by the Secretary-General.

In each ordinary session the representatives of the States of the League shall assume the chairmanship of the Council in rotation.

Article 16.

Except for the cases provided for in the present Pact, a majority shall suffice for decisions by the Council effective in the following matters:

39 (a) Matters concerning the officials.

(b) The approval of the budget of the League.

(c) The internal organization of the Council, the Committees and the General Secretariat. .

(d) The termination of the sessions.

Article 17.

The member States of the League shall file with the General Secretariat copies of all treaties and agreements which they have concluded or will conclude with any other State, whether a member of the League or otherwise.

Article 18.

If one of the member States intends to withdraw from the League, the Council shall be informed of its intention one year before the withdrawal takes effect

The Council of the League may consider any State that is not fulfilling the obligations resulting from this Pact as excluded from the League, by a decision taken by a unanimous vote of all the States except the State referred to.

Article 19.

The present Pact may be amended with the approval of two-thirds of the members of the League in particular for the purpose of strengthening the ties between them, of creating an Arab Court of Justice, and of regulating the relations of the League with the international organizations that may be created in the future to guarantee security and peace

No decision shall be taken as regards an amendment except in the session following that in which it is proposed.

Any State that does not approve an amendment may withdraw from the League when the amendment becomes effective, without being bound by the provisions of the preceding article.

Article 20.

The present Pact and its annexes shall be ratified in accordance with the fundamental form of government in each of the contracting States.

The instruments of ratification shall be filed with the General Secretariat and the present Pact shall become binding on the States that ratify in fifteen days after the Secretary-General receives instruments of ratification from four States.

The present Pact has been drawn up in the Arabic language in Cairo and dated 8 Rabi al Thani 1364 (March 22, 1945), in a single text which shall be deposited with the General Secretariat.

A certified copy shall be sent to each of the States of the League.

ANNEX ON PALESTINE

At the end of the last Great War, Palestine, together with the other Arab States, was separated from the Ottoman Empire. She became independent, not belonging to any other State.

40 The Treaty of Lausanne proclaimed that her fate should be decided by the parties concerned in Palestine.

Even though Palestine was not able to control her own destiny, it was on the basis of the recognition of her independence that the Covenant of the League of Nations determined a system of government for her.

Her existence and her independence among the nations can, therefore, no more be questioned de jure than the independence of any of the other Arab States.

Even though the outward signs of this independence have remained veiled as a result of force majeure, it is not fitting that this should be an obstacle to the participation of Palestine in the work of the League.

Therefore, the States signatory to the Pact of the Arab League consider that in view of Palestine's special circumstances, the Council of the League should designate an Arab delegate from Palestine to participate in its work until this country enjoys actual independence.

ANNEX ON CO-OPERATION WITH ARAB COUNTRIES NOT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE

Whereas the member States of the League will have to deal either in the Council or in the Committees with questions affecting the interests of the entire Arab world

And whereas the Council cannot fail to take into account the aspirations of the Arab countries not members of the Council and to work toward their realization, the States signatory to the Pact of the Arab League strongly urge that the Council of the League should cooperate with them as far as possible in having them participate in the Committees referred to in the Pact, and in other matters should not spare any effort to learn their needs and understand their aspirations and should moreover work for their common weal and the guarantee of their future by whatever political means available.

ANNEX ON THE APPOINTMENT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE

The States signatory to the present Pact have agreed to appoint Abd Al Rahman Azzam Bey Secretary-General of the League of Arab States.

His appointment shall be for a term of two years. The Council of the League shall later determine the future organization of the General Secretariat.

41 Bibliography:

Online Sources-

BBC news http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/1550797.stm September 21, 2001 http://www.middleeastnews.com/ArabWorld.html Middle East News and World Report

Infoplease.com http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0804481.html Encyclopedia, June 2, 2002

Articles-

AFX News Limited; “Germany Joins U.S. Call for Quick End to Iraq Sanctions;” May 16, 2003

Agence France Presse; “Arab League Boycott Slams US-British Occupation of Iraq,” April 24, 2003

Alef Publishing Ltd.; “Iraq: U.N. Volte Face and Arab Negligence,” June 2, 2003

BBC Monitoring; “Kuwaiti Foreign Minister in Egypt Denies “Differences” with Arab League

BBC Monitoring; “OIC, Arab League Should Deal with Common Threats: Khatami,” May 29, 2003

BBC Monitoring; “Saudi Minister Urges Iraqi Transitional Government “Quick’ End to “Occupation;” April 23, 2003

Belz, Mindy; “The U.N.’s Oily Dealings,” World Magazine; May 10, 2003

Campbell, Ian; “Analysis: Declining Dollar’s Many Dangers,” United Press International; May 6, 2003

CNN; “Arab League Calls on Saddam to Cooperate with Inspections,” march 2, 2003

42 Diaz, Kevin; “Fractious Islamic Conference Calls for Peaceful Reolution,” Star Tribune; March 6, 2003.

Drummond, James; Khalaf, Roula; “Unity Hides Hope Saddam Will Leave and Spare Area a War: Autocratic Leaders are Worried Political Change May be Forced Upon them,” Financial Times; March 3, 2003

Editorials; ‘End the Oil-For-Food Charade,” The Washington Times; April 22, 2003

El Deeb, Sarah: “Arab Summit Shows Sharp Divisions on Iraq,” Associated Press; March 1, 2003

Energy Compass; “War on Iraq: Arab Divisions to the Fore,” March 6, 2003

Federal News Service; “Press Conference with Secretary of the Treasury, John Snow, and Treasury General Counsel David Aufhauser Re:Lifting of Sanctions on Iraq,” May 27, 2003

Financial Times Information; “Arab League Chief Questions League’s Future After Divisions Over Iraq,” April 1, 2003

Ghabra, Shafeeq; “An Arab House, Openly Divided,” The Washington Post; March 9, 2003

Krugman, Paul; “Matters of Emphasis,” The New York Times; April 29, 2003

Lamb, David; “After the War/ World Reaction NewsAnalysis; Arabs Protest U.S. Presence, but Lack Strategy,’ April 25, 2003

Lederer, Edith; “Council Divided Over Lifting Sanctions but United in Wanting Iraqis to Continue to Receive Food and Medicine,” Associated Press; April 23, 2003

Lederer, Edith; “Security Council votes to Extend Annan’s Authority over Humanitarian contracts until June 3,” Associated Press; April 24, 2003

Simonian, Haig; “France and Germany Signal Support for US Plans on Iraq,” The Financial Times; May 10, 2003 Smucker, Philip; “On Iraq Question, Cracks Widen in Arab Unity,” Christian Science Monitorl; March 3, 2003

Trei, Lisa; “Panel, Teach-In Warn of Implications of Ira War’s Aftermath,” Stanford Report; April 16, 2003

43 Wallace, James; “All Nippon chooses Boeing; Airbus had Hoped to Break U.S. Dominance at Japan’s No. 2 Carrier,” The Seattle Post-Inteligencer; April 10, 2003

Wallace, James; “EasyJet Deal Gives Edge to Airbus; European Company Again Wins More Orders than Boeing,” The Seattle Post-Intelligencer; January 3, 2003

Xinhua General News Agency; “News Analysis: Why Iraq Rejects New U.N. Oil- For-Food Resolution,” April 2, 2003

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