Specific Targeted Research Or Innovation Project
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SIXTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME PRIORITY 8.1 Policy-Oriented Research
Contract for:
SPECIFIC TARGETED RESEARCH OR INNOVATION PROJECT
Annex I - “Description of Work”
Project acronym: COBECOS Project full title: Costs and Benefits of Control Strategies Proposal/Contract no.: 044153 Related to other Contract (to be completed by Commission) no.: Date of preparation of Annex 22 November 2006 I: Operative commencement 1 February 2007 date of contract: CONTENTS
1 Summary...... 1 2 project objectives...... 1 3 List of participants...... 2 4 relevance to the Objectives of the specific programme and/or thematic priority...... 3 4.1 Scientific State of the Art...... 3 4.1.1 Theory...... 3 4.1.2 Empirical knowledge...... 5 4.1.3 Impact of COBECOS on state of the art...... 7 4.2 relevance to the Objectives of the specific programme...... 8 4.2.1 Scientific basis of fisheries monitoring, control and surveillance...... 8 4.2.2 Task 5 Cost-efficiency of Control strategies:...... 8 5 Potential impact...... 11 5.1 Strategic input...... 11 5.1.1 Contributions to solving societal problems and enhancing competitiveness...... 11 5.1.2 Innovations...... 11 5.1.3 Exploitation and dissemination...... 11 5.1.4 Value added at the European level...... 11 5.2 Policy Implementation Plan...... 12 5.3 contribution to standards...... 12 6 Project management and exploitation/dissemination plan...... 13 6.1 Project management...... 13 6.1.1 Responsibilities...... 13 6.1.2 Decision Making...... 13 6.1.3 Project meetings...... 13 6.2 Dissemination of Knowledge...... 13 6.3 Raising Public Awareness...... 14 7 Detailed Implementation plan...... 15 7.1 introduction – general description and milestones...... 15 7.1.1 Definitions...... 15 7.1.2 Method...... 15 7.1.3 Basic enforcement model...... 16 7.1.4 Implementation...... 20 7.1.5 Uncertainty and data...... 20 7.1.6 Software to be developed...... 21 7.1.7 Fisheries of project: Case Studies...... 21 7.1.8 Stakeholder participation...... 30 7.1.9 Milestones...... 31 7.2 progress reports...... 32 7.3 planning and timetable...... 33 7.4 graphical presentation of work packages...... 34 7.5 List of Work packages...... 35 7.5.1 Deliverables...... 36 7.6 Description of workpackages...... 37 WP1 Literature Review...... 37 Objectives:...... 37 Description of Work...... 37 Deliverables:...... 37 Milestones and expected results...... 37 WP2 data collection...... 38 Objectives...... 38 Description of Work...... 38 Deliverables:...... 39 Milestones and expected results:...... 39 WP3 Theoretical Modelling...... 40 Objectives...... 40 Description of Work...... 40 Deliverables...... 41 Milestones and expected results...... 41 Wp4 data harmonisation...... 42 Objectives...... 42 Description of Work...... 42 Deliverables:...... 43 Milestones and expected results:...... 43 WP5 Estimation of theoretical relationships...... 44 Objectives...... 44 Description of Work...... 44 Deliverables...... 44 Milestones and expected results...... 45 WP6 Software Development...... 46 Objectives...... 46 Description of Work...... 46 Deliverables...... 47 milestones and expected results...... 47 WP7 Application of Computer model to fisheries-Calibration...... 48 Objective...... 48 Description of Work...... 48 Deliverables...... 48 Milestones and expected results...... 48 Month 21...... 48 WP-8 Simulations...... 50 Objectives...... 50 Description of Work...... 50 Deliverables...... 51 Milestones and expected results...... 51 WP9 conclusions/generalizations...... 52 Objectives...... 52 Description of Work...... 52 Deliverables:...... 52 Milestones and expected results...... 52 WP10 Project Coordination, management and Dissemination...... 53 Objectives...... 53 Description of Work...... 53 Deliverables...... 53 milestones and expected results...... 53 8 project resources and budget overview...... 54 8.1 Efforts for the Full Duration of the Project...... 54 8.2 Overall budget for the full duration of the project...... 55 8.3 Management level description of resources and budget...... 56 9 Other issues...... 57 9.1 Ethical and Gender Issues...... 57 9.1.1 Ethics...... 57 9.1.2 Gender...... 57 9.2 Other EC-policy Issues...... 58 1 SUMMARY
The primary objective of COBECOS is to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of control schemes for management strategies relevant for the CFP and, based on this analysis, infer the potential economic benefits which might accrue from proper enforcement of the management measures. We propose to achieve this objective on the basis of (1) an appropriate theory of fisheries enforcement, (2) empirical research involving intensive case studies and estimation of theoretical relationships, (3) computer modelling of fisheries enforcement (based on the theory and empirical estimations) On this basis we expect to be able to contribute significantly to answering questions such as::
What are the costs and benefits of increased enforcement effort in particular fisheries? If compliance alters (exogenously) in certain fisheries what are the costs and benefits? What are the impacts of increased penalties for violations of fisheries rules? How do different control schemes compare when the cost of enforcement is taken into account? 2 PROJECT OBJECTIVES
The fundamental objective of COBECOS is to conduct a “cost-benefit analysis of control schemes for management strategies relevant for the CFP and, based on this analysis to infer the potential economic benefits to the fisheries which might accrue from proper enforcement of the management measures.” Within this overarching objective, a number of sub-objectives may be identified. A key sub-objective of this project is to generate ability to contribute substantially to answering practical management questions such as:
What are the costs and benefits of increased enforcement effort in particular fisheries? If compliance alters (exogenously) in certain fisheries what are the costs and benefits? What are the impacts of increased penalties for violations of fisheries rules? How do different control schemes (management systems) compare in terms of costs and benefits when the cost of enforcement is taken into account? How do different control schemes (management systems) compare in terms of biological and economic robustness. We propose to achieve these objectives on the basis of:
(1) an appropriate theory of fisheries enforcement, (2) empirical research including intensive case studies and estimation of theoretical relationships for particular fisheries and (3) computer modelling of the fisheries enforcement situation (based on the theory and empirical estimations) that will allow us to provide answers to the questions suggested by the fundamental objective of this proposal. 3 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
date date Participan Participant participant Participant name enter country exit t role number short name project project Institute of Economic Studies CO 1 IoES 1 Iceland 30 University of Iceland European Commission Joint CR 2 JRC 1 EU 30 Research Centre CR 3 Fundación AZTI AZTI 1 Spain 30 Centre for Marine Law and CR 4 Economics Université de CEDEM 1 France 30 Bretagne Occidentale L'Istituto di Ricerche CR 5 Economiche per la Pesca e IREPA 1 Italy 30 l'Acquacoltura Department of Environmental and Business Economics, CR 6 USD 1 Denmark 30 University of Southern Denmark Institute of Food and Resource Economics, The Royal CR 7 FOI 1 Denmark 30 Veterinary and Agricultural University Norwegian School of CR 8 Economics and Business NHH 1 Norway 30 Administration, Bergen. Agricultural Economics CR 9 LEI 1 Netherlands 30 Research Institute Centre for Environment, CR 10 Fisheries and Aquaculture CEFAS 1 UK 30 Science Centre for the Economics and CR 11 Management of Aquatic CEMARE 1 UK 30 Resources Imperial College of Science and CR 12 IC 1 UK 30 Technology CO = Coordinator, CR = Contractor 4 RELEVANCE TO THE OBJECTIVES OF THE SPECIFIC PROGRAMME AND/OR THEMATIC PRIORITY
4.1 SCIENTIFIC STATE OF THE ART
4.1.1 Theory The state of knowledge in this area of fisheries management is quite limited. There is a basic theory of enforcement developed in general economics (Becker and Stiegler 1974, Polinsky and Shavell 2000) and the rudiments of a special theory of enforcement in fisheries (Sutinen and Anderson 1985, Charles 1993, Arnason 2003). There are very few empirical studies in the topic and some of those that exist are quite limited (Nautilius 1998, OECD 2003, Schrank et al. 2003,MRAG et al., 2004 Hatcher, and Gordon 2005). There are to our knowledge, no comprehensive empirically based models of fisheries enforcement in existence, although a number of the above studies have constructed various sections of such a model and some have established the form and quantitative parameters for some of the functions for such a model (MRAG et al 2004). Our proposed fisheries enforcement theory derives from the basic economic theory of law and enforcement (Becker 1968, Becker and Stiegler 1974 and others) and its subsequent application to fisheries (Sutinen and Anderson 1985, Mazany 1993, Schrank et al. 2003 and others). Enforcement of fisheries regulations and its costs and benefits is a relatively new topic in fisheries science and, in spite of a few references, the available literature on it is rather limited. As a result we will further develop the theory of fisheries enforcement within the project. The essence of the theoretical knowledge is as follows:
1. Fisheries management systems consist of a certain set of tools (controls, instruments) that can be applied to manage the fisheries. 2. Examples of fisheries management tools are e.g. mesh size restrictions, minimum landing size restrictions, limitations on allowable fishing days, maximum harvesting quotas and so on. There is obviously a very large number of such tools. The permissible fisheries management tools are often defined by law and/or regulations. Each combination of fisheries management tools defines a certain fisheries management system. [organizational / governance aspects also need to be taken into account when defining a system. One fisheries management system might e.g. comprise TACs, limited allowable fishing days and access licences. Another one might comprise these and some additional tools. Obviously, there is a much higher number of possible fisheries management systems than there are management tools. 3. Fisheries management measures are applications of the fisheries management tools. They are most easily thought of as assigning values to the tools. Thus, specification of maximum mesh sizes, total allowable fishing days or the annual TAC are all examples of particular fisheries management measures. Clearly, in most cases, the fisheries management measures are more often changed than the fisheries management systems. 4. To have impact on the fisheries (fishing behaviour), the fisheries management measures have to be enforced. Fisheries enforcement is fairly complicated. In essence it consists of: page 4 COBECOS
a. observing the relevant aspects (with respect to the prevalent management tools and measures) of the fishing activity, b. spotting possible violations, c. prosecuting alleged violators and d. issuing sanctions to those found guilty.
In reality, this process both involves many more steps and is often abbreviated (e.g. warnings, administrative fines etc.). There are several methods for observing the fishing activity and spotting possible violations. These include
(i) on-board observers, (ii) dock-side monitoring, (iii) air surveillance, (iv) patrol boat checking, (v) remote sensing, (vi) documentary comparison and many others.
These methods can be applied at different levels of intensity. 5. The enforcement activity leads to an expected cost to fishers of violating management measures. This cost includes expected sanctions but also other items such as impacts on reputation, conscience etc. This expected cost will modify their behaviour.. n deciding whether to violate a particular fisheries management measure, a fisher will compare the expected benefits to the expected costs. If the expected cost is high enough (compared to the benefits), violations will be few, i.e. compliance high. If the expected cost is low (compared to expected benefits), violations will be many, i.e. compliance low. 6. The purpose of fisheries enforcement is to reduce the number and extent of violations, i.e. increase compliance. The economic enforcement problem is to achieve a given level of compliance at minimum cost. Minimizing this cost involves (i) the appropriate mix of enforcement methods, (ii) the appropriate intensity of each and (iii) setting the appropriate penalty structure. In this study, the penalty structure will be taken as exogenous (given). 7. There are certain costs associated with the enforcement activity. Different methods have different costs. The costs associated with each method increase with the intensity of the application of the method. Different fisheries management systems (and within them fisheries management measures) require different types of enforcement and, therefore also enforcement costs to achieve a given level of compliance. Moreover, the cost of non-compliance (in terms of lost fisheries benefits) varies across fisheries management systems — i.e. their robustness with respect to compliance may be different. This has several implications of practical importance:
1. The most appropriate fisheries management system (and measures) can not be determined without taking into account the associated enforcement costs. 2. It may well be that the most efficient fisheries management system is so costly to enforce that its overall benefit-cost ratio is inferior to another system. 3. Certain fisheries management measures (within given systems) for the same reason may not be cost effective. 4. The optimal level of fisheries management measures (e.g. TAC, allowable fishing days etc) will in general be different when enforcement costs are taken into account (Arnason 1998). The difference may easily be COBECOS relevance to the Objectives of the specific programme and/or thematic priority page 5
substantial, meaning that significant economic losses are associated with ignoring enforcement costs in setting the management measures. 5. Full (100%) compliance is generally not economically efficient.
4.1.2 Empirical knowledge
Our discussion of empirical knowledge takes place within the framework of the available enforcement theory. For this theory, the (1) level of compliance, (2) the expected benefits and costs of non-compliance and (3) the costs of enforcement play a crucial role. So, it is in these terms that we primarily discuss the current state of empirical knowledge.
