From Chicago EEOC AJ S Summary Judgment Decision , April 12, 2012
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
From Chicago EEOC AJ’s Summary Judgment Decision, April 12, 2012 Applicable Law [Re: Title VII Burden of Proof, Reprisal, Disability, Reasonable Accommodation, Summary Judgment]
Title VII Burden of Proof. To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). She must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waiers, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978), The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with in cases where the Agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13, 1997); Pavelka v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (Dec. 14, 1995).
Reprisal. A Complainant can establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination. Hudson v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120093843 (June 6, 2011); Shapiro v. Social Security Admin., EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Specifically, in a reprisal claim, and in accordance with the burdens set forth in McDonnell Douglas, Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976), Hudson v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120093843 (June 6, 2011); Coffman v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473 (Nov. 20, 1997), a complainant may establish a prima facie case of reprisal by showing that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the agency was aware of the protected activity; (3) subsequently, he was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment. Hudson v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120093843 (June 6, 2011); McMillen v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120072556 (Feb. 26, 2009); Whitmire v. Dep't of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No, 01A00340 (Sept. 25, 2000).
An initial inference of retaliation arises where there is proof that the protected activity and the adverse action were related. EEOC Compliance Manual Section 8: “Retaliation,” No. 915.003, at 8-18 (May 20, 1998). Typically, the link is demonstrated by evidence that: (1) the adverse action occurred shortly after the protected activity, and (2) the person who undertook the adverse action was aware of the complainant's protected activity before taking the action. Id. But it is important to emphasize that it is causation, not temporal proximity itself, that is an element of Complainant's prima facie case. Kachmar v. Sunguard Data Systems, 9 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1997); Pereira v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120093818 (July 27, 2011). Temporal proximity merely provides an evidentiary basis from which an inference can be drawn. Id. The element of causation, which necessarily involves an inquiry into the motives of an employer, is highly context-specific. Id.
Disability: In analyzing a disparate treatment claim under the Rehabilitation Act, where the Agency denies that its decisions were motivated by Complainant’s disability and there is no direct evidence of discrimination, the burden-shifting method of proof is applied, as set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, , 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Heyman v. Queens Village Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Cmty Adolescent Program , 198 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1999); Swanks v. WMATA , 179 F.3d 929, 933-34 (D.C.Cir. 1999). Under this analysis, in order to establish a prima facie case, Complainant must demonstrate that: (1) he is an “individual with a disability”; (2) he is “qualified” for the position held or desired; (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances surrounding the adverse action give rise to an inference of discrimination. Lawson v. CSX Transp. Inc ., 245 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2001) . The burden of production then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, non- discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. In order to satisfy his burden of proof, Complainant must then demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency's proffered reason is a pretext for disability discrimination. Id. Timothy Hudson v. Postmaster General, EEOC Appeal No. 0120091830 (February 04, 2011)
To be entitled to protection under the Rehabilitation Act, Complainant must show that she was a “qualified individual with a disability.” A “qualified individual with a disability” is an individual with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions. Harden v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Appeal No. 0720080002 (August 12, 2011)
Reasonable Accommodation: Under the Commission's regulations, an Agency is required to make reasonable accommodation to the known physical and mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability unless the agency can show that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9. Reasonable accommodation includes modifications to the manner in which a position is customarily performed in order to enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential job functions. EEOC Notice No. 915,002, Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act (October 17, 2002) (Reasonable Accommodation Guidance).
To establish a prima facie case of failure to accommodate the complainant must establish that (1) he is a “qualified individual with a disability” that who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position in question without endangering the health and safety of the himself or others and meets the experience or education requirements of the position, and (2) there are plausible reasons to believe that his disability could be accommodated. Jones v. Postmaster General, EEOC Appeal No. 05880468, (September 28, 1988). If complainant establishes a prima facie case the burden then shifts to the Agency to demonstrate that it afforded a reasonable accommodation to the complainant. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(o)(3); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. 1630.2(o), 1630.9; see also Haschmann v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 151 F.3d 591, 601, (7th Cir. 1998); Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu, 141 F.3d 667, 677, (7th Cir. 1998). If the accommodation options available to the agency would impose an undue hardship on the operations of its program then liability may be avoided. See 29 CFR 1614.203(a). See also Connally v. Frank, EEOC Appeal No. 01891352, 90 F.E.O.R. ¶ 3165 at 90-493 (Jan. 12, 1990)
Summary Judgment: EEOC regulations allow an Administrative Judge to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Ford v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01986650, (July 27, 2001). These regulations are patterned after the summary judgment procedures set forth in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56. Feitshans, v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01996239, (December 21, 2001). In considering a summary decision without a hearing, the Administrative Judge does not sit as a fact finder. The evidence of the party opposing a summary decision must be believed at the summary decision stage and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in his or her favor. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate. Anderson v. Liberty Loby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp., v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
To successfully oppose a summary decision, the party opposing summary decision must identify the disputed facts in the record with specificity or demonstrate that a dispute exists by producing admissible evidence warranting a hearing. Celotex Corp., id. A disputed issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder, could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex, at 322-23. A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. Williams v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01984932 (July 10, 2001).