4.1.2.1 Level of compliance In most fisheries there is limited knowledge and certainly very little published knowledge about the level of compliance to management measures. The European Commission draws up a compliance scoreboard (European Commission, 2006) based on working papers on control in Member States which are in turn based on annual submissions from Member States as well as observations by the Commission. However these are generally concerned with compliance in reporting rather than compliance with management measures. For instance the 2005 scoreboard notes that only two nations submitted effort declarations on time compared to three the previous year. According to the scoreboard there was a marginal reduction in overruns of quota with a 1.8% overrun reported for 2004. More useful indicators such as the extent to which the reported landings match real landings are not estimated. This creates severe difficulties for those who need to know how many fish are removed from the fishery each year in order to assess stock levels and determine appropriate management responses. According to a 2005 study group (ICES, 2005), illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) represents the single largest potential source of unrecorded fishing mortality for stock assessment. The Arctic Fisheries Working group (AFWG) report that for NE Arctic cod, since 2002, between 90,000 – 115,000t of catch per annum has gone unreported because of transshipment. For Baltic cod, the Baltic Fisheries Assessment Working Group estimate that the true catch is between 35–45% greater than is currently reported. Based on observations from vessel detection systems (using satellite imagery), ICES North-Western Working Group (NWWG) report that redfish catches may be underestimated by 25%. Other stock assessment working groups are aware of potential biases in catch data due to IUU fishing that are seriously compromising their stock assessments, but presently have no way of quantifying this error (see e.g. Working Group on the Assessment of Mackerel, Horse Mackerel, Sardine and Anchovy (WGMHSA), Working Group for North Sea. Skagerrak and Kattegat (WKNSSK) and Working Group for Assessment of Deep-sea Fisheries Resources (WGDEEP). Other estimates of non-compliance include, at the international level, the Antarctic area (39% of total CCAMLR (Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources) catches in 2000/01 on average in the area, but with stocks having been reduced by as much as 90% in some parts of the area due to IUU fishing; Willock, (2004): the ICCAT (International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (25 000 tonnes or around 18% of all fishing activity for tuna over the 2001/2002 season). In the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO) area, it was estimated that 10.000 tonnes of groundfish were illegally caught in 2001, including plaice, cod and redfish. In addition, Greenland halibut quotas were also estimated to have been exceeded by 3.100 tonnes, and some parties were referred to fail submitting observer reports in 2000 and 2001 (OECD, 2003b). ) page 6 COBECOS
A recent study identified that the worldwide scale of IUU fishing may be in the order of $4 - 9bn per anum, with at least $1bn from sub-Saharan Africa countries alone and over $1bn from unregulated high seas fishing (MRAG, 2005). The single most important drivers for IUU fishing are economic factors (Agnew & Barnes, 2004) and poor enforcement of international and national regulations which are often exacerbated by the management systems that are chosen (HSTF, 2006). Some of the relationships between compliance and enforcement are known in their functional form, if not in their quantitative form. There is usually a non-linear relationship between enforcement effort and the level of compliance, with 100% compliance being notoriously difficult and prohibitively expensive to achieve (MRAG et al 2004). This leads, naturally, to there being enforcement optima, but the precise level of the optimum will depend on many exogenous factors such as the general satisfaction of fishermen with the management system, the general level of compliance with laws in the country in question and alternative rural employment. For instance, it is well known that compliance in European fisheries is worst when fishermen do not believe the science underpinning management decisions, and particularly when TACs are dropping faster than fishermen think is warranted. In developing countries, there also seems to be a direct relationship between the level of governance of a country and the level of compliance in its fisheries (MRAG, 2005). For locally important fisheries, such as the scallops fisheries in the Bay of Saint-Brieuc (see below for a presentation of the case study), estimates of non-compliance vary between 30% and 60% (Guyader and Fifas, 2006). In nearly all these cases, estimates of non-compliance are based on some judgement rather than statistical analysis. A 1998 study of compliance in Denmark, Germany, Netherlands and Scotland (Nautilus, 1998) summarized and characterized prosecutions for infringements but did not attempt to identify the hidden non-detected level of non compliance. Such levels were, however, identified in a later study undertaken directly to support the establishment of the European Control Agency (MRAG et al 2004).
4.1.2.2 Benefits and costs of non-compliance According to the theory, the private expected costs and benefits of non-compliance are the primary determinants of noncompliance. The benefits of noncompliance are the net operating incomes — often in the form of increased catch and sometimes reduced costs — generated by violating management measures and the costs are primarily the expected penalties for doing so. In many fisheries bio-economic models have been developed that allow the assessment of the private benefits of increased catch (or reduced costs) as well as the group or social economic impacts of that in the long run as stocks adjust. Within this project we will make use of such models in our case studies — possibly in a modified form — where they exist and develop new ones when they don’t exist. The Commission’s Scientific, Economic and Technical Committee for Fisheries sub-group for economic affairs analysed those bioeconomic models currently used within the EU. The EIAA model can assess the impact of varying outputs (catch) on fleet profitability. A number of others can assess the impact of different inputs. These include TEMAS (Bioeconomic model to assess the effect of technical management measures, BIRDMOD (Methodological Support for a Bio-Economic Model of Population Analysis of Demersal Resources) MEFISTO: (Mediterranean Bio-Economic Simulation Model), ECONMULT: (Bioeconomic multispecies models of the Barents Sea fisheries), and COBAS: (A dynamic bioeconomic model of the fisheries of the South-West of the UK to determine the costs and benefits of sustainable fisheries management). The data requirements for these models vary considerably. For instance MEFISTO requires a separate model for each vessel and EMFID requires catch per day/species/segment/area. COBECOS relevance to the Objectives of the specific programme and/or thematic priority page 7
It appears to be widely accepted that penalties are a deterrent to infringement. For instance the Nautilus study indicates that the Dutch fishers thought that “sanctions are quite prohibitive and are designed to eliminate economic gain. Two examples are mentioned. When a fisherman is caught fishing with inlets, the fine is 20000DFL (€9800) approximately half the value of his weekly catch. Infringement of the private group rules, such as putting a box of fish aside, will cost the fisherman 5000 DFL (€2450). Le Gallic (2004) argues that penalties in the form of trade measures can be used to reduce illegal fishing. Little seems to be known about the cost of illegal fishing. Among the few studies of this kind are Sumaila et al. (2004). Their conclusion is that this cost is, in most cases, negligible. Although some data on infringements and enforcement effort are available, nobody appears to have used this information to calculate either what the overall degree of compliance is or what the expected cost of a certain degree of infringement is averaged over the whole fishery. To calculate expected penalties requires the collection of data on the penalty schedule and an assessment of how enforcement effort increases the probability that violations actually result in penalties.
4.1.2.3 Enforcement effort and costs In recent years there have been a number of studies trying to assess fisheries management and fisheries enforcement costs. The most prominent of these studies are in Nautilius Consultants (1998), Arnason et al. (2000), Schrank et al (2003), OECD (2003) and MRAG (2004). These studies are predominantly on a national basis (rather than fishery basis). For the most part, they are limited to accounting for the management and enforcement costs over a period of few years and provide limited or no data on enforcement effort (Nautilius Consultants (1998) is a bit of an exception in this respect). These studies have found that the cost of managing fisheries is typically a significant fraction of the gross revenues of the fisheries. Within the EU the fisheries management costs were estimated to be about 10% of the value of the landings in 1999 with 43% of the costs - €212 million - being attributed to enforcement. The rest was “research” and management” (OECD, 2003). The annual submissions from Member States under article 35 of the Control Regulation summarise enforcement effort in terms of number of inspectors, number of flight hours, number of inspections at sea. However, whilst the Commission has made some efforts to harmonise the reports, the different institutional frameworks in the different States mean that it is not always possible to make direct comparisons. For instance the Spanish authorities report that Guardia Civil del Mar have 19 light patrol vessels of which 2 exclusively for fisheries monitoring. This begs the question as to what fraction of time the other vessels spend in fisheries monitoring.
4.1.2.4 Practical (computer) modeling As already stated, we do not know of any practical, empirically based models of fisheries enforcement. By the phrase “practical, empirically based” we mean models that allow the user to test the economic impact of varying enforcement effort, enforcement tools and sanctions for violations within a reasonably realistic description of actual fisheries. In fact, we doubt that such models exist.
4.1.3 Impact of COBECOS on state of the art COBECOS should make significant improvements to the state of the art by developing
(1) an appropriate theory of fisheries enforcement, (2) empirical estimation of theoretical relationships for particular fisheries and (3) a practical computer model for fisheries enforcement page 8 COBECOS
4.2 RELEVANCE TO THE OBJECTIVES OF THE SPECIFIC PROGRAMME
4.2.1 Scientific basis of fisheries monitoring, control and surveillance
Monitoring, control and surveillance constitute a main part of the day-to- day execution of the CFP. The implementation of the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) has provided the ground for more cost efficient methodologies to be developed. Relevant research should aim at improving the accuracy and consistency of fisheries catch data, especially in the context of growing doubts about the performance of catch reporting systems and of traditional assessment and management systems.
Our proposal addresses these issues in two ways:
(1) It is indeed clear that the Vessel Monitoring System can deliver a higher level of compliance on control measures that depend on vessel positions – effort control, closed areas. Our proposal (work package 8) will estimate the cost of enforcing a given level of compliance in these measures. Furthermore we will estimate the benefit of achieving this level of compliance to the fishery (work package 7) (2) Our project (work package 6) will give an independent estimate on the total catch – including both reported and unreported components
4.2.2 Task 5 Cost-efficiency of Control strategies:
We examine the call text for task 5 , section by section.
The CFP uses different management measures (TACs, technical measures, effort control, etc.) and sets of rules. These measures, which may vary between management areas and fisheries, are designed to ensure biological sustainable exploitation and economically viable fisheries.
We agree that each fishery is managed by a set of measures. By testing our model against a wide variety of fisheries, management authorities and management measures we aim to develop a theory and a model of general applicability.
Enforcement (monitoring and control) costs have become an important component of public expenditures related to fisheries management and it is therefore important to carefully investigate which combinations of measures would offer the best cost efficiency relationships.
We construct a model that allows each component of the management to be varied
Enforcement (monitoring and control) costs have become an important component of public expenditures related to fisheries management and it is therefore important to carefully investigate which combinations of measures would offer the best cost efficiency relationships.
Work package 7 aims to calculate the cost of enforcement for each of the fisheries based on standard costings for inspectors, patrol vessels, aircraft etc. We then vary these COBECOS relevance to the Objectives of the specific programme and/or thematic priority page 9
parameters and assess what this would mean in terms of compliance. The benefits of compliance are calculated in the same work package..
The objective of this task is to present a cost-benefit analysis of control schemes for management strategies relevant for the CFP and based on this analysis, infer the potential economic benefits to the fisheries which might accrue from proper enforcement of the management.
We go beyond this. Not only do we calculate the benefits of full compliance but we also aim to determine whether a less costly level of enforcement might produce more economic benefits at a lower level of compliance.
4.2.2.1 References: Arnason, R. 2003. Fisheries Management Costs: Some Thoretical Implicaitons. In Schrank, W.E., R. Arnason and R. Hannesson (eds) The Cost of Fisheries Management. Asgate. Aldershot UK. Arnason, R., R. Hannesson and W.E. Schrank. 2000. Costs of Fisheries Management: The Cases of Iceland, Norway and Newfoundland. Marine Policy 24:233-43. Becker, G.S. 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy 76:169- 217. Becker, G.S. and G.J. Stiegler. 1974. Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compensation of Enforcers. Journal of Legal Studies 3:1-18 Charles, A.T. 1993. Fishery Enforcement: Economic Analysis and Operational Models. Ocean Institute of Canada. Halifax. Cohen, M. 1999. Monitoring and enforcement of environmental policy. In Tietenberg, T. and Folmer,H. (Eds.) International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics, Volume III., 44-106. Edward Elgar Publishers. European Commission, 2006, Third Edition Of The Common Fisheries Policy Compliance Scoreboard http://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/scoreboard/index_en.htm Garoupa, N. 1997. Optimal Law Enforcement and the Economics of the Drug Market: Some Comments on the Schengen Agreements. International Review of Law and Economics 4:521-35. Guyader, O. and S. Fifas. 2006. La pêcherie de coquilles Saint-Jacques de la baie de Saint-Brieuc: tendances d'évolution et éléments de réflexion sur son mode de gestion . AMURE Seminar, Brest, 5 January 2006. Hatcher, A. and Gordon, D. 2005. Further investigations into the factors affecting compliance with UK fishing quotas. Land Economics 81(1): 71–86 (2005). Hatcher, A., Thébaud, O. and Jaffry, S. 2000. An economic analysis of compliance with fishery regulations. In: Van Vugt, M., Snyder, M., Tyler, T. R. and Biel, A., eds. Cooperation in Modern Society: Promoting the welfare of communities, states and organizations. Routledge; London, pp 83-101. ICES Study Group on Unacounted Fishing Mortality. 2005. Joint Report of the Study Group on Unaccounted Fishing Mortality (SGUFM) and the Workshop on Unaccounted Fishing Mortality (WKUFM) 25–27 September 2005, Aberdeen, UK Le Gallic B. 2004 Using trade measures in the fight against IUU fishing: Opportunities and Challenges”. Proceedings of the XIIth biennial IIFET Conference, Tokyo, 26-30 July 2004. 12 p. Macho-Stadler, I and D. Pérez-Castrillo. 2005. Optimal enforcement policy and firms’ emissions and compliance with environmental taxes. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 51:110-31 page 10 COBECOS
Mazany, E.L. 1993. The Economics of Crime and Law Enforcement. In A.T. Charles (ed)Fishery Enforcement: Economic Analysis and Operational Models. Ocean Institute of Canada. Halifax. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2000. The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law. Journal of Economic Literature 38:45-76. MRAG, Poseidon Ltd, Lamans s.a. and Oceanic Development. 2004. Study of the Impact and Feasibility of Setting up a Community Fisheries Control Agency. Project Fish/2003/10. A Report for the European Union. Nautilius Consultants. 1998. The Costs and Benefits of Compliance with Regulations in Northern EU Fisheries. Report prepared for the European Commission Directorate General XIV. Study Contract 96/080. Unpublished. OECD. 2003. The Costs of Managing Fisheries. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Paris. Schrank, W.E., R. Arnason and R. Hannesson. 2003. The Cost of Fisheries Management. Ashgate. Aldershot UK. Sumaila, U.R., J. Alder and H. Keith.,2004. ‘The cost of being apprehended fishing illegally: Empirical evidences and policy implications’, in OECD (2004) Fish Piracy. Combating Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, pp. 201-230. Sutinen, J.G. and P. Andersen. 1985. The Economics of Fisheries Law Enforcement. Land Economics 61:387-97 Willock, A.,2004. Using trade and market information to assess IUU fishing activities. In OECD (2004) Fish Piracy. Combating Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, pp. 67-77. 5 POTENTIAL IMPACT
5.1 STRATEGIC INPUT
5.1.1 Contributions to solving societal problems and enhancing competitiveness European fisheries, as the great majority of fisheries worldwide, are beset with biological and economic trouble. The trouble manifests itself as declining stocks, excessive fishing fleets and fishing effort, low profitability, an economically weak industry and reduced employment. The problem stems fundamentally from an inappropriate management regime or/and enforcement of management measures. Proper enforcement of (well-conceived) fisheries management measures is necessary in order to mitigate these difficulties. The economic difference between good and poor management of the European fisheries is almost certainly well over a billion Euros annually. Nobody knows whether the several hundred million euro spent annually on enforcement are used in the most effective way. It follows immediately that this project, to the extent that it contributes to improved enforcement of fisheries management measures, can produce great social and economic benefits by alleviating the fisheries problem and leading to more effective enforcement of fisheries management measures. By the same token, if the European fisheries become more efficient, their international competitiveness will be enhanced. Finally, since more efficient fisheries almost certainly lead to larger stocks, probably greater and more stable landings and most likely higher quality of landings, the European consumer will also gain.
5.1.2 Innovations The main innovative aspect of this project is the development of a consistent fisheries enforcement theory and, on that basis, a practical empirical tool to investigate the efficiency of enforcement policies. As far as we are aware this has not been done before so the project is completely innovative.
5.1.3 Exploitation and dissemination This project aims at generating results and practical tools that can be used by the EU and individual member states to improve fisheries enforcement and management. To facilitate this, the project will offer
(1) access to software to examine enforcement options (2) participation at the project meetings of authority and industry representatives (3) reports and papers (4) a web-site (see work package 10 – project management and dissemination) (5) a policy implementation plan (see section 5.2) (6) a newsletter
It is expected that in connection with this project, a number of academic talks will be offered and publications take place. page 12 COBECOS
5.1.4 Value added at the European level All fisheries management regimes for EU waters are decided collectively at an EU level so research on fisheries management almost inevitably has a European dimension. The empirical part of this project is focused on European fisheries. In fact, although parts of the project have general applicability to fisheries worldwide, the project is primarily intended to contribute to the improvement of European fisheries. By studying a range of widely different fisheries, we can ensure that:
1. the conclusions that we draw are of a general nature and not only applicable on a regional or national scale 2. lessons learned in one fishery can be applied in another
5.2 POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN The consortium will deliver a concise policy implementation plan describing the policy relevant research findings and a proposal on how these might be applied within the EU and national policy frameworks The Plan will detail the initially expected policy related results from the proposal and will be measured against the obtained results. It shall describe the potential application of the results within policy frameworks (e.g. legislation, control, potential cost savings and economic impacts) on the time scales of short-, mid- and long-term, and the overall policy guidance conclusions. The format of the PIP shall be a free-style text document written as an executive policy summary of a maximum of three A4 pages.
5.3 CONTRIBUTION TO STANDARDS We will contribute to standards in two main ways:
1. We will develop a standardized description of enforcement (work package 4) 2. We intend to develop our software within the FLR framework of software. This has already been used for several bio-economic studies within EU projects. Our work will thus contribute in a standardized way to the collection of fisheries and fisheries management software within the FLR platform. 6 PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND EXPLOITATION/DISSEMINATION PLAN
6.1 PROJECT MANAGEMENT
6.1.1 Responsibilities Within the project the following responsibilities have been defined.
Overall Liaise with Commission project officer IoES Coordinator Scientific 1. ensure smooth interaction between work packages JRC coordinator 2. edit 6-monthly progress report
Financial Collects project funding on behalf of the consortium and distributes it IoES coordinator to partners
Work Ensure quality and timeliness of deliverables See section 7 package coordinators Partner Act as first point of contact for scientific and administrative matters of a See section 7 contact point particular partner
The responsibility of each work packages is defined in section 7.5
6.1.2 Decision Making Decisions on day-to-day running of the project will be taken by work package coordinators. Any disputes will be settled by a vote of all partners – each partner having one vote. In the event of a tie the scientific coordinator will have the casting vote.
6.1.3 Project meetings The partnership as a whole will meet every six months although there will obviously be other ad-hoc meetings involving those developing a common software or discussing a particular fishery. The objectives of the six-monthly meetings are described in section 7. The Commission will be notified of meetings at least eight weeks in advance.
6.2 DISSEMINATION OF KNOWLEDGE
6.2.1.1 Confidentiality Project partners have agreed not to pass information such as call signs, vessel names and IDs that can positively identify individual fishing vessels to each other. page 14 COBECOS Project management
6.2.1.2 Dissemination of data Work package 4 ensures a harmonization of project data. All data produced in this project will be archived for posterity in a way that facilitates retrieval at a later date. Dissemination of data to third parties will need the agreement of the original data owners and a majority of the partners (??)
6.2.1.3 Dissemination of reports All reports produced by the project will be available to the public through a project web-site maintained by JRC. Given the innovative nature of this project, peer-reviewed publications are an appropriate means for further dissemination and every effort will be made to produce a good number of them. The involvement of the European Commission in this project will be demonstrated by adding the following sentence to each publication:
This study (report, paper, workshop…) has been carried out with financial support from the Commission of the European Communities, specific RTD programme “Specific Support to Policies”, FP6-2005-SSP-5-A”. It does not necessarily reflect its views and in no way anticipates the Commission’s future policy in this area.
6.2.1.4 Dissemination of software Software produced by the project will be made available to all partners. At the end of the project the partners will be free to develop it further for their own use or to distribute it to partners.
6.3 RAISING PUBLIC AWARENESS The project partners will endeavour to give maximum possible exposure to the results of the project at gatherings of experts and at conferences. The public are increasingly obtaining information through the internet, It is clearly essential that the project web-site be up to date and easy to navigate. A 2-4 page newsletter, glossy leaflet or flyer will be made by the co-ordinator. This will contain: e.g. general information about the work programme, participants, published results, and exploitation strategy. This leaflet will appear e.g. 1-3 times, and will be broadly distributed (EU, participants, industry, scientific meetings, etc). 7 DETAILED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
7.1 INTRODUCTION – GENERAL DESCRIPTION AND MILESTONES
7.1.1 Definitions This project combines biological, economic, behavioural and management sciences. The terminology used within these branches to describe a certain concept is not always uniform. In this proposal we may have used some terms in an unfamiliar way. but we have tried to be consistent. The key terminology we use is:
Fishery A set of vessels from a particular country operating in a certain area, employing a specific set of fishing gears targeting a particular set of species.
Management measures These are the restrictions or limits that are imposed on fishermen and enforced by some authority. There are generally penalties for not complying with these measures. Within this project we hope to simplify the measures by classifying them with three groups: 1. restrictions on outputs - quotas 2. restrictions on inputs – effort, licences, days at sea, engine power. 3. restrictions on the efficiency with which a fisherman can produce output with a given input (catchability, cpue). This includes net-size, closed areas.
Enforcement Landings inspections, aircraft surveillance, remote analysis (VMS) etc tools/instruments
Enforcement measures A certain application of an enforcement tool
Enforcement intensity The extent to which enforcement tools are applied. Measures of enforcement intensity are e.g. number of inspections, aircraft hours, boat trips, observation hours etc Enforcement regime A system of enforcement tools and penalty structure
Compliance The degree with which a management measure is complied with. Within this project we shall attempt to ascertain a non-dimensional degree of compliance that varies between 0 (open access fishery) and 1 (full compliance)
Private benefits from Benefits to individual fishermen (often aggregated over all fishermen) without fishing taking into account the impact of fishing on the stock of fish
Social benefits from fishing Overall benefits from fishing taking into account the effect of fishing on fish stocks and possibly non-fishing benefits of the stock of fish. Expected penalties The penalties an individual fisherman may rationally expect to suffer (usually aggregated over the whole fishery) given a level of violations and for a certain level of enforcement and penalty structure. page 16 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
7.1.2 Method Each fishery is normally managed by a mixture of measures – landings quotas, effort restrictions, technical measures. The compliance on each of these is generally unknown as is the effectiveness of each enforcement measure in terms of deterring and detecting non-compliance. The objective of an enlightened enforcement activity is to provide an enforcement that is optimal in terms of net benefits (i.e. benefits in excess of costs). This involves the appropriate mix of enforcement tools operated at the appropriate enforcement intensity. The optimal level of compliance will probably not be 100% compliance –the cost of enforcement to reach that level of compliance would probably outweigh the benefits produced, A basic hypothesis in this project, adopted from the economics of law and enforcement (Becker 1968 and Becker and Stiegler 1974, see list of references in section B.1) is that the actual compliance within a fishery will be that which achieves the maximum expected benefit to the fisherman – i.e. the benefit of transgressing will be worth the expected cost of penalties incurred. We will not take this hypothesis for granted. We will attempt to test it with data from case studies. We will develop models to describe the benefits of a fishery and the expected penalties – then compare their predictions with what has been observed in our case-study fisheries using data from these fisheries collected as part of this project. This will provide us with a certain tests of our models and their basic hypotheses. The models, moreover, assuming they are found to provide reasonable approximations to reality, will provide us with independent estimates of compliance over the past. Furthermore, using the models we can then vary the enforcement mix and intensity to determine what the impact would have been on fishing behaviour, compliance and the evolution of the fishery over time. Up to now fisheries management measures have been introduced on the assumption that full compliance will protect stocks and lead to a larger yield in the longer term. This might not be true in all cases. Some rules – such as minimum landing size – are alleged to reduce the private benefit and produce no compensating benefit to the fishery: the dead (or dying) fish are discarded rather than being sold. In any case this analysis will indicate the contribution of the level of compliance to each management measure to the overall benefits – be they positive or negative, short-term or long-term. Enforcement, i.e. generating compliance is not free. The operation of the enforcement system has to be paid for. The net benefits of enforcement are the social benefits less the the cost of enforcement. Estimating enforcement costs is difficult because the enforcement arrangement (although not necessarily the enforcement measures) in each country is different. For instance, in some countries the cost of naval support is not attributed to fisheries. Our approach will therefore be to estimate the cost of enforcement in our case study fisheries using, to the extent possible, uniform definitions of enforcement tools, measures and intensity. We will, moreover, attempt to correct for different price levels across countries in assessing the costs of on-shore inspectors, patrol vessels etc. On is basis, we hope to be able to calculate the cost of enforcement of each of the case-study fisheries, the breakdown of costs for each management measure (input, output, efficiency) and the cost-effectiveness of each enforcement measure (landings inspector, air- patrols) relative to the achieved compliance level. Taking into account the cost of enforcement will allow us to determine (1) whether each of the fisheries in the project is being managed to an optimum compliance level or whether enforcement could be tightened or relaxed and (2) whether the mix of enforcement measures is appropriate or whether the same level of compliance could be achieved more cheaply. Finally we aim to draw general lessons for fisheries management. What management measures are appropriate for particular types of fisheries? Can modern technology reduce the cost of achieving a given level of compliance? COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 17
7.1.3 Basic enforcement model The fisheries enforcement model we are going to employ will be developed within this project. Therefore, at this point, we can only outline its basic elements as they are envisaged at this time. As the work progresses, we expect certain modifications. However, we are confident that the basic structure of the model, to be described below, will remain. The fisheries enforcement model is a dynamic structure that can trace the evolution of the fishery, fisheries benefits and compliance over time. It most basic components are
1. Input module 2. Internal structure 3. Output module
The input and output modules are most easily understood when the internal structure has been clarified. Therefore we begin with that.
7.1.3.1 Internal structure The internal structure of the model consists of five sets of structural functions and one behavioural module. The structural functions may be divided into two parts: a bio-economic model and an enforcement model. The bio-economic model is, apart from its emphasis on management tools/instruments, for the most part standard. The enforcement model is new. In addition, of course, the model will contain a number of derived expressions such as social benefits, compliance levels as well as the usual computational routines and data bases. A stochastic module will also be included. The five structural function classes expressed in a simple condensed form are:
A. Bioeconomic model
A.1 Private benefit function
This function measures benefits to the fishers. These benefits would normally involve profits but could also include other desirables.
(1) B( q ,a , x ; z ) ,
where q represents the volume of harvest, vector of other fisheries choice variables subject to management controls, x the state of the fish stocks (biomass) and z exogenous variables such as input and output prices.
A.2 Stock evolution function
(2) x˙ = G( x ,a ) - q ,
where x˙ represents the change in stocks over time and the function G(x,) is the natural growth function of the stock. Note that this function now depends in principle on the various management restrictions (e.g. mesh sizes, closed areas etc.). This relationship, probably formulated as a difference page 18 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
function in the actual model, allows us to generate the evolution of the stock over time as a function of harvests. It may well be that the model will include other stock variables such as fleets. In that case a corresponding stock evolution equation would be specified.
B. Enforcement model
B.1 Probability of having to suffer a penalty function
This function describes the probability of having to suffer a penalty given that a violation has been committed:
(3) P(e ) ,
where the vector e measures the intensity of enforcement along the enforcement dimensions (air, patrol, observers etc.) specified. Obviously, this function lies in the interval [0,1] and is non-decreasing in e.
B.2 The penalty schedule
This function describes how penalties depend on the extent of violations detected.
(4) F(a- a *) ,
where * is the management restriction (expressed as an upper bound) and is actual behaviour. Presumably the function F(.) is identically zero when * and increasing thereafter. It may well be the case that actual penalty schedules are step functions. Note that restrictions on harvest may be among the management measures and therefore implicitly included in (4).
B.3 The cost of enforcement function
Enforcement activity, i.e. e, is costly. The enforcement costs are expressed as:
(5) C( e ,a ; z ) ,
where we have assumed that enforcement costs may depend not only on the intensity of enforcement, the vector e, but also on the level of the fishing activity being monitored, i.e. , as well as a set of other exogenous variables represented by z.
C. Fishers’ behaviour
It is assumed that fishers (fishing firms) adjust their fishing behaviour to maximize their private benefits less whatever penalties they expect to pay for transgressions of rules. In other words, they try to solve the following maximization problem. COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 19
Max B ( q ,a , x ; z )- P ( e )� F ( a a *) q,a .
The solution to this problem then generates the fishers’ behaviour as the functions:
q= Q( e ,a *, x , z ) ,
a= A( e , a *, x , z ) .
D. Important derived expressions
Social benefits are defined as:
B( q ,a , x ; z ) + l x˙ , where is the implied (to be calculated within the model) shadow value of biomass.
It is proposed to calculate compliance as the dimensionless ratio:
aˆ - A( e , a *, x , z ) W = [0,1] , aˆ - a * where aˆ is the level of the controlled fisheries variable which the fishers would select if there was no management.
7.1.3.2 Input module
The inputs into this model will be of three kinds:
(1) Empirical functions and parameters. This is simply the empirical form (presumably estimated in the cases studies) of the structural functions discussed above. (2) Initial states The initial value of biomass and other state variables that evolve endogenously in the model (3) Enforcement and management inputs These are the management measures and enforcement inputs hat can be changed over time and from run to run. These would typically include:
Enforcement efforts (i.e. the vector of enforcement intensity along the various dimensions of enforcement) Alterations in management measures (Possibly) alterations in the penalty schedule page 20 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
7.1.3.3 Output module
The output of the model consists essentially of the following:
Harvest, q Other fishing behaviour, . State variables such as biomass, x.
All three variables will generated over time with confidence intervals (stochastic simulations).
On the basis of these outputs, it is possible to calculate other derived output variables such as:
Private benefits Social benefits Compliance levels
The model, once constructed, can also be used to derive (i) cost minimizing combinations of enforcements measures, (ii) the benefits from increasing compliance, (iii) the costs and benefits of certain fisheries management measures, (iv) the appropriate levels of controls given imperfect compliance and costly enforcement, (v) robustness of fisheries management systems to imperfect compliance.
7.1.4 Implementation We believe that each fishery has a unique set of characteristics and what works for one fishery will not necessarily work for another. However, within this project we intend to develop a common approach. This will lead to an analysis method that is robust, that provides quantitative measures for comparing one fishery with another and that can be extrapolated to other fisheries. We will achieve this though the development of a common terminology for describing the fishery, a common method for analyzing it and a common software to be used by all partners and, subsequently, others. The common software will be developed within the FLR framework of fisheries programmes based on the R programming platform. It will be jointly owned by the partners of the project and will be set up on the internet so that all partners are working with the same version. A project database will be set up that allows partners to upload, modify and delete data. A final version of this pogramme will be made accessible to DG XIV officials. Following the completion of this project, we hope to make our software generally available to fisheries managers.
7.1.5 Uncertainty and data The fisheries that we are studying, the regulations that govern them and the impact of the regulations on the biology and economics of the fishery are complex. Although we devote a considerable amount of effort to data collection, it is obvious that we will not be able to collect precise information on all parameters of interest and that we will have to rely on expert judgment. For instance the rate of non-compliance is, by its very nature, hidden. It is therefore of great importance in incorporate measurement (and other types of) uncertainty in our model. To reduce imprecision and uncertainty, we also intend to make every reasonable effort to improve parameter and variables estimates in our empirical models. Thus, for instance, we aim to check for actual compliance in three separate ways – (1) from the number of infringements detected relative to the rate of sampling/inspections, (2) by asking fishermen and enforcers and (3) determining what rate of non- COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 21
compliance gives the maximum private benefit to the fishermen according to our model. Finally we aim to develop measures and dimensions that are consistent. Thus even if we are not able to ascertain the precise impact of a measure – mesh-size limitation – for instance – we should be able to determine its impact compared to other measures or to other fisheries.
7.1.6 Software to be developed COBECOS will further develop and apply the FLR software platform for fisheries modeling to allow cost- benefit analysis of current and alternative fisheries enforcement and monitoring options. COBECOS will develop new modules to add to the FLR library to calculate among other things the following:
Function Input Private benefits of fishing Biomass, price, management measures, landings Public benefits of fishing Private benefits + social values of biomass, employment etc. Probability of a penalty Enforcement, violations Expected penalties Enforcement, violations, penalty schedule, compliance Enforcement costs Enforcement intensity, enforcement mix, nature of fishery
The software will be developed to allow exploratory sensitivity calculations and maximization approaches and simulation evaluation of alternative management regimes with various enforcement and monitoring regimes. The FLR software framework (see details of work package 6) already includes assessment models and bioeconomic models for management scenarios. Because it is written in R, an open-source statistical package, it can be used by all partners in the project. Using it would allow the partners to benefit from work done in other projects. FLR provides the bio-economic software for the EU projects FEMS, FISBOAT, COMMIT, PRONE, CAFE and EFIMAS.
7.1.7 Fisheries of project: Case Studies The theoretical understanding of compliance, enforcement and management developed within this project will be tested through analysis of a number of very different fisheries operating under a number of different management regimes. By analyzing such a large number of case studies we will be able to see which particular management regimes and enforcement tools are appropriate for a set of particular circumstances. We will be able to determine the main conditions that determine compliance and enforcement efficiency. The fisheries to be studied and the enforcement issues they raise are listed in Table 7-1 and summarized below.
Table 7-1 fisheries to be studied in COBECOS
data from Lead collaboration enforcement issues1 partner from 1. Northern hake Spain, France AZTI minimum mesh sizes 2. The Bay of Saint- France CEDEM input restrictions Brieuc Scallops
1 Most of these fisheries have a number of management measures, the ones we list here are not necessarily the most important but they do indicate the range of measures that will be dealt with with COBECOS page 22 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
3. CCAMLR South UK, France JRC IC, CEDEM IUU Georgia/ Kerguelen 4. Ligurian and Northern net size, seasonal and area closures, Tyrrhenian Sea bottom Italy IREPA mixed fishery trawling fishery technical restrictions, TAC- 5. Norwegian fisheries Norway NHH restrictions, individual quotas time/area closures, minimum fish size restrictions, no discarding 6. Icelandic cod fishery Iceland IoES rules, effort restrictions and individual transferable quota quotas, input restrictions, technical 7. Dutch beam trawl Netherlands LEI measures 8. Kattegat & Skagerrak undersized lobsters and illegal Denmark FOI SDU nephrops fishery bycatch 9. (Western) Channel IC, CEFAS, UK CEMARE, gear and access restrictions Fisheries CEDEM The degree of collaboration of the second partner will vary. In particular CEDEM will be able to provide whatever data they have available for the IUU fishing case but will be concentrating mostly on their scallops fishery and on the “English” channel fishery.
7.1.7.1 Northern Hake (French and Spanish vessels) The European hake (Merluccius merluccius L.) is a commercially exploited top predator gadoid species in the Bay of Biscay area. Within this geographical area ICES recognizes the existence of two stocks, the so- called northern (ICES Division IIIa, Subareas II, IV, VI and VII and Divisions VIIIa,b,d) and southern stock (ICES Divisions VIIIc and IXa) (ICES, 2005a). The northern stock of European hake in the Bay of Biscay (Div. VIIIa,b,d) is one of the main commercial species for Spanish and French fleets and it has been commercially exploited since the 18th century (Casey & Pereiro, 1995), with annual catches ranging from 42 000 to 96 000 tonnes during the period 1961-2003 (ICES, 2005a). In 2003, the value of the northern hake TAC was estimated at around 90 M€. The population size of northern European hake precipitously declined during the late 1990s and the present level is considered to be only 50 % of the level of the 1970s. Based on the most recent assessment of this species, the northern stock is likely to be at a reduced reproductive capacity and at risk of being harvested unsustainably (ICES, 2005a). The stock is outside the safe biological limits and at the beginning of the 1990s the spawning biomass had decreased below the precautionary approach level (and has remained at that level. Fishing mortality has been above FPA between 1987 and 2000, then declined and is estimated to be above FPA in 2003. Due to the critical state of the population and in order to recover it an Emergency Plan was introduced in June 2001 (see Council Regulation Nº1162/2001) and, finally, a Recovery Plan was implemented for the northern stock of European hake in 2004 under the EC Reg. No 811/2004. For the case of Northern Hake also a TAE (Total Allowable Effort) system, which is previous to the TAC regulation is being used. It works as follows: In 1981 it was decided to list all the Spanish vessels operating in divisions VIIIabd and sub-areas VI and VII. in order to create the access rights to these fisheries (a single fishing right per vessel). The idea was to maintain fixed these rights even if the number of vessel decreased. When Spain joined the EU the number of vessels in that list was close to 300 and the so-called “300 list” was COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 23
created. These fishing rights became transferable by area, and the system continued nowadays. Currently there are several negotiations going on to decide whether this system will continue or not. Northern hake stock is managed by a TAC and quotas with technical measures associated (minimum mesh size in some areas for some gears and minimum length in landings) (see Council Regulation N°850/98). The minimum legal sizes for fish caught in Sub areas IV-VI-VII and VIII is set at 27 cm total length (30cm in Division IIIa). From 14th of June 2001 an Emergency Plan was implemented by the Commission for the recovery of the Northern hake stock (Council Regulations N°1162/2001, 2602/2001 and 494/2002). First, a 100 mm minimum mesh size has been implemented for otter-trawlers when hake comprises more than 20% of the total amount of marine organisms retained onboard. This measure did not apply to vessels less than 12 m in length and which return to port within 24 hours of their most recent departure. Second, two areas have been defined, one in Sub area VII and the other in Sub area VIII, where a 100 mm minimum mesh size is required for all otter-trawlers, whatever the amount of hake caught. The objective of the Northern hake stock recovery plan is to increase the level of spawning biomass of this stock. Once the target level has been achieved the Commission will introduce follow-up management measures replacing the recovery plan. This case study is interesting for several reasons. First, it will allow for an international comparison to be conducted (and for synergies between two partners to be exploited); Second, the case is particularly policy relevant, because compliance and enforcement issues related to the hake fishery have recently attracted a lot of interest in France; Third, the French hake fishery is physically associated with a large and economically important nephrops fishery. This feature may be of interest, as it is likely to enrich the basic model.
7.1.7.2 The Bay of Saint-Brieuc scallops fishery The Saint Brieuc scallop fishery is located within the western part of the English Channel (ICES area VIIe). This is one of the two major scallop producing areas in France, the other being the Seine Bay. Annual official landings reached around 6,500 tons in 2004, whilst national production fluctuated around 10,000 tons per year since the 1990’. Fraud estimates vary between 30% and 60% of total official landings. Non-compliance is thus a major issue in this fishery. This feature is reinforced by two factors. First, the cost of enforcement is already considered to be significant (between 2.5% and 5% of the turnover); Second, the cost of enforcement is partly internalised through a licence fee. The area is exploited by dredging vessels from the maritime districts of Northern Brittany. The fleet is composed of small units with an average length of 10.3 meters and 127 kW of engine power. These multipurpose fishing units use different types of gear (trawls, nets, lines and pots), especially outside the scallop official landings season. The scallop turnover has oscillated between EUR 4.5 and 15 million (base 1995) over the last 20 years, and the fishery is a structuring activity for the coastal fleets in this area. Although the fishery is not shared with other European countries, it is currently managed under a European regime (special fishing permits). This case study can be considered as relevant for the CFP because it deals with the exploitation of a sedentary species, making lessons to be easily transferable to other similar clams-like fisheries all over Europe. It is also interesting because the fishery is managed under a specific system of input regulation, based on non-transferable quotas of fishing effort (fishing hours). This may have some key implications regarding the cost-effectiveness structure of the enforcement activity. Here again, lessons learned from this case study can be of direct interest for the CFP. In addition, the species involved in this fishery is of relatively high value, which may play a role in the compliance behaviour. Last, it will be particularly interesting to investigate whether direct financial contribution (from the licence holders) to the enforcement scheme (e.g. air control) modifies (or not) the cost-effectiveness ratio of the management measure in place. page 24 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
7.1.7.3 CCAMLR: South Georgia/Kerguelen Many small island or developing countries face unique control problems that are not faced by mainland European coastal states. These problems arise from the fact that their fisheries are often very large and spread out over an extensive EEZ, but the small financial and practical resources of the state are insufficient to undertake cost-effective patrolling. Many of the resources available to such states are highly migratory – tuna, billfish, squid – and the remainder, usually demersal fish or invertebrates, are generally not able to generate high volume or value fisheries. Thus it is difficult to generate enough reliable income to allow local fishing companies to prosper, even if they could overcome the problems of accessing capital. Most of these states therefore rely on licensing of foreign or joint-venture vessels under fisheries access agreements, and suffer particularly from IUU fishing. What management models might be more efficient for these states? Many EU registered vessels make use of them, and the EU has partnership or access agreements with many. We propose to offer the CCAMLR South Georgia/Kerguelen fishery because of the availability of data. The major fishery in CCAMLR waters is toothfish, which forms the mainstay at the Sub-Antarctic Island territories of South Georgia (UK) and Kerguelen/Crozet (France). The major enforcement problem is IUU fishing, and the major control of legal fishing vessels is through inspection and observer systems. The domestic enforcement problem is exacerbated by the lack of effective control in adjacent high seas waters, for which the management body is CCAMLR. CCAMLR has been fighting IUU fishing for a decade (Agnew 2000) and an economic/resource model exploring the relative effectiveness of the different management approaches that CCAMLR and UK/France have adopted. Reference Agnew, D J, 2000. The illegal and unregulated fishery for toothfish in the Southern Ocean, and the CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme. Marine Policy. 24: 361 – 374.
7.1.7.4 GFCM GSA 9 Ligurian and Northern Tyrrhenian Sea bottom trawling fishery This case study will be a challenge. Both the fisheries and the control are complex. In fact, the Mediterranean industry exhibits a high level of species interaction and multigear features. In managing the fishing activity Authorities have to take into account these features and the results is a management system made up of a number of measures. In Liguria, as in the overall GSA 9 (three Italian regions fall into GSA 9, namely Liguria, Toscana and Lazio), fishing is performed on the bottom of the seabed, to catch mainly benthonic and batipelagic species predominantly through the use of trawling nets. At higher levels the fishing activity is carried out by using purse seines and other minor gears (pots, trammel net and so on) to capture pelagic species, especially anchovies, sardines and mackerels. Trawling is conducted with a number of tools. The most widely used type of trawl is that in which the bottom trawl, provided with otter boards, is automatically lowered, hauled and weighed by a motorised trawler. This type of trawling is called bottom otter trawling and, in most cases, it is still performed in neritic waters (up to 200m.). The catches are very varied: more than two hundred different species among which are found cartilaginous fish, osseous fish, crustaceans and molluscs. Within the 200 m isobath approximately 85 species of fish (53 edible) and 46 species of crustaceans (12 edible) are caught. Among the edible species, the most important from an economic point of view are: the Red mullet (Mullus barbatus), the Hake (Merluccius merluccius) and the Sparidae, and the Horned octopus (Eledone cirrhosa). The sandy substrata which plunge as far as the 50 m. isobath are not very frequent, while the habitats that are loaded with most part of coastal trawling are terrigenous mud and the open sea detrital seabed (approx., the former between 50-100 m. and, the latter between 100-150 m.). Epi-bathyal trawling (between 200 and 450 m.) exploits the higher levels of the slope. Local fishermen commonly define this seabed with the expression “ a scampi and potassoli” meaning that most part of landings is composed of these species. COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 25
The management measure regulating the Italian bottom trawlers fishing in GSA 9 are the ones applied at national level. In Italy, the trawling activity is managed trough a series of input control and technical measures, consisting in:
1. fishing activity regulated by a closed license scheme; 2. fishing outside 3 miles from the coastline (or within the 50 m isobath); 3. fishing with nets whose meshes are set at 40mm; 4. minimum landing size for species listed in Annex IV of EC Reg. 1626/94; 5. technical withdrawal of the fishing activity during the week-end (Saturday and Sunday). 6. seasonal withdrawal of the fishing activity during certain period, generally in the summer months.
As far as the input control measure (point 1), the effort control on trawlers is pursued by limiting the number of fishing licenses. In other words, the number of licenses for trawling cannot be increased. New licenses can be given only if the same number of licenses is withdrawn (together with capacity). As far as technical measures, the main reference of these restriction, precisely for restrictions listed in point 2, 3 and 4, is the EC Reg. no 1626/94 which establishes “Technical measures for the conservation of fisheries resources in the Mediterranean” and subsequent amendments (Reg. CEE No 1075/96, No 782/98, No 1448/1999, No 812/2000, No 2550/2000, No 973/2001).2 Concerning restriction listed in point 2 and 3, trawlers can apply for a derogation. In fact, fishers of this area use special kinds of shore-seine with smaller and more closely-knit meshes to harvest deep sea whitebait i.e. the juvenile of the minute Goby (Crystallogobius linearis) which is typical of the area. This particular fishery is regulated by a national legislation, based on seasonal permits, and by EC Reg. no 1626/94. Trawlers that want to apply for this fishery permit are allowed to fish, only in the seasons provided for by the permit itself, within the 3 miles from the coast and with mesh sizes tighter than 40 mm. The restrictions imposed on inshore trawling (point 2) and on the mesh size are justified for a number of reasons. Trawls are, by their own nature, scarcely selective gears. Besides damaging the seabed, if conducted inshore, this type of fishing activity destroys reproduction areas and risks capturing juvenile species whose development takes place near the coast. Furthermore, since trawling deprives small-scale fisheries of their catches and damages gill nets, it represents a source of conflict. The seasonal withdrawal (point 6) is, perhaps, the most important effort control measure of the Italian fishery management system, both in terms of resources conservation and in terms of enforcement control. It has been applied continuatively since 1988 and applies both to trawlers and to midwater pelagic nets as its main aim is the safeguard of the juveniles of demersal species. In particular, the seasonal withdrawal try to safeguard demersal species during their spawning and recruitment seasons. Considering the multispecificity of the Italian fishery, these periods vary from species to species and the period provided each year by the seasonal withdrawal represent a compromise, based on scientific advice, for the main species caught by trawlers and midwater pelagic nets. Anyway, it should be outlined that this measure has not been always
2 The ban to fish within 3 miles from the coast was yet regulated by the Decree by the President of the Republic no. 1639 of 02.10.1968, Regulation for the enforcement of Law no. 963 of 14 July 1965, concerning rules and regulations governing fishery. In this decree the restriction is provided for by art. 111, “limitations on the use”. Pursuant this article, it is forbidden to use trawls within 3 miles from the coast in marine areas in which the depth of waters is lower than 50 m, with the exception of those fishing activities performed by using rowing boats or by hand from the shore. In 1994, national regulations have been strengthened by the issue of the of the Community Regulation that compensated for the lack of common rules aimed at preserving Mediterranean marine resources. This occurred the very moment in which the need for safeguarding Mediterranean stocks was becoming urgent. The provisions of the regulation have been drafted by taking into account, where possible, existing national regulations. page 26 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
compulsory for the area under analysis (GSA 9). In fact, it is applied in different periods and, depending on the areas of the Italian coastline, it can be compulsory or facultative. In particular, for GSA 9 (as for the all Tyrrhenian fleets) the seasonal withdrawal has been compulsory until 1997, facultative in the years 1998- 1999, compulsory again in 2000 and 2001 (only in some harbours) and, then, facultative since 2002. This case study represents a challenge also because of the characteristics of the enforcement. A number of military bodies – i.e. Guardia Costiera, Guardia di Finanza, Carabinieri, State Policy – is in charge of the enforcement of all the measures listed above. Hence, enforcement data are, to some extent, difficult to collect, especially concerning the enforcement effort (intensity) and the associated costs destined to each single measure. It is though likely that the necessary data (or reasonable estimates for them) can be gathered in order to obtain information on: (i) enforcement intensity, (ii) enforcement costs, (iii) the probability of detection and (ii) compliance levels over time.
7.1.7.5 The Norwegian Fisheries Three institutions are involved in fisheries enforcement in Norway. These are
the coast guard the Directorate of Fisheries the sales organizations
The coast guard is responsible for at-sea monitoring. Much of this activity is directed at foreign boats with a license to fish in the Norwegian zone. These boats would have quotas issued by their flag state, but would be permitted to fish in the Norwegian zone by mutual agreement between that state and Norway. The control would be primarily to ascertain whether the boats have the necessary authorization to fish in the Norwegian zone, whether they have notified the Norwegian authorities in the prescribed manner, and whether they follow internationally agreed technical regulations such as minimum mesh sizes. Inspections of Norwegian boats would be primarily to ascertain whether such technical regulations have been observed. There exist statistics on the activities of the coast guard, such as number of boats inspected and the results of those inspections. From this information and information on the number of boats involved it would be possible to estimate the probability of being inspected. Information on the cost of the coast guard is readily available, but it is not straightforward to split this between enforcement activities in the fisheries and other activities. This would have to be done by interviewing civil servants in the Ministry of Defence. The Directorate of Fisheries is responsible for monitoring catches and compliance with quotas. Most of the fish stocks utilized by the Norwegian fisheries are controlled by overall quotas, which are split between the countries sharing the stock. Virtually all stocks are shared with the neighbouring countries, Russia, the European Union, Iceland, and the Faeroe Islands. The Norwegian quota is divided between different groups of boats, and these quota allocations are in most cases divided between the individual boats. The Directorate keeps the database for quota allocations and landings, and its control staff inspects boats from time to time to check that the quota allocations have not been exceeded and that the landings have been correctly reported. There exist no published data on this activity, but it would be possible to obtain information from the Directorate on the number of inspections, number of violations, and the measures taken. It would also be possible to obtain information on how much money is spent on this activity. It would not be straightforward to split this between different types of fisheries (say, demersal versus pelagic), but through interviews with the officials involved it would probably be possible to make a rough split, again between demersal and pelagic fisheries. COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 27
The sales organizations are involved in monitoring and enforcement in the following way. All selling of raw fish must pass through these organizations. They are responsible for collecting the catch statistics at the point of first sale and to pass this on to the Directorate of Fisheries. The sales organizations have direct access to the Directorate’s database on quota allocations and are therefore in a position to immediately check whether a boat has sufficient allocation left for the fish it is landing. All purchase of fish catches beyond quota is illegal, so to the extent this happens it will be a part of the black economy or otherwise misreported. By interviews with key personnel in the sales organization it should be possible to get a picture of their involvement in monitoring activities. Hence, it should be possible to get a fairly accurate estimate of the costs involved in monitoring, with the possible exception of the activities that the sales organizations are involved in. Estimating the benefits is a much greater challenge. At a minimum, however, the money spent on monitoring and enforcement gives an idea of how high the benefits would have to be in order to make this activity worth while. It should be possible, through looking at the value of landings over some time period and by running models of the fish stocks involved, to get an idea whether the benefits are likely to outweigh the costs. Otherwise, there are two main steps involved in assessing the possible benefits from monitoring and enforcement. The first step is to assess the deterrent effect of this activity. This is by no means straightforward. Information on the number of inspections would provide some idea of the probability of inspection. Then comes the question of the deterrent effect. How many and how serious violations would occur in the absence of any monitoring? Two factors may provide clues to this. First, how many infractions were actually detected by the monitoring activity? Second, what is the capacity of the fleet to violate the regulations in case no monitoring takes place? The second step is to assess what the enforcement activity means in terms of higher value of fish landings or higher economic rent in the fishery. Having assessed the deterrence effect of the monitoring activities, it would be possible to run bioeconomic models of the most important fish stocks over some time period with and without the deterrence and compare the value of landings in the two cases, and possibly the economic rent as well. For all the major stocks there exist well developed and validated models that can be used for this purpose.
7.1.7.6 Icelandic Demersal (cod) Fisheries The Icelandic demersal fisheries are based on a number of species of which cod is most important. This is a multi-species fishery pursued by several types of fishing vessels using essentially four types of fishing gear. This fishery has been managed by TACs since 1976, effort restrictions from 1977-1984, a mixture of ITQs and effort restrictions 1984-1990, by ITQs from 1991 to the present. In addition to these basic management tools, the fishery has been subject to a range of technical restrictions, including time/area closures, minimum fish size restrictions, no discarding rules, vessel size restrictions, anti-pollution restrictions and several others. The enforcement of these rules has been carried out at-sea by (i) coast guard vessels and airplanes, (ii) on- board observers and (iii) remote sensing. On-land it has been carried out by a system of dock-side monitoring, and special inspections. The enforcement institutes involved in this activity are the Fisheries Directorate, the Coast Guard and the general police. The penalty structure for fisheries violations as well as legal stipulations regarding burden of proof etc. has evolved considerably over the last 15 years or so. This reflects attempts to increase compliance. Bioeconomic data on the Icelandic demersal fisheries is comparatively good and the fishery has been subject to a number of studies. This means that it will be comparatively easy to construct a bioeconomic model for this fishery. The enforcement activity side of the matter has not really been investigated before although some basic fisheries management cost studies have been performed. It is though, however, that the page 28 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
necessary data can be assembled and in co-operative with the Fisheries Directorate, it will be possible to obtain reasonable estimates of (i) enforcement intensity and (ii) enforcement costs and some well-informed estimates of (iii) the probability of detection and (iv) compliance levels over time. A complicating factor, however, is the great number of regulations that are being enforced. It is though unlikely that the enforcement effort (intensity) and the associated costs can be allocated to the different regulations or even sub-fisheries with a reasonable accuracy.
7.1.7.7 The Dutch beam trawl fisheries In terms of value of landings, the beam trawl fleet is the most important segment in the Netherlands. This segment represents 34% of the total number of vessels and 58% of the total kWs of the national fleet. The vessels have an average engine power of approximately 1,600 kW. Important target species are sole and plaice but also other flatfish like turbot and brill. All these species are mainly caught in the North Sea and landed fresh. This fishery has been managed by ITQs since 1983 and a mixture of ITQs and effort restrictions since 1990 to the present. In addition to these basic management tools, the fishery has been subject to a range of technical restrictions, including minimum fish size restrictions, engine size restrictions and several others. The enforcement of these rules has been carried out at-sea by coast guard. On-land it has been carried out by a system of dock-side monitoring. The enforcement institutes involved in this activity are the Ministry of Agriculture, the Coast Guard and the general police. The ITQ system is co-managed by groups of ITQ holders. Co-management seams to have improved compliance. Data on Dutch beam trawl fisheries is comparatively good and the fishery has been subject to a number of studies. This means that it will be comparatively easy to construct a bioeconomic model for this fishery. The enforcement tasks have been investigated by the European Commission. Exact data on enforcement effort, costs and probability of detection are not available. Though, it is expected that it will be possible to obtain reasonable estimates. A complicating factor, however, is the great number of regulations that are being enforced. It is unlikely that the enforcement effort (intensity) and the associated costs can be allocated to the different regulations with a reasonable accuracy.
7.1.7.8 Norway lobster trawl fishery in Kattegat and Skagerrak The Norway lobster fishery in Kattegat and Skagerrak is a trawl fishery with a number of species as bycatch, the most important being cod. The fishery takes place in large parts of Skagerrak up to depths of 300 meters and in Kattegat, primarily in the northern and eastern part. Vessels from Denmark, Norway and Sweden take part in the fishery and landings of Norway lobster have been stable the last few years at around 4000 tons of which Denmark contributes with around 75%. Economically, the Norway lobster fishery is one of the most important in Skagerrak and Kattegat. A combination of measures is used to manage the fishery. There are several overall TACs for the different species caught in the area. The TAC for Norway lobster has been around 4500-4700 t in the last five years, while TACs for other species have varied, with the TAC for cod declining in the past few years. A minimum legal landing size has been set at 40 mm carapace length and mesh sizes between 70 and 89 mm have been prohibited since spring 2004. Bycatch has to be within a certain limit of the total catch and effort is managed through restrictions on days at sea. From the beginning of the regulation period, the fishery is free, until 50% of the TAC has been caught. After that, weekly or biweekly quotas are distributed to every vessel. These quotas can be changed on short notice. From 2007 onward, the regulation changes to individual quotas per vessel. These quotas are tradable, but must be sold together with the vessel. The quotas can also be pooled. COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 29
Pooling actually makes it possible to transfer quotas between vessels without selling the vessel. In the new regulation, restrictions on days at sea and mesh size still remain. The main problems in the fishery are landings of undersized lobsters and illegal bycatch. The most important control measures in Denmark are:
• Linkage of data of different records, e.g. logbooks and settlements from the fish buyers • Physical control in the harbours • Control at sea • Control campaigns • Satellite surveillance
The directorate of fisheries is responsible for the control of the fisheries. Organisationally there is a special unit in the directorate of fisheries which has the responsibility for the control. This unit is located at 3 offices around in Denmark and uses 4 vessels in its control work. The unit has other tasks than control, e.g. administration of licenses. The burden of proof lies with the directorate of fisheries and in many cases it is difficult to prove violations. Legal sanctions range from administrative penalties to loss of licenses and fines. The case study should give an insight in the composition of the monitoring and enforcement costs associated with this fishery. This combined with the evidence found on illegal landings should enable us to assess the benefits and costs of monitoring and enforcement in this particular fishery. Imputing the data found in a model of the fishery will allow us to analyze the effect of alternative control systems.
7.1.7.9 The UK and French (Western) Channel Fisheries The English Channel fishery is a multi-species, multi-gears and multi-fleet fishery, representing almost 4000 vessels. The French Fisheries concentrate their activity in ICES areas VIId and VIIe, although the largest vessels (e.g. from South-Brittany and Boulogne) also operate in the Celtic and the North Sea. Around 1700 registered French vessels operate in the fisheries ranging in size from 6m to over 25m. The UK Fisheries in the South-West concentrate their activity in ICES sub-regions VIIe to VIIk (i.e. the Western part of the English Channel). Within this area there are a number of multi-species multi-gear fisheries dominated by high value fish and shellfish species such as sole, lobster and scallops. Around 1500 registered UK vessels operate in the fisheries ranging in size from 4m to over 30m. There are comparable fleets from Spain and Belgium that operate in the area. Fishing activities (i.e. metiers) are defined and are broadly based on seven main gear types: beam trawl, otter trawl, pelagic/mid-water trawl, dredge, line, nets and pots. While fleets can be broadly classified on the basis of their main gear type, they are largely multi-purpose, and operate in several different métiers over the year. For example, the sub-fleet designated as UK beam trawl also operates in the otter trawl and dredge métiers, while the UK or French inshore mixed sub-fleet operates in nearly all métiers, switching from gear to gear on an opportunistic basis. Management of the fishery is undertaken at several levels. The European Council imposes total allowable catches (TACs) on several of the key species in the fishery. However, over 50 species are caught commercially in the South-West, although only 10 are subject to quota control under the CFP. Management of the other species is largely undertaken through controls on the level and use of inputs in the fishery. Entry to the fishery is limited at the national level, with each boat requiring a licence to operate. Restrictions on the use of gear and limitations on access to particular areas of the fishery are imposed at the European, national and regional level. Technical measures imposed under the CFP include minimum mesh sizes for different fishing activities. These are compounded by other restrictions imposed by the national management authorities as well as regional bodies (e.g. Sea Fishery Committees in the UK; Regional and Local Fisheries Committees in page 30 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
France). Inshore fishing restrictions exist at both the European and national levels. The hake recovery plan applies to part of this area. Established in 2002 (EC Regulation No. 494/2002) Two restricted areas are defined by boxes: one off the South/South-West of Ireland, sub-region VII; and one in the Bay of Biscay, sub-region VIII. The recovery plan relates mainly to vessels using towed gear other than beam trawl, although anecdotal evidence suggests its impact on the English beam trawl fleet in the South West has been to reduce significantly beam trawl effort in the boxes defined. Another closed area in operation in the area is the “cod recovery box” that has been initiated is an area off Trevose Head, Cornwall, UK. A fully defined model for the UK fisheries in the South-West will be used and developed in the FLR- framework with which analysis will be undertaken for this project. This model is currently calibrated to 2003 data. It is envisaged that where possible data will be updated, however the stock dynamics within the model will remain. The model provides a robust framework for the empirical investigation of compliance issues faced in this project. As for the French side of the Channel, it has been recognized that from an enforcement and compliance perspective, it makes sense to consider the whole area as a single entity. In particular, it seems relevant to analyze information related to the “administrative” and control activities at the regional and inter-regional level. While the organization and cost of control will be considered at the Channel level, the theoretical understanding of compliance, enforcement and management developed within this project will be tested for one or more selected cases studies. This will in particular allow for the discussion of compliance issues related to specific species. For the sake of example, one of the potential case studies is presented below in detail (The Bay of Saint-Brieuc Scallops fishery). Also, it is envisaged that, where possible, a preexisting bioeconomic model of the whole VIIe multispecies fishery (BECHAMEL) will be updated, in order to allow for comparisons between the French and the British situations.
7.1.8 Stakeholder participation This project is practically oriented. Its basic objective is to contribute to improved enforcement of fisheries management measures. To attain this objective it is obviously of value to consult and involve actual fisheries managers, especially those from the enforcement side of fisheries management, in the project. Another reason for involving fisheries enforcement institutes in the project is to provide feed-back on the model structure, empirical data and estimations and the practical implication of the work. Obviously, fisheries enforcers are well positioned to suggest questions of the greatest practical relevance and identify practical obstacles to seemingly promising policy modifications. They are also in a good position to help with data and give expert opinions on variables that are difficult to measure such as actual compliance. For all these reasons we intend to involve fisheries enforcers. i.e. members of fisheries enforcement agencies in this project. This will happen in two major ways. First, a point will be made of extensively consulting the relevant fisheries enforcement agencies in the fisheries cases studies themselves. The Director of the Marine Fisheries Agency in the UK has already expressed interest in the project. Second, representation from actual fisheries enforcement agencies will be formally solicited at at least two points in project; (i) the mid-term project meeting and (ii) the final meeting . In past Framework Programme projects run by JRC on enforcement issues, eg IMPAST, SHEEL< we have found fisheries authorities very willing to take part in the discussions. COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 31
7.1.9 Milestones
7.1.9.1 Project meetings The main milestones are the six-monthly project meetings. The project meetings will be held at six monthly intervals. They will provide a spur to partners to produce work on time and an opportunity to assess progress and, if necessary, to change plans in the light of lessons learned.. The expected results are summarized below: page 32 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
Expected outcome or Event month For discussion decision Work plan for project Technical annex - tasks Kick-off meeting 1 Detailed work plan for first six Lay-out partners’ duties months Literature review submitted Modification of overall Progress report on WP-2 (data coll.) workplan Progress report on WP-3 (theory) Detailed work-plan for next 6 meeting 2 7 Progress report on WP-4 (d. harm.) months Progress report on WP-6 (software) Agreement on data standards Partners duties and tasks and harmonization
Theory report submitted Modification of overall work- Data collect. report submitted plan Data harmonization report subm. Agreement on estimation meeting 3 13 Report on WP-6 (software) strategy Strategy for functional estimation Detailed work plan for next 6 Partners duties and tasks months Report on WP-5 (Estimation) Modifications to work Report on WP-6 (Software) programme in light of input mid-term meeting Delivery, testing and demonstration from authorities and industry in presence of 19 running of prototype software. Agreement about final authorities and Discussion of program application software capabilities industry Strategy for model calibration (WP-7) Agreement on questions for Strategy for simulations WP-8 simulations Agreement on scenarios to be meeting 5 Report on WP-7 (Model calibr.) run 23 (Small scale) Progress on WP-8 (Simulations) Modifications of simulations and questions Report on WP-8 (Simulations) Agreement on lessons learned Discussion of conclusions & lessons meeting 6 28 Agreement on Report on WP-9 (Conclusions) recommendations Guidelines for WP-9 (Conclusions presentation of results to Dissemination of software to 30 final project presentation authorities and other users industry
7.2 PROGRESS REPORTS After 12 months an “interim activity report” giving project status and progress overview; After 18 months a) a periodic activity report containing an overview of the activities carried out by the consortium during that period, a description of progress toward the objectives of the project, a description of progress towards the milestones and deliverables foreseen, the COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 33
identification of the problems encountered and corrective action taken. An updated plan for using and disseminating the knowledge shall be included as aseparate part of this report; b) a periodic management report on that period including: i. a justification of the resources deployed by each contractor, linking them to activities implemented and justifying their necessity; ii. the Form C Financial statement set out in Annex VI, provided by each contractor for that period; iii. a summary financial report consolidating the claimed costs of all the contractors in an aggregate form, based on the information provided in Form C. c) c) a report on the distribution between contractors made during that period of the Community financial contribution
7.3 PLANNING AND TIMETABLE The timing of the work packages is as follows: page 34 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
7.4 GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION OF WORK PACKAGES Empirical work Analytical work - Case studies -
WP-1 WP-2 Literature review Basic concepts Data collection
WP-4 WP-3 Data harmonization Theoretical modelling Definitions, Conceptual system feedbacks & adjustments WP-5 Estimation of theoretical relationships WP-6 Feedback & Software development WP-7 Computer model cross-checks Application of computer model to specific fisheries - Calibration and testing -
WP-8 Simulations Answering questions
WP-9 Conclusions/generalizations/lessons Report COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 35
7.5 LIST OF WORK PACKAGES
Work-package Lead Person- End No3 Workpackage title contractor Start month6 Deliverable No8 months5 month7 No4
1 literature review NHH 3 1 3 D1 2 data collection CEDEM 38 1 12 D2 3 theoretical modelling IoES 12 2 10 D3 4 data harmonisation JRC 15 6 14 D4 5 estimation of theoretical relationships AZTI 24 13 18 D5 6 software development CEFAS 13 2 30 D6 7 calibration of computer model IC 33 18 21 D7 8 simulations IREPA 28 21 26 D8 9 conclusions-lessons JRC 3 27 29 D9 10 project management and coordination IoES 6 1 30 D10
TOTAL 176
3 Workpackage number: WP 1 – WP n. 4 Number of the contractor leading the work in this workpackage. 5 The total number of person-months allocated to each workpackage. 6 Relative start date for the work in the specific workpackages, month 0 marking the start of the project, and all other start dates being relative to this start date. 7 Relative end date, month 0 marking the start of the project, and all ends dates being relative to this start date. 8 Deliverable number: Number for the deliverable(s)/result(s) mentioned in the workpackage: D1-Dn. page 36 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
7.5.1 Deliverables
Deliverable Delivery Dissemination Deliverable title Nature11 No9 date10 level12 D15 Web-site 0 O PU D1 Literature review 3 R PU Description of fisheries in project, their management, D2 12 R PU enforcement and enforcement costs D10 Interim activity report 12 R PU D4 On-line database of project data 16 P PP D3 Fisheries enforcement: Basic theory and how to apply it 18 R PU D11 Periodic activity report 18 R PU D12 Periodic management report 18 R PU D13 newsletter 18 O PU A report outlining for each fishery the compliance, the D7 private benefit and the enforcement cost in the past for 21 R PU the fisheries of this project. D5 Theoretical enforcement relationships 24 R PU An extensive report describing (i) the empirical D8 enforcement model, (ii) the simulation outcomes and 27 R PU (iii) answers to particular questions for each fishery. Software package to evaluate costs and benefit of D6 30 P PU enforcement D9 Final report; conclusions and recommendations 30 R PU D14 Policy Implementation Plan 30 R PU
9 Deliverable numbers in order of delivery dates: D1 – Dn 10 Month in which the deliverables will be available. Month 0 marking the start of the project, and all delivery dates being relative to this start date. 11 Please indicate the nature of the deliverable using one of the following codes: R = Report P = Prototype D = Demonstrator O = Other 12 Please indicate the dissemination level using one of the following codes: PU = Public PP = Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services). RE = Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission Services). CO = Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services). COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 37
7.6 DESCRIPTION OF WORKPACKAGES
WP1 LITERATURE REVIEW WP number 1 start date or starting Month 1 event: work package title literature review Participant id NHH CEDEM IC Total Person-months per 2 1 1 3 participant:
Objectives: 1. Produce a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature on fisheries enforcement 2. Provide a critical review of this literature
Description of Work
The relevant literature, both published and unpublished (working papers, reports etc.) will be collected. This literature will be reviewed and critically examined with for the purposes of:
(i) Identifying useful material for this project (ii) Identifying theoretical gaps (iii) Identifying empirical data gaps (iv) Locating the current project within the current state of knowledge.
The literature study will focus particularly on studies that have assessed the effectiveness, benefit or cost of enforcement rather than on data collection which is dealt with in work package 2.
Deliverables: D1 Fisheries Enforcement. What do we know? This report will contain an exhaustive bibliography and a critical review of the type discussed above.
Milestones and expected results D1. Month 3 An exhaustive bibliography and a critical review of the state of knowledge about fisheries enforcement. page 38 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
WP2 DATA COLLECTION COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 39
WP number 2 Start date or starting Month 1 event: work package title Data collection Participant id JRC IS AZTI3 CEDEM IREPA USD FOI NHH LEI CEFAS CEMAR Total Person-months per 1 3 5 10 3 2 3 3 3 1 3 38 participant:
Objectives 1. Provide a general description of the fisheries, their fisheries management systems, their fisheries enforcement systems and the costs and effectiveness of the enforcement. 2. Provide data necessary for the estimation of theoretical relationships and the construction of a practical computable enforcement model for the fishery in question
Description of Work The work will involve the following tasks :
(1) Provide a clear description of the fisheries selected for case studies (2) Provide a detailed description of their fisheries management systems and their evolution over time (3) Provide a detailed description of the enforcement system in these fisheries and their evolution over time. (4) Collect preferably numerical (cross section/time series) but, if that is not possible, qualitative data on variables crucial for estimation of theoretical relationships. This involves data necessary to estimate: (i) The private and social benefit function of fishing (bio-economic modeling data) (ii) The cost of enforcement function (enforcement costs and enforcement effort data) (iii) The probability of penalty function (enforcement effort and sanction ratios (no of sanctions over violations) (iv) The penalty schedule (this is usually specified in regulations)
The form these data could take
1. Definition of the fishery (country, region, species, ports) 2.Operation of the fishery (fleet, harvest, employment) 3.Regulations to be enforced (fishing regulations (quotas, mesh-size) , reporting requirements (logbooks, VMS) 4.Methods of enforcement (reports and checks of reports, inspection of documentation (logbooks etc), patrol vessels, air-observation, on-board observers, dock-side monitoring, paper trail method, remote sensing, etc.) 5.Cost of enforcement (per hour of flying, per dockside inspection) 6.The penalty schedule
The enforcement methods (item 4) of each regulation will be tabulated against the regulations (item 3) in terms of intensity (ie how much does each enforcement method contribute towards each regulation), cost (using item 5) and compliance (how many times do checks of VMS lead to detection of illegal entries into page 40 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
closed areas?)
Method of Enforcement Regulations 1 2 3 1 2 3
It may be that this data might be difficult to allocate on a fishery basis. In this case values for the entire country will be obtained. JRC will collect those relevant data that have been collected by the Commission that are publicly available.
Deliverables: 1. D2: Description of fisheries enforcement and enforcement costs in selected fisheries. This report will provide the basic description of the case study fisheries discussed above with discussions, interpretations and tabulated data.
Milestones and expected results: 1. D2. Month 12 a thorough description of enforcement and enforcement costs and benefits in selected fisheries COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 41
WP3 THEORETICAL MODELLING page 42 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
WP number 3 Start date or starting Month 2 event: work package title Theoretical modeling: Conceptual system Participant id IoES FOI NHH IC Total Person-months per 6 1 3 1 11 participant:
Objectives To develop theoretically consistent and empirically applicable model of fishery enforcement that is capable of:
- Explaining the principles of enforcement and compliance behaviour in general terms - Answering the research questions of this project - Serving as a framework for the empirical case studies - Serving as a blueprint for the software development
Description of Work This work-package is concerned with developing the fisheries enforcement model that will serve as a framework for (i) the empirical case studies and (ii) the software development. In this work-package the basic elements of the enforcement theory outlined in B.1 and especially B.6 will be further developed incorporating theoretical insights and constructs from the literature review (WP-1) as well as new theoretical elements emerging within the project itself. The basic elements of fisheries enforcement theory;
The private benefit function (including management tools) The fish stock evolution function (including management tools) The probability of penalty function The penalty schedule function The cost of enforcement function
will be thoroughly investigated (and possibly complemented with additional functions) with the aim of further specifying their properties of form, and the relationship between them clarified. Special attention will be paid to the problem of multidimensionality which stems from the presence of several management tools (and, therefore, several management restrictions and penalty schedules) and several enforcement tools. Under these conditions it is by no means easy to allocate costs to the enforcement of particular management measures. This is essentially a case of joint production and it may not even be possible to allocate the costs in a consistent manner. Special attention will also be paid to the stochastic formulation of the model, where random variables are most likely to appear, in what form and their underlying stochastic process. This material will be combined in a formulation of the theory that can both serve as a framework for (i) the empirical case study work and (ii) the software development work. This implies a number of things. The model has to be set out in a clear and intuitive manner with the relationship between functions, variables and measures clearly defined. The model has to be expressed in COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 43
concise mathematical terms. Explicit forms (or at least a set a suggestion of allowable forms) of the functions must be provided. Parameters to be estimated must be specified. Functional forms for econometric estimation with the appropriate stochastic structure of error terms must be specified. Logical input output structure and flow of calculations must be clearly laid-out. This WP will also attempt to utilize theory to suggest ways to obtain empirical estimates of certain key variables and the theoretical constructs such as the level of violations (as compared to detected violations), the perceived probability of having to pay a penalty and how to allocate enforcement effort and costs to specific management measures. The theory will be developed by IoES and NHH. IC will provide support for stochastic aspects of the modeling and FOI will provide an independent view during the review meetings. Initial ideas will be developed at a brainstorming meeting in month 4. A mid-term meeting at month 9 will assess progress and ensure that the data needs of the planned model can be met from those collected for the fisheries of this project and that the objectives of the project will be satisfied by the planned outputs.
Deliverables D3. Fisheries enforcement: Basic theory and how to apply it Publishable papers
Milestones and expected results D3 completed. Month 10 This report will set out all the basic elements of fisheries enforcement theory and how to apply it in practical situations.
It is expected that this work will result in a significant advance in the current theory of fisheries enforcement and consequently fisheries management in a wider sense. page 44 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
WP4 DATA HARMONISATION COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 45
WP number 4 4 Start date or starting event: Month 6 work package title Data collection Participant id JRC IoES AZTI CEDEM IREPA USD FOI NHH LEI CEFAS CEMARE Total Person-months per 5 1 2 3 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 15 participant:
Objectives (1) Develop a standard data description applicable to all fisheries (2) Provide data necessary for the estimation of theoretical relationships and the construction of a practical computable enforcement model for the fishery in question (3) Provide a project database containing data
Description of Work The data collected in the project will be structured so as to provide a common language of enforcement and facilitate the use of common models and common software. In particular we will try to classify management measures into:
1. Output restrictions (quotas) 2. Input restrictions (effort, days at sea) 3. Efficiency restrictions (restrictions on catch per unit effort through closed areas, gear, engine size, mesh-size)
We will put a great deal of effort into compiling a list of enforcement tools such as:
1. On-board observers 2. Patrol vessels 3. Remote sensing 4. Dockside monitoring 5. Electronic log-book entry and monitoring etc. and their association with costs and efficacy in generating compliance.
Common measures for enforcement intensity along different enforcement tools could be:
1. Number and hours of observers 2. Hours flying per area of EEZs 3. Number of patrol boats per number of fishing vessels and area. 4. Remote sensing coverage (in terms of boats and data) 5. Extensiveness of dockside monitoring (e.g. 50% of landings etc.) 6. The coverage of log-books and their examination.
The work will take as input the data collected in work package 2. A first proposal for a data description will be prepared by JRC and suggested to the partners at the second progress meeting in month 12. page 46 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
Deliverables: D4 The collected data in an accessible on-line data-base kept at JRC.
Milestones and expected results: 1. Month 12. D4 completed. Operational data base at JRC COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 47
WP5 ESTIMATION OF THEORETICAL RELATIONSHIPS page 48 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
WP number 5 Start date or starting Month 13 event: work package title Estimation of theoretical relationships Participant id IoES AZTI CEDEM IREPA USD FOI NHH LEI CEMARE Total Person-months per 3 3 8 3 2 1 3 3 3 24 participant:
Objectives 1. To estimate the basic relationships in the theoretical enforcement model for use in the computer model
Description of Work The following relationships need to be estimated: (1) A fisheries benefit function. This is basically a standard bioeconomic model involving a fisheries profit function and a fish stock growth function (this can be a biomass model or an age-structured relationship) and the link between the two. Note that starting from scratch, it is generally a substantial amount of work to construct this kind of a bio-economic model. However, in the case studies selected either this kind of a model already exists (and only needs to be updated) or considerable amount of groundwork has already been conducted. (2) A fisheries enforcement cost function. This function simply relates enforcement effort (along its various dimensions) to costs of enforcement. To estimate this function properly requires data on enforcement costs and enforcement effort. This should be provided in WP-4. (3) A probability of penalty function This function relates enforcement effort to the probability that a violation will entail a sanction. To estimate this function properly requires data on enforcement effort and the above probability of sanctions if a violation occurs. These latter data, while of course fundamental, are difficult to obtain. A major task of this project (WP-3 and WP-4) is to discover ways to obtain measures of this kind. In the absence of good numerical measures approximations to this function, based on qualitative and technical data will have to be employed.
The functions should use the standard descriptions of data developed in work package 4 and the project software developed in work package 6.
Deliverables D5. Estimates of theoretical enforcement relationships. This will contain 1. one section for each fishery studied. 2. comparison of results for different fisheries trying to explain why enforcement efficiency is different on the basis of the characteristics of each fishery.
Milestones and expected results Report D5 delivered. Month 18 COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 49 page 50 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
WP6 SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 51
WP number 6 Start date or starting Month 2 event: work package title Software development Participant id CEFAS AZTI JRC IC Total Person-months per 7 2 3 3 13 participant:
Objectives Develop and maintain a common software for the partnership that can:
1. Numerically describe fishers’ responses to (i) alternative enforcement regimes and (ii) changes in enforcement intensity. 2. Evaluate the potential consequences of alternative enforcement regimes combined with other fisheries management methods currently applied in European fisheries 3. Be used afterwards for other fisheries
Description of Work
Design phase (months 1-6) At the kick-off meeting the general requirements for the software will be discussed and decided on. Soon thereafter, the partners involved in this work-package will meet to:
1. Formalize arrangements for project partners to learn, apply and modify the FLR software platform as needed in its application to case studies and evaluation of alternative enforcement, compliance monitoring and fishery management regimes. 2. Initiate further development of the FLR software environment to incorporate generic modules for enforcement and compliance monitoring activities and costs,
The FLR software package will be applied. Because it is written in R, an open-source statistical package, it. a. can be accessed by all partners of project without need to buy external software packages b. has available pre-programmed utilities for mathematical and statistical operations c. can provide easy input-output processing including links to the project database. d. has been developed to facilitate estimation of parameters in biological, bio-economic and economic models commonly used in fisheries. e. has been developed to facilitate simulation evaluations of fisheries management options in European fisheries. Using it would allow the partners to benefit from work done in other projects. FLR provides the bio- economic software for the EU projects FEMS, COMMIT and EFIMAS. Based on these considerations, a basic system design layout will be prepared outlining the general expected system layout for the evaluations required in this project. This will be presented to the rest of the partnership at the second project meeting (month 7).
Implementation phase (months 10-24) The theoretical modeling work package (WP-3) and the harmonized data work package (WP-4) will begin to page 52 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
produce insights and data by month 8. The partners involved in software development can then begin implementing the software. At the scheduled project meeting in month 13, a progress report and a rudimentary prototype of the software should be available for discussion and criticism. An operational prototype must be ready by month 19 for the ‘mid-term’ meeting in time for the partners to begin testing. From then on, improved versions should be delivered with steadily increasing capability for
1. calculating theoretical relationships (private benefit, enforcement cost, penalty probability 2. simulating the behaviour of a fishery under current management rules 3. testing management options
Maintenance phase (months 24-30) Once the software begins to be used by the partners, new requirements and errors will inevitably be discovered. The project will continue to maintain the software till the end of the project. On-line documentation and help-facility will be set-up.
Project Team CEFAS will have overall responsibility for the software and architecture. IC will be responsible for the modules for calculating the new functions – penalty probability, enfocement cost etc AZI will be responsible for developing interfaces between FLR and relation SQL databases JRC will be responsible for developing and testing solutions to promote the use by less experienced users – including a web-accessed version.
Deliverables D6 fully-functioning, full-documented software package able to assess the cost and benefits of enforcement. The software will be open-source and available through a dedicated internet site. milestones and expected results month 6 presentation of outline software strategy to project partners month 13 presentation of detailed software strategy to project partners month 15 delivery of software for use by partners in estimating theoretical relationships - month 18 delivery of software for use by partners in estimating compliance month 21 delivery of software for use by partners in calculating scenarios month 30 delivery of final software package COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 53
WP7 APPLICATION OF COMPUTER MODEL TO FISHERIES-CALIBRATION page 54 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
WP number 7 Start date or starting Month 18 event: work package title simulating the fishery Participant id IC JRC IoES AZTI CEDEM IREPA USD FOI NHH LEI CEFAS CEMARE Total Person-months per 4 1 3 4 7 3 2 2 3 3 1 1 33 participant:
Objective To implement the empirical description of each fishery in the case studies in the computer model generated. Develop and maintain an operational computer simulation model capable of simulating the behaviour of each fishery contained in the case studies.
Description of Work To implement any empirical description (in the form of functional relationships and quantitative values of parameters) into a theoretically-based computer model is rarely easy. This will undoubtedly be the case here too. This implementation work will probably involve both adjustments in the empirical data and functions and the software itself. Let us refer to the outcome of this as the empirical computer model. A part of the procedure is extensive testing of empirical model to avoid nonsensical outcomes which may be either the result of software glitches or empirical errors. This work, inevitably, involves a great deal of feed-back between computer software specifications and the models available to individual fisheries. It also involves much testing and most likely calibrations or tweaking of models since it is unlikely that the empirical estimates will be robust enough to produce reasonable results right away. This work will use the computer software developed in work package 5 and the data collected in work package 2. An interesting possible aspect of the calibration process, is to use the empirical computer model to generate (back-cast) compliance levels (and other endogenous variables of the model not used in the estimation process) over the data period. This could then be compared to available extraneous information about actual compliance (measurements, surveys, questionnaires, expert opinions and so on). This will on the one hand provide a test, albeit a weak one, on the appropriateness of the empirical computer model. On the other hand, this may suggest modifications or calibration of the empirical computer model. At the beginning of this work package, Imperial College (IC) will organize a hands-on training workshop to help the participants set-up the simulation model. This will allow the partners to learn best practice from each other.
Deliverables D7 a report outlining for each fishery the compliance, the private benefit and the enforcement cost in the past for the fisheries of this project.
Milestones and expected results
Month 21 1. A complete calibrated model for each of the fisheries in this project including estimates of uncertainty. COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 55
WP-8 SIMULATIONS page 56 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
WP number 8 Start date or starting Month 21 event: work package title private benefit of compliance Participant id IREPA IoES JRC AZTI CEDEM USD FOI NHH LEI CEFAS CEMARE Total Person-months per 3 3 1 4 7 2 2 3 3 1 3 34 participant:
Objectives 1. Obtain estimates of unobserved variables such as compliance and compliance/non-compliance benefits in the past. 2. Investigate the relationships between enforcement on one hand and private and social benefits from the fishery on the other 3. Answer particular questions about enforcement, compliance, fisheries benefits, stock evolution and economic and biological robustness. 4. Answer questions concerning efficient mix of enforcement instruments and their relative intensity of application
Description of Work This work package will take as a basis the calibrated models of the fisheries developed in work package 6 and vary the input parameters – management measures, management tools and enforcement intensity – in order to answer questions about the fishery. The simulations will fundamentally fall into two categories:
I. Back-casts, i.e. simulations over the data period. This includes attempting to estimate unobserved endogenous variables such as compliance in the past and attempting to “predict” what would have happened if enforcement had been carried out in a different way.
II. Simulations to provide answers to particular questions relevant to future arrangements of the fisheries management and enforcement. Examples of questions to be answered within the present management system include:
What are the costs and benefits of increased enforcement intensity on each of the management tools? What would be the cost and benefit of full compliance? What are the impacts of increased penalties for violations of fisheries rules?
The next possible set of questions concern the management system and its compliance implications. By varying the management system - for instance by changing the balance between quota and effort restrictions – the overall contribution of each management measure to compliance can be assessed. Examples of questions to be answered are:
Taking enforcement into account could a different management system have achieved more benefits at a lower cost? Are certain management systems more efficient in terms of enforcement than others?
A third possible set of questions concern an efficient mix of enforcement instruments and the intensity of their applications in particular fisheries. Note, that there is little reason for this to be identical across fisheries. An example of questions that might be answered are: COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 57
Can the same level of compliance be reached at a lower costs with a different mix of enforcement tools?
Within the project, a set of basic questions, which each case study should attempt to answer, will be formulated. Each case study will answer at least these questions.
Deliverables D8 An extensive report describing (i) the empirical enforcement model, (ii) the simulation outcomes and (iii) answers to particular questions for each fishery.
Milestones and expected results
Month 26. A set of case study reports containing the above results Month 27. A complied report containing the individual case study outcomes appropriately cross-referenced with an extensive introduction summarizing the main outcomes and their basic patten or lack thereof. page 58 COBECOS Detailed Implementation plan
WP9 CONCLUSIONS/GENERALIZATIONS WP number 9 Start date or starting Month 27 event: work package title cost of enforcement Participant id JRC NHH IC Person-months per 3 1 1 5 participant:
Objectives 1. Interpret the results of the case studies and simulations. 2. Discuss possible generalizations and how they fit with basic fisheries and enforcement theory. 3. Derive implications for EU fisheries policy: What recommendations, if any, can be made on the basis of this study.
Description of Work This work-package consists of (i) summarizing the theoretical and empirical research, (ii) relating it to pre- existing knowledge, (iii) explaining and interpreting the main results, (iv) identifying patterns in the empirical results and relating them to theory and practice, (v) discussing generalizations to other fisheries, (vi) outlining general policy implications, (vii) suggesting policy implications for the fisheries of the EU.
Deliverables: D9 A final report summarizing the work and drawing conclusions and recommendations. This will be in a form suitable for communication to national control authorities and decision-makers D14. A separate executive summary outlining he potential application of the results within policy frameworks (e.g. legislation, control, potential cost savings and economic impacts) on the time scales of short-, mid- and long-term, and the overall policy guidance conclusions. This is the Policy Implementation Plan.
Milestones and expected results Delivery of the final report, D9. It is expected that this report will contain useful suggestions for policy improvements COBECOS 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 59
WP10 PROJECT COORDINATION, MANAGEMENT AND DISSEMINATION WP number 10 Start date or starting Month 1 event: work package title project coordination, management and dissemination13 Participant id JRC IoES Total Person-months per 3 3 6 participant:
Objectives to ensure that the project meets its scientific objectives and administrative obligations
Description of Work 1) Global management of project 2) editing the progress reports 3) setting up and maintaining a Web site 4) setting up an intranet site and bulletin board for communication between project partners 5) collecting project funding from Commission and distributing to partners Tasks 2 to 4 will be done by JRC, tasks 1 and 5 by IoES
Deliverables progress reports as specified in contract
D11, Periodic activity report D12, Periodic management report D13 a 2-4 page newsletter, leaflet or flyer carrying general information about the project (EU participants, industry, scientific meetings) D15 the web site milestones and expected results a progress meeting every six months the mid-term meeting where a periodic management report and a periodic activity report will be delivered The expected result is a project where communication between partners and to outside stakeholders are good and where the project timetable is maintained
13 See also section 6.1 Project management 8 PROJECT RESOURCES AND BUDGET OVERVIEW
8.1 EFFORTS FOR THE FULL DURATION OF THE PROJECT The effort devoted to this project is summarized in Table 8-2. Approximately 78% of the effort is devoted to work packages 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 which are those directly related to the case studies listed in Table 7-1. Having fewer case studies would have made the project cheaper but the conclusions would have then been less robust.
Table 8-2 person months breakdown by partner and work package
MONTHS IoES JRC AZTI CEDEM IREPA USD FOI NHH LEI CEFAS CEMARE IC Total 1 Literature 0.8 1.7 0.8 3.3 2 Data collection 3.3 0.8 5.0 10.0 3.3 1.7 2.5 3.3 3.3 0.8 3.3 0.0 37.6 3 Theory 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 11.0 4 Data harmonisation 0.8 5.0 1.7 2.5 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.0 15.1 5 Estimation of functions 2.5 0.0 2.5 6.7 2.5 1.7 0.8 2.5 2.5 0.0 2.5 0.0 24.3 6 Software 0.0 2.5 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.0 2.5 13.4 7 calibration 3.3 0.8 3.3 6.7 3.3 1.7 1.7 3.3 3.3 0.8 0.8 4.0 33.3 8 Simulations 2.5 0.8 4.2 6.7 2.5 1.7 1.7 2.5 2.5 0.8 2.5 0.0 28.4 9 Conclusions 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 5.0 TOTAL RESEARCH 19.0 13.4 18.4 33.5 12.5 7.5 7.5 18.4 12.5 10.0 10.0 8.4 172.4
10 coordination 2.5 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9 TOTAL MANAGEMENT 2.5 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9 Total 21.7 16.7 18.4 33.5 12.5 7.5 7.5 18.4 12.5 10.0 10.0 8.4 176.5 COBECOS Costs and Benefits of Compliance - 7 Detailed Implementation plan page 61
8.2 OVERALL BUDGET FOR THE FULL DURATION OF THE PROJECT The project resources are summarized in Table 8-3
Table 8-3 Project Resources (€) page 62 COBECOS project resources and budget overview
8.3 MANAGEMENT LEVEL DESCRIPTION OF RESOURCES AND BUDGET Six of the team use an additional cost model. Each would expect to use approximately six weeks per year of their own resources on the project. This is a total of about 2 years work over the lifetime of the project and would amount to €250000 additional resources to the project bringing the total value to just over €2 million.. The subcontract with MRAG will be a fixed cost against deliverables but it is estimated that their costs will be €65000 for labour and €5000 for travel. Similarly Agrocampus Rennes will have a fixed price contract of which approximately €18000 is labour costs and €2000 is travel 9 OTHER ISSUES
9.1 ETHICAL AND GENDER ISSUES
9.1.1 Ethics There are no ethical barriers to undertaking this research project) other than the usual ones applying to scientists. The project partners agree to search for the truth and not make misleading claims. They agree to maintain promises made to stakeholders concerning confidentiality of data.
Table 9-4 sensitive ethical questions related to proposed research in COBECOS
SUBJECT ETHICAL ISSUES Human beings None Human biological samples None Personal data (whether identified by None name or not) Genetic information None Animals none
The research does NOT involve a research activity
1) aimed at human cloning for reproductive purposes, 2) intended to modify the genetic heritage of human beings which could make such changes heritable 3) intended to create human embryos solely for the purpose of research or for the purpose of stem cell procurement, including by means of somatic cell nuclear transfer.
9.1.2 Gender A recent study commissioned by DG-FISH14 concluded that an insignificant number of women are engaged in seagoing capture fishing but that this was not due to any discrimination but rather a lack of interest from the women. There are of course a significant number of women engaged in fisheries research, including partners of this project. According to the “guide to proposers” for this project.
“ Ensuring gender equality means giving equal consideration to the life patterns, needs and interests of both women and men. Gender mainstreaming thus includes also changing the working culture.”
It is firm intention of the partners of COBECOS to bear this in mind when planning joint activities.
14 MacAlister Elliott and Partners Ltd (2002) The Role of Women in Fisheries” page 64 COBECOS Other issues
9.2 OTHER EC-POLICY ISSUES The project partners will endeavour to make the results of their research as accessible as possible in order to engage the wider community. This will be done through the project web-page and a final report which will be specifically written to be accessible to authorities and the wider public.